CD
945
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
In the Matter of
J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING
BEFORE
PERSONNEL SECURITY
BOARD
Washington, D. C.
April 12, 1954, through May 6, 1954
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1954
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER OF J. EGBERT
ATOMIC EXERGY COMMISSION,
BUILDING T-o, ROOM: 2022,
Washington, D. C., April 12, 1954.
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the board,
pursuant to notice, at 10 a. m.
Personnel Security Board : Dr. Gordon Gray, chairman ; Dr. Ward
V. Evans, member ; and Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Roger Robb and C. A. Ro]ander, Jr., counsel for the
board; J. Robert Oppenheimer, Lloyd K. Garrison, Samuel J. Silver-
man, and Allen B. Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D. C. - Price $2.75
(D
PROCEEDINGS
Dr. GRAY. I should like at this time to have the reporters sworn. For the
information of Dr. Oppenheimer and his counsel, the reporter is Anton Papich,
Jr., the transcriber Kenneth V. Bowers.
(The reporter and transcriber were thereupon duly sworn by Dr. Gray.)
Dr. GRAY. The hearing will come to order.
This board, appointed by Mr. K. D. Nichols, General Manager of the Atomic
Energy Commission, at the request of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, is composed
of the following members : Gordon Gray, chairman, Ward V. Evans and Thomas
A. Morgan. All members of the board are present, and board counsels Roger
Robb and C. A. Rolander. Dr. and Mrs. Oppenheimer are present. Present
also are Mr. Lloyd K. Garrison, counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer. Would you
identify your associates?
Mr. GARRISON. Samuel J. Silverman, my partner, and Allen B. Ecker, as-
sociate of my firm.
Dr. GRAY. An investigation of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer conducted under
the provisions of section 10 (b) (5) (B) (i-iii) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946
has revealed certain information which casts doubt upon the eligibility of
Dr. Oppenheimer for clearance for access to restricted data as provided by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946. This information is as follows :
This is a letter addressed to Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer, the Institute for Advanced
Study, Princeton, N. J., dated December 23, 1953, reading as follows :
"DEAR Dr. OPPENHEIMER: Section 10 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 places
upon the Atomic Energy Commission the responsibility for assuring that indi-
viduals are employed by the Commission only when such employment will not
endanger the common defense and security. In addition, Executive Order 10450
of April 27, 1953, requires the suspension of employment of any individual
where there exists information indicating that his employment may not be
clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.
"As a result of additional investigation as to your character, associations, and
loyalty, and review of your personnel security file in the light of the require-
ments of the Atomic Energy Act and the requirements of Executive Order
10450, there has developed considerable question whether your continued em-
ployment on Atomic Energy Commission work will endanger the common defense
and security and whether such continued employment is clearly consistent with
the interests of the national security. This letter is to advise you of the steps
which you may take to assist in the resolution of this question.
"The substance of the information which raises the question concerning
your eligibility for employment on Atomic Energy Commission work is as
follows:"
Let the record show at this point that Mr. Garrison asked to be excused for a
few minutes.
"It was reported that in 1940 you were listed as a sponsor of the Friends of
the Chinese People, an organization which was characterized in 1944 by the
House Committee on Un-American Activities as a Communist-front organiza-
tion. It was further reported that in 1940 your name was included on a letter-
heard of the American Committee for Democratic and Intellectual Freedom
as a member of its national executive committee. The American Committee
for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom was characterized in 1942 by the
House Committee on Un-American Activities as a Communist front which
defended Communist teachers, and in 1943 it was characterized as subversive
and un-American by a special subcommittee of the House Committee on Appro-
priations. It was further reported that in 1938 you were a member of the
Western Council of the Consumers Union. The Consumers Union was cited
in 1944 by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as a Communist-
front headed by the Communist Arthur Kallet. It was further reported that you
stated in 1943 that you were not a Communist, but had probably belonged to
every Communist front organization on the west coast and had signed many
petitions in which Communists were interested.
(8)
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"It was reported that in 1943 and previously you were Intimately associated
with Dr. Jean Tatlock, a member of the Communist Party in San Francisco, and
that Dr. Tatlock was partially responsible for your association with Communist-
front groups.
"It was reported that your wife, Katherine Pnening Oppenheimer, was for-
merly the wife of Joseph Dallet, a member of the Communist Party, who was
killed in Spain in 1937 fighting for the Spanish Republican Army. It was
further reported that during the period of her association with Joseph Dallet,
your wife became a member of the Communist Party. The Communist Party
has been designated by the Attorney General as a subversive organization which
seeks to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional
means, within the purview of Executive Order 9835 and Executive Order 10450.
'•It was reported that your brother, Frank Friedman Oppenheimer, became a
member of the Communist Party in 1936 and has served as a party organizer
and as educational director of the professional section of the Communist Party
in Los Angeles County. It was further reported that your brother's wife, Jackie
Oppenheimer, was a member of the Communist Party in 1938 ; and that in August
1944, Jackie Oppenheimer assisted in the organization of the Bast Bay branch
of the California Labor School. It was further reported that in 1945 Frank
and Jackie Oppenheimer were invited to an informal reception at the Russian
consulate, that this invitation was extended by the American-Russian Institute
of San Francisco and was for the purpose of introducing famous American
scientists to Russian scientists who were delegates to the United Nations Confer-
ence on International Organization being held at San Francisco at that time, and
that Frank Oppenheimer accepted this invitation. It was further reported that
Frank Oppenheimer agreed to give a 6 weeks course on The Social Implications
of Modern Scientific Development at the California Labor School, beginning
May 9, 1946. The American-Russian Institute of San Francisco and the California
Labor School have been cited by the Attorney General as Communist organiza-
tions within the purview of Executive Order 9835 and Executive Order 10450.
"It was reported that you have associated with members and officials of the
Communist Party including Isaac Folkoff, Steve Nelson, Rudy Lambert, Kenneth
May, Jack Manley, and Thomas Addis.
"It was reported that you were a subscriber to the Daily People's World, a
west coast Communist newspaper, in 1941 and 1942.
"It was reported in 1950 that you stated to an agent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that you had in the past made contributions to Communist-front
organizations, although at the time you did not know of Communist Party
control or extent of infiltration of these groups. You further stated to an agent
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that some of these contributions were
made through Isaac Folkoff, whom you knew to be a leading Communist Party
functionary, because you had been told that this was the most effective and
direct way of helping these groups.
"It was reported that you attended a housewarming party at the home of
Kenneth and Ruth May on September 20, 1941, for which there was an admission
charge for the benefit of The People's World, and that at this party you were in
the company of Joseph W. Weinberg and Clarence Hiskey, who were alleged to
be members of the Communist Party and to have engaged in espionage on behalf
of the Soviet Union. It was further reported that you informed officials of the
United States Department of Justice in 1952 that you had no recollection that
you had attended such a party, but that since it would have been in character
for you to have attended such a party, you would not deny that you were there.
"It was reported that you attended a closed meeting of the professional section
of the Communist Party of Alameda County, Calif., which was held in the
latter part of July or early August 1941, at your residence, 10 Kenilworth Court,
Berkeley, Calif., for the purpose of hearing an explanation of a change in Com-
munist Party policy. It was reported that you denied that you attended such
a meeting and that such a meeting was held in your home.
"It was reported that you stated to an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation in 1950, that you attended a meeting in 1940 or 1941, which may have
taken place at the home of Haakon Chevalier, which was addressed by William
Schneiderman, whom you knew to be a leading functionary of the Communist
Party. In testimony in 1950 before the California State Senate Committee on
Un-American Activities, Haakon Chevalier was identified as a member of the
Communist Party in the San Francisco area in the early 1940's."
Let the record show that Mr. Garrison has returned to the hearing room.
"It was reported that you have consistently denied that you have ever been a
member of the Communist Party. It was further reported that you stated to a
5
representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1946 that you had a
change of mind regarding the policies and politics of the Soviet Union about the
time of the signing of the Soviet-German Pact in 1939. It was further reported
that during 1950 you stated to a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation that you had never attended a closed meeting of the Communist Party ;
and that at the time of the Russo-Finnish War and the subsequent break between
Germany and Russia in 1941, you realized the Communist Party infiltration
tactics into the alleged anti-Fascist groups and became fed up with the whole
thing and lost what little interest you had. It was further reported, however,
that:
" ( a ) Prior to April 1942, you had contributed $150 per month to the Communist
Party in the San Francisco area, and that the last such payment was apparently
made in April 1942, immediately before your entry into the atomic-bomb project
"(&) During the period 1942-45 various officials of the Communist Party,
including Dr. Hannah Peters, organizer of the professional section of the Com-
munist Party, Alameda County, Calif., Bernadette Doyle, secretary of the
Alameda County Communist Party, Steve Kelson, David Adelson, Paul Pinsky,
Jack Manley, and Katrina Sandow, are reported to have made statements indi-
cating that you were then a member of the Communist Party ; that you could
not be active in the party at that time ; that your name should be removed from
the party mailing list and not mentioned in any way ; that you had talked the
atomic-bomb question over with party members during this period; and that
several years prior to 1945 you had told Steve Nelson that the Army was working
on an atomic bomb.
"(c) You stated in August of 1943 that you did not want anybody working
for you on the project who was a member of the Communist Party, since 'one
always had a question of divided loyalty" and the discipline of the Communist
Party was very severe and not compatible with complete loyalty to the project.
You further stated at that time that you were referring only to present member-
ship in the Communist Party and not to people who had been members of the
party. You stated further that you knew several individuals then at Los
Alamos who had been members of the Communist Party. You did not, however,
identify such former members of the Communist Party to the appropriate
authorities. It was also reported that during the period 1942-45 you were
responsible for the employment on the atom-bomb project of individuals who
were members of the Communist Party or closely associated with activities of
the Communist Party, including Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz, Joseph W. Weinberg,
David Bohm, Max Bernard Friedman, and David Hawkins. In the case of
Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz, you urged him to work on the project, although you
stated that you knew he had been very much of a Red when he first came to the
University of California and that you emphasized to him that he must forego
all political activity if he came to the project. In August 1943, you protested
against the termination of his deferment and requested that he be returned to
the project after his entry into the military service.
"It was reported that you stated to representatives of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation on September 5, 1946, that you had attended a meeting in the
Kast Bay and a meeting in San Francisco at which there were present persons
definitely identified with the Communist Party. When asked the purpose of
the East Bay meeting and the identity of those in attendance, you declined to
answer on the ground that this had no bearing on the matter of interest being
discussed.
"It was reported that you attended a meeting at the home of Frank Oppen-
helmer on January 1, 1946, with David Adelson and Paul Pinsky, both of whom
were members of the Communist Party. It was further reported that you ana-
lyzed some material which Pinsky hoped to take up with the legislative conven-
tion in Sacramento, Calif.
"It was reported in 1946 that you were listed as vice chairman on the letter-
head of the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Profes-
sions, Inc., which has been cited as a Communist front by the House Committee
on Un-American Activities.
"It was reported that prior to March 1, 1943, possibly 3 months prior, Peter
Ivanov, secretary of the Soviet consulate, San Francisco, approached George
Charles Eltenton for the purpose of obtaining information regarding work being
done at the Radiation Laboratory for the use of Soviet scientists ; that George
Charles Eltenton subsequently requested Haakon Chevalier to approach you
concerning this matter ; that Haakon Chevalier thereupon approached you, either
directly or through your brother, Frank Friedman Oppenheimer, in connection
with this matter; and that Haakon Chevalier finally advised George Charles
6
Hltenton that there was no chance whatsoever of obtaining the information. It
was further reported that you did not report this episode to the appropriate
authorities until several months after its occurrence; that when you initially
discussed this matter with the appropriate authorities on August 26, 1943, you
did not identify yourself as the person who had been approached, and you
refused to identify Haakon Chevalier as the individual who made the approach
on behalf of George Charles Bltenton ; and that it was not until several months
later, when you were ordered by a superior to do so, that you so identified
Haakon Chevalier. It was further reported that upon your return to Berkeley
following your separation from the Los Alamos project, you were visited by the
Chevaliers on several occasions; and that your wife was in contact with
Haakon 'and Barbara Chevalier in 1946 and 1947.
"It was reported that in 1945 you expressed the view that 'there is a reason-
able possibility that it (the hydrogen bomb) can be made,' but that the feasibility
of the hydrogen bomb did not appear, on theoretical grounds, as certain as the
fission bomb appeared certain, on theoretical grounds, when the Los Alamos
Laboratory was started ; and that in the autumn of 1949 the General Advisory
Committee expressed th.e view that 'an imaginative arid concerted attack on
the problem has a better than even chance of producing the weapon within 5
years.' It was further reported that in the autumn of 1949, and subsequently,
you strongly opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb; (1) on moral
grounds, (2) by claiming that it was not feasible, (3) by claiming that there
were insufficient facilities and scientific personnel to carry on the development,
and (4) that it was not politically desirable. It was further reported that
even after it was determined, as a matter of national policy, to proceed with
development of a hydrogen bomb, you continued to oppose the project and de-
clined to cooperate fully in the project. It was further reported that you
departed from your proper role as an adviser to the Commission by causing
the distribution separately and in private, to top personnel at Los Alamos of
the majority and minority reports of the General Advisory Committee on devel-
opment of the hydrogen bomb for the purpose of trying to turn. such top per-
sonnel against the development of the hydrogen bomb. It was further reported
that you were instrumental in persuading other outstanding scientists not to
work on the hydrogen-bomb project, and that the opposition to the hydrogen
bomb, of which you are the most experienced, most powerful, and most effective
member, has definitely slowed down its development.
"In view of your access to highly sensitive classified information, and in view
of these allegations which, until disproved, raise questions as to your veracity,
conduct and even your loyalty, the Commission has no other recourse, in dis-
charge of its obligations to protect the common defense and security, but to
suspend your clearance until the matter has been resolved. Accordingly, your
employment on Atomic Energy Energy Commission work and your eligibility
for access to restricted data are hereby suspended, effective immediately, pend-
ing final determination of this matter.
"To assist in the resolution of this matter, you have the privilege of appear-
ing before an Atomic Energy Commission personnel security board. To avail
yourself of the privileges afforded you under the Atomic Energy Commission
hearing procedures, you must, within 30 days following receipt of this letter,
submit to me, in writing, your reply to the information outlined above and
request the opportunity of appearing before the personnel security board. Should
you signify your desire to appear before the board, you will be notified of the
composition of the board and may challenge any member of it for cause. Such
challenge should be submitted within 72 hours of the receipt of notice of com-
position of the board.
"If no challenge is raised as to the members of the board, you will be notified
of the date and place of hearing at least 48 hours in advance of the date set
for hearing. You may be present for the duration of the hearing, may be
represented by counsel of your own choosing, and present evidence in your own
behalf through witnesses, or by documents, or by both.
"Should you elect to have a hearing of your case by the personnel security
board, the findings of the board, together with its recommendations regarding
your eligibility for employment on Atomic Energy Commission work, in the light
of Criteria for Determining Eligibility for Atomic Energy Commission Security
Clearance and the requirements of Executive Order 10450, will be submitted
tome.
"In the event of an adverse decision in your case by the personnel security
board, you will have an opportunity to review the record made during your
appearance before the board and to request a review of your case by the Com-
mission's personnel security review board.
"If a written response is not received from you within 30 days it will be as-
sumed that you do not wish to submit any explanation for further consideration.
In that event, or should you not advise me in writing of your desire to appear
before the personnel security board, a determination in your case will be made
by me on the basis of the existing record.
"I am enclosing herewith, for your information and guidance, copies of the
Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Atomic Energy Com-
mission Security Clearance and Executive Order 10450.
"This letter has been marked 'Confidential' to maintain the privacy of this
matter between you and the Atomic Energy Commission. You are not precluded
from making use of this letter as you may consider appropriate.
"I have instructed Mr. William Mitchell, whose address is 1901 Constitution
Avenue NW., Washington, D. C., and whose telephone number is Sterling 3-8000,
Extension 277, to give you whatever further detailed information you may desire
with respect to the procedures to be followed in this matter.
"Very truly yours,
"K D. NICHOLS, General Manayer.
"2 Enclosures. 1. Criteria and Procedures. 2. Executive Order 10150."
I think at this time, then, it would be appropriate for the record to reflect Dr.
Oppenheimer's reply of March 4, 1954. I shall now read Dr. Oppenheimer's reply.
This is a letter addressed to Maj. Gen. K. D. Nichols, General Manager, United
States Atomic Energy Commission, Washington 25, D. C.
"DEAR GENERAL NICHOLS : This is in answer to your letter of December 23, 1953,
in which the question is raised whether my continued employment as a consultant
on Atomic Energy Commission work 'will endanger the common defense and
security and whether such continued employment is clearly consistent with the
interests of the national security.'
"Though of course I would have no desire to retain an advisory position if my
advice were not needed, I cannot ignore the question you have raised, nor accept
the suggestion that I am unfit for public service.
"The items of so-called derogatory information set forth in your letter cannot
be fairly understood except in the context of my life and my work. This answer
is in the form of a summary account of relevant aspects of my life in more or
less chronological order, in the course of which I shall comment on the specific
items in your letter. Through this answer, and through the hearings before the
personnel security board, which I hereby request, I hope to provide a fair basis
upon which the questions posed by your letter may be resolved.
"THE PREWAR PERIOD
"I was born in New York in 1904. My father had come to this country at the age
of 17 from Germany. He was a successful businessman and quite active in com-
munity affairs. My mother was born in Baltimore and before her marriage was
an artist and teacher of art. I attended Ethical Culture School and Harvard
College, which I entered in 1922. I completed the work for my degree in the
spring of 1925. I then left Harvard to study at Cambridge University and In
Goettingen, where in the spring of 1927 I took my doctor's degree. The following
year I was national research fellow at Harvard and at the California Institute
of Technology. In the following year I was fellow of the international education
board at the University of Leiden and at the Technical High School in Zurich.
"In the spring of 1929, I returned to the United States. I was homesick for
this country, and in fact I did not leave it again for 19 years. I had learned a j
great deal in my student days about the new physics ; I wanted to pursue this
myself, to explain it and to foster its cultivation. I had had many invitations to
university positions, 1 or 2 in Europe, and perhaps 10 in the United States. I
accepted concurrent appointments as assistant professor at the California Insti-
tute of Technology in Pasadena and at the University of California in Berkeley.
For the coming 12 years, I was to devote my time to these 2 faculties.
"Starting with a single graduate student in my first year in Berkely, we grad-
ually began to build up what was to become the largest school in the country of
graduate and postdoctoral study in theoretical physics, so that as time went on,
we came to have between a dozen and 20 people learning and adding to quantum
theory, nuclear physics, relativity and other modern physics. As the number of
students increased, so in general did their quality ; the men who worked with me
6
during those years hold chairs in many of the great centers of physics in this
country; they have made important contributions to science, and in many
cases to the atomic-energy project. Many of my students would accompany me
to Pasadena in the spring after the Berkeley term was over, so that we might
continue to work together.
"My friends, both in Pasadena and in Berkeley, were mostly faculty people,
scientists, classicists, and artists. I studied and read Sanskrit with Arthur Rider.
I read very widely, must mostly classics, novels, plays, and poetry ; and I read
something of other parts of science. I was not interested in and did not read
about economics or politics. I was almost wholly divorced from the contemporary
scene in this country. I never read a newspaper or a current magazine like
Time or Harper's ; I had no radio, no telephone ; I learned of the stock-market
crack in the f all of 1929 only long after the event ; the first time I ever voted was
in the presidential election of 1936. To many of my friends, my indifference to
contemporary affairs seemed bizarre, and they often chided me with being too
much of a highbrow. I was interested in man and his experience; I was deeply
interested in my science ; but I had no understanding of the relations of man to
his society.
"I spent some weeks each summer with my brother Frank at our ranch in
New Mexico. There was a strong bond of affection between us. After my
mother's death, my father came often, mostly in Berkeley, to visit me; and we
had an intimate and close association until his death.
"Beginning in late 1936, my interests began to change. These changes did
not alter my earlier friendships, my relations to my students, or my devotion
to physics; but they added something new. I can discern in retrospect more
than one reason for these changes. I had had a continuing, smoldering fury
about the treatment of Jews in Germany. I had relatives there, and was later
to help in extricating them and bringing them to this country. I saw what the
depression was doing to my students. Often they could get no jobs, or jobs
which were wholly inadequate. And through them, I began to understand how
deeply political and economic events could affect men's lives. I began to feel
the need to participate more fully in the life of the community. But I had no
framework of political conviction or experience to give me perspective in these
matters.
"In the spring of 1936, 1 had been introduced by friends to Jean Tatiock, the
daughter of a noted professor of English at the university ; and in the autumn,
I began to court her, and we grew close to each other. We were at least twice
close enough to marriage to think of ourselves as engaged. Between 1939 and
her death in 1944 I saw her very rarely. She told me about her Communist
Party memberships; they were on again, off again affairs, and never seemed
to provide for her what she was seeking. I do not believe that her interests
were really political. She loved this country and its people and its life. She
was, as it turned out, a friend of many fellow travelers and Communists, with
a number of whom I was later to become acquainted.
"I should not give the impression that it was wholly because of Jean Tatiock
that I made leftwing friends, or felt sympathy for causes which hitherto would
have seemed so remote from me, like the Loyalist cause in Spain, and the or-
ganization of migratory workers. I have mentioned some of the other con-
tributing causes. I liked the new sense of companionship, and at the time felt
that I was coming to be part of the life of my time and country.
"In 1937, my father died ; a little later, when I came into an inheritance, I
made a will leaving this to the University of California for f eUowships to gradu-
ate students.
"This was the era of what the Communists then called the United Front, in
which they joined with many non-Communist groups in support of humanitarian
objectives. Many of these objectives engaged my interest I contributed to
the strike fund of one of the major strikes of Bridges' union ; I subscribed to the
People's World; I contributed to the various committees and organizations
which were intended to help the Spanish Loyalist cause. I was invited to help
establish the teacher's union, which included faculty and teaching assistants at
the university, and school teachers of the East Bay. I was elected recording
secretary. My connection with the teacher's union continued until some time
in 1941, when we disbanded our chapter.
"During these same years, I also began to take part in the management of
the physics department, the selection of courses, and the awarding of fellow-
ships, and in the general affairs of the graduate school of the university, mostly
through the graduate council, of which I was a member for some years.
9
"I also became involved in other organizations. For perhaps a year, I was
a member of the western council of the Consumer's Union which was concerned
with evaluating information on products of interest on the west coast I do
not recall Arthur Kallet, the national head of the Consumer's Union ; at most
I could have met him if he made a visit to the west coast. I joined the American
Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom. I think it then stood as
a protest against what had happened to intellectuals and professionals in Ger-
many. I listed, in the personal security questionnaire that I filled out in 1942
for employment with the Manhattan District, the very few political organiza-
tions of which I had ever been a member. I say on that questionnaire that I
did not include sponsorships. I have no recollection of the Friends of the Chinese
People, or of what, if any, my connection with this organization was.
"The statement is attributed to me that, while I was not a Communist, I 'had
probably belonged to every Communist-front organization on the west coast and
had signed many petitions in which Communists were interested.' I do not
recall this statement, nor to whom I might have made it, nor the circumstances.
The quotation is not true. It seems clear to me that if I said anything along
the lines quoted, it was a half -jocular overstatement.
"The matter which most engaged my sympathies and interests was the war in
Spain. This was not a matter of understanding and informed convictions. I
had never been to Spain ; I knew a little of its literature ; I knew nothing of its
history or politics or contemporary problems. But like a great many other
Americans I was emotionally committed to the Loyalist cause. I contributed to
various organizations for Spanish relief. I went to, and helped with, many
parties, bazaars, and the like. Even when the war in Spain was manifestly lost,
these activities continued. The end of the war and the defeat of the Loyalists
caused me great sorrow.
"It was probably through Spanish relief efforts that I met Dr. Thomas Addis,
and Rudy Lambert. As to the latter, our association never became close. As to
the former, he was a distinguished medical scientist who became a friend.
Addis asked me, perhaps in the winter of 1937-38, to contribute through h*™ to
the Spanish cause. He made it clear that this money, unlike that which went
to the relief organizations, would go straight to the fighting effort, and that it
would go through Communist channels. I did so contribute ; usually when lie
communicated with me, explaining the nature of the need, I gave him sums in
cash, probably never much less than a hundred dollars, and occasionally perhaps
somewhat more than that, several times during the winter. I made no such
contributions during the spring terms when I was in Pasadena or during the
summers in New Mexico. Later — but I do not remember the date — Addis intro-
duced me to Isaac Folkoff, who was, as Addis indicated, in some way connected
with the Communist Party, and told me that Folkoff would from then on get in
touch with me when there was need for money. This he did, in much the same
way that Addis had done before. As before, these contributions were for specific
purposes, principally the Spanish War and Spanish relief. Sometimes I was
asked for money for other purposes, the organization, of migratory labor in the
California valleys, for instance. I doubt that it occurred to me that the con-
tributions might be directed to other purposes than those I had intended, or
that such other purposes might be evil. I did not then regard Communists as
dangerous ; and some of their declared objectives seemed to me desirable.
"In time these contributions came to an end. I went to a big Spanish relief
party the night before Pearl Harbor ; and the next day, as we heard the news of
the outbreak of war, I decided that I had had about enough of the Spanish cause,
and that there were other and more pressing crises in the world. My contribu-
tions would not have continued much longer.
"My brother Frank married in 1936. Our relations thereafter were inevitably
less intimate than before. He told me at the time— probably in 1937— that he
and his wife Jackie had joined the Communist Party. Over the years we saw
one another as occasions arose. We still spent summer holidays together. In
1939 or 1940 Frank and Jackie moved to Stanford ; in the autumn of 1941 they
came to Berkeley, and Frank worked for the Radiation Laboratory. At that
time he made it clear to me that he was no longer a member of the Communist
Party.
"As to the alleged activities of Jackie and Frank in 1944, 1945, and 1946 : 1 was
not in Berkeley in 1944 and 1945; I was away most of the first half of 1946; I do
not know whether these activities occurred or not, and if I had any knowledge
of them at the time it would have been very sketchy. After Christmas of 1945
my family and I Tisited my brother's family for a few days during the holidays,
10
and I remember that we were there New Year's Eve and New Tear's Day in
3946. On New Year's Day people were constantly dropping in. Pinsky and
Adelson, who were at most casual acquaintances of mine, may have been among
them, but I cannot remember their being there, nor indeed do I remember any
of the others who dropped in that day or what was discussed.
"It was in the summer of 1939 in Pasadena that I first met my wife. She was
married to Dr. Harrison, who was a friend and associate of the Tolmans,
Lauritsens, and others of the California Institute of Technology faculty. I
learned of her earlier marriage to Joe Dallet, and of his death fighting in Spain.
He had been a Communist Party official, and for a year or two during their
brief marriage my wife was a Communist Party member. When I met her I
found in her a deep loyalty to her former husband, a complete disengagement
from any political activity, and a certain disappointment and contempt that the
Communist Party was not in fact what she had once thought it was.
"My own views were also evolving. Although Sidney and Beatrice Webb's
book on Russia, which I had read in 1936, and the talk that I heard at that time
had predisposed me to make much of the economic progress and general level of
welfare in Russia, and little of its political tyranny, my views on this were to
change. I read about the purge trials, though not in full detail, and could never
find a view of them which was not damning to the Soviet system. In 1938 I met
three physicists who had actually lived in Russia in the thirties. All were
eminent scientists, Placzek, Weisskopf , and Schein ; and the first two have be-
come close friends. What .they reported seemed to me so solid, so unfanatical,
so true, that it made a great impression ; and it presented Russia, even when seen
from their limited experience, as a land of purge and terror, of ludicrously bad
management and of a long-suffering people. I need to make clear that this
changing opinion of Russia, which was to be reinforced by the Nazi-Soviet Pact,
and the behavior of the Soviet Union in Poland and in Finland, did not mean a
sharp break for me with those who held to different views. At that time I did not
fully understand— as in time I came to understand — how completely the Com-
munist Party in this country was under the control of Russia. During and after
the battle of France, however, and during the battle of England the next autumn,
I found myself increasingly out of sympathy with the policy of disengagement
and neutrality that the Communist press advocated.
"After our marriage in 1940, my wife and I for about 2 years had much the
same circle of friends as I had Had before— mostly physicists and university peo-
ple. Among them the Chevaliers, in particular, showed us many acts of kindness.
We were occasionally invited to more or less obviously lef twing affairs, Spanish
relief parties that still continued ; and on two occasions, once in San Francisco
and once in Berkeley, we attended social gatherings of apparently well to do
people, at which Schneiderman, an official of the Communist Party in California,
attempted, not with success as far as we were concerned, to explain what the Com-
munist line was all about. I was asked about the Berkeley meeting in an inter-
view in 1946 with agents of the FBI. I did not then recall this meeting, and in
particular did not in any way connect it with Chevalier, about whom the agents
were questioning me ; hence it seemed wholly irrelevant to the matter under dis-
cussion. Later my wife reminded me that the Berkeley meeting had occurred
at the house of the Chevaliers ; and when I was asked about it by the FBI in
1950, 1 told them so.
"We saw a little of Kenneth May ; we both liked him. It would have been not
unnatural for us to go to a housewarming for May and his wife ; neither my wife
nor I remember such a party. Weinberg was known to me as a graduate student ;
Hiskey I did not know. Steve Nelson came a -few times with his family to visit ;
he had befriended my wife in Paris, at the time of her husband's death in Spain
in 1937. Neither of us has seen him since 1941 or 1942.
"Because of these associations that I have described, and the contributions
mentioned earlier, I might well have appeared at the time as quite close to the
Communist Party— perhaps even to some people as belonging to it. As I have
said, some of its declared objectives seemed to me desirable. But I never was a
member of the Communist Party. I never accepted Communist dogma or theory ;
in fact, it never made sense to me. I had no clearly formulated political views.
I hated tyranny and repression' and every form of dictatorial control of thought.
In most cases I did not in those days know who was and who was not a member
of the Communist Party. No one ever asked me to join the Communist Party.
"Your letters sets forth statements made in 1942-45 by persons said to be Com-
munist Party officials to the effect that I was a concealed member of the Com-
munist Party. I have no knowledge as to what these people might have said.
11
What I do know is that I was never a member of the party, concealed or open.
Even the names of some of the people mentioned are strange to me, such as Jack
Manley and Katrina Sandow. I doubt that I met Bernadette Doyle, although
I recognize her name. Pinsky and Adelson I met at most casually, as previously
mentioned.
"By the time that we moved to Los Alamos in early 1943, both as a result of
my changed views and of the great pressure of war work, my participation in left-
wing organizations and my associations with leftwing circles had ceased and
were never to be reestablished.
"In August 1941, 1 bought Eagle Hill at Berkeley for my wife, which was the
first home we had of our own. We settled down to live in it with our new baby.
We had a good many friends, but little leisure. My wife was working in biology
at the university. Many of the men I had known went off to work on radar and
other aspects of military research. I was not without envy of them ; but it was
not until my first connection with the rudimentary atomic-energy enterprise that
I began to see any way in which I could be of direct use."
Let the record show that Mr. Oppenheimer has asked to be excused briefly.
'THE WAR YEARS
"Ever since the discovery of nuclear fission, the possibility of powerful ex-
plosives based on it had been very much in my mind, as it had in that of many
other physicists. We had some understanding of what this might do for us in
the war, and how much it might change the course of history. In the autumn
of 1941, a special committee was set up by the National Academy of Sciences
under the chairmanship of Arthur Compton to review the prospects and feasi-
bility of the different uses of atomic energy for military purposes. I attended
a meeting of this committee ; this was my first official connection with the atomic-
energy program.
"Alter the academy meeting, I spent some time in preliminary calculations
about the construction and performance of atomic bombs, and became increas-
ingly excited at the prospects. At the same time I still had a quite heavy burden
of academic work with courses and graduate students. I also began to consult,
more or less regularly, with the staff of the Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley on
their program for the electromagnetic separation of uranium isotopes. I was
never a member or employee of the laboratory ; but I attended many of its staff
and policy meetings. With the help of two of my graduate students, I developed
an invention which was embodied in the production plants at Oak Ridge. I
attended the conference in Chicago at which the Metallurgical Laboratory (to
produce plutonlum) was established and its initial program projected.
"In the spring of 1942, Compton called me to Chicago to discuss the state of
work on the bomb itself. During this meeting Compton asked me to take the
responsibility for this work, which at that time consisted of numerous scattered
experimental projects. Although I had no administrative experience and was
not an experimental physicist, I felt sufficiently informed and challenged by the
problem to be glad to accept. At this time I became an employee of the Metal-
lurgical Laboratory.
''After this conference I called together a theoretical study group in Berkeley,
in which Bethe, Konopinski, Serber, Teller, Van Fleck, and I participated. We
had an adventurous time. We spent much of the summer of 1942 in Berkeley
in a Joint study that for the first time really came to grips with the physical
problems of atomic bombs, atomic explosions, and the possibility of using fission
explosions to initiate thermonuclear reactions. I called this possibility to the
attention of Dr. Bush during the late summer ; the technical views on this subject
were to develop and change from them until the present day.
"After these studies there was little doubt that a potentially world-shattering
undertaking lay ahead. We began to see the great explosion at Alamogordo and
the greater explosions at Eniwetok with a surer foreknowledge. We also began
to see how rough, difficult, challenging, and unpredictable this job might turn
out to be.
"When I entered the employ of the Metallurgical Laboratory I filled out my
first personnel security questionnaire."
Let the record show that Dr. Oppenheimer has returned to the hearing room.
"Later in the summer, I had work from Compton that there was a question of
my clearance on the ground that I had belonged to leftwing groups; but it was
indicated that this would not prove a bar to my further work on the program.
12
"In later summer, after a review of the experimental work, I became con-
vinced, as did others, that a major change was called for in the work on the
bomb itself. We needed a central laboratory devoted wholly to this purpose,
where people could talk freely with each other, where theoretical ideas and ex-
perimental findings could affect each other, where the waste and frustration and
error of the many compartmentalized experimental studies could be eliminated,
where we could begin to come to grips with chemical, metallurgical, engineering,
and ordnance problems that had so far received no consideration. We there-
fore sought to establish this laboratory for a direct attack on all the problems in-
herent in the most rapid possible development and production of atomic bombs.
"In the autumn of 1942 General Groves assumed charge of the Manhattan
Engineer District. I discussed with him the need for an atomic-bomb laboratory.
There had been some thought of making this laboratory a part of Oak Ridge.
For a time there was support for making it a Military Establishment in which
key personnel would be commissioned as officers; and in preparation for this
course I once went to the Presidio to take the initial steps toward obtaining a
commission. After a good deal of discussion with the personnel who would be
needed at Los Alamos and with General Groves and his advisers, it was decided
that the laboratory should, at least initially, be a civilian establishment in a mili-
tary post. While this consideration was going on, I had showed General
Groves Los Alamos ; and he almost immediately took steps to acquire the site.
"In early 1943, I received a letter signed by General Groves and Dr. Conant,
appointing me director of the laboratory, and outlining their conception of how
it was to be organized and administered. The necessary construction and as-
sembling of the needed facilities were begun. All of us worked in close collobora-
tion with the engineers of the Manhattan District.
"The site of Los Alamos was selected, in part at least, because it enabled those
responsible to balance the obvious need for security with the equally important
need of free communication among those engaged in the work. Security, it was
hoped, would be achieved by removing the laboratory to a remote area, fenced
and patrolled, where communication with the outside was extremely limited.
Telephone calls were monitored, mail was censored, and personnel who left the
area — something permitted only for the clearest of causes — knew that their
movements might be under surveillance. On the other hand, for those within
the community, fullest exposition and discussion among those competent to use
the information was encouraged.
"The last months of 1942 and early 1943 had hardly hours enough to get Los
Alamos established. The real problem had to do with getting to Los Alamos the
men who would make a success of the undertaking. For this we needed to
understand as clearly as we then could what our technical program would be,
what men we would need, what facilities, what organization, what plan.
"The program of recruitment was massive. Even though we then under-
estimated the ultimate size of the laboratory, which was to have almost 4,000
members by the spring of 1945, and even though we did not at that time see
clearly some of the difficulties which were to bedevil and threaten the enter-
prise, we knew that it was a big, complex and diverse job. Even the initial
plan of the laboratory called for a start with more than 100 highly qualified
and trained scientists, to say nothing of the technicians, staff, and mechanics
who would be required for their support, and- of the equipment that we would
have to beg and borrow since there would be no time to build it from scratch.
We had to recruit at a time when the country was fully engaged in war and
almost every competent scientist was already involved in the military effort
"The primary burden of this fell on me. To recruit staff I traveled all over
the country talking with people who had been working on one or another aspect
of the atomic-energy enterprise, and people in radar work, for example, and
underwater sound, telling them about the job, the place that we were going to,
and enlisting their enthusiasm.
"In order to bring responsible scientists to Los Alamos, I had to rely on their
sense of the interest, urgency, and feasibility of the Los Alamos mission.
I had to tell them enough of what the job was, and give strong enough assurance
that it might be successfully accomplished in time to affect the outcome of the
war, to make it clear that they were justified in their leaving other work to
come to this job.
"The prospect of coining to Los Alamos aroused great misgivings. It was
to be a military post ; men were asked to sign up more or less for the duration ;
restrictions on travel and on the freedom of families to move about to- be severe ;
and no one could be sure of the extent to which the necessary technical freedom
13
of action could actually be maintained by the laboratory. The notion of dis-
appearing into the New Mexico desert for an indeterminate period and under
quasi military auspices disturbed a good many scientists, and the families of
many more. But there was another side to it Almost everyone realized that
this was a great undertaking. Almost everyone knew that if it were com-
pleted successfully and rapidly enough, it might determine the outcome of the war.
Almost everyone knew that it was an unparalleled opportunity to bring to bear
the basic knowledge and art of science for the benefit of his country. Almost
everyone knew that this job, if it were achieved, would be a part of history.
This sense of excitement, of devotion and of patriotism in the end prevailed.
Most of those with .whom I talked came to Los Alamos. Once they came, con-
fidence in the enterprise grew as men learned more of the technical status of
the work; and though the laboratory was to double and redouble its size many
times before the end, once it had started it was on the road to success.
"We had information in those days of German activity in the field of nuclear
fission. We were aware of what it might mean if they beat us to the draw in
the development of atomic bombs. The consensus of all our opinions, and every
directive that I had, stressed the extreme urgency of our work, as well as the
need for guarding all knowledge of it from our enemies. Past Communist
connections or sympathies did not necessarily disqualify a man from employ-
ment, If we had confidence in his integrity and dependability as a man.
"There are two items of derogatory information on which I need to comment
at this point The first is that it was reported that I had talked the atomic-
bomb question over with Communist Party members during this period (1942-45) .
The second is that I was responsible for the employment of the atomic-bomb
project of individuals who were members of the Communist Party or closely
associated with activities of the Communist Party.
"As to the first, my only discussions of matters connected with the atomic
bomb were for official work or for recruiting the staff of the enterprise. So far
as I knew none of these discussions were with Communist Party members.
I never discussed anything of my secret work or anything about the atomic
bomb with Steve Nelson.
"As to the statement that I secured the employment of doubtful persons on
the project: Of those mentioned, Lomanitz, Friedman, and Weinberg were
never employed at Los Alamos. I believe that I had nothing to do with the
employment of Friedman and Weinberg by the Radiation Laboratory; I had no
responsibility for the hiring of anyone there. During the time that I continued
to serve as a consultant with the Radiation Laboratory and to advise and
direct the work of some of the graduate students, I assigned David Bohm and
Chaim Richman to a problem of basic science which might prove useful in
analyzing experiments in connection with fast neutrons. That work has long
been published. Another graduate student was Rossi Lomanitz. I remember
vaguely a conversation with him in which he expressed reluctance to take part
in defense research, and I encouraged him to do what other scientists were
doing for their country. Thereafter he did work at the Radiation Laboratory.
I remember no details of our talk. If I asked him to work on the project, I
would have assumed that he would be checked by the security officers as a
matter of course. Later, in 1943, when Lomanitz was inducted into the Army,
he wrote me asking me to help his return to the project I forwarded a copy
of this letter to the Manhattan District security officers, and let the matter
rest there. Still latter, at Lomanitz' request, I wrote to his commanding officer
that he was qualified for advanced technical work in the Army.
"I asked for the transfer of David Bohm to Los Alamos; but this request,
like all others, was subject to the assumption that the usual security require-
ments would apply ; and when I was told that there was objection on security
grounds to this transfer, I was much surprised, but of course agreed. David Haw-
kins was known to the personnel director at the laboratory, and I had met and
liked him and found him intelligent; I supported the suggestion of the per-
sonnel director that he come to Los Alamos. I understand that he had had
leftwing associations; but it was not until in March of 1951, at the time of hi»
testimony, that I knew about his membership in the Communist Party.
"In 1943 when I was alleged to have stated that 'I knew several individuals
then at Los Alamos who had been members of the Communist Party,' I knew of
only one ; she was my wife, of whose disassociation from the party, and of whose
integrity and loyalty to the United States I had no question. Later, in 1944 or
1945, my brother Frank, who had been cleared for work in Berkeley and at Oak
Ridge, came to Los Alamos from Oak Ridge with official approval.
14
"I knew of no attempt to obtain secret information at Los Alamos. Prior to
my going there my friend Haakon Chevalier with his wife visited us on Eagle
Hill, probably in early 1943. During the visit, he came into the kitchen and
told me that George Bltenton had spoken to him of the possibility of transmit-
ting technical information to Soviet scientists. I made some strong remark to
the effect that this sounded terribly wrong to me. The discussion ended
there. Nothing in our long standing friendship would have led me to believe that
Chevalier was actually seeking information ; and I was certain that he had no
idea of the work on which I was engaged.
"It has long been clear to me that I should have reported the incident at
once. The events that led me to report it — which I doubt ever would have be-
come known without my report — were unconnected with it. During the summer
of 1943, Colonel Lansdale, the intelligence officer of the Manhattan District, came
to Los Alamos and told me that he was worried about the security situation in
Berkeley because of the activities of the Federation of Architects, Engineers,
Chemists, and Technicians. This recalled to my mind that Eltenton was a
member and probably a promoter of the FAECT. Shortly thereafter, I was in
Berkeley and I told the security officer that Eltenton would bear watching. When
asked why, I said that Eltenton had attempted, through intermediaries, to
approach people on the project, though I mentioned neither myself nor Chevalier.
Later, when General Groves urged me to give the details, I told him of my con-
versation with Chevalier. I still think of Chevalier as a friend.
"The story of Los Alamos is long and complex. Part of it is public history.
For me it was a time so filled with work, with the need for decision and action
and consultation, that there was room for little else. I lived with my family
in the community which was Los Alamos. It was a remarkable community,
inspired by a high sense of mission, of duty and of destiny, coherent, dedicated,
and remarkably selfless. There was plenty in the life of Los Alamos to cause
irritation ; the security restrictions, many of my own devising, the inadequacies
and inevitable fumblings of a military post unlike any that had ever existed
before, shortages, inequities, and in the laboratory itself the shifting emphasis on
different aspects of the technical work as the program moved forward; but I
have never known a group more understanding and more devoted to a common
purpose, more willing to lay aside personal convenience and prestige, more
understanding of the role that they were playing in their country's history.
Time and again we had in the technical work almost paralyzing crises. Time
and again the laboratory drew itself together and faced the new problems and
got on with the work. We w'orked by night and by day ; and in the end the
many jobs were done.
"These years of hard and loyal work of the scientists culminated in the test
on July 16, 1945. It was a success. 1 believe that in the eyes of the War
Department, and other knowledgeable people, it was as early a success as they
had thought possible, given all the circumstances, and rather a greater one.
There were many indications from the Secretary of War and General Groves,
and many others, that official opinion was one of satisfaction with what had
been accomplished. At the tme, it was hard for us in Los Alamos not to share
that satisfaction, and hard for me not to accept the conclusion that I had
managed the enterprise well and played a key part in its success. But it needs
to be stated that many others contributed the decisive ideas and carried out
the work which led to this success and that my role was that of understand-
ing, encouraging, suggesting and deciding. It was the very opposite of a one-
man show.
"Even before the July 16 test and the use of the bombs in Japan, the mem-
bers of the laboratory began to have a new sense of the possible import of what
was going on. In the early days, when success was less certain and timing
unsure, and the war with Germany and Japan in a desperate phase, it was
enough for us to think that we had a job to do. Now, with Germany defeated,
the war in the Pacific approaching a crisis, and the success of our undertaking
almost assured, there was a sense both of hope and of anxiety as to what this
spectacular development might portend for the future. This came to us a little
earlier than to the public generally because we saw the technical development
at close range and in secret ; but its quality was very much the same as the
public response after Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
"Thus it was natural that in the spring of 1945 I welcomed the opportunity
when I was asked by Secretary Stimson to serve, along with Coinpton, Lawrence,
and Fermi, on an advisory panel to his Interim Committee on Atomic Energy.
We met with that committee on the 1st of June 1945 ; and even during the week
15
when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were being bombed, we met at Los Alamos to
sketch out a prospectus of what the technical future In atomic energy might
look like : atomic war heads for guided missiles, improvements in bomb designs,
the thermonuclear program, power, propulsion, and the new tools available
from atomic technology for research in science, medicine, and technology. This
work absorbed much of my time, during September and October ; and in con-
nection with it I was asked to consult with the War and State Departments on
atomic-energy legislation, and in a preliminary way on the international control
of atomic energy.
"I resigned as director of Los Alamos on October 16, 1945, after having
secured the consent of Commander Bradbury and General Groves that Bradbury
should act as my successor.
"There were then on the books at the laboratory, embodied in memoranda
and reports and summarized by me in letters to General Groves, developments
in atomic weapons, which could well have occupied years for their fulfillment,
and which have in fact provided some, though by no means all, of the themes
for Los Alamos work since that time. It was not entirely clear whether the
future of atomic weapons work in this country should be continued at or con-
fined to Los Alamos or started elsewhere at a more accessible and more prac-
tical site, or indeed what effect international agreements might have on the
program. But in the meantime Los Alamos had to be kept going until there was
created an authority competent to decide the question of its future. This was
to take almost a year.
"THE POST WAS PERIOD
"In November 1945, I resumed my teaching at the California Institute of
Technology, with an intention and hope, never realized, that this should be a
full-time undertaking. The consultation about postwar matter which had
already begun continued, and I was asked over and over both by the Executive
and the Congress for advice on atomic energy. I had a feeling of deep responsi-
bility, interest, and concern for many of the problems with which the develop-
ment of atomic energy confronted our country.
"This development was to be a major factor in the history of the evolving and
mounting conflict between the free world and the Soviet Union. When I and
other scientists were called on for advice, our principal duty was to make our
technical experience and judgment available. We were called to do this in a
context and against a background of the oflicial views of the Government on
the military and political situation of our country. Immediately after the war,
I was deeply involved in the effort to devise effective means for the interna-
tional control of atomic weapons, means which might, in the words of those
days, tend toward the elimination of war itself. As the prospects of success
receded, and as evidence of Soviet hostility and growing military power ac-
cumulated, we had more and more to devote ourselves to finding ways of
adapting our atomic potential to offset the Soviet threat. In the period marked
by the first Soviet atomic explosion, the war in Korea and the Chinese Com-
munist intervention there, we were principally preoccupied, though we never
forgot long-term problems, with immediate measures which could rapidly build
up the strength of the United States under the threat of an imminent general
war. As our own atomic potential increased and developed, we were aware of
the dangers inherent in comparable developments by the enemy ; and preventive
and defensive measures were very much on our minds. Throughout this time
the role of atomic weapons was to be central.
"From the close of the war, when I returned to the west coast until finally
in the spring of 1947 when I went to Princeton as the director of the Institute
for Advanced Study, I was able to spend very little time at home and in teaching
in California. In October 1945, at the request of Secretary of War Patterson,
I had testified before the House Committee on Military Affairs in support of
the May-Johnson bill, which I endorsed as an interim means of bringing about
without delay the much needed transition from the wartime administration of
the Manhattan District to postwar management of the atomic-energy enterprise.
In December 1945, and later, I appeared at Senator McMahon's request in
sessions of his Special Committee on Atomic Energy, which was considering
legislation on the same subject. Under the chairmanship of Dr. Richard
Tolman, I served on a committee set up by General Groves to consider classifica-
tion policy on matters of atomic energy. For 2 months, early in 1946, I worked
steadily as a member of a panel, the Board of Consultants to the Secretary of
303700—54 2
16
State's Committee on Atomic Energy, which, with the Secretary of State's
Committee, prepared the so-called Acheson-Lllienthal report. After the publi-
cation of tills report, I spoke publicly In support of it. A little later, when Mr.
Baruch was appointed to represent the United States in the United Nations
Atomic Energy Committee, I became one of the scientific consultants to Mr.
Baruch, and his staff in preparation for and in the conduct of our efforts to
gain support for the United States' plan. I continued as consultant to General
Osborn when he took over the effort.
"At the end of 1946 I was appointed by the President as a member of the
General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission. At its first
meeting I was elected Chairman, and was reelected until the expiration of my
term in 1952. This was my principal assignment during these years as far
as the atomic-energy program was concerned, and my principal preoccupation
apart from academic work.
"A little later I was appointed to the Committee on Atomic Energy of the
Research and Development Board, which was to advise the Military Establish-
ment about the technical aspects of the atomic-energy program ; I served on it
for 7 years ; and twice was designated Chairman of special panels set up by
the Committee.
"Meanwhile I had become widely regarded as a principal author or inventor
of the atomic bomb, more widely, I well knew, than the facts warranted. In
a modest way I had become a kind of public personage. I was deluged as I
have been ever since with requests to lecture, and to take part in numerous
scientific activities and public affairs. Most of these I did not accept. Some,
important for the promotion of science or learning or of public policies that
corresponded to my convictions, I did accept: the Council of the National
Academy of Sciences, the Committee on the Present Danger; the board of
overseers of Harvard College, and a good number of others.
"A quite different and I believe unique occurrence is cited as an item of
derogatory information — that in 1946 I was 'listed as vice chairman on the
letterhead of the Independent Citizens -Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and
Professions, Inc. * * * cited as a Communist front by the House Committee
on Un-American Activities.' The fact is that in 1946, when I was at work on
the international control of atomic energy, I was notified that I had been nomi-
nated and then elected as vice chairman of this organization. When I began
to see that its literature included slogans such as 'Withdraw United States
troops from China' and that it was endorsing the criticism enunciated by the
then Secretary Wallace of the United States policy on atomic energy, I advised
the organization in a letter of October 11, 1946, that I was not in accord with
its policy, that I regarded the recommendations of Mr. Wallace as not likely
to advance the cause of finding a satisfactory solution for the control of atomic
energy, and that I wished to resign. When an effort was made to dissuade me
from this course I again wrote on December 2, 1946, insisting upon resignation.
"Later in the postwar period an incident occurred which seems to be the
basis of one of the items of derogatory information. In May 1950, Paul Crouch,
a fonner Communist official, and Mrs. Crouch, testified before the California
State Committee on Un-American Activities that in July 1941 they had attended
a Communist Party meeting at a house in Berkeley, of which I was then the
tenant On the basis of pictures and movies of me which they saw some 8
years later, they said they recognized me as having been present. When the
FBI first talked to me about this alleged incident, I was quite certain that no
such meeting as Crouch described had occurred. So was my wife, when I
discussed it with her. Later, when I saw the testimony, I became even more
certain. Crouch had described the gathering as a closed meeting of the Com-
munist Party. I was never a member of the party. Crouch said that no in-
troductions had been made. I could not recall ever having had a group of
people at my home that had not been introduced. In May of 1952, I again dis-
cussed this alleged meeting with the United States attorney in the Weinberg
case (an indictment against Joseph Weinberg for perjury for having among other
things denied membership in the Communist Party). I again said that I could
not have been present at a closed meeting of the Communist Party because I
was not a member of the party : that I had searched my memory and that the
only thing that conceivably could be relevant was the vaguest impressions that
someone on the campus might at some time have asked permission to use our
home for a gathering of young people; that, however, I could recall no such
gathering, nor any meeting even remotely resembling the one described by
Crouch ; that I thought it probable that at the time of the meeting, which by
then had been teed by Crouch as approximately July 23» my wife and I were
17
away from Berkeley. Shortly thereafter, with the aid of counsel, we were able
to establish that my wife and I left Berkeley within a few days after July 4,
1941, and did not return until toward the end of the first week in August.
"I need to turn now to an account of some of the measures which, as Chairman
of the General Advisory Committee, and in other capacities, I advocated in the
years siiice the war to increase the power of the United States and its allies
to resist and defeat aggression.
"The initial members of the General Advisory Committee were Conant, then
president of Harvard, DuBridge, president of the California Institute of Tech-
nology, Fermi of the University of Chicago, Rabi of Columbia University, Rowe,
vice president of the United Fruit Co., Seaborg of the University of California,
Cyril Smith of the University of Chicago, and Worthington of the duPont Co.
In 1948 Buckley, president of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, replaced Worth-
ington ; in the summer of 1950, Fermi, Rowe, and Seaborg were replaced by Libby
of the University of Chicago, Murphree, president of Standard OH Development
Co., and Whitman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Later Smith
resigned and was succeeded by von Neumann of the Institute for Advanced Study.
"In these years from early 1947 to mid-1952 the Committee met some 30 times
and transmitted perhaps as many reports to the Commission. Formulation of
policy and the management of the vast atomic-energy enterprises were responsi-
bilities vested in the Commission itself. The General Advisory Committee had
the role, which was fixed for it by statute, to advise the Commission. In that
capacity we gave the Commission our views on questions which the Commission
put before us, brought to the Commission's attention on our initiative technical
matters of importance, and encouraged and supported the work of the several
major installations of the Commission.
"At one of our first meetings in 1947 we settled down to the job of forming our
own views of the priorities. And while we agreed that the development of atomic
power and the support and maintenance of a strong basic scientific activity in
the fields relevant to it were important, we assigned top priority to the problem
of atomic weapons. At that time we advised the Commission that one of its
first jobs would be to convert Los Alamos into an active center for the develop-
ment and improvement of atomic weapons. In 1945-46 during the period imme-
diately following the war, the purposes of Los Alamos were multiple. It was the
only laboratory in the United States that worked on atomic weapons. Los
Alamos also had wide interests in scientific matters only indirectly related to
the weapons program. We suggested that the Commission recognize as the
laboratory's central and primary program the improvement and diversification
of atomic weapons, and that this undertaking have a priority second to none.
We suggested further that the Commission adopt administrative measures to
make work at Los Alamos attractive, to assist the laboratory In recruiting, to
help build up a strong theoretical division for guidance in atomic-weapons design,
and to take advantage of the availability of the talented and brilliant consultants
who had been members of the laboratory during the war. In close consultation
with the director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, we encouraged and supported
courses of development which would markedly increase the value of our stock-
pile in terms of the destructive power of our weapons, which would make the
best use of existing stockpiles and those anticipated, which would provide
weapons suitable for modern combat conditions and for varied forms of delivery
and which in their cumulative effect would provide us with the great arsenal we
now have.
"We encouraged and supported the building up of the laboratory at Sandia
whose principal purpose is the integration of the atomic warhead with the
weapons system in which it 1s to be used. In agreement with the Los Alamos
staff we took from the very first the view that no radical improvement in
weapons development would be feasible without a program of weapons testing.
We strongly supported such a program, helped Los Alamos to obtain authoriza-
tion for conducting the tests it wished, and encouraged the establishment of a
permanent weapons testing station and the adoption of a continental test station
to facilitate this work. As time went on and the development of atomic weapons
progressed, we stressed the importance of integrating out atomic warheads and
the development of the carriers, aircraft, missiles, etc., which could make them
of maximum effectiveness.
"We observed that there were opportunities which needed to be explored for
significantly increasing our arsenal of weapons both in numbers and in capabil-
ities by means of production plant expansion and by ambitious programs to
enlarge the sources of raw materials. It was not our function to formulate
military requirements. We did regard it as our function to indicate that neither
18
the magnitude of existing plant nor the mode of operation of existing plant
which the Commission inherited, nor the limitation of raw materials to relatively
well known and high-grade sources of ore, need limit the atomic- weapons
program.
"The four major expansion programs which were authorized during the 6
years 1946 to 1952 reflect the decision of the Commission, the Military Estab-
lishment, the Joint Congressional Committee and other agencies of the Govern-
ment to go far beyond the production program that was inherited in 1946. And
the powerful arsenal of atomic weapons and the variety of their forms adaptable
to a diversity of military uses which is today a major source of our military
strength in turn reflect the results of these decisions. The record of minutes,
reports and other activities of the General Advisory Committee will show that
that body within the limits of its role as an advisory group played a significant,
consistent, and unanimous part in encouraging and supporting and sometimes
initiating the measures which are responsible for these results.
"As a committee and individually, our advice was sought on other matters
as well. As early as October 1945 I had testified before a Senate committee on
the Kilgore-Magnuson bill — the initial measure for a National Science Founda-
tion ; like most scientists I was concerned that steps be taken for recreating in
the United States a healthy scientific community after the disruption of the war
years. In the General Advisory Committee we encouraged the Commission to do
everything that it properly could to support atomic science, both in its own
laboratories and in the university centers to which we felt we must look for the
training of scientists for advances of a basic character. Throughout the post-
war period my colleagues and I stressed the importance of continuing support
and promotion of basic science so that there might be a healthy balance between
the effort invested in military research and applied science, and that invested in
pure scientific training and research which is indispensable to all else. We sup-
ported the Commission's decision to make available for distribution in appropri-
ate form and with appropriate safeguards the tracer materials, isotopes, and
radioactive substances which have played so constructive a part in medicine,
in biological research, in technology, in pure science, and in agriculture.
"We took an affirmative view on the development of reactors for submarines
and naval propulsion not only for their direct military value but also because
this seemed a favorable and forward-looking step in the important program of
reactor development. We were, for the most part, skeptical about the initially
very ambitious plans for the propulsion of aircraft, though we advocated the
studies which in time brought this program to a more feasible course. We fre-
quently pointed out to the Commission the technical benefits which would accrue
to the United States by closer collaboration with the atomic energy enterprise in
Canada and the United Kingdom.
"During all the years that I served on the General Advisory Committee, how-
ever, its major preoccupation was with the production and perfection of atomic
weapons. On the various recommendations which I have described, there were
never, so far as I can remember, any significant divergences of opinion among
the members of the committee. These recommendations, of course, constitute
a very small sample of the committee's work, but a typical one.
"In view of the controversies that have developed I have left the subject of
the super and thermonuclear weapons for separate discussion — although our
committee regarded this as a phase of the entire problem of weapons.
"The super itself had a long history of consideration, beginning, as I have said,
with our initial studies in 1942 before Los Alamos was established. It continued
to be the subject of study and research at Los Alamos throughout the war.
After the war, Los Alamos itself was inevitably handicapped pending the enact-
ment of necessary legislation for the atomic energy enterprise. With the McMa-
hon Act, the appointment of the Atomic Energy Commission and the General
Advisory Committee, we in the committee had occasion at our early meetings
in 1947 as well as in 1948 to discuss the subject. In that period the General
Advisory Committee pointed out the still extremely unclear status of the prob-
lem from the technical standpoint, and urged encouragement of Los Alamos'
efforts which were then directed toward modest exploration of the super and
of thermonuclear systems. No serious controversy arose about the super until
the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb in the autumn of 1949.
"Shortly after that event, in October 1949, the Atomic Energy Commission
called a special session of the General Advisory Committee and asked us to
consider and advise on two related questions: First, whether in view of the
Soviet success the Commission's program was adequate, and if not, in what way
it should be altered or increased; second, whether a crash program for the
19
development of the super should be a part of any new program. The committee
considered both questions, consulting various officials from the civil and military
branches of the executive departments who would have been concerned, and
reached conclusions which were communicated in a report to the Atomic Energy
Commission in October 1949.
"This report, in response to the first question that had been put to us, rec-
ommended a great number of measures that the Commission should take the
increase in many ways our overall potential in weapons.
"As to the super itself, the General Advisory Committee stated its unanimous
opposition to the initiation by the United States of a crash program of the
kind we had been asked to advise on. The report of that meeting, and the
Secretary's notes, reflect the reasons which moved us to this conclusion. The
annexes, in particular, which dealt more with political and policy considera-
tions— the report proper was essentially technical in character — indicated dif-
ferences in the views of members of the committpe. There were two annexes,
one signed by Rabi and Fermi, the other by Conant, DuBridge, Smith, Rowe,
Buckley and myself. (The ninth member of the committee, Seaborg, was abroad
at the time.)
"It would have been surprising if eight men considering a problem of extreme
difficulty had each had precisely the same reasons for the conclusion in which
we Joined. But I think I am correct in asserting that the unanimous opposition
we expressed to the crash program was based on the conviction, to which
technical considerations as well as others contributed, that because of our overall
situation at that time such a program might weaken rather than strengthen the
position of the United States.
"After the report was submitted to the Commission, it fell to me as chairman
of the committee to explain our position on several occasions, once at a meeting
of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. All this, however,
took place prior to the decision by the President to proceed with the thermo-
nuclear program.
"This is the full story of my 'opposition to the hydrogren bomb.' It can be
read in the records of the general transcript of my testimony before the joint
congressional committee. It is a story which ended once and for all when in
January 1950 the President announced his decision to proceed with the program.
I never urged anyone not to work on the hydrogren bomb project. I never made
or caused any distribution of the QAC reports except to the Commission itself.
As always, it was the Commission's responsibility to determine further distribu-
tion.
"In summary, in October 1949, I and the other members of the General
Advisory Committee were asked questions by the Commission to which we had
a duty to respond, and to which we did respond with our best judgment in the
light of evidence then available to us.
"When the President's decision was announced in January 1950, our commit-
tee was again in session and we immediately turned to the technical problems
facing the Commission in carrying out the President's directive. We sought to
give our advice then and in ensuing meetings as to the most promising means of
solving these problems. We never again raised the question of the wisdom of
the policy which had now been settled, but concerned ourselves rather with
trying to implement it. During this period our recommendations for increasing
production facilities included one for a dual-purpose plant which could be
adapted to make materials either for fission bombs or materials useful in a
thermonuclear program. In its performance characteristics, the Savannah River
project, subsequently adopted by the Commission, was foreshadowed by this
recommendation.
"While the history of the GAC opposition to a crash program for the super
ended with the announcement of the President's decision, the need for evalua-
tion and advice continued. There were immense technical complications both
before and after the President's decision. It was of course a primary duty of
the committee, as well as other review committees on which I served, to report
new developments which we judged promising, and to report when a given
weapon or family of weapons appeared impractical, unfeasible or impossible.
It would have been my duty so to report had I been alone in my views. As
a matter of fact, our views on such matters were almost always unanimous.
It was furthermore a proper function for me to speak my best judgment in dis-
cussion with those responsibly engaged in the undertaking.
"Throughout the whole development of thermonuclear weapons, many oc-
casions occurred where it was necessary for us to form and to express judgments
of feasibility. This was true before the President's decision, and it was true
20
after the President's decision. In our report of October 1949, we expressed the
view, as your letter states, that 'an imaginative and concerted attack on the
problem has a better than even chance of producing the weapon within 5 years/
Later calculations and measurements made at Los Alamos led us to a far more
pessimistic view. Still later brilliant inventions led to the possibility of lines
of development of very great promise. At each stage the General Advisory Com-
mittee, and I as its Chairman and as a member of other bodies, reported as
faithfully as we could our evaluation of what was likely to fail and what was
likely to work.
"In the spring of 1951 work had reached a stage at which far-reaching decisions
were called for with regard to the Commission's whole thermonuclear program.
In consultation with the Commission, I called a meeting in Princeton in the late
spring of that year, which was attended by all members of the Commission and
several members of its staff, by members of the General Advisory Committee,
by Dr. Bradbury and staff of the Los Alamos Laboratory, by Bethe, Teller,
Bacher, Fermi, von Neumann, Wheeler, and others responsibly connected with
the program. The outcome of the meeting, which lasted for 2 or 3 days, was an
agreed program and a fixing of priorities and effort both for Los Alamos and
for other aspects of the Commission's work. This program has been an out-
standing success.
"In addition to my continuing work on the General Advisory Committee there
were other assignments that I was asked to undertake. Late in 1950 or early
in 1951 the President appointed me to the Science Advisory Committee to advise
the Office of Defense Mobilization and the President in 1952 the Secretary of
State appointed me to a panel to advise on armaments and their regulation ; and
I served as consultant on continental defense, civil defense, and the use of atomic
weapons in support of ground combat. Many of these duties led to reports in
the drafting of which I participated, or for which I took responsibility. These
supplement the record of the General Advisory Committee as an account of the
counsel that I have given our government during the last eight years.
"In this letter, I have written only of those limited parts of my history which
appear relevant to the issue now before the Atomic Energy Commission. In
order to preserve as much as possible the perspective of the story, I have dealt
very briefly with many matters. I have had to deal briefly or not at all with
instances in which my actions or views were adverse to Soviet or Communist
interest, and of actions that testify to my devotion to freedom, or that have
contributed to the vitality, influence and power of the United States.
"In preparing this letter, I have reviewed two decades of my life. I have1 re-
called instances where I acted unwisely. What I have hoped was, not that I
could wholly avoid error, but that I might learn from it What I have learned
has, I think, made me more fit to serve my country.
"Very truly yours,
J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER.
PRINCETON, N. J., MARCH 4, 1954."
Dr. GRAY. This board is convened to enable Dr. Oppenheimer to present any
information he considers appropriate having a bearing on the documents Just
read and the information contained in them, this information being, of course,
the same as that disclosed to Dr. Oppenheimer in Mr. K. D. Nichols' letter of
December 23, 1953 to Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr. Oppenheimer's reply of March
4, 1954, and to provide a record as a basis for a recommendation to the General
Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission as to Dr. Oppenheimer's eligibility
for access to restricted data.
At this point, I should like to remind everyone concerned that this proceeding
is an inquiry and not in the nature of a trial. We shall approach our duties
in that atmosphere and in that spirit.
Dr. Oppenheimer, have you been given an opportunity to exercise the right to
challenge any or all of the members of this Board?
Dr. OPPENHEIMER. I have, indeed.
Dr. GRAY. I should point out to you, sir, that if at any time during the course
of this hearing it appears that grounds for challenge for cause arise, yon will
exercise your right to challenge for cause and the validity of the challenge will
be determined in closed session by the members of the Board.
The proceedings and stenographic record of this board are regarded as strictly
confidential between Atomic Energy Commission officials participating in this
matter and Dr. Oppenheimer, his representatives and witnesses. The Atomic
Energy Commission will not take the initiative in public release of any infor-
mation relating to the proceeding before this board.
21
Now, at this time, Dr. Oppenheimer, you will be given the opportunity to present
any material relevant to the issues before the board. At this point I think we
shall find it necessary to exclude all witnesses except the one whose testimony
is being given to the board under tiie provisions of the procedures which we must
follow in this inquiry.
I shall read from the Security Clearance Procedures of the United States
Atomic Energy Commission, dated September 12, 1950, under section 4.15,
subsection (b) :
"The proceedings shall be open only to duly authorized representatives of the
staff of the Atomic Energy Commission, the individual, his counsel, and such
persons as may be officially authorized by the board."
The Chairman would make the observation that counsel for the board has sug-
gested that in the spirit of these regulations we should have present only the
witness who is testifying or who is appearing.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, may I just say that I have a few preliminary
remarks as counsel to make before Dr. Oppenheimer testifies, and it may well be
that they will perhaps bring us to a suitable point of adjourning for this morning,
so that Dr. Oppenheimer's testimony might begin this afternoon.
However, if you would prefer that Mrs. Oppenheimer not be present while I
make these preliminary remarks which have to do largely with procedural aspects
of what we propose to do, it would be quite satisfactory, of course, to me.
Dr. GBAY. Let us then proceed on that basis. So, Mrs. Oppenheimer, you are
not at this moment excused.
I should like to ask Dr. Oppenheimer whether he wishes to testify under oath
in this proceeding?
Dr. OPFBNHEIMEB. Surely.
Dr. GRAY. You are not required to do so.
Dr. OPPENHEIMER. I think it best
Dr. GRAY. I should remind you, then, of the provisions of section 1621 of title
18 of the United States Code, known as the perjury statute, which makes it a
crime punishable by a fine of up to $2,000 and/or imprisonment of up to 5 years
for any person stating under oath any material matter which he does not believe
to be true.
It is also an offense under section 1001 of title 18 of the United States Code,
punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than
5 years, or both, for any person to make any false, fictitious, or fraudulent state-
ment or representation in any matter within the jurisdiction of any agency of the
United States.
I think that before you proceed, Mr. Garrison, that it would be well to
administer the oath to Dr. Oppenheimer.
J. Robert Oppenheimer, do you swear that the testimony you are to give the
board shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Dr. OPPENHEIMER. I do.
Dr. GRAY. May I also point out that in the event that it is necessary for anyone
to disclose restricted data during his statements before this board shall advise
the Chairman before such disclosure in order that persons unauthorized to have
access to restricted data may be excused from the hearing.
Now, Dr. Oppenheimer, you may proceed, and I gather from what Mr. Gar-
rison said, that he will at this point make a statement to the Board.
Mr. GABRISON. Mr. Chairman, members of the board, I would like to say at
the outset that far from having thought of challenging any member of the board,
we appreciate very much the willingness of men of your standing and responsibili-
ties to accept this exacting and onerous job in the interests of the country. I
express my appreciation to you.
We cannot help but be conscious of the fact that for the past week the members
of the board have been examining a file containing various items about Dr.
Oppenheimer to which we have had, and to which we shall have no access at alL
1 have been told that this is a large file, and I suppose a great deal of time has
been spent on it I am sure that it goes without saying that we are confident
that the minds of the members of the board are open to receive the testimony
that we shall submit.
If , as a result of going through the file, there are troublesome questions which
have arisen, any items of derogatory information not mentioned in the Commis-
sion's letter of December 23, 1 know we can count on you to bring those to oui
attention so that we may have an adequate opportunity to reply to them.
22
I would take note at this point of section 4.15 (j) of the Rules and Regula-
tions of the Commission, and of the second sentence, which reads, "If prior to or
during the proceeding, in the opinion of the Board, the allegations in the notifica-
tion letter are not sufficient to cover all matters into which inquiry should be
directed, the board shall suggest to the manager concerned that in order to give
full notice to the individual, notification letter should be amended."
If there are questions that you have in mind about these possible other items
in the file that you would like to have cleared up, and shall go through the
formality of the amendment of the letter, we will not. press. But it would be
helpful to us if we could at least be notified of any such items in a manner that
would give us adequate time to study them and to prepare appropriate response.
Dr. GRAY. I think you need have no concern on that score, Mr. Garrison.
Mr. GABBISON. I am sure not. I would like at this point to read into the record
a letter from Dr. Oppenheimer to Chairman Strauss of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, dated December 22, 1953. I would be glad to give copies to the members
of the board.
I shall explain the purpose in a moment of reading this letter to you.
This letter is addressed to Adm. Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission, Washington, D. C., and is dated December 22, 1953, and
reads as follows :
"DEAB LEWIS : Yesterday, when you asked to see me, you told me for the first
time that my clearance by the Atomic Energy Commission was about to be
suspended. You put to me as a possibly desirable alternative that I request
termination of my contract as a consultant to the Commission, and thereby
avoid an explicit consideration of the charges on which the Commission's action
would otherwise be based. I was told that if I did not do this within a day, I
would receive a letter notifying me of the suspension of my clearance and of
the charges against me, and I was shown a draft of that letter.
"I have thought most earnestly of the alternative suggested. Under the cir-
cumstances this course of action would mean that I accept and concur in the
view that I am not fit to serve this Government, that I have now served for some
12 years. This I cannot do. If I were thus unworthy I could hardly have
served our country as I have tried, or been the Director of our Institute in
Princeton, or have spoken, as on more than one occasion I have found myself
speaking, in the name of our science and our country.
"Since our meeting yesterday, you and General Nichols told me that the
charges in the letter were familiar charges, and since the time was short, I paged
through the letter quite briefly. I shall now read it in detail and make appro-
priate response.
"Faithfully yours,
ROBERT OPPENHEIMEB."
I have presented that, Mr. Chairman, simply to show that there has been no
disposition on Mr. Oppenheimer's part to hold onto a job for the sake of a job.
It goes without saying that if the Commission did not wish to use his services
as a consultant that was all right with him. The point of this letter is that he
felt that he could not in honor and integrity of his person simply resign and leave
these questions unadjudicated. Fully realizing the terrible burden of going
forward with this matter, and the natural risks in any proceeding of this
character, including what may go on outside of these walls, nevertheless went
forward.
He speaks in this letter of charges. I am glad that the chairman pointed
out that word is not the appropriate word to be used here. We recognize that
fact and have noted, indeed, earlier from a letter from General Nichols to me,
dated January 27, 1954, in which I in a letter to him inadvertently used the word
"charges," he said, "Please be advised that we do not consider that letter" —
the one of December 23, 1953, the principal letter which you read into the
record — "as being a statement of charges, but rather a statement of substantial
derogatory information bearing upon his eligibility for ABC security clearance."
Gentlemen, for the last several months I have been immersed in taUdng with
all of the people I could find who had worked with Dr. Oppenheimer over the
years about their recollections of his activities and their impressions of him
as a man and as a citizen, and I have immersed myself in his writings and in all
of the details of the case.
I would just like to say that I have been struck by the instantaneous and warm
and universal support which everybody that I talked with who has worked
with him has given. It will be reflected in the testimony which we will bring
23
here before you. I shall speak a little later about the scope of the testimony
anri the number of witnesses, but it has really quite impressed me.
I have also found among these gentlemen a great sense of anxiety about this
rase of what it may portend to the science program of the country if clearance
m the end could be denied to a man who has tried to serve his country as
Dr. Oppenheimer has served it; not so much a sense of what might happen to
the scientists now in the Government service themselves, although this certainly
has come to them as a great shock, hut rather what it may do to the youns
scientists to whom the Government must turn in the future for aid and assist-
ance in seeking to recruit personnel to the Government.
I mention this not because it has any precise bearing on the action and the
findings in this case, but it is a part of the warp and woof then of the feelings
with which the witnesses here will address you.
The case as it has looked to me stands out in sharp feature rather simply
this way, that these derogatory items in the file mostly have to do with activities
of Dr. Oppenheimer that go back to 12 to 15 years ago. A few have to do with
9 to 12 years. Since the war— since 1945 — apart from the Crouch incident,
which itself has to do with an alleged occurrence in 1941, there is in this letter
of December 23 — I think I am correct in saying — not a single item of derogatory
information except the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences,
from which he in fact resigned, the proffer of vice chairmanship, when he saw
what it was up to and except for the hydrogen matter, which stands all by itself.
For from being to his discredit, far from casting doubt on his desire to serve
his country as best he sees how to do It, I think our witnesses will persuade you
beyond any doubt that his conduct in the hydrogen bomb matter was beyond
any reproach ; that it was an exercise of the most honest judgment done in the
best interests of the country, and that his whole record since the war is rather
astonishingly filled with a continuous series of efforts to strengthen the defenses
of the United States in a world threatened by totalitarian aggression.
I was surprised to find that about half of his working time since 1945 has
been devoted to service on Government boards and committees, from 1945 on,
as a volunteer citizen, placing his talents at the service of the country- The
richness and the variety of the services that he rendered in those capacities
will be vividly brought out in the testimony.
I would like to say that everything he has done since the war, the hydrogen
bomb and all the rest, has been done in a blaze of liaht. There has been not
one thing that has not been done in the full daylight of the work of the Govern-
ment and subjected to the most searching criticism of the ablest men in science
and government, all doing each in their own way what they could do to serve
the country.
I believe this record will be one which will persuade this board that to exclude
Dr. Oppenheimer from the capacity that he continue to serve the Government as
he has in the past would be contrary to the best interests of all of us.
Now a word about the procedure. We hope to present this case to you in
terms of unrestricted data. It would be an unclassified case. We would like to
present it in that direct lay fashion. I am not a scientist and except for Dr.
Evans, the members of the board are not. We thought it would be best if we
could avoid having to get involved in technical evidence of a very complex and
difficult nature which would involve a great deal of time, and which would
perhaps tend to lead us into the wrong path of exposing that the issue here is
whether at a particular juncture Dr. Oppenheimer's scientific judgment was
right or wrong. I am sure we all agree that the question here is not whether
the advice that he gave at a particular time was from a scientific point of view,
one with which this board might differ in the light of history. The real question
is was his Judgment an honest judgment; did he do the best he could for his
Government
I was a little fearful if we got into the whole realm of science that we would
perhaps lost sight of that simple fact.
We want to on the other hand tell you as completely as we can— and I think
It can be done within the limits of classification, the proper limits we can talk
about here — exactly how the things were done which he did, and the procedures
that were adopted and the way the tasks were gone about, the atmosphere in
which they were conducted.
I would like to start, when we get into Dr. Oppenheimer's testimony, with a
somewhat fuller account from him of his record of public service, beginning
with the war years, and coming down to date.
24
I would like to start with that because the answer which he gave is less
complete with respect to that portion of his life. With respect to the derogatory
items of the early years, we have said about all that we can say except as you
of course may wish to question him further, as I have no doubt you will, with
regard to them. But I would like to have Dr. Oppenheimer tell you more than
he has been able to do in the encompass of the answer about the way in which
he has sought to serve the country since the war.
Our witnesses will mostly be bringing testimony about that service.
When we get through with that, there are a few supplementary things to be
said about these earlier derogatory items, and some documentary evidence
that we want to introduce.
The witnesses that we would like to call, after you yourself have finished
questioning Dr. Oppenheimer, and when he is through — and I should say we
will welcome questions as we go along, whatever you may wish to ask, as Dr.
Oppenheimer testifies, and I hope you will, because I think it will make it easier
for all of us if you would do that instead of leaving it all for the end — whenever
we are through and the board is through with questioning Dr. Oppenheimer,
then we would be prepared to invite a considerable number of witnesses to
testify. There are as of this moment 27 witnesses whom we expect to call.
There may be several more. There will also be 3 or 4 or 5—1 don't know exactly
how many — written documents from- some witnesses who are simply unable to
get here at all.
If the board would like, I should be glad to give you a list of the proposed
witnesses, so that you may have it before you, and also a skeleton of the
proposed times.
Dr. GRAY. I would think that would be very helpful, Mr. Garrison, if you
would. It just possibly might have some bearing on the questions that might
be put to Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. GAKRISON. We will, I think, bring that in after lunch. It is not quite
ready for presentation.
Dr. GBAY. Very well.
Mr. GARRISON. I would like at this time to give you — and I hope you might
perhaps keep this handy— an exhibit called biographical data on Dr. J. Robert
Oppenheimer.
Dr. GRAY. Are you offering that now, Mr. Garrison?
Mr. GARRISON. Yes.
Dr. GRAY. Would you mark the Oppenheimer exhibit No. 1, and we will
receive it for the record.
(The document was marked "Oppenheimer Exhibit No. 1*' and received for
the record.)
Mr. GARRISON. I would say to the board that if you will turn to the first page,
I, this is a concise summary of the major steps in Dr. Oppenheimer's career. It
will be a handy guide for use when witnesses are testifying to particular
committees or what not to see just at what stage they call.
Turning to the next page, II, you will see listed the various Government com-
mittees on which Dr. Oppenheimer has served, with the dates of service and
the people who served with him on these various undertakings. This is since
Los Alamos.
Dr. GRAY. May I interrupt? Just in the interest of keeping the record pre-
cisely clear, I wonder if that last statement is quite correct, because I believe
you terminated your association with Los Alamos in the fall of 1945, and some of
these committees overlap.
Mr. GARRISON. You are correct.
Dr. GRAY. I am not making it any more a particular point other than
Mr. GARRISON. I appreciate the correction. I should make a further correction,
that this is a partial list of the committees on which he served. They are the
principal ones, the ones about which we shall mainly be talking here at the
hearings.
Beginning with III and running all the way over is a detailed biography in
which, to the best of our ability, we have put down year by year every association
of which we have any record of his having joined or been a member of, every
publication of his, every position that he has held on committees, either private
or public, lectures that he has given, addresses. This is the outward and visible
account of his activities, in short, as best we could compile them If there are
inaccuracies, they are entirely inadvertent.
One of the things that struck me as I went over this biography, which I asked
*rtve ^P"6^ was tte quite evident fact that, during the prewar years in
which most of these derogatory items arise, his energies were quite strongly
25
devoted to almost entirely, really, his scientific work and scientific undertakings.
They reveal really very little in the way of political interest or associations on
his part just on the face of the record.
In the postwar period this becomes again apparent, and I would direct yoiu
attention to the fact that in this postwar period I do not think there is a single
association of his that can possibly he questioned as derogatory by the Commis-
sion or by this board or anything, indeed, other tlian a rich record of association
and devotion to his science and his service to the Government and his member-
ship in various scientific and civic organizations of the highest standing.
There is, of course, also that notation about the Independent Citizens Com-
mittee of Arts and Sciences ; but that, as he stated in his answer, he withdrew
from because of its policy in replying to their proffer of an oflScer's position in
the association and indicated his complete lack of sympathy with the kind of
policies which it stood for.
I am going to, in the course of the testimony, introduce in evidence at pertinent
places extracts from some of Dr. Oppenheimer's writings and addresses from the
period 1945 to date. To attempt to introduce them all here would be beyond the
obvious scope of -this inquiry. But I want to assure the board that you will find a
very consistent and very striking thread of continuous thought on Dr. Oppen-
heimer's part with respect to the .strengthening of the defenses of this country,
with respect to what has to be done to counter the Russian threat from abroad,
with respect to building the strongest and soundest democratic America that man
can do, consistent, unvarying, and very impressive.
This whole postwar period, everything in it, is really utterly inconsistent with
any notion that this man could have been anything but a devoted supporter of the
American system that we love.
I think that is all that I have to say of a preliminary character, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate your letting me say it I think perhaps this would be an appropriate
point to adjourn, and shall we come back at 2 : 30? Is that your schedule?
Dr. GRAY. Perhaps it should be a recess ; I do not know, Mr. Garrison ; and not
an adjournment. I am sure we want to try to meet the convenience of everyone
concerned and at the same time not to waste hours or minutes which could be
useful in getting ahead with the inquiry.
Speaking for the board, I am sure we could be ready at 2 o'clock, but I do not
want to press you and Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. SILVEEMAN. I was suggesting that we could use a little extra time.
Dr. GRAY. Would you suggest 2 : 30?
Mr. GARRISON. Let us say 2 : 15.
Dr. GRAY. All right
Mr. GARRISON. Before the recess, I want to read this into the record. This is
a letter to me from Mr. William Mitchell, general counsel, dated January 15,
1954, that the Commission will be prepared to stipulate as follows for purposes
of the hearing:
"On August 6, 1947, the Commission recorded clearance of Dr. J. Robert
Oppenheimer, which it noted had been authorized in February 1947."
What that has reference to, as we will show more fully in the testimony, was
the fact that in 1947 Dr. Oppenheimer's personnel file was sent to the Commission
by Mr J Edgar Hoover, with the request that it be reviewed. This was at the
time of the early days of the establishment of the Commission, and Dr. Oppen-
heimer had been appointed to the general advisory committee and had been
elected its chairman. The Commission considered this entire file, which I
believe the evidence will show contained substantially all that you have before
you in the letter of December 23 except the Crouch incident, which occurred
afterward, though it related to something in 1941 and except for the hydrogen
bomb matters, and the Commission unanimously after discussing Dr. Oppen-
heimer's qualifications with many of the leading people who had had to do with
him in the past and with officials of the Government reached the view that there
was no question as to his clearance. That we will show later by testimony. I
merely mention now that will be before you. I don't mean to import what I said
into the stipulation which goes in front of what I have just said.
Dr. GRAY. We will now recess until 2 : 15.
(Thereupon, at 12:20 p. m., a recess was taken until 2: 15 p. m. tne same
day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
Dr GRAY. We will begin the proceedings at this point again. Let the record
show that Mrs. Oppenheimer is not present this afternoon.
26
Whereupon J. Robert Oppenheimer was called as a witness and, having been
previously sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By MB. GARRISON :
Q. Will you tell the board what your present position is, Dr. Oppenheimer,
at Princeton?
A. My job is director of the institute of advanced study. For the most part
this is not relevant to the hearing, but I will outline briefly some of the
circumstances.
The institute is not part of Princeton University. It is a separate institute,
-sery highbrow. It has about 130 members who are postdoctoral. Some of
them are youngsters just out of graduate school; some are men of 50 and 60.
We try, though only in part, to patronize scholarship and science — science
in the old sense of the word, meaning both the natural science and the humanities.
I think the parts that are relevant to the welfare of the United States are fairly
limited. We have a very good training ground for various students in pure
mathematics, applied mathematics, and theoretical physics. Many of them who
are at the institute are supported by the United States Government; many
more go into work for a limited time or for a longer time on behalf of our
Government.
AVe have a number of governmental undertakings. I think one of the more
interesting is that we seem for the first time to be able to predict cyclogenesis —
the generation of storms. This is of practical value, and the Government has
instituted a program based on the research started at the institute.
We have one other function which I believe to be important at this time.
We are as much as we can be, with our limited resources, an open house to
scholars throughout the free world, from Europe, from Japan, from India —
mostly, of course, from Europe. I think more than half of our people are
from outside the United States. I think we go a long way toward persuading
a very small fraction of the. people abroad that the United States is a humane
and civilized place, and programs about the institute have been carried by the
Voice of America and iu State Department bulletins, and I believe that the ill-
fated glossy magazine that we put out iu the Soviet Union, called America, pub-
lished an account of our work.
In any case, there are many people In the Government who are proud of
what we are doing, and I am proud of it.
Q. Do you have occasion to use classified material at the institute?
A. The institute has never accepted— I don't know how the board of trustees
would respond— a classified contract. It has never been asked to accept one
There is work going on at the institute which is very close to classified work ;
but, by the time it is fed in to us, it is unintelligible and therefore declassified.
Individual members of the institute, of course, have done classified work. I
am an obvious example. George F. Kennan is an example. Von Neumann is
an example. I won't reel off the list of names. This is an affair between the
individual and the Government. The institute interposes no objection.
Every year I get a letter from Los Alamos: "Do you object if we renew
the contracts of these people," and I say that it is up to them and up to you.
Q. What security methods have you used at the institute in connection with
your own classified materials iu the past?
A. They have been very elaborate. When I came to Princeton the Atomic
Energy Commission established a top-secret facility. I need not describe the
rigmarole that goes into this, the warning systems and all the rest. There
is a vault there. It has been moved recently, but it still is at the institute. I
have never known the combination. The combination has been rigidly guarded
I believe our record is that we have never even displaced a document. I hope
this continues to be time. That facility is still in existence for the benefit
of other people who wish to use it.
Q. When did you come to the Institute at Princeton?
A. I came in the late summer, I think, of 1947. I had been a professor at
California Institute of Technology and at the University of California at
Berkeley. In late 1946 perhaps or early 1947, the present Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission was chairman of the nominating committee to seek
f^Slie($?Mt Sl^ce?d Dr- A^fctott at the Institute and he offered me the
job stating that the trustees and the faculty desired this
T iL^doo0tmCOept at °nce- * like California very much, and my Job there, but
I had, as will appear, not spent very much time in California. Also, the oppor-
27
tunity to be in a small center of scholarship across the board was very attractive
to me. Before I accepted the job, and a number of conversations took place, I
told Mr. Strauss there was derogatory information about me. In the course of
the confirmation hearings on Mr. Lilienthal especially, and the rest of the
Commissioners, I believe Mr. Hoover sent my file to the Commission, and Mr.
Strauss told me that he had examined it rather carefully. I asked him whether
this seemed to him in any way an argument against my accepting this job, and
he said no, on the contrary— anyway, no— in April I heard over the radio I had
accepted, and decided that was a good idea. I have been there since.
Q. You said you had riot spent much time in California. That I take it was
because of your engagement in public service in a rather continuous way?
A. Yes.
Q. That leads, I think, naturally into a discussion of your record of public
service, and I would like to begin, Dr. Oppenheimer, with the war years, and have
you tell the Board how you happened to get involved in atomic bomb work.
A. In the autumn of 1941 1 was asked by Arthur Compton to attend a session
of the special committee of the National Academy of Sciences, which had b«vn
set up to study the military uses of fission, the uranium project. I think that
committee had other meetings. I attended a 2-day meeting. At that time — I
need not go into details— I took an active part in the discussion.
Q, What was your position?
A. I was professor of physics at the University of California. I took an
active part in the discussion primarily, I think, to be sure that the open questions
were recognized as open and some sketch of a program understood. I believe
everyone there was quite clear that we had to go ahead with this.
The next step was double. On the one hand, Earnest Lawrence, who was
Director of the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley, had on the trip to this meet-
ing become more and more enthusiastic about the prospects for an electro-
magnetic separation of uranium isotopes, and we talked about that the whole
way. When he got back, he started getting other people thinking about it. and
I became a sort of adviser or consultant without appointment to that undertaking.
I don't remember just when, but some time in the course of the next few months
I had an idea which turned out to have been useful. It was not decisive, but it
perhaps doubled or tripled the capacity, or halved or thirded the price of the
plant they were building.
I met with them quite often at their steering committee and coordinating
committee meetings, but never as an employee. I was still teaching and in fact
teaching more than usual, because other people had gone off to work on radar
and we were very badly understaffed.
Other things that I began to think more intensively and on my own about how
to make atomic bombs and made some calculations on efficiency, design, probable
amounts of material and so on, so that I got into it, and knew something about it.
The result was that when I was called probably in the first days of 1042— any-
way after Pearl Harbor— to Chicago, I was able to give a little information about
this aspect of the problem. The main thing the Chicago people were up to was
building reactors to make plutonium, or trying to see if they could build reactors
to make plutonium. But in the original assignment of the responsibility, work on
fast fission, which is what they used as a shorthand for the bomb, was also part
of their Job.
The man in charge of it was Gregory Breit. He had the wonderful code name
of "Coordinator of Rapid Rupture." He wrote me some time in the spring,
suggesting that we might have a conference in Minneapolis, that he was inter-
ested in work I had been doing, and perhaps might even want to come longer to
Minneapolis. This never matured. I think Breit quit in June, I believe it was.
I went on to Chicago at Arthur Compton's request. I made arrangements to
have Bethe and Teller and a few other people meet and also the heads of the
subundertakings that were trying to make measurements relevant to the design
of bombs and specifications of bombs, and we had conferences for some days.
Fairly early in the game, Arthur Compton said would I take charge of this
part of the work and I agreed to do so.
We also agreed that at that moment the job fell into two parts. One was the
job of analysis and thinking, of theory, and we would set that up as a summer
study in Berkeley. The other was to try to get some sense into the distorted
and fragmentary work that was going on in a number of laboratories. There
was a third part which was to get some new projects started.
Q. You spoke about the fragments and the scattering. I take it that was one
of the f Actors that led you to tfrfofr in terms of what ultimately was to become
Los Alamos?
28
A. It did not go quite so fast. We spent this summer in study, and I traveled
around and saw most of the laboratories. I had very good help from John
Manley, who is not Jack Manley. We had a very heavy study, and began to see
what was involved, not all of it, I would not say all of it until much later,
and also spent a fantastically large fraction of our time on the thermonuclear
program. That is the first time we really got into it.
What we then saw of the thermonuclear program was not very relevant to
what you are reading in the papers today. But it excited us, and it seemed to
make even more necessary that we understand what this was all about.
After our conferences were over, I went and reported to Compton who was
off on a summer holiday about this aspect of it, as well as others. I then came
on, I think, at his request, and saw Dr. Bush and told him about it. We also
at about this time prepared a report on our views for transmission to the British.
There was a fairly complete interchange. We did not write about the
thermonuclear program, but we wrote about some of the subleties of the atomic
bomb program.
Then we began to notice how very much needed doing and how much the little
laboratories were suffering from their isolation.
There was supposed to be security ; anyway, there was good compartmentaliza-
tion and the result was that people would not know what was going on anywhere
else. Work was duplicated, and there was almost no sense of hope or direction
in it.
By the fall of 1942, not only the theoretical people but anyone who knew the
experimental situation realized that this had to be pulled together. It was not
the first job. The first job was to make the stuff. But in hope that would
come out all light, we had to have a place where we could learn what to do
with it. This was not trivial. We therefore started chattering about should
we have a laboratory in Chicago, should we have one at Oak Ridge. The pre-
vailing notion was that there would be more or less a conventional laboratory
until such time as we were really ready to get into almost ordnance experiments,
and then we would go out and get a proving ground somewhere, which would be
rather remote and a very few people involved.
This did not seem sound. It seemed to me and knowledgeable people, it was
one package, ordnance, chemistry, physics theory, effects, all had to be under-
stood together or the Job would not get done. These were the considerations
that led me to say to General Groves, who had by then been brought into the
project as its head, that I thought a bomb laboratory was a good idea. That I
thought it needed to have two characteristics; one, that it be free internally
to talk about problems from one part of the job to the other, and that its external
security be very, very good Indeed, that it be isolated, if necessary guarded, and
all the rest of it.
General Groves was very much interested from the beginning. I think I had
a message from him to come on down to discuss the matter, and I remember
that he and Colonel Nichols, and Colonel Marshall, and I got into some very
limited place on the Twentieth Century Limited and talked about plans for such
a post.
The original plans were much too small. They had in mind that it might be
a useful thing if the key personnel of the laboratory were commissioned. I
at that time, very foolishly I think, had no objection to It I would have been
glad to be an officer. I thought maybe the others would. But it was not very
long before I talked to people who had to come to Los Alamos, especially those
who had experience in radar and in military research, and they explained that
it was hopeless to superimpose on a natural technical organization of a laboratory
tteirrdevant and sort of additional organization of the Military Establishment
We had a long hassle about that. I think everyone agreed In a letter
£ 1942' Signed by Groves and ConanlTwas Srid ttS
£e ^oratory would be civilians. It was contemplated
cal ^J368 ** ker People would be commission^ That
*• — •* so big and there
time4n the autumn of i*^ Groves sent an engineer around to
29
which is a conceivably important part of the thermonuclear program, and one
of the first buildings built at Los Alamos had as its purpose the handling uf
materials that we thought might be of interest in thermonuclear work.
We put up a laboratory and a lot of houses which were hopelessly inadequate
to our future needs, but at least did get us started. The real problem, of course,
had nothing to do with that. It had to do with persuading people to come there.
I think it true that at that time among scientists engaged in immediate military
problems, radar, underwater sound, ordnance, and so on, the name of the uranium
project was not good, because work had been going on for a number of years
without very much sense of direction. There was great fear that this was a
boondoggle, which would in fact have nothing to do with the war we were fighting
Very, very few people turned us down coining to Los Alamos, but this was work
for everyone. I think it was perhaps most work for me. I got a large group
from Princeton, many people from the chemistry group in Berkeley, where we
recruited the key chemical personnel. A group from Stanford. I won't bore yon
with the details of this. But it took from perhaps October or November 1942
until March of 1943 to get the rudiments of a laboratory. We stole a cyclotron
from Harvard, some accelerators from Wisconsin. Everybody arrived with
trunkloads of junk and equipment, and in this way we were able to be doing
experiments— well, I got to Los Alamos toward the end of March, the equipment
started coming a few days later, and by June we were finding out things that
nobody knew before. That we thought was a fairly good record of speed.
We had a general notion at that time that all the work of the laboratory
would be open to all the scientific members of the laboratory. This is a matter
which General Groves, I think, concurred in, but which he never entirely liked.
In other words, within the laboratory the competent people were supposed to
know what the story was. It turned out over and over again this was a wise
policy. Good ideas came from places that you would not have expected. Enthu-
siasm and understanding could be generated because people knew what it was
Oe other hand, we communicated very sparingly and through quite re-
strteted external chaimels with other parts of the Manhattan District, ^places
that were making the materials, and the other laboratories, and I should say
Sot atS oHtoost not at all with any other military research estabU^ients
except those from whom we needed gear. We had some really fantastic security
rcorfsions They were not in the end effective as we know. Families were sup-
poMOto come with their husbands if they wanted to, but they were .not Allowed
totem We did have to let a couple of people leave the project, t^f* ««»
this was verv great and the pressure against it very great. We had all
illegal to mail a letter except in the authorized
*» •* *ad« «* «*"
coaa n Tne laboratory was guarded within the post and
tile post was guarded. We went to precautions which did not do the trick, but
W*taf ^ ^otic things and partly the job of
-
ss
date of June 20,1943:
have recently reviewed with Dr. Bush the
cooperation, of all concerned.
30
"I am writing to you as the leader of one group which is to play a vital role
in the months ahead. I know that you and your colleagues are working on a
bazardous matter under unusual circumstances. The fact that the outcome
of your labors is of such great significance to the Nation requires that this pro-
gram be even more drastically guarded than other highly secret war develop-
ments. I have therefore given directions that every precaution be taken to
insure the security of your project and feel sure that those in charge will see
that these orders are carried out. You are fully aware of the reasons why your
own endeavors and those of your associates must be circumscribed by very special
restrictions. Nevertheless,' I wish you would express to the scientists assembled
with you my deep appreciation of their willingness to undertake the tasks which
lie before them in spite of the dangers and the personal sacrifices. I am sure
we can rely on their continued wholehearted and unselfish labors. Whatever the
enemy may be planning, American science will be equal to the challenge, with
this thought in mind, I send this note of confidence and appreciation.
"Though there are other important groups at work, I am writing only to you
as the leader of the one which is operating under very special conditions, and
to General Groves. While this letter is secret, the contents of it may be disclosed
to your associates under a pledge of secrecy.
"Very sincerely yours,
"FBANKLIN D. KOOSEVKLT."
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. This, I gathered, was in connection witli your own efforts to impress upon
the group the paramount needs of security and the importance of the work they •
were doing.
A. The importance I think there was very little doubt about. Everybody who
was there who was a scientist knew it was important We had a great deal of
trouble with people who were not given information, with technicians, machinists,
and so on, who found the conditions of life very disagreeable and no counter-
vailing advantage of being associated with something they understood. But the
scientists knew it was important.
Q. You were under a great deal of time pressure, were you? Was there a
sense of urgency in the air?
A. My directive, I haven't got it, it is probably at Los Alamos as part of the
record, was to lose no day in preparing an atomic bomb. The definition of an
atomic bomb was that it should be at least equal to 1,000 tons of TNT in explosive
force. This sense of pressure started at the beginning and never let up. I will
come in a moment to how it was at the end.
If you want to ask anything about it, please do not hesitate to interrupt me.
Dr. GBAY. Yes. I think, Dr. Oppenheimer, we would prefer for you to go
ahead. I do not want to say that no member of the board or counsel will not
interrupt, and I tMnk we are free to do so, but I think we would like you to
proceed and if there is anything, we will inquire.
The WITNESS. Fine. We started out the job there with two sets of meetings.
One was a large meeting
Dr. GRAY. When was this?
The WITNESS. This would have been April 1943. A large meeting that I called
all the people there in and a number of others whom I hoped to lure there, and
many of whom- were In fact later to come, to discuss the technical program. The
other was a review committee that Groves appointed, more or less to find out
what we were up to and to see that we were doing and what we were not doing.
One of the things that the review committee recommended was that we immedi-
ately get into the ordnance problems.
This is something we felt very strongly. We immediately got into large scale
chemical and metallurgical problems.
Another thing they recommended was that I not try to do everything myself,
but get a personnel director, and some aides so that the place would run a little
bit better.
We were building a town at the same time that we were building the labora-
tory. The program of the laboratory emerged from the technical meetings, and
so did many of the people who were later to come there and play prominent
parts. Some of them are probably going to appear before you. Bethe, an enor-
mous, robust, and talented theoretical physicist; Admiral Parsons, who was the
head of the Ordnance Division and is now gone. Fermi, who came in rather
late and became an associate director and who among other things was in charge
of those activities of the laboratory which were directly not relevant to the
atomic bomb but looked further ahead. Bacher, who was in charge of one aspect
31
of the physics of the bomb, and who will appear later. Cyril Smith, Zacharias,
Hartley Rowe, who after he got back from General Eisenhower in Normandy
landings advised us on engineering problems and helped set up the Sandia
laboratory which has played such a large part since that time.
By Mr. GAEEISON :
Q. That is Mr. Rowe of the United Fruit Co.?
A. Yes. Norman Ramsey, who was rarsou'g deputy. I mentioned some of
the names of people who will appear here probably.
My job, I don't think too much should be made of it. It was the job of being
sure that people understood and that the decisions were properly made, and
there were many not easy decisions. We did this through a system of groups,
divisions and coordinating councils and a steering committee which finally made
the determination of laboratory policy. Sometimes on trivial things like on did
we need another housing development, sometimes on very serious things which
if made wrong would in fact have prevented our doing the job. We had quite
complex relations in which Admiral Parsons was very helpful with the military
services who in the end had to deliver this thing, and had to train for delivering
it, and had to be sure that they knew all about it. We had to agree with them
about the hardware, and be sure that the hardware we were developing would be
usable by airmen when they were actually involved in it.
We had the problem of relations with the British. Bacher and I were called
on to discuss with Chadwick and Peierls, the state of the British program and
where a British mission was established at Los Alamos under the leadership
of Chadwick, who is very, very famous and very forthright British scientist,
a mission of some 20 people, extremely good. We had the problem of relations
with the laboratories and plants that were providing us with military, the ques-
tion of the specifications of the material and who was to do what. We had the
normal administrative problems of a job that was quite unfamiliar, not as
dangerous as President Roosevelt's letter indicated, but still capable of great
danger as accidents occurring shortly after the war showed. It was very new
« nd terribly exciting.
We had the job of keeping this rapid expansion and with the very end large
group of brilliant individualistic and talented people in harmony and pulling
on the same team. We had people there who were refugees from Germany and
Italy. We had Englishmen, who had lots of Americans. It was in a funny
way an international effort.
I need to say that it was not an international effort including Iron Curtain
countries. I guess in those days there was only one iron curtain country. In
a visit during the summer of 1943, Colonel Lansdale, head of Manhattan District
security, in a talk, I think, to the key personnel of the laboratory, made it very
clear how great weight the Government attached to maintaining this operation
secure against Russian espionage or Russian intelligence.
Q. As the work progressed, you began to get goals and deadlines, I suppose,
against which to produce the bomb, if you could?
A. The deadline never changed. It was as soon as possible. This depends
on when we were ready, when the stuff was ready, and how much stuff we
needed.
Q. Wasn't there a particular effort to get it done before the Potsdam
Conference?
A. Yes, that was of course quite late. After the collapse of Germany, we
understood that it was important to get this ready for the war in Japan. We
were told that it would be very important— I was told I guess by Mr. Stimson —
that it would be very important to know the state of affairs before the meeting
at Potsdam at which the future conduct of the war in the Far East would be
discussed.
Q. Discussed with the Russians?
A. I don't want to overstate that. It was my understanding, and on the
morning of July 16, I think Dr. Bush told me, that it was the intention of the
United States statesmen who went to Potsdam to say something about this to
the Russians. I never knew how much. Mr. Stimson explained later that he
had planned to say a good deal more than what was said, but when they saw
what the Russians looked like and how it felt, he didn't know whether it was a
good idea. The historical record as it is published indicates that the President
said no more than we had a new weapon which we planned to use in Japan, and
it was very powerful. I believe we were under incredible pressure to get it
done before the Potsdam meeting and Groves and I bickered for a couple of days.
303700—54 3
32
But in actual time it has been done enough times. There have been enough
lurid news stories about that first test so that I need not repeat what it was like.
In other context it should be said that it was as successful as we had any reason
to hope, and I believe we got the job done as fast as we could. That is what
we were told to do.
Mr. GARRISON. At this point I would like to read into the record a letter from
General Groves
Mr. ROBB. May I inquire, Mr. Garrison, these are copies, but you have the
originals available?
Mr. GARRISON. We have the originals available and we would be very glad to
show them to you.
Mr. ROBB. Thank you.
Mr. GARRISON. This is the letter of July 19, 1945, from General Groves and
Dr. Oppenheimer reading as follows: [Reading:]
"Since I returned to Washington I have done little else but think about and
talk about the truly magnificent results of the test conducted at Trinity last
Monday morning."
Trinity was the code name for the place.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GARRISON (reading) : "As time goes on and the test begins to take on its
true perspective, I appreciate more and more the outstanding performance of
you and your people in making the test so successful.
"General Farrell and I have discussed the project in all its many phases and
have reviewed it from every possible angle. We both feel that the job is a
high-water mark of scientific and engineering performance. Your leadership
and skill and the loyal and able performance of all your subordinates made it
An immediate report was cabled to the Secretary of War on Monday on the
great performance."
That would be to Potsdam, I take it?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GARRISON (reading) : "He promptly cabled back heartiest congratulations
to all concerned. This morning a f uller written report was sent to him by special
courier and he should have our impressions of the test by the time you get
this letter. I know that the President, the Secretaries of State and War and
General Marshall who are so importantly engaged at Potsdam now will be as
tremendously impressed as we were by the results of the test
"I hope you will show or read the suitable parts of this letter to the men who
did so much to make the job go so well and that you will extend to them my
grateful thanks for a job well done.
"Again, with deepest thanks and every good wish for the continued success
of our great project from both General Farrell and myself, I am,
Sincerely yours,
L. R. GROVES,
Major General, USA."
The WITNESS. Now there are a few points I might make about this period.
After toe test but before the use of the bombs in Japan, I had a meeting with
General Groves in Chicago to get some last minute arrangements fixed for the
combat use of the weapon. I asked him at that time, how do you feel about
this super—the super was our code name for what we then thought of the
hydrogen bomb, and we don't know any more than we did when he came UD
there was a little work but very inconclusive. As a matter of fact, the decisive
measurements on the behavior of tritium were on my desk when I got home—
Dr. EVANS. What, sir?
The WITNESS. The decisive measurements on the tritium— these are declassi-
fied now, as you know— were on my desk when I got back from Trinity, General
^?lear whether ^ mandate and therefore mine extended to
z s° reported to
Germany ended. There was, bnt it was upward. It^as mwarih sl
33
at the speedup than in the period after the German surrender and the actual
combat use of the bomb.
The third thing is that I did suggest to General Groves some changes in bomb
design which would make more efficient use of the material ; and they have long
since been done, of course. He turned them down as jeopardizing the prompt-
ness of the availability of bombs. He and I may not entirely agree about how
long a delay would have been involved, but the very fact that any delay was
involved was unacceptable.
Finally, there was, of course, a great deal of discussion— and I will return to
the formal aspects of that— about the desirability of using the bombs in Japan.
JL think the hotbed of this discussion was in Chicago rather than in Los Alamos.
At Los Alamos I heard very little talk about it. We always assumed, if they
were needed, they would be used. But there were places where people said for
the future of the world it would be better not to use them.
This problem was referred to me in a capacity different than director of Los
Alamos. We did everything we could to get them out there and as fast and
smooth as possible.
There was, however, at Los Alamos a change In the feel of people. I am
talking vaguely because this is a community now of seven or eight thousand
people, of whom maybe 1,000 or more are scientists and very close to each other,
talking all the time. This was partly a war measure, but it was also something
that was here to stay. There was a great sense of uncertainty and anxiety
about what should be done about it.
The generation of that kind of public — of a concern very similar to the public
concern — that followed Hiroshima and one natural outgrowth of which was our
abortive effort to establish quite a new relation among nations in the control
of atomic energy ; that was not something that had its roots very far back ; it
started toward the end when the war was about over.
Hiroshima was, of course, very successful, partly for reasons unanticipated by
us. We had been over the targets with a committee that was sent out to consult
us and to consider them, and the targets that were bombed were among the list
that seemed bright to us.
The Secretary of War deleted one target, and I have always been glad he did.
That was the unbombed and culture capital of Japan, Kyoto. He struck that
off. The two that were hit were among the targets selected. We sent a
mission on out from Los Alamos to assemble, test the bombs on Tinian, and to
fly with the B-29's that went out over the targets, and also to go in as soon as
they could get clearance from General MacArthur.
That mission was under General Farrell, who might appear— I am not sure
he can — to see what mess we made of those two towns.
When the war was over we came east, Dr. Bacher, Dr. Rabi, and I together.
There was a rumor of some wonderful method of getting energy for nothing
that the General Electric research people had discovered. Groves thought I
ought to have a look at it. It turned out to be nonsense. In the course of this
visit I talked with General Groves. There were at least two points that I ought
to report.
One was that I told him, that as I had earlier suggested in outlining what
the future work of the laboratory would be, I thought I should not continue as
director. I was the director of an emergency. This was going to be something
different, and I would not be the right person to preside over the change or the
In addition, there was not much left in me at the moment. We talked about
my successor. This was not a trivial problem. It took a while. I talked to
Commander Bradbury ; I talked to General Groves. Everyone was pleased with
that, and I think it was a very fine selection. I was therefore free to resign
and did mid-October, October 16, or something like that.
The other thing is that General Groves told me very briefly that he had been
told by Governor Byrnes— Justice Byrnes, I guess— who was then I think rep-
resenting the President on the Secretary of War's interim committee, that with
things as they were the work at Los Alamos ought to continue, but this did not
apply to the super or didn't think this applied to the super.
I don't know whether I left out some things that would be illuminating. This
is not a very vital part of our story from the point of view of the case, and I
would like to get on. ^ , . _ . ..
Mr. GABRISON. I happen to have here, Mr. Chairman, the original of the
United States of America Medal for Merit awarded to Dr. Oppenheimer, and I
would just like to read it. It would only take a second. The citation is signed
34
by President Truman to Dr. Oppenheimer *'f or exceptionally meritorious conduct
in the performance of outstanding service to the War Department, in brilliant
accomplishments involving great responsibility and scientific distinction in con-
nection with the development of the greatest military weapon of all time, the
atomic bomb. As director of the atomic bomb project laboratory in New Mexico,
his initiative and resourcefulness and his unswerving devotion to duty have
contributed immeasurably to the successful attainment of the objective. Dr.
Oppenheimer's accomplishments reflect great credit upon himself and upon the
military service." Signed, Harry Truman.
I am sorry I didn't have a copy for you to follow.
Mr. ROBB. That is already in the file.
Mr. GARRISON. This is January 12, 1946.
Dr. GRAY. You wish to read that in the record?
Mr. GARRISON. Yes. I think that is enough for the war period. I think we
will now swing into the postwar problems that arose immediately out of the
war and the way in which they involved Dr. Oppenheimer in the service of the
country.
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. You went back to Berkeley, of course, or you went back to Pasadena after
you left Los Alamos.
A. We are not quite so far.
Q. What did you want to say previous?
A. In may I was asked to serve on the interim committee which Mr. Stimsou
set up
Q. This prevented your leaving.
A. Yes; this was before I left Los Alamos. Lawrence, Fermi, and Arthur
Compton were the other members of this panel. We met with the interim com-
mittee I think on the 1st of June — I am not certain — of 1945 for a very prolonged
discussion which was attended by all members of the committee, all members
of the panel, and for most of the time General Marshall.
Apart from trying to make as vivid as we could the novelty, the variety, and
the dynamic quality of this field, which we thought very important to get across,
that this was not a finished job and there was a heck of a lot we didn't know,
much of the discussion resolved around the question raised by Secretary Stimson
as to whether there was any hope at all of using this development to get less
barbarous relations with the Russians.
The other two assignments which the panel had — one was quite slight. We
were asked to comment on whether the bomb should be used. I think the
reason we were asked for that comment was because a petition had been sent
in from a very distinguished and thoughtful group of scientists : "No, it should
not be used." It would be better for everything that they should not We
didn't know beans about the military situation in Japan. We didn't know
whether they could be caused to surrender by other means or whether the inva-
sion was really inevitable. But in back of our minds was the notion that the
invasion was inevitable because we had been told that. I have not been able to
review this document, but what it said I think is characteristic of how technical
people should answer questions.
We said that we didn't think that being scientists especially qualified us as
to how to answer this question of how the bombs should be used or not : opinion
was divided among us as it would be among other people if they knew about it
U e thought the two overriding considerations were the saving of lives in the
TL,*?* *hleffec! L_?f our actlans on t*e stability, on our strength and the
stability of the postwar world. We did say that we did not think exploding one
of these things as a firecracker over a desert was likely to be very impressive.
This was before we had actually done that. The destruction on the desert to
8Q™ a bable to remem *
able to remember. ^ nad seen all these test
brought me and the other members of the panel to
ey asked us to produce a prospectus about what needed to be
Vh We™te * ^eat W« book. We called in all sorts ol
the^ is a Ust somewhere about ; I won't try to remember—
tried
£«££ ™ V* tS "? fof P^P^ion, Its use for instruments of scientific to
gation, neutrons and radloactiTe tracers. Anyway, It was a fairly big fat
35
I suppose it is from that that the remark is quoted on the feasibility of the
super that is ascribed to me in 1945. In any case that would have been my
summary view of it at that time.
In connection with writing this report, I became involved in other activities
here in Washington. The War Department was anxious to get legislation passed
so that the atomic energy enterprise was not part of its budget and responsibility.
General Marshall talked to me about it : and Mr. Harrison— who was Mr. Stim-
son's aide — talked to me about it ; and others, as well. The matter seemed to be
a bit stuck because, on the one hand, it was difficult to present legislation on the
domestic control of atomic energy without saying whether you were going to
do anything toward seeking an international control of some kind.
On the other hand, the State Department was not quite clear what it wanted
to say about this for very understandable reasons. Therefore, I was asked to
consult with Mr. Acheson and eventually with Mr. Byrnes, and the purposes of
my visits were double. One was to explain how important it was for the survival
of any atomic energy enterprise at all that there be some legislation and soon.
That the people who were working on the job had some assurance of where they
were going. And the second was to urge that, insofar as it could be with safety
done, we explore the possibility of international control.
I did that, as I say, with Mr. Acheson and Mr. Byrnes. Then I went back
to Los Alamos. We turned in our report from the interim committee. I was
called back to testify on a matter not directly connected with the atom, and
that was a pair of bills to set up a National Science Foundation by the joint
committee called the Kilgore-Magnuson committee. I did so testify, and they
asked me what the relation between the atomic energy undertaking and the Na-
tional Science Foundation should be, and I think this is the first time I had pub-
lic occasion to talk about the importance of unplanned and unprogramed scien-
tific work, the enormous importance of training scientists, the importance of
freedom in scientific world as opposed to the need for programatic and concen-
trated work on practical problems.
The next day I went up before Representative May's committee which was con-
sidering the May- Johnson bill. The May- Johnson bill was the outgrowth of the
effort to get legislation adopted. The President had stated that he would seek
international control, first talk with our allies, the British and Canada, and other
nations, and he was considering a measure which would at least put our domestic
house in order. This bill had been introduced in the House and Senate simulta-
neously. Hearings were bein'g held on it in the House. Most scientists, and I
think all the liberal press, was very mad at this bill. It sounded repressive. It
had severe penalties for revealing information. It gave the Commission that was
to handle the atom rather wide and rather undefined powers. I had a lot of
confidence in the people who had drafted it and the people who would be adminis-
tering it, and I testified in' favor of it as an interim measure because I thought
the sooner this got into organized hands the better chance that places like Oak
Ridge and Los Alamos would be taken good care of, and after a year there would
be plenty of chance to amend the legislation with whatever one had learned in
between.
The newspaper PM had on the basis of my testimony the day before made one of
their cartoons, Hats Off, on the basis of my testimony on this bill put in another
cartoon Hats On. They didn't like it.
After that I went with Patterson— -I think before this Stimson had left Wash-
ington. I saw him on the last day he was in office here, and he had indicated to
me on that day that he thought it right and necessary to see if we could work out
an international agreement on the regulation of the atom — I went with Patter-
son to talk to President Truman about it He told me that he had invited King
and Attlee to come and they would shortly be getting into it. By this time I
moved to Pasadena.
I took up a job there as professor of physics. I did actually give a course, but
it is obscure to me how I gave it now. The intention was to make that quite
a full-time job and settle in Pasadena at least for that year. I still had the
appointments at the University of California at Berkeley and the California
Institute of Technology at Pasadena. I was called away from Pasadena to
come back to Washington and testify before McMahon's committee. I was
sort of reluctant to do it on the ground that I hoped to stay put. But I came
back. He kept me over for several days to give both public testimony and
secret testimony. ^ ^ ^
While that was going on, I was brought into conferences in the State
Department
36
By Mr. GAEBISON :
Q. That committee of McMahon's was for what purpose?
A. The special Senate committee was trying to study the atom and draft
legislation which was better than the May-Johnson bill — the committee that
led to the McMahon Act under which we are operating even today. I was called
into the State Department in the preliminary discussions of what the mission
that was going over to Moscow might talk to the Russians about. The United
States, England and Canada had issued a very resounding declaration about the
need for international control of atomic energy consistent with safeguards,
and the question was, What do we do next?
We discussed this at some length. I got the impression that we didn't have
a very well thought through notion of what international control was or what
we could say to the Russians, and I think it ended by our simply asking them to
subscribe to the three-power declaration.
It is, I think, partly because of that that my interest in and to some extent my
knowledge about the problem became known to people in the Department, and
the result was that I was called back shortly after the opening of the next year
for very serious work on the problem of international control.
I ought to mention one thing that occurred in Pasadena at that time. Gen-
eral Groves had this immense mass of technical information developed during
the war. All of it was secret. Some was about lubricants, some about valves, and
some about bombs. He wanted to get started on the job of sorting it out. What
should be made public, what should by all means not be made public, and what
should be worried about.
He appointed Dr. Richard Tolman in Pasadena as the chairman of the com-
mittee, and I was a member of it. You have a list of the other members. I
think Lawrence and Urey were on it, to begin this process of sorting it out We
divided things into three classes : Those which were manifestly useful for science
and the arts, and seemed to have no security value of any kind ; those that were
obviously connected with the military aspects of atomic energy and which should
not be declassified unless there were international safeguards, an intermediate
class of tough problems where we thought it would be dependent on the political
assessment of the state of the enemy— it was not enemy in those days— of Soviet
efforts and the prospects of conflict in a short time.
Our general philosophy was that if we are going to have a long, long period
when we are not going to use these things and don't need these things, the more
that is open, the better American technology and science will prosper. If the
time is kind of short, then the advantages of our secretly developed information
will be considerable.
Dr. GRAY. You say Dr. Tolman was chairman of this committee?
The WITNESS. That is right.
Dr. GRAY. What was this committee called?
The WITNESS. I have it down as declassification committee, but I am not
sure. May I at this point interpolate that the biographical material that you
were given late this morning was compiled by a very intelligent secretary. I did
check with her on 1 or 2 things I remember. The records are good only since
we came to the Institute. I wouldn't have you think that they are admirable
records of the years during the war, because there just are no such things. It is
the best we could do for your convenience.
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Then this takes us into the beginning of the plans for international control
of atomic energy.
A. Yes.
Q. And the preliminary discussions within the Government about that?
A. I have talked about some of the preliminary discussions. I believe the
background for the Lilienthal panel was the following. The Russians didn't
want to talk about the atom at Moscow, but they did agree to this three-power
declaration, and they threw the thing into the United Nations. There there was
another resounding declaration and two Senators, Vandenberg and Oonnally
were disturbed that this might leak secrets, that we might not be adequately
protected.
The Secretary of State said "No, there will be safeguards." When he got
home he set up a committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Acheson, with General
Groves, Dr. Bush, Dr. Conant, and Jack McCloy on it, and they were supposed to
devise the safeguards. They started thinking about the safeguards andin Mr
Acheson s words, they soon found they were trying to devise a cowcatcher without
37
ever having seen a locomotive, because nobody knew what was meant by interna-
tional control. TVTiat sort of things would be, who would do what and what
would the rules be. They appointed a panel of which Lilienthal was chairman,
the membership you have in full there, Mr. Barnard was on it, and Mr. Winne
was on it, and we were supposed to make a sketch of international control which
would be sureful in coping with the atom and which would, if possible, be a
step in carrying out that avowed intent of our action, namely, so to alter the
relations between nations that war itself would be a lot less likely.
This was a pretty ambitious thing with all that in mind. It did not work, but
people were talking that way in those days, and I must say that I was one of
those who talked that way very freely.
Q. Did you about this time prepare a memorandum to Mr. Lilienthal contain-
ing your ideas?
A. The way it worked is that we met and in the first few weeks, a week or two,
my job was that of teacher. I would get back at the blackboard and say you
can make energy this way in a periodic table, and that way and that way. This
is the way bombs are made and reactors are made. I gave in other worrts a
course. I gave parts of this course also to Mr. Acheson and Mr. McCloy at
night informally. Then we listened to parts of it that I didn't know anything
about, where the raw materials were, and what kind of headache that was.
Then everybody was kind of depressed the way people are about the atom, and
we decided to take a recess.
Mr. Lilienthal asked everybody to write him a note if they had any ideas as
to what might work and asked me in particular to write a primer on the subject
so that people could have the facts at their disposal. I stayed in Washington
and did both of these. I think the note is the thing to which you refer.
Q. Yes. I show you this document entitled, "Memorandum of February 2, 1946."
It should be entitled, "Extract From Memorandum of February 2, 1946, From
Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer to David E. Lilienthal, Chairman of the Board of
Consultants to the Secretary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy." This
extract has been copied, has it not, from a carbon copy in your flies from a
memorandum which you gave to Mr. Lilienthai at the time?
A. So you tell me. There is no reason why the whole memorandum should
not be available, but it is rather long.
Mr. GARKISON. I might say to the board that we will from time to time as we
go along be offering you extracts from writings and articles and addresses of
Dr. Oppenheimer. The full text of each of those will be available to the board,
and the only reason for taking excerpts from them is to save time, and because
they have a certain relevance to Dr. Oppenheimer's views at the time with respect
to our foreign relations. This is an example of what we shall be doing. I
would just like to read this, because it is quite a significant document.
L Reading:]
"It is probable that the main desire of our Government is the achievement of
safety and protection against the threat of atomic warfare. Even if it were
possible to achieve this without considering such positive features as the ex-
tension of knowledge and its application to constructive purposes,, it might be
argued that such a course should not be followed. It is my belief that quite apart
from its desirability, the provision for constructive development of the field
of atomic energy will turn out to be essential for the operation of any system
of safeguards. * * * In particular, it has become clear to us that not only politi-
cally but scientifically and technically as well, the field of atomic energy has
witnessed very rapid change and very rapid progress. I believe that this will be
the case in the future, too, and that no organization and no proposal can be
effective which does not have a flexibility adequate to these changes. I further
believe that any proposed organization must itself reflect the changing character
of the problem and the constructive purposes which are a complement to
control. * * *
"Almost everyone has, at one stage or another in his acquaintance with this
problem, considered prohibiting further work on atomic energy, and devising
a system of inspection adequate to insure that this prohibition is carried out.
It is not only that this proposal would make impossible the application of exist-
ing knowledge to constructive ends ; it would be so contrary to the human pat-
terns of exploration and exploitation that no agreement entered into by heads
of state could command the interest or the cooperation of the people of the
world. An apparently less radical solution would be the separation of the func-
tions and development and of control according to which the only responsibility
of an international authority would be the inspection of work carried out under
38
a purely national or private initiative, and the possible prohibition of some of
this work. The negative approach to the problem of control would leave the
inspecting agency with inadequate insight, both into the technical state of the
subject, and into its motivation and the organic characteristics of its
growth. * * *
"Against this background of the difficulties of control as an isolated and nega-
tive function, I have thought it essential at least to consider combining the
functions of development and of control in a single agency. It is fairly certain
that there are now, and will increasingly be, activities having to do with atomic
energy which are not vital to control and which, for human, or organizational,
or political reasons should not be included among the functions of the controlling
authority ; but there are certainly several such functions which, as matters now
appear, should be so included among them : The development of raw materials,
the exploration of atomic weapons, and the application, in its more dangerous
forms, of atomic energy to power and technology. * * *"
Mr. ROBB. Do you have the original of that, Mr. Garrison, so that we can see
the end of these sentences?
The WITNESS. We have only my own carbon of it, but we have it complete.
Mr. ROBB. That is what I mean.
The WITNESS. I am not ashamed of any aspect of the memorandum.
Mr. ROBB. I was not suggesting that you are, Doctor.
The WITNESS. I didn't want to burden you with it.
Dr. GRAY. May I ask a question there. Is your request there for the purposes
of making the entire memorandum part of the record?
Mr. ROBB. Oh, no.
Mr. GARRISON. Quite probably we should have had it ready, and we will have
it ready in a moment.
The WITNESS. Shall we save time by going on and we will have it as soon as it
is available.
Mr. ROBB. Yes.
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Would you care to make any comment between the relationship of the ideas
you expressed in this memorandum and the central philosophy of the Acheson-
Lilienthal report as it finally emerged?
A. The comment seems to come inappropriately from me. I think they are
identical. I think this is the heart of United States policy. I will say more. I
think that any attempt at that time to establish control along these lines would,
if accepted by the Soviets, have so altered their whole system and so altered their
whole relations with the Western World that the threat which has been building
up year after year since could not have existed. I think that no one at that time
could with much confidence believe that they would accept these proposals. I
think it was important to put them forward, and it was also important not to
express too much doubt that they might be accepted.
In the U. N. we hammered away at this line, but there are some intervening
complications. *
Q. The central idea of this scheme, I take it, was that there should be not
merely inspection of atomic-energy production and atomic-energy armaments,
but actual ownership and control of that whole process by an international
agency, so that purely national development of these atomic-energy programs
would be ruled out; and that would have entailed in Russia as in other countries
the actual ownership of productive facilities in that land, as in others, by an
international agency, is that correctly stated?
A. That is correctly stated. I think it is part of the story. It would have
meant that the Russian Government gave up control over things going on involv-
ing their citizens on their territory. It would have permitted free intercourse
between Russian nationals and people of the rest of the world. It would have
meant that there could be no Iron Curtain. How radical it was I may indicate
by a comment that came much later. General Ridgway was on the Military Staff
Committee at the U. N. at the time when I was on Mr. Brook's staff, and our
people had looked at this proposal and said if it were to go through, they would
recommend that all secret military establishments be abolished. This was auite
a slug. *
Q. Then work went forward on the report?
A. We worked very hard on it. I think I should say this, I have been on many
committees. The last thing I want to persuade you is that I was the "big cheese"
on these committees. I did have this idea. It does derive from me. But in other
ways, the other members of the committee had similar ideas.
39
For instance, Dr. Winne and Dr. Thomas said when they heard about the raw
material situation, we ought to get rid of the scramble for uranium. If we don't
work together on this we will never catch up with the control problem. So each
relying on his experience came to somewhat similar conclusions.
I think the implication that I am responsible and alone responsible for the
report is wrong. I am responsible for writing a great deal of it; not all of it,
but perhaps a half of it. It was, I think, persuasive document which both here
and abroad spoke well of the generosity and prudence and sense of America.
Mr. GARRISON. I have here, Mr. Chairman, a copy of the Acheson-Lilienthal
report, entitled "Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy" in case
any members of the board would like to look at it now or later. I would like at
this time to just read into the record three very short extracts from it.
Dr. GRAY. What is the date of that report?
Mr. GARRISON. March 16, 1946. It was prepared for the Secretary of State's
Committee on Atomic Energy by a board of consultants, Chester I. Barnard,
Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer, Dr. Charles A. Thomas, Harry A. Winne, David LUien-
thal, chairman. I can put the page references into these excerpts.
Dr. GRAY. I don't think that is necessary.
Mr. GARRISON (reading) : ''International control implies an acceptance from
the outset of the fact that our monopoly cannot last" (p. 53).
"It is essential that a workable system of safeguards remove from individual
nations or their citizens the legal right to engage in certain well-defined activi-
ties in respect to atomic energy which we believe will be generally agreed to
be intrinsically dangerous because they are or could be made steps in the pro-
duction of atomic bombs." (p. 22).
"It therefore becomes absolutely essential that any international agency seek-
ing to safeguard the security of the world against warlike uses of atomic energy
should be in the very forefront of technical competence in this field. If the in-
ternational agency is simply a police activity for only negative and repressive
functions, inevitably and within a very short period of time the enforcement
agency will not know enough to be able to recognize new elements of danger,
new possibilities of evasion, or the beginning of a course of development having
dangerous and warlike ends in view * * *" (p. 23.)
I think those three paragraphs are significant of the central thought of the
report. I am sure if the board will at its leisure re-read again the memorandum
to Mr. Lilienthal that Dr. Oppenheimer wrote on February 2, 1946, you will see
that the same thought appears in that memorandum as appears in the final report
Dr. GRAY. For the purposes of the record, these are not paragraphs which
appear consecutively in this document. I don't know. I am asking for informa-
tion. Are they separated? Is my question clear?
Mr. GARRISON. Yes, it is, indeed.
Mr. ECKEB. I believe they do not appear consecutively where the quotes are
closed.
Mr. GARRISON. Suppose we at the end of the hour put the page references in.
They should be in.
Dr. GRAY. I think that is satisfactory.
By Mr. Garrison :
Q. Do you want to go now to your testimony before the McMahon committee?
A. I will go quickly. When the report was done, we had several conferences
with Acheson's committee. In fact, the last and rather delicate chapter of the
report which I largely wrote we did not originally have in. But the committee
thought that some description of how you might get from where we were then
to where we thought we would like to be was called for. This had the disad-
vantage that it tended to disclose some aspects of our negotiating position and
made the publication of the report perhaps less wise than it would otherwise have
been.
I went home and I was very soon called back for two reasons. The report was
out and the newspapers greatly distorted and exaggerated the virtues of denatur-
ing. We had said you could fix up fissionable material so it was not immediately
useable in bombs. This was the headline. Probably when we wrote it we in-
vJted that distortion. In any case it occurred.
I came back partly ot attend the meeting to get an agree statement out of a lot
of echnical people as to what the truth was and partly to testify before McMahon's
committee. I remember Senator Vandenberg saying "I like this." I think it
was largely in that spirit that we went on with it. Baruch had been appointed
to represent the United States in these negotiations and this was announced, I
think, just about the time the report was done. I went back to California again,
40
but before long I came back to talk with Mr. Baruch and Hancock and Bberstadt
and tell them a little bit about how we had gone about it.
I then gave some lectures at Cornell on a rather broad subject, but one of the
lectures was about the international control of atomic energy. It was reprinted
rather widely, and was an advocacy of the position that we had adopted. I gave
another talk the next day in Pittsburgh which was another job of advocacy of this
pet of proposals. It was reprinted in the New York Times. Mr. Baruch told me
that I had scooped his speech that he was going to make at the opening of the
U. N. That was not true. But it did have in it one element which was missing
from the Lilienthal report and that was the remark that this business we were
talking about was incompatible with a veto. You could not run a job like this
and have Yugoslavia or Crete decide that they didn't like what was going on and
stop it. This was the veto on operations ; it was not the veto on sanctions, be-
cause nothing we discussed had to do with sanctions. That was the second of
Mr. Baruch's points.
We met in Blair Lee House the next day and had a long discussion with Mr.
Baruch and his staff. He asked me what we had done wrong in the report I
remember mentioning a few points, among them the failure to make clear the
relation of what we proposed to the veto, and the invitation that we gave to the
press and the public to exaggerate the value of the denaturing.
Very shortly thereafter I agreed to serve as one of the consultants to Mr.
Baruch in preparation for and in the conduct of the U. N. negotiations. The
senior consultant was Dr. Richard Tolman, whom I mentioned before. I think
Dr. Robert Bacher and I were the most active next to Dr. Tolman, but Compton
and Thomas and one or two other people were also involved.
We spent through the summer with him and with his staff, and tried to help.
The main job we did was to get an agreed paper out of the International Com-
mission that international control was technically feasible. This was something
you could do. The Russian delegate, I think it was Gromyko, balked at signing
this, but finally the Russians agreed that international control was technically
feasible. I think it is the last time we have agreed with them on anything in the
U. N., and certainly anything having to with the atom.
Q. They agreed that it was technically feasible, but the report did not say it
was politically feasible.
A. They attacked the proposal. They attacked both the aspects which were
prominent in the Acheson and Lilienthal thing, and that which Mr. Baruch added
having to do with sanctions. I think they mostly attacked the main point, that
this would have been a terrible invasion of their privacy, and they were not
going to have it This attack continued for years.
Dr. GRAY. May I interrupt you there, Dr. Oppenheimer. I want to know
whether you want a break. You have been talking rather constantly
Mr. GARRISON. I think he will be getting a break because I will be reading a
lew documents into the record, but I think the Board would like a break.
Dr. GRAY. I would like to see the point at which we will stop the hearing this
afternoon,
(Discussion off the record.)
Dr. GRAY. Suppose we take a recess for 5 minutes.
(Brief recess.)
Dr. GRAY. I think we might as well proceed, Dr. Oppenheimer.
The WITNESS. After the summer of work with Mr. Baruch, it became diffi-
cult even for a dedicated optimist to think that anything would come of the
negotiations in the sense of a real agreement. It was hard to believe that
before it started, and the nature of the Soviet conduct, not only the kind
of objections they made, but the nature of their dealings was extremely reveal-
ing to anyone who saw it for the first time.
In fact, it is worth recollecting that the Acheson-Lilienthal board was work-
ing in early 1946 at precisely the time when Stalin made the speech about
their encirclement and their need to keep their guard up and to rearm.
I revert to the fact that it was healthy for us to attempt this, but that it
should not be read into that time that we were going around in a mood of high
optimism. I have seldom been as gloomy in my life; that even includes today
Nevertheless there was a job to do and I continued to do it The job was
establishing to our friends in the U. N., to the governments and so far as
possible to the officials and to the people of our friendly nations, that what
we had put up made sense and was not a bluff and was not propaganda and
that it had merit.
41
I don't know how important that job was but I stayed with the Baruch
enterprise until he resigned, and then I was asked to serve as adviser to
General Osborn, who took over in the spring of 1947. Osborn asked me to
come up and spend some time with him talking it over. On the way I stopped
at the State Department and Mr. Acheson showed me the President's speech
on the Truman Doctrine. He wanted me to be quite clear that we were entering
an adversary relationship with the Soviet, and whatever we did in the atomic
talk we should bear that in mind.
I worked with Mr. Osborn intensively at first. I testified before the U. N.
AEG, or one of its committees, on how you would go about on the interna-
tional cooperative beneficial uses of atomic energy.
I continued to consult Mr. Osborn in company with Dr. Conant and General
Farrell and General Groves, and maybe General Nichols, as long as the prob-
lem of atomic control was still a matter of debate in the United Nations until
it was engulfed in the wider but also hopeless job of disarmament.
I would like at this time to say only two things. One is that the negative
view of the possibility of any agreed solution with the Russians which came
on us all then, as it has not gotten any different but gotten deeper, and I would
like to refer to that again in connection with the work we did in 1952 for
the State Department on the regulation of armaments, where the context was
somewhat different.
The second is to say that incidental good did come of this effort. I think
that, insofar as people paid attention to it, the United States proposals were
recognized as indeed sensible, and we got lots of credit for them.
I ran into the representatives of the French and English and some other
countries, too— however, primarily the French and English — and, though always
keeping my own Government informed, as usual, I was, I think, able to do some
useful jobs on the side. I talked to the French officials as well as the French
scientists about the desirability of their building up a real scientific life in
France and about the undesirability of their getting into any rivalry with us on
the atomic business.
I said I thought we would be able to help and have more fellowships and
laboratories, and we would get into lots of trouble if they were getting into
sensitive areas from the point of view of security. I think I always reported
and checked with the officials of AEC or the State Department when any such
conversations occurred.
With the United Kingdom it was quite a different thing. There we had had
an intimate partnership, as you read in the newspapers and know anyway,
in the last few years and during the war. There were some excluded areas,
but all the things I was concerned with the British knew about and con-
tributed to.
I visited Europe in the summer of 1948. In the winter of 1949 we undertook
to see what could be done to restore this partnership. You will hear testimony
about this from other people. The problem kept arising because of raw-
materials allocation, because of the dissatisfaction of the British, and because
of the double problem that it was nonsense to have their best people duplicat-
ing what we were doing and that there was thought to be and perhaps was
a security problem in working with them.
We had a meeting in Princeton for 2 or 3 days that I think was chaired
by Mr. William Webster. The Commission was represented by the General
Manager and General Counsel. The Military Establishment was represented
by General Nichols and General Norstad ; the State Department, by Mr. Kennan
and Mr. Butler ; and the interest at laity, by Dr. Conant and myself.
This was the beginning of an attempt which was abortive but which got quite
far along to reuniting the relations between United States, England, and Canada
in the atomic-energy business. It was abortive — I had better not say why be-
cause I was not in the politics of its abortion. But I have always regretted
that failure, and I am not sorry for the efforts I made.
Mr. MORGAN. When was that? ^^^
The WITNESS. The meeting was in 1949. I read when I was out west in 1949
of the evening when the President called in the Senators to Blair House when
he was leaving, and when they came out of the door the reporters talked to
them and were told that the Senators heard something so dreadful that they
could not speak about it. Wnat they heard was about the wartime collaboration
and that the British knew a lot about atomic bombs and could probably make
them if they tried and that they were on the point of trying on their own. This
is hearsay testimony, or testimony as to what I read in the papers.
42
As I say, our relations with the scientists of other countries and some effort
to improve what we have learned to call the basis— the cordiality and strength
of our alliances — these things did come out of these U. N. meetings. But it was
pretty thin fruits compared to the vision of world government and permanent
peace which some people had at the time.
I think now there is stuff to read.
By Mr. GAEEISON :
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, I have here a document, called atomic energy as a
contemporary problem, by Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, presented at the National
War College in Washington, September 17, 1947. This is a stenographic tran-
script of the remarks made by you on that occasion.
This came from your files, I take it?
A. That is right.
Mr. GARRISON. I would be glad to hand it to counsel as I read an excerpt
from it.
The WITNESS. This may not be published without the permission of the War
College. It has no restricted data, but it cannot be published without the
permission of the War College.
(Discussion off the record.)
Dr. GRAY. Will you proceed?
Mr. GABRISON. These excerpts are from pages 6 to 8 of that transcript.
Mr. HOBB. I have it.
Mr. GABRISON (reading) : "At the same time, I think no one can take with
any seriousness the hope or expectation that the Soviet Union will accede, or
that it will come closer to acceding, to what is now the majority plan.
That is the United States plan. [Reading :]
"That is not too hard to understand. The cornerstone of our proposal is an
institution which requires candidness and great openness in regard to technical
realities and policy. It involves the working cooperation between peoples, irre-
spective of nationality. It involves a maximum effort to abolish national rivalries
in the field of atomic energy, and in all dangerous areas of atomic energy It
involves a total and genuine international action. It is clear that, even for the
United States, proposals of this kind involve a very real renunciation * * *."
Mr. ROBB. Wasn't there an omission at that point?
Mr. GARRISON. There are three dots which I have indicated here, and if there
is anything significant in the omission
Mr. ROBB. No ; I have not said there is.
Mr. GABBISON. I have indicated the omissions by dots.
Mr. ROBB. I think for the record it should be indicated.
Mr. GARRISON. Yes ; the reporter will so indicate. [Reading:]
"But if, for the United States and the Western European powers, some sacri-
fices are required by these proposals, the sacrifices, the renunciation, required of
Russia are of another order of magnitude; and that is because the proposed
pattern of control stands in a very gross conflict to the present patterns of state
power in Russia and because the ideological underpinning of that power —
namely, the belief in the inevitability of conflict between Russia and the capitalist
world, or the allegedly capitalist world — this underpinning, which is most diffi-
cult, I suppose, for a government to renounce, would be repudiated by a coopera-
tion as intense or as intimate as is required by our proposals for* the control
of atomic energy. Thus what we have asked of the Russians is a very far-
reaching renunciation and reversal of the basis of their state power and of their
state power itself. It does not seem to me likely that we have found induce-
ments or cajolery or threats which together are adequate to make them take
this great plunge. That does not mean, I suppose, that this will never happen,
but it will almost certainly not happen as a result of the discussions in the
United Nations.
"The whole notion of international control presupposes a certain confidence,
a confidence which may not be inconsistent with carrying a gun when you sit
down to play poker but at least is consistent with sitting down to play poker.
In the year and a half since the effort on these problems started, we have found
ourselves forced by the Soviet moves and by the changing political situation
throughout the world over and over again to take steps which were in essence
a repudiation of that confidence; and the Soviet has taken ever more grave steps
in repudiation of that confidence. * * * I therefore think that to believe seriously
today [1947] that in 6 months, a year, or a year and a half we will have some-
thing resembling an ADA [Atomic Development Authority]. The cooperative
development of atomic energy involves a kind of schizophrenia which can only
43
lead to very bad political confusion. I even think the worry that one often
hears discussed in unofficial, and sometimes official, circles — 'What would happen
if the Russians suddenly reversed their stand, embraced our proposals, and
started to work to put them in effect?'— that is an empty worry because it is in
the nature of the proposals we have made — a protection afforded by our plans
for the United States — that they cannot be implemented in very bad faith, that
they presuppose a very large measure of peaceful intention, of cooperation, of
confidence and candor before they can get started. I am therefore not very
much alarmed that Mr. Gromyko will someday say to Mr. Osborn, 4We finally
have understood your proposals and we think they are wonderful. We accept
them in f ull.' I do not think this will happen."
The next excerpt is from an article in Foreign Affairs for January 1948,
entitled "International Control of Atomic Energy/' by ,T. Robert Oppenheiiner.
These are pages 12, 13, and 14 in that article.
Mr. Robb, do you have page 12 there?
Mr. ROBB. Yes.
Mr. GAEEISON. This, you will see, is several months after the War College
speech which we have just been through. [Reading :]
"Two aspects of this development need to be specially mentioned. One has
to do with what may be called the aim of the United States policy— the sketch
of our picture of the world as we would like to see it insofar as atomic
energy was concerned. Here the principles of internationalization, openness,
candor, and the complete absence of secrecy, and the emphasis on cooperative,
constructive development, the absence of international rivalry, the absence of
legal right for national governments to intervene — these are the pillars on
which our policy was built * * * The second aspect of our policy which needs
to be mentioned is that, while these proposals were being developed and
their soundness explored and understood, the very bases for international co-
operation between the United States and the Soviet Union were being eradicated
by a revelation of their deep conflicts of interest, the deep and apparently
mutual repugnance of their ways of life, and the apparent conviction on the
part of the Soviet Union of the inevitability of conflict — and not in ideas alone,
but in force. For these reasons the United States has coupled its far-reaching
proposals for the future of atomic energy with rather guarded reference to the
safeguards required, lest in our transition to the happy state of intenational
control we find ourselves at a marked relative disadvantage. Natural and
inevitable as these desires are, they nevertheless stand in bleak contradiction
to our central proposals for the renunciation of sovereignty, secrecy, and rivalry
in the field of atomic energy. Here again it is no doubt idle to ask how this
country would have responded had the Soviet Union approached the problem
of atomic-energy control in a true spirit of cooperation. Such a situation pre-
supposes those profound changes in all of Soviet policy, which in their reactions
upon us would have altered the nature of our political purposes and opened
new avenues for establishing international control. * * *
"Questions will naturally arise as to whether limited but nevertheless worthy
objectives cannot be achieved in this field. Thus, there is the question of whether
agreements to outlaw atomic weapons more like the conventional agreements,
supplemented by a more modest apparatus for inspection, may not give us some
degree of security. Possibly, when the lines of political hostility were not
as sharply drawn as they are now between the Soviet Union and the United
States, we might have tried to find an affirmative answer to this question.
Were we not dealing with a rival whose normal practices, even in matters having
nothing to do with atomic energy, involve secrecy and police control which is
the very opposite of the openness that we have advocated— and under suitable
assurances offered to adopt — we might believe that less radical steps of inter-
nationalization could be adequate. * * * My own view is that only a profound
change in the whole orientation of Soviet policy, and a corresponding reorienta-
tion of our own, even in matters far from atomic energy, would give substance
to the initial high hopes."
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, here is a letter to you from Mr. Chester Wood, the
Secretary of the New York State Bar Association, enclosing a transcript of
the remarks that you addressed to a meeting of the judicial section of that
association, this being February 1948— the precise day is not clear. This was
taken from your files, was it not?
A. It was certainly taken from my files. That is all I can say.
Q. Then you identify the document, I assume, do yon not?
44
A. If I am to make a serious identification, I should see it.
Q. Yes [handing].
Mr. GABRISON. The excerpts which I have taken from that are at pages 7 to
10, inclusive.
The WITNESS. I do identify it
Mr. GARRISON. Now I would like to read from this address. [Reading :]
"The proposals which the United States made and which are manifestly not
going to be accepted were perhaps somewhat more radical even than the people
of this country believed, perhaps even than some of the officers of this Govern-
ment believed. The idea was not that one would fasten a scheme of control
onto an otherwise unaltered pattern of the relations between sovereign states.
The relation was rather that here appeared to be an opportunity, very pressing
in its urgency and very rich in its technical patterns, for getting started, for
making a very profound alteration in the relations between states, and one
which might conceivably be sufficiently attractive to the Government of the
Soviet Union to cause them to reverse what has been their long-standing policy
of extreme secrecy, considerable terror, and very great latent hostility to the
non-Soviet world.
"The changes that were implied or that would have been implied by the ac-
ceptance of our proposals, by the elaboration and implementation of our pro-
posals, would have altered the face of the world. They would have done so in
ways that no one is wise enough to predict but that surely would have led to a
much greater openness, to a much greater candidness, to much more working
cooperation between the peoples of various nations. * * * When you think,
for instance, that so obvious a notion as the economic cooperation of the countries
of Western Europe is still very far from a reality, you begin to realize that the
formal agreement of the delegates was only the beginning of the problem. But
one point overshadows this, and that is, however great the enunciation of what
is for us a powerful action, however great the enunciation might appear to the
British, who are concerned, as rapidly as possible, to reach the exploitation of
atomic energy as a form of power, the sacrifices which the acceptance of these
proposals would have meant to the Government of the Soviet Union went very
much further than that, because it implied a repudiation of the philosophy by
which that Government has come into being, has been living * * *."
Dr. GRAY. Do you suppose that word "enunciation" was improperly transcribed
from your remarks?
The WITNESS. Yes. It was certainly "renunciation."
Mr. ECKER. It is a verbatim copy of the stenographer's transcript.
Mr. GARRISON. I am sure you are right, Mr. Chairman.
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, I show you a manuscript entitled, "Address by J. Robert
Oppenheimer before the Rochester Institute of International Affairs, December
11, 1948," at Rochester, N. Y., devoted to the prospects for world peace, and ask
you if counsel selected that from your files?
A. He did.
Q. Will you hand it to counsel?
A. Yes [handing],
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I have a very short extract from that at page 8
[Reading:]
"Certainly there was little to inspire, and nothing to Justify, a troubled con-
science in the proposals that our Government made to the United Nations, as to
the form which the international control of atomic energy should take. These
proposals, and some detailed means for implementing them, were explored and
criticized, elaborated, and recommended for adoption by 14 of the 17 member
nations who served on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. They
were rejected as wholly unacceptable, even as a basis for further discussion, by
the three Soviet states, whose contributions to policy and to debate have through-
out constituted for us a debasingly low standard of comparison."
Mr. GARRISON. I have here a reprint from the record of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, volume 6, No. 3, for March 1951, containing an
address by Dr. Oppenheimer, entitled "Contemporary Problems of Atomic
Energy."
The excerpts which I am about to read to the Board appear at page 109 of this
reprint from the record. [Reading:]
"Our proposals for the International Control of Atomic Energy, which were
largely based on the technical realities of the field, were presented on our behalf
to the United Nations by Mr. Baruch, and were widely accepted by the non-
Communist nations. The implementation of these proposals would have re-
quired a profound alteration in some, at least, of those features of the Soviet
45
system which are responsible for the great troubles we are in today. The failure
to persuade the Soviet Government to alter its practices was anticipated by
many. Yet we should not forget that this is an objective not only of the past
but of the future as well.
"Let me mention 1 or 2 points. One, to my mind, the principal one, was that
it was clear that no secure system could be developed for protecting people
against the abuse of atomic weapons, unless the world were open to access,
unless it was possible to find out the relevant facts everywhere in the world
which had to do with the security of the rest of the world. This notion of open-
ness, of an open world, is, of course, relevant to other aspects of the Soviet sys-
tem. It is doubtful whether, without the newly terrible, yet archaic, apparatus
of the Iron Curtain, a government like the Soviet Government could exist. It
is doubtful whether the abuses of that Government could persist."
Mr. GABBISON. I have just one more short excerpt to read. This is from an-
other article in Foreign Affairs of which we have a copy here for July 1953. This
is quite recent. The excerpts are from pages 525 to 526 of that article.
[.Reading:]
"Earlier, shortly after the war's end, the Government of the United States
had put forward some modest suggestions, responsive to these views, for dealing
with the atom in a friendly, open, cooperative way. We need not argue as to
whether these proposals were stillborn. They have been very dead a long, long
time, to the surprise of only a few. Openness, friendliness, and cooperation did
not seem to be what the Soviet Government most prized on this earth.
"It should not be beyond human ingenuity for us to devise less friendly pro-
posals. We need not here detail the many reasons why they have not been put
forward, why it has appeared irrelevant and grotesque to do so. These reasons
range from the special difficulties of all negotiation with the Soviet Union,
through the peculiar obstacles presented by the programmatic hostility and the
institutionalized secretiveness of Communist countries, to what may be regarded
as the more normal and familiar difficulties of devising instruments for the
regulation of armaments in a world without prospect of political settlement.
"Instead we came to grips, or began to come to grips, with the massive evidences
of Soviet hostility and the growing evidences of Soviet power, and with the many
almost inevitable, yet often tragic, elements of weakness, disharmony and dis-
unity in what we have learned to call the free world."
The WITNESS. I think we are through with this. I will leave it to counsel to
say what it means, but I think that in every case I tried to explain that we could
not take this path to people who insisted on thinking that we might, and yet not
to talk publicly of the fact that we were giving up a position until the Government
of the United States had in fact given it up.
There was a bit of discrepancy between our official position and reality and
the opinion, let us say, of my colleagues in science. I tried to explain, to them
that the jig was up, because that was relevant to getting back to work. At the
same time I could not come out and say, "This is a hopeless thing," because I
had some official connection with the Government until the Government had
itself said so. I think these dates will bear that out more or less.
Now we are through with this phase and entering on a new one. In late 1946,
I was appointed by the President as a member of the General Advisory Commit-
tee to the Atomic Energy Commission. That is a long big job and I will talk
about it. Shortly thereafter I was given a concurrent appointment which I held
perhaps even a little longer. That was as a member of the Committee on Atomic
Energy of the Joint Research and Development Board in the Military Establish-
ment. This later became the Research and Development Board and the Chair-
men varied. The initial arrangements were made by Dr. Bush who was head of
this outfit
Dr. Bush appointed Conant as Chairman, the members of the statutory mili-
tary liaison committee as members, and as civilian members me and Crawford
Greenewalt. There was some overlapping of membership between the Advisory
Committee and this committee, and total overlapping of membership between the
military liaison committee and this committee.
What we did on this committee I don't propose to go into in such detail, and I
will try to finish with that this afternoon.
The initial job was to try to give direct technical information to the military
on the military liaison committee. General Groves knew quite a lot about the
atom and so did Admiral Parsons. The other members of the committee in those
days were not very fresh to it. There was at that time not very much machinery
for gathering information*
46
I think, as Dr. Bush explained it, it seemed like a good idea if the same technical
considerations which were being made available to the Commission were being
made available directly to the military. It was a liaison function. We had
very little, if any, power, but we had the ability to talk about common problems.
The importance of this function declined very much because the military
developed admirable ways of getting their own intelligence and their own
knowledge and became as expert as anyone. But it did provide a continuing
channel of discussion. Every once in a wliile we would stir something up in this
committee which was useful.
I have in inind two examples. * * * I won't spell out the details but the
question of getting from the hardware which the Commission provided and the
hardware which the military services had to the point where you could really
make effective use right away.
This was the time, I may remind you, when the feeling that war might break
out, however erroneous — widespread war — was very, very general, and there
was a war going on in Korea and it was not going too well.
Another example-— our role was certainly not major in it — comes to mind, * * *
There were two panels on this Board of which I acted as chairman. One was
in the summer of 1948, and I think the members of it are listed on your paper,
which was a general sorting operation. By then an enormous number of poten-
tially useful applications of atomic energy to military things came up, some of
them crazy, some of them sensible, some of them immediate and some of them
very remote.
We sat down, the three generals, the admiral and I, and called in other people
whose help would be useful and wrote our best opinion as to the relative time
scales and absolute time scales of submarine propulsion and nuclear aircraft pro-
pulsion ; how it was going with the deliverability of tactical weapons, what
needed to be done here, what needed to be done there.
The description of the report, the contents of which I cannot tell you, is not
going to be very interesting. I think it was a decent Job.
The report that we wrote in late 1950 and early 1951 — and I may remind you
of who was on that committee. I was again the chairman.
Q. You are reading from what?
A. The third page of your notes. Bacher, Alvarez, Lawrence, Kelly, Parsons,
Wilson, McOormack. There we took a somewhat deeper bite, because this was
the time of the Chinese intervention and a time when as you may remember
of daily alerts about the possibility of attack on the continental United States,
a time of very great anxiety. We addressed ourselves to the question with
what we have and can have soon, how rapidly we can get a really effective use
of the atomic capability that we have developed. What can we do fast about
this. Yon will hear testimony about this possibly from the other witnesses.
It is also a time at which technical prospects on the thermonuclear program
were quite bleak. We so reported. I think it is interesting that there was no
difference of opinion among us as to what we had solved.
This committee has continued until the Research and Development Board
was abolished. I think these are the few points that I wanted to cover.
Now we have the GAC appointment and I suppose there it would be best to
start up fresh in the morning. There is something to read. It is something
that I came upon in the files during the period of getting them straight. It is a
letter I wrote to Admiral McMorris of the General Board of the Navy, and it
represents the view of our military problem which, at that time, and I believe
before and after, was the view that I took into the General Advisory Committee
and kept through it. It is not a committee statement. It is not a report of
the GAC. It is my own thoughts. It may give some background for what we
started out to do and what we did do in the descriptions we gave on the General
Advisory Committee.
Q. These excerpts there come from this carbon from your files, is that correct'
A. That is correct.
Q. They begin on page 1.
Dr. GRAY. What is the date of this?
Mr. GARRISON. April 14, 1948. [Reading:]
"Whatever our hopes for the future, we must surely be prepared, both in
planning and in the development of weapons, and insofar as possible in our 'force
in being1, for more than one kind of conflict. That is, we must be prepared to
meet the enemy in certain crucial, strategic areas in which conflict is likely and
to defeat him in those areas. We must also be prepared, if need be, to engage
in total war, to carry the war to the enemy and attempt to destroy him One
reason why we must keep both of these objectives in mind (and they call for
,47
quite definite plans and quite different emphasis as to equipment, troops and
weapons) is that it may not be in our hands to decide. With this reservation,
it seems appropriate to suggest that there may be two phases to the problem.
"At the present time (1948), to the best of my knowledge, the Soviet Union
is not in a position to effectively attack the United States itself. Opinions differ
and evidence is scanty as to how long such a state of affairs may last. One
important factor may be the time necessary for the Soviet Union to carry out
the program of atomic energy to obtain a significant atomic armament. With all
recognition of the need for caution in such predictions, I tend to believe that
for a long time to come the Soviet Union will not have achieved this objective,
nor even the more minor, but also dangerous possibility of conducting radiological
warfare." •
The WITNESS. This was a bad guess.
Mr. GABRISON [reading] : "Insofar as the United States need not for some time
to come fear a serious and direct attack on this country, it would seem to me
likely that our primary objective would be to prevent the success of Soviet arms
and Soviet policies, to carry out a policy of attrition, and not to engage in a total
war aimed at destroying entirely the sources of Soviet power. There are many
arguments for this and I have little to add to the obvious ones. Yet, the general
political consideration that the consequences, even in victory, of a total war
carried out against the Soviet Union would be inimical to the preservation of
our way of life, is most persuasive to me.
"On the other hand, as time approaches, if it ever should, where as a result
of political or military success in Europe or Asia, as a result of advancing
technological development and improved industrial output, the Soviet Union
becomes a direct threat to the United States, we shall no longer have this option.
We should no longer have this option if the maintenance of a strategic area such
as Western Europe or Japan could not be achieved without a direct attack on
the sources of Soviet power.
"From this it seems to me that two conclusions would seem to follow: (1)
That we must be prepared, in planning, in logistics, and in development, for more
than one kind of war; and (2) that the very greatest attention must be given
to obtaining reliable information about the state of affairs within the Soviet
Union bearing on its military potential.
"One final comment : There is to my mind little doubt that were we today, with
the kind of provocation which the Soviet Union almost daily affords, to attack
the centers of Soviet population and industry with atomic weapons, we should
be forfeiting the sympathy of many potential allies on whose cooperation the
success of our arms and the fundamental creation of a stable peace may very
well depend. These same people would no doubt be almost equally disturbed
were we to renounce, irrespective of the development of Soviet power, recourse to
such armament"
Are there any comments you would like to make on the views expressed there?
The WITNESS. I need to say two things. First, that this was apparently an
answer to some inquiry. I don't know what the inquiry was. Second, that I
was completely wrong in thinking that we could be relaxed about the Soviet
atomic threat. I think I was in very general company. I think we all very soon
rectified these views as the evidence came in. But this was a year and a half
before the first Soviet explosion and the time when my views was, I think, quite
the same as the general intelligence views.
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. This opening paragraph, if I may go back to it for a moment, sounds to me
rather like what Admiral Radf ord said the other day about the New Look. "We
must be prepared to meet lie enemy in certain crucial, strategic areas in which
conflict is likely, and to defeat him in those areas. We must also be prepared, if
need be, to engage in total war, to carry the war to the enemy and to attempt
to destroy him." .This has emphasis on flexibility, which I think is also apparent
in that testimony by Admiral Radf ord.
Dr. GRAY. May I ask, did you read the beginning of this letter?
The WITNESS. No. I would like to have the beginning read, because the
beginning states that I don't know anything about this subject.
Mr. ROBB. It occurred to me, Mr. Chairman, that the beginning and the end
should be read to give the entire picture.
The WITNESS. I don't know what the beginning says.
Mr. ROBB. You are quite right, it says you don't know anything.
The WITNESS. Shall I do that. [Reading.]
303700—54 4
48
"Thank you for your letter of March 31. In this you enclose the agenda for
the study of the General Board, serial 315. You request specifically such com-
ments as I can make on items 110, 118, and 120.
"Though I am aware of the great importance which attaches to this study, and
the need for serious thought and effort on the part of many if the study is to be
successful, I nevertheless must protest my almost total lack of qualification for
speaking to the question which you have put. Such comments as I can make
should be given no great weight; they rest on little experience and little
knowledge.
"All three of the items referred to me have to do with the plans of the United
States for waging war, and with the kind of war we should fight. Implicit in
some questions and explicit in others, is the issue of weapons of mass destruc-
tion ; should we use these, should we plan to use these, should we postpone the
use of these. Implicit in the question is also the issue of a limited versus a
total conflict ; should the objective be destruction of the enemy, or his defeat in a
specific area. Let me attempt to give my views on these matters."
Then it goes into what Mr. Garrison read.
The end is: "In conclusion, let me again remind you that these are in the
nature of personal views, and that I can attach little weight to them, if, in
matters which fall more closely within my field of competence, I can be of use
to you, I shall of course be glad to do so.1'
Dr. GRAY. That is addressed to whom?
The WITNESS. Admiral McMorris, head of the General Board of the Navy. I
am in a complete fog as to what it was all about, except insofar as this answer
Dr. GRAY. Was this signed as Chairman of some panel?
The WITNESS. No, this was an individual opinion.
Dr. GRAY. Thank you.
Mr. GARRISON. It is simply introduced at this time to show his general ap-
proach to the whole policy of armament of this country.
The WITNESS. There is one small item before we get into the General Advisory
Committee, and that is the following : There was set up under the. contract with
all three services, Army, Navy, and Air Forces, I think the operating contractor
was the Army, a study at California Institute of Technology, Dr. DuBridge was
in charge of it, under the name of project Vista, and its function was generally
speaking to talk about ground combat and the support of ground combat. What
that finally came down to was the study of the defense of Europe and what it
came down to was the study of what you do to defend Europe at any time, as
soon as possible, if necessary.
The men involved in this project worked very hard on it, and they kept asking
me to come out and talk about the use of atomic weapons in this picture. I
thought they knew as much as I did. Dr. Bacher was there. Dr. Lawrence was
there, Dr. Christie was, and Dr. DuBridge was there. But they finally prevailed
upon me, and I went out in the autumn of 1951, and we worked together on this
problem.
Dr. Lauritsen and Dr. DuBridge went over with Mr. Whitman from the Office
of the Secretary of Defense to visit General Eisenhower, Gruenther, Norstadt,
and Hanley In Europe.
"What we attempted to do was to be sure it was clear to them how varied and
useful atomic weapons could be in ways that are probably now quite obvious
to you and ways which were not completely obvious then. General Eisenhower
made 1 or 2 suggestions about things that he though it would be handy to have.
The principal messages that we brought back to this country were a plea for
more information as well as more hardware and to make atomic weapons avail-
able and for restriction of the limitations on discussions of military problems,
with Allied Commanders. These were the things that made it hard to get on
with these. I don't want to go into the technical aspects of it, though the
antiair use of atomic weapons, their use to put out enemy airfields, both those
that are near enough for combat planes and the deep lines strategic ones is an
obvious example. This was the complement to the panel report I spoke of
earlier on getting the atom to work on the battlefield as well as in the heartland.
I think this may be a place to stop.
Dr. GRAY. Before we stop, I wonder if you can, Mr. Garrison, give an indication
of the witnesses.
Mr. GARRISON. I thought we might discuss that informally off the record. I
can bring this chart and show you about how it looks now.
Dr. GRAY. We will go off the record for a moment.
(Discussion off the record.)
49
Dr. GRAY. Are we prepared to say we will meet again tomorrow morning
at 9:30?
Mr. GARRISON. We will undertake to be prompt.
Mr. ROBB. May I say, Mr. Chairman, as far as I am concerned, and Mr,
Rolander, I cannot speak for the board, if it will accelerate matters and assist
counsel to get some witnesses here, I would be very happy to come here earlier
in the morning. I do not want to make that proposition too firm.
Dr. GRAY. Let the chairman speak for himself only and not for the other
members of the board. If by meeting at 9 o'clock we could move along without
inconvenience and so forth, I believe the board would be willing to meet at that
time.
Mr. EVANS. You can say it for me, because time is important to me.
Mr. MORGAN. Yes.
Dr. GRAY. So would you bear that in mind, Mr. Garrison. Any telescoping
we can do without inconvenience or harm we would be interested in doing.
(Thereupon at 5:13 p. m., a recess was taken until Tuesday, April 13, 1954, at
9:30 a. m.)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER OF J. ROBERT OPPE^HETMER
ATOMIC ENERGY COMSJ:ISSIOX?
BCTELDING T-3. ROOM 2022,
Washington, D. C^ April 13^ 1964.
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to recess,
before the board, at 9 :30 a. m.
Personnel Security Board : Mr. Gordon Gray, chairman ; Dr. "Ward
V. Evans, member; and Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Roger Robb, and C. A. Rolander, Jr., counsel for the
board ; J. Robert Oppenheimer, Lloyd K. Garrison, Samuel J. Silver-
man, and Allen B. Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
(51)
PROCEEDINGS
Mr. GRAY. I would like to call the proceeding to order.
The chairman of the board has a few observations to make, and I have a few
questions to ask on behalf of the board.
I should like to read again for the record a statement which I made yesterday,
that the proceedings and stenographic record of this board are regarded as
strictly confidential between Atomic Energy Commission officials participating
in this matter, and Dr. Oppenheimer, his representatives, and witnesses. The
Atomic Energy Commission will not take the initiative in public release of any
information relating to proceedings before this board.
The board views with very deep concern stories in the press which have been
brought to the attention of members of the board. I personally have not had
time to read the New York Times article, but I am told that both the Nichols
letter to Dr. Oppenheimer, of December 23, and his reply of March 4, are re-
printed in f ull. Without having any information whatsoever, I have to assume
that this was given to the New York Times.
Dr. OPPENHEIMER. It says so in the paper.
Mr. GRAY. I do not suggest that represents a violation of security. I have a
serious question about the spirit in keeping with the statement we made for the
record yesterday about these proceedings being a matter of confidential relation-
ship between the Commission and the board representing the Commission, and
Dr. Oppenheimer and his representatives and witnesses.
We were told yesterday before this hearing began that you were doing all you
could to keep this out of the press. You said you were late yesterday because
you had "fingers in the dike," I believe was your expression, which I found
somewhat confusing against subsequent events in the day when you say that
you gave everything that you had to the press. We agreed yesterday that it
would be very unfortunate to have this proceeding conducted in the press. There
was no dissent from that view which was expressed, I believe, by all of us.
I think that it should be perfectly apparent, particularly to the attorneys in-
volved, that this board faces real difficulties if each day matters about this
proceeding appear, not on the basis of rumors or gossip, but on the basis of
information handed directly to the press. I think it only fair to say for the
record that the board is very much concerned.
I should like to ask some questions for the record about the authorized spokes-
man for Dr. Oppenheimer. I assume in addition to Dr. Oppenheimer that Mr.
Garrison, Mr. Silverman, and Mr. Ecker are actively and officially associated in
this proceeding.
I should like to ask who else is working on this who may be talking to the
press?
Mr. GABRISON. Mr. Chairman, perhaps you could let me answer that question
by a little history. The letter from the Commission was given on December 23. I
came into the case early in January. Almost immediately, or perhaps the middle
of January, it became quite apparent from inquiries that Mr. Reston addressed
both to the Atomic Energy Commission and to Dr. Oppenheimer, that he already
had information that clearance had been suspended, and that proceedings were
going forward against Dr. Oppenheimer. He was most anxious to obtain back-
ground information from us.
We explained to him the nature of the proceedings and our earnest desire
that this not be the subject
Dr. OPPENHEIMER. May I correct that. Was this your conversation with
Reston, because I believe the initial conversations were with me. He called and
he was very persistent in calling. I tried to evade it, I knew what it would
be about. After about 5 or 6 days of persistent telephoning, he talked to my
wife, and said that he had this story and he wished I would talk to him.
I talked to him on the phone. I said I thought it 'contrary to the national
interest that the story should be published, that I did not propose to discuss it
with him, but if the time came when it was a public story, I would be glad to
discuss it with him.
(53)
54
That was mid-January. I don't remember the date. I am depending on
counsel's memory. I believe that was the substance of our talk. He told me two
things First, that my clearance had been revoked. That was the story he had
heard. That this had been cabled, telegraphed, and broadcast to submarine
commanders throughout the flleet and Army posts throughout the world, and
second, that Senator McCarthy was fully aware of this and thought I ought to
know that. That was the end of that discussion.
I was given to understand by proffers of kindness but not other sign that the
Alsops knew the situation. Later fhis was confirmed by one of the prospective
witnesses.
Mr. GBAY. You did not talk with either one of the Alsops?
Dr. OPPENHEIMER. I have not talked to either one of the Alsops until very
recently, and I will describe those conversations. This was long ago, and it
was my affair, and I thought my memory would be more vivid than yours.
Mr. GARRISON. Why don't you tell of your conversation with the Alsops?
Dr. OPPENHEIMEE. That is not until very recently. Stewart Alsop called co-
counsel, that is Herbert Marks, whose name should be in these proceedings—-
when would that have been, Saturday, Friday— quite recently, saying that they
had the story and were frantic to publish, and that I should call Joe Alsop, who
is up in Connecticut at a rest home.
Mr. GARRISON. In Garrison, N. Y.
Dr. OPPENHEIMER. I did call him there. I put on my spiel, the thing that I
have said to everyone, that I thought this story coming out before the matter was
i-esolved could do the country no good. Either I was a traitor and very, very
important secrets had been in jeopardy over the last 12 years, or the Government
was acting in a most peculiar way to take proceedings against me at this moment.
This is the impression that I feared would be made. Neither impression could
be good. Having both of them could be only doubly bad.
Therefore, not as far as I was concerned, but as far as what I thought was
right, I urged Joe Alsop to hold his story, not to publish it. We did not discuss
any substantive things except that Alsop told me how apprehensive he was
that Senator McCarthy would come out with it. I believe that was all I said to
Joe Alsop. He said he thought I was making a great mistake, but I said it was
my mistake.
I recognized of course that he could publish any moment that he wanted to.
Mr. GRAY. May I ask, as of this time or 10 o'clock yesterday morning, had
you given the New York Times these documents?
Dr. OPPENHEIMEB. These documents were given to Reston by my counsel
Friday night, I believe, without any instruction as to what he was to do with
them, as background material.
Mr. GRAY. So that you knew when you made the statement here yesterday
morning that you were keeping the finger in the dike that these documents, dated
December 23, and March 4, were already in the possession of the New York Times.
Dr. OPPENHEIMEB. Indeed we did.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, they were given to Mr. Reston with instruc-
tions not to be used unless it became essential for the Times to release the story
because others were going to do likewise. We hoped even as of yesterday — the
last word we had with Mr. Reston was after lunch — we hoped even as of
yesterday that this could be held off, although I told you at the start that it
might be only a matter of hours.
Mr. GRAY. You didn't indicate to me in any way — If you attempted to do so,
it is a matter of my misinterpretation — that you had given documents which
relate to these confidential proceedings and are part of these proceedings.
You mentioned Mr. Marks. Who else is authorized to speak for you, Dr.
Oppenheimer?
Mr. GARRISON. No one else. Mr. Marks is not counsel of record in this pro-
ceeding. He has been associated with us from the start because of his knowledge
of past history. I am still seeking his guidance and help.
Mr. GRAY. He is assisting, I take it, in preparing these documents which you
present?
Mr. GARRISON. No; we did all that work ourselves.
Mr. GRAY. May I ask specifically for the record who prepared the excerpts
about which I asked the question yesterday?
Mr. GARRISON. We did in our own office. I did. Mr. Ecker worked on them,
Mr. GRAY. I should like to know, Mr. Garrison, why it was yesterday that not
one of the three of you could answer the question as to whether these para-
graphs were consecutive or came from consecutive pages. It Is apparent that
someone else had prepared them.
55
Mr. GARRISON. No, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. I have drawn a conclusion. If I am wrong
Mr. GARRISON. I am very sorry that such thoughts should even occur to you.
What happened was that some weeks ago I went through Dr. Oppenheimer's
writings and I marked particular sections and passages from a lot of them
that seemed to me to be worthy of presentation to the board, and I asked that
they be extracted and copied out. I have not been over them for some time.
To be frank with you, I have had so much else to do.
Mr. GEAY. My point in raising all this is that if there are a good number
of people who are not appearing here who are going to be talking to the press,
I would like to know what control or lack of control there may be in this situa-
tion. That is why I am raising this thing.
Mr. GARRISON. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. I think these stories are very prejudicial to the spirit of inquiry
that I tried to establish as an atmosphere for this hearing as we started yester-
day. I would very much regret that what would appear to be to the board
possible lack of cooperation in conducting these proceedings in the press if that
were prejudicial to what are the basic fundamental issues involved.
Mr. ROBB. Might I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. I don't think we have identified Mr. Marks.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Herbert S. Marks, former General Counsel of the Atomic
Energy Commission, and a lawyer in Washington.
Mr. GRAY. He is an attorney and member of the District of Columbia Bar?
Mr. GARRISON. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. And do I understand he is of counsel to Dr. Oppenheimer?
Mr. GARRISON. He is associated wtlh us as counsel.
Mr. GRAY. In the relationship of lawyer and client, is that correct?
Mr. GARRISON. Yes.
Mr. Chairman, may I just say another thing about the problem that we faced.
Mr. Reston from the middle of January has had the Alsops, aud I don't know
who else busy gathering information from anybody they could find and had
developed so much of the story when Mr. Reston talked with us on Friday that,
it seemed to us that if the story had to break that rather than half a story or
two-thirds of it or a quarter of it in fragments with constant demands after-
wards from the press for the rest of it, that it was better that the basic docu-
ments be there for all to see.
This was not a happy decision or a pleasant one for Dr. Oppenbeimer, believe
me, to have the letter of charges displayed for the American public. It was
something no man would ever wish to do. It was not until Mr. Reston tolfl us
yesterday afternoon that the thinjr absolutely could not hold, the stories were
going to be published, Ateop said the same thing, that we said all right, go ahead
then and print the documents.
Now, it is not our purpose to make any press comments upon this case. It
is not our purpose to release any transcripts. If you will observe the Reston
story, I am sure you will see that we have tried to avoid any kind of special
pleading. Dr. Oppenheimer has made no statement. We are not trying to try
this case ourselves in the press. I assure you with all earnestness that is true.
I feel absolutely certain that it is better in the long run for the Government, for
this board, and for us, that there be no suspicion about what is the scope of this
case, whether the H-bomb is in it, and all those kinds of questions that would
arise if the actual facts had not been disclosed.
Mr. SILVERMAN. May I point out, if I may interrupt, there was an item in the
Reston story , however, it is understood that he, Dr. Oppenheimer, also put in
evidence another secret document in the form of a memorandum. We haven't
the faintest idea what they are talking about, nor did we give them any such
information.
Mr. GRAY. Who is "we"? Who actually handed the documents to Mr. Reston?
Mr. GARRISON. I did myself, Mr. Chairman, personally.
Mr. ROBB. Did he also get a copy of this autobiography?
Mr. GARRISON. No.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Garrison, may I ask another question? Didn't I understand
you to say yesterday morning that explaining your tardiness at the hearing that
you had been engaged in a press conference?
Mr. GARRISON. No, I had been engaged in threshing this problem out among
ourselves, because the calls were coming in and putting us under the greatest
pressure. In fact, right along we have been under pressure to make statements,
56
to initiate statements of our own and come forward with information. It has
been a very, very difficult undertaking, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. I am quite aware of that. On the other hand, you are quite aware
also that the members of this board have been under pressure, and that we have
I believe without fail said we will not discuss it. That will continue to be our
position.
Mr. GAREISON. I should also like to say that we did not disclose to anybody —
when I say "we", I mean every one of the counsel to my knowledge, and Dr.
Oppenheimer — the names of this board or where the hearings were being held or
anything else.
Mr. EVAN.S. Where did they get it?
Mr. GARRISON. I don't know. I have no idea.
Dr. EVANS. They called me up about 1 :30.
Mr. GRAY. They called me, too, but I didn't answer the phone.
I would like to move to another point, if I may. I ana sorry we are keeping
Dr. Kelly waiting. This has to do with the schedule of hearings. You left a
suggested typewritten schedule with us yesterday which was not made a part
of the record. I think I should say that the Board cannot accept this as a
schedule. I repeat, indeed, if it is necessary to repeat, that this is to be a fair
inquiry, that Dr. Oppenheimer will be given full and adequate opportunity to
make any presentation he has, and to present such witnesses as he desires, but
as far as the schedule is concerned, the board feels that it is up to Dr. Oppen-
heimer and counsel to furnish the witnesses and information for the board.
We propose to sit from 9, if it is desired by Dr. Oppenheimer and his counsel,
or from 9 :30 to 12 :30 and from 2 until approximately 4 :30, give and take a little
because of circumstances. Frankly, I think the board is unwilling to commit
itself to a schedule which I am sure means that we will have some witnesses
on a certain day who will be through and then there is nothing more for the
board to do or for a part of the day. I should like to suggest, Mr. Garrison,
that we inform you again that we will meet and we will hear the witnesses and
and some approach be made to this problem from the point of view of the con-
venience of this board and not the convenience of the witnesses as would be
true in most proceedings in the American tradition. If it seems to be necessary
to hear a witness at a particular time in accordance with some prearranged
schedule, some days in advance, I think you should be warned that the witness
will probably be asked under oath whether this is the only time that he could
appear, if we run into a situation where we must recess or delay proceedings
because of a witness who has said, "I can come on a certain date.*'
We understand fully that Dr. Kelly can only be here this morning. We are
very glad to hear him and we will hear him. Then I would very much prefer,
and the members of the board would, if we could receive the remainder of Dr.
Qppenheimer's presentation, and proceed with whatever period it seems desirable
of questioning Dr. Oppenheimer, and then try to move forward with receiving
testimony from the witnesses.
So I don't think that we wish to commit ourselves to a schedule which draws it
out precisely as this is drawn. I am hopeful you will find that we will be reason-
able and fair in hearing the witnesses.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to your wishes that you expressed
informally to us yesterday, I arranged for Dr. Bush to appear instead of this
morning on Monday afternoon, the 19th, and I have arranged with Mr. Gordon
Dean to appear Monday morning the 19th, in lieu of Wednesday afternoon.
Mr. GRAY. I would say, Mr. Garrison, that is quite all right with the board.
This is a part of your responsibility of keeping witnesses and whatever else is to
be presented to the board moving along as we sit and are available to hear them.
Mr. GARRISON. I have no doubt that we shall fill the afternoon session on the
19th, so that there will be no waste time of the board, because there are still
several witnesses whom we have contemplated calling and we have not had a
chance yet to talk with them.
Mr. GRAY. All right, sir.
Mr. GARRISON. For example, Mr. Conant, Mr. Bradbury, and several others.
If you will indulge me, I would like to say one other word about counsel, because
I think there has been some mystery, perhaps, cerated by Mr. Marks' relationship
to the case. Mr. Marks is an old, very dear and very personal friend of Dr.
Oppenheimer. They both came to see me when I was asked to serve as counsel.
I am serving without fee in this case as a public service. To the best of my
knowledge, Mr. Marks is serving without fee in this case as a gesture of very
deep friendship and admiration for Dr. Oppenheimer. We have been working
together, he and I, as one would work together in a matter of this sort without
57
any really formal relationship except that it was understood that I would in
effect try the case, conduct the proceedings and have the final decision and
responsibility. He is now simply going about his law practice, and as I feel
that I use his advice and need him, Dr. Oppenheimer leans very heavily on his
opinions, we meet together and talk things over. It is that kind of a relationship.
It never occurred to me that it would be necessary or that I would be not frank
with the Board in not entering his appearance here today, because actually we
are the counsel conducting this proceeding, and I have the final decision. But
I want you to be quite sure that Mr. Marks is not authorized by me to talk with
the press or to exercise himself in any fashion on this matter. He is a friend
and advisor and associate in that sense.
Dr. OPPENHEIMER. He is sometimes authorized to talk to the press in specific
ways and with a specific message.
Mr. GARRISON. Both he and I have had conversations with Mr. Reston and Mr.
Alsop and other newspapermen have called him up, but what I am trying to say
is that Mr. Marks is not sitting in his office at my request conducting press con-
ferences to spread information about this case. You can be just as sure
as that
Mr. GRAY. But he is authorized to speak to the press, at least those were Dr.
Oppenheimer's words.
Mr. GARRISON. He is not authorized to conduct press conferences. He cannot
avoid Inquiries when they come to him. As far as I know, Mr. Chairman, we are
all going to be battered— I was called at quarter to seven this morning.
Mr. GRAY. You can't avoid the call. But I can say to you on the basis of per-
sonal experience that it is possible not to talk.
Mr. GARRISON. That is what all of us have pledged each other to do, that is,
not to talk.
Mr. GRAY. As of what time did you take that pledge?
Mr. GARRISON. We decided when the documents were made public that ends
this matter as far as we are concerned.
Mr. GRAY. Fine. I am sorry we kept Dr. Kelly waiting. Would you get him
in, if you are ready now to present Dr. Kelly.
Whereupon, Mervin J. Kelly, was called as a witness, and having been first
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Kelly, do you wish to testify under oath. You are not required
to do so.
Dr. KELLY. I would be glad to testify under oath.
Mr. GRAY. Would you stand, then, please and raise your right hand.
Mervin J. Kelly, do you swear that the testimony you are to give to the
board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
• Dr. KELLY. I do.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Ms. GARRISON :
Q. Dr. Kelly, you are the president of the Bell Telephone Laboratory in New
York City?
A. I am.
Q. And in 1950 to 1951, you served on a Research and Development Board
panel under Dr. Oppenheimer's chairmanship?
A. That is correct.
Q. You had met Dr. Oppenheimer before that time?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Could you say when you first met him?
A. It was at either a National Academy meeting— what is this thing in
Philadelphia we belong to— the American Philosophical Society meeting in
Philadelphia shortly after the war, late 1945, or early 1946. Oppie was address-
ing a meeting there at that time.
Q. Would you tell the board- very briefly about your work with Dr. Oppen-
heimer on the Research and Development Board panel?
A. The Research and Development Board has had an Atomic Energy Standing
Committee. At that time Robert LeBaron, Mr. William Webster was the head
of the Research and Development Board. At Mr. Webster's request or sug-
gestion Mr. LeBaron formed a panel in the late fall of 1949, as I remember.
I had a letter from Mr. LeBaron in early November concerning serving on the
panel, in which he told me that Dr. Oppenheimer was to be the chairman.
58
T accepted membership and then had relations with Dr. Oppenheimer from then
on about it
We had our first meeting early in December. The committee had 9 members,
3 military, 3 of the more academic scientists and 3 of the less academic. Gen.
J. McCorinick, who was then the military officer in the AEG, reporting to the
General Manager, in charge of military programs, was ex officio and at all
meetings.
The group was made up of Dr. Oppenheimer as chairman, Dr. Bacher,
then of Cal Tech. He had been on the Commission. . Dr. Louis Alvarez of
the University of California. Prof. Charles Lauritsen of Cal Tech. Prof.
Walter Whitman of MIT, and myself were the civilians. The three military
members were Gen. K. D. Nichols of the Army, Adm. W. S. Parsons of the
IS'avy, and Gen. R. C. Wilson of the Air Force.
The general charge to the committee was for it to view the status of atomic
research in the Commission and its progress, the state of the stockpile, with
the knowledge of the weaponry to come up with recommendations for the
scope and emphasis in the military applications of the research and development
program.
Mr. GEAT. Dr. Kelly, may I interrupt for a moment. I am afraid I failed
to tell you that in the event that it is necessary for you to discuss any restricted
data, I would appreciate your letting me know that you propose to do so.
The WITNESS. I don't propose to say- anything here that in a closed hearing
is not perfectly all right, whether the people are cleared or not.
Mr. GRAY. All right, sir.
The WITNESS. I was stating the scope of the examination as requested by
Mr. LeBaron. I think I had completed by saying that we were going to look
at what the military applications of the research and development program
should be in the light of advancing knowledge in the atomic area, and the
stockpile and the military situation. We had about 6 days in December of
meetings and went over this whole matter. It was the first time that I had
seen Dr. Oppenheimer in action in an operating sense in a responsibility of this
kind.
He was an unusually able chairman. I have been on lots of committees
and- chairman of some, and I would put him right at the top in his patience
in developing views and getting the views of everyone, and promoting full
discussion, and yet giving the minimum of waste time for busy people that
jroes with committees of that size.
We came up, after much discussion, with very common views because it was
in an area where, excepting for the enemy situation, there was generally a
background of factual knowledge to work on.
After we had gotten to where we had a commonness of view as to what we
should say the program should be in scope and emphasis, Dr. Oppenheimer
undertook the job of preparing our report, which was an aid to all of us. I
remember his staying on in Washington between meetings and beyond meetings
for drafting the report. He drafted a report which with very minor modifi-
cations, I would say, all of us could sign as representing fully our own views
as to what the military emphasis in research and development should be.
This was just at the threshold of the time where atomic basic knowledge had
reached the point that it was possible to consider versatility. By that I mean
extending the range of weapons well beyond that of the large free falling
bombs. So this was rather a critical time.
That opportunity for extending the scope of weapons, that is, the range of
versatility in military action, was a thing that needed very careful weighing
and was weighed and our report encompassed the views on how that should be
broadened. As a matter of fact, I know from my participation in the program
that what happened in the succeeding years was very much along the line or
substantially identical to the charter that we suggested as the research and
development programing plan.
Mr. LeBaron wrote me, and no doubt other members of the committee, after-
ward, expressing appreciation and stating the way that it had been accepted
favorably in both the Commission and the military. Throughout this Dr
Oppenheimer was one of us in views, that is, had common views with us, as to
the best military use of the fissionable materials and the kind of weapons that
should be put into development, and in discussion there was every evidence of
his dedication to the best use of this kind of power in the national interest
possible. Any divergence in views as they developed were detailed and no
greater difference in his views on that from one of us to the other than there
would be between any two of us.
59
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. Did you ever deduce that Dr. Oppenheiiner ever overstated, in your opinion,
the need of continental defense as distinguished from the production of offensive
weapons and plans?
A. Quite the contrary. Dr. Oppenheimer's views on continental defense are so
close to those that I have held from any close contact with it that I could not
distinguish a difference.
In the late fall of 1952, Secretary Lovett asked me to head a civilian committee
made up principally of top business leaders, such as Bob Wilson of Standard Oil.
jmd top educational people, to survey the continental defense problem and to
put it in proper perspective with the rest of our deterrent efforts. General
McCormick, who had then come over into the Air Force, I succeeded in getting
as a secretary to my committee.
During the progress of the committee's work which was in the first several
months of 1953 — the committee was then operating under Secretary Wilson,
but Mr. Lovett had cleared with him when he appointed us in November that he
wanted us to continue because it was going into the new administration of Mr.
Wilson — and a number of times General McCorniick for me, as I had a lot of
other responsibilities, saw Dr. Oppenheimer. I know particularly of two visits.
I remember two visits to Princeton where he discussed with Dr, Oppenheimer
the evolving report and views. Of course, this could be said to be hearsay, but
he recounted to me Dr. Oppenheimer's comments which were wholly favorable
and differed only in insignificant detail. Dr. Oppenheimer felt it was a con-
structive judgment, which was in general, that while the country had not given
proper emphasis to continental defense relatively, yet that our chief deterrent
was strike, and that nothing should be done in bringing up to a proper level a
continental defense effort that would weaken our strike. That was the general
philosophy.
We recommended certain organizational and planning and procedural things
to unify the program, but placed it second to strike in the general program of
our best defense, and best deterrent aspect.
With the discussions that General McCorniick had with him I could distinguish
no difference. In fact, he spoke very complimentary , so General McCormick
related to me, of the direction our thinking was taking.
I do not find the time to do a lot of talking about these things that are directly
concerned, but in the Lincoln summer study, two of my members were on that
study, and I know from them that the views of Dr. Oppenheimer, who was there
occasionally, and others of the academic side, were very strong for looking into
the Arctic line and the kind of implementation that was then in breadboard state,
but in proper perspective.
I have since heard Dr. Oppenheimer discuss the defense aspect at closed
meetings in the Council of Foreign Affairs — and this is in relatively recent
months — and found his views there in general accord with the ones I have held
and pushed for a stronger continental defense, better organized, unified, but done
not at the expense of our stride power.
Q. What would you say as to Dr. Oppenheimer's reputation for straightfor-
wardness, directness, veracity?
A. Among his peers, he is, first, known and recognized for his accuracy of
thought and cleanness of expression. His words are considered generally well-
weighed ana meaningful because of their accuracy and temperate. I would
know of no one that knew him as well as I that would feel that he overstated
his position.
As to his veracity and dedication, I know of no one in the program, with the
high clearances that he has had, and that I have, Q and top secret, everything he
has done and said gives a full appearance to a great dedication, as full an
appearance as any of us that are in and still cleared.
Q. Would you say that as chairman of this panel he made a contribution to the
national welfare?
A. I am sure that he did. In the form that he writes all of his things, getting
the views of the full committee that he shared, as to what the forward looking
program should be, getting it clean, orderly, and well placed was a great con-
tribution, as anyone working in the atmosphere of the Pentagon knows the great
need for, that is, of getting direction and aim and purpose well spelled out. It
was in this report of the panel which was his fine, clean writing, but which was
the views of all of us which he shared.
Q. What have you to say as to his reputation for integrity and patriotism and
your own personal feeling about that?
60
A. Among his peers, those who know him and know his work, I would say his
reputation is the highest. As to my own personal belief, I know of no one in the
program that I would have any more confidence in their integrity and dedication
than I would of Dr. Oppenheiiner.
Q. What would say as to- the competence of the setup at Los Alamos and
Sandia to handle the whole program during the years while Dr. Oppenheimer
served on the General Advisory Committee, roughly 1947 to 1952.
A. I have known the situation there intimately since January 1949. That was
my first entrance broadly into the atomic-weapon area. During the war we had
quite a good-sized job at the laboratory in an area that did not concern Los
Alamos directly, or Dr. Oppenheimer, and that was the research and early devel-
opment of the membrane used at Oak Ridge for diffusion, a very difficult physical
chemical job. In early 1949, the Commission asked me to make a study of the
Los Alamos-Sandia combined operation and make recommendations as to any
organizational changes. They had in mind not a complete satisfaction of the
applied end of the weaponry, that is, after the nuclear job was completely done,
the clothing of that with all the aerodynamic, electronic, and radar gear to make
the completed weapon. That, as well as the nuclear, had been up at Los Alamos
up until maybe a year or two, I was in in 1949, and then that part of it that had
to do with the weaponry, exclusive of the explosive unit, was moved to Sandia
to be close to the military people. But both operations were under Dr. Bradbury,
and that was a contract with the University of California.
There was some question within the Commission, and Dr. Bradbury himself,
as to the operations in Sandia. So I spent the greater part of 3 months looking
searchingly at Los Alamos and at Sandia, and reported orally — I made the stipu-
lation to the Commission that I must do it orally, as I could not take the time
for a polished, finished report— giving my judgment of the very high competence
of the Los Alamos operation, and the quality of the people in the program, the way
they were attacking them, and while the buildings were temporary in the facili-
ties for doing it.
The applications end of clothing the unit that has the explosive with the re-
quired aerodynamic and electronics, I found was not up to the capacities of the
country in that kind of applied science and technology. So I recommended that
part of the job be given to an industrial contractor, as there were components
of engineering judgment and background at high levels that just were not in
the program, and also knowing how to recruit the kind of people to build such
a staff.
That recommendation was acted upon and Mr. Truman requested the A. T.
& T. that we accept that Sandia operation, and a subsidiary corporation of the
Bell System had been formed to do that.
The technical, the whole research and engineering side of it is my direct re-
sponsibility. I spend 1 week in 5 — in fact, I am going out there tomorrow — so
I have known the program intimately since 1949. I would say that the overall
integrated program is the finest expression of American scientific and technical
ability, and that we are where we are in the weapons program because of that
plan for doing it, its competence and its relative freedom to operate as scientists
and technologists do in bur society, relieved from a lot of restrictions that come
in from civil service, and other kinds of handling.
As I say, the only blemish on that program in 1949 was the inadequacy of
the applied technology having to do with the aerodynamics, electronics, and so on.
Q. Based on your knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer, your experiences with him,
and his reputation as yon know it, do you believe that his clearance would be
clearly consistent with the interest of national security?
A. To the very best of my knowledge, I sincerely believe that, and I think that
his absence from the programs and from the councils would be a distinct loss.
There is one observation, as I told you, that I would like to make, if this is an
appropriate time, that I think is pertinent to the aspects of the problem that I
can't testify directly on.
When scientists and applied scientists look into the crystal ball in the early
stages when there is not enough known about the facts of nature, you can find
quite wide and honest diversity of views which clear up and views become sub-
stantially common when enough knowledge of nature's laws and behaviorisms in
the area come to light.
Taking an example, I was thinking last night from my earliest entrance into
science at the graduate level in 1914 and 1918, 1 was Milliken's research assistant
in Chicago. As I did, I did at great deal of the oil drop experimentation that
he was doing, first to establish that there was an electron with a unique charge,
61
and only 1 electron. During the early year of that there was quite a school
of thought that there was not, that there were electrons of various sizes. I
remember a distinguished professor at Vienna, whose name has slipped my
mind, who published greatly on the subelectron. By 1917 there was enough
accumulation of the facts that agreed there was only one electron, which is our
primer today.
In this atomic area, as you know, the Atomic Energy Commission has not
been blind through the years to the civilian application for power and, of course,
have been looking at power applications for military with more vigor in the
parlier stages of it than they were at the direct civilian-economy applications.
But until the last year or so there were competent applied scientists who knew
all of the facts that had evolved certainly up to a year and a half ago ; and
some of those that were right in the middle of it were of the views that the
civilian applications, while certainly important to humanity, had a distant
date because of economic considerations that you measure in decades.
One of the ones who was right in the program and so had all of the knowledge
from that side that I frequently talked with about it in the last year and a
half has changed his views completely and says that he has and he now feels
confident that economic power will be with us in a decade. Yet, until there was
more information that came from his programs, showing what economic factors
could be, he was of the belief that it was a few decades at least away.
Dr. EVANS. You say you did work with Bob Milliken?
The WITNESS. Yes; I did all my graduate work with Milliken from 1914 to
1918 and then came to the Bell System, and have been there ever since.
Mr. GARRISON. That is all of Dr. Kelly unless the board would like to ask
questions.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By MR. ROBB:
Q. Dr. Kelly, may I ask what is your field?
A. I got my doctorate with a major in physics and minor in mathematics and
came to the Western Electric laboratories in New York — and which later
became Bell laboratories in 1925 — as a research physicist and did my productive
work as an applied scientist in the field of electronics. Since about 1936 I have
been one with increasing scope of the technology that have looked at what
others have done rather than doing it myself. So, over the whole field of
telecommunications and science and technology, I would say that I am expert.
Q. Are you what is described as a nuclear physicist?
A. No ; I am not a nuclear physicist. I have kept very conversant with it as
un interested scientist, but there was in my student days and my active days,
there was nuclear physics; and, as it evolved, I followed it closely. I have a
number of nuclear physicists in my staff, among them Dr. risk, who was the
first research director of the Atomic Energy Commission but knows as a par-
ticipant the nuclear-fission field quite well. I have never practiced it, though.
Q. You would not offer yourself as an authority on nuclear physics?
A. No ; just as one with an understanding of what others have done but not
as an authority, because I have not practiced it— because again I limit myself
in the amount that I look at
Q. And, by the same token, I assume you would not offer yourself as an
authority on the superbomb or the thermonuclear weapon?
A. No; that is right
Q. Who are the leading authorities in the country on the thermonuclear
weapon?
A. I would say that the outstanding nuclear physicists that are in the pro-
gram, such as Bradbury and his immediate staff and Edwin Teller and Johnny
von Neumann, would be names that would first come into my mind.
Q. Dr. Lawrence?
A. Yes. Again Dr. Lawrence is not a participant in the sense these men are
but has a great understanding and came up through nuclear.
Q. I was not limiting myself to those who are not participating.
A. He would be one of great standing and the head of the laboratory doing a
great deal in that field.
Q. Dr. Alvarez?
A. Dr. Alvarez, who was on this committee, is another; yes.
Q. Of course, Dr. Oppenheimer.
A. Dr. Oppenheimer, Teller, Bradbury, and von Neumann. Those are the
first names that would come to my mind, but these that you add axe in the
same ball park.
62
Q. Probably Dr. Oppenheimer would be preeminent; would he not?
A. He would certainly be in the first four.
Q. Whether he would bat first or fourth you would not want to say, but he
would be in the first four.
A. That is right I would not be able to judge. I don't know that anyone
could, because there are different qualities to it
Q. Dr. Kelly, in this report that you spoke of that your panel made in 1950,
would that have been the report dated December 29, 1950?
A. I would expect, without referring to the notes, that would be right. We
finished our deliberations about the 22d or 23d, as I remember, and my letter
from Mr. LeBarron is dated January 30. He talks of the report having been
received and studied. That is January 30, 1951. So certainly it was issued
some time after December 22 and before January 30.
Mr. GRAY. What was the date you mentioned?
Mr. ROBB. December 29, 1950.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Do you have any way of establishing that?
A. I could easily get it from the Department of Defense.
Q. Perhaps I can be of assistance. In your discussions in that panel, Doctor,
did you and your colleagues discuss the so-called superweapon, the thermonuclear
bomb?
A. No; we did not It was not in the area of our cognizance. It was a
research thing where it had not even been proved that it would be, and it was
not in a stage where military application could be considered. So there was
no discussion in committee at all about it.
Q. Would you say that again?
A. It was not in a stage of development where, as corresponded to the fission
weapons, you could be talking about military applications knowledgeably and the
different ways that you would use it. All the discussions, the formal discussions
of the committee — if there were any others, it was individual and separate from
the meetings I attended — was about fission and not fusion.
Q. In other words, you felt that the fusion weapon was something in the
future; is that correct?
A. That is correct. We were working for the Department of Defense and not
the AEO, and it was not ready to be considered at that stage.
Q. Did you make any comment in your report on the matter of thermonuclear
warheads or fusion weapons?
A. I have not seen the report since it was issued. I would feel confident it was
not there because it was not a matter of discussion. If it was, that is 4 years
ago. I can't remember. It is three and a quarter years ago.
Mr. KOBB. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read the witness something from the
report, which is classified.
The WITNESS. I have Q clearance; I can look at it
Mr. GBAT. In that event, those who are not cleared in this hearing room will
necessarily be excused.
Dr. OPENHEIMER. Since this is a report I wrote, is this one I may listen to?
Mr. KOBB. Absolutely, Doctor.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, we hoped that this might not arise, but if it is
the feeling of the board that it is important to its own understanding of the
case to put this kind of question, of course it is entirely acceptable to us, and we
shall withdraw.
Mr. GBAT. I believe that would be best, Mr. Garrison.
(Counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer withdrew.)
(Classified transcript deleted.1)
Mr. GBAT. Would you excuse me
Mr. ROBB. I think counsel can come back now.
Mr. GBAT. That is what I was thinking. I don't want them excluded any more
than necessary.
(Counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer returned to the hearing room.)
The WITNESS. It appears there is a reference to the thermonuclear job as
being more than just in the future and my comments, Mr. Garrison, were that is
is a complete blank in my memory, and I have not attempted to get a copy of that
and read it before coining here. What I said was that the thermonuclear had not
reached Sandia at all. While I knew the general situation and had not tried
to f ollow it, so if it was discussed in the committee— I first said I had no memory
1 Counsel not cleared for classified information.
63
of it, and I still haven't — but it must have been discussed, but I don't retain it.
But at any rate, the thing it says there about the time of its development would
have been a thing that I in signing it would have had to count on Dr. Oppen-
heimer, Dr. Alvarez, and Dr. Bacher as the nuclear physicists who would know
and whose judgment I would have respected. But I can't recount because I don't
remember any of the discussions between the three.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Dr. Kelly, were Dr. Alvarez and Dr. Bacher at that time, that is to say,
1950, close to the program of the Atomic Energy Commission?
A. Dr. Bacher had only recently resigned— I think it must have been within
the year— from the Commission and gone out to Cal Tech. So he was pretty
well up to date.
Q. How about Alvarez?
A. Alvarez was in the Radiation Laboratory and was very knowledgeable on
nuclear phenomena generally, but what he would have known about this partic-
ular thing, having that knowledge, I would not know. He could well not be all
current, but still capable of being so if he was given information. But Bacher
certainly would have known, because he would have been a part of the delibera-
tions. Alvarez may have known, but I don't remember what part he had in the
program at the time, other than being at the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley.
Q. Doctor, would you search your memory, please, and, sir, tell us was there
any discussion in your meetings at that time as to whether or not the Atomic
Energy Commission had the capabilities, the personnel, and so forth, to develop
the thermonuclear weapon?
A. Any discussion of the thermonuclear problem is out of my mind. I have
to say frankly that it was such a small part of the whole, and was so distant
from the things that the committee itself could get hold of— I mean that the
military could get hold of in the time immediately ahead— that it has not stuck
with me as one of the more than minor things there. I just can't say.
Q. In other words, Doctor, is it fair to say that the thermonuclear problem, if
we can call it such, was not a major part of your discussions and was not
considered at that time to be important? Is that correct?
A. It was not considered at that time to be ready with enough knowledge about
it to consider the emphasis in the military application area.
Q. I see.
A. It had not reached that state of development. I knew from visits from
time to time up to Los Alamos and I had heard some discussions from Teller
and others of the pros and cons about the development as people will discuss
in that stage when there is insufficient data. Whatever discussion there was
in this committee, I will have to say, not having refreshed my memory without
reading it, I can't remember and would have said there was not discussion.
Q. Was there any discussion that you can recall of a second laboratory?
A. No, not in this committee at all.
Q. Doctor, when did you say you first met Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. It was at a meeting after the war in Philadelphia where he addressed
either of those two societies that we belonged to. I can't remember which it
was. It was very close after the war, because it had to do with these atomic
problems, as I remember.
Q. I am not pressing for the exact date.
A. I would guess 1945 or 1946. It might have been even early 1947. I cannot
remember without refreshing my mind. Do you remember wl^en you made that
talk in Philadelphia?
Dr. OPPENHEIMEE. May I answer?
Mr. GR^Y. Yes.
Dr. OPPENHEIMEE. This was a joint meeting of the Philosophical Society and
the Joint Academy of Sciences in mid-1945.
Mr. ROBB. We will give you the award for memory.
Dr. QppBNHEitfm I made the speech.
The WiTNEsa He made the speech. That is the first time I met him. I
knew him by name.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. How frequently have you seen him since?
A. It would average 4 or 5 or 6 times a year. Since I am only testifying
directly as to one occurrence, this is the one occurrence where I had business
relations, common obligations with Oppie, but I would see him at scientific
503313—54 5
€4
meetings or at universities 4 to 6 times a year, I would say would be a proper
average.
Q. But the occasion about which you testified was your intensive experience
with him.
A. That is right. This was one where I saw him in detailed action and taking
a leadership as a good chairman should take.
Mr. ROBE. I think that is all I care to ask.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Kelly, I am sorry, I don't think I can ask this question, because
it involves the quotation.
May I ask this question: If there appeared in a report which you signed
material which was not reflected in the discussions, would you have raised the
question at the time?
THE WITNESS. Yes, I would be very meticulous about signing a thing if I
didn't have views of my own from my own knowledge to sustantiate it. I would
have asked afterward, or I would have had assurance from discussions that I
do not now remember, that is, I would not have signed with that in there at the
time I signed the report without a feeling that it reflected the judgments of
exvperts in that area that I respected.
Mr. GRAY. I understand that, and I think that is quite appropriate, as you
have said earlier, that you would have relied upon the three members of this
committee who were particularly qualified in certain areas. I am afraid I
perhaps did not phrase my question adequately.
I have no question about the reliability or your sense of dependence and
confidence in the individuals concerned. My question really is, is it possible that
this report could have reflected discussions which the committee did not actually
engage in?
The WITNESS. I can't imagine that, because again knowing myself, I am con-
fident that as of the time I signed it, I would not have signed it with something
in that I either had not heard discussed and felt satisfied with or raised ques-
tions about But my mind is just blank on that, because it was such a minor
thing of the things to get hold of with the military. You must remember in a
thing like this you had the combinations of expertness. There were questions
talked about in there about tossed bombing. Lauritsen would know a lot about
it. But Alvarez or Bacher would not know anything about it. So it was a
combination of expertness in different areas adding up to the total. It just
happens that my memory over the years had just dropped out completely what-
ever their discussions there were, even to the point of a comment as to the
fusion weapon. Insofar as the military could do or the programing could do
at that time it is somewhat gratuitous because it just was not ready for the
military to get hold of.
Mr. GBAY. You felt as a committee member for one reason or another the mili-
tary was not asking you to consider thermonuclear weapons.
The WITNESS. That is right. In the scope of the things that the military them-
selves would be concerned with, which really was the things at hand in the next
year or so— there had been a meeting 2 years before, or a study of this kind 2
years before— it just was not in that ball park.
Mr. GBAY. Were you engaged in the earlier study?
The WITNESS. No ; I was not in the earlier study. It was referred to. I don't
remember what was in it but we had before us in the committee the study of the
2 years before. I remember having read it then, but I don't remember a thing
that was in it now.
Mr. GBAY. Thank you, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Dr. Kelly, were you surprised how quickly they did develop the
thermonuclear weapon after they started on it, or were you not?
The WITNESS. Sir, I was very much surprised. As a peripheral person on that
and hearing the discussions about it before there were data up at Los Alamos
and— they were not discussions like this war business, because I would not have
been in them— -but these were discussions preceding cocktail parties on the hill
where Teller and others were engaged in speculations. The general views I had
of the discussions there was that it was a long hard row
Mr. GABBXSON. What year was this?
The WITNESS. This was along in the 1960-61 time. I can't place it closer than
that. I was up on the hill
Mr. ROKB. May I interpose that you are in Washington. You are talking about
the hilL You mean on the hill in Berkeley, Calif.?
The WITNESS. Down in Sandia we always speak of Los Alamos as on the hill
I would go up to Los Alamos about every other or every third trip to Sandia. At
65
one of those in the early days of the nuclear physicists considering the structure
and the problems involved, I remember a lot of cryogenic questions, just hearing
those as a peripheral person cleared to hear it — the judgments I got and I well
remember it was a thing we would not have to worry about for quite a while.
"We" meaning the Sandia Corp-
Dr. EVANS. If you had to venture an opinion on it, your opinion would have
been that it would have taken 2 or 3 years or longer than that?
The WITNESS. That is right. Frankly I was and am greatly surprised at the
tempo of advance, and I believe that all in the program are somewhat surprised
at some of the simplifications that are coming to light after you get hold of the
things physically and can see them.
Dr. EVANS. Would you put the Englishman, Chadwick, in that list of people
that know about it?
The WITNESS. Of course, Chadwick was out of the program. This is not the
kind of thing that we can discuss with Englishmen after the Atomic Energy Act.
I was not directly in the program during the war. But Chadwick, John Cockrof t
are among the names I would first mention in England of nuclear physicists who
are very knowledgeable. But what they know about bombs, I don't know. While
I see them at least once a year, we don't talk about bombs, because it is illegal.
Mr. GRAY. Do you have any further questions?
Mr. GARRISON. No.
Mr. GBAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Kelly. We appreciate your being here.
Mr. EOBB. Mr. Chairman, would it be in order for counsel to suggest a 5-minute
recess.
Mr. GBAY. Yes, we will now take a short recess.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GRAY. The proceeding will begin again.
Whereupon, J. Robert Oppenheimer resumed the stand as a witness, and having
been previously sworn, was examined and testified further as follows :
DIRECT EXAMINATION— Continued
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, would you care to make a comment about some of the
matters touched on by Dr. Kelly in his testimony?
A. If the board would permit it, I would like very much to comment on it. This
panel meeting about which Dr. Kelly has told you I referred to yesterday.
Mr. GARRISON. Could I interrupt a minute, please?
The board will find the reference to this panel on the second page of roman n,
Membership on Government Committees, No. 5 (b) .
The WITNESS. It was next to the last item in my testimony yesterday just be-
fore I told about Vista. I told you the personnel and the critical atmosphere of
the war. I would like to stick as much as I can to nonclassifled things.
I believe I told you yesterday two things about the period of this report One
was that it was the period after Chinese intervention in Korea when general war
was very much in everybody's mind, not as a remote but as an immediate thing.
The second was that it was a low point in the prospects of the super. What
you have heard read reflects that opinion. Dr. Kelly would certainly not have
been more than a bystander in the formulation of this opinion. As he said, this
was not his job. But the impression created in his testimony seems to me to need
amplification.
Bacher was a member of the Atomic Energy Commission until sometime before.
He was a continued consultant to Los Alamos and spent a good deal of time there.
General McCormick was the Director of the Division of Military Applications
to the Commission, and was responsible for Los Alamos, received regular reports
from the laboratory, talked with everyone involved that he wished to talk with
and was well informed.
He is not a nuclear physicist, but he knew the views of nuclear physicists.
Lauritsen is a nuclear physicist. His whole life has been spent in nuclear
physics except that part spent in atomic development. He was a consultant
during the war and has been very close to the program of all forms of atomic
development.
Alvarez is a nuclear physicist of distinction and was, I believe, one of the
initial promoters of the crash program for the super, and has always had a
great interest in the work.
General Parsons was a member of the evaluations group at that time. He
had been at Los Alamos. His job was to keep in touch with current develop-
ments,
General Nichols— his status at that time I have forgotten, but I think he was
in research and development in the Army.
All of these men had access to every document and report that existed and
were knowledgeable not as to deep problems of contemporary physics, but as
to the practical problems and evaluations which were current in the various
places where work was going on or evaluation considered. Berkeley was one
of them and Alvarez was there. I, therefore, think that there was a very sub-
stantial group of people, McCormick, Parsons, Bacher, Lauritsen, Alvarez, and
myself, who knew what was believed at that moment and who had a chance to
evaluate it critically.
Any judgment that was expressed about the thermonuclear program could
have been expressed only with the consensus, the complete agreement of all
members of that committee who knew about it and the undertaking on the part
of those who didn't.
One other thing: Walter Whitman was a member of the General Advisory
Committee and had complete access to all reports and so on, and he was, I think,
a member of the committee.
The only thing I wish to protest is the suggestion that I was the only person
competent to judge and that I sneaked a conclusion into the report that had not
been thoroughly hashed out. I also concur with Dr. Kelly's statement, of course,
that his primary interest was in other aspects of it.
Do you wish to question me about that at all?
Mr. GRAT. Mr. Robb, do you have any questions?
Mr. BOBB. No, not at this time.
Dr. GRAY. I think not, Dr. Oppenheimer. Would you proceed?
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Would you tell the board, now, Dr. Oppenheimer, about your appointment
to the General Advisory Committee in 1946 and then something about its
personnel and its purposes?
A. I thing I did describe my appointment which was in late 1946. Our first
meeting was in early 1947. I was held up by bad weather. I thing Dr. DuBridge
and I were both held up by bad weather and arrived late for the meeting.
Mr. GARRISON, This is on the first page of roman II, item 4.
The WITNESS. When I arrived I found the other members of the committee
had held a meeting and elected me chairman. After consultation with the Com-
mission itself, I accepted that position. We agreed that we would elect the
chairman at every subsequent meeting, that is, the first meeting of each year.
I was reelected at first without any concern on my part, but later with great
concern. I will come to that when we come to that time in the history.
I think you have the names of the members of the committee.
Dr. EVANS. Yes.
The WITNESS. It is in my letter. It would only bore you to repeat the names.
Mr. GARRISON. They are right before the committee.
Mr. SH.VEBMAN. These were not all members at the same time.
The WITNESS. No. But I think that is spelled out in my answer. It is ob-
viously an eminent committee and a varied committee. I can assure you that
it was not a committee that regarded itself as subject to manipulation, or that
it was subject to manipulation.
By Mr. GARRISON:
Q. What was the statutory function of the committee?
A. The law spells out that it is to advise the Commission on the scientific and
technical aspects of research, development, production, materials, something
along those lines, a rather clear mandate.
We, of course, from the very beginning recognized with relief that the job of
decision making, the job of negotiation with other parts of the Government,
the job of management, the final job of determination, rested elsewhere. It rested
with the Commission, with the Department of Defense that was to establish
military requirements, or rather, with the President who on the advice of the
Department of Defense was to establish .military requirements ; with the Congress
that carried out the appropriations. Our job was limited to advice.
A scientific adviser has, I think, one overriding obligation. It is his principal
one in which he is delinquent if he fails, and that is to give the best fruits of
his knowledge, his experience, and his judgment to those who have to make
decisions.
He must attempt to study the problems that are put before htm, to analyze
them, to relate them to his own experience and to say what he thinks will hap-
67
pen and what he thinks won't happen ; what he thinks experiments mean ; what
he thinks will happen if a program is developed along certain lines.
It is not possible to give this advice except against a background. That back-
ground is the kind of questions you ask; very often the things that are assumed
in the questions you ask rather than state. If you are on your toes sometimes
you can say that the question is not asked in the right way, that a different
question should he asked. But by and large you will find yourself advising on
what concerns the people to whom we are feeding advice. This through the
years changed a great deal.
I have already testified that as of early 1947, the prospects of any mean-
ingful international action in the field of atomic energy were largely gone. The
problem that we faced then was to devise a program which would regain some of
the wartime impetus and vigor, and above all to make available the existing
know-how, the existing plant, the existing scientific talent, to make this available
in the form of actual military strength.
It was not so available as of the first of January 1947. I need not go into
the classified details. They are certainly available to you if you want them.
In the period characterized by the Russian bomb and the war in Korea and
the Chinese intervention, the background of many questions was immediate
readiness for general conflict, or the best we could do with regard to that.
In the last days of my service on the general advisory committee, one of
the obvious questions was this : Since things are going quite well for us, what can
we do, what should we do, to be prepared against enemy action? No doubt the
enemy will have some time or other similar success.
These changes in the nature of the background were always there and I don't
want to pretend that scientific advice in practical matters is like doing an
experiment just for the purpose of satisfying your curiosity.
The GAG did not, strictly speaking, abide by its terms of reference. I would
say in 2 or 3 ways it did not. In the first place in the early days we knew more
collectively about the past of the atomic energy undertaking and its present
state, technically and to some extent even organizationally or some parts of it,
than the Commission did.
The Commission was new; its staff needed to be recruited. We knew about
Los Alamos ; we knew about Sandia, we knew about the Argonne Laboratory at
Oak Ridge, and it was very natural for us not merely to respond to questions
that the Commission put, but to suggest to the Commission programs that it
ought to undertake; to suggest to the Commission things that needed doing
of a technical sort.
Very frequently we would be asked, What will be the best way of organizing
this; what will be the best conditions for recruiting scientists and for making
their work productive? We never regarded that as a serious violation of our
terms of reference.
As time went on and the Commission through its staff and actually in its
membership knew more and more about the program, we tended to let the
questions come from them. We would be confronted by great piles of docu-
ments and sometimes a set of questions about them at the beginning of every
meeting. We would try to answer their questions rather than digging up from
our own experience things that we knew.
This transition took place as the members of the committee became more
remote from direct active participation in the program and as the Commission's
understanding of its problems improved.
Sometimes the Commission would address to us questions which were not
obviously related to scientific and technical advice. I would mention at the
least three.
The Commission reviewed with us its security procedures, the procedures,
I think, under which we are now sitting. I believe their interest in doing that
was to find out whether these would seem fair and reasonable to scientists. I
don't believe we responded in writing to that, but we probably said that this
looked like a very fair setup.
The Commission reviewed with us very often the hassle about the custody
of atomic weapons. The act provides that the President shall arrange their
transfer from the Commission to the military services. This involved, I guess,
both technical and political problems. We in this case confined ourselves to
talking about the technical problems and pointing out that there were much
more Important political ones which it was not our job to pass on.
The very broad terms— and this, of course, I am. coming to in a good deal
more detail — in which the Commission addressed to us the question of the
super bomb was another example, I think, where it did not consult us purely
68
on the technical problem, but asked advice in which supposed technical com-
petence and general good sense were supposed to be blended.
I haven't got all the examples, and I know many times we bowed out and
did not answer the questions which were not technical and scientific. Often
we were seduced into answering them.
The committee, during my chairmanship, met about 30 times in regular
stated meetings. I think the most impressive thing — maybe we did some good —
but the most impressive procedural thing is that the committee had 9 members ;
that means 270 attendances, and I believe there were not more than 5, or
something close to that number of absences. That is, almost always everybody
would be there and it was a rare meeting where two people, if there was such
a meeting, would be absent There were occasions where a member was abroad,
as in the case of Dr. Seaborg in our meeting in October 1949. But they were
not frequent
This active interest and participation, I think, shows that the members of
the committee, whatever the truth was, felt that what they were being asked
to do was important to the Nation and they had a contribution to make.
We had several subcommittees appointed very early in the game, that is, into
the natural divisions of the problem: A subcommittee on weapons, with Dr.
Conant of Harvard as chairman ; a subcommittee on reactors, of which, I think,
Dr. Cyril Smith was chairman ; and a subcommittee on research, of which Dr.
DuBridge was chairman.
We also had an ad hoc subcommittee which lasted only a limited time to
consider the problems of the best possible way in which existing or shortly
to be available plant and existing raw material could be used to increase the
quality and usefulness of the product, here, I think, only from the point of
view of weapons ; that is, how did you operate this plant? Did you operate them
in parallel; were they independent units, and so on. That was tinder the
chairmanship of Fermi, who was from the University of Chicago.
The committee as such had some foreign relations.
By Mr. GABEISON:
Q. By "foreign relations", you mean with other agencies of Government?
A. Thank you ; with other agencies of Government.
We met quite frequently, especially in the early days, with the military liaison
committee. It was usually present during our final report to the Commission.
The committee, at least once or more than once, appeared before the joint
congressional committee. Its members appeared in open sessions during the
spring of 1949 and in secret sessions.
We once, I think, called upon the President and wrote him an unclassified
progress report. At the end of my service we wrote him a top secret progress
report which I sent over and talked over with him when I visited him.
But by and large our relations were only those established by law to advise
the Commission and we stuck pretty closely to that
There is an important qualification to this. Many members of the committee
were consultants to one or another of the laboratories. Rabi, for instance, was
a founder of Brookhaven and very much interested in it. Fermi was a con-
sultant to Los Alamos. So was Von Neumann, who came on later.
Many of the members of the committee had connections with Oak Ridge and
the Argonne Laboratory. In addition to that we were, of course, a part of the
general traffic of scientists. We knew each other. Therefore, we had another
function besides advising the Commission on technical matters, and that was
to represent to the Commission when it was a clear and obvious thing, the
views of our colleagues and to represent to our colleagues the views of the
Commission.
I mean by this, those who were engaged in the work, if the matters were
classified; those who were not engaged in the work if it were such a thing
as the support of basic science or a fellowship program or anything like that
We got our information initially because we had it in our heads and had
some reports left over from earlier times, overwhelmingly from Commission
sources, but to some extent also by direct visits to the laboratories and by calling
in directors of the laboratories, by calling in staff from the laboratories so we
tried to keep up to date.
I think we had Bradbury on very many times to tell us about the weapons
work in the early days. Our secretary was John Manley, and he was Associate
Director of Los Alamos, so he would bring a report to us, sometimes semi-
official and sometimes informal, of what was going on.
We consulted with tlie directors of all the laboratories at one time or another,
and where relevant, with the people in charge of production plants.
We did one other thing which perhaps was not quite within the terms of the
statute. Occasionally we would propose for the Commission, or rather, prepare
for the Commission a statement of views which we would authorize them to
make public. These were nonclassified statements in hearings before the Con-
gress or in any way that they wanted.
I remember one such occasion when we thought a public statement would be
desirable to set the atomic power problem in some kind of perspective so that
people would not expect that coal and oil would be obsolete the day after tomor-
row. We drafted a statement of this kind. First it was secret and then we
got all the secret stuff out of it and handed it to the Commission. It used it
in some way — I think not a terribly effective way— in a report to Congress. I
think it was in regard to the use of isotopes, the fellowship programs, the
promotion of basic research. We wrote several documents for the Commission
to use if it would do them any good.
By Mr. GABRISON : -
Q. When you say, Dr. Oppenheiiner, that the committee acted beyond the
statutory frame of reference, what you really mean, I take it, is that you did
not act in violation of the statute?
A. Oh, no.
Q. But that it simply came about that the Atomic Energy Commission looked
to your committee for help and guidance in ways that perhaps had not been
forseen?
A. That is exactly right. The Commission relied on us very heavily, especially
at the beginning, and relied on us for lots of things that were not provided for
in the Act; where we felt we could help them we did. Our concern was to
give them every possible encouragement and support.
Q. And then, as you testified a little earlier, as the Commission became more
and more expert in its own field there was correspondingly less dependence for
this kind of assistance from the committee?
A. That is right.
Q. Now, would you tell the board something about what the committee
actually did and begin with the first meeting?
A. My recollection is not clear as to what happened at the first and what
happened at the second meeting, but I think this is perhaps not too important
Very early in the game we thought it important to see whether we agreed
or had any views at all about what the job of the Commission was. That, of
course, was the Commission's business to determine, but the nature of the
advice we gave would be dependent on that.
Without debate — I suppose with some melancholy — we concluded that the
principal job of the Commission was to provide atomic weapons and good atomic
weapons and many atomic weapons. This referred to atomic explosives. There
are other things, like the atomic submarine that you can call an atomic weapon,
but that is not what we had in mind.
We thought it had three other undertakings. We thought from the first that
however remote civil power might be, the Commission had an absolute mandate
to do everything it could economically and fruitfully to get on with the explora-
tion of it. We thought that * the Commission needed to respond to requests
from the military and needed to alert the military establishment as to other appli-
cations of atomic energy of military use, of which propulsion, radiological war-
fare may be two examples. I won't attempt to evaluate them at this moment.
The third thing that we felt— and it was not really third in our feelings, but
simply in a budgetary and practical way— was that the Commission had a man-
date to stimulate basic science in this country: The training of scientists; I
guess just the acquisition of knowledge is what the law states.
At that time there existed in the Office of Naval Research one very good Gov-
ernment agency which was promoting basic science in many different fields with
great forethought, wisdom and skill. Some of the things the Office of Naval
Research did touched on the field that the Commission was in on atomic science.
We never had an$r feeling that it was bad for the ONR to be in that. But this
was to come up over and over again and I will return to it a little bit later.
These were the principal themes that occurred to us at the first meeting and
the one that separated itself by urgency and importance in our own minds was
the weapons field.
Q. That required attention first of all to the state of affairs at Los Alamos?
70
A. Yes. I think perhaps I should say that we did at one early meetin'g con-
sider whether Los Alamos was the right place for weapons development.
Q. This is now 1947?
A. This would be early 1947. It was set up during the war for reasons which
I went over yesterday. It is remote. It is expensive. It does not have very
free access to a university or laboratories not under its control. There could
have been arguments that a fresh start with something of the vigor that Los
Alamos had when we began it might have been desirable.
We concluded at the first meeting that this was impractical; that Los Alamos
had proved itself and its survival value by being there, by having a good staff, it
was working on atomic bombs. It was not only working on atomic bombs but
doing a lot of miscellaneous physics and chemistry. But it existed and the no-
tion of starting up something else or tearing this down seemed to us full of dan-
gerous delay.
So our first set of recommendations to the Commission was addressed— I
think there were a lot at one time — but at any rate first among the recommen-
dations were the recommendations to get Los Alamos going as a really first rate
place.
The Commission had asked us either at our first or second meeting to review
the report I described yesterday on the job in atomic energy which we had writ-
ten for Mr. Stimson's paneL They asked us the question: Have any of these
objectives been1 attained? They had not been. The time was rather short.
The objectives were not easy. I think we said strictly speaking none has been
attained. There are some now that ought to be added that have come up in the
meantime. That report was not entirely complete.
We suggested that every inducement be made available to make work at Los
Alamos attractive in the way of salaries and housing, but above aU in the morale
sphere in the sense of giving the men who were there the feeling that they were
doing something vital for their country and in getting abroad in the country the
sense that Los Alamos was not something left over from the last war, that work
on the atomic bombs was somehow not an entirely creditable occupation, but
quite the contrary feeling that there was nothing the nation needed more.
This did result in vast building programs at Los Alamos, in the expansion of
the laboratory, in the availability to the laboratory of a great many people who
were not trafficking there at earlier times. People go out now for tie summer
months and have been for the last 5 or 6 years and they come as consultants.
There is hardly a clear and qualified scientist in the country who is not avail-
able to Los Alamos for consultation or for such things as he is good for.
They have established a scheme of subcontracting which enables them to draw
in even further resources than they can put on' this relatively limited mesa.
I am not going to take all the recommendations of our early meetings. In the
first place I have not looked them up and I don't have them in mind. I will
rather follow the weapons themselves.
There had been, I think, some thought about weapons development after I
left Los Alamos. There was one meeting which I could not attend on the
thermonuclear program, and there were lots of things left over from the wartime
to get people interested in making better weapons, better here meaning a whole
lot of things. It means obviously getting more bang for a buck. It means more
economy in the use of fissionable material. It means getting weapons which
give you the maximum versatility in the kind of delivery system we have, so
you don't have to use very big bombers and so on.
It means versatility in the size of weapons and their explosive effects. It
means the ability to use the fissionable materials that are produced in some
reasonable proportion to how they are produced and In some reasonable recogni-
tion of overall economy of neutrons and production facilities.
Very early in the game it became dear to us that nobody was going to pay
attention to improving weapons. All that happened is that there were lots of
blueprints and lots of models lying around and the only way to get this
business really moving was through a testing program. The payoff with atomic
weapons is to see if they really work as we think they do.
Sometimes you do this test to prove out a model which is essentially what
you think it right. Sometimes you do it in order to see, as well as you can by
experiment, how things are working in the explosion and guide you in future
design. Good tests usually combine these features.
I believe we were extremely strong in urging that a test facility be estab-
lished. I know that we worked quite hard to get accepted the Initial Los
Alamos program for the Eniwetok test which were a little more ambitious
71
than was generally approved and where we felt they were really very much
needed.
We were worried about the test site out in the Pacific as the only test site
because of the cumbersomeness and the long advanced planning that was re-
quired. But the problem of getting a continental test site was one to which
we could not contribute much except to say that it was very much needed and
that we hoped it would be available.
Mr. GRAY. May I ask, when you say "we", you are always referring to GAG?
The WITNESS. For this field I am talking about the GAC. There were points
on which we had differences of opinion. They were not very frequent. I be-
lieve in the weapons field they were not very major.
There were differences of opinion about the proper way to get reactor develop-
ment going and perhaps some difference of opinion about the value of various
forms of military propulsion. What I am reciting now I believe to be unani-
mous.
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, in all of the recommendations that were made through-
out these years from 1947 to 1952, during which you were Chairman, did you
concur in those recommendations yourself personally? I mean to say that if
there were differences of opinion, were there any instances in which recom-
mendations were made in which you did not concur?
A. I think there may be that there were, but I don't remember them. They
were not on points that seemed of great importance.
Mr. GRAY. May I ask as a matter of practice if the committee made a report
and then if members had some difference of view they were reflected in a separate
memorandum?
The WITNESS. The way it worked is the following : Maybe I had better go back
to procedures. The meeting was generally opened by a meeting with the Com-
mission, sometimes with the military liaison committee, at which the Commission
would discuss with us what was on its mind, what advice it wanted.
There would be a period of briefings in which documents were brought in and
the staff came and very often members of the various laboratories came and
told their story. Usually there was more to consider than could be adequately
considered in a 2 -or 3-day meeting.
We then would go into executive session, go over the program aloud and begin
to talk about questions. Sometimes it was clear that the answer was obvious.
Sometimes it was very tough. Sometimes we felt that the right answer would
be very difficult for the Commission to carry out and we had the problem of
giving our advice to the Commission in a way which was both honest and useful.
When we were about clear as to what we had to say we would meet again
with the Commission, and occasionally with the military liaison committee,
and at that point I would usually summarize out loud what our thoughts were
and a record would be made of that. If I knew of divergences of opinion, I
would call on those who had any divergent opinion to express their differences ;
If I didn't know about any, in any case I would go around the table asking for
comments. There almost always were some comments because I had forgotten
something, or I had given an emphasis which was not right, or some one wanted
to strengthen what I had said.
This oral report I then made the basis of a letter to the Commission which was
our immediate report to them. This was circulated to the members of the
committee who could approve it and it was brought up for approval and amend-
ment at the subsequent meeting as to whether it was an adequate expression of
the Commission's views.
I remember one instance in which there was a dissent—one and only one
instance — from my representation of the view of another member who said
I had not gotten it straight and who wrote a letter amplifying.
We also, not always, but normally kept minutes. I say not always because
I have the impression that the most controversial meeting in the light of
history, that of October 1949, minutes were not kept. The meeting was too
hectic, or something. The secretary never wrote them up, but wrote notes
afterward. You know that better than I do.
The reports of the Commission, of course, though they usually were top
secret or often top secret, were the Commission's property, and if it wanted to
send them over to the Joint Congressional Committee, or the military liaison
committee or anyone else, that was fine with us.
The minutes of the meeting, which often told what kind of hassles we had,
what kind of arguments or considerations, we made available to the Commission
72
to throw whatever light they could on what we knew and what we thought,
but we asked them not to distribute the minutes since they identified Individuals
as saying this or that.
I think this is how the record was kept.
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. I wanted the board to be sure, Dr. Oppenheimer, that when you recount,
as you are about to do — and, indeed, as you have already begun doing — some of
the important things that the committee recommended to the Commission and
urged upon it in the national interest, they were all actions in which you yourself
wholeheartedly approved.
A. If I had dissented, I would certainly have said so.
Q. So that the Board can understand that, you were really talking as much
about your own views and contributions as you are about other people.
A. Yes, although I need to make one point clear. It is very important for
a chairman to get everybody into the act and not to dominate a meeting.
I think my normal practice was to bring up a question and then see what other
members of the committee would say. I would not wish to testify, and I can't
testify, that the views which I came out of the meeting with were always the same
as the views I went into the meeting with. This was a matter of discussion.
Sometimes new facts were brought to light, sometimes we learned things we
had not known before; sometimes people talked me out of what I originally
thought. But I certainly never incorporated in a report anything different than
I thought was the best advice that I would give at that point.
Q. You have spoken now about the stress which the committee laid on the
importance of tests for the development of atomic weapons. Do you want to say
something about some of the other aspects of weapon Improvement which you
pressed for in those days.
Dr. EVANS. Pardon me, but may I ask one question about these tests before
you leave that?
Dr. Oppenheimer, were there what we might call bad tests that did not come up
to your mathematical calculations?
The WITNESS. I am not sure whether the answer to this is classified or not?
Dr. EVANS. Maybe I should not ask it.
The WITNESS. The security officer has left, but I will take the chance.
Dr. EVANS. I will hold the question.
The WITNESS. All right. The answer is of some interest, but not, I think, in
connection with whether I am fit to serve the country.
Mr. GABBISON. If the chairman would like, we would be glad to step out.
The WITNESS. Let us not have any more classified stuff than we have to.
I ought to say that, at our first meeting or two — I don't remember which — we
brooded to a very considerable length about the thermonuclear program, I
think the state of affairs was that not much was known about it; it had not
been pursued very vigorously, and the unknowns overwhelmed the knowns.
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. Just to recapitulate, the work in the thermonuclear field began when at
Los Alamos?
A. The theoretical work began in Berkeley in the summer of 1942. The thermo-
nuclear work was pursued merely as a theoretical Job and not a development
job. I think it would naturally have been somewhat intensified after the war
with the view of making better measurements and better calculations because
it was one of the interesting things to do.
The question we tried to ask ourselves was, Is there enough in this so that
it ought to be pushed, or is it something that will be a distraction from the very
immediate Job of getting some weapons into the places where they are needed?
Our answer was, I think, the following: That it was a very interesting problem
or set of problems; that if work were going on at Los Alamos it would attract
first-rate theoretical physicists and that the probability was that if people
studied the thermonuclear problems at Los Alamos this would help the other
program rather than hurt it because it would have the effect of increasing the
brains and resources of the laboratory.
I will have to give you a complete review of the thermonuclear thing, but
this was our initial recommendation.
We made a number of other observations relevant to the weapons program.
I think one of the important ones — I am not sure we were the first to do it-
was to keep asking the Commission not how many bombs should they make, be-
cause that was not our Job— that was the Job of the Military Establishment—
73
but what were the real limits on how many they could make. How much mate-
rial could be made available? Because, even thousrh very great strides were
made between 1047 and 1&10 in the effectiveness with which material was used,
there was still the question, Is the plant we have being used in the best possible
way? Is there any inherent limitation on the plant? Is there enough raw
material to sustain more plant? Is there any way in which you can relieve
the limitation on raw material? Does this come back to a dollar limitation?
We addressed to the Commission from time to time questions intended to
make clear to the Military Establishment that the requirements they were plac-
ing for atomic weapons were perhaps all that could be done right then with
existing plant, raw material, operation, and bomb design, but by no means all
that you could do if you really set to work on it.
The very large expansion programs which, of course, were not approved or
formulated by us were certainly in part stimulated by the set of questions.
There have been several expansion programs, and the whole atomic-weapons
capacity has risen enormously. It took quite a while for this to take hold, but
1 think we started on it fairly early.
We were very concerned— I think probably this concern reached its maximum
during the Korean war but started earlier and continued later— to adapting
atomic warheads so that they could be used by a variety of carriers. This
sometimes meant developing designs which were not, from the point of view
of nuclear physics, the most perfect design, because you had to make a com-
promise in order to get the thing light or small or thin or whatever else it was
that the carrier required. But experience showed that almost every improve-
ment that you made in trying to make, let us say, a physically smaller atomic
bomb was reflected in an improvement in the performance of the larger ones.
So, as this thing began to unroll, you could not really tell whether an effort
aimed at making an atomic bomb that you could shoot out of a machinegun —
to take an obviously unclassified example — would not also help the very large
bombs which are the most efficient.
This had something to do with trying to bring together the enormous pro-
gram, of which our chairman surely knows a good deal, of missiles and the
adaptation of weapons plans and missile plans. In this connection we wel-
comed the building up of Sandia that Dr. Kelly has described to you and tried
generally to get as much coordination between the hardware side, the military
application side, and the development of the atomic explosives themselves. I
believe we were rather early in this preoccupation, which later became quite
general. ^ _ ..
We were concerned with flexibility and made a number of recommendations
to the Commission which I need not spell out, the purpose of which was to be
sure that if, during a war, you found out bombs you had were not -exactly the
one you wanted, you could do something about it. We felt that no amount of
crystal-balling would make it certain that your stockpile corresponded to what
you really needed in combat. ^ ^ . ^
We suggested a variety of devices by which you could take advantage of what
you learned in combat and come up quickly with what you needed.
I have listed these as some of the things about weapons. I have obviously
left the hydrogen bomb for a separate item. I might run rather briefly through
the other aspects of the Commission's work that I have mentioned.
The war almost stopped the training of scientists in this country and this
started up again at an accelerated pace under the GI bill and the rest of it
But it was very clear that there were not enough people in the country to do
the things that were needed. The couple of billion dollars which we now spend
on research and development is not all spent on the salary of scientists, but it
is very often bottlenecked by scientists.
It seemed to us that the source of all this was universities and university
training. It seemed to us that the source of all this was the research in uni-
versities, in other words. It seemed to us that the source of the good work
that had been done in the war was not in applied science but in the pure
scientists who had learned their stuff in the hardest of all fields, the exploration
of something that is really not known and really new.
We encouraged the Commission to take a number of steps which we thougnt
would help this. They have, first of all, their regional laboratories, of which
Brookhaven is a good example, Argonne is a good example, Oak Ridge and Ber-
keley There we tried to get the Commission to do something which was only
partially successful but has been quite successful in Brookhaven, and that is to
separate as sharply as possible the secret and sensitive things which ought to be
74
guarded and restricted and the things that are Just published all the time in the
journals and, therefore, to make it possible for these facilities to serve as wide
a group of people as possible without involving delays and clearance procedures
and in order to maintain really secure the things that were secret.
We tried very hard to get the Commission to support work which was not
directly obviously related to the practical applications of atomic energy. There
were arguments in those days that the Commission was so short handed, so in
need of physicists, that the best thing they could do was to make it hard for
physicists to get jobs so that they would come and work in the various labora-
tories. We thought that was quite wrong— that the best thing they could do
was to support physics in the universities, that this would provide the young
men — and it has, of course — who would be able to man their various laboratories
in the years to come and they should do at least as well as the Office of tfaval
Research in those fields of science which by statute they were supposed to be
responsible for— atomic science and chemistry, physics, geology. They have
done this, and anyone who picks up a contemporary physics journal will see in it
innumerable examples where it says that this work was supported by the Atomic
Energy Commission.
The level of activity in physics, especially, but also In chemistry, has been
very much raised by their efforts, and the number of people practicing has been
enormously raised. What is more than that, if you now go to a contemporary
Atomic Energy Commission Laboratory, a lot of the bright ideas and a lot of the
best work is done by men whose names were not known 7 or 8 years ago and who
have precisely come up through university training in the meantime. This is
true of Los Alamos, and it is true of all the others.
I think on this we probably pushed the Commission and they regarded us as
people who were, after all, largely professors and university presidents and we
were pleading a special interest. We did plead a special interest, but we believed
it to be in the national interest, too.
Where possible in basic science, we urged the Commission to make its unclassi-
fied facilities available on a worldwide basis. A good many scientists from
friendly nations have come here to do experiments, to learn techniques, and also
to teach us what they knew ; and there are magnificent examples of International
collaboration that have taken place in the Commission's laboratories. I think
the most striking is probably known to you.
In 1947, 1 guess, the big accelerator at Berkeley started operation. Maybe it
was 1946. People immediately looked to see whether the new high energies that
were being provided were creating mesons which we knew were created in the
cosmic rays but which were not artificially created before. They looked for
months and months, and the reports were negative. This seemed very puzzling
from the point of view of the theory.
A young Brazilian who had been studying in England arrived at the radiation
laboratory, knew the technique used there, exposed a few photographic plates,
and there were the mesons. This is a small illustration of the need from the
scientific point of view of the international collaboration.
I think I need not point out that it is also a very limited but a very healthy
element in the general structure of our alliances and in the good feelings that
exist between people in other countries and here at home.
The Commission has, I think — and we so represented it — an obligation to
make available to industry and to technology and medicine those facilities which
by statute it and only it can operate. It has fulfilled this very well. The dis-
tribution of isotopes had been begun by the Manhattan District. It has been
enormously expanded and speeded up and improved by the Commission. This
is one example.
The use of reactors for both secret and nonsecret work is another example.
I don't know how much you have found it profitable to leaf through the general
advisory committee reports. I am sure you will find in them just countless
occasions where either in general terms or in specific terms we tried to steer
the Commission on a course which would enable it to do the maximum for
American science.
I am not so proud of our record in the reactor program. This we never
managed to give as effective advice about as I wished. We worried a lot about
it, and you will find that if the advice was not good it was at least copious.
I think one reason for the difficulty is that progress in reactor development,
whether for civil or military purposes, is a very expensive thing. It is the kind
of thing you don't do In a small university laboratory. It is a big industrial
75
enterprise. It may cost $10 million; it may cost S50 million. It is not some-
thing you can just try out for size.
We found it very hard to compose the conflict between the need for an orderly
and comprehensive and intelligible program of reactor development and the
inevitable enthusiasm which groups would get to have for their own pet baby
and which maybe was a reactor which was not especially illuminating from
the point of view of the program as a whole. We thought at one time that this
could be helped by centralizing the reactor development work and so recom-
mended to the Commission. This was one of the recommendations which was
opposed. Fermi thought this was bad advice. In any case, it never happened.
So we don't know whether it would have been good or not. We tried very hard to
get some kind of policy committee of the people who knew about reactors, and
that was formed, a committee of Oak Ridge and Argonae and General Electric
scientists, so that they would get some agreement and not all push their own
babies.
We strongly urged the Commission to get somebody in Washington who was
an expert in reactors, and it turned out to be the Director of Reactor Develop-
ment, Dr. Hafstad, who held that job from the beginning. I am not clear that
he will be on any of your lists.
What in the end happened was that we began to sort out better and the Com-
mission began to sort out better what the reactors were for, and therefore have
more rational criteria of which ones to build. They were for production, the
production of materials for bombs. They were for military propulsion. They
were for learning about reactors so that you would know how to build the next
ones better. These 3 purposes I think we recognized in 1947 or 1948.
After that I think the Commission's program began to take extremely good
shape, and we have moved very far. We always liked the submarine reactor,
not only because it would be a usable thing in warfare, but it looked close enough
to civil power, relevant enough to civil power, to be of interest from that point
of view, too.
I believe we dragged our feet very much on the initial plans for flying aircraft
with nuclear power. It seemed to us a very long-range thing and one that ought
to be approached in the spirit of research rather than have a definite develop-
ment and commitment When I last heard about it, this was the state of affairs.
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. This brings us logically to the report on the H-bomb in the fall of 1949.
I don't know whether the board would think this was an appropriate point to
adjourn or whether we should go ahead and start on it.
Mr. GRAY. I think we should start on it, Mr. Garrison, if you don't mind.
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. The story begins, I take it, with the Russian explosion of an atomic bomb
on September 23, 1949?
A. I don't think the story begins there. I will go back a little bit. We can
begin in the middle and go both backward and forward.
In September of 1949, I had a call from either General Nelson or Mr.
Northrop. * * *
A little later I came down to Washington and met with a panel. I see it says
in my summary that this was advisory to General Vandenberg. I never was
entirely clear as to who the panel was supposed to advise.
Mr. GRAY. This appears in the exhibit?
The WITNESS. That is right This was Admiral Parsons, Dr. Bacher, Dr.
Bush.
Dr. EVANS. Where is that?
Mr. ECKER. It is item 6, II.
Dr. EVANS. Yes ; I have it
The WITNESS. I think I had seen a good deal of the evidence before the panel
was convened. In any case, we went over it very carefully and it was very
clear to us that this was the real thing, and there was not any doubt about it
We so reported to whomever we were reporting. I think it was General Vanden-
berg. This was an atomic bomb, * * *
Yesterday you read evidence that in 1948 I was not thinking it would come
so soon. * * *
I went over to the State Department where the question was being discussed —
I was asked to go over by the Under Secretary — should this be publicly announced
by the President and I gave some arguments in favor of that.
76
I don't know who finally resolved the matter, but the President did make a
public statement. I was taken up to hearings before the Joint Congressional
Committee. General Vandenberg certainly appeared and probably Admiral
Hillenkoetter and other people whom I have forgotten. The committee was
quite skeptical as to whether this was the real thing.
Mr. GHAT. Is this the GAC?
The WITNESS. No, the Joint Congressional Committee. They were quite
skeptical and I was not allowed to tell them the evidence. It was understood
that this was to be kept secret. All I could do was just sound as serious and
convinced and certain about it as I knew how. I think by the time we left the
Joint Congressional Committee understood that this event had been real. I do
remember Senator Vandenberg's asking me, and it was the last time I met with
him—he became ill not long thereafter— "Doctor, what do we do now?" I
should have said I don't know. I did say we should stay strong and healthy,
and we make sure of our friends. This was immediately before the General
Advisory Committee meeting.
The Committee had a whole lot of stuff on its docket I have forgotten the
details. There was a docket for us. We disposed of that business, and we talked
about this event. At that point Dr. Rabi returned. He had been in Europe on
the UNESCO Mission. He read about this in the newspapers. The President
had announced it He said very naturally, "I think we ought to decide what
to do. I think we ought to advise the Commission." I opposed that I
think most all other members of the Committee did on the ground that it might
take a little while to think what to do and also on the ground that many of
the things to do would be done against a framework of governmental decision
as to which at that point we could only speculate.
During October or late September, I think October, a good many people came
to see me or called me or wrote me letters about the super program. I remember
three things. Dr. Teller arrived. ,He told me that he thought this was the
moment to go all out on the hydrogen-bomb program.
Mr. GRAY. May I interrupt? I am sorry. This is following
The WITNESS. Following the GAC meeting of September and prior to the
meeting in October.
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. Dr. Bethe arrived. I think they were there together or their
visits partly overlapped, although I am not sure. He was very worried about
it He will testify.
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. About what?
A. About the thermonuclear program, whether it was right or wrong; what
his relations to it should be. I assume he will testify to that better than I can.
It was not clear to me what the right thing to do was.
Mr. ROBB. You say to you or to him?
The WITNESS, To me. I had a communication. I can't find it as a letter,
and I don't know whether it was a letter or phone call. It was from Dr. Conant
He said that this would be a very great mistake.
By Mr. GABBISON:
Q. What would be a great mistake?
A. To go all out with the super. Presumably he also will testify to this.
He did not go into detail, but said if it ever came before the General Advisory
Committee, he would certainly oppose it as folly.
The General Advisory Committee was called to meet in Washington, and met
on two questions which were obviously related. The first was, was the Commis-
sion doing what it ought to be doing. Were there other things which it should
now be undertaking in the light of the Soviet explosion.
The second was the special case of this ; was it crash development, the most
rapid possible development and construction of a super among the things that
the Commission ought to be doing.
Now I have reviewed for you in other connections some of the earlier hydrogen-
bomb tale. The work on it in the summer of 1942, when we were quite enthusi-
astic about the possibility, my report on this work to Bush, the wartime work
in which there were 2 discoveries. 1 was very much casting doubt on the feasi-
bility, and 1 which had a more encouraging quality with regard to the feasibility.
Of the talks with General Groves in which he had indicated that this was not
something to rush into after the war. Of the early postwar work, prior to the
establishment of the Commission. Of onr encouragement to the Commission
77
and thus to Los Alamos and also directly to Los Alamos to study the problem
and get on with it in 1947 and 1948.
The GAG record shows I think that there were some thermonuclear devices
that we felt were feasible and sensible and encouraged. I believe this was in
1948. But that we made a technically disparaging remark about the super in
1948. This was the judgment we then had. 1 remember that before 1949 and
the bomb, Dr. Teller had discussed with me the desirability of his going to Los
Alamos and devoting himself to this problem. I encouraged him to do this.
In fact, he later reminded me of that, that I encouraged him in strong terms
to do it.
Now, the meetings on
By Mr. GABRISON :
Q. The meeting of October 19?
A. The meeting of October 19, 1949. Have we the date right?
Mr. KOBE. October 29.
The WITNESS. October 29. I think what we did was the following. We had
a first meeting with the Commission at which they explained to us the double
problem : What should they do and should they do this? We then consulted a
number of people. * * *
We had consultations not with the Secretary of State, but with the head of
the policy planning staff, who represented him, George Kennan, as to what he
thought the Russians might be up to, and where our principal problems lay from
the point of view of assessment of Russian behavior and Russian motives. We
had consultations with the Military Establishment, General Bradley was there,
Admiral Parsons, I think General Hull or General Kyes, head of the Weapons
Systems Evaluation Committee, General Nichols, probably. I won't try to recall
all. Also Mr. LeBarron.
Prior to this meeting there had been no great expression of interest on the
part of the military in more powerful weapons. The atomic bomb liad of
course been stepped up some, but we had not been pressed to push that develop-
ment as fast as possible. There had been no suggestion that very large weapons
would be very useful. The pressure was all the other way; get as many as you
can.
We discussed General Bradley's analysis of the effects of the Russian explo-
sion, and what problems he faced and with the staff, of course.
Then we went into executive session. I believe I opened the session by
asking Fermi to give an account of the technical state of affairs. He has always
been interested in this possibility. I think it occurred to him very early that
the high temperatures of a fission bomb might be usable in igniting lighter
materials. He has also an extremely critical and dear head. 1 asked others
to add to this. Then we went around the table and everybody said what he
thought the issues were that were involved. There was a surprising unanimity—
to me very surprising— that the United States ought not to take the initiative
at that time in an all out program for the development of thermonuclear weapons.
Different people spoke in different ways. I don't know how available to you
the actual record of this conversation is or even whether it fully exists. But
there was not any difference of opinion in the final finding. I don't know
whether this is the first thing we considered or whether we considered the Com-
mission's other question first. I imagine we went back and forth between the
two of them.
To the Commission's other question, were they doing enough, we answered no.
Have you read this report, because if you have, my testimony about it will add
nothing.
Mr. GRAY. I believe that the report with two
The WITNESS. Annexes.
Mr. GRAY. I don't know whether they are actually annexes, but two supple-
mentary statements, I don't know whether that is in one page signed by two
people or two separate sheets.
The WITNESS. The report itself you have.
Mr. GRAY. The report is available.
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. I think you better say what you recollect of it
A. I recollect of it that the first part of the report contained a series of
affirmative recommendations about what the Commission should do. I believe
all of them were directed toward weapons expansion, weapons improvement and
weapons diversification. Some of them involved the building of new types ol
78
plant which would give a freedom of choice with regard to weapons. Some of
them involved just a stepping up of the amount I don't think that this expressed
satisfaction with the current level of the Commission effort.
On the super program itself, I attempted to give a description of what this
weapon was, of what would have to go into it, and what we thought the design
would be. I explained that the uncertainties in this game were very great,
that one would not know whether one had it or not unless one had built it and
tested it, and that realistically one would have to expect not one test, but per-
haps more than one test. That this would have to be a program of design and
testing.
We had in mind, but I don't think we had clearly enough in mind, that we
were talking about a single design which was in its essence frozen, and that
the possibility did not occur to us very strongly that there might be quite other
ways of going about it Our report had a single structure in mind — or almost a
single structure— whose characteristics in terms of blast, of damage, of explosive
force, of course, and certainly we tried in the report to describe as faithfully
as we knew how. I think in the report itself we were unanimous in hoping that
the United States would not have to take the initiative in the development of
this weapon.
There were two annexes, neither of which I drafted. There is nothing of
restricted data in those I believe, but perhaps we can't read them into the record
anyway. Are there any restricted data?
Mr. ROLANDEB. I think the question raised is whether other security informa-
tion might be divulged.
The WITNESS. How many bombs we have and so on?
Mr. ROLANDEB. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. Perhaps Dr. Oppenheimer could give us his summary.
The WITNESS. It is a long time since I read them. This ought to be in the
record, ought it not? Gould you let me read them?
Mr. ROBB. They have been available to Dr. Oppenheimer ever since the letter
was sent to him. I think that was clearly understood, was it not, Doctor?
The WITNESS. I was told by counsel that I would be allowed
Mr. ROBB. Any reports that you had prepared?
The WITNESS. That is right
Mr. ROBB. So far you have not come down to avail yourself of it
The WITNESS. I see. They are not here?
Mr. ROBB. We have extracts of them, yes, sir.
The WITNESS. I would think I might read the two annexes and paraphrase
them.
Mr. GBAY. I think I am going to ask that we recess now, because there is not
another matter to bring up not related to the testimony. I think in the mean-
time, Mr. Robb, the chairman would like to be advised about this.
Mr. ROBB. The security aspect?
Mr. GRAY. Yes. So we will recess now until two o'clock.
(Thereupon, at 12 : 25 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. GRAY. Gentlemen, shall we proceed.
(Thereupon, Albert J. Gasdor, the reporter, was duly sworn by the chairman.)
Whereupon, J. Robert Oppenheimer the witness on the stand at the time
of taking the recess, resumed the stand, and testified further as f ollows :
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. You were in the course of commenting on the 1949 Report when we
recessed.
A. Yes.
I find that the report has a letter of transmittal, that it has a section, on
affirmative actions to be taken, that it has a section on super bombs and that
it has these two- annexes of which you have heard.
As far as length is concerned, the section on affirmative actions and the
section on super bombs are about equal, and I guess I can't tell you what is in
the one on affirmative actions except In the very general terms I used before.
The first page of the page-and-a-half of the report on the super bomb is
an account of what it is supposed to be, what has to be done in order to bring
it about, and some semiquantttattve notions of what it would take, what kind
79
of damage it would do, and what kind of a program would be required. The
essential point there is that as we then saw it, it was a weapon that you
could not be sure of until you tried it out, and it is a problem of calculation and
study, and then you went out in the proper place in the Pacific and found out
whether it went bang and found out to what extent your ideas had been right
and to what extent they had been wrong.
It is on the second page that we start talking about the extent of damage
and the first paragraph is just a factual account of the kind of damage, the
kind of carrier, and I believe I should not give it— I believe it is classified,
even if it is not possibly entirely accurate.
I would like to state one conclusion which is that for anything but very
large targets, this was not economical in terms of damage per dollar, and
then even for large targets it was uncertain whether it would be economical
in terms of damage per dollar. I am not claiming that this was good foresight,
but I am just telling you what it says in here.
I am going to read two sentences :
"We all hope that by one means or another, the development of these weapons
can be avoided. We are all reluctant to see the United States take the Initia-
tive in precipitating this development. We are all agreed that it would be wrong
at the present moment to commit ourselves to an all-out effort towards its
development."
This is the crux of it and it is a strong negative statement. We added to
this some comments as to what might be declassified and what ought not to
be declassified and held secret if any sort of a public statement were contem-
plated. If the President were going to say anything about it, there were some
things we thought obvious and there would be no harm in mentioning them.
Actually, the secret ones were out in the press before very long.
The phrase that you heard this morning, "We believe that the imaginative
and concerted attack on the problem has a better than even chance of producing
the weapon * * *"— I find that in this report, and in this report there is,
therefore, no statement that it is unfeasible. There is a statement of uncer-
tainty which I believed at the time was a good assessment. You would have
found people who would have said this was too conservative, it could be done
faster and more certainly, and you would find other people who would say
that it could not be done at all ; but the statement as read here, no member of
the General Advisory Committee objected to, and I have heard very little objec-
tion to that as an assessment of the feasibility at that time.
This is the report itself, and there are parts of it which I think you should
read but, for the record, there are parts that I cannot get into here.
Mr, ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I think it might be well for the record to show at
this point that the board has read the entire report.
The WITNESS. I see. Then, what am I doing that for?
Mr. ROBB. Doctor, that Is up to you.
Mr. GABEISON. I thought, Mr. Chairman, there was expressed a littte doubt
on the part of the board this morning as to just how completely it was recalled
at this time, and I think also for that reason it is quite appropriate for Dr.
Oppenheimer to perhaps tell the board in hie own way what was in it.
Mr. GRAY. That is what I understood was the purpose of addressing his re-
marks as he is doing.
Mr. GABEISON. I am sure counsel was not mentioning that in the form of an
objection.
Mr. ROBB. No, not at all. I was not offering that as an objection, and I do
not object to anything. In fact, I might say that later on we might want to
come back to this report.
The WITNESS. One important point to make is that lack of feasibility is not
the ground on which we made our recommendations.
Another point I ought to make is that lack of economy, although alleged is
not the primary or only ground, the competition with fission weapons is obviously
in our minds. The real reason, the weight, behind the report is, In my opinion,
a failing of the existence of these weapons would be a disadvantageous thing.
It says this over and over again.
I may read, which I am sure has no security value, from the so-called minority
report, Fermi and Rabi.
"The fact that no limits exist to the destructiveness of this weapon makes
it very existence and the knowledge of Its construction a danger to humanity
as a whole. It is necessarily an evil thing considered in any light. For these
80S&L3— 54 6
80
reasons, we believe it important for the President of the United States to tell
the American public and the world that we think is wrong on fundamental ethical
principles to initiate the development of such a weapon."
In the report which got to be known as the majority report, which Conant
wrote, DuBridge, Buckley and I signed, things are not quite so ethical and funda-
mental, but it says in the final paragraph : "In determining not to proceed to
develop the super bomb, we see a unique opportunity of providing by example some
limitations on the totality of war and thus of eliminating the fear and arousing
the hope of mankind."
I think it is very clear that the objection was that we did not like the weapon,
not that it couldn't be made.
Now, it is a matter of speculation whether, if we had before us at that time,
if we had had the technical knowledge and inventiveness which we did have
somewhat later, we would have taken a view of this kind. These are total views
where you try to take into account how good the thing is, what the enemy is
likely to do, what you can do with it, what the competition is, and the extent to
which this is an inevitable step anyway.
My feeling about the delay in the hydrogen bomb, and I imagine you want to
question me about it, is that if we had had good ideas in 1945, and had we
wanted to, this object might have been in existence in 1947 or 1948, perhaps
1948. If we had had all of the good ideas in 1949, I suppose some little time
might have been shaved off the development as it actually occurred. If we had
not had good ideas in 1951, I do not think we would have it today. In other
words, the question of delay is keyed In this case to the question of invention,
and I think the record should show — it is known to you. — that the principal
inventor in all of this business was Teller, with many important contribu-
tions * * * other people, * * * It has not been quite a one-man show, but he
has had some very, very good ideas, and they have kept coming. It is probably
true that an idea of mine is embodied in all of these things. It is not very in-
genious but it turned out to be very useful, and it was not enough to establish
feasibility or have a decisive bearing on their feasibility.
The notion that the thermonuclear arms race was something that was in £he
interests of this country to avoid if it could was very clear to us in 1949. We
may have been wrong. We thought it was something to avoid even if we could
jump the gun by a couple of years, or even if we could outproduce the enemy,
because we were infinitely more vulnerable and infinitely less likely to Initiate
the use of these weapons, and because the world in which great destruction has
been done in all civilized parts of the world is a harder world for America to live
with than it is for the Communists to live with. This is an idea which I believe
is still right, but I think what was not clear to us then and what is clearer to me
now is that it probably lay wholly beyond our power to prevent the Russians
somehow from getting ahead with it. I think if we could have taken any action
at that time which would have precluded their development of this weapon, it
would have been a very good bet to take that, I am sure. I do not know enough
about contemporary intelligence to say whether or not our actions have had any
effect on theirs but you have ways of finding out about that
I believe that their atomic effort was quite imitative and that made it quite
natural for us to think that their thermonuclear work would be quite imitative
and that we should not set the pace in this development I am trying to explain
what I thought and what I believe my friends thought I am not arguing that
this is right, but I am clear about one thing: if this affair could have been
averted on the part of the Russians, I am quite clear that we would be in a safer
world today by far.
Mr. GRAY. Would you repeat that last sentence. I didn't quite get it.
The WITNESS. If the development by the enemy as well as by us of thermo-
nuclear weapons could have been averted, I think we would be in a somewhat
safer world today than we are. God knows, not entirely safe because atomic
bombs are not Jolly either.
I remember a few comments at that meeting that I believe it best that people
who are coming here to testify speak for themselves about; I am not sure my
memory is right— comments of Fermi, of Conant, of Kabi, and of DuBridge as to
how they felt about it
Mr. GEAY. How many members of the GAC are being called by you— the
members of the GAC at that time?
The WITNESS. Four or five, I think.
Mr. GABRISON. Mr. Conant, Dr. DuBridge, Dr. Fermi, Dr. Eabi, Mr. Eowe, Mr
Whitman, Professor Von Neumann
The WITNESS. He was not there.
81
Mr. GEAT. It is a substantial membership.
Mr. GARRISON. We have a statement from Mr. Manley that we will probably
introduce in written form to avoid the necessity of calling him from the State
of Washington.
The WITNESS. I do not think we called Dr. Cyril Smith, but I will testify that
he was an ardent signer of these documents.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Seaborg was away.
There were meetings after this.
The WITNESS. Yes. I think we have to keep strictly away from the technical
questions. I do not think we want to argue technical questions here, and I do
not think it is very meaningful for me to speculate as to how we would have
responded had the technical picture at that time been more as it was later.
However, it is my judgment in these things that when you see something that
is technically sweet, you go ahead and do it and you argue about what to do about
it only after you have had your technical success. That is the way it was with
the atomic bomb. I do not think anybody opposed making it ; there were some
debates about what to do with it after it was made. I cannot very well imagine
if we had known in late 1949 what we got to know by early 1951 that the tone of
our report would have been the same. You may ask other people how they feel
about that. I am not at all sure they will concur; some will and some will not
In any case, after this report, we had a series of further consultations. I re-
member that almost immediately afterward, I consulted with the Secretary of
State — I think I consulted with him twice, perhaps alone and once with the head
of the policy-planning staff — and we talked about this problem.
I remember that the Commission called us down sometime after our meetings,
October 29 meeting, called only those members of the committee that were nearby,
those on the east coast— Conant, Buckley, Rabi and me, four of us— and we went
into it in a more informal session and that is the first time that I became aware
of a division of opinion in the Commission and presumably we explained what we
had in mind. There is no record of that meeting, or at least I have no record
of it, and I have forgotten the details. I know they had another GAC meeting
before the President's decision was made, and the Commission asked us to
amplify those points. Presumably that was done and presumably you have access
to those records, and I have no vivid recollection as to what was said.
In addition to that, toward the end of the period during which the President
which making up his mind, I was called by the Joint Committee to come and ex-
plain what we had in mind. I was out in California at the time, but when I got
back, I did appear before the joint committee. This was immediately before
the President's decision was made, and I know how a decision was coming out,
but I tried to explain what we had in mind as well as I could. That testimony
is presumably also available to you. It is a fairly long statement, questions and
answers from the Senators and Congressmen, and I think it stresses the same
points as our first report ; that is the impression I have. It is not accessible to me.
In any case, the GAC which had a habit of always being around when some-
thing was happening was in Washington when the President issued his announce-
ment saying that we were going ahead with it.
Mr. GABRISON. The date of that was when?
The WITNESS. January 29, 1950. I remember two things: One is that in the
relatively short interval between October 29 and January 29, the technical
prospects for doing what we were planning to do had deteriorated. This was to
continue for a long time, and the essential points had not yet come up. By that
time, were also quite worried how to carry out the Presidential directive. I
believe that our report of that meeting, January 29, 1950, said something like
this : we are not going to go into the question of the wisdom of the decision. We
now have to look at how to carry it out, and we pointed out that there were several
things that the Commission needed to get very busy on if the program was to
match. It had to make certain materials available in order to support the Los
Alamos efforts, and it had to rearrange its programs in certain ways in order
to get on with the job, and I think it was probably at that time that we got
into the details of the Savannah River plant. The dual purpose of this seemed
just right in view of the great technical uncertainties which were both qualitative
and quantitative which then existed.
I believe that in every subsequent GAC report where we gave advice on the
thermonuclear program, on the super part of it or the other parts of it, that the
problem before us was what to do and how to get on with it, what made sense
and what did not make sense, and that the morale and ethical and political issues
which are touched on in these two annexes were never again mentioned, and
that we never again questioned the basic decisions under which we were operating.
82
We tried, I think, throughout to point out where the really critical questions
were. There was a tendency in this job, as in many others, to try to solve the
easy problems and try to leave the really tough ones unworried about, and I
think we kept rubbing on the toughest one, that this had to be looked into. That
was done not completely ; perhaps it is not absolutely done completely today,
but the situation developed in a most odd way because, by the spring and summer
of 1951, things were not stuck in the sense that there was nothing to do, but they
were stuck in the sense that there was no program of which you could see the end.
Now, different people responded differently to that. Teller also pointed out
quite rightly that there were other possibilities that might turn up and other
people took a very categorical view that the whole business was nonsense.
Mr. GABBISON. Scientifically nonsense.
The WITNESS. Scientifically nonsense. I believe my own record was one that
it looked sour but we have had lots of surprises and let's keep open-minded.
I was under very considerable pressure to report in bleak terms through the
General Advisory Committee to the Commission and to the military on the
prospects. I remember General McCormick saying that we had a duty to do
this. At a later time, I remember Admiral Parsons saying that we had a duty
to do this to the military rather than to the Commission. We were in somewhat
of an uncomfortable position. We recommended against this ; it was not going
well, and we didn't quite think that it was right for us to say how badly it was
going on the ground that this might not be credible, might not be convincing.
What we did do was hold a meeting — perhaps this was the weapons subcom-
mittee of the GAG — out at Los Alamos at which we had talks by the people
working on the job— Wheeler, Teller, Bradbury— I will not try to list them
all— but, anyway, the people who were really doing the work, and we kept a
transcript of these talks. We showed the transcript to the people whose views
were represented and we asked them to edit the transcript and transmitted this
transcript to the Commission, not as a report of ours but as a firsthand report
of how things looked. I think this would have been in the summer of 1950 or it
may have been somewhat later.
At the same time we went over the program with Los Alamos, there were
weapons testing programs, their calculation programs, and I believe you will
hear evidence that at least some people out there thought we were just the OT>
posite of harmful but quite helpful in connection with this job.
We also kept in touch with and tried to help the production activities of the
Commission, some of the engineering activities that went along with the basic
research and development It was partly, I think, in response to the sense that
a report on this matter also needed to be available in military circles that the
hydrogen super bomb was included in this report of the panel that we heard
of this morning ; it was toward the end of 1950, but it was all a part, that part
of the advice or which seems to me is most central and basic and inescapable
responsibility which is to tell what he knows of what is going on and what he
knows of the truth. I feel that in this we did our duty rather well
There are things that you probably want to question me about in some detail
in the General Manager's letter. They have to do with unauthorized distribu-
tion of reports. We have an affidavit which we will introduce later which
throws some light on it. To me, it was an utterly mysterious document. I did
of course— I won't say of course— in fact did show various GAG reports from
time to time to a very few people who were actively engaged and responsibly
engaged in the program. The purpose of this was certainly not to persuade them
to come over to my views but to elicit their views and have a discussion
I showed some of the reports on the super to Von Neumann at the Institute
who is a very close friend and a very responsible man and whom I knew to be
to^ai T M^nTn ^ program- * tad no notion at aU &** this was going
I showed nothing at Los Alamos. I wasn't there, and you will have a record
of what happened, which I think will satisfy you as to why some tf ttattto*
h°W Uttie ** ^*dyn--at ^ast tffl
i^1^^? aSeged that I kept people from working on the hydrogen bomb If
2£SW ""«?* ?? a kn<>w,}ea*e of «» 'tow which got to be rathefwide:
spraid I had an effect I cannot deny it because I don't know, bnt I thinkl cai
deny that I ever talked anybody out of working on the hydrogen bomb w
desired to talk anybody out of working on the hydrogen bomb ^u will
some testimony on this, bujb since I don't know whf the people S
referred to in the General Manager's letter, what I say might not
83
responsive. I know that in one case there was a very brilliant young physicist
called Conrad Longmire. I think he was at the University of Rochester. In
any case, he had applied to come to the Institute, and we granted him a mem-
bership there, and he said that he would like to go to Los Alamos for a year
and I said, "Fine, go do that, and you can have your membership here at any
time you want it," in an attempt to make the decision easy for him, because
he didn t want to give up his Institute membership. I don't know but that there
are other cases. Longmire is still there.
There are times when they communicated with me saying that it would be
nice for him to spend a year at the Institute, but he has not come yet. I think
we will have to get into the details if there is anything about my slowing down
the work on the super, because, as a general allegation, I find nothing to take
hold of there.
Mr. GARRISON. May I ask the board if it would suit your convenience to ask
Dr. Oppenheimer questions that you have in mind about any of these portions,
or would you rather do it at the end?
Mr. GRAY. I think we would rather do it at the end. I have not consulted
with Mr. Robb about it
Mr. ROBB. I think it would be preferable to ask the questions at the end.
Mr. GRAY. I think that would be preferable to get the continuity of Dr.
Oppenheimer's testimony.
The WITNESS. I think it would be fair to say that between the first of 1950
and early 1951, my attitude toward this object was that we didn't know how
to make it, and it was going to be very hard to make, but we had been told to
dot it and we must try.
In the spring of 1951, there were some inventions made. * * * and from then
on it became clear that this was a program which was bound to succeed. * * *
Why none of us had them earlier, I cannot explain, except that invention is a
somewhat erratic thing.
Teller had been working on this from 1942 on, his heart was in it, but it wasn't
until 1951 that he thought about how to do it right
Now, I have a few matters here which came in between. During the doldrums
of the H-bomb, the war in Korea broke out, and a large part of GAC's and other
committee's attention was, as I say, devoted to the very immediate and the very
obvious, and, I would say, to using an atomic explosive not merely in a strategic
campaign but also in a defensive or tactical campaign, and I think the record
will bear out that that is what we were spending most of our time worrying
about. That is the origin of the panel Kelly talked about this morning, the
origin of the exercises which led to the development of a tactical capability in
Europe, the origin of one at least of the threads, one at least of the reasons for
the very great expansion in the atomic energy enterprise to support a much
more diversified use of weapons, even leading some people to suggest — I think
this was Gordon Dean— 4hat maybe the atomic weapons on the battlefield would
be so effective that it would not be necessary to use them strategically. I have
never really believed that that was possible or believed that a sharp distinction
between the two could be maintained or made intelligible.
In the late summer and autumn of 1950, 1 had an obvious personal worry. I
had made as chairman, and had participated in, the recommendation against
the development of the super. The super was a big item on the program. It
wasn't going very well, and I wondered whether another man might not make
a better chairman for the General Advisory Committee. This was particularly
true since there were three new members added to the committee — Whitman,
Murphree and Libby— and I felt a little uncomfortable about continuing in that
office. I discussed it with several physicists. I remember discussing it with
Teller and Bacher. Teller says that he does not remember discussing it with me.
The general advice was: Let's all stick together as well as we can and don't
resign and don't change your position.
Mr. ROBB. What was that date?
The WITNESS. In the summer of 1950.
When I got back in the autumn of 1950, the first meeting, I went to see Mr.
Dean, who was Chairman of the Commission, and Commissioner Smyth and
told them about my problem, and they said that obviously the chairman should
be someone who would be comfortable with them — what would be their sugges-
tions? They protested in very forceful terms that I should not quit as chairman,
and that they would be very unhappy if I did, that I ought to carry on.
I also took the thing up with our committee, but our committee was not a very
responsive group when it came to electing other chairmen, and I got no place,
I did not feel that I ought to resign as chairman or refuse to serve. I thought
84
I ought to do what was comfortable for the Commission and the committee,
and I tried to ascertain what that was.
Mr. GARRISON. How about your Princeton meeting?
The WITNESS. We are still on the subject of the H-bomb and its consequences.
In the spring of 1951, I called— I am not sure whether I suggested it or
whether Commissioner Smyth suggested it but we consulted about it— a rather
large gathering for a couple of days at the institute in Princeton, and we had
there, I think, all five Commissioners, the general manager and his deputy, the
head of the Division of Military Applications, Bradbury and his assistants,
Teller, Von Neumann, Bethe, Bacher, Fermi who was no longer a member of
the committee, and Wheeler and one of his assistants, the people who were work-
ing on the program, and we had a couple of days of exposition and debate. I
chaired the meeting, and I suppose I did the summarizing. It was not the full
General Advisory Committee — the Weapons Subcommittee, essentially ; the secre-
tary of the committee was there and he took some notes but he did not write
up an official report. At that time, I think we did three things. We agreed
that the new ideas took top place and that although the old ones should be kept
on the back burner, the new ones should be pushed. I believe there was no
dissent from this; there was no articulated dissent. But later Commisisoner
Murray asked if this wasn't a violation of the Presidential directive, and I could
only respond that I didn't know as to what, but I thought it was a good course
and, if it was, maybe the President would modify his directive.
At that meeting, I remember no dissent from that but there was a great deal
of surprise at how things were changed. Fermi knew nothing of these develop-
ments and was quite amazed, and I think for the Commission it was quite an
education to see what had happened in the meantime. At least that was the
purpose, to get everybody together so that there was a common understanding.
The second thing was to recognize that some materials * * * might be handy
to have, and the Commission was urged to get started on producing some of
these materials. This was something that there was a little bit of objection
to on the ground that everything changed so often in the past and maybe change
in the future, and why get committed to a cumbersome operation on the basis
of the then-existing state of knowledge, but I believe the prevailing opinion,
and I know mine, was that the prevailing state of opinion was that it was a lot
solider than anything that had occurred before and that they ought to go ahead
and even at the risk of wasting a small amount of money.
The third thing we did was to talk about the construction and test schedules
for these things, and there there were differences of opinions, having to do with
whether the schedule should be aimed at a completed, large-scale explosion, or
whether one should be aimed at componentry testing which presumably was
supposed to have happened earlier and therefore might be illuminating with
regard to the large-scale explosion.
As I say, there was not agreement, but the consensus was that unless the
studies of the summer passed out on the feasibility of it, one should aim directly
at the large-scale explosion, and the time scale of that operation from mid-1951
to late 1952 was, I think, a miracle of speed. I know there may be people who
disagree, and I think it might have been done faster, but I can only reminisce
and say that in the first days of Los Alamos, and in the fall of 1943, Bethe
and Teller, two of the most brilliant theorists in this game and in their way
most responsible men, said to me: "If we had the material now, we could have
a bomb in 3 weeks." Actually, we were ready for the material Just about when
it arrived, which was not quite 2 years later, and the laboratory had doubled
every 9 months in the interval and everybody was busy; and I think that the
estimate of the theorists on how quickly you could do things that involve engi-
neering and involve new chemistry and involve new metallurgy was likely to be
a little optimistic.
I am continually impressed by the speed, sureness, certainty, skill and quality
of the work that went into the preparation of this first large explosion and the
subsequent work to exploit the development there established.
The next thing on which I had notes is that in the autumn of 1951
Mr. GAEEISON. That was at Princeton?
The WITNESS. This was the Princeton meeting that I have described. I think
it was a very useful meeting. It might have been useful to me if we had made
a record of it
It was largely that it was not a formal type of GAG meeting and our secretary
did not want to keep a record, but I believe a fairly good account of the sub-
stantive findings exist, and I believe Commissioner Smyth knows where to set
hold of it I don't know how to get hold of it *
85
In the autumn of 1951, there was an international conference in Chicago, and
I attended it even though I was called away to testify for money for the National
Science Foundation.
While there, I talked at some length with Teller and the summer's work had
only made things look tied together. Teller expressed dissatisfaction with the
arrangements made at Los Alamos. He didn't think the man whom Bradbury
had put in charge of this development was the right man for the Job, and he
expressed to me the view that Fermi or Bethe or I would be the only people that
he would be happy to work with. I don't know whether he meant me, but I
said, "Well, that is fine," and he said that Bethe and Fermi wouldn't ; "Would
you be willing to?" I won't quote myself verbatim, but I remarked that that
would depend on whether I would be welcomed by Bradbury. I had not planned
to go back to Los Alamos. It seemed to me a bad thing for an ex-director to
return. I was content with my job and work at Princeton, but I would com-
municate with Bradbury, and I called him and told him of the conversation and
he gave no signs of wanting to have the ex-director back, and said that he had
full confidence in the present man, and that was the end of that.
I don't believe that it would have been practical. I think you can't make an
anomolous rise twice. I think I could create and guide Los Alamos during the
war, but I think if I had returned there the situation would have been so
different ; I would have been ancient and not on my toes anymore, and I doubt
If I would have felt appropriate, but, in any case, the success of this would have
decisively depended on its being something that was actively in the desires and
interests of the director, and it was not so.
The hydrogen bomb was not done, and during the winter of 1951-52 Los Alamos
was working on it, and we kept in quite close touch. Bradbury came in quite
frequently. He sent Froman and other people in to report to us, and I want
to make it clear that I was not actually calculating out and working on it. I
was merely trying to understand where the difficulties lay, if any, what the
alternatives were, and to form a reasonable judgment so that I might give
reasonable advice.
At that time, Teller's unhappiness with the arrangements became quite gen-
erally known, and we were frequently asked by the Commission, "Should there
be a second laboratory?" We were asked, "Should this work be split off in some
way from Los Alamos?" I don't know how many times that came up during
the winter of 1951-52 as an item before the General Advisory Committee.
I think, on this point, we were not unanimous. I think Dr. Libby thought it
would be a good idea to have a second laboratory at any time. The laboratory,
the purpose of which would be to house Teller and bring you people into the
program who were not now working on it, even though this might take some
people away from Los Alamos, even though it might interfere with the work
then going on. The rest of us, I think, were fairly clear that the things were
really going along marvelously well, and that if it was too difficult for Los
Alamos to do the whole job, then steps should be taken to get some of their more
routine operations moved to Sandia. We talked at great length about the re-
arrangement of the workload between the two places. Some of the suggestions
we made were adopted.
We also talked to Bradbury about making within the framework of Los Alamos
an advanced development section in which really radical ideas and wild ideas
could be thought up and tried out. The Director thought it was feasible If he
could get the right man. He tried very hard to get one man for it and, after some
delay, this mart turned him down, and I don't believe such a reform was under-
taken then.
I believe that with the Commission's reluctance to establish a second weapons
laboratory, there was some thought that the Air Force might directly establish
one, and I think the Commission protested that but this is hearsay.
In any case, during the winter, our recommendations were to fix up Los Alamos
so that it could do the job rather than start a separate establishment Later,
in the spring, perhaps in April, we learned that there had been some preliminary
talks toward the converting of the laboratory at Livermore which had been
engaged in an enterprise related to atomic energy, of which we the members
of the GAC took a rather sour view of converting this, in part, so that it could
get more weapons testing work with a special eye to the thermonuclear pro-
gram. This we liked and this we endorsed.
The laboratory at Berkeley had often been involved in the instrumentation of
weapons tests, and it seemed that this was a healthy growth which wouldn't
weaken Los Alamos, which would bring new people into it where there was
an existing managerial framework and where the thing could occur gradually,
86
and, therefore, constructively, the notation of setting out into the desert and
building a second site like Los Alamos and building a laboratory around Teller
had always seemed to us to be something that was not going to work, given the
conditions and given the enormous availability to Los Alamos of the talent that
was needed for this problem.
In any case, the Livermore Laboratory was established sometimes perhaps in
the summer of 1952, and has played its part in the subsequent work at the time
when my clearance was suspended, the major and the practical, and the real
parts of the program were still pretty much Los Alamos doing, but it was my
hope, all our hope, that both institutions would begin pulling great weight. There
had also been no serious friction between them.
Mr. GABBISON. Did you tell the board that Dr. Teller was in charge of the
Livermore Laboratory?
The WITNESS. My understanding is that the director is Herbert Tork, but that
this part of the laboratory's work was under the scientific direction of Teller.
I think the board probably knows that better than I do at this point.
The super also— well, it was no longer the super— I forgot one thing, and it
may be of some slight importance. This goes back — and I am sorry to have a
bad chronology here
Mr. GRAY. I think the record should show that Dr. Evans has Just stepped out
of the room.
Mr. ROBB. Dr. Evans has just stepped back into the room.
The WITNESS. At the time that the H-bomb problem first came up — I forgot to
say two things.
I spoke of my later feeling that I should perhaps not be the chairman of the
General Advisory Committee myself— but two things happened much earlier.
1 had some talks with the Secretary of State, too, I think, and so had Dr. Conant
Dr. Conant brought back, and so did Mr. Lilienthal, from the Secretary of State
2 messages ; 1 was a message to Conant and me, for heck's sake not to resign or
make any public statements to upset the applecart but accept this decision as the
best to be made and not to make any kind of conflict about it. That was not
hard for us to do because we hardly would have seen any way of making a pub-
lic conflict, and the second part of the message was to be sure to stay on the
General Advisory Committee ; and that is what both of us did.
There was another item. He recognized, as has Mr. Lilienthal and as would
any other sane man, whether or not a hydrogen bomb could be made, how soon
we made it, the Russian possession of an atomic bomb raised a lot of other prob-
lems, military and political and upset a great many things.
The Government had been saying we had been expecting it, but now here it
was— with regard to the defense of Europe ; with regard to the usefulness of
atomic retaliation in special conflicts, and I was called in to help in the prepara-
tion of the Security Council paper which was prepared that spring on the subject
of which essentially was rearmament and the subject of which was how to
solidify our alliances and increase the overall military power of the United
States.
Mr. GBAY. This was the spring of 1950?
The WITNESS. This was the spring of 1950, in NSC 68 or 69, and you probably
remember the number better than I do * * *.
In any case, it needs to be testified by me that I was very aware of the fact
that you couldn't, within the atomic energy field alone, find a complete or even
a very adequate answer to the Russian breaking of our monopoly. I don't ttHnir
I had a major part in this paper. It took months of staff work to do it I
wouldn't be surprised if — I don't know whether I had any part — but, in any
case, I approved and helped with some parts of that and its purpose was the
buildup which started some months later after Korea.
Mr. GBAY. Is that a good breaking point? Shall we take a 5-minute recess?
The WITNESS. It is fine since that is out of order and I apologize for putting
it that way.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GBAY. Shall we proceed?
The WITNESS. I have a few more words on the hydrogen bomb which are not
very major. The hydrogen bomb once it looked like it got in Dr. Kelly's province,
of course, came out in the Research and Development Board committee on which
I served. * * *
I would like to summarize a littie bit this long story I think you will hear
from people who believed at the time, and believe now that the advice we gave
in 1049 was wrong. You will hear from people who believed at the time and
87
who even believe now that the advice we gave in 1949 was right. I myself would
not take either of these extreme views.
I think we were right in believing that any method available consistent with
honor and security for keeping these objects out of the arsenals of the enemy
would have been a good course to follow. I don't believe we were very clear
and I don't believe we were ever very agreed as to what such course might be, or
whether such a course existed. I think that if we had had at that time the tech-
nical insight that I now have, we would have concluded that it was almost hope-
less to keep this resource out of the enemy hands and maybe we would have given
up even suggesting that it be tried. I think if we had had that technical knowl-
edge, then we should have recommended that we go ahead full steam, and then
or in 1948 or 1946 or 1945.
I don't want to conceal from you, and I have said it in public speeches so it
would not make much sense to conceal from you the dual nature of the hopes
which we entertained about the development of bigger and bigger weapons, first
the atomic bomb, and then its amplified version, and then these new things.
On the one hand, as we said at the time, and as I now firmly believe, this stuff
is goiiig to put a'n end to major total wars. I don't know whether it will do so In
our lifetime. On the other hand, the notion that this will have to come about
by the employment of these weapons on a massive scale against civilizations and
cities has always bothered me. I suppose that bother is part of the freight I took
into the General Advisory Committee, and into the meetings that discussed the
hydrogen bomb. No other person may share that view, but I do.
I believe that comes almost to the end except for one thing. I know of no case
where I misrepresented or distorted the technical situation in reporting it to my
superiors or those to whom I was bound to give advice and counsel. The nearest
thing to it that I know is that in the public version of the Acheson-Lilienthal
report, we somewhat overstated what could be accomplished by denaturing. I
believe this was not anything else than in translating from a technical and there-
fore secret statement into a public and therefore codified statement, we lost
some of the precision which should have gone into it, and some of the caution
which should have gone into it.
I am now through with this.
By Mr. GAKEISON :
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, you said a little while back that you had shown GAC
reports to several people. You mentioned von Neumann. I would like to clear
up two things. One, to whom specifically do you recall having shown reports,
and secondly, what was the character of these people in relation of the
Government?
A. I will tell you what I remember. I showed our discussion of the reactor-
development program to Wigner, who was the great expert in the field. I wanted
to know what he thought. This may have been in 1947 or 1948. Wigner was,
of course, an active participant in the reactor development work of the Com-
mission, fully cleared and with very strong views of his own.
Q. He was not at Los Alamos?
A. No, his work was at Argonne and Oak Ridge. He was director of Oak
Ridge, and he lives in Princeton. I did not go to any trouble to show it to him.
I showed the one report that I was reading, the October 29 report, to von
Neumann at the institute. He was one of the experts on the thermonuclear prob-
lem. He had talked with me, talked my ear off about it before, and also after.
I may have shown it to Bethe but I am not sure.
Q. Bethe and he were again both cleared for top-secret information?
A. Yes. I doubt whether I showed it to Bethe, but I am not clear. I don't
recollect. I would not have regarded it as improper. I would have regarded
it as consistent with my job of attempting properly to advise the Commission
and represent the scientific elite to the Commission — experts, not elite — and back
and forth. I would have regarded it as proper on occasion and with discretion
to show and discuss some of these problems with a cleared person. I am quite
dear that a great deal of other showing was done in other ways, but that is
something I had nothing to do with.
Q. With regard to the item of information in the Commission's letter that you
caused to be distributed to key personnel at Los Alamos copies of the October 29,
1949, report with a view to influencing them against the H-bomb program, what
have you to say about that specifically?
A. Specifically I deny it. I never did anything about having extra copies
of reports made or sending them out or anything like that I had no desire
to influence Los Alamos. I certainly did not succeed in influencing Los Alamos.
Mr. GARRISON. May I say to the board that I would like at this point to read
into the record an affidavit from Dr. John Manley. I shall hand the original
to the Chairman and then to counsel and copies to the members of the board,
and then I will explain what it is about. I introduce this, Mr. Chairman,
at this point because in the latter portion of this affidavit there is an account
from Dr. Manley's records of what distribution- was made at Los Alamos of
the report in question. It will show, I think, conclusively that Dr. Oppenheimer
had nothing to do with this.
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, could you Just tell the board in a few words who Dr.
John Manley is?
A. Before the war he was professor of physics at the University of Illinois
at Urbana. I knew him slightly. When I was asked by Arthur Compton
to take charge of the bomb work, I didn't know much about experimental
things and he asked Manley to be my deputy with gregard to that. He was,
an we worked very closely together. This would have been 1942-43. He
helped build the Los Alamos Laboratory. He was in charge of the group at
Los Alamos in the physics division of the laboratory.
He left Los Alamos after the war, returned to Los Alamos a year or so later,
and became, I don't know how immediately, associate director. First he was in
charge of the physics division. At that time, after our first meeting, the
General Advisory Committee asked me to invite him to become our secretary.
He was our secretary until what would have been 1950 or 1951 — I have for-
gotten the date— at that time he left atomic-energy work and left Los Alamos
and is chairman of the department of the University of Washington at Seattle.
He is not Jack Manley.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I am introducing this in affidavit form for a
couple of reasons. One, Dr. Manley is in the State of Washington which is
quite a little distance from us. Secondly, the part I want most to draw to
the board's attention when I reach it in the affidavit has to do with an account
of records of his. It is a little more precise to introduce it in written form,
but needless to say, if the board would like to have us call Dr. Manley, we
would be glad to do so. The program is rather crowded, and so there will
be perhaps half a dozen written statements which perforce we will put in the
record.
I would like to read this rapidly to the board now.
"STATEMENT OP DR. JOHN MANLEY :
"I live at 4528 W. Laurel Drive, Seattle 5, Wash. I am a professor of physics
and executive officer of the department of physics of the University of
Washington.
"I joined the Metallurgical Laboratory in January of 1942. This was before
Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer had anything to do with it It was under the
direction of Dr. A. H. Compton. In July of that year, Dr. Oppenheimer was
selected to head the bomb phase of the project. I recall, for example, the
expression of pleasure by Dr. Compton that he was able to get Dr. Oppenheimer
to head this portion of the activities. At the same time, I was given responsi-
bility for the experimental phase of the bomb project, Dr. Oppenheimer devot-
ing his time to the overall problems and especially the theoretical aspects.
(The first time I ever met Dr. Oppenheimer was in connection with this work
in about July 1942. I had nothing to do with the selection of Dr. Oppenheimer
for his post)
"During the period from July 1942 to April 1943 I was responsible for the
supervision of the experimental work under the direction of Dr. Oppenheimer
with headquarters in Chicago. Although he was in residence in Berkeley at
that time, he came east frequently for consultation on the detail work under
numerous contracts. I was impressed at that time by his ready grasp of even
minor details relating to the program.
"In the latter part of 1942, a decision was made to concentrate this phase
of the program at Los Alamos, New Mexico. In this connection, I acted
directly as an agent for Dr. Oppenheimer, who was to assume direction of the
laboratory. Among ' other things I undertook the recruitment of personnel,
to go to Los Alamos, from those groups who had already been engaged in experi-
mental work.
"In April of 1943 I joined Dr. Oppenheimer at Los Alamos and assumed
responsibility for one phase of the experimental program. During the period
from 1942 to 1945 in which I continued to be closely associated with Dr. Oppen-
heimer, the clarity of the wisdom of the choice of him to lead this project
89
increased. I am convinced that no one of my acquaintance possesses either the
necessary broad technical knowledge and quick grasp of details or the sympa-
thetic understanding of people which were so necessary to accomplish the
project objective in a remote, isolated and self-contained community. I con-
sider it a remarkable achievement, due in very great part to Dr. Oppenheimer's
leadership, that this work was completed in time it was.
"During this period at Los Alamos, though I have no specific knowledge of
the detailed matters of security procedures, personnel clearances, etc., I can
recall no instance or situation which impressed me as suggesting laxity or
slighting of security measures. There were, for example, specific instructions
from Dr. Oppenheimer in 1943, when I was recruiting personnel, concerning
the secret nature of the project, and during the whole Los Alamos period,
very evident support by him of restrictions imposed on civilian personnel,
especially with respect to travel, correspondence, etc. As director of the labora-
tory, Dr. Oppenheimer was normally the recipient of most of the complaints
from civilian personnel about security restrictions — restrictions on travel, etc.,
and I was impressed with the effectiveness of the job he did in persuading us
of the necessity of these restrictions while in no wise relaxing the restrictions.
"I did not know anything about Dr. Oppenheimer's attitude on the question
of employment of Communists, or ex-Communists, or pro-Communists; nor
did I know whether any of the people employed were or had been Communists
or pro-Communists. In my recruitment work I didn't have occasion to go
into this question because (a) security was not my job, and (&) the recruit-
ment that I had to do with was largely confined to individuals who were already
working on various phases of the project and so had been cleared. I have not
to this day heard any suggestions or even rumor of any security leakage with
respect to the atomic-weapons program for which Dr. Oppenheimer could be
charged with personal responsibility, or for which anyone ever suggested that
Dr. Oppenheimer was even remotely responsible — unless the letter of the Com-
mission dated December 23, 1958, suspending Dr. Oppenheimer's security clearance
may be deemed to be such a suggestion.
" Although Dr. Oppenheimer left Los Alamos at the close of 1945, I continued
there, and in 1946 was asked by him to spend part of my time as secretary to
the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, of which
he was Chairman (as such secretary I was not a member of the General
Advisory Committee). I acepted this duty and from that time until January
1951 I spent about one-fifth of my time in connection with the committee work,
being at Los Alamos the remainder of the time, first as a division leader, and
subsequently as technical associate director of the laboratory.
"In this period I know of no circumstances in which Dr. Oppenheimer at-
tempted to influence in a direct personal way the course of events at Los Alamos
(as distinct from the effect that the recommendations of the GAC might, in
normal course, have on the work of the laboratory). In fact, I recall that
on occasions when I would discuss laboratory problems with him he would
frequently say 'But that's a problem for you and Norris.' (Norris Bradbury,
the director of the Los Alamos Laboratory). Although Dr. Oppenheimer kept
informed on the technical features of all phases of the weapons program and was
often most helpful to the laboratory through the GAC or in personal contacts,
I believe that he did not feel sufficiently familiar with the details of the labora-
tory operation to be able to advise appropriately on internal questions of use of
personnel and facilities. It should be understood that many of the wartime
senior personel of Los Alamos left at the close of the war, and those of us who
stayed on felt a very direct challenge to assume all responsibility for the con-
tinuing program relying, of course, on occasion, on the technical advice of
those individuals who had participated in the wartime program — individuals such
as Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr. Fermi, Dr. Bethe, Dr. Bacher, and sot on. It should
also be understood that the laboratory prepared its own program of activities
and submitted those to the ABC for approval. In my own dual capacity as
secretary to the GAC and one of the senior members of the Los Alamos Labora-
tory, I felt a special responsibility for liaison between that committee, so largely
composed of former Los Alamos personnel, and the laboratory* It is my belief
that this dual function of mine was considered valuable both by the committee
and the laboratory.
"Shortly after the end of the war, there was considerable discussion among
the people at Los Alamos as to whether it would be wise to continue the Los
Alamos Laboratory, or whether it would be better to abandon the Los Alamos
Laboratory because of its remoteness and the resultant complexity of the opera-
tion. It is my impression that Dr. Oppenheimer was not clear in his own mind
90
as to what lie thought would be wiser In the national interest. But it was
my impression that there was no doubt in Dr. Oppenheimer's mind that the
atomic-weapons program had to be continued, whether at Los Alamos or else-
where, unless the international situation clearly indicated, by agreement, the
abandonment of such activities.
"I should like to comment on the operation of the GAG as guided by its
Chairman, Dr. Oppenheimer. A less conscientious committee could have con-
sidered only such matters as were presented to it by the Commission. The
GAG, however, with many individuals senior to the Commission itself in
atomic matters, considered it an obligation to supply such guidance to the
Commission as its experience suggested might be in the national interest. Each
meeting would be devoted to items specifically requested by the Commission
and other items which the GAC deemed worthy of discussion. I recall several
instances in which the GAC on its own initiative made recommendations for
new programs long before the ABC found it possible to start such programs.
The GAC was generally understood to be advisory, not simply in a formal sense
to the Commission, but to its division and laboratories as well. This was
accomplished by discussion with appropriate people in and out of GAC meetings
and by visits to various laboratories. It was the method by which the GAC
kept in close touch with key people and programs of the AEC.
"I should mention also that there was a very close similarity in the thinking
of the members of the GAC and the top people at Los Alamos on most matters
relating to weapons programs, so that if there were a division of opinion or
doubt on any particular matter within the GAC, there would normally be the
same division of opinion or doubt among the top people at Los Alamos. On the
other hand, if there was unanimity of opinion and no doubt as to the proper
course with respect to any particular question among the people at the GAC,
there would normally be the same unanimity of opinion and lack of doubt as
to those matters among the top people at Los Alamos. This was not primarily
because either the people at Los Alamos took their lead from the GAC or the
other way round (although of course each group normally would be, to some
extent, influenced by the thinking of the other group) ; but the essential reason
for the similarity was just that both groups had a common recognition of the
national need and the limitations of facilities and personnel.
"This was true with respect to the debate concerning thermonuclear programs
which became a subject of vigorous discussion at Los Alamos following the
Bussian explosion of an atomic bomb in September 1949. This debate continued
until resolved by the President's announcement in January 1950. In this period
there was, as in the past, informal exchange of views between members of the
GAC and the senior personnel of the laboratory."
Now comes the part, Mr. Chairman, that is particularly pertinent to the
question I put to Dr. Oppenheimer.
"I have been informed that it has been charged that Dr. Oppenheimer caused
to be distributed separately and in private to personnel at Los Alamos certain
majority and minority reports of the GAC having to do with the thermonuclear
program. With reference to this matter, the following statements of my own
knowledge are made :
"A. On November 10, 1949, while en route from Washington, D. C. to Los
Alamos, I received a phone call from Carroll Wilson, ABC General Manager.
The substance of this call was that Senator McMahon had requested copies of
the GAO papers from the ABO and these had been sent to him. In view of the
forthcoming visit of the Senator to Los Alamos, Mr. Wilson wished me to show
the documents to Bradbury and C. L. O^yler (ABO manager at Los Alamos) and
discuss their contents. He wished me also to show them to Wally Zirm (director,
Argonne Laboratory), but as I was not carrying the documents, this was im-
possible. Mr. Wilson also asked if I would go on to Berkeley and talk to
Earnest Lawrence (director, University of California Radiation Laboratory).
I replied that since Bradbury would be away from Los Alamos all the following
week, and I would be in charge, I could not comply with this request.
"B. Neither Bradbury nor Tyler were available when I arrived at Los Alamos
on November 11, 1949, so the session with them was held the afternoon of No-
vember 12, At this session, I showed them the papers which had arrived by
courier and tried to supply them with the background discussion which led to
the papers.
"C. In view of the fact that Senator McMahon would be in Los Alamos the
following week for discussion with senior laboratory personnel (Tech Board,
except Dr. Bradbury, who left, I think, on November IS) I showed and discussed
these papers with the following : J. M. B. Kellogg, evening November 12. Carson
91
Mark, morning November 13. Edward Teller, morning November 13. Robert
Kimball, evening November 13. Alvin Graves, morning November 14. Darol
Froman, morning November 14.
"I would add that I feel quite certain that the papers were shown to other
members of the Tech Board who were to be present in the meeting with McMahon
though my appointment list does not show this. In each case it was emphasized
that the policy question was under consideration in highest governmental
quarters and discussion of such matters should be strictly limited to senior
personnel.
"D. The reports to which reference is made in this statement were the majority
and minority reports prepared in the GAG meeting which ended October 30,
1949, and the report of the Chairman, GAG addressed to the Chairman, AEC
on this meeting. In addition there was a report prepared by myself as secretary
and directed to the Chairman, GAG. This report was prepared in lieu of minutes
for the purpose of setting forth the secretary's impressions of the discussion of
the GAC which led to the committee's documents, in order to provide additional
background for interpretation of these documents. Since Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr.
Fermi, and Dr. Smith were in Washington on November 7, they were consulted
on the draft of my report and minor changes were made to represent their views
with more correct emphasis. This report was completed and given to the
Chairman, GAG on November 9.
"E. The meeting with Senator McMahon for which the 'distribution' of reports
as described above was made, took place as Los Alamos November 15, 1949. The
purpose of the meeting was to review the Los Alamos program including work on
thermonuclear weapons. It was not for policy discussion concerning the thermo-
nuclear program.
"From these items of fact it is clear that — (a) Revelation of these particular
reports was authorized by the AEC in the person of the General Manager that
the laboratories at Argonne, Berkeley, and Los Alamos be made aware of the
GAC recommendations, (6) that the showing of the reports to members of the
Tech Board was on the responsibility of Dr. Bradbury and myself in preparation
for discussion with Senator McMahon who had seen them, (c) that the handling
of the documents was in accord with established procedures, and (d) that Dr.
Oppenheimer had nothing to do whatever with this matter.
"The discussion as to relative concentration on fission weapons and thermo-
nuclear weapons had been a continuing one since 1942. It was recognized that
the fission weapon would have to be made before the thermonuclear weapon
would be possible. But even at the beginning it made an obvious difference
in the program whether one were pointing toward a fission weapon, which should
itself be used as the primary atomic weapon, or whether one were planning to
make a thermonuclear weapon. There was also the question of whether it was
better, as a military matter to improve and make larger numbers of fission
weapons or to devote major time and effort to establish the possibility and
practicality of some thermonuclear weapon. Wholly apart from the question of
whether it would be technically possible to make a thermonuclear weapon, it was
clear that the making of thermonuclear weapons would require the use of the
same materials and personnel and money that might otherwise be devoted to
making of improved fission weapons. In short, it would be a task comparable
with tie wartime development of the fission weapon. It was a matter of judg-
ment as to the best way to utilize the materials, personnel, and money as
between the fission-weapons program and the thermonuclear-weapons program.
"One of the difficulties that all concerned felt keenly in the effort to make up
their minds on this question was that they did not have any really adequate
appraisals of the military usefulness of the different weapons, nor were such
appraisals supplied by the military.
"It is my impression that the GAC labored under the same difficulties as others
on this problem, but that the GAC was certainly as active as any other group
with respect to this problem. The GAC, and particularly Dr. Fermi, made an
effort to evaluate the relative costs in terms of production facilities of the two
types of weapons. It was not a military evaluation of worth.
"I normally attended meetings of the GAG, and it was my observation that
Dr. Oppenheimer as Chairman took pains on all questions to sound out the
views of the other members of the Committe before expressing his own. It was
my impression that he did this because he was keenly conscious of the restraints
of the chairmanship. It is my recollection that this was the way he conducted
the October 1949 meetings that discussed the thermonuclear-weapons program.
The matter of annexing both a majority and minority report to the report of
the October 1949 meeting was, as I recall it, at Dr. Oppenheimer's suggestion
02
and instruction because he wanted to be sure that the report fully reflected the
views of all members of the committee. It was in the same spirit that he re-
quested me to prepare a report on the meeting as a supplement to his report
and those of the majority and minority.
"I find the suggestion that Dr. Oppenheimer attempted to or did retard the
work of the Los Alamos Laboratory in any field, and specifically in the field of
thermonuclear weapons, preposterous and without foundation. I had no feeling
whatever that anybody at Los Alamos was holding back in effort on the thermo-
nuclear weapon because of Dr. Oppenheimer's suggestion or example. (Indeed, I
had no feeling that anyone was holding back on the work on the thermonuclear
weapons once the President had decided the question by his announcement in
January 1950. The work proceeded with willingness and cooperation from all
concerned.) I know of my own knowledge that Dr. Oppenheimer never sug-
gested to me that I should refrain from working on the thermonuclear-weapons
program, or that I should go slow on it or anything like that.
"I never observed anything to suggest that Dr. Oppenheimer opposed the
thermonuclear-weapons project after it was determined as a matter of national
policy to proceed with the development of thermonuclear weapons, or that he
failed to cooperate fully in the project to the extent that someone who is not
actively working could cooperate. I do not recall anything in his subsequent
conduct of the GAO meetings that suggested to me in the slightest that he was
doing anything less then wholeheartedly cooperating. Neither have I ever heard
from any scientists that Dr. Oppenheimer was instrumental in persuading that
scientist not to work on the thermonuclear-weapons project.
"I have known Dr. Oppenheimer now since 1942. Until 1951 I worked very
intimately and closely with him. I feel that I know him very well indeed. I
consider that the work that he has done has been of the greatest possible value
to the country ; that if comparisons must be made, his contribution has probably
been of more importance in the development of the atomic energy program
than that of any other scientist in the country and perhaps than that of any
other person in the country. I make this statement not only in recognition of
the great contribution he made while he was director of the Los Alamos
Laboratory, but also from by familiarity with his activities as Chairman of the
GAG. He took an active part in the many complex problems of the whole
atomic energy program. Its achievements are, I think, due in no small part
to his activities. He has at all times had the national interest at heart and has
never done anything that he thought or suspected might be contrary to the
national interest.
"I am absolutely clear that he is in no sense whatever a security risk. I saw
this both on the basis (a) of the fact that for over 10 years he was entrusted
with the most secret information pertaining to the Nation's atomic developments
and there was never the slightest leakage of secret information from or through
him, or in any way related to him, and (b) on the basis of my intimate personal
knowledge of him, his character and his views.
"My attention has been called to the fact that the letter of December 23, 1953,
from the Atomic Energy Commission suspending Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance
mentioned his having known someone named Jack Manley. I suppose I should
record the fact that I assume that I am not the Jack Manley referred to because
the letter refers to Jack Manley as a member or official of the Communist Party,
and I have never been associated with the Communist Party. I do not recall
that I have ever been known as Jack Manley. I do not know who Jack Manley
is, nor do I know anyone of that name.
"JOHN H. MANLET.
"Sworn to before me this 16th day of February 1954.
"MABY B. MOSSMAN, Notary Public."
By Mr. GABBISOBT :
Q. Do you wish to make any comment on that affidavit, or does the Board
wish to ask any questions of Dr. Oppenheimer relating to it?
Mr. GRAY. I am sure my question would be one which Dr. Oppenheimer could
not answer, because it relates to the statement of Dr. Manley. I don't know
what the significance of this is, but I would read this statement in parentheses
on page 10. I don't take it that this refers to Dr. Oppenheimer, but in general
it says: "Indeed, I had no feeling anyone was holding back on the work on
thermonuclear weapons once the President decided the question." I get from
that, it seems to me, the inference that there were those who were holding back.
I repeat that does not refer to Dr. Oppenheimer in his language, but it seems
to me that is a carefully worded observation. This is a reaction to it, however.
93
The WITNESS. Do you want to put a question to me about it? I will hazard
an interpretation.
Mr. GRA.Y. Yes.
The WITNESS. The research calculations and experiments that were in course
at Los Alamos would not be held back ; they would be accelerated because there
was a chance of going all out. Some arrangements of an engineering kind, of
a production kind, of an administrative kind, you would make if you knew you
were trying to make this thing as fast as possible but you would plan for but
not make if you were uncertain as to that.
An example may be the Savannah Eiver plants. Thinking began on them —
should have begun earlier — but certainly began on them once the question was
raised. The actual letting of the contract for design drawings and so on would
presumably have waited the Presidential decision. I suppose it is this kind of
thing. There was not any retardation compared to what went before. It was a
failure to accelerate in those things which involved the commitment of funds.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, suppose we get in touch with Dr. Manley and
either have a supplementary affidavit or ask him to come on. I think that is
going to be a little awkward.
Mr. GRAY. May I not at this time, but later, consult with the counsel for the
board on this point and perhaps we could pass on. I don't think it is fair to ask
Dr. Oppenheimer to interpret what Dr. Manley had in his mind.
Mr. GABEISON. I agree with you.
Mr. SILVERMAN. May we go off the record for one moment?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. GRAY. Suppose we proceed, and If we wish anything further I will let you
know, Mr. Garrison.
The WITNESS. I have three other items of national service. As far as I know,
they are not controversial. I will outline them briefly.
In late 1950 and early 1951, Mr. William Golden was asked by the President's
office to explore the question, Is the mobilization of scientists adequate? There
was much talk during the Korean crisis of recruiting an emergency office like the
Office of Research and Development. He talked with a lot of people, including
me. I recommended that there be an advisory group to the National Security
Council, if the National Security Council and the President wanted it, on techni-
cal matters, and there be standby plans for all-out mobilization. But, in view
of the immense expansion of research and development in the Department of
Defense, an emergency organization like Dr. Bush's in the last war would just not
fit into anything.
After reflection, Golden persuaded his superiors that there should be an advisory
committee. It was attached in a rather peculiar way to the Office of Defense
Mobilization, and the invitations to Join it suggested that this commitee would
be advisory to the Director of Defense Mobilization, the then Mr. Charles Wilson,
and the President. The chairman of the committee was Oliver Buckley. You
have a list of its members.
Mr. GARRISON. It is item 7 on the second page of II of the biographical sheet.
The WITNESS. During approximately that first year, the committee met from
time to time. It was seldom asked for advice. Dr. Buckley did a great many
useful liaison jobs. We proffered very little advice. I think that our only func-
tion, perhaps, was to keep some balance between the needs for basic and universal
research and training, on the one hand, and defense research and development,
on the other.
Dr. Buckley resigned because of ill health and was replaced by Dr. DuBridge,
who became chairman in 1952. I don't remember the date.
In the autumn of 1952 we had a 2- or 8-day meeting— probably 2 days— at Prince-
ton of this full committee to see whether we had any suggestions to pass on to
the new administration as to the mobilization of science. I think we concluded
that we had been of no great use and that as constituted and conceived we should
be dissolved.
We suggested some changes in research and development in the Defense De-
partment, and they are pretty close, I think, to what has taken place in the reor-
ganization of the summer of 1953. We also said that somehow or other the
Security Council might need and should certainly have available to it technical
advice of the highest order and must have access to the whole community of sci-
entists so that, if anything they wanted to know that was relevant to their deliber-
aions, it might be available.
We said In that framework it is conceivable that another committee might be
useful. We scribbled these things down on a piece of paper, and DuBridge was
94
supposed to see that they somehow got to President-elect Eisenhower. The Pres-
ident-elect had a lot of other things to do ; and we went together, DuBridge and I,
to Nelson Rockefeller, who had been put in charge of a committee to suggest the
reorganization of the executive branch of the Government. We talked a good bit
about our good-for-nothing committee, handed him this memorandum, and he
reported to me and DuBridge that they discussed it in the committee and gave it
to the President and thought it made sense. We thought we were dead. We
were, but not quite.
In the spring of 1953, I think at the request of Mr. Stemming and Mr. Cutler,
we were reactivated and asked to convene. We met several times. The princi-
pal problems put before us were the proper use of scientific manpower, the very
controversial and tough problem of continental defense, where there were several
technical things that we were asked to look into and advise on and report on, and
I think some other problems, but since I don't have the records of the committee
I can't detail them.
The last meeting I attended was just before I left for Europe and not very long
before my clearance was suspended, and our principal Job there was to make sure
that the Council and its staff knew of technical advances which were useful in
early warning and in radar generally and that they understood that some of the
arguments against the feasibility of early warning were obsolete because of dis-
coveries that had been made in the meantime.
I have no further testimony on this committee.
By Mr. GAEEISON :
Q. Then we come to certain studies of defense that you made or engaged in—
defense against atomic warfare — perhaps you can say a word to the board about
them.
A. Yes. This can be fairly brief.
The Department of Defense adopted during the Korean crisis a practice of
letting our large segments of the defense problem as study projects to a university.
The university would then call in competent people from the rest of the country.
I have referred to project Vista as one such. There was one under contract,
I think, only with the Air Force at MIT. Its code name was Charles. Its pur-
pose was to have a look at air defense. I had the faintest connection with this.
I believe I was present at some of the briefings. It led to the establishment of
the Lincoln laboratory, which is a very large radar and air defense laboratory
operated by MIT for the Air Force.
Another such study which I had suggested was set up through the Army and
the NSRB, I guess, and that was to have a look at civil defense— a very tough
and unstudied problem, really. I was not very active. I was on the advisory
council or the policy council, but I met rather rarely. I did give one or two
briefings, and I talked with General Nelson about the problems of writing an
effective report. There were a great many recommendations; many of them
have been made public. I think those which attracted the greatest attention
were that, if civil defense was to be manageable at all, early warning and
improved military interception, improved over what we than had or were planning,
were an essential part of making civil defense manageable. With these
conclusions I concurred.
The third item here is that, largely growing out of the work of some people on
East River, and in particular Dr. Berkner and Dr. Rabi, there came a conviction
not only that one had to have a better continental defense but quite a lot could
be done about it,
I was consulted about the wisdom of it, and I agreed to hold a study during
the summer of 1952, 2 months of Intensive study, at the Lincoln laboratory,
which would concern itself with both an evaluation of the prospects of continental
defense and recommendations of how to get on with the job.
The Lincoln Laboratory was working very hard and very effectively on some
aspect of this problem. The notion of the summer study was to look at parts
that had not been adequately dealt with.
I attended the first week and I thtnk the last week of meetings there. Radar
is not the subject of my expertness. * * * There was a good deal of argument
about interception. * * * There was certainly a great deal of discussion about
the gravity of the problem and a great deal of discussion about the two-way
relations between the Strategic Air Command and the continental defense, on
the one hand the early warning, giving the Strategic Air Command a chance, and
on the other hand the Strategic Air Command playing an essential part in
reducing the severity of the attack.
The only part of the work that seemed to me undoubtedly successful were the
proposals for early warning, the technical proposals about the equipment, and
95
the general schemes about the location of the line and their extension. I
regarded and don't know too much about the problems of interception and kill
as fairly much unresolved at the end of the study.
These things came back, as I have said, to the Science Advisory Committee,
and we picked up the recommendations there and did our best to explain them.
These almost all have to do with early warning. I believe that I have read in
the papers that many steps have been taken to improve the situation. I think it
is a very important contribution not to the security but to the deterrent value of
our own offensive striking power and a deterrent to attack, at least during the
period of limited enemy capability.
Those are the three projects.
The final assignment — an4 1 assure you it is final — was of a somewhat different
kind. In the spring of 1952*1 had a letter from the Secretary of State appointing
me or asking me whether I would serve as a member of a panel. The other
members of the panel were Allen Dulles, John Dickey, Vannevar Bush, and Joe
Johnson, The letter appointing us said that it seemed to be time that the dele-
gate, who was then Benjamin Cohen, who was representing us in the disarma-
ment conference, would like to advise and even more the people in the State
Department who were responsible for our policy with regard to the regulation
of armaments. We all went to a meeting with the Secretary of State, people of
Defense — it was a great big meeting — somewhat puzzled as to whether there
was any reality to the job we had been asked to assume but willing at least to
listen.
At the meeting it was made clear by the Secretary that he would like any
report, any study of the regulation of armaments — was it a feasible goal, was
there any way to go about it, were there any tricks to it — similar to the Acheson-
Idlienthal report of many years before, could armaments be regulated, and he
would like us to help the people who were working diplomatically in this field.
But he thought in addition that we ought to see whether we did not have some-
thing to say and get it written down.
Mr. GABBISON. This is item 8 of the memorandum.
Mr. GBAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. As to the consultations, they took place. I saw something of
Mr. Cohen and maybe helped in some minor ways, and I think others did. We
also talked with people in the Department of State. But there was clearly not
much reality to the discussions of disarmament in the United Nations, and the
most we could do was make a few helpful suggestions which would encourage
our friends as to our good faith and interest.
It took a long while for the members of the panel to get cleared. But that
happened sometime during the summer. We got George Brandy to be our
secretary, who is now dean of Harvard College but was then professor of political
science there. We had a look at what we had been asked to look at. We went
over the studies of past efforts of disarmament. Mr. Dulles remembered them
very vividly. It was very clear that you could not negotiate with the Russians
much about anything and that nothing was harder to negotiate about than dis-
armament, and if you put these two things together it just was the bleakest
picture in the world of getting anything effective down that line.
We took a look at the armament situation, getting some estimates of the
growth of Russian capability and some estimates of our own as a measure for
where they might be some time in the future. I think as always we thought we
were being careful, but we were a little too conservative in estimating the speed
and success of the Soviet program. We became very vividly and painfully aware
of what an unregulated arms race would lead to in the course of years. We
tended to thfofe in the course of 5 or 10 years, but probably the time was shorter.
Our report was of course classified. We filed it in January of 1953. It had 5
recommendations, of which 2, I think I should not talk about because they had
to do with the conduct of our diplomatic affairs and should be regarded as secret.
They are not very ingenious.
The other three I embodied in an article that I published in Foreign Affairs.
Before publishing it, I took it to the President. He showed it to Mr. Cutler.
Mr. Cutler had no objection to my publication. He thought my publication would
be helpful and encouraged me to go ahead with it.
These three were that the people of this country be given a better under-
standing of the dangers of the atomic arms race, that we attempt either through
administrative practice or through revised legislation to work more closely with
our allies on problems having to do with the offensive and defensive aspects of
large weapons, and three, that we take further measures for continental defense
as a supplement to our striking capability.
808518—54 1
I was asked to report on these three things before the Jackson committee, I
think it was on psychological strategy and so did rather briefly, and I was asked
to report on these more or less as an advocate before the National Security
Council, asked by the President, and I went to do that. At that time Dr. Bush
and Commissioner Dean went with me. I presented the arguments, which I
think are in Foreign Affairs, and which are still persuasive to me, in favor of
these three steps.
I did mention the diplomatic points at the Security Council, because that was
of course not a public meeting.
That brings me to the end of this fairly long spiel I have given you about my
connection with the United States Government.
Mr. GRAY. Just one question. What was the date of that Foreign Affairs
article?
The WITNESS. It was published in the July issue of 1953. It actually came
out a little earlier, in June or something like that
Mr. EOKEB. That was submitted to you.
Mr. GRAY. I was not sure that was the same one.
The WITNESS. There are two.
Mr. EOKER. Yes.
(Discussion off the record.)
The WITNESS. Might I put one more statement into the record on my conduct
as a part time public servant during these years.
Of course, these things were secret. They were not subject to the scrutiny
of the press, and they were not generally open, but they were not secret in the
sense that the people did not know what we were up to. We were constantly
testifying before congressional committees, we were writing reports which were
very widely circulated. We were under, I would say, a very intensive search-
light of scrutiny. We were always in a position where our advice could be
countered, could be overruled or could be accepted. There was no opportunity
for conspiracy in these things because the light of criticism was constantly
shining on them.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, the first letter I should like to introduce into
the record is from Gordon Dean, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
to Dr. Oppenheimer dated June 14, 1952.
"Mr. J. ROBERT OPPENHETMER,
"Institute for Advanced Study,
"Princeton, N. J.
"DEAR MR. OPPENHEIMER: I want to express my personal thanks to you for
our talk of yesterday concerning the General Advisory Committee and its role
as an advisory group to the Commission. It was most helpf uL
"I want you to know that I fully appreciate the reasons behind your unwilling-
ness to have your name considered for reappointment to the GAC. I would
not have been quite so prepared for this had you not so long ago advised me of
your intention to pass the baton on to another.
"It is impossible for me to magnify the contribution which, as Chairman of
this distinguished group, you have made to the Commission and the country.
It has been a magnificent one and we of the Commission will be forever grateful
to you. The period covered by your chairmanship has been one in which this
new agency needed very much the wisest possible guidance. This we have
received and no one knows this better than myself.
"I am quite aware that there is no one who can adequately take your place,
but your willingness to remain as a consultant to the Commission somewhat
softens the blow of your departure from the GAC councils.
"With every good wish,
"Sincerely,
"GORDON DEAN, Chairman."
The second letter is signed Harry Truman, the White House, Washington,
D. C., September 27, 1952 :
''Dr. J. :
"Director, the Institute for Advanced Study,
"Princeton, N. J.
"DEAR DR. OPPEN^EIMER: Having in mind your strong desire, which you
expressed to me last month, to complete your service on the General Advisory
Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission with the expiration of your
present term, I note with a deep sense of personal regret that this time is now
upon us.
97
"As Chairman of this important committee since its inception, you may take
great pride in the fact that you have made a lasting and immensely valuable
contribution to the national security and to atomic energy progress in this
Nation. It is a source of real regret to me that the f ull story of the remarkable
progress that has been made in atomic energy during these past 6 years, and
in which you have played so large a role, cannot be publicly disclosed, for it
would serve as the finest possible tribute to the contribution you have made.
"I shall always be personally grateful for the time and energy you have so
unselfishly devoted to the work of the General Advisory Committee, for the
conscientious and rewarding way in which you have brought your great talents
to bear upon the scientific problems of atomic energy development, and for the
notable part you have played in securing for the atomic energy program the
understanding cooperation of the scientific community.
"As director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory during World War II,
and as chairman of the General Advisory Committee for the past 6 years, you
have served your country long and well, and I am gratified by the knowledge
that your wise counsel will continue to be available to the Atomic Energy
Commission on a consultant basis.
"I wish you every future success in your important scientific endeavors.
"Very sincerely yours,
"HABRY TEUBCAJ*."
And the final letter is another one from Gordon Dean dated October 15, 1952.
"Dr. J. ROBERT OPPENHEEMER,
"Institute for Advanced Study,
"Princeton, N. J.
"DEAB OPPT : I cannot let your departure from the General Advisory Com-
mittee go by without expressing again my deep appreciation for the time and
talent which you have so generously devoted to the work of the committee, and
for the immensely valuable contribution you have made to the atomic energy
program during the period I have been associated with it and before.
"I know that you are as fully aware as I am of the assistance the General
Advisory Committee has given to the Commission during these past 6 formative
years, and of the great scientific and technical strides that have been made in
that time. I sincerely hope that some day, when the ills of the world are
sufficiently diminished, the complete story of this progress can be told, so that
the contribution of you and your colleagues may find its rightful place in the
chronicle of our times.
"May I say that I shall always be grateful for your past work on behalf of
the program, and for your willingness to continue to advise the Commission
on a consultative basis.
"With every good wish,
"Sincerely,
"GOBDON DEAN, Chairman."
There are, Mr. Chairman, several exhibits that I would like to introduce at this
time having to do with Dr. Oppenheimer's views on the freedom of the mind and
the human spirit. I introduce them to show a position which I think could not
be tolerated for one moment behind the Iron Curtain.
Mr. GBA.Y. These are to be exhibits?
Mr. GARRISON. These will be extracts from original documents which I will
hand the board. One is taken from a lecture, which 1 of the 3 was it, Dr.
Oppenheimer, you gave?
The WITNESS. No ; there were six. This is the last one.
Mr. GARRISON. Do you want to tell the board in 1 minute what those lectures
were?
The WITNESS. Gladly. I was invited a year ago and then again this year
to give lectures in England. They are named in honor of Lord Reith. They are
on the home program and there is really a large audience, 15 million or some-
thing. They are meant to be quite serious. I think the first lectures were given
by Russell, called Authority and the Individual. I called mine Science and a
Common Understanding. I talked about it— I wont summarize them. That is
irrelevant The principal point was to indicate in what ways contemporary
science left room for an integrated human community. Why it was not neces-
sary specialized knowledge led to fragmentation in society. That was about it.
The last lecture has something about that in it
Mr. GRAY. My question is whether these are offered as exhibits. We have a
couple of earlier documents.
Mr. GARRISON. I would like to treat these as the others, to have them available
for the inspection of the board, so you may look at them in the whole.
Mr. ROBB. Are those the lectures published in a publication called The Listener?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. We have those.
Mr. GABBISON. The one I shall read into the record is a very short excerpt
from a speech given to the University of Denver by Dr. Oppenheimer February
6, 1947. It is page 8 of the small reprint which I just handed to you. It reads
as follows :
"And above all, I think, there stands the great conflict with Soviet com-
munism. There may be people who believe that this (system)" — the insertion
is our own for clarity— "originated in a desire to provide for the well-being of
the people of Russia. * * * But whatever its origin, it has given rise to political
forms which are deeply abhorrent to us and which we not only would repudiate
for ourselves but which we are reluctant to see spread into the many areas of
the world where there is great lability. * * *"
That word is "lability" and I understand it means flexibility.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Garrison.
Mr. GARRISON. Of course, Mr. Chairman, it is quite obvious— there is no
mystery about these excerpts— I have quite plainly selected those which seemed
to me relevant and that bore upon Dr. Oppenheimer's attitude toward the
problem of our relation with Russia. They don't attempt therefore to be com-
prehensive excerpts of the whole speech but simply of those items which seem
to me are utterly inconsistent with the notion that Dr. Oppenheimer could be,
as depicted in the Commission's letter.
The next excerpt from the Reith lectures in The Listener, pages 1076 and 1077 :
"It is true that none of us will know very much ; and most of us will see the
end of our days without understanding in all its detail and beauty the wonders
uncovered even in a single branch of a single science. Most of us will not even
know, as a member of any intimate circle, anyone who has such knowledge ; but
it is also true that, although we are sure not to know everything and rather
likely not to know very much, we can know anything that is known to man, and
may, with luck and sweat, even find out some things that have not before been
known to him. This possibility, which, as a universal condition of man's life
is new, represents today a high and determined hope, not yet a reality ; it is for
us in England and in the United States not wholly remote or unfamiliar. It is
one of the manifestations of our belief in equality, that belief which could
perhaps better be described as a commitment to unparalleled diversity and
unevenness in the distribution of attainments, knowledge, talent, and power.
"This open access to knowledge, these unlocked doors and signs of welcome,
are a mark of a freedom as fundamental as any. They give a freedom to resolve
difference by converse, and, where converse does not unite, to let tolerance
compose diversity. This would appear to be a freedom barely compatible with
modern political tyranny. The multitude of communities, the free association
for converse or for common purpose, are acts of creation. It is not merely that
without them the individual is the poorer ; without them a part of human life,
not more nor less fundamental than the individual, is foreclosed. It is a cruel
and humorless sort of pun that so powerful a present form of modern tyranny
should call itself by the very name of a belief in community, by a word 'com-
munism' which in other times evoked memories of villages and village inns
and of artisans concerting their skills, and of men of learning content with
anonymity. But perhaps only a malignant end can follow the systematic belief
that all communities are one community; that all truth is one truth; that all
experience is compatible with all other ; that total knowledge is possible ; that
all that is potential can exist as actual. This is not man's fate ; this is not his
path ; to force him on it makes him resemble not that divine image of the all-
knowing and all-powerful but the helpless, iron-bound prisoner of a dying world.
The open society, the unrestricted access to knowledge, the unplanned and
uninhibited association of men for its furtherance— these are what may make
a vast, complex, ever-growing, ever-changing, ever more specialized and expert
technological world nevertheless a world of human community."
Mr. GRAY. It is now I think 4 : 20. I wonder if there are any other exhibits
If not, this would seem to be a good breaking point.
Mr. GARRISON. Yes; I think so.
Mr. GRAY. Unless counsel for 'the board has something to say. we will then
recess and meet again at 9 : 30 tomorrow morning.
(Phereupon at 4:2° p- m-» a recess was taken until Wednesday, April 14,
1954, at 9 : 30 a. m.) .
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER OF J. EGBERT OPPENHEIMER
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
BUILDING T-3, ROOM 2022,
Washington, D. tf., April 1^ 1954-
The above entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to recess,
before the board, at 9 : 30 a. m.
Personnel Security Board: Mr. Gordon Gray, chairman; Dr. Ward
V. Evans, member; Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Koger Robb, and C. A. Rolander, Jr., counsel for the
board.
J. Eobert Oppenheimer, Lloyd K. Garrison, Samuel J. Silverman,
and Allen A. Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
Herbert S. Marks, cocounsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer. (Present
for p. m. session only.)
(99)
PROCEEDINGS
Mr. GRAY. The presentation will begin.
Whereupon, J. Robert Oppenheimer, the witness on the stand at the time of
taking the recess resumed the stand and testified further as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION (CONTINUED)
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, will you tell the board something about your brother
Frank, your relations with him?
A, He was 8 years my Junior.
Q. It was just you and Frank in the family?
A. We were the only children. I think I was both an older brother and in
some ways perhaps part of a father to him because of that age difference. We
were close during our childhood, although the age gap made our interests differ-
ent We sailed together. We bicycled together. In 1929 we rented a little
ranch up in the high mountains in New Mexico which we have had ever since,
and we used to spend as much time there as we could in the summer. For my
part that was partly for reasons of health, but it was also a very nice place.
My brother had learned to be a very expert flutist. I think he could have
been a professional. He decided to study physics. Since I was a physicist this
produced a kind of rivalry. He went abroad to study. He studied at Cambridge
and at Florence. He went to college before that at Johns Hopkins.
When he came back to this country, he did take his doctor's degree at the
California Institute of Technology.
We were quite close, very fond of one another. He was not a very disciplined
young man. I guess I was not either. He loved painting. He loved music.
He was an expert horseman. We spent most of our time during the summer
fiddling around with horses and fixing up the ranch.
In the very first year he had two young friends with him who were about his
age, and I was the old man of the party. He read quite widely, but I am afraid
very much as I did, belles lettres, poetry.
Dr. EVANS. Was your father there at that time?
The WITNESS. My father was alive. He did occasionally visit at the ranch.
His heart was not very good. This is almost 10,000 feet high, so he did not
spend much time there. We could not put him up. It was a very primitive
sort of establishment. There was of course the tension which a very intimate
family relation of this kind always involves, but there was great affection
between us.
He worked fairly well at physics but he was slow. It took him a long time
to get his doctor's degree. He was very much distracted by his other interests.
In 1936, 1 guess it was, he met his present wife and married. I am not com-
pletely sure of the date, but I could check it After that, a good deal of the
warmth of our relations remained, but they were less intimate and occasionally
perhaps somewhat more strained. His wife had, I think, some friends and
connections with the radical circles in Berkeley. She was a student there. She
had a very different background than Frank. She certainly interested him for
the first time in politics and leftwing things. It was a great bond between
them.
As I wrote in my answer, not very long after their marriage they both joined
the Communist Party. This was in Pasadena. I don't know how long there-
after, but not very long thereafter, Frank came to Berkeley and told me of this.
We continued to be close as brothers are, but not as it had been before Ms
marriage.
He once asked me and another fellow to come visit one of the meetings that
he had in his house, which was a Communist Party meeting. It is, I think,
the only thing recognizeable to me as a Communist Party meeting that I have
ever attended.
Mr. ROBB. I am sorry. Could we go back to where the doctor said he once
asked me. I did not get the rest of the words.
102
The WITNESS. And another fellow. I would be glad to identify him, but he
is not alive and not involved in the case.
By Mr. GABRISON :
Q. This was a professor?
Mr. ROBB. Was that Dr. Addis?
The WITNESS. No. This was Calvin Bridges, a geneticist at Cal Tech, and a
very distinguished man, not a Communist as far as I know.
Dr. EVANS. This was not a closed meeting of the Communist Party?
The WITNESS. It was not closed because it had visitors. I understood the
rest of the people were Communists. This was on the occasion of one of my
visits to Berkeley and Pasadena. The meeting made no detailed impression on
me, but I do remember there was a lot of fuss about getting the literature dis-
tributed, and I do remember that the principal item under discussion was segre-
gation in the municipal pool in Pasadena. This unit was concerned about that
and they talked about it. It made a rather pathetic impression on me. It was
a mixed unit of some colored people and some who were not colored.
I remember vividly walking away from the meeting with Bridges and his
saying, "What a sad spectacle" or "What a pathetic sight," or something like
that.
Mr. GRAY. Did you give the approximate date of this, Doctor?
The WITNESS. I can give it roughly.
Mr. GRAY. I mean within a year.
The WITNESS. It would have been not before 1937 or after 1939. I think I
ought to stress that although my brother was a party member, he did a lot of
other things. As I say, he was passionately fond of music. He had many
wholly non-Communist friends, some of them the same as my friends on the
faculty at Cal Tech. He was working for a doctor's degree.
He spent summers at the ranch. He couldn't have been a very hard working
Communist during those years.
I am very foggy as to what I knew about the situation at Stanford but my
recollection is that I did not then know my brother was still in the party. He
has testified that he was, and that he withdrew in the spring of 1941. He lost
his job at Stanford. I never clearly understood the reasons for that, but I
thought it might be connected with his communism.
We spent part of the summer of 1941 together at the ranch, about a month.
That was after my marriage. He and his wife stayed on a while. Then they
were out of a job. Ernest Lawrence asked him to come to Berkeley in the fall,
1 don't remember the date, but I think it is of record, and work in the radiation
laboratory. That was certainly at the time not for secret work. He and I
saw very little of each other that year.
My brother felt that he wanted to establish an independent existence in
Berkeley where I had lived a long time, and didn't want in any sense to be my
satellite. He did become involved in secret work, I suppose, shortly after Pearl
Harbor. I don't know the precise date.
He continued with it and worked terribly hard during the war. I have heard
a great many people tell me what a vigorous and helpful guy he was, how many
hours he spent at work, how he got everybody to put their best to the Job that
was his. He worked in Berkeley. He worked in Oak Ridge. He came for a
relatively brief time to New Mexico, where his job was as an assistant to Bain-
bridge in making the preparations for the test of July 16.
This was a job that combined practical experience, technical experience, a
feeling for the country, and I think he did very well. He left very early-
left long before I did— and went back to Berkeley. We did not see him again
until the New Year's holidays in 1945 and 1946. After that, when we came
back to Berkeley, we saw something of them, quite a little of them, until they
moved to Minnesota.
As you probably know, he resigned from the University of Minnesota— his
assistant professorship there— in the spring of 1949 at the time he was testifying
before the House committee that he had been a member of the Communist Party.
The university accepted his resignation. He has not been able ta get a job
since, or at least not one that made sense.
He had in the summer of 1948, maybe, or the winter of 194&-49, acquired a
piece of property in southwest Colorado. It is also fairly high. It is in the
Blanco Basin. I think he got it because it was very beautiful, and thought it
would be nice to spend summers there. In any case, he and his wife and children
moved up there, and have been trying to build it up as a cattle ranch ever since.
103
They have been there, I think, with no important exceptions, from 1949 until
today. This life is not what he was cut out for and I don't know how it will go.
I try to see him when I can. It does not come out to being much more than
once a year. I think the last time I saw him was in late September or October
of last year. Usually he would conae down to Santa Fe, and we would have
an evening together or something like that. I had the feeling the last time that
I saw him that he was thoroughly and wholly and absolutely away from this
nightmare which has been going on for many, many years.
These are at least some of the things that I wanted to say. I would like to say
one more thing.
In the Commission's letter
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Perhaps I could ask you about that.
On page 6 of the Commission's letter, which talks about Haakon Chevalier,
there is a statement, I am quoting, "that Haakon Chevalier thereupon approached
you either directly or through your brother, Frank Friedman Oppenheimer, in
connection with this matter."
Was your brother connected with this approach by Chevalier to you?
A. I am very clear on this. I have a vivid and I think certainly not fallible
memory. He had nothing whatever to do with it. It would not have made
any sense, I may say, since Chevalier was my friend. I don't mean that my
brother did not know him, but this would have been a peculiarly roundabout
and unnatural thing.
Q. You spoke about attending at your brother's invitation that little Com-
munist Party meeting in Pasadena somewhere in the late thirties, and that
reminds me to ask you about another portion of the Commission's letter.
On page 3, 1 will just read a paragraph :
"It was reported that you attended a closed meeting of the professional section
of the Communist Party of Alameda County, Calif., which was held in the latter
part of July or early August, 1941, at your residence, 10 Kenilworth Court,
Berkeley, Calif., for the purpose of hearing an explanation of the change in
Communist party policy. It was further reported that you denied that you
attended such a meeting and that such a meeting was held in your home."
Dr. Oppenheimer, did you attend a closed meeting of the professional section
of the Communist Party of Alameda County which is said to have been held in
your house in the latter part of July or early August, 1941?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever attend at any time or place a closed meeting of the professional
section of the Communist Party of Alameda County?
A. No.
Q. Were you ever asked to lend your house for such a meeting?
A. No.
Q. Did you every belong to the professional section of the Communist Party
of Alameda County?
A. I did not I would be fairly certain that I never knew of its existence.
Q. Did you ever belong to any other section or unit of the Communist Party
or to the Communist Party?
A. No.
Q. Apart from the meeting in Pasadena, to which we have just referred, have
you ever attended a meeting which you understood to be open only to Communist
Party members, other than yourself?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever had in your house at any time any meeting at which a lecture
about the Communist Party has been given?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall any meeting in your house at any time at which a lecture
about political affairs of any sort was given?
A. No.
Q. To sum up, Dr. Oppenheimer, do you deny the report set forth on page 3
of the Commission's letter which I read to you?
A. All but the denial ; I deny the rest
Mr* GABBISON. Just so the board understands, I read the statement to Dr.
Oppenheimer, "It was further reported that you attended such a meeting and
that such a meeting was held in your home.
The WITNESS. That I don't deny.
104
By Mr. GABBISON.
Q. The first sentence of the report you do deny.
A. Yes.
Mr. GABBISON. I would like to introduce, Mr. Chairman, at this point, copies
of correspondence relating to the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts,
Sciences and Professions, which is mentioned in the Commission's letter on
page 6, which reads that "it was reported in 1946 that you (that is, Dr. Oppen-
heimer) were listed as vice chairman on the letterhead of the Independent
Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, Inc., which has been
cited as a Communist front by the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
I think in my earlier discussion with the board, I pointed out that in all the
postwar period, this is the only association cited by the House Committee or
in any other way challenged by any group in the Government as un-American
with which Dr. Oppenheimer had any connection at all.
I now would like to introduce the correspondence which will show his resig-
nation and his relationship to that committee which I think the board will agree
was to his credit. I would like to read these into the record.
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, I have here carbon copies of letter from you to the
Independent Citizens Committee dated October 11, 1945, October 11, 1946, No-
vember 22, 1946, is an original letter from the committee to you, followed by a
carbon of December 2, 1946, from you to them, and an original from the secretary
to you of December 10, 1946. Do you identify these as having been in your files?
A. Yes, these were in my file, and I made them available to you.
Mr. GBAY. Mr. Garrison, I think perhaps for the record, at least what we
have been handed, reflects nothing dated 1945. In your characterization of
these documents, you said a letter of October something 1945.
Mr. EOKEB. Excuse me. That is because it is a fuzzy date on the carbon.
Mr. GABBISON. It is my fuzziness, Mr. Chairman. The carbon shows its 1946.
Mr. GRAY. I am Just trying to get the record straight.
Mr. GABBISON. I regret my eyesight was not equal to the carbon.
This first letter reads as follows, the letter of October 11, 1946, to the commit-
tee.
"INDEPENDENT CITIZENS COMMITTEE OF THE
SCIENCES AND PROFESSIONS,
"New 7ork J7, N. 7.
"GENTLEMEN i Some months ago I was elected a vice chairman of the ICQASP.
This has not been a very arduous responsibility, since I have had virtually no
contact with the organization. I have, however, noted with a growing uneasiness
over the past months ICGASPs statements on foreign policy.
"As examples, I may quote two programatic statements of the ICCASP policy :
'Maintain the Big Power veto in the Security Council', and 'Withdraw United
States troops from China.1
"I do not wish to challenge the merits of the arguments that may be advanced
for these two theses. They do not seem to me, at least in this bald form, to
correspond to the extension of President Roosevelt's foreign policy ; nor am I
in accord with them.
"Most recently I have noted in the papers an item which disturbs me more,
because it concerns the problem of atomic energy, with the outlines of which I
am not unfamiliar, and for which I may even have a certain responsibility. I
am, of course, aware that newspaper comments may often be misleading. As
I understand it, the ICOASP at a recent convention in Chicago agreed to endorse
the criticism of United States policy and procedure enunciated by Secretary
Wallace in his letter to the President of July 23. Here again, I should not wish
to argue that there was nothing sound in Mr. Wallace's comments, nor for a
moment to cast doubt on the validity of his great sense of concern that a
satisfactory solution for the control of atomic energy be achieved ; but I cannot
convince myself that, in the large, the suggestions made by Mr. Wallace would
if adopted, advance this great cause; and above all, I feel that the evidence
which is now available, and which goes beyond that which was available on
July 23 Indicates the illusory nature of his recommendations.
"It is clear that I should not prejudge the position which the ICCASP is
taking on these many important questions; but unless I am badly misinformed
on what that position is, it seems to me that I can no longer remain a vice
chairman of that organization. ^^
105
"Will you, therefore, accept this letter as a letter of resignation, unless it is
clear to you, and you can make it clear to me, that it is based on a misunder-
standing of the facts.
"Sincerely yours,
J. R. OPPENHEIMER."
Then comes the reply from the executive director, signed by Hannah Dorner,
the executive director:
"INDEPENDENT CITIZENS COMMITTEE OF THE ARTS,
SCIENCES AND PROFESSIONS, INC.
"New York 19, N. 7., November 22, 1946.
"Dr. J. B. OPPENHEIMER,
"University of California, Berkeley 4, Calif.
"DEAR DR. OPPENHEIMER: Please forgive this delay in answering your letter,
but I have been out of town a good deal and this is the first opportunity I have
had.
"It would come as a great surprise to the members of the board of ICCASP
that the organization can be found guilty of any contradiction of President
Roosevelt's foreign policy. We have stated repeatedly that the organization
was formed initially to re-elect Mr. Roosevelt and then reformed in order to
provide a medium through which the members of the arts, sciences and pro-
fessions could help to implement and carry out his program,
"In connection with the two programatic statements you refer to in your
letter, unless I am very much mistaken the veto power is the core of the post-
war foreign policy which Mr. Roosevelt outlined in conjunction with Churchill
and Stalin. I don't know what Mr. Roosevelt would have said were he alive
today about maintenance of United States troops in China. I do know that for
years during the war he refused to send materiel into China because Chiang
Kai-Shek was not using it against Japan but instead, saving it for the conflict
he is currently engaged in. It is fairly common knowledge that the presence
of United States troops and American materiel are being used to aid one side
against another in a civil war. Without discussing the merits of either side,
certainly it would seem that the American position should be one in which a
real effort is made to create a democratic China instead of bolstering the position
of military feudalism which Chiang Eai-shek and his supporters represent. I
think Madame Sun Yat Sen's position is one which Americans might fairly sup-
port and the presence of our troops in China and our present policy are giving
no encouragement to her views and to those Chinese who wish as she does for a
truly democratic China.
"In connection with Mr Wallace's comments on atomic energy, let me make
it clear that the statement on atomic energy at the Chicago conference was
made by some 300 delegates representing many organizations, of which ICCASP
was Just one.
"You will have seen, I am sure, a further statement made since that conference
on atomic energy by a coordinating committee of the Chicago conference, after
Mr. Baruch clarified the points raised at the Chicago conference. As you un-
questionably know, our science division has been working for some time both
in New York and Chicago on an analysis of the atomic energy control program
and as yet the ICCASP has not adopted a position since we are waiting on the
final report of the science division. I assume that as a member of the division
you will receive that report for your comment and criticism.
"In this letter I am attempting to answer the issues raised, with the hopes
that they will clarify our position and that you will find yourself in substantial
agreement with us. I realize that it is difficult for someone with as many
demands upon his time as you to attend meetings of the ICCASP. It is un-
fortunate that this is so because you should participate with the rest of us In
forming the policy, instead of getting it without the benefit of all of the full
discussion that goes into arriving at these decisions.
"I hear frequently about how often you are in New York. If you would only
let me know about these visits you could, I am certain, find a few hours to attend
some of these meetings. I am sure it is quite unnecessary to make the point to
you that the fate of a generation or two is being shaped today. The ICCASP is
conscientiously trying to do what it can to make it a kinder fate. I am certain
that all of us individually will disagree with the organization's position on one
or two issues from time to time. The importance of the committee as a whole,
106
what it has accomplished, and the need for keeping it alive and strong should
transcend occasional differences.
"All of us value your continued association with the organization.
"Sincerely yours,
DOBNEB."
The reply by Dr. Oppenheimer, dated December 2, 1946, is as follows :
"Miss HANNAH DOBNEB,
"Independent Citizens' Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, Inc.
"Hotel Astor, New YorJc 19, N. Y."
I see the copy which we have handed the members of the Board, Dr. Oppen-
heimer's signature does not appear, nor does it appear on the carbon, but his
initials are on the lower left and that of the typist.
"DEAR Miss DOBNEB: Thank you very much for your letter of November 22,
in which you tried to explain to me how poor are the reasons I gave for resigna-
tion from the vice chairmanship of IOCASP in my letter of October 11. I wish
that I might have been convinced by what you wrote for I share with you an
appreciation for the many constructive and decisive things which the IOGASP
is doing, and I am quite sure that I should not be moved to resign were it not
for two circumstances. One is that I have a somewhat unreal position as vice
chairman and might thus be thought to be far more influential and effective in
shaping ICOASP policy than I have been or than I am likely to be in the near
future. The second is that the matter of atomic energy is one of the very few on
which I have more than the vaguest kind of views, is perhaps the only political
issue on which I have a limited competence and have in the past borne some
responsibility.
"I find nothing in the record to comfort me in the matter of atomic energy.
The press release of the Chicago conference and its subsequent announcement
are both very far from my views and were endorsed by ICOASP without quali-
fications. The last communication that I have received is dated Monday, Sep-
tember 23, and reached me after my letter of resignation. In it a resolution of
the division of science and technology closely parallel to that adopted in Chicago
was submitted to the executive committee of the ICCASP and approved. I have
had no further communication since that time either with regard to atomic
energy or to the functioning of the science division of the ICCASP, except for
the proposed statement on the control of atomic energy which is undated and
which likewise does not represent my views. I, therefore, feel that it is likely
that there is a genuine difference of opinion on this matter between me and the
executive committee of the ICCASP.
"For the reasons stated above I think it is not proper to continue to serve as
vice chairman under these circumstances. I recognize that it is largely my own
doing that I have not had a greater part in the formulation of IOOASP policy,
but that should be a genuine reason of all of us not to accept a position of ap-
parent responsibility without being willing to make the responsibility real.
"I should like to take this course of resignation since the alternative, to make
public my dissident views, is repugnant to me and can help neither the ICCASP
nor the cause of world peace which is surely our greatest common aim. I am,
therefore asking you to accept my letter of resignation.
"Sincerely yours,
" JBO : cL"
Then the reply from Hannah Dorner.
Mr. ROBB. It is the same heading you had before.
Mr. GABBISON. Yes, it is the same heading as before. The date of this is
December 10, 1946. It was on the original and should be on these copies. This
is in reply to Dr. Oppenheimer's second letter insisting on resignation which I
have just read to you.
"INDEPENDENT CITIZENS COMMITTEE OF THE ABTS,
SCIENCES AND PBOFESSIONS, INC.,
m T ^ ^
"Dr. J. R. OPPENHEIMEB,
"University of California, Berkeley 4, Calif.
"DEAB DB. OPPENHEIMEB: "We accept with regret your resignation from the
organization.
"We hope that some time again in the future you may want to rejoin us.
"Sincerely yours*
107
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Did you ever rejoin the organization, Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. No.
Mr. Gray. Just as a matter of curiosity, did they ever take your name off the
letterhead, do you know?
The WITNESS. They stopped sending me communications. I don't know.
Mr. GRAY. Your name apparently did not appear on these letterheads.
Mr. SH.VERMAN. We did on the back. There are a lot of names on the hack
of the original.
Mr. GARRISON. We will hand this to the chairman in just a moment. I am just
looking over these names. It shows Joseph E. Davies as the honorary vice
chairman.
Mr. ROBB. Don't you think he ought to read them all?
Mr. GRAY. I think it would be well to read the whole.
Mr. GARRISON. This is on the back of the letterhead of the Independent Citi-
zens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, Inc. This is the letter of
December 10, 1946, accepting with regret Dr. Oppenheimer's resignation from
the organization, and hoping some time again in the future he may want to rejoin
them.
Mr. ROBB. Is that the same as the original letter of November 23, 1946? Is
that the same list?
Mr. GARRISON. It appears on superficial observation the same. Mr. Robb, you
can examine it at your leisure. I can see no difference.
Mr. ROBB. Why don't you let me take one of them and I will follow as you
read, and we will know whether they are the same or not.
Mr. GARRISON. I am reading from the back of the letterhead, Independent Citi-
zenfe' Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions, Inc., Hotel Astor, New
York 19, N. Y. Circle 6-5412.
Vice chairmen: Joseph E. Davies, honorary; Brig. Gen. Evans F. Carlson;
Norman Corwiri ; Reuben G. Gustavson ; Fiorello H. LaGuardia ; J. Robert Op-
penheimer ; Paul Robeson ; Harlow Shapley ; Frank Sinatra.
Board of directors. Do you wish the board of directors ?
Mr. GRAY. I think you better read it all.
Mr. GARRISON. Samuel L. M. Barlow, William Rose Benet, Leonard Bernstein,
Walter Bernstein, Henry Billings, Charles Boyer, Henrietta Buckmaster, Eddie
Cantor, Morris Llewellyn Cooke, Samuel A. Corson, John Cromwell, Bosley
Crowther, Duke Ellington, Howard Fast, Jose Ferrer, Joan Fontaine, Allan R.
Freelon, Dr. Charming Frothingham — a very dear friend of mine from Boston,
Massachusetts, a distinguished physician— -Dr. Rudolph Ganz, Ben G-rauer,
Marion Hargrove, Louis Harris, Moss Hart, Lillian Hellman, John Hersey,
Melville J. Herskovits, J. Allen Hickerson, Thorfin R. Hogness, Walter Huston,
Crockett Johnson, Gene Kelly, Isaac M. Kolthoff, Richard Lauterbach, Eugene
List Peter Lyon, John T. McManus, Florence Eldridge March, Dorothy Maynor,
Stanley Moss, Ernest Pascal, Robert Patterson—I take it that was not the Sec-
retary of War, but I guess we don't know.
The WITNESS. I know nothin'g about it.
Mr. GARRISON. I assume it was not. Linus Pauling, Virginia Payne, Dr.
John P. Peters, Walter Rautenstrauch, Quentin Reynolds, Hazel Scott, A. C.
Spectorsky, Carl Van Doren, Orson Wells and Carl Zingrosser.
Then follow a list of regional chapters. Shall I read those, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. GRAY. Is this just names of cities?
Mr. GARRISON. Yes, an'd addresses.
Mr. GRAY. I see no point in that This is not related to the proceeding. But
here is an organization accepting the resignation of one of its vice chairmen and
apparently did not bother to strike his name off the letterhead on his letter of
resignation. I really think this has no point, but from what I heard, it is very
difficult to resign from some of these organizations once one seems to be a
member.
Mr GARRISON. I t^ir you can take judicial notice of the fact that organi-
zations reprint their letterheads at intervals, sometimes at considerable intervals.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I might say that the lists were identical so we have
that in the record, too.
By Mr. GARRISON.
Q Dr Oppenheimer, do you adopt your answer consisting of your letter to
Maj. Gen. K. D. Nichols, dated March 4, 1954, as your testimony in this pro-
ceeding?
A. Yes.
108
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, that will be all the questions I wish to ask Dr.
Oppenheimer. I may a little later as we proceed come back with some occa-
sional questions, perhaps. That will be all at this point.
Mr. GRAY. They will be related to questions and discussions which will take
place from now on. This is not going to circumscribe you in any way, but I take
it Dr. Oppenheimer's presentation as you see it, and as he sees it, is complete
now?
Mr. GABBISON. Yes. Mr. Chairman, there may be some detail that I have
overlooked in the great press of preparing this which I might at a later stage
ask to be inserted in the record, but so far as I am now aware, this completes
the direct case. I assume we are not quite so rigid but what if I have over-
looked something it may be later introduced?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
Mr. GARRISON. There is no design to do so.
Mr. GRAY. I understand.
At this point, I think, then, we will suggest that counsel for the Board put
to Dr. Oppenheimer the questions which he may have in mind.
CROSS EXAMINATION
By Mr. EOBB:
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, did you prepare your letter of March 4, 1954, to General
Nichols?
A. You want a circumstantial account of it?
Q. I assume you prepared it with the assistance of counsel, is that correct?
A, Yes.
Q. In all events, you were thoroughly familiar with the contents of it?
A, I am.
Q. And have read it over very carefully, I assume?
A. Yes.
Q. Are all the statements which you make in that letter the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth?
A. Yes.
Q. Those things which you state in there as of your personal knowledge are
true to your personal knowledge?
A. That is right.
Q. And those things which you state of necessity on your information and
belief, you do believe to be true?
A, That is right
Q. Did you also prepare your exhibit 1, 1 believe it is, the biographical data?
A. The whole of it?
Q. Yes.
A. No, I did not
Q. Who did prepare that, sir?
A. The long biographical account, the third part of it was prepared by Mrs.
Katharine Russell, my secretary. I went over it and pointed out some things
that were missing and that I knew were not in order. But I did not
prepare it I think I suggested most of the dates in the chronology, but some of
them I don't know whether they came from, from counsel, presumably. As to
the second, that was also prepared by Mrs. Russell.
Q. But you have, I assume, read it over pretty carefully?
A. No.
Q. You have not?
A. No. This was meant to be a helpful document containing what we could
find in the files.
Q. Are you or are you not prepared to vouch for the accuracy?
A. No, I am not It is everything we could find in the files or that I recollected
in going over it
Q. You have looked it over, have you not?
A. Sure.
Q. Is there anything in there that is not accurate to your knowledge?
A. No.
Q. Doctor, I am going to ask you to remember that you are under oath, and
that therefore your oath must overweigh your modesty in answering the next
few questions I am going to ask you. Will you do that, sir?
A. I will remember that I am under oath.
Q. Doctor, is it true that from 1943 until recently, at least, you were the
most influential scientist in the atomic energy field in this country?
A. I think this is a question you will have to ask the people influenced.
109
Q. What is your answer?
A. With some people I was very influential. With others not at all. I was
an influential physicist and put it anywhere you want.
Q. You were certainly
A. I think Lawrence probably had in many ways more influence.
Q. Can you think of anyone else that you might say was more influential
than you?
A. I should think the Commissioners, the physicists who were on the Com-
mission, had more effect. Whether they had more influence or not, I don't know.
Q. You were certainly one of the most influential, were you not?
A. Of course.
Q. You might be described as one of the leading physicists in that field.
A. I have been so described.
Q. And you would concede in all modesty that is true. That is an accurate
description, is it not?
A. Let me distinguish two things. One is the weight which was attached
to my views, and that was considerable. The second is whether I was really
very good at the subject and that I will have to leave to others to testify.
Q. Doctor, from 1943 until 1945, as director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, you
were in direct charge of the atomic weapons program, were you not?
A. Of the program at Los Alamos, and some related things ; yes.
Q. From 1943 until recently, sir, you had access to all classified information
concerning the atomic-weapons program ; is that true?
A. Yes. Probably not some aspects of atomic intelligence, but concerning our
own program ; yes.
Q. And from 1946 until 1952, while you were chairman of the General Advisory
Committee, you had access to all classified information concerning the entire
atomic-energy program, did you not?
A. I did.
Q. Doctor, in one way or another from 1943 until comparatively recently, you
participated in all the important decisions respecting the atomic-weapons pro-
gram, did you not?
A. I am not sure, but I will say yes, to be simple.
Q. Substantially all?
A. I won't embroider this. I don't know the deliberations of the interim
committee, for instance. You may say I participated because we did give them
some expressions of our opinion.
Q. That is why I said, Doctor, in one way or another.
A. Yes, I think that is probably fair.
Q. Is it a fair statement, Doctor, that until recently you knew more than
anybody else about the atomic-weapons program?
A. I should think not I should think Bradbury, who was in direct charge of it
within the nature of things would have known a lot more about it.
Q. Prior to the time when you left Los Alamos in 1945 that was true, was it
not?
A. Yes.
Q. Subsequent to 1945, Bradbury would probably be the only possible exception,
would he not?
A. My feeling is that the people who do the Job more than the kibitzers, and
therefore some of Bradbury's top assistants— I may mention Froman, Holloway
would have been more intimately versed. They would have certainly known
more details and probably had as good a general picture.
Q. In all events, Doctor, you knew a great deal about it.
A. Yes.
Q. There is no question about that?
A. No, no.
Q. While you were chairman of the General Advisory Committee, were you
frequently consulted by Mr. Lilienthal on a more or less personal basis for advice?
A. Not frequently, no.
Q. Sometimes.
A. Barely, I think. I remember one occasion. I think the relations were
committee to committee. I don't mean that we didn't discuss things. But I
don't believe he put to me a problem, like shall we do this, or what shall we do
about such and such a laboratory, as an individual. He occasionally talked to
me about what to say in speeches.
Q. Did he used to call you on the telephone rather frequently?
A. I would say no, if you mean by rather frequently several times a month.
I remember occasional telephone calls.
110
Q. Doctor, in your opinion, is association with the Communist movement
compatible with a job on a secret war project?
A. Are we talking of the present ; the past?
Q. Let us talk about the present and then we will go to the past.
A. Obviously not.
Q. Has that always been your opinion?
A. No. I was associated with the Communist movement, as I have spelled out
in my letter, and I did not regard it as inappropriate to take the job at Los
Alamos.
Q. When did that become your opinion?
A. As the nature of the enemy and the nature of the conflict and the nature
of the party all became clearer. I would say after the war and probably by 1947.
Q. Was it your opinion in 1943?
A. No.
Q. You are sure about that?
A. That association
Q. With the Communist movement.
A. The current association?
Q. Yes.
A. I always thought current association
Q. You always thought that?
A. That is right
Q. There had never been any question in your mind that a man who is closely
associated with the Communist movement or is a member of the Communist
Party has no business on a secret war project ; is that right?
A. That is right
Q. Why did you have that opinion? What was your reason for it?
A. It just made no sense to me.
Q. Why not
A. That a man who is working on secret things should have any kind of loyalty
to another outfit
Q. Why did you think that the two loyalties were inconsistent?
A. They might be.
Q. Why?
A. Because the Communist Party had its own affairs, and its own program
which obviously I now know were inconsistent with the best interests of the
United States, but which could at any time have diverged from those of the
United States.
Q. You would not think that loyalty to a church would be inconsistent with
work on a secret war project, would you?
A. No.
Q. And of course that was not your view in 1943, was it?
A. No.
Q. Doctor, what I am trying to get at is, What specificaUly was your reason
for thinking that membership or dose association with the Communist Party
and the loyalties necessarily involved were inconsistent with work on a secret
war project?
A. The connection of the Communist Party with a foreign power.
Q. To wit, Russia.
A. Sure.
Q. Would you say that connection with a foreign power, to wit, England, would
necessarily be inconsistent?
A. Commitment would be.
Q. No; I said connection.
A. Not necessarily. You could be a member of the English speaking union.
Q. What I am getting at, Doctor, is what particular feature of the Communist
Party did you feel was inconsistent with work on a secret war project?
A. After the Chevalier incident I could not be unaware of the d&nger of
espionage. After the conversations with the Manhattan District security officers,
I could not be but acutely aware of it.
Q. But you have told me, Doctor, that you always felt that membership or
close association in the Communist Party was inconsistent with work on a
secret war project. What I am asking you, sir, is why you felt that. Surely
you had a reason for feeling that, didn't you?
A. I am not sure. I think it was an obviously correct judgment.
Q. Yes, sir. But what I am asking you is to explain to me why it was obvious
to yon.
Ill
A. Because to some extent, an extent which I did not fully realize, the Com-
munist Party was connected with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union was a poten-
tially hostile power, it was at that time an ally, and because I had heen told
that when you were a member of the party, you assumed some fairly solemn
oath or obligation to do what the party told you.
Q. Espionage, if necessary, isn't that right?
A. I was never told that.
Q. Who told you, Doctor?
A. My wife.
Q. When?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Prior to 1943?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Doctor, let me ask you a blunt question. Don't you know and didn't you
know certainly by 1943 that the Communist Party was an instrument or a vehicle
of espionage in this country?
A. I was not clear about it.
Q. Didn't you suspect is?
A. No.
Q. Wasn't that the reason why you felt that membership in the party was
inconsistent with the work on a secret war project?
A. I think I have stated the reason about right.
Q. I am asking you now if your fear of espionage wasn't one of the reasons
why you felt that association with the Communist Party was inconsistent with
work on a secret war project?
A. Yes.
Q. Your answer is that it was?
A. Yes.
Q. What about former members of the party ; do you think that where a man
has formerly been a member of the party he is an appropriate person to work
on a secret war project?
A. Are we talking about now or about then?
Q. Let us ask you now, and then will go back to then.
A. I think that depends on the character and the totality of the disengagement
and what kind of a man he is, whether he is an honest man.
Q. Was that your view in 1941, 1942, and 1943?
A Essentially.
Q. What test do you apply and did you apply in 1941, 1942, and 1943 to satisfy
yourself that a former member of the party is no longer dangerous?
A As I said, I knew very little about who was a former member of the party.
In my wife's case, it was completely clear that she was no longer dangerous.
In my brother's case, I had confidence in his decency and straightforwardness
and in his loyalty to me.
Q. Let us take your brother as an example. Tell us the test that you applied
to acquire the confidence that you have spoken of?
A. In the case of a brother you don't make tests, at least I didn't.
Q. well -
A. I knew my brother.
Q. When did you decide that your brother was no longer a member of tne party
and no longer dangerous? ^
A. I never regarded my brother as dangerous. I never regarded nim— the tact
that a member of the Communist Party might commit espionage did not mean to
me that every member of the Communist Party would commit espionage.
Q. I see. In other words, you felt that your brother was an exception to the
doctrine which you have just announced?
A. No ; I felt that though there was danger of espionage that this was not a
^S Xfwords, you f elt-I am talking now about 1943-ttat fibers ?*
the Communist Party mignt work on a secret war project without danger to
sid was that there was danger that a member of the
Communist Party would not be a good security risk. This does not mean that
every member would be, but that it would be good policy to make that rule.
Q. Do you still feel that way?
A. Today I feel it is absolute.
S0831&— 54 - 8
112
Q. You feel that no member of the Communist Party should work on a secret
war project In this country, without exception?
A. With no exception.
Q. When did you reach that conclusion?
A. I would think the same timing that I spoke of before as the obvious war
between Russia and the United States began to shape up.
Q. Could you give us the dates on that?
A. Sure. I would have thought that it was completely clear to me by 1948,
maybe 1947.
Q. 1946?
A. I am not sure.
Q. Doctor, let me return a bit to the test that you might apply to determine
whether a member of the Communist Party in 1943 was dangerous. What test
would you apply, or would you have applied in 1943?
A. Only the knowledge of the man and his character.
Q. Just what you yourself knew about him?
A. I didn't regard myself as the man to settle these questions. I am stating
opinions.
Q. That is what I getting at. You have testified that your brother, to your
knowledge, became a member of the Communist Party about 1936 ; is that right?
A. Yes, 1937, 1 don't know.
Q. When is it your testimony that your brother left the party?
A. His testimony, which I believe, is that he left the party in the spring of
1941.
Q. When did you first hear that he left the party?
A. I think in the autumn of 1941.
Q. In the autumn?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that when he went to Berkeley to work in the Radiation Laboratory?
A. Yes, on unclassified work.
Q. But he shortly began to work on classified work, is that right?
A. The time interval, I think, was longer.
Q. Shortly after that. Shortly after Pearl Harbor?
A. I am not clear about that It was within a year certainly, probably about
6 months.
Q. You were satisfied at that time that your brother was not a member of the
party any more?
A. Yes.
Q. How did you reach that conclusion?
A. He told me.
Q. That was enough for you?
A. Sure.
Q. Did you know that your brother at that time and for quite a while after
that denied both publicly and officially that he had ever been a member of the
Communist Party?
A. I remember one such denial in 1947.
Q. Did you know that your brother's personnal security questionnaire, which
he executed when he went to work at Berkeley, failed to disclose his member-
ship in the Communist Party?
A. No, I knew nothing about that
Q. Did you ask him about that?
A. No.
Q. You knew, didn't you, sir, that it was a matter of great interest and im-
portance to the security officers to determine whether or not anyone working
on the project had been a member of the Communist Party?
A. I found that out somewhat later.
Q. Didn't you know it at that time?
A. It would have made sense.
Q. In 1941?
A. It would have made sense.
Q. Yes. Did you tell anybody, any security officer or anybody else, that
your brother had been a member of the Communist Party? Did you tell them
that in 1941?
A. I told Lawrence that my brother — I don't know the terms I used — but I
certainly indicated that his trouble at Stanford came from his Red connections.
Q. Doctor, I didn't ask you quite that question. Did you tell Lawrence or
anyboy else that your brother, Frank, had actually been a member of the Com-
munist Party?
113
A. I doubt it
Q. Why not?
A. I thought this was the sort of thing that would be found out by normal
security check.
Q. You were not helping the security check, were you, sir?
A. I would had if I had been asked.
Q. Otherwise not?
A. I didn't volunteer this Information.
Q. You think your brother today would be a good security risk?
A. I rather think so.
Q. Beg pardon?
A. I think so.
Q. Doctor, will you agree with me that when a man has been a member of
the Communist Party, the mere fact that he says that he is no longer a mem-
ber, and that he apparently has no present interest or connections in the party,
does not show that he is no longer dangerous as a security risk?
A. I agree with that.
Q. Beg pardon?
A. I agree with that.
Q. You agree with that.
A. I would add the fact that he was in the party in 1942 or 1938, did not prove
that he was dangerous. It merely created a presumption of danger. This is
my view, and I am not advocating it.
Q. In' other words, what you are saying is that a man's denial that he is a
member and his apparent lack of interest or connections is not conclusive by
any means; is it?
A. No.
Q. Did you feel that way in 1943?
A. I would think so.
Q. Or 1942?
A. I would think so. I need to state that I didn't think very much about the
questions you are putting and very little in the terms in which you are putting
them. Therefore, my attempt to tell you what I thought is an attempt at re-
construction.
Q. Yes, but you couldn't conceive that you would have had a different opinion
in 1943 on a question such as that, would you, Doctor?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever been told, Doctor, that it was the policy of the Communist
Party, certainly as early as 1943, or say certainly as early as 1941, that when
a man entered confidential war work, he was not supposed to remain a member
of the party?
A. No.
Q. No one has ever told you that?
A. No.
Q. Can you be sure about that, sir? Does that statement come as a surprise
to you?
A. I never heard any statement about the policy of the party.
Q. Doctor, I notice in your answer on page 5 you use the expression "fellow
travelers." What is your definition of a fellow traveler, sir?
A. It is a repugnant word which I used about myself once in an interview with
the FBI. I understood it to mean someone who accepted part of the public
program of the Communist Party, who was willing to work with and associate
with Communists, but who was not a member of the party.
Q. Do you think though a fellow traveler should be employed on a secret war
project?
A. Today?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. No.
Q. Did you feel that way in 1942 and 1943?
A. My feeling then and my feeling about most of these things is that the judg-
ment is an integral judgment of what kind of a man you are dealing with. Today
I thiTik association with the Communist Party or fellow traveling with the Com-
munist Party manifestly means sympathy for the enemy. In the period of the
war, I would have thought that it was a question of what the man was like, what
he would and wouldn't do. Certainly fellow traveling and party membership
raised a question and a serious question.
Q. Were you ever a fellow traveler?
A. I was a fellow traveler.
114
Q. When?
A. From late 1936 or early 1937, and then it tapered off, and I would say I
traveled much less fellow after 1939 and very much less after 1942.
Q. How long after 1942 did you continue as a fellow traveler?
A. After 1942 I would say not at all.
Q. But you did continue as a fellow traveler until 1942?
A. Well, now, let us be careful.
Q. I want you to be, Doctor.
A. I had no sympathy with the Communist line about the war between the
spring of 1940 and when they changed. I did not admire the fashion of their
change.
Q. Did you cease to be a f ellow traveler at the time of the Nazi-Russian Pact
in 1939?
A. I think I did, yes.
Q. Now, are you changing
A. Though there were some things that the Communists were doing which I
still had an interest in.
Q. Are you now amending your previous answer that you were more or less
a fellow traveler until 1942?
A. Yes, I thlnfr I am.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I think he testified that he tapered off ; did he
not?
Mr. ROBB. I said more or less a fellow traveler. I was trying to paraphrase.
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. Do you want to say something more, Doctor?
A. Yes.
Q. Doctor, I don't intend to cut you off at any time. If I ask a question and
if you have not completed your answer, I wish you would stop me and finish
your answer.
A. Let me give you a couple of examples.
Q. Yes, sir.
A. The Communists took an interest in organizing the valley workers. I think
this was long after the Nazi-Soviet Pact. That seemed fine to me at the time.
They took an interest in extricating and replanting the refugee loyalists fighters
from Spain. That seemed fine to me at the time. I am not defending the wisdom
of these views. I think they were idiotic. In this sense I approved of some
Communist objectives. Beating the drums about keeping out of war, especially
after the battle of France, did not seem fine to me.
Q. You continued your contributions to Communist causes through Communist
channels until approximately 1942?
A. I don't remember the date. I have no reason to challenge the date in the
Commission's letter.
Q. When did you fill out and file your first personnel security questionnaire?
A. It was in June or July, I guess, of 1942.
Q. Was that about the time when you ceased to be a fellow traveler?
A. No.
Q. How much before that?
A. I have tried to tell you that this was a gradual and not a sharp affair.
Any attempt by me to make it sharp would be wrong. I tried in my answer to
spell out some of the steps in my understanding, first, of what it was like in
Russia. Second, the apparent pliability of American Communist positions to
Russian interests, and my final boredom with the thing. It was not something
that I can put a date on. I did not write a letter to the papers.
Q. Is It possible, Doctor, for you to set a date when you were sure you were
no longer fellow traveling?
A. In that I had no sympathy for any cause the Communists promoted?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I think I can put it this way. After the war and about the time of this
letter
Q. Which letter?
A. My letter to the Independent Citizens Committee, I was clear that I would
not collaborate with Communists no matter how much I sympathized with what
they pretended to be after. This was absolute. I believe I have not done so since.
Q. So that would be the Ultima Thule of your fellow traveling, that date?
A. Yes, but I think to call me a f ellow traveler in 1944 or 1946 would be to
distort the meaning of the word as I explained it.
Q. I think you have explained it pretty welL
115
A. That is right.
Q. Doctor, as a result of your experiences and your knowledge of Communists
and communism, derived from your brother or wherever, were you able in 1942
and 1943 to recognize the Communist attitude and the Communist philosophy
in a man?
A. In some cases, sure.
Q. Would you explain that a little bit?
A. My brother never talked Communist philosophy to me. I don't think it
meant anything to him. I don't know. Some people did. They were interested
in dialectical materialism and believed in the more or less determinate course
of history and in the importance of the class war. I would have recognized that.
Q. You knew, of course, in 1943, and the years prior to that year, that Com-
munists stood for certain doctrines and certain philosophies and took certain
positions, did you not?
A. I don't know how much this is what I knew then, but it seems clear to me
that there were tactical positions on current issues, which might be very sensible
looking or popular or might coincide with the views of a lot of people who were
not Communists. There was also the conviction as to the nature of history, the
role of the classes and the changing society, the nature of the Soviet Union,
which I would assume was the core of Communist doctrine, and I am not quite
clear which of these you are talking about.
Q. What I am getting at, Doctor, and I will put it very plainly, do you think
in 1942 -and 1943 you were able to tell a Communist when you saw one?
A. Sometimes.
Q. What time do you think you would not have been able to?
A. In the case of a man who did not talk like one.
Q. What I am getting at is, how could you tell when a man was talking like
one? What would a man who was talking like a Communist say?
A. In 1942 and 1943, I should think that an excessive pride and interest and
commitment in the Soviet Union, a misstatement of their role, a view that they
had always been right in everything they had done, these would have been some
of the earmarks.
Q. Can you give us an example of such a man that you knew in those years?
A. I remember Isaac Folkoff talking about the wisdom of the Nazi-Soviet Pact,
the strength of the Red Army, the certainty of Soviet victory at a time when I
was very skeptical of the possibility of Soviet victory.
Q. And those were indicia to you that Folkoff was a Communist, is that right?
A. I knew it also, but they would have been.
Q. When was that, Doctor?
A. Obviously after the war started in Russia, probably in the winter of 1941
and 1942.
Q. Do you recall where you heard him make those statements?
A. I think it was at Berkeley.
Q. Where in Berkeley?
A. I don't remember. Not a public meeting.
Q. At someone's house?
A. Yes.
Q! Your house?
A. Conceivably.
Q. He was at your house?
A. I think so. My wife is sure not. I don't know.
Q. It would not have been unusual for him to be there; would it?
A. I don't believe he came more than once if he came at all. It would have
been unusual.
Mr. GRAY. Excuse me. I would like to get that last. Did you say it would
have been unusual?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. It would have been unusual?
The WITNESS. Yes.
By Mr. ROBB.
Q. Is there some particular occasion that you had in mind when he was at
your house?
A. I remember this conversation I just repeated to you.
Q. Wasn't that at your house?
A. I think so. I am not sure.
Q. You think so?
A. Yes.
116
Q. What was the occasion that he was at your house, to the best of your
recollection?
A. I have no recollection of what brought him. He had a son, I believe,
living in Berkeley.
Q. Were there other people present?
A. Oh, surely, but I don't know who. There was no meeting of any kind, no
conference, no conclave.
Q. Can you think of any other person that you recall now during those years
of 1942 and 1943, maybe 1944, that talked and acted like a Communist so that
you knew him to be one?
A. Obviously I knew Steve Nelson was, and I think he talked about the Red
army sometimes. This wasn't a time at which Communist talk was very easily
recognizable.
Q. Would you search your memory for any other example you might give us?
A. Possibly, though I don't think he was a member of the party, Bernard
Peters would have talked along those lines.
Q. Did Peters ever tell you that he had been a member of the party at one
time in Germany?
A. That was my impression, but he told me that I had misunderstood him.
This was before the Nazis
Q. Yes. Anybody else that you can think of that you can identify as a Com-
munist by his talk and actions?
A. In a quite different way and not indicating Communist connections, Haw-
kins— this is David Hawkins — talked about philosophy in a way that indicated
an interest and understanding and limited approval, anyway, of Engels, and
so on.
Q. Of who?
A. Bngels, who was a Communist doctrinaire, whom I have not read.
Q. Was that before Hawkins came to Los Alamos?
A. I don't remember when it was, but we have had several discussions.
Q. It was either before he came to Los Alamos or while he was at Los Alamos?
A. Yes.
Q. Anybody else?
A. That talked like a Communist?
Q. Somebody that you were able to identify by these tests that you have
given us, these objective indicia of Communist sympathy or Communist con-
nections?
A. Nothing is coming to my mind. If you have a specific person in mind, why
don't you suggest it?
Mr. ROBB. Let us pass to something else.
Mr. Chairman, it seems to be 11 o'clock. If it meets with the board approval,
we might take a brief recess.
Mr. GRAY. I think it would be well.
Dr. BVAITS. I think it would be very wise.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GBAY. The proceeding will resume.
By Mr. ROBB.
Q. Doctor, do you think that social contacts between a person employed in
secret war work and Communists or Communist adherents is dangerous?
A. Are we talking about today?
Q. Yes.
A. Certainly not necessarily so. They could conceivably be.
Q. Was that your view in 1948 and during the war years?
A. Yes; I think it would have been. My awareness of the danger would
be greater today.
Q. But it is fair to say that during the war years you felt that social contacts
between a person employed in secret war work and Communists or Communist
adherents were potentially dangerous ; is that correct?
A. Were conceivably dan'gerous. I visited Jean Tatlock in the -spring of
1943. I almost had to. She was not much of a Communist, but she was cer-
tainly a member of the party. There was nothing dangerous about that There
was nothing potentially dangerous about that.
Q. But you would have felt then, I assume, that a rather continued of- constant
association between a person employed on the atomic-bomb project and Com-
munists or Communist adherents was dangerous?
A. Potentially dangerous ; conceivably dangerous. Look; I have had a lot of
secrets in my head a long time. It does not matter who I associate with. I
117
don't talk about those secrets. Only a very skillful guy might pick up a trace
of information as to where I had been or what I was up to. Passing the time
of day with a Communist— I don't think it is wise, but I don't see that it is
necessarily dangerous if the man is discreet and knows what he is up to.
Q. Why did you think that social contacts during the war years between
persons on the project — by the project, I mean the atomic-bomb project — and
Communists or Communist adherents involved a possibility of danger?
A. We were really fantastic in what we were trying to keep secret there. The
people who were there, the life, all of us were supposed to be secret. Even a
normal account of a man's friends was something that we didn't want to get
out "I saw the Fermis last night"— that was not the kind of thing to say.
This was a rather unusual kind of blanket of secrecy. I don't think, if a
Communist knows that I am going to Washington to visit the ABC, that Is
going to give him any information. But it was desired that there be no knowledge
of who was at Los Alamos, or at least no massive knowledge of it.
Q. Did you have any talk with your brother, Frank, about his social contacts
at the time he come on the project?
A. When he came to work for Earnest Lawrence, before there was any classi-
fied work, before I know about it and before he was involved in it, I warned
M™ that Earnest would fire him if he was not a good boy. That is about all
I remember.
Q. You didn't discuss with him his social contacts?
A. No.
Q. Either at that time or subsequently?
A. If you mean did he ever tell me that he had seen So-and-So, I don't know.
Q. No.
A. I don't believe we had a systematic discussion.
Q. Did you ever urge him to give up any social contacts who might have been
Communists or Communist adherents?
A. I don't know the answer to that. It doesn't ring a bell.
Q. If you did, it made no impression on you?
A. Not enough to last these years.
Q. Doctor, referring to your answer — by the way, do you have a copy of your
answer?
A. I have a copy of it
Q. I think it would be well if you kept that before you because I might refer
to it from time to time.
At pages 20 and 21 you speak of the statement in the letter to General Nichols
that you secured the employment of doubtful persons on the project ; and you
mentioned Lomanitz, Friedman, and Weinberg. You say on page 21 : *'When
Lomanitz was inducted into the Army, he wrote me asking me to help his return,
to the project. I forwarded a copy of his letter to the Manhattan District security
officers and let the matter rest there."
I will show you the original of the letter signed by you, dated October 19,
1943, enclosing a copy of a letter apparently signed by Lomanitz of October 15,
1943, and I will ask you
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Robb, do you have a copy?
Mr. ROBB. Yes; we have those.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. I will ask you if your letter is the one that you. spoke of in your answer.
A. Yes.
Q! Anol the enclosure was the one you had received from Lomanitz?
A. I have not looked at the enclosure, but I have no reason to doubt it Yes.
Q. Your original letter is on the stationary of "Post Office Box 1663, Santa Fe,
N. Mex." That was the Los Alamos address, was it not?
A. That was the only address we had.
Q. The letter is dated October 19, 1943, and reads as follows:
"Lt Col. JOHN LANSDALB,
"War Department, Washington, D. 0.
"DBAS COLONEL LANSDALB: I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I just
received from Rossi Lomanitz. You will note that he states that Dr. Lawrence
is interested in having Mm return to the project for work and suggests that I
make a similar request.
"Since I am not in possession of the facts which lead to Mr. Lomanitz' induc-
tion, I am, of course, not able to endorse this request in any absolute way. I can,
however, say that Mr. Lomanitz' competence and his past experience on the
118
work in Berkeley should make him a man of real value whose technical service
we should make every effort to secure for the project. In particular, Lomanitz
has been working on a part of Dr. Lawrence's project in which historically I
have a close interest and which I know is in need of added personnel.
"Sincerely yours,
"J. R. OPPENHEIMER."
This is Lomanitz' letter :
PBESIDIO OF MONTEREY,
October 15, 1943.
Prof. J. R. OPPENHBIMER,
Los Alamos, Santa Fe, N. Me®.
DBAE OPJE : For 4 days now I've been a private in the Army, and to date it's
not half bad.
We have taken examinations and had interviews in order to determine where
we might best be assigned and are waiting for the assignment orders to come
through from IX Corps area headquarters in Fort Douglas, Utah.
Before I left Berkeley, I spoke to Lawrence, and it was his idea for himself to
put in a request that I be assigned back to work with him.. He thought it might
be quite effective if at the same time you were to ask for me, either to work
with Lawrence or elsewhere.
I do not know whether or not you are in sympathy with this idea ; it appeals
to me, however ; and, if you are interested, it might be wise to put in a request
before assignment has been made by IX Corps area headquarters, which will
certainly occur within a few days.
In any case, so far I'm rather enjoying the life here. Monterey is a beautiful
place. Although they work us hard, they do it efficiently and with a purpose.
The barracks, the messhall, the grounds are kept scrupulously clean. The food
is excellent and abundant. There is a small library, a theater, and beer at the
PX. And the men are easy to get along with.
I have not heard from Max since he got to Salt Lake City. I certainly hope
he is getting along all right
If I am shipped to another camp for basic training, I'll let you hear from me
from there.
Respectfully yours,
Pvt. G. R. LOMATOTZ,
A. 8. N. 39, 140, 466, Company D; SOU 1930, Group 46.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, referring to your letter, you state, "I am, of course, not able to
endorse this request in an absolute way."
What did you mean by that, sir?
A. The meaning to me, reading it now, is that I didn't know what the security
problems were with Lomanitz, I had just been given a vague account that there
were some. The phrase was that he had been indiscreet. I therefore could
not judge whether there was a security hazard in his working on the project.
If there was not, it seemed lifce a good idea.
Q. I see.
A. The thing that he was working on had been robbed of personnel because they
came to Los Alamos. One of the men at Los Alamos was under great pressure
to return to Berkeley, and we needed him at Los Alamos. This is what this
recalls to me.
Q. Is this a fair statement? This meant that, so far as you knew, he was
all right, but there was something else about him that you didn't know.
A. No. What it meant was that, as far as the technical side of things went,
it would be a good idea to have him back. I would leave it to the security officer
to decide whether there were overriding considerations.
Q. Did yon know anything about him at that time that lead you to believe,
except, as you have said, "vague stuff," that he was a security risk?
A. It was very vague. I knew one thing, and I reported it. That is that this
whole business about Lomanitz had caused a big flap — his being inducted. I
think more than one person wrote to me about it Lansdale didn't tell me more
than that he had been quite indiscreet
In Berkeley I talked with the security officer, and either he suggested or he
concurred in the suggestion that I talk with Lomanitz an'd see if I could not get
him to come in and talk frankly. about what the trouble was. He said there
wasn't anything; there was nothing to talk about This didn't reassure me.
Q. Of course, yon would not have written that letter if you had known
Lomanitz was a Communist, would you?
119
A. An active Communist?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. Would you if you had known that he had previously been a Communist?
A. That would have depended on lots of things— what kind of a man he was,
how long ago it was.
Q. In all events, you didn't know then, did you?
A. No.
Q. Would you have written that letter if you had known that Lomanitz had
actually disclosed information about the project to some unauthorized person?
A. Of course not.
Q. All you knew was that Lansdale had said that in some way or another this
Lomanitz had been indiscreet?
A. I knew that he was a relative of some one in Oklahoma, I think, who had
been involved in a famous sedition case of some kind. As I said in my answer,
I knew that he had been reluctant to take any part in the warwork.
Q. But certainly would not have wanted to have him around or suggested
that he be around if you had known that he was a Communist or if you had
known that he had revealed or disclosed information to some unauthorized
person?
A. That is right
Q. Beg pardon?
A. That is right.
Q. Your answer at page 21, you say that "in 1943 when I was alleged to have
stated that 'I knew several individuals then at Los Alamos who had been
members of the Communist Party,1 I knew of only one ; she was my wife," and
so forth.
Are you sure that you> knew only one person at Los Alamos that at that time
who had been a member of the Communist Party?
A. I would not have written it if it had not been my best recollection.
Q. I thought so. How about Charlotte Berber?
A, I don't believe she ever was a member of the Communist Party.
Q. Was she at that time at Los Alamos?
A. Yes, and in a responsible position.
Q. You did not know?
A. No ; I don't know today. In fact, I don't today believe.
Q. Pardon?
A. I don't today believe unless there is evidence that I have never heard of.
Q. It would be a great surprise to you to find that she had ever been a mem-
ber of the party?
A. It would.
Q. Now, speaking of surprise, your answer at page 21, you; state, "I asked
for the transfer of David Bohm to Los Alamos, but this request, like all others,
was subject to the assumption that the usual security requirements would
apply. When I was told that there was objection on security grounds to this
transfer, I was much surprised but, of course, agreed."
By that do you mean that, when you asked for the transfer of Bohm to Los
Alamos, so far as you knew there was nothing wrong with him?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Otherwise you would not have asked ; is that right?
A. I asked for the transfer of my brother, or at least concurred in it later,
and there had been something wrong with him. But if I had known if there
was anything wrong, I would certainly •
Q. I believe it was Colonel DeSilva that told you that, was It not?
A. No.
Q. About Bohm?
A. No; it was a coded telephone message from General Groves. When I
asked what was wrong, I was told that he had relatives in Nazi Germany.
Q. So he might be subject to pressure from the Nazis?
A. I won't pretend that I fully believed this story. I didn't know what to think.
Q. That was the only thing that indicated that Bohm was not a fit man to come
to Los Alamos?
A. What happened, this was a fairly dramatic thing and unique, so I re-
member it. I was in Santa Fe. General Groves and I had a little quadratic
letter code. He called me up and told me in the code that Bohm could not come.
That was that. I asked maybe a couple of people later what was wrong and
they told me this story.
Q. About Nazi Germany.
120
A. Yes.
Q. Would DeSilva be one of those people?
A. I don't remember.
Q. He was your security man there, was he not?
A. Tes. I don't remember when he came. There was a first security man.
Q. Did you ever talk to DeSilva about Bohm?
A. I remember talking about Weinberg, Peters. Bohm may have been one
of them. I think only in terms of a very general question on DeSilva's part,
which of these is the most dangerous man in your opinion.
Q. Can you fix the approximate time when you got that information from
General Groves about Bohm?
A. Ton mean that Bohm could not come?
Q. Yes.
A. That would have been late March.
Q. Of 1948?
A. That is right
Q. Was there a man named Bernard Peters at the Berkeley radiation labora-
tory in 1943?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you know him?
A. Yes.
Q. How well did you know him?
A. Keally fairly well.
Q. How had you come to know him?
A. He was a graduate student in physics and was interested In theoretical
physics, so he was a student of mine. I knew both him and his wife personally
Q. Was you relationship with Peters more than just the normal relationship
of a professor and a student?
A. Yes.
Q. Social as well?
A. Yes.
Q. Was he a guest at your house from time to time?
A. Yes; he was.
Q. And his wife as well?
A. Yes.
Q. And were you and your wife guests at their house?
A. I am sure we were.
Q. How frequently did you see Peters outside of the normal contact that you
had with him as a professor? I am talking now about the years 1942 and 1943,
and so on.
A. I think after early 1943, not frequently.
Q. Because you were down at Los Alamos?
A. No, even before that. After it was clear that Peters was not going to Los
Alamos. I had raised with him the question of whether he would.
Q. Eaised with Peters?
A. Yes, of whether he would come. The fact that he was the right kind of
physicist and that she was a doctor and we were short of doctors made this an
attractive deal. They decided not to come. I tMnfr in 1941 we saw quite a lot of
them.
Q. When did you first meet Peters?
A. I don't remember the date. It would have been in the late thirties either
at the time or shortly before the tune that he came to study in the graduate
school.
Q. When did he come to study there?
A. I can do a little dead reckoning.
Q. Approximately.
A. Approximately 1948 or something like that
Q. I believe you said that you suggested to Peters he would be a good man
to come down to Los Alamos.
A. I did.
Q. And Mrs. Peters, being a doctor, you thought she could be of help down
there, too.
A. I certainly did.
Q. When was that, Doctor?
A. It would have been late 1942.
Q. Late 1942?
A. That is right.
Q. Mrs. Peters, you say, was a doctor. Did she ever act as your physician?
121
A. Yes ; she did. I think only once in the spring of 1941. It may have been
more frequent I remember that time.
Q. But your relations with her were both professional and social, I take it.
A. Oh, yes.
Q. As of 1043 or 1942, what did you know about the background of Dr. Peters?
A. I knew that he had been caught as a student— his father was a professional
man of some kind whom I met, they lived in Berkeley-— that he had been caught,
I believe, in Munich at the time of Hitler's rise to power; that he had taken
part in that struggle. I would then have said— I have subsequently said— as
a Communist. He had told me that this is an exaggeration. He was put in
Dachau, that he managed to get out, that his wife and he escaped the country,
that they came to this country, that they made some sort of a deal or agreement
that he would work and she would go to medical school, and then she would work
and he would go to college or to the university. These are in broad outlines the
background.
Q. Did you regard Peters as in any way a dangerous man to be on a secret war
project?
A. I am alleged to have said so.
Q. Did you say so?
A. I think I did.
Q. When?
A. At Los Alamos.
Q. When?
A. I thin*- in 1943.
Q. 1943?
A. But I am not sure. I think not that he was a dangerous man to have on
a secret war project, no. I think what I was asked by DeSilva, "Here are four
names, Bohm, Weinberg, and somebody else and Peters; which of these would
you regard as the most likely to be dangerous, and I think I answered Peters?
Q. Was that after you had suggested to Peters that he come to Los Alamos?
A. It was.
Q. How long after?
A. A year and a quarter, something like that
Q. When had you formed that view that Peters might be a dangerous man?
A. During the period that he decided not to come to Los Alamos.
Q. What caused you to form that opinion?
A. The way he talked about things.
Q. Had he ever told you that he was a member of the Communist Party in
Germany?
A. I believe that he had, or that I had been told it by a friend. I believed that
he had. He told me later that I had misunderstood him.
Q. When did you believe that he told you that?
A. Early.
Q. When?
A. Late thirties.
Q. Who was the friend that you thought might have told you?
A. Possibly Jean Tatlock.
Q. Did she know Peters, too?
A. Yes.
Q. Quite well?
A. She knew Hannah Peters quite welL
Q. Did you know anything about Mrs. Peters' background?
A. Much. less.
Q. What did yon know about her?
A. That she also escaped from Germany, that she went to Italy, that she had
been in medical school in this country.
Q. What did you know about her association with the Communist Party?
A. Literally nothing.
Q. Wasn't it pretty well known that Peters had been a Communist, and when
I say wasn't it, I mean in 1941, '42 and '43?
A. I am not sura
Q. What Is you best judgment?
A. I would say it was not well known,
Q. Ton would say it was not?
A. But I am not sure.
Q. Did anyone else besides Miss Tatlock tell yon anything about Peters'
Communist connections?
122
A. No. The way in which this story came to me was that he had been involved
in the great battle between the Communists and the Nazis in Germany ; not that
he was a member of the Communist Party in this country or anything like that
I think it came from him, and I don't think it came from Miss Tatlock, but I am
not sure.
Q. Doctor, you have told us that to the best of your recollection Peters told you
maybe in 1938 that he had been a member of the Communist Party. You testified,
I think you said in 1942 or 1943, you suggested to him that he come to Los Alamos,
is that correct?
A. That is right.
Q. What test did you apply at the time you suggested that he come to Los
Alamos to satisfy yourself that he had severed any connection with the Com-
munist Party?
A. I didn't think, and I don't think he had a connection with the Communist
Party for 5, 6, 7, or 8 years, since he left Germany. That was a different
Communist Party.
Q. What I am asking you, sir, is how did you reach that conclusion? What
test did you apply?
A. He spoke disparagingly of the party.
Q. When was that?
A. From time to time all during this period. He never indicated any con-
nection with it, though we often saw each other. I was just sure that he had no
connection with the Communist Party.
Q. Did there come a time when you changed that opinion?
A. No.
Q. Are you satisfied that he never had any connection with the Communist
Party?
A. I really know nothing about it after 1942. Therefore my satisfaction
doesn't mean much except with regard to that time.
Q. Doctor, this young man, Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz, I believe you called him
Rossi, didn't you?
A. That is the name he went by.
Q. He was a student of yours?
A. Yes.
Q. When?
A. Well
Q. I might assist you with that
A. Why don't you tell me?
Q. The record shows that he graduated at Oklahoma with a B. A. in physics in
1940. Then I believe he came to Berkeley and became a student of yours. Is
that in accord with your recollection?
A. It could be.
Q. He went to work at the radiation laboratory at Berkeley on June 1, 1942
Is that in accord with your memory?
A. I have no recollection.
Q. But you would accept that?
A. Sure.
Q. The record also shows he was born October 10, 1921. Of course, you don't
know that, but he was quite a young man.
A. He was extraordinarily young.
Q. Which would make him not quite 21 when he went to work at the laboratory.
*cx. xes.
Q. Did he take his doctorate under you?
A. No ; I don't think he got through with it. He was studying for it when the
war interrupted. I am not certain on this point.
Q. Did you ask Lomanitz to come to work on the project?
A. Not in those terms. What I remember of it, I put down in my answer that
I endeavored to persuade him that he ought to be willing to do work on behalf of
his country.
Q. It might be helpful to the board if we had an answer to a statement made to
you in a letter to you from General Nichols at page 5
Mr. GBAY. Which letter is this?
Mr. ROBB. Letter of December 23, 1953, page 5 : "In the case of Giovanni Rossi
Lomanitz, you urged him to work on the project."
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Is that true?
A. I don't know. I urged him to work on military problems.
123
Q. The particular problem you had in mind was the atomic bomb, wasn't it?
A. Yes, but there were lots of other military undertakings. I believe that
this report stems from my own account. I don't know where else it comes from.
If that is true, I go ahead and accept it, but I don't remember at this point.
Q. I will continue the reading from the letter of General Nichols, "In the
case of Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz, you urged him to work on the project,
although you stated that you knew that he had been very much of a Red when
he first came to the University of California."
Did you so state?
A. I have no recollection of it. I have no reason to doubt it.
Q. "And that you emphasized to him that he must forego all political activity
if he came onto the project"
Did you so emphasize?
A. I doubt that.
Q. You doubt it?
A. Yes, because I never knew of any political activity.
Q. "In August 1943, you protested asrainst the termination of his deferment."
Did you do that?
A. Do we have anything on that, Mr. Garrison?
Q. Don't you have any recollection one way or another without assistance from
the counsel?
A. I don't — that is, I don't have any recollection of to whom or in what terms.
Did I communicate with Lansdale about that?
Mr. GARRISON. We have in our file a copy, I assume Dr. Oppenheimer will
recall it, to Col. James C Marshall, Manhattan District, New York City, dated
July 31, 1943, "Understand that the deferment of Rossi Lomanitz, left in charge
of my end of work for Lawrence project by me, requested by Lawrence and
Shane, turned down by your office. Believe understand reasons but feel that very
serious mistake is being made. Lomanitz now only man at Berkeley who can
take this responsibility. His work for Lawrence preeminently satisfactory. If
he is drafted and not returned promptly to project, Lawrence will request that
I release 1 or 2 of my men. I shall not be able to accede to this. Therefore,
urge you support deferment of Lomanitz or insure by other means his continued
availability to project. Have communicated with Fidler and am sending this
to you in support of what I regard as urgent request. Lomanitz deferment
expires August 2."
Do you recall that now?
The WITNESS. It is obviously right. I didn't recall it.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. You sent that telegram?
A. Sure.
Q. And you didn't recall that when I asked you the question whether you
protested the deferment of Lomanitz?
A. No; I didn't.
Q. You had not seen that until your counsel read it?
A. I saw it at the time. I have not been over this file.
Q. You have not been over that?
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, would it be proper for me to say that this was
a file given to me by Mr. Marks who had very much earlier discussed this with
Dr. Oppenheimer. I don't know at what point. I have not been over it with
Dr. Oppenheimer myself.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire what other official papers that Mr.
Marks had that he turned over to counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. GABBISON. Is this an official paper?
Mr. ROBB. It certainly is.
Mr. GRAY. I believe this is an official paper. I think at least I have a copy
of it here.
Mr. ROBB. I have the original here. It is stamped confidential. It came from
the records of the Manhattan District. I am slightly curious to know what
Mr. Marks, a lawyer in private practice, is doing with parts of the files of the
Manhattan Engineering District
Mr. GRAY. Can you throw any light on this?
Mr. GABBISON. I don't know.
Mr. GBAY. Could you say whether by looking at that file there seem to be
documents of a classified nature in it?
Mr. GABBISON. I really don't know. I honestly looked at this Just now. I do
think I went over with great speed over that a minute or two ago.
124
Mr. GRAY. Perhaps the Chair should say that this is not a fair inquiry to
put yon to since Mr. Marks is not available, at least at this point, to answer
the question. I think the record should reflect that at least there seems to he
some reason for concern and Inquiry as to how, as counsel said, there seems to
be in the possession of a civilian lawyer in the community at least a document
which is an official document, and which so far as this record shows is still
marked "classified" with the classification of "confidential." I think it is unfair
to expect you to answer that question.
I think, however, I should say for the record that this board may find it
desirable to pursue this point further.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, I shall make diligent inquiry during the noon
hour and tell you all that I can.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, if I might add, I trust that Mr. Garrison will inquire
of Mr. Marks whether or not as General Counsel when he left his employment
with the Commission as General Counsel, he took any other records or papers
from the files.
The WITNESS. I believe that Mr. Marks would have gotten this in a very differ-
ent way. If I had a file on this subject of Lomanitz, or if there were things
around in my file and my secretary assembled them, he would have gotten it
that way. I believe this to be correct
By Mr. BQBB:
Q. Doctor, do you have in your files now any other Government records or
papers which you have not returned to the Commission?
A. I was supposed to return everything. I directed my secretary to return
everything, and I doubt very much if I have anything.
. Q. I know you were supposed to return everything. My question was, sir,
did you?
A. I signed a statement saying that I had directed my secretary to return to
the Commission all classified documents.
Q. Doctor, I am sorry. I don't want to fence with you. Would you please
answer my question. Did you return all the Government records you had in
your possession?
A. From the Commission?
Q. From the Commission or any other source.
A. From the Commission.
Q. From the Commission? You still have some Government records from other
sources?
A. Yes, they are in a vault. I don't have them accessible.
Mr. GABBISON. Because of my ignorance, I just raise the question whether
a copy of this thing was Commission or Government property? I just don't know.
Mr. ROBB. I don't know. I am just curious to know.
Mr. GBAY. Is there any indication of a classification on the copy you have?
Mr. GAEEISON. No.
Mr. ROBB. I have the original here of that teletype. It is marked "confi-
dential"
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Doctor, would that have been sent in code?
A. I don't know, but everything that went out of Los Alamos was confiden-
tial because we were confidential
Q. Is there any question that this telegram was sent over a Government wire?
A.. None.
Q. It was; was it not?
A. Sure.
Q. You didn't consider that telegram to be a part of your personal records,
did you, sir, as distinct from the record of the Manhattan Engineering project?
A. If Itookacopyofit,Idid.
Q. Bat you have told us it was sent 'over a Government wire and presumably
at Government expense on a matter of official business ; is that right?
A. That is right
Q. Now, getting back to the question that we started with, it is true that in
August 1943, you protested against the termination of the deferment of Lomanitz ;
is that correct?
A. That is right
Q. And it is true that you requested that he be returned to the project after
his entry into the military service?
125
A. That is right
Mr. GRAY. Excuse me, Mr. Robb. In Nichols* letter this is all in one sentence.
It says, "In August 1943 you protested the termination of his deferment and
requested that he be returned to the project after his entry into the military
service."
This latter suggested action did not take place in August 1943. I think the
record should show. In fact, I don't think there has been any testimony here
about the request that he be returned to the project after he entered the mili-
tary.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. That was your letter of October 19, 1943, was it not, doctor?
A. That is right. That is the one I have before me.
Dr. GRAY. I beg your pardon. This is the letter that was read into the
record.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. That requested that he be returned.
A. If there were no security objections.
Mr. GRAY. That was dated October 19, 1943.
Mr. ROBB. Yes.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, how well did you know Lomanitz when he went to work at the
Radiation Laboratory on June 1, 1942?
A. Not very well.
Q. Did you come to know him better thereafter?
A. No. Certainly somewhat better, because we would see each other from
time to time,
Q. Did you have any relationship with him other than the relationship of
professor and student?
A. Obviously this talk that I had with hi™ was somewhat abnormal for the
relation of professor and student Otherwise not, I should think.
Q. Did he call you by your first name?
A. Robert? No.
Q. Did he call you "Oppy"?
A. He did in this letter.
Q. Did he do tnat habitually?
A. I don't know.
Q. What did you call him?
A. Rossi, I think.
Q. What did you know about his background, his past, at the time he came
onto the project on June 1, 1942?
A. I knew but I no longer recall the connection in Oklahoma.
Q. Would you tell us about that?
A. He had an uncle or a relative who was tried on a sedition charge. It
was a very major affair and was reported in the press shortly before he came
to Berkeley. He was recommended as an extremely brilliant student.
Q. Who recommended him?
A. The people at the University of Oklahoma.
Q. Do you recall who they were?
A. No. Background beyond that— background when he came, nothing.
Q. When did
Mr. GABBISON. Were you going to finish?
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Had you finished?
A. This was as to the time when he arrived in Berkeley.
Q. No, I am asking you at the time when he went to work on the secret
project on June 1, 1942, what you knew about him as of that time.
A. After that I knew something about his work. I knew he talked in a fairly
wild way.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. For instance, the statement that he didn't care, not that he didn't care,
but it seemed to him tnat the war was so terrible that it didn't matter which
side won, which I tried to talk h*™ out of. That didn't seem to me a very
sensible statement.
Q. Anything else?
A. I don't think so.
126
Q. Did you know at the time he came on the project that he had heen what
you described as a Red?
A. That was the story which he arrived with in Berkeley. Other graduate
students told me that.
Q. Who?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Weinberg?
A. No.
Q. Bohm?
A. No.
Q. You are quite sure it was not Weinberg or Bohm?
A. Positive.
Q. But you can't recall who it was?
A. That is right
Q. What was the name of that case in Oklahoma; do you remember?
A. I think it was Lomanitz.
Q. Was it the Allen case?
A. I am sorry, I don't know.
Q. You say it was a criminal sedition or syndicalism case?
A. I have not looked this up. It was hearsay at the time, or newspaper
stuff. I can't tell you beyond the fact that it was a sedition or syndicalism case
of some kind.
Q. Did you discuss it with Lomanitz?
A. I believe not
Q. Beg pardon?
A. I believe not.
Q. You have mentioned several times a conversation you had with Lomanitz
Just prior to the time when he came to work on the secret project at Berkeley.
Would you search your recollection and tell us all you -can tell us about that
conversation?
A. I told you that he explained that he wanted to continue to study physics
that he was not eager to participate in the war effort. I argued with him about
it. I don't know whether I convinced him at the time.
Q. Is that all you recall about it?
A. Yes.
Q. Where did that conversation take place?
A. I think it was up in our home on Eagle Hill.
Q. When you say "our," you mean your home?
A. Yes. I think I asked him to come up to talk to me. I am not certain
of that.
Q. Did you in that conversation discuss his radical political activities?
A. My memory is not.
Q. Was there anything said about him going to work in the shinvards?
A. I don't remember it. I think not.
tin?e?Did y0tl kn°W anything ab<mt Ms radical or Political activities at that
A. No.
u& ^ ?°***y down *** conditions to Lomanitz which you thought he should
abi.dej£ ** the event ne went *° work on &e secret project at Berkeley?
A. This has a much more sinister sound than anything I could have said. I
might have said he should behave himself.
Q. What did you mean by that?
A. He should not do anything wild or foolish.
Q. Such as what?
A. Such as make speeches.
Q. About what?
world' ** fouy of ** war' or *** of *e
Q. What led you to think that he might?
A. Because I had listened to him talk for a year or so
Q. Where had you heard his talk?
A. This is not public speeches. I mean his conversation.
Q. Where had you heard those?
A. In the physics department
Q. You mean in the classrooms?
A. No, in the offices.
nat b- stricay
127
A. The relations between me and my student were not that I stood at the
head of a class and lectured.
Q. I understand that, Doctor. Was it customary for your student to talk to you
about the injustices of the world and things of that sort?
A. It was not uncustomary to talk to each other and me about anything that
was on their minds.
Q. But you are quite sure that you knew nothing about Lomanitz's past radical
or political activities at the time
A. Activities, no.
Q. Why do you emphasize activities?
A. Because though I don't remember well, I do remember talk and not what
he said but the general color of it
Q. Do you remember any political talk?
A. No.
Q. You are quite sure that you laid down no conditions for him to abide
by in the event he went to work on the secret project?
A. Beyond what I have said.
Q. Was there any reason for you to lay down such conditions?
A. I have told you that I knew nothing of political activity.
Q. That is what I thought. Now, prior to the time when Lomanitz went on
the secret project in June 1942, did you discuss with any security officer anything
that you knew about Lomanitz's background?
A. No, because — well, no.
Q. You didn't tell any security officer that you knew his family had been
mixed up in a criminal case in Oklahoma involving sedition?
A. No.
Q. You may have answered this, Doctor, but how did you hear about that case?
A. I am not clear. Either by reading about it— no, somebody in the depart-
ment told me about it
Mr. GRAY. May I ask, did this decision involve the Communist Party?
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. It was a criminal syndicalism case.
A. I am not clear. It was sedition or criminal syndicalism.
Q. Did you understand it involved Communist activities?
A. It was not clear to me, but revolutionary activity, or alleged revolutionary
activity.
Q. It might have been Communist ; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. As we have seen, there came a time, did there not, when you learned that
Lomanitz was about to be inducted into the Army?
A. That is right
Q. How did yon learn that?
A. I first heard it in a letter from Dr. Condon.
Q. Dr. Who?
A. Condon.
Q. Condon?
A. Yes.
Q. What is his first name?
A. Edward.
Q. Edward Condon?
A. That is right.
Q. How did he happen to write you about it?
A. He had been at Los Alamos as associate director and left after a relatively
short time and he transferred to Berkeley where he was involved in getting a
transition from the laboratory work to the construction work under Westing-
house. He was director of research or associate director of research for West-
inghouse. He was working in Berkeley.
One of the things he was working on was this invention that I mentioned
a day or so ago. Why he wrote me about it, I don't know. He wrote me about
it in a great sense of outrage.
Q. About when was that?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Do you have a copy of that letter?
A. I don't have a copy of that
Mr. GAEEISON. I don't know. I have not seen it
The WITNESS. I doubt it
308S13— 54 9
128
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. This would be about when?
A. It would hare been at the time the matter came up.
Q. That was about July.
A. That is right. Somewhat earlier, I think.
Q. A little earlier?
A. I think I went to Berkeley in July. I may have my dates mixed up.
Q. You made quite a stir about the matter ; didn't you?
A. Apparently I did.
Q. You sent the teletype that we have seen.
A. That is right.
Q. Whom did you talk to about it?
A. Lansdale, when he was in Los Alamos.
Q. That is Colonel Lansdale?
A. That is right.
Q. The security officer of the District?
A. That is right, a security of$cer whose name I no longer remember in
Berkeley.
Q. Would that be Captain Johnson?
A. It is not that you can refresh my memory. I really don't know.
Q. Would it be Colonel Pash?
A. I remember him.
Q. Did you talk to him about it?
A. That I think is possible.
Q. Anybody else?
A. I don't think so.
Q. During that period of time when this matter was under discussion and
consideration did you talk to Lomanitz about it?
A. With the approval or the suggestion, I don't remember, of the security
officer, I endeavored to persuade Lomanitz to get the thing straight with the
security people. He assured me that there was nothing to get straight.
Q. Did you talk to hi™ On the telephone?
A. I don't remember. I thought I talked to hjrn in person.
Q. I think you did, but did you also talk to him on the telephone on several
occasions?
A. I have no recollection of that, but you apparently know that I did.
Q. By the way, did you talk to Dr. Weinberg about Lomanitz's induction?
A. At that time?
Q. At that time or at any time?
A. I would be virtually certain not.
Q. At the time you discussed this matter with Colonel Lansdale, what did he
tell you about it?
A. That Lomanitz had been indiscreet
Q. Did Lansdale tell you what the indiscretion was?
A. No.
Q. Did Lansdale tell you or suggest to you that a rather thorough investiga-
tion was being made in connection with Lomanitz?
A. A thorough investigation?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I don't believe so. Maybe he said we have looked into the matter very
completely, or something like that.
Q. Did you understand either from Lansdale or anybody else that there was an
Investigation revolving around Lomanitz at that time?
A. I understood that there was an investigation— I won't say an investiga-
tion—but that something had been found out, and that people were worried, and
they were trying to get it straightened out
Q. Worried about what?
A. The alleged indiscretion.
Q. Worried about security?
A. Yes.
Q. Security meant espionage, didn't it?
A. Not to me.
Q.It didn't?
A. I didn't known what this was all about.
Q. But you knew there was some investigation going on, didn't you?
•A* JL68.
129
Q. I notice in your answer at page 21, you say that you assumed that Lomanitz
would be checked by the security officers as a matter of course. Is that correct?
A. I say that.
Q. Having that assumption in mind at the time Lomanitz joined the secret
project, did you tell the security * * *
A. I knew very little about his background and I told them nothing.
Q. However much you knew, you told them nothing.
A. That is right
Q. You didn't think that would have been appropriate for you to do?
A. I do today.
Q. You do today?
A. Yes.
Q. Why?
A. I think it would have been appropriate for me to tell the security officers
anything I knew, but I didn't at that time volunteer any information.
Q. Why do you today think it would be appropriate?
A. I understand it as the proper relation of an employee to his Government.
Q. Doctor, what I am asking you is why do you so understand. What is your
reasoning?
A. That part of the obligation of a Government employee is to make informa-
tion available.
Q. You knew that the security of this project was of vital importance to the
United States, did you not?
A. I did.
Q. And you had information, however little you think it was, which had a
bearing upon whether or not Lomanitz was a good security risk, didn't you?
A. That is right.
Q. And you now understand, do you not, that it was your duty to make that
Information available to the security officers? Is that correct?
A. That is right
Q. Especially in view of the fact that you had urged Lomanitz to Join the
project ; is that correct?
A. That is right.
Q. But you didn't do it.
A. That is right.
Q. You have said that Lomanitz was not a close friend of yours.
A. That is right
Q. So that your failure to make that information available was not because of
any ties of friendship ; was it?
A. No.
Q. I notice in your telegram, which Mr. Garrison has read, to Colonel Mar-
shall—by the way, who was Colonel Marshall?
A. He was before General Groves took charge the head of the Manhattan
District. What his position at this moment was, I am not clear.
Q. I notice in your telegram, in which you state that this is an urgent request,
you say that Lomanitz was the only man in Berkeley who could take this
responsibility, and so forth. Lomanitz at that time was 21 years old ; wasn't he?
A. Twenty-two, I guess, by the record.
Q. After he left and went in the Army, did the project suffer very seriously?
A. I think it was taken over by Peters who had been doing something different.
Q. Lomanitz's Job was taken over by Peters?
A. I believe so, but I am not sure. At that time I was pretty busy with my
own troubles.
Q. .Did you suggest Peters as a possibility for that job?
A. No.
Q. What I am getting at is, the project did not collapse after Lomanitz left;
did it?
A. No. The things were put into the Oak Eidge plants. I don't know what
arrangements were made.
Q. Yes, sir. Doctor, on page 22 of your letter of March 4, 1954, you speak of
what for convenience I will call the Eltenton-Chevalier incident.
A. That is right.
Q. You describe the occasion when Chevalier spoke to you about this matter.
Would you please, sir, tell the board as accurately as you can. and in as much
detail as you can exactly what Chevalier said to you, and you said to Chevalier,
on the occasion that you mention on page 22 of your answer?
130
A. This is one of those things that I had so many occasions to think ahont
that I am not going to remember the actual words. I am going to remember
the nature of the conversation,
Q. Where possible I wish you would give us the actual words.
A. I am not going to give them to you.
Q. Very well.
A. Chevalier said he had seen George Eltenton recently.
Mr. GBAY. May I interrupt just a moment? I believe it would be useful for
Dr. Oppenheimer to describe the circumstances which led to the conversation,
whether he called you or whether this was a casual meeting.
Mr. ROBB. Yes, sir.
The WITNESS. He and his wife
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. May I interpose, Doctor? Would you begin at the beginning and tell us
exactly what happened? ^ , ,_ ^ A- » ^ ,
A. Yes. One day, and I believe you have the time fixed better than I do in
the winter of 1942-43, Haakon Chevalier came to our home. It was, I believe,
for dinner, but possibly for a drink. When I went out into the pantry, Chevalier
followed me or came with me to help me. He said, "I saw George Eltenton
recently." Maybe he asked me if I remembered him. That Eltenton had told
him that he had a method, he had means of getting technical information to
Soviet scientists. He didn't describe the means. I thought I said "But that is
treason," but I am not sure. I said anyway something, "This is a terrible thing
to do." Chevalier said or expressed complete agreement. That was the end of
it It was a very brief conversation.
Q. That is all that was said?
A. Maybe we talked about the drinks or something like that
Q. I mean about this matter, Doctor, had Chevalier telephoned you or com-
municated with you prior to that occasion to ask if he might see you?
A. I don't think so. I don't remember. We saw each other from time to time.
If we were having dinner together it would not have gone just this way. Maybe
he called up and said he would like to come.
Q. It could have been that he called you and you said come over for dinner;
is that correct?
A. Any of these things could have been.
Q. You said in the beginning of your recital of this matter that you have
described that occasion on many, many occasions ; is that right?
A. Yes
Q. Am" I to conclude from that that it has become pretty well fixed in your
mind?
A. I am afraid so.
Q. Yes, sir. It is a twice told tale for you.
A. It certainly is.
Q. It is not something that happened and you forget it and then thought about
it next, 10 years later, is that correct?
A. That is right
Q. Did Chevalier in that conversation say anything to you about the use of
microfilm as a means of transmitting fotg information?
A. No.
Q. You are sure of that?
A. Sure.
Q. Did he say anything about the possibility that the information would be
transmitted through a man at the Soviet consulate?
A. No; he did not
Q. You are sure about that?
A. I am sure about that
Q. Did he tell you or indicate to you in any way that he had talked to anyone
but you about this matter?
A. No.
Q. You are sure about that?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you learn from anybody else or hear that Chevalier had approached
anybody but you about this matter?
A. No.
Q. You are sure about that?
A. That is right
131
Q. You had no indication or no information suggesting to yon that Chevalier
had made any other approach than the one to you?
A. No.
Q. You state in your description of this incident in your answer that you
made some strong remarks to Chevalier. Was that your remark, that this is
treasonous?
A. It was a remark that either said — this is a path that has been walked over
too aften, and I don't remember what terms I said th*s is terrible.
Q. Didn't you use the word "treason"?
A. I can tell you the story of the word "treason."
Q. Would you answer that and then explain?
A. I don't know.
Q. You don't know now?
A. No, I don't know.
Q. Bid you think it was treasonous?
A. I though it was terrible.
Q. Did you think it was treasonous?
A. To take information from the United States and ship it abroad illicitly, sure.
Q. In other words, you though that the course of action suggested to Eltenton
was treasonous.
A. Yes.
Q. Since Eltenton was not a citizen, if it was not treasonous, it was criminal;
is that correct?
A. Of course.
Q. In other words, you thought that the course of conduct suggested to Eltenton
was an attempt at espionage; didn't you?
A. Sure.
Q. There is no question about it Let me ask you, sir: Did you know this
man Eltenton?
A. Yes ; not well.
Q. How had you come to know him?
A. Perhaps "know" is the wrong word. I had met him a couple of times.
Q. How?
A. I remember one occasion which was not when I met him, but when I remem-
ber seeing him. I don't remember the occasion of my meeting him. Do you want
me to describe the occasion I saw him?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I am virtually certain of this. Some time after we moved to Eagle Hill,
possibly in the autumn of 1941, a group of people came to my house one afternoon
to discuss whether or not it would be a good idea to set up a branch of the Associ-
ation of Scientific Workers. We concluded negatively, and I know my own views
were negative. I think Eltenton was present at that meeting.
Dr. EVANS. What was that?
The WITNESS. I think Eltenton was present at that time. That is not the first
time I met him, but it is one of the few times I can put my finger on.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Do you recall who else was present at that meeting?
A. The list is not going to.be comprehensive and it may be wrong. I rather
think Joel Hildebrand of the chemistry department at Berkeley, Ernest Hilgard
of the psychology department at Stanford. There were several people from
Stanford, 6 or 7 people from Berkeley.
Q. Was your brother Frank there?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Was David Adelson there?
A. I am not sure. I doubt it, but it is possible.
Q. He might have been?
A. Yes.
Q. Was a man named Jerome Yinograd there?
A. I don't think I knew him.
Q. Was he there whether you knew M™ or not?
A. I don't know.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I see it is half past 12. Would you want to ad-
journ now. This is a good stopping place now.
Mr. GRIT. I think so.
We will reconvene at 2 o'clock.
(Thereupon at 12 : 30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., the same day.)
132
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. GRAY. We will begin the proceeding now.
The record should show the presence of Mr. Herbert S. Marks.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Herbert S. Marks,
associated with me as counsel in this matter to make a brief statement about how
the copy of the teletype message that I read into the record this morning from
Dr. Oppenheimer to Colonel Marshall came into first his possession and then
mine.
Mr. GRAY. All right, sir.
Mr. MARKS. Shortly after the general manager's letter to Dr. Oppenheimer
notifying him of this matter of the proceedings — shortly after that but con-
siderably before Mr. Garrison came into this case— I began working in Dr. Op-
penheimer's behalf in preparation for it
On one occasion — I think it was the latter part of December — I was in Prince-
ton and asked for whatever material Dr. Oppenheimer had there which might
bear on any of the allegations in the letter.
As I recall, Dr. Oppenheimer's secretary gave me this particular folder or
this particular batch of letters. The top one, which is a letter to Dr. Oppenheimer
from Colonel Lansdale, dated October 22, 1943 — this is a copy that I have — was
marked "Confidential," but the word "Cancelled" was written over "Confiden-
tial." There also appeared a notation "Classification Cancelled through the
Atomic Energy Commission, H. H. Carroll /s/ for the Chief, Declassificatton
Branch."
I notice that the date under that cancelation is "1-29-53." I think that must
be in error because this trip that I have reference to would have been in De-
cember of 1953 and not January 1953. The explanation, which as I remember
Dr. Oppenheimer's secretary gave me was, this was just at the time when the
Commission's representatives were in Princeton transferring or taking away
files that Dr. Oppenheimer had there which were classified.
Dr. Oppenheimer's secretary explained further to me that in the course of her
releasing these classified files to the Atomic Energy Commission, as she had
been instructed to do, she went over them and identified certain items of cor-
respondence which seemed to be of an essentially nonclassifled character and
made arrangements with the security officer for their declassification.
Without checking with her I can't be sure that this explanation is the one
that accounts for all of the papers in this particular batch, of which the one
referred to this morning, the teletype, which I believe was the one with the date
of July 31, 1943, of which that item was one.
Without checking with Dr. Oppenheimer's secretary I can't be sure that this
is the explanation, but I think it is.
Mr. GRAY. Is it your impression that the security officers declassified that
whole file as of whatever date in December it was?
Mr. MARKS. You see, all I have, Mr. Gray, is the top letter of the batch with
"Confidential" marked on it, and then canceled out and noted "declassified."
These are apparently copies of material which Dr. Oppenheimer's secretary
made and I assume she kept whatever she copied from. The only thing I can
conjecture is that that declassification must have been intended to apply to the
whole batch, but perhaps Mr. Carroll of the Commission could be checking on
that and we will also do so with Dr. Oppenheimer's secretary, if you wish.
Mr. GRAY. I think I should say for the record that although the original of
the teletype message that we have been discussing — I have forgotten the date
of it— is in the possession of the board and is itself marked "Confidential," of
course, I have had no information as to when this was classified "Confidential" —
whether when sent or some later date.
Mr. ROBB. I do not know.
Mr. GRAY. We do not know.
Dr. OPPENHEIMER. All teletypes out of Los Alamos carried the "Security"
designation whatever their content.
Mr. GRAY. I would guess that, but I was not informed on that point So I
assume this was originally a confidential message. Again I assume this is the
original.
Mr. GARRISON. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to give you the whole file for your
inspection and that of the board.
Mr. GRAY. Of course, some of this is correspondence between Dr. Oppenheimer
and Lomariitz, and includes these communications.
I don't think there is any point in dwelling on this at the moment, Mr. Garrison.
I think Mr. Marks has given us the best explanation he can give. Unless some
133
member of the board or counsel, Mr. Robb, has any questions of Mr. Marks,
perhaps we better proceed with the hearing.
Mr. MARKS. I understand, Mr. Gray, that there was a question this morning
as to whether I had any other file. I think there was this file and one other
that could have been — 1 or 2 more, although I doubt it — in any case when we
decided to concentrate the final preparation of the case in Mr. Garrison's office,
I simply scribbled on them as on this file, "Dr. Oppenheimer's own files," and
turned them over to Mr. Garrison.
The only other file I remember of that character was the one dealing with the
Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions, but my
office will have a record of precisely what they were and I will check that.
Mr. GARRISON. In any event, that file, too, had nothing to do with Dr. Oppen-
heimer's relations with the Government at all, or his period of service at Los
Alamos.
I, Mr. Chairman, certainly have no recollection of any file containing any
correspondence of a quasi-governmental character except this one. The Inde-
pendent Citizens Committee file which Mr. Marks turned over to us we have read
completely into the record in toto. There may be 1 or 2 other files of that
character. Again I am not quite sure, but I am quite certain on the quasi-
governmental character.
Mr. GBAT. Yes. It would appear, and this is entirely supposition, that Dr.
Oppenheimer had retained a file containing all of his correspondence with and
relating to Mr. Lomanitz, and that the security officer apparently took that file
and allowed Dr. Openheimer's secretary to make copies for another complete
file on this.
This would be the impression I get from what Mr. Marks said.
Mr. MARKS. That is my impression of what occurred but I would have to
check with Dr. Oppenheimer's secretary.
Mr. Garrison also mentioned to me that there was a question as to whether
I had taken any files from the Atomic Energy Commission. I don't know
whether that question was on the record or off, but for your reassurance I must
say, of course not
I took away from the Commission when I left in 1947 a great many papers
that were mine or that were Government Printing Office documents, but all of my
files were reviewed page by page by a security officer who then stamped the
bundles that were transferred to me personally and gave me a certificate to the
effect that there was nothing in them that belonged to the Commission or of a
classified nature.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much. I understood Mr. Marks came for the
purpose of making this statement ; is that right?
Mr. GARBJBOBT. I would like to have him remain this afternoon, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. The record will show that he remains in his capacity of — how do
you describe him— cocounsel?
Mr. GARRISON. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. So the record will reflect.
Mr. MARKS, That is the capacity I made this statement, I take it.
Mr. GRAY. There is no reason that the record should not reflect that.
Mr. RORB. May I proceed?
Mr. GRAY. Yes ; if you will.
Whereupon, J. Robert Oppenheimer, the witness on the stand at the time of
taking the recess, resumed the stand and testified further as follows :
DIRECT EXAMINATION— Continued
By Mr. RORB :
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, while we are on the matter of the telegram about Mr.
Lomanitz, I notice in the file that Mr. Garrison handed to the chairman a
copy of a wire you sent to Mr. Lomanitz, dated July 31, 1943 :
"Mr. G. R. LOMANITZ,
"Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.:
"Have requested in proper places reconsideration of support for your defer-
ment. Cannot guarantee outcome but have made strong request Suggest
you ask Fidler for current developments. Good luck.
"OPJE."
Q. Did you send that wire?
A. Evidently.
Q. Why was it so important to you that Lomanitz be not drafted?
134
A. I am not sure that it was so important to me. I had this outraged
communication from Condon
Q. You had what?
A. An outraged communication from Condon about it. We were very short
of people. I doubt whether there was any more to it than that.
Q. Dr. Condon's opinions had a great weight with you?
A. They had some weight with me.
Q. I beg your pardon?
A. They had some weight with me. I thought it reflected a sense of trouble
in Berkeley.
B. Is it your recollection that that communication was by way of a letter?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you put that in your file?
A. I don't have it
Q. I didn't ask you that, sir. Did you put it in your file?
A. I don't know.
Q. Did you get any other letters from Rossi Lomanitz which are not in your
filed?
A. I got some later.
Q. When?
A. Toward the end of the war. All of these were open and read, and there
may be a record of them. I don't have any in mind. I had no further com-
munications about his situation in the Army after I wrote a letter to his
commanding officer.
Q. What were those communications about that you got from him later?
A. I think about coming back to Berkeley and studying after the war, that
kind of thing.
Q. Did he ask your assistance in getting him back to Berkeley?
A. I don't recall. I don't see why that would be necessary.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. I would not have had to get him into the university.
Q. Did you do anything about getting him a job or getting him placed after
he got back from the Army?
A. I don't know. I wasn't there at that time.
Q. Wherever you were, did you do anything about it?
A. I have no recollection whatever. He would have come back as a graduate
student, and I have no recollection at all of how he got back as a graduate
student
Q. If he had asked you, I assume there is no reason why you would not have
helped him?
A. No.
Q. Doctor, do you have a file of correspondence with all of your graduate
students who were working on this project with you?
A. No.
Q. Is there any particular reason why you preserved the file on Lomanitz?
A. Yes ; there is. He was in seme kind of trouble. I thought that somebody
I might be asked about how I behaved.
Q. So you wanted to keep a record of it?
A. That is right
Q. I assume you likewise charged your mind with the matter ; is that correct?
A. No ; I think I forgot it
Q. Beg pardon?
A. I forgot it
Q. You knew it was a matter that had to be handled with some care, did
you not, because of the fact that he was in trouble?
A. I was aware of the fact that he was in trouble and thought I should keep
what record I had.
Q. Doctor, before the noon recess we were talking about your acquaintance-
ship or friendship, whichever it was, with Mr. Bltenton. You told us, I believe,
that he came to your home on one occasion for a meeting; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. That was in the evening?
A. I think it was in the afternoon.
Q. Who had called that meeting?
A. I am not clear about that I .have tried to remember and I can't
Q. Do you remember who presided?
A. No. Maybe I did.
135
Q. I believe I was asking you to try to remember who was there.
A. I identified probably fumblingly one or two people. It is possible that
Addis was there.
Q. Who?
A. Addis. It is quite certain that Hilgard was there. It is probable that
Hildebrand was there. I am not certain or very sure beyond that.
Q. When you said Addis, you meant Thomas Addis?
A. I did.
Q. Was David Adelson there?
A. You asked me that
Q. Yes ; I did. I don't think you answered.
A. I can't I doubt it, but I am not certain.
Q. The last one I asked you about was Jerome Tinograd. Was he there?
A. Yes; you did. I answered that, not being acquainted with him, I don't
know.
Q. How many people were there?
A. Fifteen.
Q. You are quite positive that Eltenton was there?
A. No; but I think so.
Q. Had you met Eltenton on many other occasions?
A. Oh, yes ; I had met him before that
Q. Where?
A. I don't remember.
Q. A social occasion?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you recall any of them?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall who introduced you to him?
A. No.
Q. Did Eltenton come to your house on any other occasion?
A. I am quite sure not
Q. Did he come to your house in 1942 on one occasion to discuss certain awards
which the Soviet Government was going to make to certain scientists?
A. If so, it is news to me. I assume you know that this is true, but I certainly
have no recollection of it
Q. You have no recollection of it?
A. No.
Q. Let me see if I can refresh your recollection, Doctor. Do you recall him
coming to your house to discuss awards to be made to certain scientists by the
Soviet Government and you suggesting the names of Bush, Morgan, and perhaps
one of the Comptons?
A. There is nothing unreasonable in the suggestions.
Q. But you don't recall?
A. But I really don't remember.
Q. What did you know about Eltenton's background in 1943 when this Eltenton-
Chevalier episode occurred?
A. Two things, three things, four things : That he was an Englishman, that he
was a chemical engineer, that he had spent some time in the Soviet Union, that
he was a member of the Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and
Technicians— five things — that he was employed, I think, at Shell Development
Co.
Q. How did you know all those things?
A. Well, about the Shell Development Co. and the Federation of Architects,
Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians, I suppose he told me or someone else
employed there told me. As for the background in Russia, I don't remember.
Maybe he told me; maybe a friend told me. That he was an TflngHghmnTi was
obvious.
Q. Why?
A. BTfg accent
Q. You were fairly well acquainted with him, were you not?
A. No. I think we probably saw each other no more than 4 or 5 times.
Q. Did you see Eltenton after this episode occurred?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever seen him since?
A. No.
Q. Could that have been on purpose on your part? Have you avoided him?
A. I have not had to, but I think I would have.
136
Q. You have mentioned your conversation with Colonel Lansdale which I
believe you said took place at Los Alamos?
A Yes
Q. In which he told you he was worried about the security situation at
Berkeley. I believe we agreed that worry would naturally include a fear of
espionage?
A. That is right.
Q. Did he mention any names in connection with that worry?
A. Lomanitz was obviously in the picture, and I believe that is the only one.
Q. Weinberg?
A. I don't think he did.
Q. But Lomanitz obviously?
A. Lomanitz.
Q. When did you first mention your conversation with Chevalier to any
security officer?
A. I didn't do it that way. I first mentioned Bltenton.
Q. Yes.
A. On a visit to Berkeley almost immediately after Lansdale's visit to Los
Alamos.
Q. Was that to Lieutenant Johnson; do you remember?
A. I don't remember, but it was to a security officer there.
Q. At Berkeley?
A. That is right.
Q. If the record shows that it was to Lieutenant Johnson on August 25, 1943,
you would accept that?
A. I would accept that.
Q. You mentioned the Eltenton incident in connection with Lomanitz, didn't
you?
A. The context was this. I think Johnson told me that the source of the
trouble was the unionization of the radiation laboratory by the Federation
of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians. Possibly I had heard
that from Lansdale. The connection that I made was between Bltenton and
this organization.
Q. In your answer at page 22 you say, referring to the Bltenton episode:
"It has long been clear to me that I should have reported the incident at once."
A. It is.
Q. "The events that lead me to report it, which I doubt ever would have be-
come known without my report, were unconnected with it"
You have told us that your discussion with Colonel Lansdale encompassed
the subject of espionage. Of course, you have told us also that the Bltenton
matter involved espionage ; is that correct?
A. Let us be careful. The word "espionage" was not mentioned.
Q. No?
A. The word "indiscretion" was mentioned. That is all that Lansdale said.
Indiscretion was talking to unauthorized people who in turn would talk to
other people. This is all I was told. I got worried when I learned that this
union was connected with their troubles.
Q. But, Doctor, you told us this morning, did you not, that you knew that
Lansdale was worried about espionage at Berkeley; is that correct?
A. I knew he was worried about the leakage of information.
Q. Isn't that a polite name for espionage?
A. Not necessarily.
Q. I will ask you now, didn't you know that Lansdale was concerned about
the possibility of espionage at Berkeley?
A. About the possibility ; yes.
Q. Yes.
A. That is right
Q. So, Doctor, it is not quite correct to say that the Bltenton incident was not
connected with your talk with Lansdale, is it?
A. I didn't mean it in that sense. I meant that it had nothing to do with
Chevalier or Bltenton with respect to the events that aroused this.
Q. But your talk with Lansdale did have to do with the subject which included
Chevalier and Bltenton, didn't it?
A. I have described it as well as I can. Chevalier's name was not mentioned ;
Bltenton's name was not mentioned ; and espionage was not mentioned.
Q. I didn't say that But it had to do with the subject which involved
Chevalier or at least Bltenton?
A. Sure; that is why I brought it up.
137
Q. What did you tell Lieutenant Johnson about this when you first mentioned
Eltenton to Mm?
A. I had two interviews, and therefore I am not clear as to which was which.
Q. May I help you?
A. Please.
Q. I think your first interview with Johnson was quite brief, was it not?
A. That is right. I think I said little more than that Eltenton was somebody
to worry about.
Q. Yes.
A. Then I was asked why did I say this. Then I invented a cock-and-bull
story.
Q. Then you were interviewed the next day by Colonel Pash, were you not?
A. That is right
Q. Who was he?
A. He was another security officer.
Q. That was quite a lengthy interview, was it not?
A. I didn't think it was that long.
Q. For your information, that was August 26, 1943.
A. Right.
Q. Then there came a time when you were interviewed by Colonel Lansdale.
A. I remember that very well.
Q. That was in Washington, wasn't it?
A. That is right.
Q. That was September 12, 1943.
A. Right.
Q. Would you accept that?
A. Surely.
Q. Then you were interviewed again by the FBI in 1946 ; is that right?
A. In between I think came Groves.
Q. Pardon?
A. In between came Groves.
Q. Yes. But you were interviewed in 1946 ; is that right?
A. That is right
Q. Now let us go back to your interview with Colonel Pash. Did you tell Pash
the truth about this thing?
A. No.
Q. You lied to him?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you tell Pash that was not true?
A. That Eltenton had attempted to approach members of the project— three
members of the project— through intermediaries.
Q. What else did you tell him that wasn't true?
A. That is all I really remember.
Q. That is all? Did you tell Pash that Eltenton had attempted to approach
three members of the project
A. Through intermediaries.
Q. Intermediaries?
A. Through an intermediary.
Q. So that we may be clear, did you discuss with or disclose to Pash the identity
of Chevalier?
A. No.
Q. Let us refer, then, for the time being, to Chevalier as X.
A. All right
Q. Did you tell Pash that X had approached three persons on the project?
A. I am not clear whether I said there were 3 X's or that X approached
I't you say that X had approached 3 people?
A. Probably.
Q. Why did you do that, Doctor?
A. Because I was an idiot
Q. Is that your only explanation, Doctor?
A. I was reluctant to mention Chevalier.
Q. Yes.
A. No doubt somewhat reluctant to mention myself.
Q. Yes. But why would you tell him that Chevalier had gone to 3 people?
A. I have no explanation for that except the one already offered.
Q. Didn't that make it all the worse for Chevalier?
A. I didn't mention Chevalier,
138
Q. No ; but X.
A. It would have.
Q. Certainly. In other words, if X had gone to 3 people that would have shown,
would it not
A. That he was deeply involved.
Q. That he was deeply involved. That it was not just a casual conversation.
A. Right
Q. And you knew that, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you tell Colonel Pash that X had spoken to you about the use of micro-
film?
A. It seems unlikely. You have a record, and I will abide by it
Q. Did you?
A. I don't remember.
Q. If X had spoken to you about the use of microfilm, that would have shown
definitely that he was not an innocent contact?
A. It certainly would.
Q. Did you teU Colonel Pash that X had told you that the information would
be transmitted through someone at the Russian consulate?
(There was no response.)
Q. Did you?
A. I would have said not, but I clearly see that I must have.
Q. If X had said that, that would have shown conclusively that it was a crim-
inal conspiracy, would it not?
A. That is right
Q. Did Pash ask you for the name of X?
A. I imagine he did.
Q. Don't you know he did?
A. Sure.
Q. Did he tell you why he wanted it?
A. In order to stop the business.
Q. He told you that it was a very serious matter, didn't he?
A. I don't recollect that, but he certainly would have.
Q. You knew that he wanted to investigate it, did you not?
A. That is right
Q. And didn't you know that your refusal to give the name of X was impeding
the investigation?
A. In actual fact I think the only person that needed watching or should have
been watched was Bltenton. But as I concocted the story that did not emerge.
Q. That was your judgment?
A. Yes.
Q. But you knew that Pash wanted to investigate this?
A. Yes.
Q. And didn't you know, Doctor, that by refusing to give the name of X you
were impeding the investigation?
A. I must have known that.
Q. You know now, don't you?
A. Well, actually
Q. You must have known it then?
A. Actually the only important thing to investigate was Bltenton.
Q. What did Pash want to investigate?
A. I suppose the 3 people on the project
Q. You knew, didn't you, Doctor, that Colonel Pash and his organization would
move heaven and earth to find out those 3 people, didn't you?
A. It makes sense.
Q. And you knew that they would move heaven and earth to find out the
identity of X, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. And yet you wouldn't tell them?
A. That is true*
Q. So you knew you were impeding them, didn't you?
A. That is right
Q. How long had you known this man Chevalier in 1943?
A. For many years.
Q. How many?
A. Perhaps 5; 5 or 6, probably.
Q. How had you known him?
139
A. As a quite close friend.
Q. Had you known him professionally or socially?
A. He was a member of the faculty, and I knew him socially.
Q. What was his specialty?
A. He was a professor of French.
Q. How did you meet him ; do you remember?
A. Possibly at one of the first meetings of the teachers union, but I am not
certain.
Q. Were you a frequent visitor at his house?
A. Yes.
Q. And your wives were also friendly?
A. Right
Q. Had you seen him at the meeting of leftwing organizations?
A. Yes. I think the first time I saw him I didn't know him. He presided at
a meeting for Spanish relief at which the French writer Malraux was the speaker.
Q. Where was that meeting held?
A. In San Francisco.
Q. At whose house?
A. It was a public meeting.
Q. What other meetings did you see him at?
A. I am not sure that I can catalog them all. Parties for Spanish relief.
The meeting was held at his house at which Schneiderman talked. The teachers
union meetings, if they are counted as leftwing.
Q. What was the teachers union meeting about?
A. They had them regularly.
Q. Were those teachers union meetings held at private homes?
A. No.
Q. Some of them?
A. I don't think the union could have met in a private home.
Q. I don't know.
A. No. These were held in halls or, I think, in the International House.
Q. Any other meetings that you remember?
A. I would be certain there were, but they are not coming up.
Q. This meeting that you mentioned at which Schneiderman spoke— that was
December 1, 1940, was it not?
A. I don't know the date, but I will accept it.
Q. Who was Schneiderman?
A. He was the secretary of the party in California.
Q. The Communist Party?
A. Right
Q. This was held at Chevalier's house?
A. Yes.
Q. How many people were present?
A. Twenty, as a guess.
Q. In the evening?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall who was there?
A. Not very accurately and not with certainty. I didn't even recall the meet-
ing until my wife refreshed my memory.
Q. Was Isaac Folkoff there?
A. It is possible.
Q. Was Dr. Addis there?
A. I think so.
Q. Was Rudie Lambert there?
A. I don't remember that, but possibly.
Q. Do you remember anybody else who was there?
A. Mr. Jack Straus.
Q. Who? How do you spell that?
A. S-t-r-a-u-s. I don't know whether it is one or two s's.
Q. Who was he?
A. A San Francisco businessman.
Q. Was he a member of the Communist Party?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. By the way, was Lambert a member of the Communist Party?
A. Yes.
Q. What was his function?
A. I never knew.
Q. You knew he was a member?
140
A. I knew he was a member and, In fact, had an official Job.
Q. How often did you see Lambert?
A. Half a dozen times.
Q. In what connection?
A. Different ones. Affairs like this : I had lunch with him once or twice with
Folkoff. I saw him at a Spanish party.
Q. What was the purpose of those luncheons?
A. This was one of the times when they were telling me about why I needed
to give them money.
Q. Money to what?
A. To them for use in Spain.
Q. Folkoff was a Communist?
A. Yes.
Q. What was his job in the party?
A. I think he was treasurer of something, but I never knew of what.
Q. Can you describe Lambert to us?
A. A lean, rather handsome man, moderate height, rather an effective speaker
in conversation.
Q. What was the purpose, again, of this meeting at which Schneiderman spoke?
A. I suppose it was to acquaint the interested gentry with the present line
or the then line of the Communist Party.
Q. Who asked you to go?
A. The Chevaliers.
Q. It was his house ; wasn't it?
A, Yes.
Q. Did you know Chevalier as a fellow traveler?
A. I so told the FBI in 1946 and I did know him as a fellow traveler.
Q. He followed the party line pretty closely, didn't he?
A. Yes, I imagine he did.
Q. Did you have any reason to suspect he was a member of the Communist
Party?
A. At the time I knew him?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. No.
Q. Do you know?
A. No.
Q. You knew he was a quite a "red", didn't you?
A. Yes. I would say quite Pink.
Q. Not Bed?
A. I won't quibble.
Q. You say in your answer that you still considered him a friend.
A. I do.
Q. When did you last see him?
A. On my last trip to Europe. He is living in Paris, divorced and has been
remarried. We had dinner with them one evening. The origin of this, or at
least part of the origin
Q. May I interpose? That was in December 1953?
A. Yes, December.
Q. Go ahead.
A. He wrote me a note saying that he had been at UNESCO and had run
into Professor Bohr who told him I was coming to Europe — we were coming to
Europe.
Q. Professor who?
A. B-o-h-r. He asked us to look him up if we got to Paris. We planned to
do so. My wife called. He was out of town on a Job. He got back and we
had dinner together, the four of us.
The next day he picked us up and drove us out to visit with Malraux, who
has had rather major political changes since 1986. We had a conversation of
about an hour and he drove us back to the hotel.
Dr. EVANS. How long was Bohr in this country?
The WITNESS. Bohr?
Dr. EVANS. Yes.
The WITNESS. He has been here many different times.
Dr. EVANS. Just about the time that you began the work.
The WITNESS. He arrived early in 1944 and left about mid-1945 ; so that would
be a year and a half.
Dr. EVANS. Did he go under the name of Bohr here?
The WITNESS. He had the code name of Nicholas Baker.
141
By Mr. KOBB :
Q. What kind of a code was that?
A. It was meant to conceal from people who should know that he was in this
country and working on the atomic project.
Q. I see. Getting back to your visit with Chevalier in December 1953, was
Dr. Malraux the gentleman who first introduced you to Chevalier?
A. He did not introduce me. He was the speaker at a meeting at which
Chevalier presided. Malraux became a violent supporter of De Gaulle and his
great brainman and deserted politics and went into purely philosophic and literary
work. Our talk was purely of that.
Q. What was your conversation with Chevalier that you said you had for
about an hour?
A. With Malreaux that was.
Q. It was not with Chevalier?
A. Chevalier took us there. We had dinner with him and his new wife the
night before. The talk was personal, diffuse, and about how they were living
and how we were living.
Q. Did yon talk about Chevalier's passport?
A, No.
Q. Did you thereafter go to the American Embassy to assist Dr. Chevalier
in getting a passport to come back to this country?
A. No.
Q. Do you know a Dr. JeofCrey Wyman?
A. Tes, I do.
Q. Who is he?
A. He is the science attache* of the State Department in Paris. He is a man
I knew at Harvard when I was a student there and Cambridge. He resigned
from Harvard to accept this job.
The first day or so my wife and I were in Paris we called at the Embassy
and we called on the Charge* d'Affaires, the Ambassador was ill and away, and
Wyman asked us to lunch and we had lunch with him. This was a propriety.
We didn't see Wyman again.
Q. Did you discuss with Wyman or anybody else the matter of Chevalier's
passport?
A. I did not
Q. At any time?
A. At no time.
Q. Let us move along to your interview with Colonel Lansdale on September 12.
A. Bight
Q. Did you tell him substantially the same story you told Colonel Pash?
A. I don't know whether he repeated it to me or I repeated it to h*™
Q. In all events, if he repeated it to you
A. I did not modify it
Q. You affirmed it as the truth?
A. Tes
Q. So you lied to him, too?
A. That is right.
Q. Did he plead with you to give him the name of X?
A. He did.
Q. Did he explain why he wanted that name?
A. I suppose he did. I don't remember.
Q. You knew why he did?
A. It didn't need explanation.
Q. Did he explain to you that either X or Eltenton might have continued to
make other contacts?
A. This would have been a reasonable thing to say.
Q Did you give him the name of X?
A. No.
Mr. GRAY. Suppose we break now for a few minutes.
(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)
Mr. GBAT. May we resume.
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Doctor, Just so the record will be complete, do you recall in 1950 getting
a letter from Dr. Chevalier who was then in San Francisco asking you to assist
him by telling him what you testified before the House committee about the
Chevalier-Eltenton incident?
A. Yes, I remember.
142
Q. Do you recall answering that letter?
A. I did answer it. I think I did not tell him what I testified, because it
was in executive session, but referred him to a press account of what I testified.
I am not quite certain on this point.
Q. At that time he was attempting to get a passport to leave the United
States, was he?
A. I thought that was later, but I am not sure.
Q. That may have been. You did hear about it when he was attempting to
get a passport; did you?
A. Yes.
Q. We will come to that later.
I will read you and ask you if this is the letter that you wrote to him. I am
sorry I haven't a copy of it. On the stationery of the Institute for Advanced
Study, Princeton, N. J., office of the director, February 25, 1950:
"BE. HAAKON CHEVALIER
"8127 Washington Street
"San Francisco, CaUf.
"BEAB HAAKON : Thank you for your good letter of February 21. I can under-
stand that an account of my testimony before the House committee could be
helpful to you in seeking a suitable academic position at this time. I cannot
send it to you because I have never myself had a transcript, and because the
committee ruled at the time that they desired to keep, and would keep, the
hearings secret But I can tell you what I said. I told them that I would
like as far as possible to clear the record with regard to your alleged involve-
ment in the atom business. I said that as far as I knew, you knew nothing of
the atom bomb until it was announced after Hiroshima; and that most cer-
tainly you had never mentioned it or anything that could be connected with it
to me. I said that you had never asked me to transmit any kind of information,
nor suggested that I could do so, or that I consider doing so. I said that you
had told me of a discussion of providing technical information to the U. S. S. E.
which disturbed you considerably, and which you thought I ought to know about
There were surely many other points; but these were, I think, the highlights;
and if this account can be of use to you, I hope that you will feel free to use it.
"As you know, I have been deeply disturbed by the threat to your career
which these ugly stories could constitute. If I can help you in that, you may
call on me.
"Sincerely yours,
"EGBERT OPPENHEIMEB."
Bid you write that letter?
A. Oh, sure. I didn't recollect it.
Q. Was the account of your testimony which you gave there an accurate one?
A. I think it is fairly accurate.
Q. Dr. Chevalier thereafter used that letter in connection with his passport
application.
A. I didn't know that
Q. Bid you talk to him about his passport application?
A. I did. He came to Princeton at the time and I referred him to counsel
to help him with it
Q. To whom did you refer him?
A. Joe Fanelli.
Q. In Washington?
A. Bight
Q. Is that the same Joe Fanelli who represented Mr. Weinberg in his criminal
trial?
A. I believe it is.
Q. Was he a friend of yours, Fanelli?
A. No. I had not met him at the time I referred Chevalier to him, but he
represented my brother at the time of his appearance before the House Un-
American Committee. Wait just a minute
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry. I don't t^^> counsel should coach
the witness.
The WITNESS. You are quite right.
Mr. MASKS. I am very sorry.
Mr. ROBB. Will you resume?
The WITNESS. I did hear the correction,
Mr. ROBB. I hope it won't happen in the future.
143
Mr. GBAY. I think we should be careful, counsel, If you do not mind* I
should repeat I think at this time because Mr. Marks has not been present before,
that we consider under the regulations, spirit and letter that this it not a trial
but an inquiry. Very considerable latitude, as you have observed and we have
all experienced, is certainly allowed, and is to continue, in not trying to con-
form to rigid court procedures. But as far as the testimony of a witness is
concerned, it must be his own testimony.
The WITNESS. I am sorry I did hear it. I was mistaken.
Mr. GRAY. The purpose of the inquiry is not entrapment.
The WITNESS. I understand that. I met Fanelli at one time, but I believe
it was after I referred Chevalier to him. I met him first on the train going
from Washington to Princeton where I was introduced by a friend, and I met
him later in the preparation for the Weinberg case. But he had been recom-
mended to me very highly, and I suggested him to Chevalier.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Dr. Chevalier came to Princeton to see you about the matter ?
A. He came and stayed a couple of days. I don't think it would be right to say
he came to see me about the passport problem. He had just been divorced. He
talked of nothing but his divorce. But he was worried about whether to use an
American passport or his French passport.
Q. About when was that, Doctor?
A. Could it have been the spring of 1951?
Q. I don't know.
A. It was immediately at the time he left the country.
Q. You had previously met Mr. Fanelli ?
A. I believe I did not meet him until after this.
Q. Who, Doctor, had so highly recommended Fanelli to you?
A. I had heard him warmly spoken of by Mr. Marks. I think that is what
it was.
Q. Who was the friend that was on the train with you?
A. Two, Sumner Pike, and Archie Alexander.
Q. I believe you said that your account of your testimony which you gave to
Dr. Chevalier in your letter of February 24, 1950, was substantially accurate to
the best of your recollection?
A. It was intended not to be misleading and to be reassuring.
Q. And had your testimony to which this letter referred been true? Was it the
truth?
A. My testimony was certainly true.
Q. Doctor, I would like to go back with you, if I may, to your interview with
Colonel Pash on August 26, 1943. I will read to you certain extracts from the
transcript of that interview.
Colonel Pash said to you :
"Mr. Johnson told me about the little incident or conversation taking place
yesterday in which I am very much interested, and had me worried all day
yesterday since he called me.
"OPPENHEIMEB. I was rather uncertain as to whether I should or should not
talk to him, Rossi, when I was here. I was unwilling to do it without authori-
zation. What I wanted to tell this fellow was that he had been indiscreet I
know that is right that he had revealed information, I know that saying that
much might in some cases embarrass him. It doesn't seem to have been capable
of embarrassing him, to put it bluntly."
Do you recall saying that?
A. Let me say I recognize it
Q. In substance did you say that?
A. I am sure I did.
Q. So there was no question, Doctor, that this matter of the Eitenton incident
came up in connection with your conversation about Lomanitz.
A. That is right
Q. There is no question, is there, either, that at that time, August 26, 1943,
you knew that Lomanitz had revealed certain confidential information?
A. I was told by Lansdale, that he had been indiscreet about information.
It was not made dear to me
Q. This says, "I know that -is right that he had revealed information." So
wouldn't you agree that you knew he had revealed information?
A. Yes,
soma— 54 10
144
Q. Very well. Pash said :
"Well, that is not the particular interest I have. It is something a little
more in my opinion that is more serious. Mr. Johnson said that there was a
possibility that there may he some other groups interested.
"OPPENHEIMER. I think that is true, but I have no first hand knowledge that
it would be for that reason useful. But I think it is true that a man whose
name I never heard, who was attached to the Soviet consul, has indicated indi-
rectly through intermediate people concerned with this project that he was
in a position to transmit without any danger of a leak or scandal or anything
of that kind information which they might supply."
Do you recall saying that in substance?
A. I certainly don't recall it
Q. Would you deny you said it?
A. No.
Q. Is there any doubt now that you did mention to Pash, a man attached
to the Soviet consul?
A. I had completely forgotten it. I can only rely on the transcript.
Q. Doctor, for your information, I might say we have a record of your voice.
A. Sure.
Q. Do you have any doubt you said that?
A. No.
Q. Was that true. Had there been a mention of a man connected with the
Soviet consul?
A. I am fairly certain not
Q. You were very certain before lunch that there had not ; weren't you?
A. Yes.
Q. You continue in that same answer : "Since I know it to be a fact, I have
been particularly concerned about any indiscretions which took place in circles
close enough to be in contact with him. To put it quite frankly, I would feel
friendly to the idea of the Commander in Chief of informing the Russians
who are working on this problem. At least I can see there might be some
arguments for doing that but I don't like the idea of having it moved out the
back door. I think it might not hurt to be on the lookout for it"
Do you recall saying something like that?
A. I am afraid I am not recalling very well, but this is very much the way
I would have talked.
Q. Did you feel friendly to the idea of the Commander in Chief informing
the Russians who were working on the problem?
A. I felt very friendly to the attempt to get real cooperation with the Russians,
a two-way cooperation, on an official governmental level. I knew of some of the
obstacles to it.
Q. Is this an accurate statement of your sentiments as of August 26, 1943 :
"I would feel friendly to the idea of the Commander in Chief informing the
Russians who are working on this problem" ?
A. The Russians who are working on this problem?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I think that is not an accurate sentence.
Q. That is not the way you felt then?
A. No. I think I can say that I felt that I hoped that during the war good
collaboration all along the line could be established with the Russians through
governmental channels but I had no idea that there were any Russians working
on the problem.
Q. On the problem, not the project On the problem.
A. What problem?
Q. "I would feel quite friendly to the idea of the Commander in Chief inform-
ing the Russians who are working on this problem."
If you said that to Colonel Pash ; did that express your sentiments?
A. What does it mean?
Q. I am asking you.
A. I don't know.
Q. That language is not intelligible to you?
A. On this problem? No.
Q. The problem of the atom bomb. Did you in 1943 feel friendly to the idea
of the Commander in Chief of informing the Russians who were working on
the problem of the atomic bomb?
A. I don't think there were any Russians working on the problem of the
atomic bomb.
145
Q. Did you feel friendly in 1943 to the idea of the Commander in Chief giving
the Russians any information about the work that was being done on the atomic
bomb under your supervision?
A. If it had been a completely reciprocal and open affair with their military
technology and ours, I would have seen arguments for it ; yes, sir.
Q. In other words, you did feel friendly.
A. With these qualifications.
Q. You said here, "At least I can see there might be some arguments for doing
that, but I don't like the idea of having it moved out the back door."
A. Right
Q. Pash then said: "Could you give me a little more specific information as
to exactly what information you have? You can readily realize that phase
would be to me as interesting pretty near as the whole project is to.
"OPPENHEIMER. Well, I might say the approaches were always made through
other people who were troubled by them and sometimes came and discussed
them with me and that the approaches were quite indirect. So I feel that to
give more perhaps than one name would be to implicate people whose attitudes
were one of bewilderment rather than one of cooperation."
Do you recall saying something like that?
A. I don't recall that conversation very well.
Q. But you did, you are sure, tell Colonel Pash there was more than one
person involved.
A. Right.
Q. Continuing : "I know of no case, and I am fairly sure in all cases where
I have heard of these contacts would not have yielded a single thing. That is as
far as I can go on that. There is a man whose name was mentioned to me a
couple of times. I don't know of my own knowledge that he was involved as an
intermediary. It seems, however, not impossible. If you wanted to watch him
it might be the appropriate thing to do. He spent a number of years in the
Soviet Union. I thtnfc he is a chemical engineer. He was, he may not be here,
at the time I was with him here employed by the Shell Development. His name
is Eltenton. I would think that there was a small chance — well, let me put it
this way. He has probably been asked to do what he can to provide information.
Whether he is successful or not, I do not know. But he talked to a friend of his
who is also an acquaintance of one of the men on the project and that was one
of the channels by which this thing went. Now, I think that to go beyond that
would be to put a lot of names down of people who are not only innocent but
whose attitude was 100 percent cooperative."
Do you recall saying that to Colonel Pash?
A. This sounds right
Q. How much of that was not true? Approaching more than one person?
A. More than one person was not true.
Q. He talked to a friend' of his, who is also an acquaintance of one of the
men on the project. Who was the friend of his that you had in mind?
A. I can only guess, but that would be Chevalier and I would be the man on
the project
Q. Pash said to you: "However, anything we may get which would eliminate
a lot of research work on our part would necessarily bring to a closer conclusion
anything that we are doing."
In other words, he told you, didn't he, that they were going to have to do a
lot of work to investigate this?
You answered, "Well, I am giving you the one name that is or isn't— I mean
I don't know the name of the man attached to the consulate. I think I may
have been told and I may not have been told. I have at least not purposely,
but actually, forgotten. He is and he may not be here now — these incidents
occurred in the order of about 5, 6, or 7 months ago."
You did tell Colonel Pash that there was a man from the consulate involved,
didn't you?
A. I did.
Q. Was that true?
A. That there was a man in the consulate involved?
Q. Yes.
A. That I read since the end of the war?
Q. No. Did you know then that there was?
A. I am fairly sure not ^ _ .
Q. Chevalier had not said anything to you about a man from the consulate,
had he?
A. I have told you my sharp recollection of it
146
Q. Further along you said, "I would feel that the people that they tried to
get information from were more or less an accident, and I would be making
some harm by saying that."
So you were talMng about more than one person always, weren't yon?
A. Yes ; at that time.
Q. When you said "Well, I will tell you one thing. I have known of 2 or 8
cases, and I ttflnk 2 of the men are with me at Los Alamos. They are men who
are closely associated with me.
"PASH. Have they told you that either they thought they were contacted for
that purpose or they were actually contacted for that purpose?
"OPENHEIMEB. They told me they were contacted for that purpose.
"PASH. For that purpose?"
Do you recall saying that to Pash in substance?
A. Yes.
Q. So you told him specifically and circumstantially that there were several
people that were contacted.
A. Right
Q. And your testimony now is that was a lie?
A. Right
Q. Then you continue: "That is, let me give you the background. The back-
ground was, well, you know how difficult it is with relations between these two
allies and there are a lot of people that don't feel very friendly towards Russia.
So the information, a lot of our secret information, our radar and so on, doesn't
get to them, and they are battling for their lives, and they would like to have an
idea of what is going on, and this is just to make up in other words for the
defects of our official communication. That is the form in which it was
presented."
Did you tell Colonel Pash that?
A. I evidently did. This is news to me.
Q. Had the matter been presented to you in that form?
A. No.
Q. Had anyone told you that it had been presented in that form?
A. No.
Q. In other words, this also was a lie?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Then you continue : "Of course, the actual fact is that since it is not a
communication that ought to be taking place, it is treasonable."
Did you say that?
A. Sure. I mean I am not remembering this conversation, but I am ac-
cepting it
Q, You did think it was treasonable anyway, didn't yon?
A. Sure.
Q. "But it was not presented in that method. It is a method of carrying
out a policy which was more or less a policy of the Government. The form in
which it came was that couldn't an interview be arranged with this man Elten-
tcn who had very good contact with a man from the Embassy attached to the
consulate who is a very reliable guy and who had a lot of experience in micro-
film or whatever."
Did you tell Colonel Pash that microfilm had been mentioned to you?
A. Evidently.
Q. Was that true?
A. No.
Q. Then Pash said to you: "Well, now, I may be getting back to a little
systematic picture. These people whom you mention, two are down with you
now. Were they contacted by Eltenton direct?"
You answered, "No."
"PASH. Through another party?
"OPPENHBIM&B. Yes."
In other words, you told Pash that X had made these other contacts, didn't
you?
A. It seems so.
Q. That wasn't true?
A. That is right This whole thing was a pure fabrication except for the one
name Eltenton.
Q. Pash said to you, "This would not involve the people, but it would indicate
to us Eltenton's channel. We would have to know that this is definite on
Eltenton."
In other words, Pash wanted to find out the channel, didn't he?
147
A. Yes.
Q. Pash said again, "The fact is this second contact, the contact that Eltenton
had to make with these other people, is that person also a member of the
project?"
You said "No." That was correct, wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Again you said to Pash, "As I say, if the guy that was here may by now
be in some other town, and then all I would have in mind is this. I understand
this man to whom I feel a sense of responsibility, Lomanitz, and I feel it for
two reasons. One, he is doing work which he started and which he ought to
continue, and second, since I more or less made a stir about it when the question
of his induction came up. This man may have been indiscreet in circles which
would lead to trouble."
Did you say that to Pash?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you feel some responsibility for Rossi Lomanitz?
A. Evidently.
Q. Why?
A. Well, partly because I had protested his induction. Partly because he
was a student of mine. Partly because I tried to persuade him to go into secret
work.
Q. And you continue, "That is the only thing I have to say because I don't
have any donbt that people often approached him with whom he has contact —
I mean whom he sees— might feel it their duty if they got word of something
to let it go further and that is the reason I feel quite strongly that association .
with the Communist movement is not compatible with a job on a secret war
project. It is just that the two loyalties cannot go."
Doctor, who were the people that you thought Lomanitz had contact with or
whom he saw who might feel it their duty to let the word go further?
A. I had no idea.
Q. You had none then?
A. I don't believe so. I certainly have none now.
Q. You did say that you thought association with the Communist movement
was incompatible with work on a secret war project.
A. Right
Q. Pash said to you again, "Were these two people you mentioned contacted
at the same time?'
You answered, "No, they were contacted within a week of each other.
"PASH. They were contacted at two different times?
"OPPENHEIMER. Yes, but not in each other's presence."
Was that part of what you call a cock and bull story, too?
A. It certainly was.
Q. Pash said, "And then from what you first hear, there was somebody else
who probably still remains here who was contacted as well?
"OPPENHEIMER. I think that is true."
Do you recall saying something like that?
A. No, but it fits.
Q. "PASH. What I am driving at is that there was a plan at least for some
length of time to make these contacts and you may not have known all the
contacts?
"OppENHEiMBR. That is certainly true. That is why I mentioned it If I
knew all about it, then I would say forget it I thought it would be appropriate
to call to your attention the fact that these channels at one time existed."
Doctor, is it now your testimony that there was no plan that you knew of?
A. This whole thing, except for the single reference to Eltenton I believe to
be pure fabrication.
Q. In other words, your testimony now is that there was no plan that you
knew about?
A. Right I am certain of that
Mr. GRAY. Excepting the Chevalier incident
The WITNESS. Yes, yes. The only thing I mentioned here that has any truth
to it is Eltenton.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, could I Just'make a short request at this point?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
Mr. GARRISON. I appreciate the existence of the rule under which we cannot
ask for access to the file and I am not going to protest that rule. I wonder,
however, if it would not be within the proprieties of this kind of proceeding
148
when counsel reads from a transcript for us to be furnished with a copy of the
transcript as he reads from it. This, of course, is orthodox in a court of law.
I don't pretend that this is a court of law, but I do make the request because
I don't know what else is in the transcript, and if parts of it are read from, it
would seem to me that it would be proper for us to see what parts are not
read from and to look at it as a whole. I don't want to make an argument
I put the question to you.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I don't know of any rule in the court of law that
you must furnish counsel with the copy of the transcript you are reading of
at the time. I might say that my thought would be at the conclusion of this
examination to make the entire transcript a part of the record and let Mr.
Garrison read it and see it, and then if he wants to ask anything about it on
redirect, he can do so.
Mr. GBAY. I think that would be appropriate. I would like to indicate a
caution — I don't know about this particular transcript— but I am not sure
that in any case you could be able to make the whole thing a part of the record.
Mr. ROBB. I don't know, sir; this is presently marked "Secret" so I could
not make it available to Mr. Garrison at this time.
The WITNESS. But it is being read into the record.
Mr. ROBB. That is right.
Mr. GBAY. Let us clarify that point for a moment. There is a classification
officer who may at some time be present with us — I don't think he has been In
the room — but he will be presented if he does come in and sit in the hearing,
who is reading the transcript from the point of view of the classification necessi-
ties. So that all of the testimony is being read by him with the view to its treat-
ment as open or classified matter. So that all of the tesimony will be so con-
sidered. I don't think that announcement has been made, and I think Dr.
Oppenheimer and his counsel are entitled to know that
Mr. GARRISON. Then do I understand the response to be that subject to check
with the classification oflicer you propose to put the whole transcript in the
record?
Mr. ROBB. I said that was my disposition, yes, sir, but Mr. Garrison, as you
know, I am not an expert on the matters of classification myself. That is my
disposition. This is something that Dr. Oppenheimer participated in, which I
presume he knows about I see no reason why it should not be made available
to counsel. But as you know, as an amateur in the matter of classification, I
will have to talk to other people about it
Mr. GRAY. The record will reflect Mr. Garrison's request. I t™nTr the record
should also reflect that the chairman has nothing to add beyond the exchange
of conversation that has taken place here, because I don't know the answer,
frankly, Mr. Garrison. We will consider the request and meet it the best we can.
Mr. GABEISON. I would like to make one further request in the interest of
expedition, Mr. Chairman, and that is, if Mr. Robb could conveniently do so, it
would be helpful if he checked with the classification oflicer the text of any
further transcripts that he proposes to use, so that, assuming they do not contain
Government secrets that can't be revealed in the interest of Justice in this
proceeding, we might have copies of them as soon as you have finished, or I would
prefer while you were reading from them, because there has been, and I assume
will continue to be, some time lag in the furnishing of transcripts to us. We have
not yet had even the first day's transcript, which it is hard for me to believe
could have contained anything of a classified nature and could have been read
over rather shortly. I am not being querulous, Mr. Chairman, or complaining,
but I Just want to point it out
Mr. GRAY. I understand.
Mr. ROBB. May I proceed, sir?
Mr. GBAY. Yes.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Doctor, one further item from the Pash interview. You said to Colonel
Pash, according to this transcript, or Colonel Pash said to you, "I can see that
we are going to have to spend a lot of time and effort which we ordinarily would
not in trying to
"OPPENHEIMER: Well
"PASH. In trying to run him down before we even go on this.
"OPENHETMEB. You better check up on the consulate because that is the only
one that Eltenton contacted and without that contact, he would be inefficient
and that would be my
"PASH. You say this man is not employed in the consulate?
149
"OPPEWHEIMEB. Eltenton?
"PASH. No, this man.
"OPPENHEIMER. I have never been introduced to him.
"PASH. Have you ever heard his name mentioned?
"OPPENHEIMER. I have never heard his name mentioned but I have been
given to understand that he is attached to the consulate. But isn't it common
practice for a consulate or legation to have someone attached to them?
"PASH. Yes. Military attache's are really run efficiently."
Dr. Oppenheimer, assuming that, don't you think you told a story in great
detail that was fabricated?
A. I certainly did.
Q. Why did you go into such great circumstantial detail about this thing if you
were telling a cock and bull story?
A. I fear that this whole thing is a piece of idiocy. I am afraid I can't explain
why there was a consul, why there was microfilm, why there were three people on
the project, why two of them were at Los Alamos. All of them seems wholly
false to me.
Q. You will agree, would you not, sir, that if the story you told to Colonel
Pash was true, it made things look very bad for Mr. Chevalier?
A. For anyone involved in it, yes, sir.
Q. Including you?
A. Bight
Q. Isn't it a fair statement today, Dr. Oppenheimer, that according to your
testimony now you told not one lie to Colonel Pash, but a whole fabrication and
tissue of lies?
A. Bight
Q. In great circumstantial detail, is that correct?
A. Bight
Q. Doctor, I would like to refer you again to your answer on page 21, in which
you referred to David Bohm, and said that you were much surprised that you
heard there was much objection to his transfer on security grounds. I believe
we had some talk about that this morning.
A. We did.
Q. I want to read to you from a memorandum written by then Major DeSilva
on March 22, 1944 in which he started off— this is file A— March 21, 1944, "Dr.
Oppenheimer asked through his office for the purpose of relating certain inci-
dents which took place at Berkeley, Calif., during Dr. Oppenheimer's recent
visit there." It goes on to various matters and finally it comes to this :
"4. Oppenheimer went on to say that just as he was preparing to leave his
hotel at Berkeley on his return trip, David Joseph Bohm came to see him. Bohm
inquired about the possibilities of his being transferred to project Y on a perma-
nent basis, stating that he had a 'strange feeling of insecurity* in his present
surroundings. Oppenheimer stated he did not commit himself to Bohm but told
him that he would let Bohm know if an opportunity were open at this project,
and that if Bohm did not hear from Oppenheimer he should assume that such
an arrangement was not workable and to forget the matter. Oppenheimer asked
the undersigned if he would have objections to Bohm coming to project Y. The
undersigned answered yes. Oppenheimer agreed and said the matter was there-
fore dosed."
Does that memorandum refresh your recollection about your conversation with
DeSilva?
A. There were two incidents. One was in March 1943 that I described this
morning.
Q. Yes.
A. This is in March 1944, a year later, I take it.
Q. Yes.
A. I gather this is no more than my having been asked by Bohm could he
come, my checking to see whether the objections to him still obtained.
Q. I see.
A. I think that is all.
Q. Was there any surprise, as you recall looking back, when you were told by
DeSilva that the objection still obtained?
A. No.
Q. And the objections were what, now?
A. What I was told was that Bohm had relatives in Nazi Germany.
Q. Do you recall the circumstances of Benin's coming to you at your hotel?
^A. I did not recall them.
Q. Do you now?
150
A. No, but
Q. You don't know whether he came to yon in your room or where?
A. I don't know whether it was in the room or the lobby.
Q. Project Y was Los Alamos?
A. That is right
Q. Let me see if I can refresh your recollection about the circumstances of
Bohm coming to you. I will read you from a report of a surveillance of J. R.
Oppenheimer, March 16, 1944, in Berkeley, Calif. :
"6:05 p. m. Subject and Frank left hotel."
That would be your brother?
A. Right.
Q. "And walked up and down Telegraph Avenue in front of the hotel. Both
engaged in earnest conversation with each other.
"6:15 p. m. David Bohm walked south on Telegraph Avenue and met the
Oppenheimers in front of the hotel. J. R. Oppenheimer and Bohm engaged in
conversation for 5 minutes but Prank stood about 10 feet away from them and
did not participate in the conversation."
Does that help to refresh your recollection?
A. No. I don't remember the incident I don't see any reason to doubt it
Q. Were you waiting for Bohm on the sidewalk there?
A. Since I don't remember the thing, I could not remember that I don't know
whether this was an appointment, an accident, or what
Q. I might read you the next item :
"6 :20 p. m. Subject and Frank entered car, license 53692, with Oppenheimers'
luggage and drove to Fisherman's Wharf, San Francisco."
Would that indicate to you that you had waited for Bohm on the sidewalk?
A. It suggests it but I don't want to remember more than I do remember.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. I don't want you to, Doctor. Let me read to you from a memorandum from
Captain DeSilva at that time— he must have been promoted— dated January 6,
1944:
"Subject, DSM conversation with J. R. Oppenheimer. Capt H. K. Calvert,
United States Engineers Office, Post Office Box 1111, Knoxville, Tenn.
"1. During a recent conversation with Dr. Oppenheimer he brought up the
subject of a situation at Berkeley, Calif. A general discussion followed, touch-
ing on such subjects as of AEC which Oppenheimer deplored, the Bltenton inci-
dent which he thought was reprehensible, and the contacts made by the professor
which contacts he believed to be innocent During the course of the conversa-
tion which took place en route to Santa Fe, Oppenheimer touched on the subject of
what persons at Berkeley were in his opinion truly dangerous. He named David
Joseph Bohm and Bernard Peters as being so. Oppenheimer stated, however,
that somehow he did not believe that Bonm's temperament and personality were
those of a dangerous person and implied that his dangerousness lay in the possi-
bility of his being influenced by others. Peters, on the other hand, he described
as a 'crazy person' and one whose actions would be unpredictable. He described
Peters as being 'quite a Red' and stated that his background was filled with in-
cidents which indicated his tendency toward direct action."
Do you recall that conversation?
A. I recall the conversation, though I don't recall these as accurate words. I
remember only being asked by DeSilva, among these people, and I think there
were four, which do you thing is the most dangerous, and saying Peters.
Q. Did you mention Bohm as truly dangerous?
A. I am quite certain I didn't I think DeSilva mentioned Bohm, Weinberg
and somebody else and Peters.
Q. You say you are quite sure you did not mention Bohm as dangerous?
A. I think so.
Q. You think you did?
A. I did not I certainly never thought of Mm that way.
Q. You did not think of Mm as dangerous. If you had, you would not have
spoken to DeSilva in March about bringing him to Y, would you?
A. I should hope not I think there is a garble in this and also the whole
tone is not I believe accurate. The conversation was initiated by DeSilva. He
presented me with a list of names. I don't believe this is something that I
dredged up for Mm.
Q. What did you know of Bohm's background?
A. I don't think I know anything about it
Q. Nothing?
151
A. I have even forgotten where he comes from. I think I did not that "Was
it Pennsylvania?
Q. There was nothing in Bohm's background to cause you to say to DeSilva that
Bohm was a dangerous person?
A. No. My strong recollection is that I couldn't have said that, and didn't
think so.
Q. You could not be mistaken about that?
A. I could be mistaken about almost anything, but this does not fit
Q. But you had asked General Groves to transfer Bohm to Los Alamos.
A. In March of 1943, yes, before that.
Q. How long had you known Bohm? When did you first meet him?
A. I met him when he came as a graduate student to the department. I have
forgotten when that was. A couple of years before 1943, probably.
Q. Where. is he now, do you know?
A. Yes. He is in Sao Paulo, Brazil.
Q. He taught for a while at Princeton?
A. At the university, yes.
Q. You helped him to get his Job there, didn't you?
A. I think I did.
Q. When?
A. 1946 or 1947.
Q. What Job did he have there?
A. He was assistant professor of physics.
Q. Did you see him frequently when he was there?
A. He came to seminars. I saw him infrequently otherwise.
Q. Did you see him socially?
A. Infrequently. I went to a farewell party that Professor Wigner gave for
him.
Q. When was that?
A. Just before he left for Brazil, probably 1949 or 1950.
Q. Do you recall in May 1949 when Bohm testified before the House com-
mittee here?
A. Yes. I remember meeting him on the street with Weinberg and Whitman
and a couple of other people.
Q. What street?
A. Main street of Princeton, Nassau Street.
Q. Weinberg was up there?
A. He was up there.
Q. Was that before he testified?
A. Oh, no, Weinberg was not there. I am sorry. Lomanitz and Bohm were
there.
Q. Was that before they testified?
A. Yes, I think so.
Q. Did you discuss with them or either of them what their testimony might be?
A. I said they should tell the truth.
Q. What did they say?
A. They said "We won't lie."
Q. Did you discuss with them whether they would claim their constitutional
privilege?
A. No.
Q. You know now they did claim their constitutional privilege?
A. Yes, but I didn't know that at the time. I didn't know whether they knew
it. This was a 2 minute brush on the street
Q. Did they ask you for any advice about testifying?
A. No.
Q. Did they ask you to recommend counsel to them?
A. I am sure not. '
Q. Did you recommend counsel to them?
A. I would have if they asked me.
Q. Who would you have recommended?
A. I am foggy on this. I might have recommended Durr, but this is not a'
recollection; it is a conjecture.
Q. Mr. Durr did in fact represent them, didn't he?
A. Bight I. don't know that
Q. You first said "Right" How did you know that? Did yon hear he. did?
A. It was certainly in the record.
Q. Did yon read the record?
A. Yes.
152
Q. When?
A. Sometime afterward; I don't know.
Q. Why?
A. I was involved in the same investigation.
Q. You knew that they refused to answer upon the grounds of possible self-
incrimination when asked about their Communist Party membership and
activities.
A. I did, that is right
Q. And espionage activities.
A. Did they refuse to answer about espionage, too?
Q. Doctor, I don't have it before me so I won't make a categorical answer.
You probably know it better than I do.
A. I am not sure.
Q. Did you see Bohm after he testified?
A. I would assume so, since he came back to Princeton.
Q. How long after he testified was the farewell party?
A. Quite a long while.
Q. How long?
A. I think he spent a whole year at Princeton.
Q. Do you recall who else was at the party?
A. No, I remember the host and I remember that most of the physicists in the
physics department were invited.
Q. Who was the host?
A. Eugene Wigner.
Q. Was Bohn fired at Princeton?
A. No, his contract was lapsed. It was not renewed.
Q. Did you assist him to get his job in Brazil?
A. I don't believe I had anything to do with that.
Q. Did you write him a letter of recommendation?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Would you think about that a minute?
A. It won't do any good.
Q. Would you have written him one if he had asked?
A. I am quite sure I would have written a letter of recommendation about
his physics.
Q. Do you know how he did get his job in Brazil?
A. No.
Q. Do you know anybody in Brazil who is a physicist?
A. Caesar Lattes.
Q. Doctor, let me go back a moment. I am sorry I overlooked something.
Did there finally come a time whein you did disclose the identity of Pro-
fessor X?
A. Yes.
Q. When was that?
A. I don't remember when. In late summer or fall of 1943, 1 should think, at
Los Alamos.
Mr. GRAY. May I in the interest of having the record perfectly straight, there
is a Professor X who has been in the newspapers and I Wtik that ultimately
turned out to be a name that does appear in this record.
Mr. BOBB. Yes, I am sorry.
Mr. GRAY. So let us make it clear when Dr. Oppenheimer is asked about dis-
closing the identity of Professor X, actually in this case we are talking about Dr.
Chevalier.
Mr. ROBB. Yes, we agreed that we would refer to him as X. I am talking about
Dr, Chevalier.
Mr. GBAY. I am sorry. I guess it was Scientist X, but in any event, let us
make it clear what we are talking about.
Mr. ROBB. I think your point is well taken.
By Mr. BOBB.
Q. There came a time at. last when you did disclose that Haakon Chevalier
was the intermediary.
A. Right.
Q. I find in the file, Doctor, a telegram signed, "Nichols" and addressed to the
area engineer, University of California, Berkeley, Calif., attention Lt I<yle
Johnson, reading as follows :
"Lansdale advises that according to Oppenheimer professor contact of Eltenton
is Haakon Chevalier. RBF, BIDMMI-34. Classified secret. Oppenheimer states
153
in his opinion Chevalier engaged in no further activity other than three original
attempts."
That wire is dated December 13, 1943. Would it be about December 13, 1943,
that you disclosed the identity of Dr. Chevalier?
A. I thought it was earlier. It could have been that late. I thought it was
considerably earlier.
Q. To whom did you make that disclosure?
A. To General Groves.
Q. And under what circumstances?
A. We talked in his room in Los Alamos
Q. All right.
A. He told me that he simply had to know, and I surely told him that the
story I told Pash was a cock and bull story at that time. That there were no
three people.
Q. In other words, you lied to Groves, too?
A. No, I told him that the story I told Pash was a cock and bull story.
Q. You told Groves that you had told Pash a cock and bull story?
A. I am quite certain about that.
Q. You are sure about that?
A. Yes.
Q. You notice in this wire from General Nichols
A. There are still the three people.
Q. You are still talking about the three people. I notice in the file of the
same day General Nichols wired the Commanding Officer, United States Engineer
Office, Santa Fe, New Mex., attention, Captain DeSilva. "Haakon Chevalier to
be reported by Oppenheimer to be professor at RadLab who made three contacts
for Eltenton. Classified secret. Oppenheimer believed Chevalier engaged in no
further activity other than three original attempts."
On December 12
Mr. GARRISON. That last wire was from whom?
Mr. ROBB. Nichols. On December 12, 1943, a wire to Capt. H. K. Calvert,
Clinton Engineer Work, Clinton, Tenn. What was that, Oak Ridge?
The WITNESS. Yes.
By Mr. ROBB.
Q. "According to Oppenheimer professor contact of Eltenton is Haakon Cheva-
lier. Oppy states in his opinion beyond original three attempts Chevalier engaged
in no further activity. From Lansdale. DeSilva and Johnson to be notified
by you."
Does that indicate to you that you told General Groves that there weren't three
contacts?
A. Certainly to the contrary. I am fairly clear.
Q. You think General Groves did tell Colonel Nichols and Colonel Lansdale
your story was cock and bull?
A. I find that hard to believe.
Q. So do I. Doctor, may we again refer to your answer, please, sir. On
page 4: "In the spring of 1936, I had been introduced by a friend to Jean
Tatlock, the daughter of a noted professor of English at the university, and
in the autumn I began to court her, and we grew close to each other. We were
at least twice close enough to marriage to think of ourselves as engaged. Be-
tween 1939 and her death in 1944, I saw her very rarely. She told me
about her Communist Party memberships. They were on-again, off-again
affairs and never seemed to provide for her what she was seeking. I do not
believe that her interests were really political. She was a person of deep
religious feeling. She loved this country, its people, and its life. She was, as
it turned out, a friend of many fellow travelers and Communists, a number of
whom I later was to become acquainted with."
Doctor, between 1939 and 1944, as I understand it, your acquaintance with
Miss Tatlock was fairly casual; is that right?
A. Our meetings were rare. I do not think it would be right to say that our
acquaintance was casual. We had been very much involved with one another,
and there was still very deep feeling when we saw each other.
Q. How many times would you say you saw her between 1939 and 1944?
A. That is 5 years. Would 10 times be a good guess?
Q. What were the occasions for your seeing her?
A. Of course, sometimes we saw each other socially with other people. I
remember visiting her around New Year's of 1941.
Q. Where?
154
A. I went to her house or to the hospital, I don't know which, and we went
out for a drink at the Top of the Mark. I remember that she came more than
once to visit our home in Berkeley.
Q. Tou and Mrs. Oppenheimer?
A. Bight. Her father lived around the corner not far from us in Berkeley.
I visited her there once. I visited her, as I think I said earlier, in June or July
of 1943.
Q. I believe you said in connection with that that you had to see her.
A. Yes.
Q. Why did you have to see her?
A. She had indicated a great desire to see me before we left. At that time
I couldn't go. For one thing, I wasn't supposed to say where we were going
or anything. I felt that she had to see me. She was undergoing psychiatric
treatment. She was extremely unhappy.
Q. Did you find out why she had to see you?
A. Because she was still in love with me.
Q. Where did you see her?
A. At her home.
Q. Where was that?
A. On Telegraph Hill.
Q. When did you see her after that?
A. She took me to the airport, and I never saw her again.
Q. That was 1943?
A. Yes.
Q. Was she a Communist at that time?
A. We didn't even talk about it I doubt it.
Q. You have said in your answer that you knew she had been a Communist?
A. Yes. I knew that in the f all of 1937.
Q. Was there any reason for you to believe that she wasn't still a Communist
in 1943?
A. No.
Q. Pardon?
A. There wasn't, except that I have stated in general terms what I thought
and think of her relations with the Communist Party. I do not know what she
was doing in 1943.
Q. You have no reason to believe she wasn't a Communist, do you?
A. No.
Q. You spent the night with her, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. That is when you were working on a secret war project?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you think that consistent with good security?
A. It was, as a matter of fact. Not a word— it was not good practice.
Q. Didn't you think that put you in a rather difficult position had she been
the kind of Communist that you have described her or talk about this morning?
A. Oh, but she wasn't.
Q. How did you know?
A. .1 knew her.
Q. You have told us this morning that you thought that at times social
contacts with Communists on the part of one working on a secret war project was
dangerous.
A. Could conceivably be.
Q. You didn't think that spending a night with a dedicated Communist
A. I don't believe she was a dedicated Communist.
Q. You don't?
A. No.
Q. Did she go over to Spain?
A. No.
Q. Ever?
A. Not during the time I knew her.
Q. What was the occasion of her telling you about her Communist Party mem-
bership?
A, She would talk about herself rather freely, and this was one aspect of her
life. She would tell me that she had been with a medical unit — I am making it
up—with some kind of a unit, and it had been frustrating.
Q. What do you mean, you are making It up?
A. I mean I don't remember what kind of a unit, but she had been with some
sort of a Communist unit and had left it. It had been a waste of time, and so on.
156
Q. By a medical unit, you mean a medical cell?
A. That is what I would have meant.
Q. You say here she was as it turned out a friend of many fellow travelers
and Communists. Who were they?
A. Well, Addis was a friend of hers. Lambert was a friend of hers.
Q. Doctor, would you break them down? Would you tell us who the Com-
munists were and who the fellow travelers were?
A. Lambert was a Communist. Addis is reported to be a Communist in the
Commission's letter. I did not know whether he was a member of the party
or not
Q. You knew he was very close, didn't you?
A. Yes. Among fellow travelers, Chevalier. Among Communists or probable
Communists, a man and his wife who wrote for the People's World.
Q. Who were they?
A. John Pitman and his wife. A lawyer called Aubrey Grossman, his wife
she had known.
Q. Was she a Communist?
A. I don't know in the sense of party membership.
Q. But very close.
A. Close. Is the list long enough?
Q. I want you to give the ones you remember, Doctor. I assume when you
wrote this sentence that she was, as it turned out, a friend of many fellow
travelers and Communists, that you had people in mind.
A. I have gone over some of those I had in mind.
Q. Have you any more in mind?
A. There was another couple; yes. A girl called Edith Arnstein.
Q. Was she a Communist?
A. I believe so ; yes.
Q. Anybody else?
A. I am sure there were more people.
Q. When did you first meet this group of Communists and fellow travelers
who were friends of Miss Tatlock?
A. That came on gradually during 1037, maybe late 1936, not all at once.
Q. But they continued to be your friends?
A. Some of them.
Q. Chevalier still is your friend?
A. Chevalier is my friend.
Q. Addis was your friend until he died?
A, No. We had essentially, I think, no relations after the war.
Q. When did he die?
A. In 1950 or 1951.
Q. Do you recall, when you were interviewed by the FBI in 1950, yon were
asked about Dr. Addis?
A. Yes.
Q. And you declined to discuss Dr. Addis?
A. Yes.
Q. You said he was dead and couldn't defend himself.
A. I did say that.
Q. What did you think he had to defend himself against?
A. Being close to the Communist Party.
Q. Didn't you continue to see Dr. Addis periodically until he died.
A. No.
Q But you say in your answer he did become a very close friend of yours.
A. Close would be wrong, I am sure. He became a good friend, I think I said.
Q. A friend.
A. A friend ; that is more like it, I imagine.
Q. At least he was enough of a friend so you wouldn't discuss him witn tne
FBI ; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. That was in 1950?
A. I asked if it were important, and they thought not.
Q. They asked you about him, though, didn't they?
A. They were asking about me.
Q. Didn't they also ask about your friends?
Q" You ^ to your answer at page 5, in describing your friendship with Miss
Tattock and meeting people through her, "I liked the new sense of companion-
156
ship." Who were the people whose companionship you enjoyed that you met
through Miss Tatlock, the people that you just mentioned?
A. Oh, no. People who were in the teachers union, people in Spanish causes,
great masses of people, in addition to some of those I just mentioned.
Q. Was the teachers union a Communist organization?
A. I think that there were Communists in it. I know there were some.
Q. Who were they?
A. Kenneth May, and I believe his first wife.
Q. Who else?
A. I have no certain knowledge of anyone else.
Q. You say in your answer at page 6, "I was invited to help establish the
teachers union, which included faculty and teaching assistants in the univer-
sity and schoolteachers of the East Bay." Who invited you ?
A. We invited ourselves, I guess. A group of people from the faculty talked
about it arid met, and we had a lunch at the Faculty Club or some place and
decided to do it. I don't know at whose initiative this was caused.
Q. About when was that, Doctor?
A. 1937 would be a fair guess.
Q. How long did you stay in that union?
A. Until 1941 or, I think, early 1941.
Q. Did you make a formal resignation?
A. No. That chapter of the union dissolved, and with its dissolution
Q. Was Kenneth May an officer in the union?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. Do you recall who the officers were during your tenure as recording secre-
tary?
A. I will remember some of them.
Q. Who?
A. Chevalier was president at one time. Margaret Ellis was president at
one time.
Q. Was she a Communist?
A. I don't know.
Q. Was she close to it?
A. I think so. The reason I think so is that I had a letter from her about the
Rosenberg affair not long ago.
Q. You mean asking your support?
A. Something like that.
Q. For the Rosenbergs?
A. Yes.
Q. That indicates to you that she is a Communist sympathizer, at least?
A. That is right
Q. Who else among the officers?
A. A man called Fontenrose; Joe is the first name
Q. Was he a Communist sympathizer?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Who else?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Kenneth May was a Communist functionary in Alameda County, was he
not?
A. That was later.
Q. Later?
A. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. Are you going to ask anything more about the teachers organiza-
tion?
Mr. ROBB. I didn't have any questions in mind.
Mr. GRAY. I would just ask whether the dissolution related to any interna-
tional event.
The WITNESS. The miserable thing fell apart because it grew into a debating
society between the anti-interventionists and the interventionists, which had
even less to do with teachers' welfare than what we had been doing before. I
was strongly in favor of letting it collapse. It is my recollection that was not
the pro-Communist view at that time, that they wanted it to continue.
By Mr. ROBB.
Q. Yon say in your answer on page 5 : "I contributed to the strike fund of
one of the major strikes of Bridges' union."
Do you recall about when that was, Doctor?
A. Could it have been 1938?
157
Q. I don't know.
A. Well, it couldn't have been before 1936, because I just didn't know or do
anything of that kind before late 1936. It was probably 1938, 1937 or 1938.
Q. Do you recall about how much you gave?
A. I can guess.
Q. How much?
A. About ?100.
Q. In cash?
A. I think so.
Q. Do you recall through whom you made that contribution?
A. I went to the wicket, the union wicket
Q. Did you understand that Bridges was a Communist?
A. No, I understood to the contrary. I may have been fooled.
Q. You subscribed to the People's World, you say. When did you do that?
A. I don't recollect. It was for several years.
Q. How long did that subscription continue?
A. I would say for several years.
Q. Can you tell us about when it expired?
A. I can't of my own knowledge : no.
Q. Was it after you joined the project?
A. Since I don't know when it was, I can't answer that question.
Q. That was the west coast Communist newspaper; wasn't it?
A. That is right
Q. Did you have that paper sent to you at your house?
A. Yes. I don't know whether I had it sent but anyway it came.
Q. And you paid for it?
A. Again I don't know whether I paid for it or whether it was distributed.
I think I paid for it.
Q. Do you recall whether you canceled your subscription or whether you just
let it expire or what?
A. I don't recall. I don't believe I canceled the subscription.
Q. Why did you subscribe to the People's World?
A. Well, I guess I took an interest in this formulation of issues; perhaps
somebody asked me to.
Q. You read it, I take it?
A. Not fervently. It taught me to read— well
Mr. GRAY. Would you repeat that?
The WITNESS. It was an interjection that was unnecessary.
Mr. GRAY. Excuse me.
By Mr. ROBS:
Q. You say "I contributed to the various committees and organizations which
were intended to help the Spanish loyalist cause." What were they?
A. Wasn't there a North American committee?
Q. I don't know, Doctor ; I am asking you.
A. I think there was a North American committee. There was another one.
I don't know its name.
Q. Were those contributions fairly substantial?
A. I would think they were.
Q. What amounts would you say?
A. In the hundred dollar range.
Q. In cash?
A. Pardon me?
Q. In cash?
A. I would think so.
Q. I will come back to that in a minute.
You say, "I also began to take part in the management of the physics depart-
ment, the selection of courses and the awarding of fellowships."
What do you mean by taking part in the awarding of fellowships, Doctor?
A. I was named to the graduate council of the university. The graduate
council had a committee on graduate fellowships, and I served on that This
has nothing to do with communism.
Q. Were any fellowships awarded to any of your students?
A. I would hope so.
Q. Do you know whether or not Lomanitz or Bohm or Weinberg or Fred Mann
had a fellowship?
A. My recollection is that they did not
158
Q. In all events, if they did, yon didn't have any thing to do with it?
A. No, I think it was off the graduate council at that later date.
Q. You say on page 6: "I also became involved in other organizations. For
perhaps a year I was a member of the Western Council of the Consumers
Union."
Who composed the Western Council of the Consumers Union?
A. Chairman and the man I knew best was Robert Bradley, a professor of
economics at the university.
Q. Was he a Communist sympathizer?
A. No, I don't think so. His wife was Mildred Eddy, and the two of them
were what made this. They had enthusiasm for this.
Q. Did they recruit to it? ,,.«.. „
A. Yes, they asked me to come. It was a very inappropriate thing for me
to do. I know nothing about the business.
Q. Who else was in the council?
A. I remember only one other man, and that is a man named Folkoff, who was
not Isaak Folkoff.
Q. That is Richard Folkoff.
A. That could be.
Q. Was he a Communist?
A. I thought not, but I could be wrong.
Q. Anybody else?
A. There were other people, and I have forgotten them.
Q. What year was that that you were a member of that?
A. It says in my PSQ; I am afraid I can't improve on that. Could it have
been 1937?
Mr. GABBISOK. I think the biography will show, the one we submitted to you.
ByMr.BoBB:
Q. "I joined the American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom
in 1987."
Did you also serve on the national executive committee of that organization?
A. The letterhead says so. I didn't meet with them.
Q. Do you know how you happened to get on the letterhead?
A. I supposed I accepted membership. I have no records of this except my
own record— except what I said about it in the personal security questionnaire.
Mr. GBAY. 1938 is shown here as the date of the Consumers Union, 1938 to
1939.
Mr. BOBB. Yes.
By Mr. Boss:
Q. When did you serve on the executive committee of the American Committee
for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom?
A. I would assume that my dates 1937 to whatever it was that I gave in the
personnel security questionnaire refer to that I have no other record.
Mr. GABBISON. Again I think the biography may show that.
Mr. GRAY. It shows 1937 in the biography.
Mr. BOBB. The copy of the biography does not show a date when you ceased
to be a member of that organization. When was it?
The WITNESS. I have no recollection of ceasing to be. It played no part in
my life.
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. You mean yon might still be a member of it?
A. I haven't heard from them for an awful long time.
Q. Your PSQ lists the American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual
Freedom, 1937-, with an asterisk being at the foot of the page where you say,
"It includes all organizations to which I now belong." So you were still a mem-
ber in 1942 ; were you not?
A. Right.
Q. You have no idea how long after that you continued to be a member?
A. My membership involved no attendance in meetings, no activities that I
could recall, and I certainly was not very active at Los Alamos.
Q. I see. You say, talking about your PSQ on page 6, "I say on that ques-
tionnaire, that did not include sponsorships." What is a sponsorship?
A. I am charged with a sponsor of this Friends of the Chinese People. I don't
know what it means, but I think it means that you lend your name to something.
I am sure that I lent my name to 1 or 2 parties or bazaars for Spanish war or
159
Spanish relief. I had no record of these and no good memory of them when I
filled out my PSQ.
Q. A sponsorship was just something you lent your name, but did not become
a formal member?
A. Yes. Maybe it was something you couldn't be a member of.
Q. Were there any other things that you think of now that you sponsored as
distinguished from joining?
A. No, I can't.
Q. Now, coming to your questionnaire again, page 7, "The statement is at-
tributed to me that while I was not a Communist, I'd probably belonged to every
Communist-front organization on the west coast and had signed many petitions in
which Communists were interested.
"I do not recall this statement nor to whom I might have made it, nor the
circumstances. The quotation is not true. It seems clear to me that if I said
anything along the lines quoted, it was a half jocular overstatement."
Assuming that it was a Jocular overstatement, Doctor, had you belonged to
any Communist-front organizations that you can think of?
A. We have just been over the Committee on Democracy and Intellectual
Freedom, which has been so designated; Consumers Union which has been so
designated ; the Teachers Union, of which it could be so designated, I think. I
think we have been over the list.
Q. That is what you had in mind ? Had you signed any petitions ?
A. I don't remember signing petitions. I think I may have or I would have
signed petitions in the early days with regard to lifting the embargo on arms
to Spain, or such a matter, but this is conjecture and not memory.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I have just a couple of more questions.
Mr. OKAY. Very well.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, I would like to read to you from a memorandum dated September
14, 1943, memorandum for the file.
"Subject: Discussion by General Groves and Dr. Oppenheimer, signed John
Lansdale, Jr., Lt. Col., Field Artillery, Chief Review Branch, CIGMIS, reading
as follows :
"During a recent train ride between Cheyenne and Chicago, General Groves
and Dr. Oppenheimer had a long discussion which covered in substance the fol-
lowing matters :
"(f) Oppenheimer categorically stated that he himself was not a Communist
and never had been, but stated that he had probably belonged to every Com-
munist-front organization on the west coast and signed many petitions con-
cerning matters in which Communists were interested."
Did you make such a statement to General Groves as reflected in this
memorandum from Colonel Lansdale?
A. I remember the trip from Cheyenne to Chicago. I do not remember making
the statement. I see no reason to deny it
Q. Do you think if you did make it, you were just joking with General Groves?
A. I am pretty sure I was.
Q. Do you think General Groves misunderstood you maybe?
A. Maybe he didn't. Maybe in transmission it got garbled. I have no way of
knowing.
Q. In that same paragraph while I am reading :
"He (meaning you) stated while he did not know, he believed his brother
Frank Oppenheimer had at one time been a member of the Communist Party,
but that he did not believe that Frank had had any connections with the party
for some time."
Do you recall that statement?
A. I don't recall it I did believe at that time that my brother had been out
of the party for some time.
Q. Did you tell General Groves that while you did not know, you believed
that your brother had at one time been a member of the party?
A. I should not have told him that
Q. Did you tell him that?
A. I don't know.
Q. But you might have?
A. I should not have.
Q. If you did say that to General Greves, it was not strictly true?
A. No, I did know.
808318—64 11
160
Q. Because you knew he had been a member.
A. I did know it.
Q. Yes, sir. Would you now deny that you made that statement to General
Groves?
A. Oh, I couldn't
Q. In other words, you might have told General Groves something that was not
true?
A. Well, I hope I didn't
Q. You might have; is that correct?
A. I hope I didn't
Q. But might have ; might you not?
A. Obviously I might have.
Mr. ROBB. It is half past four, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. All right I should like to say before we recess that one thing I
neglected to say with respect to the transcript which we discussed earlier. In
view of the fact, and especially referring now to the transcript of the first day,
since there are so many references to other agencies, particularly the Defense
Department, I am informed that it has been necessary to check not only with the
security officers of the Commission, but with other Departments which in part
explains the delay. There is no design, Mr. Garrison.
Mr. GABBISON. I am sure of that.
Mr. GRAY. We will meet again at 9 : 30.
(Thereupon at 4 : 30 p. m., a recess was taken until Thursday, April 15, 1954,
at 9:30 a. m.)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER OP J. EGBERT OPPEKHEIMER
ATOMIC
BCTLDIXG T-3, ROOM 2022,
Washington, D. <7., April 15, 1954..
The above entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to recess,
before the board, at 9 : 30 a. m.
Personnel Security Board : Mr. Gordon Gray, chairman; Dr. Ward
V. Evans, member ;and Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Eoger J&obb, and C. A. Eolander, Jr., counsel for the
board; J. Eobert Oppenheimer, Lloyd K. Garrison, Samuel J. Silver-
man, and Allen B. Ecker, counsel for J. Eobert Oppenheimer, and
Herbert S. Marks, cocounsel for J. Eobert Oppenheimer.
(161)
PROCEEDINGS
Mr. GRAY. The presentation will begin. I believe that General Groves is
waiting.
General Groves, I should like to ask you whether you would like to testify under
oath. You are not required to do so.
General GBOVES. Whichever you prefer. It makes no difference to me.
Mr. GRAY. It is my guess that most everyone who appears will be testifying
under oath.
General GBOVES. It makes no difference in my testimony, but I would be very
glad to.
Mr. GBAY. What are your initials?
General GBOVES. Leslie R.
Mr. GRAY. Will you raise you right hand. Do you, Leslie R. Groves, swear that
the testimony you are to give the board shall be the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
General GROVES. I do.
Whereupon, Leslie R. Groves, was called as a witness, and having been first duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. General Groves, you are now vice president in charge of advance scientific
research at Remington Band?
A. No, I am not longer in charge of research. I am a vice president and
director of Remington Rand.
Q. During the war, you headed the Manhattan Project in complete charge and
development planning for use of the atomic bomb?
A. That is correct.
Q. During the postwar period you were Commanding General of the Armed
Forces Special Weapons Project, 1947 to 1948?
A. Yes. My charge of the atomic work ended on the 1st of January 1947.
I think you also should add that during the period from about March of 1947
until my retirement on the 29th of February 1948, 1 was a member of the Military
Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission.
Q. You appointed Dr. Oppenheimer to be the director of the work at Los
Alamos?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You devolved great responsibility upon him?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you Just say a word about the nature of that responsibility?
A. Complete responsibility for the operation of Los Alamos Laboratory, the
mission of which was to carry on the research necessary to develop the design
of a bomb, to develop the probabilities of whether a bomb was possible, and
if the design would be feasible, and to develop what the power of the bomb
would be. That was so that we would know at what altitude the bomb should
be exploded.
Mr. GRAY. General, may I interrupt? I am sorry. If it becomes necessary .
in the course of your testimony to refer to any restricted data, I would appreciate *
your letting me know in advance that you are about to do so.
The WITNESS. All right, sir.
Not only design and make these experimental tests, but to actually produce
the bombs which we expected to use in the war. It should be understood that
as early— certainly before Yalta, because at that time I so informed President
Roosevelt, or just before Yalta— I had concluded that we only needed two bombs
to end the war.
Of course, I also proceeded on the theory that I might be wrong. For that
reason we decided, or I decided that we would construct the actual bombs at
Los Alamos. That included as matters developed the final purification of
Plutonium at Los Alamos.
(163)
164
Possibly — I am not certain — any final purification of TJ-235 that might be
necessary.
In addition to that, as time went on throughout the project, I consulted with
Dr. Oppenheimer frequently as to other problems with which I was faced. I
think one of those is of such importance that it might be well to explain it to
give a picture of the responsibilities which you might say he carried.
There was a very serious problem as to the purification of U-235. While
this is not secret in any way, I would rather not have it talked about by anyone
here, because it reflects to some extent on the wisdom of another scientist.
Mr. GRAY. There are no security implications involved?
The WITNESS. No security whatsoever. I will watch out for that. I have been
watching out for that for so many years I don't think I will slip.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you, sir.
The WITNESS. There was a great question as to the electromagnetic process-
how pure did the U-235 have to be to have an explosion. We could get no advice
on that matter from the people that were responsible because nobody knew.
All that was known was that the natural state of 0.707 percent of U-235 in
uranium that it did not explode.
I felt * * * that we would have to have a * * * high * * * percentage
of purity in order to have an explosive. Dr. Oppenheimer was used by me
as my adviser on that, not to tell me what to do, but to confirm my opinion.
I think it is important for an understanding of the situation as it existed
during the war to realize that when I made scientific decisions — in case there
are any questions that come in on that— that outside of not knowing all
the theories of nuclear physics, which I did not, nobody else knew anything
either. They had lots of theories but they didn't know anything. We didn't
know whether plutonium was a gas, solid, or electric. We didn't even know
that plutonium existed, although Seaborg, I believe it was, claimed to have seen
evidences of it in the cyclotron.
We didn't know what any of the constants that were so vital were. We
didn't know whether it could be made to explode. We didn't know what the
reproductive factor was for plutonium or uranium 235. We were groping entirely
in the dark. That is the reason that General Nichols and myself were able,
I think, to make intelligent scientific decisions, because we knew just as much as
everybody else. We came up through the kindergarten with them. While they
could put elaborate equations on the board, which we might not be able to
follow in their entirety, when it came to what was so and what was probably
so, we knew just about as much as they did. So when I say that we were
responsible for the scientific decisions, I am not saying that we were extremely
able nuclear physicists, because actually we were not We were what might
be termed "thoroughly practical nuclear physicists".
As a result of this experience, maybe because Dr. Oppenheimer agreed with
me and particularly because of other questions that were raised, I came to
depend upon him tremendously for scientific advice on the rest of the project,
although I made no effort to break down my compartmentalization. As you
know, compartmentalization of information was my chief guard against infor-
mation passing. It was something that I insisted on to the limit of my capacity.
It was something that everybody was trying to break down within the project.
I did not bring Dr. Oppenheimer into the whole project, but that was not only
because of security of information— not him in particular, but all the other
scientific leaders, men like Lawrence and Compton were treated the same
Way — but it was also done because if I brought them into the whole project,
they would never do their own job. There was just too much of scientific in-
terest, and they would just be frittering from one thing to another.
. So Dr. Oppenheimer was used in many ways as a chief scientific adviser on
many problems that were properly within his bailiwick. That included his
final advice which brought up the question of the thermal diffusion separation
process, which was the case, as you know probably by now, that we made this
last ditch effort to bring that into the project.
We were late In bringing it in, because— again this is something that is not
confidential, but I would rather not have it talked about — there had not been
the proper cooperation by certain scientific personnel at the Naval Research
Laboratory. There had been suspicion on the part of certain scientists that the
figures that were talked about at the Naval Research Laboratory were not
sound, * * * and we could not depend on them. The reason they felt this
way was that the results were not in accord with scientific theory. It just
gave the wrong answer. They were too favorable. We did not get into using
that, to my recollection— I am not absolutely certain— but I believe it was Dr.
165
Oppenheimer who suddenly told me that we had a terrible scientific blunder.
I think he was right. It is one of the things that I regret the most in the whole
course of the operation. We had failed to consider this as a portion of the
process as a whole. In other words, we considered this process as a process
that would take uranium 235 from 0.707 up to the final purity instead of saying
we will take it from 0.707 up to, say, 2 percent, and then put that in.
What we had done, everybody in the project — this was brought to my atten-
tion by I believe Oppenheimer— -had failed to think about, well, after all, if you
started off with uranium at 2 percent instead of 0.7 in any of our other
processes, we would be crippling our output.
I tell you that not in praise of Dr. Oppenheimer, but more to give you a picture
of how he was used throughout the process. I think that more or less answers
Mr. Garrison's question.
If I talk too long, Mr. Gray, if you will just tell me to stop, it is your time
and not mine.
By Mr. GABBISON.
Q. How would you rate the quality of his achievement as you look back on it?
A. Naturally I am prejudiced, because I selected him for the job, but I think
he did a magnificent job as far as the war effort was concerned. In other words,
while he was under my control — and you must remember that he left my control
shortly after the war was over.
Q. If you had to make the decision again, would you make it in the same way
with respect to the selection of Dr. Oppenheimer and devolving the responsi-
bilities on him which you did?
A. I know of no reason why not. Assuming all the conditions are the same,
I think I would do it.
Q. You saw him very closely during those years?
A. I saw him on the average, I would say, of anywhere from once a week to
once a month. I talked to him on the phone about anywhere from 4 to 5 times
a day to once in 3 or 4 days. I talked on all possible subjects of all varieties.
During the time I spent a number of days, for example, on trains traveling
where we might be together for 6 or 8 or 12 hours at a time.
Q. You were aware of his leftwing associations at the time — his earlier
leftwing associations?
A. Was I or am I?
Q. Were you at the time you appointed him?
A. At the time I appointed him to the project, I was aware that there were
suspicions about him, nothing like what were contained — and I might say I
read the New York Times, the letter of General Nichols and Dr. Oppenheimer's
letter. I was not aware of all the things that were brought out in General
Nichols' letter at the time of the appointment, but I was aware that he was or
that he had, you might say, a very extreme liberal background.
I was also aware of another thing that I think must be mentioned, that he
was already in the project, that he had been in charge of this particular type of
work, that is, the bomb computations, and that he knew all that there was to
know about that. In general, my policy was to consider the fact that the man
was already in the project, and that made it very questionable whether I should
separate him and also whether I should separate him under what might be
termed unpleasant conditions, because then you never know what you are going
to do to him. Are you going to drive him over to the other side or not? As far
as what I knew at the time of his actual selection, I knew enough to tell me
that I would have considered him an extreme liberal with a very liberal back-
ground. Just how many of the details I knew at the time I don't know. I did
know them all later.
Q. Based on your total acquaintance with him and your experience with him
and your knowledge of htm, would you say that in your opinion he would ever
consciously commit a disloyel act?
A. I would be amazed if he did.
Q. Was there any leakage of Information from Los Alamos to improper sources
for which Dr. Oppenheimer had in your opinion any responsibility?
A. That is a very difficult question, because it brings up the fact that the
scientists — and I would like to say the academic scientists — were not in sympathy
with compartmentalization. They were not in sympathy with the security re-
quirements. They felt that they were unreasonable. I never held this against
them, because I knew that their whole lives from the time they entered college
almost had been based on the dissemination of knowledge. Here, to be put in a
strange environment where the requirement was not dissemination, but not
166
talking about it, was a terrible upset. They were constantly under pressure
from their fellows in every direction to break down compartmentalization.
While I was always on the other side of the fence, I was never surprised when
one of them broke the rules.
For example, I got through talking to Neils Bohr on the train going to Los
Alamos for the first time, I think I talked to him about 12 hours straight on what
he was not to say. Certain things that he was not to talk about out there. He
got out there and within 5 minutes after his arrival he was saying everything he
promised he would not say.
' The same thing happened on one occasion with Ernest Lawrence, after he was
told that he was not to say something; he got up to the blackboard with this
group— it was a group of smaller size than this of the key people — and said
"I know General Groves doesn't want me to say this, but" and then he went on
and discussed what I didn't want him to say.
You may say what kind of military organization was that. I can tell you I
didn't operate a military organization. It was impossible to have one. While
I may have dominated the situation in general, I didn't have my own way in a
lot of things. So when I say that Dr. Oppenheimer did not always keep the faith
with respect to the strict interpretation of the security rules, if I could say that
he was no worse than any of my other leading scientists, I think that would be
a fair statement It would not be right to say that he observed my security rules
to the letter, because while I have no evidence of his violating them — after all,
I am not stupid— I know he did. I could not say of my own knowledge that I
never knew him just on the spur of the moment and I can't recall a case where
he deliberately violated my security instructions.
That is different from violating what he knew that I would want. That was
done by everybody in my organization, including the military officers because my
organization was a peculiar one. A great deal of responsibility devolved on
everybody. They all knew the goal. I know I was put in positions where I had
to approve things, things people knew I didn't want to approve, but they got me
in that corner. That was not limited as I say to scientific personnel. It applied
to engineering personnel, that applied to military officers. They were the kind
of men I wanted, and they were the kind of men that made the project a success.
If I had a group of yes men we never would have gotten anywhere.
Q. The absence of compartmentallzation on the Los Alamos project, General
Groves, would you say that represented on Dr. Oppenheimer's part an honest
Judgment as to what in his opinion would produce the best operating results
among the scientists on the project?
A. I always felt—I can't quite answer that— that Dr. Oppenheimer was led to
that breakdown of compartmentalization at Los Alamos by a number of con-
flicting factors. Here I am just giving my surmise as to what I thought.
First, that he personally felt that was right in view of his background of
academic work.
Second, that he felt it was necessary in order to attract the kind of men that
he felt he had to have at Los Alamos. I agreed that it was a very decided .factor
and always thought it was in getting such men. I also felt that he was very
much influenced at that time by the influence of Dr. Condon, who was for a very
brief time the associate director there, and, as you all know, a very complete
disappointment to me in every respect.
I would like to emphasize now before any question is asked that I was not
•responsible for the exact selection of Dr. Condon, but I was responsible for his
selection because I insisted when Dr. Oppenheimer took the directorship that
he have as his No. 1 assistant an industrial scientists, and we just made a
mistake when we selected Dr. Condon. Who gave his name the first time I
don't know, but Dr. Condon turned out to be not an industrial scientist, but an
academic scientist with all of the faults and none of the virtues. That was my
opinion. He did a tremendous amount of damage at Los Alamos in the initial
setup. How much influence he had on Dr. Oppenheimer I don't know. But he
was given certain responsibilities with my full approval— in fact, you might
say my very insistent suggestion— that Dr. Condon with the industrial back-
ground should be the one to establish the working rules and the administrative
scientific rules in the establishment, while Dr. Oppenheimer was thinking about
how was the actual scientific work to be done.
I coupld never make up my own mind as to whether Dr. Oppenheimer was
the one who was primarily at fault in breaking up the compartmentalization or
whether it was Dr. Condon. I don't to this day know whether it was wise.
I think it was a serious mistake and felt so at the time to have the lack of
compartmentalization go on down the line. In other words, it was all right to
167
have the leaders, maybe 20 to 30. but not to have as many men as were permitted
to break down compartmentalization. * * *
They all, of course, had given an oath that they would support the security
regulations, but that was not controlling. They wavered here and there.
I think that answers your question in general.
Q. How long was Dr. Condon on the project?
A. I think a very short time. The record would show, but my impression
would be only 6 weeks to 2 months. I don't recall. A very short time. His
departure, of course, was at his own volition. I always thought it was because
he thought the project would fail, and he was not going to be associated with it.
His record showed since then he has never been satisfied anywhere he was. He
was always moving. It was a mistake to get him out there. It is a mistake lor
which the responsibility was maybe 75 percent mine and 25 percent Oppen-
heimer's or maybe my share was even more than that. But mine was very heavy,
because he would never have been there if I had not told Oppenheimer what
kind of assistant he should have.
Q. Apart from the question of compartmentalization as an operating policy,
you had no occasion to believe that any leakage of information from Los Alamos
occurred as a result of any conscious act of Dr. Oppenheimer 's?
A. Oh, no. I don't consider that his compartmentalization was a conscious act
that would tend to encourage the leak of information.
Q. You had complete confidence in his integrity?
A. During the operation of Los Alamos, yes, which was where I really knew
him.
Q. And you have that confidence today?
A. As far as that operation went, yes. As I say, as far as the rest of it goes,
I am, you might say, not a witness. I am really ignorant on that, excepting
what I read in the papers.
Q. As the war neared its end, there was an even greater urgency to produce
the bomb in time to use it, was there not?
A. No, because no one in this country conceived of the Japanese war ending
as soon as it did, no one in responsible positions today, no matter what they
say today or said since. There is not a soul that thought that the war was
going to end within a reasonable time.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer work as hard as a man could to produce that bomb
in accordance with the deadline dates that you had projected?
A. Oh, yes, yes. In fact, he worked harder at times than I wanted him to,
because I was afraid he would break down under it. That was always a danger
in our project. I think it is important to realize in the case of Dr. Oppenheimer
because I had a physical taken of him when we were talking about making it a
militarized affair, and I knew his past physical record, and I was always dis-
turbed about his working too hard. But I never could slow him down in any way.
Q. Do you recall your conversation with Mm about the Chevalier incident?
A. Yes, but I have seen so many versions of it, I don't think I was confused
before, but I am certainly starting to become confused today. I recall what I
consider the essential history of that affair. As to whether this occurred this
time, where I was at the moment, I can't say that I recall it exactly. I think I
recall everything that is of vital interest, as far as would be necessary to draw
a conclusion as to that affair.
Q. Would you say what your conclusion was?
A. My conclusion was that there was an approach made, that Dr. Oppenheimer
knew of this approach, that at some point he was involved in that the approach
was made to him — I don't mean involved in the 'sense that he gave anything — I
mean he just knew about it personally from the fact that he was in the chain,
and that he didn't report it in its entirety as he should have done. When I
learned about it, and throughout, that he was always under the influence of
what I termed the typical American schoolboy attitude that there is something
wicked about telling on a friend. I was never certain as to just what he was
telling me. I did know this : That he was doing what he thought was essential,
which was to disclose to me the dangers of this particular attempt to enter the
project, namely, it was concerned with the situation out there near Berkeley —
I tMtiTr it was the Shell Laboratory at which Eltenton was supposedly one of
the key members — and that was a source of danger to the project and that was
the worry. I always had the very definite impression that Dr. Oppenheimer
wanted to protect his friends of long standing, possibly his brother. It was
always my impression that he wanted to protect his brother, and that Bis brother
might be involved in having been in this chain, and that his brother didn't behave
quite as he should have, or if he did, lie didn't even want to have the finger of
168
suspicion pointed at his brother, because he always felt a natural loyalty to
him, and had a protective attitude toward him.
I felt at the time that what Oppenheimer was trying to tell me and tell onr
project, once he disclosed this thing at all— as I recall I had the feeling ,tha£
he didn't disclose it immediately. In other words, he didn't come around the
next day or that night and say to our security people, "Listen, some things are
going on." I think he thought it over for some time. I am saying what I
thought now, and not what we could prove, because we could never prove any-
thing definite on this thing, because it all depended on the testimony of a man who
was concerned in it.
I felt that was wrong. If I had not felt it was important not to have any point
to protect Chevalier or to protect somebody else who was a friend, whom he
felt that the man had made a mistake and he had adequately taken care of that
mistake and more or less warned this man off.
I felt tht was wrong. If I had not felt it was important not to have any point
of issue on what after all was a minor point with respect to the success of the
project, I might have had quite an issue with him right then and there. As he
told me very early in my conversation with him, he said, "General, if you order
me to tell you this, I will tell you." I said, "No, I am not going to order yon."
About 2 months later or some time later, after much discussion in trying to
lead him into it, and having then got the situation more or less adjusted, I told
him if you don't tell me, I am going to have to order you to do it. Then I got
what to me was the final story. I think he made a great mistake in that I
felt so at the time. I didn't think it was great from the standpoint of the project,
because I felt that I was getting what I wanted to know which, after all, I did
know already, that this group was a source of danger to us. I didn't know that
this group had tried to make this direct approach and pinpoint it that way, but
I knew they were thoroughly capable of it, and I knew we had sources of danger
in the Berkeley project.
I think that really was my impression of it, that he didn't do what he should
have done. The reasons why were desire to protect friends and possibly his
brother, and that he felt that he had done what was necessary in pinpointing.
As far as I was concerned, while I didn't like it, after all it was not my Job to
like everything my subordinates did, or anybody in the project did. I felt I had
gotten what I needed to get out of that, and I was not going to make an issue
of it, because I thought it might impair his usefulness on the project
I think that gives you the general story.
Mr. GARRISON. I think that is all that I would like to ask.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Bobb.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. General, you said this group ; what group did you have in mind, sir? The
group at Berkeley?
A. Oh, no. The group at the Shell Oil Co. laboratories. We never knew how
many people were in that group. I didn't bring it to the attention of the Shell
Oil Co. at the time, because I didn't want to disclose anything. I would rather
have it there where I knew it Of course, after the war, I brought it to the
attention of various friends in the Shell Oil Co., and I believe that group was
cleaned out in 24 hours.
Q. General, I find in the files a letter signed by you, dated November 14, 1946.
I will read it:
ARMY SERVICE FORGES,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE, MANHATTAN DISTRICT,
WASHINGTON LIAISON OFFICE,
Washington, D. a, November U, 1946.
Mr. DAVID E. LTT.TF.NTHAL,
Chairman, Atomic Enerffy Commission, Washington, D. O.
DEAR MR. LTT.TENTHAL; I desire to bring to your attention that in the past I
have considered it in the best interests of the United States to clear cerain
individuals for work on the Manhattan. project despite evidence indicating con-
siderable doubt as to their character, associations, and absolute loyalty.
Such individuals are generally persons whose particular scientific or technical
knowledge was vital to the accomplishment of the Manhattan project mission.
In some instances, lack of time prevented our completely investigating certain
persons prior to their working f dr the Manhattan project, so that in some cases
individuals, on whom it was subsequently determined that derogatory informa-
tion existed, had access to project information.
169
With the appointment of the Commission and the legal provisions for investi-
gation of personnel by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, I see no reason why
those persons on whom derogatory information exists cannot be eliminated. I
unhesitatingly recommend that you give the most careful consideration to this
problem.
The FBI is cognizant of all individuals now employed on the Manhattan proj-
ect on whom derogatory information exists.
Sincerely yours,
L. R. GROVES, Major General, USA.
I find an answer to that from Mr. Lilienthal, dated December 4, 1946, which I
will read :
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C.
Maj. Gen. LESLIE R. GROVES,
Commanding General, Manhattan Project,
Washington, D. C.
DEAR GENERAL GROVES: This will acknowledge your letter of November 14,
1946, concerning continued employment of project personnel whose character,
associations, and loyalty have been questioned by the Manhattan project but
who have been employed nevertheless because they were considered vital to
the accomplishment of the Manhattan project mission. This matter will re-
ceive the most careful consideration by the Commission. It would appear that,
since the persons referred to in your letter had been continued somewhat beyond
the accomplishment of the Manhattan project mission, that you do not regard
their presence a source of critical hazard. On the other hand, if in your opinion
a decision in this connection is urgent, I would appreciate your further views.
Sincerely yours,
DAVID LILIENTHAL, Chairman.
I find, then, your response to that letter, dated December 19, 1946:
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., December 19, 1946.
MR. DAVID E. LHJENTHAL,
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D. C.
DEAR MR. LILIENTHAL : Reference is made to your letter of December 4, 1946,
concerning the presence of certain individuals in the Manhattan project whose
character, associates, and loyalty may be open to question. They could not be
discharged summarily but, as I explained, their removal is of necessity a rather
slow process, and whenever possible such removals have been effected by us
through administrative means when the individuals could be conveniently re-
lieved of such assignments. Considerable progress in reducing the number of
such individuals has been made to date.
It would seem to me that, with the reinvestigation of all Manhattan project
personnel by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, you could find it appropriate to
effect the removal of the remaining individuals of questionable character.
Sincerely yours,
L. B. GROVES, Major General, USA.
General, do you recall writing the two letters and getting the answer from
Mr. Lilienthal?
A. I recall writing a letter. You did very well. I didn't recall the other
two. I recall writing one. I think it is appropriate, if I may, to insert that
these letters were only written because previous verbal discussions which were
very limited had proven unavailing and because Mr. Lilienthal had made it very
plain that he wanted no advice of any kind from me. He wanted nothing what-
soever to do with me. He thought that I was the lowest kind of human being,
and he was not going to get anything from me. This was written because I felt
that it was the only way that I could adequately bring to the attention of the
Commission the seriousness of this problem. Knowing Government procedure,
I knew that, as long as it was verbal, nothing would be done. If I put it in
writing, that they would always be thinking about the record. That is the
reason that the letter was written.
I have never made a practice of trying to protect myself on the record, but I
thought this was one time that I could secure action, and it was not written
really with the idea of clearing my skirts for something that might come up,
such as this, many years hence. It was to make him do it whether he wanted
to do it or not
170
Q. General, was Dr. Oppenheimer one of the "certain individuals" to whom
you referred In those letters.
A. I don't believe so, because Dr. Oppenheimer was really out of the project
at the time. Of course, he was retained as a consultant, but Just what my
consultant arrangements with him were I am not certain. It was more of a
personal affair. I would say that he was not one of those that I was thinking
about. I recall who I was thinking about in particular, and he was not the man.
I don't think I was thinking about him.
If I may answer that you may ask next, but which is necessary for my answer,
if he had been a member of the Manhattan project at the time, he would have
been one of those about whom I was thinking.
Q. General, would you have cleared Dr. Oppenheimer in 1943 if you had not
believed him to be essential to the project and if you had not known that he
was already steeped in the project?
A. I think that I would not have cleared him if I had not felt that he was
essential and if he had not already been so thoroughly steeped in the project.
If the two were separated, I don't know. I can't say, because I was never faced
with that, and it is awfully hard to try to recast it.
Q. I will show you a photostat of a letter bearing your signature, dated July 20,
1943, and ask if that is the letter whereby you did give clearance to Dr.
Oppenheimer.
A. It is certainly my signature, because nobody has been able to forge it yet,
and they have tried many times. Nobody could ever do it. I don't remember
the exact wording. I do know that a letter of this general tenor was written.
There is no question but what it was my letter.
Q. I might read this into the record. It is stamped "top secret," but it has
been declassified:
WAB DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, July 20, 194$.
Subject : Julius Robert Oppenheimer
To : The District Engineer, United States Engineer Office, Manhattan District,
Station P, New York, N. Y.
1. In accordance with my verbal directions of July 15, it is desired that clear-
ance be issued for the employment of Julius Robert Oppenheimer without delay,
irrespective of the information which you have concerning Mr. Oppenheimer.
He is absolutely essential to the project.
L. R. GBOVES, Brigadier General, CS.
General, did your security officers on the project advise against the clearance
of Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Oh, I am sure that they did. I don't recall exactly. They certainly were
not in favor of his clearance. I think a truer picture is to say that they reported
that they could not and would not clear him.
Q. General, you were in the Army actively for how many years?
A. I don't know. 1916 to 1948, and of course raised in it, also.
Q. And you rose to the rank of lieutenant general?
A. That is right
Q. During your entire Army career, I assume you were dealing with matters
of security?
A. Never before this thing started. We didn't deal with matters of security
in the Army, really, until this time. The Army as a whole didn't deal with
matters of security until after the atomic bomb burst on the world because it
was the first time that the Army really knew that there was such a thins if vou
want to be perfectly frank about it ^^
Q. Certainly with your work In the Manhattan project you dealt Intensively
with matters of security?
A. I would say I devoted about 5 percent of my time to security problems.
Q. You did become thoroughly familiar with security matters.
A. I think that I was very familiar with security matters.
Q. In fact, it could be said that you became something of an expert in it?
A. I am afraid that is correct
Q. I believe you said that you became pretty familiar with the file of Dr.
Oppenheimer?
A. Ithink I was thoroughly f amiliar with everything that was reported about
Dr. Oppenheimer; and that included, as it did on every other matter of impor-
tance, personally reading the original evidence if there was any original evidence.
Li other words, I would read the reports of the interviews with people. In
171
other words, I was not reading the conclusions of any security officer. The
reason for that was that in this project there were so many things that the
security officer would not know the significance of that I felt I had to do it
myself. Of course, I have been criticized for doing all those things myself and
not having a staff of any kind; but, after all, it did work, and I did live
through it
Q. General, in the light of your experience with security matters and in the
light of your knowledge of the file pertaining to Dr. Oppenheiiuer, would you
clear Dr. Oppenheimer today?
A. I think before answering that I would like to give my interpretation of
what the Atomic Energy Act requires. I have it, but I never can find it as to
just what it says. Maybe I can find it this time.
Q. Would you like me to show it?
A. I know it is very deeply concealed in the thing.
Q. Do you have the same copy?
A. I have the original act.
Q. It is on page 14, I think, where you will find it, General. You have the
same pamphlet I have.
A. Thank you. That is it. The clause to which I am referring is this : It is
the last of paragraph (b) (i) on page 14. It says :
*The Commission shall have determined that permitting such person to have
access to restricted data will not endanger the common defense or security,"
and it mentions that the investigation should include the character, associations,
and loyalty.
My interpretation of "endanger" — and I think it is important for me to make
that if I am going to answer your question — is that it is a reasonable presumption
that there might be a danger, not a remote possibility, a tortured interpretation
of maybe there might be something, but that there is something that might do.
Whether you say that is 5 percent or 10 percent or something of that order
does not make any difference. It is not a case of proving that the man is a
danger. It is a case of thinking, well, he might be a danger, and it is perfectly
logical to presume that he would be, and that there is no consideration whatso-
ever to be given to any of his past performances or his general usefulness or, you
might say, the imperative usefulness. I don't care how important the man is,
if there is any possibility other than a tortured one that his associations or his
loyalty or his character might endanger.
In this case I refer particularly to associations and not to the associations as
they exist today but the past record of the associations. I would not clear Dr.
Oppenheimer today if I were a member of the Commission on the basis of this
interpretation.
If the interpretation is different, then I would have to stand on my interpreta-
tion of it
Mr. ROBB. Thank you, General. That is all.
Mr. GRAY. I would like to ask a question, General Groves. This relates to a
question Mr. Garrison asked about the urgencies, whether the urgencies had been
stepped up with respect to having these weapons ready toward the end of the
war.
My recollection is that you said that there was not any acceleration as far as
you were concerned?
The WITNESS. No. My mission as given to me by Secretary Stimson was to
produce this at the earliest possible date so as to bring the war to a conclusion.
That was further emphasized by his statement that any time that a single day
could be saved I should save that day. The instructions to the project were
that any individual in that project who felt that the ultimate completion, insofar
as he understood it, was going to be delayed by as much as a day by something
that was happening, it was his duty to report it direct to me by telephone, skip-
ping all channels of every kind. So that urgency was on us right from the start
Mr. GRAY. And any instructions with respect to that which went to the labora-
tory at Los Alamos would have come then from you?
The WITNESS. That is correct. I think, for your information, while the
laboratory officially was under General Nichols, because the whole district
was under Nichols, by an understanding between Nichols and myself, because
that left me doing nothing but telling Nichols what to do, and it was beyond
his capacity to do everything, in general a division of direct responsibility was
made, and Nichols took over essentially Oak Ridge and the general
administration.
With respect to Los Alamos, it was directly my responsibility in every way,
everything that happened. The orders were issued direct We tried to keep
172
Nichols informed to such extent as was necessary. So from a practical stand-
point, although not on paper, the chain of command was direct from me to Dr.
Oppenheimer. . .
Dr GRAY. One other question now. Do you recall any key personnel in the
project who left the project because of unsatisfactory record or promise as
security risks? ta _ .
The WITNESS. Oh, yes. There were some that were gotten rid of. A man
named Hiskey, who very unfortunately happened to be a Reserve officer and
was called to active duty and thus gotten out of it.
A man named Lomanitz' deferment on the draft was taken away. He was
eventually drafted, although that took the utmost pressure. His draft hoard
refused to remove the deferment. It became a matter of issue in which General
Hershey had to issue direct orders that this exemption be removed and that he
be drafted. If he was not drafted, he was going to get rid of the entire State
board as well as the local board, which apparently was controlled by an element
that were not in accord with what you and I think they should be. The board
insisted on this man's being deferred.
There were other people that we wished to get rid of that we were unable to
get rid of because of the effect upon the organization as a whole. Those were
men — I don't think their names need be mentioned — about whom I had suspicions.
Also, I think bearing on this there was an early conversation with the Secretary
of War's office at the time before I started dealing with the Secretary direct, in
which I asked if it was possible to intern a particular foreign scientist, an alien,
and I was asked what evidence I had, and my reply was that I had no evidence
other than intuition. I just didn't trust him. I knew he was a detriment to the
project. I didn't accuse him of disloyalty or treason, but simply that he was a
disrupting force and the best way out of it was to intern him.
I was told that this man didn't want to take it up with the Secretary- I in-
sisted on it. He came back and said "General, the Secretary said we can't do
that. General Groves ought to know that I told the Secretary, of course, Gen-
eral Groves knew that would be your answer. He just still wanted to make a
try." I think that is essential to realize.
In other cases, one of them at Berkeley, where I asked Dr. Lawrence or told
him that I wanted a man to be gotten rid of, he said, "If I get rid of him — don't
misunderstand me, if you order it, I always accept your orders— I want to warn
you that if he is gotten rid of, there will be no work done in this laboratory for
at least a month, no matter what I try to do myself, and the effect may last for
6 months or a year because of the attitude of the scientific world which did not
appreciate the need of security."
I think that attitude was prevalent in the country as a whole. It was very
touchy, and you could not run this thing and say a man is either black or white.
If he is black or has any tinge of it, out he goes, and there is no question about it
Mr. GRAY. Does the name "Weinberg" mean anything to you?
The WITNESS. Oh, yes.
Mr. GRAY. Would you mind.
The WITNESS. Weinberg was one of— I think some of the people over there
could maybe amplify it a little— he was as I recall one of four young scientists
at Berkeley. The other names, if they are mentioned, I think I could remember
them.
Mr. ROBB. Might I mention them to assist: Weinberg, Bohm, Lomanitz, and
Friedman.
The WITNESS. That sounds very familiar, and I think that is approximately
right Essentially they were a. group about whom there was a great deal of
question. I never had any confidence in them at all from the time that we started
to get reports. They were not essential to the project. They were young men,
and they could be replaced. But remember at that time there were not very many
men and even a young man it was difficult to replace. But even so, we could get
along without them.
Mr. GRAY. You did indeed in some cases.
The WITNESS. Oh, yes.
Mr. GRAY. The project was successful, and some of these men left the project?
The WITNESS. Yes ; we got rid of them. But each one it was a terrible task to
get rid of because it was not a case of my deciding he should go. First, the sus-
picion of the man, then a development enough to convince me, and then manipula-
tion and just how were we going to do this thing. It was just as difficult as to
get rid of a Cabinet officer in Washington that the country is behind, because
you had all of the political play in there. Men who would become violently ex-
cited about the most minor thing. If I went on to the laboratory or on to a plant
173
and failed to speak to somebody who was there or didn't see him — even at Oak
Ridge I even had to go back at the expense of about three hours one day to speak
to a superintendent that I had failed to see when I went through the plant and
when he spoke to me, I had not answered him. When Nichols told me about it, I
said "What is the damage?" He said, "You just got to go back." So it took
about 3 hours with our location down there, and I went back. That was true.
Everybody with the exception of a few of us, like Nichols and myself, whose
physical resistance maybe was better, everyone was worked to the point where
they were tense and nervous and they had to be soothed all the time.
I say that so you get the picture of why certain people were not removed. You
say why didn't you remove them? Sure I wanted to remove them, but it was not
wise. I think it is also important to state — I think it is well known— that there
was never from about 2 weeks from the time I took charge of this project any
illusion on my part but that Russia was our enemy and that the project was con-
ducted on that basis. I didn't go along with the attitude of the country as a
whole that Russia was a gallant ally. I always had suspicions and the project
was conducted on that basis. Of course, that was so reported to the President.
Mr. GBAY. One other Question about individuals. You said that Dr. Condon
had been unsatisifactory in every respect. Does that include security? Did
you have anything in mind on security in that regard, or loyalty?
The WITNESS. I would say not in giving any information, but in setting up.
He set up the rules at Los Alamos— at least I always felt he was the man
responsible for the rules — that tended to break down compartmentalization. He
was the man who was primarily responsible for Los Alamos for the friction which
existed. There would have been friction anyway. But the intensity of the
friction that existed between the military officers who were trying to do the
administrative operations out there so as to enable the scientists to work at
science, Condon was the one who built all of that up.
The fact that he left there as he did and left this mess behind him, he left
because of the reasons that he did leave. The fact that he— of course later when
he worked at Berkeley — he didn't do what I term an honest day's work, I might
add for your clarification that the work he was engaged on at Berkeley was
something that required a man of his capabilities. Dr. Condon was a first-rate
physicist. Don't misunderstand me. Lawrence and myself did not feel that
this particular phase of the work was at all interesting to us. We thought it
was just no hope at all. But we also felt that we could not allow this field to go
unexplored just because of a curbstone opinion which is really what Lawrence
and mine were because we didn't know anything about it— I don't remember what
it was now— it involved mathematics to see if this was feasible.
We had Condon working on that with a small group of juniors. By doing
that we definitely proved that we were right in saying that we should neglect it.
He was kept on there at Berkeley on a sort of parttime basis, traveling back
and forth. He was very unsatisfactory there. In other words, he just didn't
do an honest day's work in our opinion.
He would also be going to Pittsburgh for his own family convenience. He
would be leaving Pittsburgh because he wanted to get out to Berkeley for
personal reasons. Then of course the situation came up with his attempts to
go to Russia Just before the bomb exploded to that scientific conference where
a member of our State Department kept the Army from knowing about these
invitations. I found out about it because our scientists told me that they had
received invitations. So we checked our project to see that none of our people
would go, and then at the last minute when the plane was about to leave, we
suddenly discovered that some industrial scientists, namely Condon and Langmuir
of General Electric were going, and I then raised the question as to whether
they should go with their top company officials.
After discussion with GE, I withdrew any objection to Dr. Langmuir going.
Of course, Dr. Langmuir has since represented that, but that is all right. I did
not withdraw; the objection to Condon going. I had the fullest support from
the corporations concerned. Condon's passport was withdrawn and he made
a terrific battle to go. That battle was so unrealistic and so completely lacking
in appreciation of what was the best interest of the United States that you
couldn't help but feel that either he was such an utter fool that he could not be
trusted, or else that he put his own personal desires above those of the welfare
of the country and therefore he was in effect disloyal, even if it was not a case
of deliberately going out to aid the enemy.
Mr. GBAT. One other question about Dr. Condon.
When he left Los Alamos and assumed this other relationship at Berkeley,
did he have any responsibility for personnel at either place?
174
The WITNESS. He didn't leave directly for Berkeley. He was relieved from
the project, and went back to the Westinghouse Co. It was later that he was
picked up to go to Berkeley because we wanted to take a man that would not
hurt the project in any way. As to his responsibilities for personnel at Los
Alamos, that was one of his big responsibilities, to assist in recruiting per-
sonnel. The idea was that Dr. Condon, in my concept, and I believe Dr.
Oppenheimer carried out that concept completely insofar as he felt that it was
possible to carry it out because we both found out pretty soon that Condon was
not competent— Oppenheimer was to think the scientific problems and 'to estab-
lish the schedule of scientific and technical work. Condon was to run everything
connected with the procurement of personnel, the operation of the personnel,
their relations with the military, and all that. The military was to run the
housekeeping. As I say, Condon failed in that. Oppenheimer started to move
into the personnel thing. Of course, Oppenheimer still had at the beginning to
get the senior personnel, but building up and getting all the arrangements was
supposed to be Condon's responsibility.
Mr. GRAY. This is while he was identified with the project.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. When he left, he had no responsibility?
The WITNESS. That is right. He had no responsibility. He left with, I would
say— both Dr. Oppenheimer and myself— we had the utmost distaste for Dr.
Condon. There was the utmost cooperation in getting this thing on a plane where
you might say we had Dr. Condon on the record in a way that he has never liked
to have it disclosed since, that he had not done a good Job out there.
Mr. GRAY My next question involves a considerable change of pace, General.
The WITNESS. That is all right, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Do you think that the Russian effort to develop this kind of weapon
has in any way, as you look back on history, been accelerated by any information
they may have gotten one way or another from our own people?
The WITNESS. Oh, yes. There is no question. If I can go into that a little
bit, first they got information as to our interest essentially through espionage
at Berkeley. These are all conclusions. You can't prove them, of course.
Mr. GRAY I understand.
The WITNESS. They got the thought that we were interested there. They cer-
tainly had gotten before he ever came to the country— they must have gotten
information from Fuchs that Britain was interested in this affair and that we
were, too, because up until the time I came into control, there was a complete
interchange of scientific information between Britain and America on this. If
the British didn't know everything we were doing, it is because they were stupid,
and they were not on the job. I don't think they did, but they knew most of it.
The next disclosure outside of that particular thing is that whatever Fuchs
passed during the war, and I don't think he passed too much until near the end,
they undoubtedly knew certain things — they had good espionage — and they knew
a lot of things that were going on.
For example, when we had trouble at Hanford and our piles suddenly quit — I
think that is generally known, again that is not secret, but I wouldn't like to
have it repeated— we had trouble with our piles. The trouble existed because
this was a sudden disclosure of » scientific effect that nobody had anticipated.
The reason we had not anticipated that was because we had never operated
our pile at Chicago, our preliminary work there, continuously. We had not
operated continuously because my orders to the Chicago laboratory were directly
and deliberately disobeyed. I had said that they will be operated continuously.
We don't know what will happen. Let us find out. Of course I didn't anticipate
this scientific problem, but after all, any engineer knows you ought to operate
something continuously.
The power worked so well at Chicago that they operated it only during nice
convenient hours. So we never got this effect that was so disastrous at Hanford.
My officer in charge at Chicago failed because he didn't report that they were
not carrying out my orders, which he should have done if he could not get them
to comply.
When this thing happened at Hanford, it was known by people that had no
right to know it within— I can't recall the exact time now— I think it was 48
hours. It was known in New York by somebody who was not in the project.
To get to New York, I had to trace out this thing. I think it went from Hanford
to Chicago, which was legitimate. * * * We found out that this man had an
inkling that something had happened, and that was enough to show the extent
of this kind of espionage.
175
There was a great deal of loose talk about it by scientific people, as I say,
breaking down my compartinentalization rules.
Of course, I always knew that if you have this many people on a project,
that somebody is going to be faithless and somebody is going to betray you,
and that is why we had compartmentalization.
Then after the war when the May case broke in Canada, that of course was
pure luck, what May had done. Apparently May gave to the Russians a sample
of U-233 and a sample of something else. I think it was plutonlum. I don't
recall now. But the U-233 was all-important because that indicated to the
Russians that we were interested in thorium, which could only be produced
that way. The result of that was most unfortunate.
Then the next thing that happened was— I didn't know this until later—-
apparently there was a diary kept up there with certain names in it I have
never been able to get the truth of that, because people who were Involved have
clammed up. They were not people who were friendly to me in the main, anyway.
They were not people who would disclose matters to me. But I believe there
was a diary. I believe Fuchs' name was in that diary, a list of acquaintances
or addresses, that was in the hands of somebody in that Canadian ring. I have
always thought it was Puchs. It has been told it was somebody else. Fuchs'
name was in that. That list was supposedly disclosed to people in the United
States, not in the project, but outside of the project, and the list was never!
shown to me, the one man who should have had it shown to him by all means.
There were attempts on the part of our Government to keep me from knowing
about this Canadian affair. * * *
As I say, it was repeated and they knew what the story was, and yet they
brought Fuchs over. Unfortunately Fuchs was in the delegation of British who
came and discussed with us the gaseous diffusion process which was the one
process we had that we really took our hair down and told them all about be-
cause the feeling was that they had initiated that process and they could be
helpful.
There was also a very strong element, I would say 98 to 99 percent of the
scientific personnel on the project, who considered the gas diffusion process a
mistake, including the people who were actually responsible for the develop-
ment. Dr. Urey, who was the head, violently opposed it. He said it couldn't
possibly work. So it was not unreasonable to let the British look at it
Of course, as you know and is well known, I was not responsible for our close
cooperation with the British. I did everything to hold back on it. I would say
perfectly frankly I did the things that I have sort of maybe by implication blamed
on my scientists for doing. I did not carry out the wishes of our Government
with respect to cooperation with the British because I was leaning over
backwards.
That information that Fuchs gave was all important The mistake that was
made at Los Alamos in breaking down compartmentalization was vital to Fuchs,
because Fuchs later went to Los Alamos, it was vital to Fuchs, and the informa-
tion he passed to the Russians.
But in doing that, I think it is important to realize this with respect to Fuchs.
If we had limited it to a small group, say just the top peopde, Fuchs might still
have been in that group. Fuchs would also have worked on the hydrogen bomb
as one of the subordinates, and would have passed that information.
With the British not being completely under my control, I think it would have
been passed on by the British group to Fuchs, whether we had the compartment-
alization strictly observed there or not. But irrespective of that, I feel that was
one of the disadvantages of the breakdown of compartmentalization * * *.
On the situation as a whole, our reliance, when we first talked after the war
about what the time limits were on the Russians and it is quite possible I talked
to you about it when you were Secretary of the Army — I don't recall, I certainly
made no bones about it— our reliance on what the Russians could or could not do
was based on primarily the supplies of material which I felt would be available
to them, that is raw material, and on the basis that there would be no general
relaxation of security rules beyond the Smyth report, and the dedassification
study which said what could be released.
In that the criterion— and that criterion was established by a committee of emi-
nent scientists, but like all committees, it was under pretty rigid control by me
because I had the chairman, Dr. Tolman, who was in complete sympathy with
me as far as I know, I had the secretary, who was an officer and a distinguished
chemist handling that end— and they were told in advance what should be the
criterion and they got the board to agree to that criterion. Nothing was recom-
176
mended for declassiflcation where it was felt that would be of any assistance to
the Russians in developing the bomb.
Later, that has been stretched and stretched, and there has been a tremendous
amount of data published. As you know I fought the battle. I did not win.
The American people and the Congress and everybody else was opposed to me.
It has always been said, get the information out, and there has been a great
laxness there.
I think the primary reason was that the Eussians got into these materials in
Saxony. We didn't know about the material in Saxony. Of course, we knew
about the material in Goachimstal. We were not worried about that. We never
conceived that the whole area would be turned over to the Russians as they
pleased, and to be able to mine on the basis they were, I don't know whether
it was paid for by the American labor. The raw ore would very well have cost
us $100 a pound at that time to get out the uranium * * *.
Mr. GRAY. Just one other question which relates to my general question
whether information actually went to the Russians. Of course, it has been a
matter of considerable discussion in some quarters that one of the scientists
by the name of Weinberg passed information to a Communist Party functionary.
The WITNESS. There is no doubt about that in my mind.
Mr. GRAY. I am sorry. My question I am sure has not been expressed. But
there may have been other instances of that sort that you know nothiag about.
The WITNESS. Of course, and I think there were. On Weinberg, I would like
to emphasize that the information he passed was probably with respect to the
electromagnetic process, and with respect to the fact that we were engaged in
a big effort because that is all that he knew legitimately. He may have known
some things illegitimately, and I am sure he did. We were never too much
concerned about that, because I personally felt that the electromagnetic process
was a process, while it was of extreme importance to us during the war, and we
saved at least a year's time by doing it, that it was not the process we would
follow after the war. That is one reason why we put silver in those magnets,
because we knew we would get it out.
Dr. EVANS. General Groves, I would like to ask one question that is not very
important, and maybe you can't answer it. There are some things that appear
in magazines that is almost classified information. That article in Life, do
you remember seeing that?
The WITNESS. No, I didn't read that.
Dr. EVANS. I think it was Life. It contained a lot of material that I did
not think was unclassified. Did any of you people read that article?
The WITNESS. I have not read that, but I can tell you that I am constantly
being shocked by what I see. With respect to that, to clarify a little my pre-
vious answer to Mr. Gray, because I am reminded of this by your question,
.during the war there were two things that came out that annoyed me tremen-
dously. The last one was kind of funny but it still annoyed me. I thought
that is an awfully cheap thing to do.
As you know, we had the utmost cooperation from the press. That is very
definite. Our relationships were generally good. But on one occasion a news-
paper wanted to print news about Hanf ord and what a tremendous development
was out there. They had their reporter out and they had their story written and
it was a hangup story. We found out about it, and they were told no, they
could not permit it. Of course, that was handled through press censorship.
We didn't deal directly with them. They said there are thousands of people
that know it, and they would not agree with our philosophy which was that
thousands of people could know it but that is no sign the Russians did, or the
enemy— we could not talk about the Russians too much then. So that they
agreed not to publish it.
About a month afterward a Congressman from Oregon, I think his name was
Angell, suddenly made a speech on the floor of the House appealing for more
appropriations for the Interior Department for, I think, instaUation of electric
generators in Grand Coulee, or something of that kind, and among other things
he said that there was this tremendous plant with great electrical demand at
Hanford, Wash.
The paper came out with this. It was a little squib on the interior page.
It said the Congressional Record contained the following today and it just
quoted that absolutely. As I say, I thought it was awfully poor. I knew it
had not been top management. I think it was somebody who got smart But
there was one very serious break that disclosed during the war— to me, if I
had been a Russian I think if the intelligence of Kapitsa and the background
or the intelligence of anyone else who was working on this project— it would
177
have indicated that the way to produce an atomic bomb was in some way to
take care that it might be based on implosion. I don't know if anyone else in
the room saw that article. I think I probably discussed it with Dr. Oppenheimer
at the time.
Dr. EVANS. I saw it
The WITNESS. It was a terrible article. There just was not anything we
could do. I was just as certain as I could be that somebody was just trying to
get that information out. I don't know who was responsible. We, of course,
did almost nothing about it, because that is the kind of thing you don't do any-
thing about. We prevented in this country the repubiicatiou of articles appear-
ing abroad, particularly in Scandanavian papers, that disclosed ideas. We made
no mention, for example, in the press dispatches when the heavy water plant
was finally destroyed in Norway. They might be described in detail in the
Scandanavian press. We objected and were successful in having them not re-
printed on the ground that would indicate to the Russians some interest.
I don't know how successful we were in keeping the Russians from realizing
what a tremendous effort this was, and how hopeful we were, and what the
effects would be, but judging from the Russian attitude, I would say that they
did not appreciate the strength of this weapon until it dropped on Hiroshima,
and they were told of the effects. They still did not appreciate it until after
Binkini, because the attitude of the Russian delegation at the United Nations,
which of course was very responsive to Moscow as you know, changed com-
pletely, not immediately after the explosion, but within about 24 hours of the
time that the ships returned to San Francisco, and the Russian observers who
were there against my wishes — as you know, I did not control Bikini— got
ashore and went to the Russian consulate. Within 24 hours to 48 hours, the
whole attitude of the Russian delegation at the United Nations changed, and
this became a very serious matter, instead of just being something, "Oh, well,
it doesn't amount to much." That would indicate to me that they had not been
convinced by their espionage of just how important this all was.
Mr. GRAY, Mr. Garrison.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. General, Dr. Oppenheimer had no responsibility for the selection or the
clearance of Fuchs, did he?
A. No, not at all. He had no responsibility whatsoever, as far as I can re-
member. He had no responsibility for it, and I don't recall his ever having asked
me to get an Englishman at the laboratory in any way, nor did he suggest their
need. He acquiesced when I said I thought we should get them there in view of
things, and because we desperately needed certain assistance that those men can
give. They were a scientific reservoir. There was not any use in trying to
keep them out, as I saw the picture. In other words, I tried to be reasonable
about it. I didn't try to oppose the administration when I knew I was going to
get licked. After all, I had been in Washington for many, many years.
Q. All this talk about espionage, you didn't mean to suggest by anything that
you said with respect to it that Dr. Oppenheimer had anything whatever to do
with espionage activities with foreign agents?
A. Oh, by no means. Dr. Oppenheimer was responsible as the director of the
laboratory for assisting in every possible way our security and defense against
espionage at Los Alamos. If you look down the chart, he might be responsible
to a certain degree for operation of the security officer. It was more in the
way of assisting that officer and of advising me or this officer's superiors if he
thought the officer was not doing a good job. But the officer from a practical
standpoint did not report to Oppenheimer excepting as a matter of courtesy.
Q. So you would not want to leave with this board even by the remotest sug-
gestion that you are here questioning Dr. Oppenheimer's basic loyalty to the
United States in the operation of the Los Alamos plant.
A. By no means and nothing about the espionage. I think it is very impor-
tant if there has been any misunderstanding that Dr. Oppenheimer was not in
any way responsible for anything to do with the protection of the United States
against espionage, excepting cooperation which was natural as the head of the
scientific effort out there. By no means was there any intent to imply. I hope
I did not lead anybody to think otherwise for an instant.
Q. After Dr. Oppenheimer resigned as the director of the project, did he re-
main as a consultant for the Manhattan District?
178
A. Apparently he did. I didn't realize that until somebody asked me about it,
or something was said here earlier. I think he did. I don't think he was on
the payroll in any way. But certainly I would not have hesitated to ask him
any questions or to discuss anything that was of a secret nature during that
period I remained in control. For one thing, there was nothing that came up
with which he was not already thoroughly familiar. There was no possibility of
anything in1 that. So the question never arose. I think also as I recall he was
a member of this declassification board although I am not certain of that. That
would be in the record and of course he would know. That was the one chair-
manned by Dr. Tolman.
Q. You have given us your interpretation of the requirements of the Atomic
Energy Act, General Groves. Leaving the act to one side or supposing that it
provided that the test of the employment of a man in Dr. Oppenheimer's position
should be what is in the public interest, would you say that the revocation of his
employment would be in the public interest if that is the way the act read?
A. The revocation under such extreme publicity as has occurred I think would
be most unfortunate, not because of the effect on Dr. Oppenheimer — that I leave
to one side — but because of what might be a very disastrous effect upon the
attitude of the academic scientists of this country toward doing Government
research of any kind, and particularly when there was not any war on. I
thiTiTr you can refer back to history as to the attitude of the average academic
man in 1945 when* the war was over. They were exactly like the average pri-
vate in the Army who said to himself, the war is over, how soon can I get
back home to mom and get out of this uniform. That was the way the average
academic scientists felt. He wanted out. He wanted to be where he could
resume his old academic life, and where he could talk and not have to be under
pressure of any kind.
What happened is what I expected, that after they had this extreme freedom
for about 6 months, they all started to get itchy feet, and as you know almost
every one of them has come back into Government research, because it was Just
too exciting, and I think still is exciting. Does that answer your question?
Q. Yes. I have, General, a copy of a letter which I am sure you recall from
yourself to Dr. Oppenheimer, dated May 18, 1950. I would like to read it, if I
may, into the record. I am sure you have no objection to that
A. No. Anything I wrote I have no objection to whatever.
Q. This is on the letterhead of Remington Hand, Inc., Laboratory of Advanced
Research, South Norwalk, Conn. May 18, 1950.
'•Dr. J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER,
"The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J.
"DEAR Dr. OPPENHEIMER : If at any time you should feel that it were wise, I
would be pleased to have you make a statement of the general tenor of that which
f ollows :
" 'General Groves has informed me that shortly after he took over the respon-
sibility for the development of the atomic bomb, he reviewed personally the
entire file and all known information concerning me and immediately ordered that
I be cleared for all atomic information in order that I might participate in the
development of the atomic bomb. General Groves has also informed me that
he personally went over all information concerning me which came to light dur-
ing the course of operations of the atomic project and that at no time did he regret
Ms decision.9
"I don't believe that you will find any need to make use of any such statement,
but you might You might wish to show it to some individual for his use in
handling unpleasant situations, if any arise.
"I have been very much pleased with the comments that have been made by
various persons in whose judgment I have more than average faith, such as the
reported statement of Representative Nixon that he had 'complete confidence in
Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty.' This was made in a speech at Oakdale, Calif.
"I am, sure of one thing, and that is, that this type of attack, while it is
unpleasant, does not in the end do real damage to one's reputation.
"I wonder if you saw the editorial in the Washington Post to the effect that
the way to cripple the United States atomic energy program would be to single
out a few of the foremost nuclear physicists and dispose of them by character
assassination. When I remember how the Post has written about me, it makes
me wonder just who wrote this particular editorial.
"I do hope that you are finding life enjoyable and not too hectic and that I
will have the pleasure of seeing you again before too long.
"My very best to Mrs. Oppenheimer.
179
"Sincerely yours" signed "L. R. Groves, Lt. General U. S. Army (Retired)."
General, if Dr. Oppenheimer had had occasion to make this statement public,
needless to say it would have been the quoted portion as set forth in your
letter. But I think it appropriate in this executive session to put the whole
letter in the record and ask you if the expressions of confidence in him contained
in this letter you wrote hold?
A. I think the letter is something that was absolutely what I thought at the
time that I wrote it. I think if you interpret it in that light and know what has
happened since, that you can draw your own conclusions as to what I feel today.
Mr. GABEISON. That is all.
Mr. ROBB. May I ask another question?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
RErCBOSS-EXAiCEiATIOW
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. General Groves, I show you the memorandum which you wrote to the Sec-
retary of War under date of March 24, 1947, and ask you if you recall writing
that?
A. No; I don't recall. Oh, yes, surely I recall writing this. I know I wrote
it because again my signature is there, and nobody ever successfully forged it
Mr. ROBB. I think it might be well, Mr. Chairman, so the record would be
complete, if I read this in the record, too.
"Memorandum to the Secretary of War.
"Subject : Loyalty clearance of Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer.
"WAS DEPABTMENT,
"Washington, March 24, ISJff.
"In accordance with our telephonic conversation, I express below my views
relative to the loyalty of Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer.
"When I was first placed in charge of the Atomic Bomb development in Sep-
tember 1942, I found a number of persons working on the project who had not
received proper security clearances. One of these was Dr. Oppenheimer who had
been studying certain of the theoretical problems concerning the explosive force
of the bomb. The security organization, then not under my control, did not
wish to clear Dr. Oppenheimer because of certain of his associations, particularly
those of the past. After consideration of the availability and caliber of suitable
scientists, I decided that it would be in the best interests of the United States
to use Dr. Oppenheimer's services. Prior to this, I reviewed Dr. Oppenheimer's
complete record personally. It was apparent to me that he would not be cleared
by any agency whose sole responsibility was military security. Nevertheless,
my careful study made me feel that, in spite of that record, he was funda-
mentally a loyal American citizen and that, in view of his potential overall
value to the project, he should be employed. I ordered accordingly that he be
cleared for the Manhattan project. Since then, I have learned many things
amplifying that record but nothing which, if known to me at that time, would
have changed my decision.
"In connection with the above statement, it must be remembered that the
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 did not control my actions prior
to the enactment of that law. My decisions in respect to clearances of personnel
were based on what I believed to be the best overall interests of the United
States under the then existing circumstances. As I have long since informed
the Atomic Energy Commission, I do not consider that all persons cleared for
employment by the Manhattan District, while under my command, should be
automatically cleared by the Atomic Energy Commission, but that that Com-
mission should exercise its own independent judgment based on present circum-
stances."
Signed "L. R. Groves, Major General, U8A."
The WITNESS. Might I ask the date?
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. March 24, 1947. I thought I read that
A. Oh, you did.
Q. Do yon care to comment on that?
A. Yes ; I would like to comment on that.
Q. Yes, sir.
A. It is my recollection, and particularly reinforced by those letters that you
read previously and something that appeared in some paper which I know was
true, that it was about this time that the Atomic Energy Commission reviewed
180
this question of Dr. Oppenbelmer's usefulness on the project. They apparently,
I think at that time that they actually reviewed it — and the paper stated it
was March 8 that Lilienthal got a telephone call or that It was taken up by
the Commission in response to a letter or something of information from
J. Edgar Hoover — I believe I was in Florida at that time, because I had gone down
there about that time to try to get away from Washington, and particularly to
get away so that I would not be in Washington during the confirmation fight on
the Hill on Lilienthal and the other Commissioners. The War Department
insisted on my coming back. They thought, I think, 10 days was enough leave
for me. They exerted all kinds of pressure on the Surgeon General, and I
was finally sort of forced to come back much sooner than I wanted to come
back. It was not health ; it was just a case I wanted to be out of Washington
during that time. I thought it was wise from the standpoint of everybody,
including the national interest.
The Commission apparently cleared Dr. Oppenheimer on the basis of a letter,
two letters — either 1 or 2 — by Bush and Conant, who said more or less to the
effect, as I recall, that Oppenheimer should be cleared because during the war
I had used him on the Manhattan project, and everybody knew how insistent I
was on security, and therefore he should be cleared. But the Commission
never asked me.
As I say, Mr. Lilienthal never asked me anything anyway. So apparently after
I got back, somebody woke up and they finally asked Paterson, and Mr. Pater-
son asked me to give him my views. That is why that letter was written..
I would like also to add for your information that all these letters that have
been written, and in fact, almost every letter that was ever signed by me during
the whole project, was personally written by me. It was not a staff prepared
letter. I didn't have a staff in the first place, and I didn't write any letters that
weren't important. All the letters you have heard today were undoubtedly
written by me originally without a draft from anyone — possibly with some
advice from people as to what do you think of this draft or something like
that— but they were my letters in their entirety in every way.
Mr. ROBB. Thank you, General.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, General. We are glad to have had you as
a witness.
The WITNESS. Thank you very much for letting me come in.
Mr. GRAY. We will take a recess now, gentlemen.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Robb, are you ready?
Mr. EOBB. Yes, sir.
Whereupon, J. Bobert Oppenheimer, a witness having been previously duly
sworn, was recalled to the stand and testified further as follows :
CROSS-EXAMINATION — Resumed
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, yesterday we discussed for a little bit David Joseph
Bohm. Do you recall that?
A. I recall most of it, I think.
Q. You testified that in accord with your letter of answer to General Nichols
that you asked for the transfer of Bohm to Los Alamos. Do you recall that?
A. Surely.
Q. What did you know about David Joseph Bohm's academic background?
In other words, his record as a scholar?
A. He was a good student, a very good student.
Q. Where had he been a student?
A. At Berkeley.
Q. Do you recall that his grades were not very good at Berkeley?
A. No. I think the grades he got from me were probably good. He has made
a very great name for himself as a scientist
Q. You testified, as I recall, that you had seen Bohm and Lomanitz at Prince-
ton before they appeared and testified before the House committee.
A. This was pure accident. I was walking from the barber
Q. Thereafter you read the transcript of their testimony.
A. Yes. I don't recall how carefully I read it, but I read it
Q. It was a matter of interest to you, though, was it not?
A. Naturally.
Q. Did you notice that both Bohm and Lomanitz declined to answer upon
ffte ground of possible self-incrimination when asked whether or not they knew
• bteve rselson?
181
A. I recognize that.
Q. Did that make any particular impression upon you?
A. I concluded that they did know him.
Q. You also concluded, did you not, that the fact that they knew him might
cause them to be incriminated in some criminal proceeding?
A. Right.
Q. It was not an unreasonable conclusion on your part, was it, that the
criminal matter might be espionage?
A. I had been told in that interview in the spring of 1946 with the FBI
that the investigation concerned their joining the Communist Party.
Q. But didn't you conclude when you read their testimony refusing to admit
or answer whether or not they knew Nelson that they might have been in-
volved in espionage with Nelson ?
A. I didn't conclude that they were. I didn't conclude anything, sir.
Q. Didn't you conclude that they might have been?
A. I didn't draw any conclusion.
Q. What did you think they might have been incriminated in by their answers?
A. Membership in the Communist Party?
Q. Is that all?
A. That is all I knew about.
Q. Did you see Bohm after he testified?
A. I am sure I did.
Q. Did you talk with him about his testimony?
A. No.
Q. Tou did not cross him off your list of friends after he testified, did you?
A. We were in Princeton not really friends. We were acquaintances. I
didn't cut him. I didn't run away from him. I don't believe there was any
real problem.
Q. Was there any change whatever in your relationship with and your atti-
tude toward Bohm after he testified?
A. I was worried about his testimony. I didn't like it.
Q. Was there any change in your relationship with Bohm or your attitude
toward him?
A. My attitude I have just described.
Q. Was there any change in your relationship?
A. I find it hard to answer that question because the relationship was not
a very substantial one.
Q. You said you were worried about his testimony. What do you mean
by that? J
A. I don't like it when people that I know have to plead the fifth amendment.
Q. But you testified yesterday that you would, had he asked you, given him
a letter of recommendation after that.
A. A letter of recommendation as a competent physicist.
Dr. EVANS. Bohm is publishing scientific articles now, is he?
The WITNESS. He is.
Dr. EVANS. What university is he at?
The WITNESS. University of Technical Institute or something at Sao Paulo,
Brazil.
By Mr. EOBB :
Q Did you know a man by the name of Mario Schoenberg?
A! I fhfafc that is right. I was there last summer, and I didn't see Schoen-
berg.
Q. Do you know him?
A. No.
Q. Do you know anything about him?
A. He is reputed to be an active Communist.
Q. You have been told he was?
Q*. Did you and certain other persons sign a letter in his behalf in 1952, I
believe it was?
A. Schoenberg?
A. f tort remember it I was told he was a Communist last summer when
would like to ask if this was referred to in General Nichols'
letter ; do you recall?
182
Mr. ROBB. Not specifically; no; but it was covered in general terms. May
we pass on to something else while we try to find it?
The WITNESS. Let me stipulate. I learned of Schoenberg as a rather great
scandal among the physicists in Brazil last summer. I don't know what the
incident involving him was or what the problem involving him was, but obviously,
if there is a petition or letter of record, I don't want to put you to the trouble
of digging it up.
Mr. GARRISON. Yes.
The WITNESS. You want to see it?
Mr. GRAY. I just want to call attention to the fact that this letter was
not specifically referred to.
Mr. GAEBISON. This is totally new to us. We have never heard of the man
as far as counsel is concerned.
Mr. GRAY. I am calling your attention to the fact that it is probably some-
thing new.
Mr. ROBB. We do not have it here. I will come back to it.
Mr. GRAY. Will you return to this ?
Mr. ROBB. Yes, sir.
The WITNESS. I should not stipulate anything.
Mr. SILVERMAN. No ; not as to a letter you couldn't remember.
The WITNESS. I don't remember.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request at this point that,
subject to check by you with counsel, that this whole matter of Dr. Oppen-
neimer's relations, if any, with this man Schoenberg be not considered a part
of the record until the item has been checked.
Mr. GRAY. This portion of the record beginning with the first question about
Schoenberg at this point will be stricken until you are prepared to read the letter.
Mr. ROBB. I have it here now, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Was that your suggestion?
Mr. GARRISON. No; I would like to make sure it does have some relation
to Bohm or Lomanitz or some one of the people mentioned here. Otherwise
it is completely new, and I think we should have a little notice of it, if we may.
That is what I meant by a check.
Mr. GRAY. I think it would be well for counsel to read the letter and see
whether you wish to make any suggestions.
Mr. ROBB. I will show this photostat to the doctor and ask him if he did in
fact sign this letter.
I am sorry about the date, Doctor ; it was in 1948.
Mr. GARRISON. Would you show it to us?
Mr. ROBB. Yes, indeed.
Mr. MARKS. Why don't you let us take a look at it first, Mr. Robb?
The WITNESS. I will identify my signature and the company, but I will also
shut up.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I think, strictly speaking, it is not within the
purview of the letter, but we have no objection at all to its being read.
Mr. ROBB. Very well
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Doctor, I will read you this letter, or rather a photostat of it At the top
it bears the typewritten legend : "Dispatch No. 743, June 1, 1948. To Depart-
ment—E. P. Keeler/elig." Below that, in printing, "Palmer Physical Labora-
tory, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J., May 20, 1948." Stamped "American
Embassy, June 1, 1948."
"The Honorable HERSCHEL V. JOHNSON,
"American Ambassador, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
"MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR : Prof. Mario Schoenberg, who was a guest in our
laboratories at Princeton for several months a number of years ago, we have
heard, to the dismay of all of us, has been imprisoned at Sao Paulo since March
80 without any formal accusation or any legal process. Can you do something
to have his case reviewed? Schoenberg has made significant contributions to
mechanics, classical and Quantum electrodynamics, astrophysics, and cosmic*
ray physics. He is the leader of the school of theoretical physics at Sao Paulo.
His imprisonment has stopped not only the work of one of the leading Brazilian
scientists but also his training of new Brazilian scientists, which is possibly even
more serious. We have been told that Schoenberg is a Communist It would
appear most unfortunate if the apparently illegal imprisonment of Schoenberg
could be used by Communists and fellow travelers to make M™ into a martyr for
183
civil liberties. Both on this account anrl for the sake of science we hope you
can do something either to get him freed directly or tr» have him brought to a
fair trial
"Respectfully yours,
"P. A. M. DIT.AE,
"Professor of Mathematical Physics, Institute of Advanced Study.
"S. BEFSCHETZ,
"Chairman, Mathematics Depart nirtit, Princeton University.
"J. R. OPPENHEIMER,
"Director, InxtitNte for Adrnnceil Study.
"JOHN A. WHEELER,
"Professor of Pltysics. Princrtan University.
"ErGENE P. WlGNEB,
'•Professor of Mathematical Physics, Princeton University"
Did you sign that letter, sir?
A. My signature is authentic.
Q. Had you known Schoenberg before this?
A. It is my impression that I had not. I don't have an image of what he looks
like. I was not in Princeton some years prior to that letter.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, if Mr. Robb is going to pursue a line of ques-
tioning about this which is, so far as we are concerned, new matter — we make
no technical objection to its being introduced — I think it would be fair if we
might have a 5-minute recess to discuss with Dr. Oppenheimer what he knows
about this man.
Mr. ROBB. Why don't I defer this matter until after the luncheon recess?
Mr. GARRISON. All right.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, do you have before you your letter of answer to General Nichols
again?
A. I do.
Q. Will you turn to page 7, the middle paragraph, where you state, "I con-
tributed to various organizations for Spanish relief "—can you tell us what they
were?
A. I mentioned the North American Committee yesterday afternoon. That
is the one whose name sticks in my mind, but there were others.
Q. Do you recall any others?
A. I have forgotten the name of the other or rival organization. There was
something about medical aid, an organization devoted to that.
Q. I believe you said your contributions were mostly in cash?
A. I think so. I am not very clear about it.
Q. You told us something of Dr. Addis yesterday and also Rudy Lambert,
who is mentioned in the next paragraph. Addis was either a Communist or
very close to a Communist.
A. Yes.
Q. Lambert was a Communist to your knowledge?
A. Right
Q. You told us that Addis died, I think, in 1950 ; is that right?
A. I am not sure of that date.
Q. Approximately, then.
A. Approximately.
Q. You say here, "Addis asked me perhaps in the winter of 1937-38 to con-
tribute through him to the Spanish cause."
Do you recall the circumstances under which he made that request to you.'
A. He invited me to come to his laboratory to talk to me about it.
Q. And you went?
A. I went
Q. Did you talk to him privately?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he say to you? ^ . _
A. He said, "You are giving all this money through these relief organizations.
If you want to do good, let it go through Communist channels, through Com-
munist Party channels, and it will really help."
Q. Is that all he said?
A. That is the substance of it
Q. Was there anything said about the amount of your contributions?
A! He said what I could.
Q. Did you tell h**n what you thought you could?
184
A. I don't think I made up my mind at that time.
Q. Did there come a time when you did?
A. No ; except as we went on.
Q. Then you say, "He made it clear that this money, unlike that which went
to the relief organizations, would go straight to the fighting effort." What do
you mean hy "the fighting effort"?
A. I understood that it meant getting men into Spain in an international
brigade and getting equipment for them. That is what I understood. This
was, I believe, an illegal operation, but I am not sure.
Q. Were you so advised at the time?
A. I was not advised ; no.
Q. Is that why you made your contributions in cash?
A. I think it would have been a good reason for it. I ought to say that I did
a great deal of my business in cash.
Q. Was there any other reason for making your contributions in cash?
A. I think I have stated it
Q. You have stated the specific reason. Wasn't the reason in general that you
wanted to conceal them?
A. I didn't want to advertise them, certainly.
Q. Reading further from your answer at the top of page 8 : "I did so con-
tribute usually when he communicated with me explaining the nature of the
need."
How often would he communicate with you to explain the nature of the need?
A. I would think maybe 5 or 6 times during the time I was in Berkeley. A
year.
Q. Five or six times a year?
A. Yes.
Q. What would be the nature of the need that he would explain?
A. First, it was the war, and then later it was something else. He would tell
me about the fighting ; he would tell me that they were hard up. He would paint
the picture of the desperate situation as it rapidly developed and what money
could do for it
Q. You said later on it was something else. What was that?
A. That was the problem of getting the Spanish Loyalists out of the' camps in
France and getting them resettled. Don't misunderstand me. I am not talking
of this in contemporary terms but in the terms that I understood in those days.
Q. What do you think now the need was?
A. I think probably, if the money went through Communist channels, the
money was to rescue Communists.
Q. You knew it was going through Communist channels.
A. I knew it
Q. For how many years did that go on?
A. You have fixed the date in early 1942. I have the feeling that is about
right.
Q. You mean you think your last contribution was probably in early 1942?
A. Yes ; in early 1942.
Q. Starting in 1937 or earlier?
A. Yes.
Q. In other words, it continued for approximately 4 years?
A. Yes*
Q. What was the average yearly amount that you gave through those channels?
A. I never totaled it up.
Q. I know that.
A. I should think more than $500 and less than $1,000.
Q. Doctor, I don't mean to pry into irrelevant matters of your personal life or
affairs, but your income during those years was probably between fifteen and
twenty thousand dollars a year, wasn't it?
A. No ; that is on the high side.
Q. Would it have been $15,000?
A. I think my salary was $5,000. I have not looked it up. I believe we got
about $8,000 or so in dividends and interest
Q. Doctor, I am not trying to trap you.
A. No, no. It was not under $12,000 and not over $18,000.
Q. I have looked at your income-tax return for, I think, 1942, and it seemed
to me to be about $15,000.
A. Good.
Q. That was your State income-tax return. So that it would be perfectly
possible for you to give him $1,000 a year or even more, wouldn't it?
Ibo
A. Sure. I was not using the money I had for my personal needs.
Q. You might have given him as much as $150 a month on the average?
A. That is a leading question.
Q. Yes ; I know.
A. I could have as far as the money I had available.
Q. And you have no definite recollection as to just how much you did give him?
A. I remember once giving §300.
Q. In cash?
A. In cash.
Q. What was the need that he explained to you for that money?
A. I believe that was just before the end in Spain, that is, of the war.
Q. What was the need?
A. The need was to prevent defeat.
Q. You mean more cartridges or something?
A. More people.
Q. Your testimony is that Addis started you off on this, or rather your answer
states that Addis started you off, and your testimony is, too, and there is a time
when he brouirht in Isaac Polkoff.
A. Right. He told me he had been giving the money to Folkoff and Folkoff
could explain things just as well.
Q. Was any reason given to you why Folkoff executed for Addis?
A. None.
Q. By the way, where did you usually give him this money — in your house, or
where?
A. Sometimes when he was coming to Berkeley. More often I went to San
Francisco and very often went to visit him in his laboratory or in his home. It
wasn't a regular meeting. Sometimes we met casually and he talked to me and
we would fix a meeting.
Mr. GABEISON. May I ask the clarification whether the "he" refers to Folkoff or
Addis?
By Mr. RQBB:
Q. I am talking about Addis. Did you follow the same system with Folkoff?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there any difference?
A. No, except that Folkoff came less frequently to Berkeley.
Q. Did you ever go to FolkofPs house or office to give him money?
A. I don't remember his office or his house, but I won't at this stage deny it.
Q. About when was that when Folkoff came into the picture?
A. I don't remember. I can make a guess. In 1940. But it is a guess.
Q. You testified that Addis told you Folkoff would take over, and he would
explain things to you, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. What did Folkoff explain to you?
A. With one or two exceptions it was all the business about the refugees,
the camps in France, the resettlement problems, and how much it cost and how
much it cost to get to Mexico, and all the rest. This was the campaign.
Q. What were the exceptions?
A. I remember one. The one I remember was a campaign — this occurred
more than once— to organize the migratory labor in the California valley. I
understood that Communists were involved in that.
Q. I was about to ask you a campaign by whom, and the answer would be by
the Communists.
A. Right.
Q. You say in your answer, "Sometimes I was asked for money for other
purposes. The organization of migratory labor in the California valleys, for
instance." That is what you have reference to.
A. Right.
Q. What were any of the other purposes besides that?
A. Besides these three I mentioned, I don't recollect
Q. You do recall there were others?
A. I have the impression there were others.
Q. Was it your procedure to cash a check and then turn the cash over to either
Addis or Folkoff?
A. I presume I got the money from the bank.
Q. You had a checking account
A. I had a checking account.
186
Q. You say In your answer, "In time these contributions came to an end. I
went to a big Spanish relief party the night before Pearl Harbor ; and the next
day, as we heard the news of the outbreak of war, I decided that I had had about
enough of the Spanish cause, and that there were other and more pressing crises
in the world,"
Doctor, the Spanish cause was identified in your mind with the Communist
Party, wasn't it?
A. Not as clearly as it has been since. The International Brigade, I think in
fact was not purely Communist. It was certainly Communist organized.
Q. In all events, your contributions were strictly made to the Communists.
A. Absolutely.
Q. You did not feel any revulsion against the Communists until after Pearl
Harbor?
A. I don't believe this indicates revulsion.
Q. Did you at the time of Pearl Harbor feel any revulsion against the Com-
munist Party?
A. That is much too strong a word.
Q. You did not?
A. Not anything as strong as revulsion, no.
Q. You were not quite as enthusiastic as you had been previously, is that right?
A, Yes ; I could put it a little more strongly than that and a little less strongly
than revulsion.
Q. Very welL What was the reason why Pearl Harbor had any bearing on
your attitude towards the Communist Party?
A. I think I should add something to what it says here, that is, I didn't like
to continue a clandestine operation of any kind at a time when I saw myself
with the possibility or prospect of getting more deeply involved in the war.
Q. There was no question in your mind that this was a clandestine operation,
was there?
A, I don't think I concealed it from friends, but I didn't advertise it
Q. You didn't conceal it from your Communist friends, certainly.
A. Or my wife or so on.
Q. What effect did the Nazi-Russian Pact of 1989 have on your attitude
towards the Communist Party?
A. I hated the sudden switch that they made. I hoped that they would
realize that this was a mistake. I didn't understand that the Communists in this
country were not free to think, that the line was completely dictated from abroad.
Q. You didn't cease your contributions at that time, did you?
A. Contributions to this affair?
Q. Yes.
A. I don't think it had any effect
Q. Pardon?
A. I think it had no effect.
Q. Doctor, coining to page 9 of your answer, you refer to your brother Frank,
he told you in 1937, probably in 1937, that he and his wife Jackie had Joined the
Communist Party. What was the occasion for telling you that?
A. My memory is sharp, but it could be wrong. I think he drove up to
Berkeley, spent the night with me, and told me about it then.
Q, What was the reason for telling you, do you know? Did he explain why
he was telling you ?
A I was his brother, I suppose, and something of the fraternal relations was
involved.
Q. Did he ask your advice about it?
A. Oh>lordrno. He had taken the step.
• Q. .Was It shocking to you?
A. My recollection, which may not be the same as his, is that I was quite upset
about it.
Q* You say in- the autumn of 1941 they, meaning your brother and his wife.
came to Berkeley. , , . . .
A. They moved to Berkeley.
Q. I am reading your answer.
. . - . .
Q. "* * * and Frank worked for the Radiation Laboratory. At that time be
^ •"""" * * -
A. By saying so, I think.
Q. Just that?
A. It was presumably in a context I don't remember the context
Q. You mean he Just said, "1 am no longer a member"?
187
A. He probably said that he had not been since he left Stanford, which was
some time earlier. No, I don't think he did. I don't think he did, because the
Stanford thing I was not clear about.
Q. Did you talk with him about his left wing friends either then or later?
A. I may have.
Q. Why do you say you may have?
A. I don't recollect it I may be wrong about this conversation with Frank,
and it may be that I asked him, did he have any party connections.
Q. Why would you have asked him?
A. Ernest Lawrence had told me he would like to take Frank on. This was
not secret work, but it was in the Radiation Lab. Lawrence had a very strong
objection to political activity and to left wing activity. When Lawrence had
talked to me about it, he said provided your brother behaves himself, or some
such, and keeps out of these things. It would have been natural for me to
inquire.
Q. You knew that if it were known that your brother was a member of the
Communist Party, he could not get the job, didn't you?
A. Yes. My honor was a little bit involved because of my having talked to
Lawrence.
Q. Did you know or did you believe that if it were known that your brother
was a very recent member of the Communist Party, he might not get the job?
A. I didn't know and I don't know now what effect that would have had.
Q. Did you inquire?
A. No.
Q. Did you tell Lawrence that your brother had been a member of the Party?
A. I think I told him he had a lot of left wing activity.
Q. Did you tell him he had been a member of the Communist Party?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Your honor didn't require you to do that?
A. I didn't think so.
Q. You should have, should you not?
A. These things were not that way in those days, at least not in the community
that I knew. It wasn't regarded, perhaps foolishly, as a great state crime to be
a member of the Communist Party or as a matter of dishonor or shame.
Q. Now, continuing with your answer on page 9 :
"As to the alleged activities of Jackie and Frank in 1944, 1945 and 1946: I
was not in Berkeley in 1944 and 1945 ; I was away most of the first half of 1946 ;
I do not know whether these activities occurred or not, and if I had any knowl-
edge of them at the time it would only have been very sketchy."
Doctor, may I ask -you, sir, you say if you had any knowledge; did you have
any knowledge of them?
A. If I had Imown whether I had knowledge, I would have said so in here. I
can't remember.
Q. You don't know whether you did or not?
A. That Is right I can't remember whether Frank referred to these things
or not I had no knowledge in the sense of a detailed or clear discussion and I
didn't think it right to say that he couldn't have mentioned these lectures or
something like that
Q. Referring to your New Year's Day visit to Frank at his house, you were
at Frank's house on New Year's Day in 1946?
A. I was. I believe that later in the day we went out to a reception, but this
is my brother's recollection.
Q. Do you recall seeing Pinsky and Adelson there that day ?
A. I certainly don't I have written it here as is true.
Q. Do you recall that Mrs, Oppenheimer, I mean your wife, was ill that day?
A. I remember something which is not very clear. No, I don't recall. I
thought maybe the evening before we had to come home early from New Year's
Eve because she was not feeling welL
Q. Where were you staying at that particular time?
A. The whole of our family was staying with the twhole of my brother's
family. We had not seen each other for a long time, and we stayed in Berkeley.
Q. But you were not staying in the same house as your brother ,was in,
,
A. We were in sort of a barn. » . . . ,. . ,, ,.
if 'Q. fflhotfis fcOHwet * . Don't you recall that Mrs. Oppenheimer WES not feeling
r goody and she stayed in the ham and you went over to your brother's hxrase and
taltexito Adtfswk and PInshy:?
188
A. I don't recollect it, no. I have no recollection of my wife's illness.
Q. Yon say "Pinsky and Adelson, who were at most casual acquaintances of
mine" — how had you made their acquaintance, casual or otherwise?
A. Adelson I met, I believe, for the first time in his house— no, in the house
of a friend, or in his house, I am not clear. That was many, many years earlier.
They were thinking of starting this union at Shell, and they asked me to talk
about how the Teachers Union had been.
A. I believe he had to do with the Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chem-
ists, and Technicians.
Q. What was Adelson's work as far as you know?
A. He was at the Shell Development Co. as a scientist of some kind.
Q. Both Pinsky and Adelson you knew to be Communist sympathizers if not
members?
A. I didn't know them to be members and I had so little contact with them
at the statement that they were Communist sympathizers goes beyond what
I know.
Q. Do you know a man named Barney Young?
A. Young?
Q. Yes.
A. I don't recollect
Q. What did you see of Pinsky and Adelson subsequent to New Year's Day
in 19^6.
A. I don't think I saw them.
Q. Did you hear from them?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Or either of them?
A. I can't deny this because it has been a rather full life, but I don't recol-
lect it
Q. Do you recall in March 1946 when Adelson and Pinsky or either of them
suggested that you run for Congress?
A, In March 1946?
A. March 1946, that I run for Congress?
Q. Suggested to Mrs. Oppenheimer.
A. I think this suggestion I heard about
Q. That is rignt
A. But I believe it was addressed to my brother.
Q. You are sure it was not to you?
A. Quite sure.
Q. How did you hear about it?
A. My brother told me. ' Not Pinsky and Adelson, but that somebody had put
it up to him that he should run for Congress. You have a long record of folly
here, but not that I ran for Congress.
Q. I was not insinuating that you accepted the suggestion, Doctor.
Doctor, you speak on page 10 of your letter of answer of the fact that your
wife "for a year or two during her brief marriage to Ballet" was a Communist
Party member. How long was her marriage with Dallet?
A. She will testify and you will get from her a real biography. The Impres-
sion I have is that it started in 1984 or 1985, that he was killed In 1987. Some-
thing like 2 or 8 years. They were separated a part of this time. It is quite
a complex story, and I don't want to make it more complex by my own imftmifH.
arity witji it
Q. I merely wish to find out what you meant by ''brief marriage.'!
A. Bight; 2 or 8 years.
Q. At page 10 of your answer, "I need to make clear that this changing opinion
of Kussia, which was to be reinforced by the tfazi-Soviet Pact, and the behavior
of the Soviet Union in Poland and in Finland, did not mean a sharp break for
me with those who held to different views. At that time I did not fully under-
stand—as in time I came to understand— how completely the Communist Party
in this Country was under the control of Russia."
At that time, I assume you mean 1988 or 1989?
A. Ho; at tkat time refers to this period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact
Q. I see. When did you come to understand that the Communist 'Party in
this country was completely under the control of Soviet Russia? -."•.' / /.
:--A. i woifld give more or less the same answer to that, that I gave to four
question about fellow traveling, that it was a gradual process. The shift in
Communist position after the German attack on Russia, comlag
189
Soviet Pact, made a big impression. I guess during the war thinking about it
and talking to people, I got that conviction pretty deep in me.
Q. Maybe 1946?
A. I think it was earlier than that
Q. 1945, 1944?
A. Something like that. 1944 would be a good
Mr. GBAY. Excuse me, Mr. Robb. It is 12 : 30. If you are about to go to some
other question, I think we should now recess for lunch.
Mr. ROBB. Yes. I did not realize that.
Mr. GRAY. Yes. We will meet again at 2 o'clock.
(Thereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. GBAY. The proceeding will begin.
I would like to say with respect to the proceedings today and tomorrow,
I think we will go ahead with the questioning of Dr. Oppenheimer this after-
noon as expeditiously as possible. We would like to finish, if we can, the
questioning of Dr. Oppenheimer and then put on these three witnesses tomorrow
that are going to be here.
I understand that will be Colonel Lansdale, Mr. Glennon, and Dr. Gompton.
At the conclusion of their testimony we will then begin what would be referred
to as redirect examination.
In this general connection, also, I express the hope that we can start at nine
o-clock in the morning.
Mr. GARRISON. I am sure that is possible.
Mr. GBAY. I think I would also like to say, Mr. Garrison, that I assume in a
court that the general procedure would be that a judge would direct that the
redirect examination proceed immediately upon the conclusion of the question-
ing on cross. However, in an effort to make sure we are giving every considera-
tion possible to Dr. Oppenheimer and his counsel will take these witnesses out
of order.
Mr. GARRISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe it to be in the discretion
of even a trial judge to do that. I also understand that this is not a trial but
an inquiry.
Mr. GRAY. That is right, sir.
Mr. GARRISON. I have not been able to reach Colonel Lansdale yet His plane
is supposed to be arriving at 1 :30.
Mr. GBAY. Then he has not been upset by any communication.
Mr. ROBB. May I proceed, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. GBAY. Yes.
Whereupon, J. Robert Oppenheimer, the witness on the stand at the time of
taking the recess, resumed the stand and testified farther as follows :
CROSS-EXAMINATION — Continued .
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, would you refer to your letter of answer on page 11,
where you say: "After our marriage in 1940, my wife and I for about 2 years
had much the same circle of friends as I had had before — mostly physicists and
university people."
Could you tell us, Dr. Oppenheimer, what names occur to you as your circle of
friends during that period?
A. Many. Ed McMillan; the first night we were back In Berkeley we had
dinner with the Lawrences ; I had relatives there called the Sterns whom I had
brought over from Germany — the Hands, the Chevaliers, the Edward Tolmans,
the Meiklejohns, Jenkins.
Q. Is that David Jenkins?
A. No ; that is Francis Jenkins. I can go on and on.
Q. I just wondered whom you had in mind.
A. This Is not a bad example. The Addis'.
Q. The Kenneth Mays?
A. No; they were not close friends. I am not trying to name all the people
that we occasionally saw.
Q. Did your circle of friends include some Communists or Communist sym-
pathizers? ' -, :
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Who were they? . ,.. . * / '
A. Let us see about friends. Tfee Chevaliers I have mentioned; the Addis* I
have mentioned.
190
Among Communists, I don't think it would be right to call the Steve Nelsons
friends, but we saw something of them. They were acquaintances. We did see
the Mays— at least Ken May ; I don't know that we saw his wife very much.
Almost everybody in the physics department. The Hlldebrands, the Peters'.
Dr. EVANS. La timer?
The WITNESS. We saw him but he was not a personal friend.
Mr. GAEEISON. Just for clarity
The WITNESS. The Stephen Peppers.
Mr. GAKEISON. When he said almost everybody in the physics department,
would you determine whether he was referring to Communists or Communist
sympathizers ?
The WITNESS. No ; not Communists.
Mr. ROBB. I understood you to mean you saw almost everybody in the physics
department
The WITNESS. That is right.
Mr. GRAY. The record will show that the witness did not say that everybody
in the physics department was a Communist.
The WITNESS. That is right The Peters1.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. They were Communists.
A. I told you yesterday that they had no connection with the party.
Q. They were pretty dose?
A. I think they had no connection with the party at all.
Mr. GRAY. There was one name that I didn't get and I don't know whether the
reporter did, either. Was it Hand?
The WITNESS. George Hand.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Doctor, have you ever crossed anybody off your list or ceased to see them
because of their Communist Party connections?
A. I can't put it that way. Since the war there are people with whom there
has been a sense of hostility which I identified with their remaining close to
the party.
Q. Who were those people?
A. This happened with the Peters'? It happened with a boy who was a doctor
and a close friend of my brother's and used to spend summers at the ranch
long ago.
Q. What is his name?
A. If you need his name I will give it to you. It is Roger Lewis. This
is in a sense an estrangement, but it is not that I know they are members of
the party and I no longer have anything to do with them.
After the war I did not wish to have anything to do with party people in
California. You mentioned the different Jenkins. That is Miss Arnstein's pres-
ent name and I did not wish to see them and I didn't.
Q. She is the Miss Arnstein you mentioned yesterday?
A. Yes.
Q. Is she married to David Jenkins?
A. Yes.
Q. How well do you know Jenkins?
A. Not very well.
Q. Did you know him in 1948 and 1944?
A. 1944 certainly not
Q. Did you know him in 1943?
A. I met him and don't have any recollection of seeing him in 1943.
Q. But you knew Miss Arnstein at that time?
A. From way back, yes.
Q. .In what connection did you know her?
A. I think I told you she was one of Jean Tatlock's best friends.
Q. Did you see David Jenkins and Miss Arnstein* or Mrs. Jenkins after the
war?
A. No.
Q. What caused you to be estranged from her?
A. This is an example of people in the party. I have been searching to
answer your question.
Q. You have searched you memory carefully and those are the names that came
up?
A. I am not sure if I searched longer I would find others.
191
Q. Yon say on the same page: "We were occasionally invited to more or
less obviously leftwing affairs, Spanish relief parties that still continued;*'
Doctor, why were they obviously leftwing?
A. If Schneiderman talked they were obviously leftwing. The Spanish Belief
parties I think by then were obviously leftwing.
Q. What was there about them that indicated so clearly that they were
leftwing?
A. I suppose the presence of many of the people whose names I have told you.
Q. In other words, you felt that those people would not have been at a
party unless it was pretty obviously leftwing?
A. No, no ; not at all. I don't think anybody would refuse to go to a party
because it wasn't leftwing; but many people might refuse to go to a party
if it were leftwing.
Q. Ton say on two occasions, "once in San Francisco and once in Berkeley
we attended social gatherings of apparently well-to-do people, at which Schneid-
erman, an official of the Communist Party in California, attempted, not with
success as far as we were concerned, to explain what the Communist line was
all about."
Where were those parties held?
A. One that I talked about yesterday was at the Chevaliers. One that I
did not talk about yesterday was at Louise Bransten's.
Q. Who is she?
A. She lived in San Francisco. I think she was separated from her husband,
had some money and was a friend of Addis. I know very little about her
but I believe she was a Communist sympathizer.
Q. Wasn't she a member of the Communist Party?
A. If she was I didn't know that. I didn't know anything about that.
Q. Did you ever hear that she was a mistress of a man named Keiflts who was
in the Russian Consulate?
A. No ; I never heard that
Q. How did you happen to meet Miss Brans ten?
A. I don't remember.
Q. This party was held at her house?
A. Yes.
Q. In the evening?
A. Yes.
Q. How many people were present?
A. It was similar to the one at the Chevaliers, 20 people. I don't have a
clear distinction between the two in mind.
Q. Can you recall about when that was?
A. No. It was after our marriage because my wife was there.
Q. After 1940?-
A. I would say after the end of 1940.
Q. Subsequent, of course, to the Nazi-Soviet Pact?
A. Yes. Possibly subsequent — well, I don't remember.
Q. Who was present beside you?
A. I told you a few names at the Chevalier party, and I have no further
memory or no very different memory about this group.
Q. You think it likely the same group?
A. Not identical, but overlapping.
Q. Can you tell us anybody who was there at Louise Bransten's house who was
not either a Communist or a Communist sympathizer?
A. If you use the word "sympathizer" in a very loose sense, I can't.
Q. Have you ever described that meeting at Louise Bransten's house before
in any testimony or in any statement that you have made?
A. Either my wife or I did to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Q. When?
Mr. MASKS. Mr. Chairman, could we have Dr. Oppenheimer's last preceding
answer read, and also the question? I am trying to be sure I understood exactly
what he said.
Mr. ROBB. Will the reporter read the question and answer, please.
(The question and answer were read by the reporter as herein recorded.)
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. My last question was when did you tell the FBI about the Louise Bransten
party?
308318— 64 13
192
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, isn't this an item not in the the Commission's
letter?
Mr. ROBB. It is in Dr. Oppenheimer's answer. I think I have a right to
explore it
Mr. GARRISON. Did he mention Louise Brans ten?
Mr. ROBB. He mentioned 2 parties, and I think I have the right to find out
which they were and where they were held.
The WITNESS. I am not sure when. Conceivably the last time was in 1942.
But that is easier to check on for you than for me.
By Mr. ROBB: .
Q. Going back to the answer that Mr. Marks asked to have reread, the answer
as to whether you could tell us anybody who was at Louise Bransten's who was
not either a Communist or a Communist sympathizer, I will rephrase the ques-
tion as follows: Can you tell us anybody there who was not either a Com-
munist or a fellow traveler as you define -that word?
A. I need to say that I cannot really remember who was there. I had trouble
yesterday with the Chevalier meeting. I have a similar trouble here. I cannot
help you out
Q. Of those who you do remember being there, they were either Communists
or fellow travelers, were they not?
A. I am not sure of Jack Straus.
Q. Jack who?
A. Straus. I am not sure where he stood. I am not absolutely certain
whether he was at both of these meetings. He was at one of them. I tfrinfr
Mrs. Chevalier was not much of a Communist sympathizer. She was certainly
at the one at her home, possibly at the one at Louise Bransten's.
Q. When you talked to the FBI agents in 1946, as you mentioned in your
answer, is it your testimony that you did not recall one of these meetings had
taken place at Chevalier's house?
A. That is right
Q. And they asked you about certain meetings and you said that you thought
they were completely irrelevant?
A. That is my recollection.
Q. Doctor, if you didn't remember at that time where the meeting had taken
place, how did you know it was completely irrelevant?
A, It was a sudden change in questioning which had been about Chevalier and
then there was a question as perhaps in this form : Do you remember attending
a meeting at Bast Bay at which Schneiderman talked, or something like that.
Q. And you at once said that that is irrelevant?
A. I don't recollect You have the record.
Q. My question is, sir, how could you be sure that the meeting was irrelevant
if you didn't recall where it took place?
A. I couldn't be sure that I thought if it were relevant it would be explained
to me. Instead the agent said that "we Just do this sort of thing to test your
veracity."
Q. When did you recall it took place at the Chevaliers?
A. I told my wife about this interview and she reminded me of it
Q. When?
A. Very shortly thereafter.
Q. A day?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Within a day or two?
A. Very shortly thereafter.
Q. Did you then telephone the FBI to tell them that you remembered that it
took place at the Chevaliers?
A. No ; because the FBI had indicated that this was not a substantive question.
Q. Not what?
A. Not a question of substantive interest.
Q. When you recalled it had taken place at the Chevaliers, did you then think
it was relevant?
A. Not terribly because I defined as well as I could Chevalier's political views.
Q. Did you think it had any relevance at all after you recalled where it had
taken place?
A. I don't believe I put that question to myself.
Q. You were asked about the meeting again in 1950 by the IPBL is that correct?
A. Eight
Q. At that time you told them about the meeting at Chevalier's house. .
193
A. Bight.
Q. So you thought then it was relevant?
A. I don't rememher the line of questioning. It was certainly relevant to
their then questioning and they asked me about It.
Q. You next mention on page 11, Kenneth May. You knew he was an active
Communist, didn't you?
A. I certainly knew it when it was public knowledge. I don't believe I knew
it before that
Q. When did that become public knowledge?
A. That is a matter of record, but not in my mind.
Q. Didn't you know he was a Communist Party functionary at any time of
your association with him?
A. Yes.
Q. You knew that?
A. Yes. It was public knowledge that he was a Communist Party functionary
during part of my association.
Q. I see.
A. But I don't remember the date when this occurred.
Q. In other words, while you were associating with him socially and other-
wise, you knew that he was a Communist Party functionary because it was
public knowledge?
A. Socially is better than socially and otherwise.
Q. Socially? VerywelL
A. Sure.
Q. How did you come to know Dr. Weinberg?
A. In the most normal way. I knew all the graduate students who studied
theoretical physics in the department of physics in Berkeley. I believe I called
them all by their first names.
Q. Did you have any relationship with Weinberg other than that of professor
and student?
A. I think I need to say several things in answer to that. The first simple
answer is "No," until after the war when he was not a student but an instructor
and when he and his wife— we saw them once or twice as was proper for dinner or
tea or something.
The second thing is that with most of my students it would not be an uncommon
thing for me to have dinner with them or to have lunch with them while we were
working. I think my relations to Weinberg were much less dose than with most
of my graduate students.
Q. What was the occasion for you meeting with w™ and his wife after the
war?
A. He was an Instructor in the physics department in Berkeley. I ifM-nk we
probably had dinner or tea or something with every member of the department.
Q. Did he and his wife come to your house for social occasions?
A. Not more than once or twice.
Q. They did from time to time?
A. No.
Q. Well, once or twice?
A. Once or twice. I am not certain about this. I am speculating. We did see
them as we saw everybody.
Q. You mentioned yesterday recommending counsel to Dr. Weinberg at the
time of his criminal trial.
A. No. That is a misunderstanding.
Q. I beg your pardon.
A. That is a misunderstanding. I mentioned recommending counsel to Cheva-
lier for his passport problem.
Q. I see.
A. It turns out that it was the same man or one of the 2 people who represented
Weinberg in the course of his trial. I had nothing to do with his selection.
Q. Did you see Weinberg about the time of his criminal trial?
A. No, I did not. I saw him once very briefly. I can fix the time. It was
the winter of 1952 at the American Physical Society meetings. I was with
another past president and the president-elect of the society and he walked by,
noticed us, shook hands and we passed the time of day.
Q. Did you ever discuss with Weinberg the matter of his criminal trial either
before or after it took place?
A. I was represented by counsel.
Q. I know that.
A. There were no discussions between me and Weinberg.
194
Q. Your counsel and Weinberg's counsel presumably did discuss it?
A. That is right.
Q. Did you in any way help to finance Weinberg's defense in that case?
A. I did not.
Q. When did you first hear that Weinberg had been a Communist?
A. At the time of the 1946 interview with the FBI, the agents told me— they
questioned me about Weinberg, Lomanitz and so on — and I said, "What is
wrong with them?" He said, "There is a question of their membership in the
Communist Party.*'
Q. Were you surprised to hear that?
A. A little bit but not much in the case of Weinberg.
Q. You are quite sure that is the first time you ever heard or had been told
he was a Communist?
A. No. I had heard an earlier rumor.
Q. When?
A. When he came to Berkeley that he had been a member of the YCL, the
Young Communist League in Madison, but it was hearsay.
Q. Who told you that?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Did you hear anything more about him at that time?
A. No.
Q. Did Weinberg and Lomanitz come to you to talk about Lomanitz' draft
deferment?
A. No.
Q. Are you sure?
A. Let's see. The only time this might have been would have been at the
time I talked to Lomanitz at the same time we talked so much of yesterday in the
summer of 1943. I have no recollection of Weinberg being involved in that.
Q. Do you recall an occasion in Dr. Lawrence's office when you talked to both
Weinberg and Lomanitz?
A. No, I don't.
Q. In all events, doctor, you are sure that until 1946, except for the rumor
that you mentioned, you had no information to the effect that Weinberg was or
had been a Communist?
A. No. I think that is right.
Q. You could not be mistaken about that?
A. One can be mistaken about anything. This is my best recollection.
Q. You say in your answer, "Hiskey I did not know."
A. No.
Q. Did you ever meet Hiskey?
A. There is this allegation that I met him at this party. I have no recollection
of it and I don't know whether I was at the party or not I didn't know h1™
before the party ; I didn't know him after the party ; I am not clear whether I was
at the party or noif
Q. Were you ever at any party at which either Hiskey or Weinberg was
present?
A. I never had any recollection of Hiskey whatever until this story was
brought up.
Q. How about Weinberg?
A. I am sure I was at parties at which Weinberg was present
Q. What kind of parties?
A. Physics department, graduate school parties. I don't know what else.
Q. Leftwing parties?
A. I would not be surprised, but I don't remember.
Q. You would expect him to be at and to find him at some such party, would
you not?
A. I would not have found it strange.
Q. When did you first meet Steve Nelson?
A. I don't know whether it was before my marriage to my wife or not
I think it was. She thinks that it was after our marriage.
Q. When did you think you met him, and what were the circumstances under
which you met him?
A. I think it may have been in connection with a big Spanish party In the
fall of 1939.
Q. Where?
A. In San Francisco.
Q. Do you recall talking to Mrn on that occasion?
A. No.
195
Q. What is there about the occasion that makes feteve Nelson stand out in
your mind?
A. He was a hero and there was either talk of him or I saw him, I don't know.
Q. What was he a hero for?
A. For his alleged part in the Spanish War.
Q. You knew he was a Communist Party functionary?
A. I knew he was a Communist and an important Communist.
Q. Thereafter, Steve Nelson was at your home on various occasions, was
he not?
A. That was much later.
Q. When was that?
A. The times I remember— and I think they are the only times — were in the
winter of 1941-42.
Q. What is the last date that you recall him being at your home?
A. I don't recall the dates. It probably was in 1942.
Q. 1942?
A. Yes.
Q. Summer, fall, spring, or when?
A. I don't know.
Q. Were you at that time working on the secret war project?
A. I was thinking about it if it was in the winter, and I was employed on it
if it was the summer.
Q. I beg your pardon?
A. If it was in the winter I was thinking about it, and consulting about it ; if
it was in the summer, I was actually employed on it
Q. In all events whether it was in the winter or summer, at the time Steve
Nelson was at your house you had some connection with this project, did you
not?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. How many times did Steve Nelson come to your house?
A. I would say several, but I do not know precisely.
Q. Did you ever go to his house?
A. I am not clear. If so, it was only to call for him or something like that.
Q. Call for him?
A. Yes.
Q. Why would you have called for him?
A. To bring him up to our house.
Q. Who else was present at your house on the occasions when Nelson was
there?
A. I have no memory of this. These were very often Sundays and people
would drop in.
Q. The occasions when he was there were not occasions when there was a large
group of people?
A. No. We would be out in the garden having a picnic or something like that.
It is quite possible that my brother and sister-in-law would come, but I have
no memory of this.
Q. Can you give us any idea how long these visits were with Nelson?
A. A few hours.
Q. Each time?
A. The ones I am thinking of, and I think they are the ones you are referring
to, and the only ones that occurred, are when he and his wife and his baby
would come up.
Q. What did you have in common with Steve Nelson?
A. Nothing, except an affection for my wife.
Q. Did you find his conversation interesting?
A. The parts about Spain, yes.
Q. Was he a man of any education?
A. No.
Q. What did you talk about?
A. We didn't talk about much. Kitty and he reminisced.
Q. Eeminlsced about what?
A. My wife's former husband, people they had known in the party.
Q. Communist Party activities?
A. Past Communist friendships.
Q. Did Nelson tell you what he was doing in California?
A. No. I knew he was connected with the Alameda County organization.
Q. Did Nelson ever ask what you were doing?
A. No.
196
Q. Are you sore?
A. Positive. He knew I was a scientist
Q. He knew that?
A. Yes.
Q. How did he know that?
A. It was well known in the community and we talked about it.
Q. Did you call him Steve?
A. I think so.
Q. Did he call you Oppy?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Probably?
A. I don't remember. He and my wife— she will tell you about it. They had
close affectionate relationships and I was a natural bystander.
Q. Doctor, you knew a man named David Hawkins, did you not?
A. Yes.
Q. You speak of him on page 21 of your answer.
A. Bight
Q. How did you meet him?
A. I know that I— well, I better be careful because I never am quite dear or
very seldom dear how I first meet people.
I believe we met hi™ and his wife at my brother's at Stanford. I thinir it
likely that I was at least acquainted with him on the Berkeley campus before
that time, though I doubt I met his wife.
Q. Was the occasion that you think you met him at your brother's house at
Stanford the occasion of some leftwing gathering?
A. No. It was a few people on the porch, or something like that.
Q. You say that you understood that Hawkins had leftwing associations?
A. Yes.
Q. How did you understand that?
A. I understood it in part from the conversations we had and in part from
my brother. I am not sure where I got this information.
Q. When did you have the understanding first?
A. I don't know.
Q. Prior to 1943?
A. Prior to his coming to Los Alamos.
Q. What were the leftwing associations that you understood that he had?
A. Well, my brother was a good enough example.
Q. What others?
A. He and the Morrisons were closely acquainted.
Q. Who are the Morrisons?
A. Phillip Morrison was a student of mine and was very far left
Q. He was very far left?
A. Yes.
Q. Was he a Communist?
A. I think it probable.
Q. Did he go to work on the project?
A. He did.
Q. With your approval?
A. With no relation to me.
Q. Did you ever make known to anyone that you thought that Phillip Morrison
was probably a Communist?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. Well, let me say he was on the project in another branch quite independent
of me. When he came to Los Alamos, General Groves let me understand that
he knew Morrison had what he called a background and I was satisfied that the
truth was known about him.
Q. Morrison came to Los Alamos?
A. That is right. When he came to Los Alamos we had this discussion.
Q. He was so far leftwing that you thought that the mere fact that Hawkins
was a friend of his stigmatized Hawkins, too, did you not?
A. Not stigmatized him ; gave him a leftwing association.
Q. What did Morrison do at Los Alamos? I don't mean in detail but in gen-
eral.
A. He came late and he worked in what was called the bomb physics division.
He worked with the reactor we had there. Then after the war he built a quite
ingenious new kind of reactor.
Q. Did Phillip Morrison go over to Hiroshima to witness the drop?
197
A. He was over there. I think he was in Japan. He certainly was not at
Hiroshima.
Q. Did you designate him to go to Japan?
A. I don't know. I don't believe so.
Q. Was your advice asked about him going there?
A. I am afraid to say to that I don't know the answer. I don't believe I would
have interposed an objection,
Q. You would not have?
A. But I don't believe I was asked.
Q. Had you read Phillip Morrison's testimony before the House Committee?
A. I have.
Q. Was it House or Senate?
A. Senate.
Q. Are you satisfied from that testimony that he was a Communist?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you surprised when you read that testimony?
A. No.
Q. It accorded with what you previously knew?
A. With what I believed.
Q. Yes. What else did you know about Hawkins' leftwing associations?
A. I don't think I knew much more about it than I told you.
Q. Did you know anything about his wife?
A. I think he had a brother-in-law of whom I heard it said he was a Com-
munist.
Q. Did you know a man named Parkman?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you know that Parkman was discharged from the Air Force because
of his Communist leanings?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever hear that?
A. No.
Q. Did you know that Hawkins was a friend of Louise Brantsen?
A. No.
Q. What was Hawkins' training?
A. He was trained as a mathematician and philosopher.
Q. What was his major?
A. I don't know. I suppose philosophy.
Q. Philosophy?
A. I t*friTr so.
Q. Don't you know that?
A. He was a professor of philosophy. I didn't know him as a student
Q. He was not a physicist?
A. No.
Q. By the way, how old was he, do you know?
A. No.
Q. Comparatively young, wasn't he?
A. Yes. I thing he was an instructor teaching mathematics at that time.
Q. You said: "I supported the suggestion of the personnel director that he,
Hawkins, come to Los Alamos."
A. Yes.
Q. How did you support that suggestion?
A. Let me give a word of background. A committee of which Richard Toman
was a member, possibly he was chairman, had come to review the state of affairs
at Los Alamos in the spring of 1943. One of their recommendations was that
we get a personnel director. There were a great many that I will not here record.
One of their recommendations was that we get an aide to help the personnel
director and me in the relations between the military establishment and the
laboratory. The personnel director was William Dennis, a prof esor of philosophy
at Berkeley. He did not stay terribly long but he came to help out in an
emergency. What I heard indicated that Dennis proposed that Hawkins come
as his aide and I approved it
Q. How did you approve it?
A. I said I thought it was a good idea. However, I have relied somewhat
on Hawkins' own testimoney of how he got to Los Alamos because I have very
little— I have almost no direct memory of it.
Q. At the time you approved that suggestion you knew what you have told us
about Hawkins' background and connection, didn't you?
A. I did.
198
Q. I find in the minutes of the governing board at Los Alamos for May 3,
this entry : "Dr. Oppenheimer said he was going to try to get lit. Ool. Neil
Asbrldge added to Harmon's staff. He said Mr. Smith was leaving. He pro-
posed to get David Hawkins from Berkeley to handle our relations with the post."
Do you recall that?
A. Obviously. , A __ _ .
Q. So you rather heartily approved of the suggestion that Hawkins come?
A. Oh, sure.
Q. What did Hawkins do when he got there?
A. I don't have the records available, but his first jobs were two. One was
to handle the draft deferments which got to— and this was a job for the personnel
division. He was a New Mexican. He knew the local head of the draft board.
The second job was to take up the complicated negotiations between the
military authority and the scientists on the acceptance of a building, the instal-
lation of equipment, the completion of housing. That was the way it started out.
I also asked him to serve, along with Manley and Kennedy, on the Laboratory
Security Committee, which had largely to do with physical security. I asked
him after discussing the thing with General Groves to write the technical history
of the laboratory. That was much later. By that time I knew him quite well
and had come to have a sense of confidence in him— of great confidence.
Q. Hawkins wrote thhe manual of security for Los Alamos?
A. I don't remember that, but it would have been likely. I discussed security
with him many times. His views and mine were in agreement
Q. Hawkins became more or less your administrative assistant, didn't he?
A For a while. The only person who had that title was David Dow.
Q. Wasn't Hawkins in fact, whether he had the titie or not, pretty much
your administrative assistant?
A. On the matters I have discussed, yes.
Q. Did Hawkins have access to all the secret information on the project at
Los Alamos?
A. Most of it, I should think, yes.
Q. When he wrote the history, he had access to all of it, didn't he?
A. Most of it. I still think that some things like production rates, and so on,
would not have come his way.
Q. Did his wife come to Los Alamos with him?
A. Yes.
Q. You know she was extremely left wing, if not a Communist, didn't you?
A. I didn't have that impression, but I may be wrong.
Q. You knew that her brother was, anyway?
A. Yes; I heard that.
Q. Did you ever make known to any security officer what you knew about
Hawkins and his wife?
A. What I knew was not very substantial. When the question of the report
came up I asked General Groves whether he regarded Hawkins' background as
a reason for not doing this. I also discussed it at one other time in connection
with a protest Groves made about one of his actions.
Q. You asked General Groves?
A. Bight
Q. Did you tell him what you knew?
A. I knew nothing beyond what was obvious that he had a left wing back-
ground.
Q. Did you tell him what you knew?
A. I don't remember.
Q. You say you don't remember?
A. No; I imagine I didn't in the light of the record in the other cases but
I don't remember. I know we talked about it
Q. What was there in Hawkins' background which led you to believe that
he was qualified by training or experience to be an administrative assistant
to you at Los Alamos?
A. For the jobs that I had in mind he had impressed me as a reasonable, tact-
ful, intelligent person, interested in science, familiar with it As far as I know,
he was in fact very good.
Q. He was teaching philosophy, wasn't he?
A. No; he was teaching mathematics at that time. He knew a great deal
about science. His philosophical interests were in science. I may add that he
was certainly not the only person in the country for this job.
199
Q. Doctor, we spoke yesterday of your interview with Colonel Lansdale. I
want to read you some extracts from the transcript of that interview, sir. Colonel
Lansdale said to you, according to this transcript
Mr. GARMSON. May we have the date?
Mr. ROBB. September 12, 1943. This is the interview that took place at the
Pentagon. Colonel Lansdale said to you :
"We know, for instance, that it is the policy of the Communist Party at
this time that when a man goes into the Army his official connections with the
Party are thereupon ipso facto severed."
You answered : "Well, I was told by a man who came from my — a very promi-
nent man, who was a member of the Communist Party in the Middle West, that
it was the policy of the party there that when a man entered confidential war
work, he was not supposed to remain a member of the party."
Who told you that?
A. I have no recollection at all, I will think, if you wish.
Q. I wish you would, sir.
A. From the Middle West.
Mr. GRAY. Read that again.
Mr. ROBB. "I was told by a man who came from my — a very prominent man
who was a member of the Communist Party in the Middle West that it was the
policy of the party there that when a man entered confidential war work he was
not supposed to remain a member of the party."
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Who was that man?
A. I recollect nothing about it. I will be glad to think about it.
Q. Do you want to think now?
A. I would prefer not to. If I can think about it and tell you tomorrow. It
simply rings no bell.
Q. You don't recall anybody ever told you that?
A. No, I said yesterday I didn't recollect.
Q. I know you did. Does this serve to refresh your recollection in any way?
A. Quite to the contrary. From the Middle West?
Q. You then spoke about your brother.
Mr. MARKS. May I inquire, Mr. Chairman, if these transcripts are taken from
recordings, just so we can understand what is being read?
Mr. ROBB. Yes. I have every reason to believe it is accurate.
Mr. MABKB. I don't question that, I just wondered what the origin was.
Mr. ROBB. I don't think that is necessarily a question counsel should have to
answer,
Mr. MABKS. I asked the Chairman, sir.
Mr. GBAT. My answer is "I don't know." If you wish to discusse it further
I would be glad to.
Mr. MASKS. I thought it was a matter that could be answered simply.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. You spoke of your brother and said, "It is not only that he is not a member,
I think he has no contact." Do you recall that?
A. No ; I don't recall it, but that I can imagine saying.
Q. Lansdale said: "Do you know about his wife, Jackie?"
You answered : "I know I overwhelmingly urged about 18 months ago when
we started that she should drop social ones which I regarded as dangerous.
Whether they have in fact done that, I don't know.
Lansdale said, "Well, I am quite confident that your brother Frank has no
connection with the Communists. I am not so sure about his wife."
You answered, "I am not sure either, but I think it likely some of its importance
has left here. Also, I believe it to be true that they do not have any— I don't
know this for a fact— but if they had, I didn't know it, any well established
contacts in Berkeley. You see they came from Palo Alto, and they had such
contacts there. Then my brother was unemployed for three very, very salutory
months, which changed his ideas quite a lot, and when they started in Berkeley
it was for this war job. I do not know but think it quite probable that his wife
Jackie had never had a unit or group to which she was attached in any way.
The thing that worried me was that their friends were very left wing and I
think it is not always necessary to call a unit meeting for it to be a pretty
g°Doctor, who were the friends and social contacts that you might have had in
mind when making that statement?
200
A. My sister-in-law in Berkeley?
Q, And your brother.
A. I am not sure who I did have in mind. My sister-in-law had a very old
friend called Winona Nedelsky.
A. Who was she?
A. She was the wife of a physicist who left here— quite Russian— who had
once been my stduent. She was a good friend of Jackie's. She earned her living
in some Federal Housing Agency or Social Security Agency.
Q. Was she a Communist?
A, I believe so.
Q. Was she a friend of your sister-in-law in 1943?
A. I would think so. She was a friend. I don't know how much they saw
each other.
Q. But in all events, you thought it cause for worry.
A. I would not have thought that a special cause for worry. I am having
trouble in remembering what I could have had in mind and what I did have
in mind.
Q. Can you think of anyone else that you might have had in mind as dangerous
social contacts of your sister-in-law and your brother?
A. I don't know much about the life in Berkeley. I am afraid I can't.
Q. Lansdale said again, "To refer again to this business concerning the party,
to make it dear the fact a person says they have severed connections with the
party, the fact that they have at present no apparent interest or contact in it
does not show where they have unquestionably formerly been members that they
are dangerous to us."
You said, "I agree with that"
You still agree with that, do you?
A. Yes.
Mr. GABEESO-BT. Mr. Chairman, I repeat the same request I made with respect
to the previous transcript, that we would like to see a copy of the full transcript.
Mr. GRAY. May I say with respect to that that Dr. Oppenheimer will be
given an opportunity to see documents reflecting conversations. They cannot
be taken from the building.
Mr. GABBISON. We appreciate that. When may we have that opportunity?
Mr. GBAT. When the board and counsel have finished with the questioning.
Mr. GABBISON. You mean this afternoon?
Mr. GRAY. Whenever this is concluded.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Lansdale said to you, according to this transcript, speaking of your reluc-
tance to disclose the name of Professor X : "I don't see how you can have any
hesitancy of disclosing the name of the man who has actually been engaged in
an attempt of espionage in time of war. I mean my mind does not run along
those channels."
You said, "I know it is a tough problem and I am worried about it a lot"
That was a correct statement of your attitude, wasn't it?
A. I would assume so.
Q. Lansdale, referring again to your reluctance to disclose the name, says,
"Well, if you won't do it, you won't do it, but don't tMnk 1 won't ask you again.
Now I want to ask you this, And again, for the same reason which implies
you're here, you may not answer. Who do you know on the project in Berkeley
who are now, that's probably a hypothetical question, or have been members
of the Communist Party?'
You answered, "I will try to answer that question. The answer will, however,
be incomplete. I know for a fact, I know, I learned on my last visit to Berkely
that both Lomanitz and Weinberg were members. I suspected that before, but
was not sure. I never had any way of knowing. I will think a minute, but
there were other people. There was a, I don't know whether she is still
employed or was at one time a secretary who was a member."
"LANSDALE. Do you recall her name?"
"OPPENHEIMEB. Yes, her name was Jane Muir. I am, of course, not sure she
was a member, but I think she was. In the case of my brother it is obvious that
I know. In the cases of the others, it's Just things that pile up, that I look at that
way. I in not saying that I couldn't think of other people, it's a hell of a big
project You can raise some names." *
?°ad those lines' ^ yon now concede tbat you
Lomanitz and Weinberg had been members of the
201
A. Evidently. Was I told by the security officers?
Q. I don't know. I have just read what you said. So when you wrote that
letter of October 19, 1943, forwarding Lomanitz's request to be transferred
back to the project from military service, you knew that he had been a Communist
Party member, didn't you?
A. So it appears.
Q. And you knew as early as 1943 that Weinberg had been, too.
A. So it appears.
Q. Yes, sir.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, what troubles me about this whole method of
examination is that counsel is reading from a transcript bits and parts without
the full course of the conversation which took place to a witness whose memory
at best, as anyone of ours would be, is very, very hazy upon all these things,
and picking here a sentence and there a sentence out of context, and then holding
him to the answer. I do think that this is a method of questioning that seems
to me to be very unfair.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I don't mean to make any argument about the matter,
but I assume that this Board is following this transcript If the Board feels
I am being unfair at any point, I suppose the Board will interpose.
Mr. GARRISON. Why shouldn't counsel be allowed to follow as any court of
law, and this is not even a trial?
Mr. ROBB. As you no doubt know, I have tried a good many cases, and I don't
think it would be in the ordinary course of a trial.
Mr. GARRISON. I disagree with you.
Mr. ROBB. I resent counsel's statement that I am trying to be unfair with
this witness, because I -assure you that I have made every attempt to be fair
with him. In fact, were I trying to be unfair, I would not ask this witness
any of these questions, but would leave it in the file for the Board to read. I
am giving this witness a chance to make whatever explanation he wishes to
make.
Mr. GARRISON. I still think that the fair thing would be to read the whole
conversation and ask him what parts you want, instead of to pick isolated
questions.
Mr. GRAY. On the point of picking isolated questions, without trying to look
at this whole question at this moment, I think it is clear that this interview
concerned itself with matters which are involved in the questions Mr. Robb has
been putting to the witness, and which are generally, I think, not new material.
General Nichols' letter of December 23, and Mr. Oppenheimer's reply of March 4,
I think both address themselves in one way or another to these individuals,
Lomanitz, Weinberg, Bohm, which have been the subject of these questions.
I would say, Mr. Garrison, that I don't think it would be helpful to you at this
point to have the transcript I have said, however, that Dr. Qppenheimer and
his counsel will be entitled to examine it and certainly after examination if you
wish to reopen any of this testimony, you will be given every opportunity to do
so. I think it is the feeling of the chairman of the board that things are not
taken here out of context in a way which is prejudicial. I flUnfe also that the
board has heard Dr. Oppenheimer say that with respect to some of these matters
he has no recollection, which at least to me is perfectly understandable, many of
these things having taken place many years ago. I do not think that it is the
purpose of counsel to develop anything beyond what the facts are in this case.
At least that is my interpretation.
Mr. ROBB. That is my endeavor, Mr. Chairman.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. May I ask you whether or not you recall this Jane Muir?
A. I remember her, not welL
Q. How did you happen to know her?
A* I met her and her husband through the Chevaliers some time before the war.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to be captious or legalistic, but this
is the example of the kind of problem. Jane Muir is not mentioned in the Com-
mission's letter. Are we to be given a chance to remember all there is to remember
about particular individuals? Now, Dr. Oppenheimer is being read aloud out of
things that it is said he said a great many years ago, and new names come out
which are not in the letter, and which we have never heard, and now he is asked
all about them. That seems to me I submit not in keeping with the spirit of the
letter. If he had volunteered the name of Jane Muir in testimony, that would be
another matter. But this is something that is a complete surprise.
202
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, is it Mr. Garrison's position that he wishes time
to consult with his client about the Jane Muir matter before we go into it?
Mr. GARRISON. With respect to any new name that is brought into this without
any warning at all, we should be given a chance to have Dr. Oppenheimer reflect
on what he remembers about it, and for use to have a chance to talk about it.
Mr. ROBB. We will let the Jane Muir go and come back to it at some future
date if counsel feels that would be fair.
Mr. GARRISON. I think that would be fair with respect to every new name.
Mr. ROBB. We will go on to something else, then.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Then you were asked by Colonel Lansdale :
" can you tell me the names of anyone at Los Alamos that have been or
are now party members?"
You answered : "I can't tell you the numbers of any who now are" — I assume
that means names — "but I know that at least Mrs. Berber was a member. She
comes from the Loef family in Philadelphia."
A. To the best of my knowledge this is not true.
Mr. GARRISON. That is the same question.
Mr. ROBB. I think not, Mr. Chairman. I think this is certainly in the scope of
the letter of notification which Dr. Oppenheimer has challenged. Dr. Oppen-
heimer has said in his answer that the knew of no former member of the party
at Los Alamos except his wife. He said that with some emphasis and repeated
it here. I think I have the right to ask him whether he did know that Mrs.
Serber was a member. I asked about Mrs. Serber yesterday.
Mr. GRAY. Mrs. Serber's name has appeared in this proceeding.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Don't you know that you did know in 1943 that Mrs. Serber had been a
member of the party?
A. I don't know that she was a member of the party. I don't thirik she was
a member of the party.
Q. You testified yesterday you would be very much surprised to find if she
ever had been.
A. That is right, I would still be today.
Q. Have you any idea how this statement got in this transcript?
A. No.
Q. Do you know that Mrs. Serber came from the Leof family in Philadelphia?
A. That I know.
Q. When did you know that?
A. Long ago, 16 years ago.
Q. Beg pardon?
A. 15 years ago.
Q. How did you find that out?
A. She told me. My wife also knew her.
Mr. GRAY. Are you at a breaking point?
Mr. ROBB. Yes, sir. l
Mr. GRAY. Let us take a recess.
(Brief recess.).
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, forgive me for coming back to the same point
but during the recess I discussed this problem with my partner, Mr. Silverman
who has spent his life trying cases in the State of New York— I am not a trial
lawyer, sir — our practice I am informed up there universally is that when counsel
is cross examining a witness on a transcript he has never seen, counsel for the
other side, if he asks the court for a copy, so he may read along with it that
request is granted. So if nothing else— I would not think of impugning this to
Mr. Robb, and I hope he won't misunderstand me— I think it is the basis of the
rule. That is the only reason I mention it. In other words, to make sure that
the questions are in fact being read accurately from the transcript, and there
are no interlineations or marks or matters of that sort that might perhaps raise
a S1^^^ *° the acciiracy of what is there quite apart from the method by
which the transcript was arrived at, and also to understand what the thread and
continuity of the matter is. I merely report that to the Chairman. I don't want
JWh£l?o H? ,baflof ^Ules,of law' because God *""«• K !• *"* rule ^re
that this not a, trial,, but an inquiry, and I should suppose that a fortiori, what is
proper in court of law would be accorded to us here ii an inquiry. I doiot labor
the point I present it to you and I will rest upon it W.JHIMW
The Wmrass. May I make a comment?
203
Mr. GRAY. Surely.
The WITNESS. This last quotation about Mrs. Berber strikes me as so bizarre
that I am troubled about the accuracy of the document I am not certain
Mr. GARRISON. Do you know, Mr. Robb, whether this was taken down by a
stenographer or was it from a tape?
Mr. ROBB. Colonel Lansdale will be here. I might ask him. He is the one
who conducted the interview.
Mr. GRAY. I would like to be excused with counsel for the Board for a moment,
if you please.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I don't agree at all with the statement of law which
has been made by Mr. Garrison although I confess I am not a New York trial
lawyer. It has always been my understanding that when a witness is ques-
tioned about inconsistent statements, he is read the statements and he is asked
if he made them. However, it is entirely immaterial to me whether counsel
follows this statement or not. If the Chairman wants to have counsel have a
copy of it, it is all right with me.
Mr. GARRISON. We would appreciate that
Mr. ROBB. Very well.
Mr. GRAY. I am about to make the ruling that Mr. Robb follow reading this
transcript as Mr. Robb reads it. Have you got a copy of it, Mr. Rolander?
Mr. ROLANDER. I just went out and asked the secretary to try to locate a copy
from the original files. I though that might be most helpful.
Mr. ROBB. May the record now show, Mr. Chairman, that we are handing to
Mr. Garrison the photostat copy of the interview with Dr. Oppenheimer by Lt
Col. Lansdale, 12 September 1943, consisting of 26 pages.
Mr. GARRISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. I am reading from page 10. The transcript shows, Doctor, that you were
asked this question by Colonel Lansdale :
"Now, do you know, was Mr. Serber a member of the party?"
You answered : "I thfafr it possible, but I don't know."
Do you recall that question or answer?
A. No.
Q. Did you think at that time, think it possible that Mr. Serber was a member
of the party?
A. That he was then a member of the party?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. Did you thinfe it possible that he had been?
A. Possible but unlikely.
Q. Were both Mr. and Mrs. Serber then at Los Alamos?
A. Right
Q. What did you know about their background?
A. I knew them quite welL
Q. Did you know that they were leftish?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you know that they were at least fellow travelers?
A. I would say at most fellow travelers.
A. At most fellow travelers?
A. Yes.
Q. How did you acquire that information?
A. They were good friends of mine.
Q. From things they said to you and from activities yon observed?
A. That is right
Q. What activities?
A. Mrs. Serber was extremely active in Spanish relief at the time they were
in Berkeley.
Q. What else?
A. Talk.
Q. What talk?
A. Just talk about affairs and politics.
Q. Communism?
A. Not as such.
Q. Had you seen the Serbers at these left wing gatherings that you mentioned?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Frequently?
A. At the Spanish things very frequently.
204
Q. Along with the other people that you mentioned?
A. Eight.
Q. What was Berber doing at Los Alamos?
A. He was a very prominent and constructive member of the theoretical
physics division.
Q. Did he have access to classified information?
A. Indeed he did. He created it
Q. Now, skipping down, you were asked: "How about Dave Hawkins?"
And you said, "I don't think he was, I would not say so." Meaning "I don't
think he was a member of the Communist Party." Do you recall that?
A. No. I clearly am not recalling this conversation at all.
Q. Was that your view in 1943 that you didn't think he was a member or had
been?
A. I wish I knew what my view on these things was.
Mr. MABKS. Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to give the witness the question
and the answer as it appears here.
Mr. GARRISON. It reads : "I don't think he was, I would not say so."
Mr. ROBB. That is what I read.
Mr. MASKS. You interpreted it.
Mr. BOBB. Very well. If you don't want me to give the witness the benefit of
an interpretation, I won't do it.
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. The next question and answer :
"Now, have you yourself ever been a member of the Communist Party?"
You answered, "No."
"LANSDALB. You've probably belonged to every front organization on the
coast.
"OPPENHEIMER. Just abOUt"
Doctor, do you. recall that question and answer?
A. No, I don't I don't recall this interview.
Q. If you said that to Colonel Lansdale, were you Jocular?
A. I don't think I could have been jocular during this interview.
Q. "LANSDAI& Would you in fact have considered yourself at one time a
fellow traveler?
"OEPENHEIMEB. I think so. My association with these things was very brief
and very intense."
Do you recall that at all?
A. I am not recollecting anything. You may find a phrase that I do recollect.
Q. In all events, Doctor, your answer, "I think so. My association with these
things was very brief and very Intense," it is now your testimony that was a
correct statement of fact?
A. It was very intense ; brief is a relative word.
Q. Colonel Lansdale said : "I should Imagine the latter anyway."
Now, on page 11, you said, "It was historically quite brief and quite intense,
and I should say I was "
"LANSDAIJE. Now I have reason to believe that you yourself were felt out, I
don't say asked, but felt out to ascertain how you felt about it, passing a little
information, to the party.
"OPPENHBSMER. You have reason?"
"LANSDALE. I say I have reason to believe, that's as near as I can come to
stating it. Am I right or wrong?
"OPPENHH3ME&. If it was, it was so gentle I did not know it
"LANSDALJE. You don't know. Do you have anyone who is close to you, no
that's the wrong word, who is an acquantance of yours, who may have perhaps
been a guest in your house, whom you perhaps knew through friends or relatives
who is a member of the Communist Party. By that I mean
"OPPENHEIMER. My brother, obviously.
"LANSDAm Well, no, I don't mean him.
"OraENHEiMEB. I think probably you mean someone who just visited for a
few hours.
"I/ANSDALE. YeS.
"OPPENHEIMKR. Yes, certainly, the answer to that is certainly, yes.
"LANSDAUJ. Would you care to give me any of their names?
"OPPHJNHEIMER. There is a girl called Bldred Nelson."
Do you know a girl called Bldred Nelson?
A. No, I know a man by that name.
Q. Who was he?
205
A. He was a student of mine. At the risk of finding I said something else
10 years ago, I would say he was not a Communist.
Q. Having heard Colonel Lansdale's question about whether you had any
acquaintance of yours who might have been a guest in your bourse, whom you
knew perhaps through friends and relatives, is it now clear to you who Colonel
Lansdale was talking about?
A. I don't know. It might well be Steve Nelson.
Q. Isn't that pretty plain?
A. Yes.
Q. Why didn't you mention Steve Nelson?
A. I seem to have mentioned a Nelson.
Q. Eldred.
A. Eldred Nelson is not a girl. He is not a Communist. I think this only
adds to my confusion about it.
Q. Very well. I will continue:
"LANSDALE. Suppose I've got a bunch of names here, some of them are right
and some of them are wrong, you don't mind treating it that way, do you?
"OPPENHEIMEB. No.
"LANSDALE. Did you know William Schnelderman?
"OPPENHEIMEB. I know who he is. He is the secretary of the Communist
Parly. I have met him at cocktail parties.
"LANSDALE, You have no real personal acquaintance with him?
"OPPENHEIMEB. No."
Now, you had met Schneiderman at these meetings where he lectured, had
you not?
A. Yes.
Q. Were those cocktail parties?
A. Drinks were served.
Q. Were they cocktail parties?
A. No, I think they were evening parties.
Q. Did you tell Lansdale about that?
A. I don't know what I told him.
Q. If I tell you that the transcript shows yon didn't, would you accept that?
"LANSDALE. Do you know a fellow named Rudy Lambert?
"OPPENHEIMEB. I'm not sure, do you know what he looks like?
"LANSDALE. No, I've never seen him. He's a member of the party. Do you
know a Dr. Hannah L. Peters?"
You knew what Rudy Lambert looked like, didn't you?
A. Sure.
Q. Why did you ask Lansdale what he looked like?
A. I don't know that I did.
Q. If you did, Doctor, would it mean that you were ducking the question?
A. I would think so.
Q. The end of the question by Lansdale: "Do you know a Dr. Hannah L.
Peters?
"OPPENHEIMEB. Yes, I know her quite well.
"LANSDALE. Do you know that she's a Communist?
"OPPENHEIMEB. I certainly knew that she was very close. I did not know
she was a member.
"LANSDALE. You don't know what her position in the party is?
"OPPENHEIMEB. No. I didn't even know she was a member.
"LANSDALE. Do you have any more than just an acquaintance with her?
"OPPENHEIMEB. Yes, I know her quite well. Her husband is on the project."
That was true, wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. "LANSDALE. How about a fellow by the name of Isaac Folkoff?
"OPPENHEIMEB. I don't know. I knew a Richard Folkoff who was a member
of considerable importance."
A. Of what?
Q. I am reading you what the transcript shows.
A. A member of considerable importance?
Q. You knew that Isaac Folkoff was a member of considerable importance,
didn't you?
A. Yes. I think that is a garble in the transcript again. Richard Folkoff
was a member of Consumers Union as I told you yesterday.
Q. "LANSDALE. How about a man by the name of Steve Nelson?
"OPPENHEIMEB. He was a professional party member. He's an organizer.
206
"LANSDALE. Did you know him well at all — under what circumstances did
you know him?
"OPPENHEIMER. He was a friend of my wife's former husband who was
killed in Spain. I have a thoroughly unprofessional acquaintance with him."
Do you recall saying anything like that?
A. I recall telling Lansdale about my wife and Nelson.
Q. "LANSDALE. How about Haakon Chevalier?
"OPPENHEIMER. Is he a member of the party?
"LANSDALE. I don't know.
"OPPENHEIMER. He is a member of the faculty and I know hitn well. I
wouldn't be surprised if he were a member, he is quite a Red."
That is true?
A. He was quite a Red.
Q. You would not have been surprised to find he was a member of the party,
would you?
A. I think I would during the period I knew him.
Mr. ROBB. Now I will skip over to page 14. Is there anything else in connec-
tion with those particular questions that you would like to have me read, Mr.
Garrison?
Mr. GARRISON, I have not read all in between.
Mr. ROBB. I did not leave out anything for a couple of pages.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. At the top of page 14 :
"LANSDALE. Now, I want to ask you to go back to Lomanitz. You told me
when I was down there that when you broke the subject to, what do you call
him, Rossi?
"OPPENHEIMER. Rossi."
What do you mean by "down there"?
A. Lomanitz was never at Los Alamos.
Q. No. "You told me when I was down there."
A. I guess he means Los Alamos. I don't know.
Q. "When you first broke the subject to him about going on the place you
stated that he was uncertain, he came up to your house and did what you char-
acterized as a good deal of soul searching. I would like to know whether that
soul searching or discussion of his own feelings had any relation to his work
in the party?
"OPPENHEIMER. None whatever, I did not know he was a member of the party.
"LANSDALE. Until Just recently.
"OPPENHEIMER. Yes. I knew he was extremely Red, but frankly I thought he
was a member of the Trotskyite faction.
"LANSDALE. Which would ipso facto prevent him from
"OPPENHEIMEB. Being a member of the party. That's what I thought at that
time. What he said he wanted at that time was to be a soldier and be one of the
American people in that way and help mold their feelings by being a soldier,
and wasn't that more worthwhile than working on this project I told him he
obviously had a lot of talent, he had training that he was throwing right away
and that if he could make up his mind and it was a clearcut decision to use
himself as a scientist and nothing else, that then that was the right thing to do
'LANSDALE. What led you to exact from him a promise, or to make the condi-
tion of giving up political activities?
"OPPENHEIMER. Because he had distributed leaflets and because it was just
generally obvious that he was a member of the union and radical societies."
Does that refresh your recollection as to what you knew about Lomanitz's
background and what you said to him before he went on the project?
A. The union I guess is the FABCT. The leaflets I don't remember.
Q. Do you recall having any such conversation with Lansdale?
A. I didn't remember our discussing Lomanitz.
Q. Do you now recall that you did have a discussion with Lomanitz about his
activities before he went on the project?
A. I think the substance of the conversation is that if he could be a scientist
he should and he should do just that
Q. Do you now recall laying down the conditions to him about giving up his
previous political activities?
A. I don't recall it. We discussed it yesterday. I am not likely to recall that
matter today. I don't mean to deny it, sir.
207
Q. "LANSDALE. Now, you have stated to me and also I think to General Groves
that in your opinion membership in the party was incompatible with work on
the project from a loyalty standpoint.
"OPPENHEIMER, Yes."
That was your viewpoint, wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. "LANSDALE. Now, do you also go so far as to believe that persons who are
not actually members but still retain their loyalty to the party or their adher-
ence to the party line are in the same category?
"OPPENHEIMER, Let me put It this way. Loyalty to the party, yes, adherence
to the party line, maybe no. In that it need not necessarily, although it often
is, be the sign of subservience. At the present time I don't know what the party
line is in too much detail, but I've heard from Mrs. Tolman, Tolman's wife, that
the party line at present is not to discuss postwar affairs. I would be willing
to say that anyone who, well let me put it this way, whose loyalty is above all
else to the party or to Russia obviously is incompatible with loyalty to the United
States. This is, I think, the heart of it. The party has its own discipline."
Do you recall saying that?
A. No, I don't recollect much about this. This, however sounds like what I
thought.
Q. You have no doubt that was your view at that time?
A. Substantially that was my view.
Q. Is there any difference between what I have read and what your view was
at that time?
A. I don't know. It is a long couple of paragraphs. It is a long time ago. I
think it is substantially what I then thought.
Q. Lansdale then continued : "Now, I was coming to that. I would like to
hear from you your reasons as to why you believe, let's stick to membership in
the party, is incompatible to complete loyalty to the project. When, to state
something a little bit foolishly membership in the Democratic Party certainly
wouldn't be.
"OPPENHEIMER. It's an entirely different party. For one thing * * * I think
I'd put it this way. The Democratic Party is the framework of the social
customs * * * of this country, and I do not think that is true of the Communist
Party. At least, I think that there are certainly many Communists who are
above all decent guys, but there are also some that are above all Communists.
It's primarily that question of personal honor that I think is involved. I don't
know whether that answers the question but my idea is that being a Democrat
doesn't guarantee that you're not a fourflusher, and also it has no suggestion
just by virtue of your being a Democrat that yon would think it would be all
right to cheat other people for a purpose, and I'm not too sure about this with
respect to the Communist Party."
Do you recall saying anything like that?
A. I don't
Q. Would you say that did represent your views at that time?
A. I find nothing incompatible between it and what I remember. This is for
me not a very easy line of questioning because I don't recollect what I said and
I remember what I thought only in general terms.
Mr. GRAY. Before you turn the page, I think that as a matter of record at the
end of the fourth line, the party, as you read it, I think, "The party has its own
discipline," at least this copy seems to say "The party has its own disciples."
Mr. ROBB. Disciples, that is right.
Mr. GRAY. I don't think it is material.
Mr. GARRISON. I think this indicates the problems of accuracy, because it
would probably make more sense as Mr. Bobb read it.
Mr. ROBB. There seems to be a pen and ink interlineation.
Mr. GARRISON. The word "fourflusher" is not quite correct.
Mr. ROBB. Now I will turn to page 17. Mr. Garrison, is there something you
want read?
Mr. GARRISON. Afterward, after I read it over.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Lansdale starts on page 16 and makes quite a little talk which I won't
read because it is not essential to the context At the top of page 17, he says :
"Here we are, we know that information is streaming out from fhfs place
every day. We know about some of it, how much of it is there that we don't
know about?
303313—54 14
208
"OPPENHBZMEB. Places other than the west coast?
"LANSDALE. Sure, we know that definite efforts are being made to find out,
they wouldn't be going to these efforts unless they really wanted it. Now, what
giraH we do? Shall we sit back and say well, my God, maybe the guy recanted,
maybe he isn't at all.
"OPPENHEIMER. Hard for me to say because of my own personal trends, and
as I say I know that the Berbers afford a good illustration of this I would hesi-
tate to say to a stranger * * * about another closeup * * * person whose his-
tory was the same as that of Mrs. Berber's, sure she's all right but I know the
Serbers and I am confident of them. Now I have worked on rather a personal
basis. I don't know the Woodwards are members, I did not know that until
General Groves mentioned it the other day that there was some question of it.
I feel that in the case of the Serbers I could understand that very well. But I
Just don't know in a general case, it's impossible to say. I don't know any of
these people in Berkley, I don't know Weinberg and Lomanitz well enough to
swear
"LANSDALE. Why is he moving heaven and earth to keep out of the Army?
"OPPENHEIMER. He told me he thought he was being framed, and I said I
think that's nonsense, why would you be framed, and he said, 'Well, part of the
general scheme * * * maybe they're after bigger game than the party.'
"LANSDALE. Did you ask fri™ what the bigger game was?
"OPPENHEIMER. He said he thought you were after the union.
"LANSDALE. We're not.
"OPPENHEIMER, Well, I suggest you keep your eyes open. * * * I presuaded
him, I think, that he should not try to stay on the project there."
Do you recall that portion of your conversation with Lansdale?
A. No.
Q. Would you deny that took place?
A. No.
Q. Your answer is no?
A. No.
Mr. GARRISON. Do you know whether these dots represent words that the
stenographer didn't catch?
Mr. KOBE. I don't.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Now, we go to page 22. Lansdale said :
"Can you tell me any more, did Weinberg, it was Weinberg and Bohm who
came to you, wasn't it?
"OPPENHEIMEB. Yes, they came to me in Lawrence's office.
"LANSDALE. Yes. Did Weinberg and Bohm say anything? What did they
say about the party?
"OPPENHEIMER, They didn't say anything about the party.
"LANSDALB. They didn't? Did they talk about the union?
"OPPENHEIMER, They talked, well they didn't even talk about the union. They
talked about, I think I've given you a fairly good, I don't know what they might
have said if we had met in the woods some place, but we met after all where
there were two secretaries in the room.
"LANSDALE. Oh, they were there?
"OPPENHEIMER. I don't know whether the door was closed or not, but it was
extremely open interview. I saw Lomanitz more or less, well I saw him first
at one of the offices of a man, and we walked out to telegraph * * * but his dis-
cussion was a little bit more uninhibited than the others. These two fellows
were concerned with only one thing, they said they had worked closely with
Rossi, they thought he was a good guy and that they thought he was being
framed for his activities in the union and his political sympathies, and they
thought that because of this they were also in danger of such a nature that they
should get out of the project into some other useful work or were they likely
to be treated the same way.
"LANSDALE. Now let me ask you this. From what you stated to them, if they
were in fact not fulfilling the conditions which you mentioned to them, which
you said to them would have been tantamount to telling, then if you are doing
that you'd better get out
"OPPENHEIMER, Yes.
"LANSDALE. That is correct, isn't it?
"OpPENHmiEB. Yes, that is if they were violating any of the three rules
which meant active in union, maintaining any contacts with Beds, not main-
taining discretion, they were useless to the project."
209
Doctor, does that refresh your recollection about laying down some rules for
Lomanitz, Bohm and Weinberg?
A. It refreshes to the extent that these three things said to them in the summer
of 1943 would have been natural for me to say. I don't believe these were rules
established by me long in advance. I think this refers to this conversation.
Q. Don't you recall now that you had a conversation with at least Lomanitz
in which you had told him prior to his coming on the project that he would
have to abide by these rules?
A. I don't remember those three rules at all. I think it natural that I talked
to them at this time in those terms.
Q. I see. Your mind is a blank of any talk you might have had with Lomanitz
prior to his going on the project?
A. No, it is not a blank. I have told you a little about it here, and I tesH-
fled to the extent I can recall it.
Q. Aside from that, you could not recall anything?
A. Bight
Q. And your memory is not refreshed by what I read you?
A. No, on the whole it is confused by it.
Q. Very well. Doctor, did Naakon Chevalier tell you he had been inter-
viewed by the FBI about the Eltenton Chevalier incident?
A. He did.
Q. When did he tell you that?
A. June or July of 1946.
Q. Shortly after he was interviewed?
A. Fairly shortly after.
Q. Did he tell you how long before that he had been interviewed?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Did you get the impression that it had been very recent?
A. I don't recollect the time interval. It was not a year or a month or month
or anything— or a half year.
Q. What did he teU you about the interview?
A. He told me that he and Eltenton had been interviewed simultaneously, that
they had questioned him about his approach to me.
Q. What else?
A. That they had asked him if he had approached anyone else, and I think —
well, that they picked him up at Stimson Beach and had taken him into head-
quarters.
Q. Anything else?
A. That they pressed him about whether he talked to anyone else.
Q. Did he tell you what he said?
A. Not in any detail.
Q. How did he give you that information— in person or by telephone or by
letter, or what?
A. What I recollect is that he came to our home.
Q. In Berkeley?
A. Tes.
Q. Was that before or after you were interviewed by the FBI?
A. It was quite a while before.
Q. So when you were interviewed by the FBI you knew substantially what
Chevalier had told them?
A. Not in great detail.
Q. I said substantially.
A. Tes, I think so.
Q. Did you also learn what Eltenton had said?
A. No.
Q. Did you attempt to find out?
A. No.
Q. Now, you recall that you were interviewed by the FBI again in May 1950?
A. Yes. .
Q. That was at Princeton, wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you tell the agents on that occasion that you didn't know Weinberg
was a Communist until it became a matter of public knowledge?
A. I may have said I was not certain. My own recollection of it is contrary
to this interview with Lansdale which is that the first time I was alerted
to it was by the FBI in 1946. But it is clear that I learned something about
it or it may be dear that I learned something about it during the war.
210
Q. Didn't you tell the FBI agent on that occasion that you did not ynow that
Weinberg was a Communist until it became a matter of public knowledge?
A. I don't remember.
Q. You don't remember whether you told them that or not?
A. No.
Q. When did it become a matter of public knowledge?
A. It is still not.
Q. Long after 1943, wasn't it?
A. He still denied it and I don't quite know what this refers to.
Q. Doctor, did you know prior to the time I began to read them to you that
there existed transcripts of your interviews with Colonel Pash and Colonel
Lansdale?
A. I Imagined that.
Q. You think so?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. How.do you think you found that out?
A. I didn't know it. I said I imagined it.
Q. You imagined it?
A. I thought almost certain that there would be a transcript of security talks.
Q. Had you asked anybody about it?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Were you interested?
A. I should have been. I don't think I was.
Q. In that same interview with the FBI in May 1950, did you tell the agent
that you had made a big mistake in not dropping your Communist Party friend
long before you did?
A. I certainly don't recognize that.
Q. Would you say you didn't tell them that?
A. I need to know more of the context and when this was and what it was
about.
Q. It was May
A. I don't mean the date of the interview, but the context of the interview,
and what time we were referring to. Taken in this bald form
Q. Did you say anything to that effect?
A. I don't know.
Q. Doctor, there came a time in 1949 when you testified before the House
Committee on Un-American Activities concerning Dr. Peters, didn't you?
A. Bight.
Q. Your testimony was thereafter reported in the public press, wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall what paper it was that it came out In?
A. It was the Rochester paper.
Q. Did you see that item in the Rochester paper?
A. It was sent to me.
Q. Who sent it to you?
A. Oh, many people. Peters, probably Condon, several other people.
Q. Was your testimony accurately reported in the press?
A. As I remember, it was fairly accurately reported in the press. It was
supposed to be secret testimony.
Q. I have before me a photostat — I am sorry I have not a copy, Mr. Garrison,
but I will read most of it— a story of the Rochester Times Union, Rochester, N. Y.,
June 15, 1949. The headline was: "Dr. Oppenheizner Once Termed Peters
'Quite Red.' "
The leadoff paragraph is: "Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, wartime director of
the atom bomb laboratory at Los Alamos, N. M., recently testified that he once
termed Dr. Bernard Peters of the University of Rochester *a dangerous man and
quite Red,' The Times-Union Washington bureau reported today."
The story then continues after some explanatory paragraphs.
Mr. GRAY. Let me interrupt to say, have you another photostat of this news
story?
Mr. GARRISON. I would like to see it if we could.
Mr. ROBB. Surely.
Mr. GABBISON. Is this question to be about Bernard Peters or Hannah Peters?
Mr. ROBB. Bernard.
Mr. GARRISON. The letter mentions Hannah Peters, and not Bernard.
Mr. ROBB. Are you sticking to that technicality, Mr. Garrison?
Mr. GABBISOW. I was asking you if this was an inquiry into Bernard Peters'
background.
211
Mr. ROBB. In Dr. Oppenheimer's testimony we have been talking about Bernard
Peters for a couple of days.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. The newspaper story continues after some explanatory paragraphs, "In
his testimony, Dr. Oppenheimer said he became 'acquainted' with the existence
of a Communist cell at Berkeley 'by disclosure of the intelligence agencies of
the Government." The quotes are not closed, but I assume they should be there.
"Concerning Dr. Peters, Dr. Oppenheimer said he had known the scientists as a
graduate student in the physics department in the late 1930's.
"Said Dr. Oppenheimer:
" 'Dr. Peters was, I think, a German national. He was a member of the
German National Communist Party. He was imprisoned by the Nazis, and
escaped by a miracle. He came to this country. I know nothing of his early
period in this country. He arrived in California, and violently denounced the
Communist Party as being a "do-nothing party." '
"Dr. Oppenheimer said he told Major DeSylva he believed Dr. Peters' back-
ground was filled with incidents that would point toward 'direct action.'
"Asked to explain this point, Oppenheimer observed :
" Incidents in Germany where he had fought street battles against the Na-
tional Socialists on account of Communists; being placed in a concentration
camp ; escaping by guile. It seemed to me those were past incidents not pointing
to temperance.'
"Questioned specifically on his reference to 'direct action', Dr. Oppenheimer
said of Dr. Peters :
" 'I think I suggested his attack on the Communist Partly as being too con-
stitutional and conciliatory an organization, not sufficiently dedicated to the
overthrow of the Government by force and violence.'
"Asked the source of his information that Dr. Peters had been a member of
the Communist Party in Germany, Dr. Oppenheimer replied :
" 'It was well known. Among other things, he told me.'
"Dr. Oppenheimer said he could 'affirm that there is no connection between
his (Peters') work and any application of atomic energy that falls within the
jurisdiction of the (Atomic Energy) Commission. * * * I would believe that
if Dr. Peters could teach what he knows to a young man capable of learning
it, the country would be better off, because if Dr. Peters cannot be employed by
the War Department, at least the young man could be employed by the War
Department.' "
Doctor, are those quotations from the news story I have read you an accurate
summary of your testimony?
A. They are fairly accurate. I didn't have the transcript at the time. I be-
lieve that a collation was made by Mr. Volpe, who had the transcript, to see how
accurate they were.
Q. In other words, you checked it at the time to see if it was an accurate
statement?
A. Somewhat later. It is not a very inaccurate statement
Q. It is substantially accurate, isn't it?
A. I think so.
Q. Is there anything in there that you could point to and say that was out of
line or inaccurate or incorrect?
A. Not without the transcript and perhaps not with the transcript.
Q. Did you at that time find anything to complain about in the accuracy?
A. No, not in the accuracy. The fact of the publication.
Q. Yes, you objected to that Following the publication of that story, did you
hear from Dr. Peters?
A. I did.
Q. How did you hear from him?
A. He wrote me — I was on the way west, and I learned that he had called my
office at Princeton and my secretary reported to me what was bothering him;
when I got to Berkeley there was a letter from him.
Q. What did he say?
A. He said that he was appalled and how could I have done him such harm,
I don't remember the words of the letter.
Q. How long after you appeared and testified was that?
A. About 2 weeks.
Q. Did you hear from anybody else about this story?
A. I did indeed.
212
A. Prof. Hans Bethe, Condon, my brother, Weiskopf, perhaps other people.
Q. What did Condon have to say?
A. He said I should not have hurt an innocent and loyal American in that
way, that I must take him on at the institute if he lost his job, that if he lost his
job, it would be wholly my doing. "That I must try to make restitution, and that
he hated to believe that I could have said such a thing, and in an attempt to
protect myself. I knew very well if my file were ever made public, it would be
a much bigger flap.
Q. Was that by way of a letter?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where was Dr. Condon at that time?
A. In Idaho Springs.
Q. What business was it of Condon's what you said about Peters?
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, isn't this a new item of derogatory information
that is being produced here?
Mr. BOBB. Dr. Oppenheimer brought the name up; I didn't
Mr. GABBISON. Not in this connection.
Mr. BOBB. Certainly he did.
Mr. GABBISON. Not as an item of derogatory information.
Mr. BOBB. Mr. Chairman, I don't think we have to sift this through such a fine
sieve as that
Mr. GRAY. What is the objection, Mr. Garrison?
Mr. GABBISON. This is a wholly new transaction it seems to me. I don't know
what Mr. Bobb is leading up to, but it seems to be embarking on, a course of
discussion of Dr. Oppenheimer's relations with Dr. Condon, If that is to be
regarded as an item of derogatory information whatever may be said of it,
which I don't know, I should think that we should be entitled to some notice of it.
Mr. GRAY. I had not gathered, at least up to this point, that the discussion of
Dr. Condon was of a derogatory nature. I believe Dr. Oppenheimer mentioned
Dr. Condon's name. Do you need to refer at this point to Dr. Condon?
The WITNESS. I don't mind answering the question unless my counsel tells
me not to.
Mr. GABBISON. I withdraw it
The WITNESS. I don't know what business it was of Dr. Condon's, except that
he was outraged at any harm brought to a scientist
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. Is that the same Dr. Condon that wrote you about Lomanitz?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And protested his draft deferment?
A. Yes, the same Dr. Condon about whom General Groves spoke this morning.
Q. Was Condon still on the project when he wrote about Lomanitz?
A. I don't know. He was cleared for it He was an employee of Westing-
house, and I don't know his exact status. He was not part of the Los Alamos.
Q. Is that the same one as quoted as voicing absolute confidence and loyalty
and integrity of Dr. Oppenheimer in the Princeton paper?
A. I would not be the least bit astonished but I don't know.
Q. You received that letter at Berkeley.
A. Bight
Q. At the same time did you see Peters at Berkeley?
A. Peters came to see me.
Q. Where did Peters come from?
A. He came from Idaho Springs.
Q. He went out with Condon?
A. There was a conference of physicists. I was supposed to go. I could not
make it. I went straight to the west coast
Q. Did your brother go?
A. No.
Q. Did Peters come alone?
A. His parents live in Berkeley.
Q. What did he say?
A. The general substance was : Was there any way in which I could help him
to keep his job at the University. He also said I had misunderstood him about
his being a member of the Communist Party in Germany. He worked with the
Communists, he was not ashamed of it, but he was not actually a member and
nobody could prove he was. He said, "You don't know my views about the
American Communist Party" and I should not have quoted fr^.
Q. You were sure he had told you he had been a member?
213
A. I felt quite sore.
Q. You were sure he had told you he had been a member?
A. But I am not infallible in these things as is being made very clear in
these proceedings.
Q. What did you do after you received the letter from Dr. Condon and talked
to Dr. Peters?
A. I did a lot of things. I consulted Mr. Volpe over the phone who accom-
panied me to these hearings.
Q. Who is Mr. Volpe?
A. General counsel of the Atomic Energy Commission. He had accompanied
me to the hearings. I told him of the great disturbance and I then wrote a
letter to the Rochester papers which you no doubt have, the purpose of which
was to undo any injury that I should not have done to Peters. I think I also
wrote or communicated with the officials of the university saying that I would
be glad to talk to them when I got back.
Q. Did you see Dr. Peters at Princeton before you saw him at Berkeley?
A. I believe I did.
Q. Did you tell him on that occasion that you had testified but that God
had guided the questions so you didn't hurt him?
A. I certainly didn't.
Q. Or anything of that sort?
A. No.
Q. Did he come to see you at Princeton?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. About what?
A. I don't remember. He had been down to testify before this same com-
mittee. I imagine it was in that connection.
Q. He came to see you about your testimony and his testimony, didn't he?
A. I don't — I am sure he came to see me in connection with the testimony.
Q. And you discussed it?
A. I don't believe I discussed mine. It was in executive session.
Q. Did you discuss his? You didn't tell him in substance that God guided
the questions or that fortunately the questions were such that you didn't do
him any damage?
A. That would certainly not have been an accurate statement, and I don't
remember making it.
Q. You then wrote a letter after you saw Peters and received Dr. Condon's
letter to the paper.
A, Yes, sir.
Q. And in that letter you retracted some of the testimony you had given; did
you not?
A. Right I had that letter shown to the committee.
Q. Just for the record, I will read the letter. Do you have it there, Mr,
Garrison?
Mr. GARRISON. No, but that is all right.
Mr. ROBB. This is a photostat from the Rochester, New York Democratic
Chronicle, July 6, 1949. The letter is dated June 30, 1949, headed "Dr. Oppen-
heimer Explains."
"EDITOR, Democrat and OhronActe:
"Recently the Democrat and Chronicle published an article based on reports
of my testimony before an executive session of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities, which it seems to me could be damaging to the good name
of Dr. Bernard Peters, of the University of Rochester.
"I first knew Dr. Peters about 12 years ago during his student days in Cali-
fornia. I knew him, not only as a brilliant student, but as a man of strong
moral principles and of high ethical standards. During those years his political
views were radical. He expressed them freely, and sometimes, I thought, with-
out temperance. This seemed to me not unnatural in a man who had suffered
as he had at Nazi hands. I have never known Dr. Peters to commit a dis-
honorable act, nor a disloyal one.
"Dr. Peters has recently informed me that I was right in believing that in
the early days he had participated in the Communist movement in Germany,
but that I was wrong in believing— as the article stated— that he had ever held
a membership in the Communist Party. That he has today no regrets for his
actions in Nazi Germany he himself made clear in his statement that accom-
panied the publication of the article.
"From the published article one might conclude that Dr. Peters had advocated
the violent overthrow of the constitutional government of the United States. He
214
has given an eloquent denial of this in his published statement. I believe his
statement.
"As indicated in the article, the questions which were put to me by the House
committee with regard to Dr. Peters arose in part because of reports of discussion
between me and the intelligence officers at Los Alamos. These Los Alamos con-
sultations took place in connection with confidential wartime assignments. I
wish to make public my profound regret that anything said in the context should
have been so misconstrued, and so abused, that it could damage Dr. Peters and
threaten his distinguished future career as a scientist.
"Beyond this specific issue, there is ground for another, more general, and even
greater concern. Political opinion, no matter how radical or how freely ex-
pressed, does not disqualify a scientist for a high career in science ; it does not
disqualify him as a teacher of science ; it does not impugn his integrity nor his
honor. We have seen in other countries criteria of political orthodoxy applied
to ruin scientists, and to put an end to their work. This has brought with it the
attrition of science. Even more, it has been part of the destruction of freedom
of Inquiry, and of political freedom itself. This is no path to follow for a people
determined to stay free.
"ROBERT OPPENHEIMEB.
"BERKELEY, CALIF., JtmC 80, 194&."
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, is that the letter you sent?
A. It is.
Q. How has your remark or testimony been misconstrued or abused?
A. Well, for one thing they were abused by being made public. This was an
executive session. I should not have talked in executive session without think-
ing what they might do publicly.
Q. How had your testimony been misconstrued?
A. It was being misconstrued to mean that he should not keep his job. I had
explicitly said that I thought it was good he keep his job.
Q. The report of your testimony was accurate, wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. And you have just told us that this letter was intended at least in part to
repudiate that testimony, is that correct?
A. To repudiate is a little strong.
Q. Is it now your testimony, Doctor, that your testimony before the House
committee to which we have referred was not true? •
A. No, it is certainly not my testimony that it was not true. As to Peters'
membership in the Communist Party in Germany, I have only really his word to
go on. I am fairly sure of my initial recollection. I am very clear of his later
denial. I don't
Q. Doctor, when you testified before the House eommittee, you knew for you
to say that Dr. Peters told you that he had been a member of the Communist
Party was a matter of great seriousness, didn't you?
A. Bight.
Q. You would not have said that, would you, had you not been absolutely sure
it was true?
A. I was convinced it was true, or I would not have said it.
Q. Beg pardon?
A. I was convinced it was true.
Q. And yet when Peters came to see you and you received a letter from Dr.
Condon, you in effect repudiated that testimony, didn't you?
A. Does it say that I don't believe he was a member of the party?
Q. I have just read it to you.
A. I have forgotten.
Mr. GARRISON. Do you mind if I show it to him?
Mr. ROBB. Not at all.
The WITNESS. I don't say I believe his denial. I Just say he denied it
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Very well. Isn't the implication of your letter that you were wrong in
believing that he had been a member of the party?
A. I think it leaves the matter open.
Q. Was it your intention to convey that impression when you wrote the letter?
A. I think the sum total of my intention was not to get this guy fired from the
University of Rochester because of intemperate remarks I made before the
House committee.
Q. You thought your remarks were intemperate?
215
A. I think somewhat.
Q. You thought the truth was intemperate?
A. I think the phrasing of it was intemperate.
Q. Was it intemperate for you to testify, believing it to be true, that Peters had
told you he had been a member of the Communist Party?
A. No.
Q. Wasn't it your intention in writing this letter on June 30 to convey to the
public the impression that you had been mistaken in saying that he told you
he had been a member of the party?
A. I simply gave his own statement.
Q. I know you did. But wasn't it your intention to give the public through
the press the impression that you were mistaken?
A. I had no specific intention.
Q. When Dr. Condon wrote you about your own file what do you think he
referred to by that?
A. I should think the material before you.
Q. Do you think you were being placed under any pressure by either Peters
or Condon to retract what you said?
A. No, the real pressure came from people who were not belligerent at all,
but who were regretful.
Q. Who were they?
A. Bethe, Weiskopf , my brother. They wrote very, very nice letters saying,
this guy was being put — was suffering for something because I had done it and
he should stay on his job.
Q. And you were influenced by that pressure, were you not?
A. Of course, I was.
Q. Where is Peters now?
A. He is in Tata Institute in Bombay.
Q. When did you hear from him last?
A. I had a note from him about physics, just an offprint, about a year ago.
Q. Did you help him get that job?
A. No.
Q. Did he
A. Let's see. The man he works for— I didn't help him get the job. I know
the man he works for.
Q. Who is that?
A. Bhabha is the name.
Q. Has he any Communist connection?
A. No, I don't know. He is an Indian, he is a millionaire. I don't know
what he is.
Q. Do you hear from Dr. Peters frequently?
A. Very infrequently. I think the communications have been scientific papers,
and one question, because I said he made a mistake and he wanted to know
what I meant I didn't answer it
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I have a subject that will take a few minutes.
Would the Chair want me to continue or would you want to adjourn?
Mr. GRAY. It is now 25 minutes past 4, I believe. We usually sit until 4: 80.
I should like to inquire of Dr. Oppenheimer, and counsel, what their wishes are?
The board is prepared to sit further.
Mr. GABBISON. Could we take a 3-ininute recess?
Mr. GBAY. We certainly may, and we are prepared in the interest of moving
along to sit further if Dr. Oppenheimer feels up to it.
Mr. GABBISON. Dr. Oppenheimer is ready to go on for about half an hour.
Mr. Chairman, I would just like to direct the Board's attention to a clipping I
have just been handed from the New York Daily News for Thursday, April 15,
1954. The headline, "Two Letters Hit Oppenheimer as Informer." This is a
news article by Jerry Green of the News Bureau, dated Washington, D. C.,
April 14. That is yesterday.
"The ABC problem of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer as a security risk tonight
focused on two mysterious letters accusing the atomic scientist of turning in-
former in 1949 to protect himself. The letters bore the name of Dr. Hugh
Condon" —
and so forth.
I know nothing more than to bring this to your attention.
Mr. ROBB. What paper is that in?
Mr. GABBISON. New York Daily News. It is today's paper but written date-
line of yesterday, saying that this problem last night focused on the Condon
letters, one of which at least has been the subject of testimony this morning.
216
Dr. EVANS. I read that last night I wondered about it.
Mr. ROBB. They must have been clairvoyant. Could we proceed, Mr.
Chairman?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
By Mr. ROBB :
' Q. Doctor, I would like to talk with you a bit about for convenience what I
should call the Kenilworth Court incident. Are you familiar with what I am
talking about?
A. I do indeed.
Q. You are quite familiar, are you not, with the testimony of Paul Crouch and
Mrs. Crouch concerning that episode?
A. I have read it I have gone over part of it with counsel. I am certainly
familiar with its general import
Q. I am not trying to trap you or anything, but merely trying to save time.
If you are familiar with it, I won't need to rehearse it.
A. There may be points that I will be unfamiliar with but let me raise those.
Q. You recall that they testified in substance that they had been present at a
closed Communist Party meeting in late July 1941 — was it?
A. Right.
Q. At a house which you were the lessor at 10 Kenilworth Court, Berkeley,
Calif. Crouch had addressed the meeting, explained the Communist Party line,
and I believe they said that Joseph Weinberg was also present. Is that about it?
A. That is at least part of it
Mr. G-ARBISOST. The word is "lessee."
Mr. ROBB. I said lessor ; the lessee.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. I believe, Doctor, that the substance of your response in your answer at
page 30 is that you were the lessee of the house at that time, but that you were In
New Mexico, and did not attend such a meeting, is that correct?
A. That is part of my answer. The rest of it is that I also didn't attend such
a meeting at any time.
Q. Yes, sir. You state in your answer, I believe, that you attempted to estab-
lish your whereabouts and with the assistance of counsel had found you were
in New Mexico, is that correct?
A. I stated that. My answer, I think took— we will find the words, as near to
July 23 as the central date.
Q. That is page 30 and 31.
A. I thought probably that at that time of that meeting which by then had
been fixed by Crouch as approximately July 23, my wife and I were away from
Berkeley. Shortly after with the aid of counsel
Q. Is it your testimony now, Doctor, that you did not attend that meeting or
any similar meeting at which Crouch made a talk?
A. Yes. A closed meeting of the Communist Party in my house at which
people were introduced at which Crouch talked, I did not attend.
Mr. SILVERMAN. At which people were not introduced.
The WITNESS. Were not Introduced.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Had you ever attended a closed Communist Party meeting of any kind?
A. I told you of the meeting at my brother's, which was not closed, because we
were guests, but where everybody else I understood to be a Communist I know
of no other.
Q. Except for the identity of the speaker, Doctor, was there any substantial
difference between the meeting at your brother's which you described and the
meeting which Crouch described.
A. There was everything different. Crouch described a lecture. No one was
introduced. It was at my house. It was to discuss, according to his description,
high Communist policy. The meeting at my brother's house was a meeting at
which people were introduced, at least to some extent, very friendly and not a
lecture. They had literature. There was no talk of literature at the Crouch
description. Everybody at this other meeting knew everybody else, except the
two visitors, who were introduced as visitors. No similarity that I can, see.
Q. What about the meeting at Louise Bransten's house? Was there a
speaker there?
A. There was.
Q. Who was that?
A. Schneiderman.
217
Q. He was also the speaker at Haakon Chevalier's house, wasn't he?
A. Bight
Q. What was the difference between those two meetings and the meeting that
Crouch described, of course leaving out the fact that Grouch described a meeting
at your house which we know.
A. I had no impression and I know that the meetings at the Chevaliers and
the Branstens were not intended as Communist Party meetings.
Q. But at both meetings, both the Chevalier and Bransten, you had a talk
from a high Communist Party functionary about the Communist Party line,
didn't you?
A. Bight, absolutely.
Q. So at least to that extent those meetings were similar to the one described
by Grouch.
A. Bight
Q. And they were both at night in a private house, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And the one described by Crouch was at night and in a private house?
A. Yes.
Q. I believe you told us that so far as you recall most everybody at the Bran-
sten meeting and the Chevalier meeting was either a Communist or a fellow
traveler.
A. I said taking sympathizer in a broad sense, a sympathizer.
Q. So that the Bransten meeting and the Chevalier meeting and the one
described by Crouch were all meetings where a high Communist Party func-
tionary was going to explain and expound the Communist Party line, is that
correct?
A. In that respect, correct I believe there is a difference, because Crouch's
description indicates that he was telling the comrades what to say and do.
There was none of that quality in these other meetings.
Q. You mean Schneiderman didn't tell the comrades anything?
A. He said the party stands for this, the party decides, and so on, as a sort of
exposition.
Q. Do you have any doubt that any comrade there present would have
gathered from what Schneiderman said what Schneiderman was, what he was
supposed to believe and say and do?
A. I can testify that it had no such meaning for me, because I was not a
comrade.
Q. That was not quite my question, Doctor. Would you read my question back
to the Doctor?
( Question read by the reporter. )
The WITNESS. I have a little doubt. I had more the feeling that this was a
public relations show on Schneiderrnan's part
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. You thought it was necessary for a Communist Party functionary to engage
in public relations with comrades?
A. No, they weren't all comrades.
Q. A substantial number of them were, weren't they?
A. I don't know.
Q. Doctor, when you first heard about Crouch's testimony before the Cali-
fornia committee, did you immediately deny categorially that you had been
present at such a meeting?
A. I first heard about it from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, not from
the testimony.
Q. When you first heard about it from the FBI, did you immediately cate-
gorically say, "No, I was not present?" s a .
A. I sai4 it pretty strongly. It took a long time. The investigators produced
more and more detail and the more detail they produced, the more convinced I
was that it had not occurred.
Q. Whose investigators?
A. The FBI investigators. I have forgotten their names.
Q. You mean it was not until after an investigation had been made
Q. No, the FBI came to see me about this matter before the California
testimony.
Q. Yes, sir.
A. They started interrogating me. As their account of the details of the
meeting, the suggested details of the meeting, developed, it became quite clear
that it had not occurred. I promised to talk it over with my wife and see If she
218
had any recollection of it, and I saw them a few days later, and said by then I was
sure it did not occur.
Q. It took you a little while to make up your mind whether you had been
present or not, didn't it?
A. I didn't know what It was that they were talking about. It did not come
out in terms of a closed Communist meeting. You probably have the record of
the interview, and I don't remember the details. But I remember that it wasn't
until the thing had some shape that I knew what they were talking about.
Q. As soon as you were told that the question was whether you had been at a
closed Communist Party meeting and Paul Crouch had made a talk
A. I was not told about Paul Crouch.
Q. As soon as you were told by anybody that the question was whether or not
you had been at a closed Communist Party meeting where somebody had made a
talk, did you immediately say "No, it couldn't have been true ; I was not there"?
A. I don't remember, and I don't know that is the form in which the incident
occurred in the FBI interview.
Q. Was that prior to the time when Crouch testified?
A. Yes, I am sure that as a result of these two interviews with the FBI I did
deny it But I do not know in what sequence the itemization of this meeting
occurred.
Q. But, Doctor, isn't it a fair statement to say that it took you some little time
before you finally denied that you had been at such a meeting?
A. I don't— it probably took me some time, but I don't know what the facts
withheld from me were until I denied it. This is available to you, but it is not
in my memory. I will say one thing. I believe it was late in the interview that
I said this didn't happen. But I don't know in what order things occurred.
Q. Do you recall telling the agents that you did recall somebody asking you
to "give us your house for a meeting of young people"?
A. I have that in my answer.
Q. Do you recall telling the agents that?
A. No, I don't
Q. Do you recall telling that the person who requested such permission could
have been Kenneth May, but you don't recall that it was?
A. Yes. Now I recollect I said that to somebody. Whether it was to the
United States attorney or the agents, I don't remember.
Q. What I am asking you about is an interview with two special agents of
the FBI.
A. Right
Q. I believe at San Francisco.
A. No.
Q. Pardon. Wasn't it? Was it Princeton?
A. If it is the one I am thinking of, it was at Princeton.
Q. Do you recall making that statement about possibly loaning your house
to some young people, possibly Kenneth May being involved, making that state-
ment in May 1952, to perhaps the United States Attorney's office here?
A, Yes. In fact, I say that in my answer.
Q. Did you categorically deny ever having been at such a meeting, Doctor,
until after your representatives had made the investigation in New Mexico?
A. I categorically denied it to the FBI in these two interviews.
Q. Doctor, your position is that you could not have been there because you
were in New Mexico, is that right?
A. No. My position is a little more complicated than that. It is first that
I recollect nothing about it, and that the circumstances are such that I don't
believe I could fail to recollect it. It is second, that if I were there, it could
not have been a closed meeting of the Communist Party, because I wasn't. It
is, third, that at the time it is alleged to have occurred, and for a considerable
time before and after that, we were not there.
The first point is important I forget a lot, but the notion that I would forget
a meeting in my own home at which a lecture has been given, I think that has
never happened, is a little hard. The notion that I would forget a meeting
in my own home filled with people at which no one was introduced is a little
hard.
Q. Doctor, you purchased your house at one Eagle Hill there from a Mrs.
Damon?
A. I did.
Q. .Those negotiations were going on during July of 1941, weren't they?
A. Yes. ,
219
Q. Do you recall meeting with Mrs. Damon at Berkeley to divide up some
furniture that was in the house?
A. Yes.
Q. In the new house?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall when that was?
A. Not with precision, but I should think the 8th of August was a pretty good
guess. 10th of August, maybe. I am not sure.
Q. Did you go back to New Mexico after that happened?
A. No.
Q. Did you stay in Berkeley?
A. We stayed in Berkeley.
Q. It would have been physically possible for you to fly back from New Mexico
for a day or two to Berkeley and then return, would it not?
A. Of course it would.
Q. It would not have taken you very long to get back from New Mexico?
A. No, especially for an important Communist meeting.
Q. But your testimony is that you didn't do that
A. That is right
Mr. HOBB. I thing that brings that item to a dose.
. Mr. GBAY. Do you have one other line of questioning?
Mr. ROBB. It will take quite a while.
Mr. GRAY. It is not yet five. Maybe I can ask two or three miscellaneous
questions, if I may.
The WITNESS. Is there just one other major line of questioning?
Mr. ROBB. I think so, Doctor, but don't hold me to that.
Mr. GRAY. I was interested a while ago, and I suppose this is more curiosity
than anything else, when you referred to being accompanied by counsel to the
House Un-American Activities Committee, you mentioned Mr. Volpe.
The WITNESS. That is right
Mr. GRAY. And identified him as General Counsel.
The WITNESS. Right
Mr. GRAY. Was he at that time General Counsel?
The WITNESS. He was. And I was Chairman of the General Advisory
Committee.
Mr. GRAY. It was in that capacity?
Q&e WITNESS. I think the Commission agreed or decided that this was a
proper arrangement.
Mr. GRAY. I don't know whether you know the answer to this question, Dr.
Oppenheimer, but in reading the files, there appear references to closed meetings
of the Communist Party. There also appear many references to meetings of
people who were Communists or fellow travelers, which were referred to as
social gatherings. Without implying that you are an expert in these matters,
but from conversations with your brother, perhaps, or Mrs. Oppenheimer and
others, is there any real difference between a closed meeting and a social
gathering if the same people are involved?
The WITNESS. Let me tell you what I mean by the words. The words
"closed meeting" mean to me one to which only members of the Communist
Party can come. I think that is a rather sharp distinction if you are trying to
identify who is and who isn't a member of the Communist Party. I should sup-
pose that the difference between a meeting and social gathering was rather
wide. In a meeting it was business and it was transacted and there was prob-
ably a chairman and there might be dues collected and there might be litera-
ture. Anyway, this happened at the little meeting I saw at my brother's.
I should think that a social gathering would be a lot of talk which could indeed
be very bad talk, but which would not be organized or programatic. This
is the sense in which I would interpret the words.
Mr. GRAY. So these two meetings which have been the subject of some discus-
sion at both of which I believe Mr. Schneiderman spoke, in the terms of the
definitions which you have given, they would really have been social gatherings?
The WITNESS. I would say they were neither. They were social gatherings
ornamented by a special feature, namely, this lecture or speech. An ordinary
social gathering I don't think has a lecture even in Communist jargon.
Mr. GRAY. I just had the impression about these functions that many of those
that we referred to were social gatherings may have been meetings. That
doesn't concern your attendance at all.
There is one question I have which relates to the security of the project itself.
Very early in your testimony in some discussion about procedures or security
measures which were taken after very careful thought, you made the observa-
220
tion obviously they did not succeed. Again this is not a direct quote. Do you
mind amplifying on that just a moment?
The WITNESS. Yes. I think of the known leakages of information, Fuchs is
by far the most grave. It occurred out of Los Alamos. I won't attempt to
assess responsibility for the surveillance of personnel who moved around there.
Faculties for surveillance were available, and they could well have been used
in following Fuchs rather than somebody else. That would not have prevented his
prior espionage, but it would have prevented the espionage at that time. I
can't imagine any more pinpointed leakage than if Fuchs had simply communi-
cated what he was working on. I don't mean that this was the only secret,
but I can't imagine any single little point that would be more helpful to an
enemy than the job he had himself. While not wishing to debate with General
Groves either the necessity, the desirability or the dangers of compartmentaliza-
tion, I would like to record that if Fuchs had been infinitely compartmentalized,
what was inside his compartment would have done the damage.
Mr. GRAY. Here is a rather sharp change of pace again. Do you know what
was the source of the allegation that you caused to be circulated the GAO
report at Los Alamos?
The WITNESS. No. I would very much like to know the source of it I have
a conjecture, but I would prefer to be told and not to make the conjecture.
Mr. ROBB. Might I ask this one question, Mr. Chairman, suggested by a ques-
tion that you asked?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, when did you tell the FBI about this meeting at Louise
Bransten's house.
A. I spoke of that earlier. I said at the latest 1952 and possibly earlier. I
don't remember.
Q. At one of the interviews that we have talked about, either in 1946, 1950,
or 1952, is that right?
A. Yes, in 1952 I think it possible that it was an interview with my wife
at which I was present.
Q. You think that is when you told them about it?
A. I know that it occurred not later than that interview.
Q. Have you been interviewed since 1952?
A. Only minor ones, not protracted ones.
Mr. GRAY. Again a shift of subject, and you may have answered a question
about this, Dr. Oppenheimer. I am sure you testified that your brother Frank
had told you that he joined the Communist Party.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Were you questioned about your knowledge about his severing con-
nection with the Communist Party? I don't want to plow over some old ground.
The WITNESS. Was I questioned here? I think I was. I think it is in the
transcript As to the facts, I felt assured by t*-iM"g to hi™ in the fall of 1941
he was no longer a member. Whether that is because I asked him or because
he told me
Mr. GRAY. Yes, I do remember that was covered. Were you also asked about
Mrs. Frank Oppenheimer? Did she follow the same course?
The WITNESS. I understood this went for both of them, but perhaps not
quite so sharply.
Mr. GBAY. One other unrelated question. We talked yesterday about your
having dinner or at least a social visit with Dr. Chevalier in Paris in Novem-
ber or December. There was in the morning press a statement attributed to
Dr. Chevalier which had a St Louis date line, I believe.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Which indicated to me that he is in this country. Were you aware
of the fact that he was back in this country?
The WITNESS. No. In fact, I am skeptical of it.
Mr. GRAY. I gather you are saying that you have no reason to believe that
he is not still in Paris?
The WITNESS. That is right.
Mr. GRAY. I don't want to clutter up the record with the quotes of Dr
Chevalier, but am I right in thinking I read that in today's press?
Mr. ROBB. You are correct.
Mr. GRAY. It is now a couple of minutes after five. We will meet at nine in
the morning and you will proceed with the questioning.
(Thereupon, at 5: 30 p. m., a recess was taken until Friday, April 16, 1954,
at 9a.m.)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER OF J. ROBERT OPFENHEIMER
ATOMIC ENERGT COMMISSION,
BUILDING T-3, ROOM 2022,
Washington, D. C., Friday, April 16, 1954.
The above entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to recess,
before the board, at 9 a. m.
Personnel Security Board: Mr. Gordon Gray, chairman; Dr. Ward
T. Evans, member; Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Roger Robb, and C. A. Rolander, Jr., counsel for the
board; J. Robert Oppenheimer, Lloyd K. Garrison, Samuel J. Silver-
man, and Allen B. Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer. Her-
bert S. Marks, cocounsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
(221)
PROCEEDINGS
Mr. GRAY. The proceeding will begin.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, before we begin, I want to make one procedure
question.
When we adjourn this afternoon at half past three, it would be very helpful
to us if we could have copies of all the transcripts of the testimony to date,
whether they have been cleared or not, to work on. I assume this can be
arranged. In other words, we could work on them in the other room with the
understanding that they will not be taken out of the building, so that we can
do some work on them over the weekend. I think perhaps this afternoon, this
evening and tomorrow would pretty well do it. Are they still going the rounds?
Mr. ROBB. Frankly, Mr. Garrison, I don't know. I have had so many other
things on my mind, I don't know what has been happening. I know somebody
is reading them with a view to seeing what should be classified and what should
not. Who had to do it and how many times it has to be read, I don't know. I
have not read it myself.
Mr. GARRISON. This is the end of the first week now. Next week is going to
be a very concentrated string of witnesses. This is about the only time that
we shall have to do any work on them. There was such a jumble of dates and
names that it is pretty hard just from scribbled notes here to *-
Mr. GRAY. In response to the point raised by Mr. Garrison, I would have to
say that I don't know what the situation is with respect to transcript and I will
have to find out and we will respond.
Mr. GARRISON. That is why I raised the point at this point of time. I assume
that the only problem is they are going out of the building, because as far as
we are concerned, we have heard it all.
Mr. ROBB. It seems reasonable to me that Mr. Garrison should have access to
them if they are available. As I say, there are higher powers than I.
Mr. GRAY. We will respond to the request.
Mr. ROBB. You have heard all the testimony, so why can't you read it?
Mr. GARRISON. It would be far better if they were released and we could keep
them.
Mr. ROBB. Yes, but I don't have any control of that.
Mr. GARRISON. The next request has to do with the transcripts of the inter-
views with Pash and Lansdale. I have personally not had time to go over them,
but my associates have, and I would like very much to have an opportunity to go
over them myself at the end of the afternoon session.
Mr. ROBB. Surely.
Mr. GARRISON. Also, I would like to hear, and I think I should be entitled to
hear, the recordings, because it appears from these transcripts there are places
were they just don't seem to make sense at all. There were quite a number of
gaps and statements when one doesn't know which voice is what, just from the
grammatical structure of the thing. I don't want to make too much about this at
all, but I am worried about it as counsel.
Mr. GRAY. We will receive this request along with the other, and we will
respond to it in the course of the day.
Mr. GARRISON. I am told that the Pash transcript says in a little box at the
top of it, some indication that this does contain errorfe and is substantially
correct, or words to that effect. I feel this particularly on my conscience because
I think it may well be that if we had the sense of what that transcript was like
at the time Dr. Oppenheimer was testifying, I am not at all sure his testimony
at all points would have been quite as it was. I don't want to overdo that point,
but I want you to feel that sense of urgency that I as counsel do about it.
Mr. GRAY. I would make the observation, Mr. Garrison, that it is entirely
possible that Dr. Oppenheimer's might not have been the same, but this is his
testimony and not counsel's testimony.
Mr. GARRISON. That is right.
Mr. GRAY. I don't know that your having had an opportunity to read these
transcripts in advance and advise Mr. Oppenheimer, if it had! changed his
S0331&— 64 15 (223)
224
testimony essentially, it would not have been in the interest— I don't suppose
you meant to imply that.
Mr. GABBISON. No, I didn't mean having them in advance and advising him
before, but simply having them before me as they were read so I might see
what these gaps and garbles were. I did have the sense of the testimony in
connection with the Lansdale one had rather a different quality and the line of
questioning perhaps. But I don't want to carry the argument any further or
push it an inch beyond what it is entitled to. I just want to express my sense
of urgency as counsel to do a good Job.
Mr. GRAY. I understand, and I have received the two requests, and we will re-
spond to them.
Whereupon, J. Robert Oppenheimer, the witness on the stand at the time of
taking the recess, resumed the stand and testified further as f ollows :
CROSS EXAMINATION— Resumed
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Doctor, I have 1 or 2 miscellaneous questions. You mentioned Mr. and
Mrs. Serber yesterday. Did you know them very well ?
A. I did.
Q. How long have you known them?
A. He came as national research fellow to Berkeley. I think he held the fel-
lowship 2 years. This may have been 1934-35. He stayed on as my research
assistant I think for another 2 years. I got to know them during the period
of this fellowship. I have known them ever since.
Q. Did you know his wife, Charlotte?
A. Sure.
Q. You mentioned that she had a rather important position at Los Alamos.
What was It?
A. She was librarian.
Q. Did that mean she had charge of aU the technical publications and tech-
nical materials in the project there?
A. She was in overall charge. The actual documentary stuff was in the im-
mediate charge of another woman.
Q. Who was the other woman?
A. I have forgotten her name.
Q. Was Mrs. Serber's position one which would be described as highly sensi-
tive?
A. Yes.
Q. She had access to a great deal of important classified information ?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you know about her background so far as Communist connec-
tions were concerned?
A. I knew that she came of a radical family, the Leof family. I saw and
heard in the transcript of my interview with Lansdale that I said she had been
a member of the Communist Party. I have no current belief that this is true.
I told you that she was very active in Spanish relief and that she and her hus-
band had strong leftwing views.
Q. You knew that when she came to Los Alamos?
A. Yes.
Q. Were her activities and her beliefs such as those that we have described,
I believe, as indicia of communistic tendencies? Do I make myself plain?
A. Only in part. I recollect, for instance, her expressing concern and dis-
satisfaction with the purge affairs, which I think was not a pro-Communist
position. On the Spanish thing she was certainly very, very much engaged.
Q. On the leftwing side?
A. On the Loyalist side, which was also the leftwing side.
Q. How did you know about her family in Philadelphia ?
A. I once met them. When I was in Philadelphia I met them on another af-
fair. But this is something that over the years she gossiped about quite a lot.
Q. You said you knew she was quite radical, I believe.
A. Yes.
Q. Would you explain what you meant by radical ?
A. I will try. I believe Leof was an old-time Socialist. Probably he was a
Socialist when the various factions had no split. I believe that they also were
very much concerned with the Spanish cause. I believe they also had leftwing
friends. But I do not know any details.
Q. What did you mean when you spoke of the factions splitting, Doctor?
225
A. The Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Trotskyite Party, the Stalin
Party, and so on.
Q. Which faction did you understand that Leof went with?
A. I didn't understand.
Q. You were more or less familiar with those details of the factional disputes
and debates in the party?
A. No, I was familiar with their existence.
Q. Was Mr. Serber also at Las Alamos?
A. Yes, he certainly was.
Q. What was his position?
A. He was head of a group in the theoretical physics division.
Q. Likewise, I assume, in possession of a great deal of classified information?
A. Indeed.
Q. Did you have anything to do with bringing them there?
A. Oh, yes, I was responsible.
Q. What did you do to bring them there?
A. I believe that they came to Berkeley for the summer study in 1942 along
with the others that I mentioned. I think that they were still in Berkeley at
the time we went to Los Alamos. They followed us there shortly after that.
Q. At your suggestion?
A. Yes.
Q. Where are the Seifcers now?
A. At Columbia University.
Q. Do you see them frequently?
A. Very infrequently, to my regret.
Q. You still consider them your friends.
A. Oh, yes. I think they are no longer in any way leftwing.
Q. When did you last hear from them?
A. It is quite some time. Not a year, but they had personal difficulties this
autumn, and we were in communication with them about that. I had a note
from him on recommending a candidate more recently.
Q. Candidate for what?
A. A membership in the institute.
Q. You mentioned a man named Philip Morrison, doctor.
A. Yes.
Q. How well did you know him in 1843?
A. In 1943? I had known him well when he was in Berkeley. He was away,
I don't remember quite howi many years after leaving Berkeley. But I had
known him very weU at Berkeley.
Q. In what connection?
A. As a student and as a friend.
Q. You saw him socially and shall we say officially?
A. Yes. He was a student and then I believe he could not get a job, and we
made some kind of an arrangement for him to stay on. I think he was probably
in Berkeley 4 or 5 years.
Q. Did you see Morrison at many of these leftwing functions that you
attended?
A. Not so riiany, I should think. He was not a person who was going to give
much money to the Spanish cause. He had no money.
Q. What did you know about his political beliefs and affiliations in 1943?
A. As of then, or as of an earlier time?
Q. Beg pardon?
A. As of then I knew nothing.
Q. As of an earlier time.
A. As of an earlier time I knew that he was very close to the party and would
have presumed that he might have been in the YGL or in the party.
Q. I believe you told us that yesterday. I believe you said yesterday that you
either knew, or assumed that he was a member of the Young Communist League;
is that right?
A. No ; I didn't say that yesterday.
Q. Did you read Dr. Morrison's testimony before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary?
A. I did not read it carefully. I think I was away when he testified. I am not
sure. I know the substance of it
Q. You know that he testified that he had been a member of the Communist
Party.
A. Right.
226
Q. That didn't surprise you?
A. No.
Q. It was in accord with what you previously had known about him in general ;
is that correct?
A. It was.
Q. Morrison was a man who I believe you said went over to Japan before
the drop on Hiroshima?
A. Not before. I think after.
Q. For what purpose did he go there?
A. I think to inspect damage. There was a team under General Farrell, and
he wanted to see what the mess was that we had made.
Q. In other words, they wanted to see how the thing you made had worked.
A. Yes ; and whether there was radiation ; to make a good observation of the
consequences.
Q. Who else from Los Alamos went over at that time?
A. Serber was also in Japan because he brought me a bottle from Nagasaki.
I don't remember who else. Alvarez, I think.
Q. Did you select Serber and Morrison for those missions?
A. I don't recall how the selection was made. I would certainly not have
been without responsibility for it, no matter how it was made. There may be a
record of that.
Q. They would not have gone had yon not approved it?
A. They would not have gone if I disapproved, that is certain.
Q. How recently have you seen Philip Morrison?
A. I think it may be a year ago.
Q. What were the circumstances?
A. I gave a lecture at the Runrford Bicentennial in Boston. I am not com-
pletely certain of this. I have not been in Ithaca, and he has not been in — well,
I have not been in Ithaca, and he has not visited me at Princeton for something
like a year.
Q. Has he visited you at Princeton since the war?
A. I don't recollect. It would have been very natural that he should have
Q. Why do you say it would have been very natural?
A. Princeton is a place that almost all physicists visit. He and I are old
friends. I mean no more than that.
Q. And what?
A. I mean no more than that. He has not spent the night at our house or
anything like that.
Q. But I assume that you had the occasion arise when you would have been
happy to have offered him your hospitality for the night?
Mr. GAEBISON. Mr. Chairman.
The WITNESS. This is not a question I feel capable of answering.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. You still consider htm your friend?
A. Yes. I don't feel very close to him. I suspect that though he is no longer
at all close to the Communists, his views and mine do differ, and perhaps on
matters on which he feels rather strongly.
Q. You say he is no longer at all close to the Communists?
A. That is my understanding.
Q. Where did you get that understanding?
A. We have many common friends.
Q. Who told you that he was no longer close to the Communists?
A. I don't think it is any one man. He worked at MIT last year, and several
of the professors there talked to me about him and several of the people from
Ithaca have talked to me about him,
Q. Did you base that understanding in any part upon Morrison's testimony
which he gave before the Senate committee In May 195S?
A. No. Perhaps I should have, but I didn't
Q. You have gone over that testimony?
A. I have gone over it this way (gesturing) .
Mr. GABKTSOW. What was the answer?
The Wrnrasss. I have gone over it not in great detail.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. I believe you said, Doctor, that you didnt think Morrison had visited you
at Princeton during the last year. Was that your testimony?
A. That is my recollection ; yes, sir.
Q. Had he visited you at Princeton prior to a year ago?
227
A. You asked me the question and I said I supposed it was likely. I have no
recollection of a visit.
Q. Have you visited him or lunched or dined with him either in New York or
Princeton or Ithaca or wherever since the war?
A. Yes. I had one dinner with him which I remember vividly. I think Mr.
Marks
Q. Mr. who?
A. Mr. Herbert Marks, Mr. Bacher, he and I had dinner together at the Hotel
Brevoort. I may be wrong about Mr. Marks. Anyway, Bacher, Morrison, and
1 had dinner together, and I think Mr. Marks was there. This was during the
time when he was on a committee appointed by General Groves
Q. Who was on the committee?
A. Morrison — to consider the international control of atomic energy, and I
was on a committee appointed by Mr. Byrnes to consider the international con-
trol of atomic energy. We were with encouragement as well as approval doing
a little cross talking to see what ideas there were in the technical group.
I have also seen him at another time — certainly more than once he lectured
at Cornell in the spring of 1946— and I would presumably have seen him then,
though I don't specifically recollect it. I lectured at Cornell later, and I am
sure I saw him at the reception which was given for me at the time. We have
attended conferences of physicists and I am sure I have seen him then. This is
probably not a complete list, but that is what comes to mind.
Q. Now, Doctor, I would like to turn to the matter of the thermonuclear
problem.
A. Right
Q. I think it might be helpful to the board, sir, if you gave, if possible, some
categorical answers to some of the statements made in General Nichols' letter.
I don't find that your letter of answer sharpens those issues, and I wonder if
you can't sharpen them a bit. Do you have General Nichols letter before you?
A. I will get out General Nichols' letter. But to questions that are badly
phrased, categorical answers are not always possible.
Q. Let us try, Doctor.
Page 6 of General Nichols' letter at the bottom of the page. Do you have it
before you, sir?
A. I have it before me.
Q. "It was reported in 1945 you expressed the view that *There is a reasonable
possibility that it (the hydrogen bomb) can be made,' but that the feasibility
of the hydrogen bomb did not appear on theoretical grounds as certain as the
fission bomb appeared certain on theoretical grounds when the Los Alamos
Laboratory was started."
Is that a true statement, Doctor?
A. You mean is this a true statement about the thermonuclear bomb or about
my assertions?
Q. Your assertions.
A. It is a precise statement of what I thought.
Q. In 1945.
A. In 1945.
Q. Did you express that view in 1945?
A. I wrote a report. You see, I don't know to what document this refers.
Is this in the Interim Committee report? If you will tell me where this is
alleged to have been written, I will confirm it. It is an exact quotation, or
purports to be an exact quotation. I have no objection to saying that it is a
reasonable quotation, but how can I confirm it without knowing whether this
is testimony before the Joint Congressional Committee, or an interview with
Colonel Lansdale or a report I wrote.
Mr. GRAY. Can you identify the source of that?
Mr. ROBB. I am looking for it right now.
The WITNESS. Please don't misunderstand me. This is a good statement of
what- 1 believed. But I am being asked to say did I actually say it.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, 1 think we are entering an area here where,
if this is an inquiry and not a trial, great latitude should be allowed the wit-
ness to explain his answers. I am sure that nothing could be more misleading
than to have a simply yes or no as in a trial to things that simply overflow the
landscape and their surrounding factors.
Mr. GKIT. I Just make the observation that I don't recall, Mr. Garrison, at
any point in this proceeding when the witness was interrupted in any way.
Do yon?
Mr. GABBISON. No.
228
The WITNESS. I was asked to make categorical answers and to some extent
it might not be possible.
Mr. BOBB. I said it would be helpful to the committee.
The WITNESS. I will do the best I can.
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. You will agree it would be helpful to the board?
A. I do not agree on that second point. I will gladly state that this first
statement is a good expression of my overall view in 1945, that I had occasion
to report to the Government both to the congressional committee, McMahon's
Committee, and to the War Department, and no doubt to other places and I
would have expressed my view, and since this was it, I have no objection to
taking this as an expression of my view.
Q. Very well. That answers the question.
Now, to continue : "* * * and that in the autumn of 1949 the General Advisory
Committee expressed the view that 'an imaginative and concerted attack on the
problem has a better than even chance of producing the weapon within 5 years.' "
A. I think that is a direct quotation from the report of the October 29 meet-
ing of the General Advisory Committee. I believe I wrote it myself. I think
the committee had agreed with this statement ahead of time. I believe we
discussed the statement and it is an expression of the views of the committee
and of me.
Q. So that statement 18 true.
A, It is true.
Q. "It was further reported that in the autumn of 1949 and subsequently you
strongly opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb: (1) On moral grounds ;
(2) By claiming it was not feasible ; (3) by claiming that there were insufficient
facilities and scientific personnel to carry on the development, and (4) that it
was not politically desirable."
Is that statement true either in whole or in part?
A. It is true in part It is out of context and it gives a very misleading
impression.
Q. Now, would you please explain your answer and tell us what part is not
true, what part is true?
A. I would say that in the official 1949 report, which you have read, we evalu-
ated the feasibility, as it is stated up above, namely, that there was a better
than even chance that if you worked hard on it and had good ideas you would
have something in 5 years. That was then our view.
In the same reiport, which you have read, we pointed up the moral and
political arguments against making an all-out effort This was primarily in the
annexes that were attached to the report, rather than in the official report which
I prepared.
I tMnfr it possible that similar arguments were repeated in the report lof
the next meeting of the General Advisory Committee.
Q. Which would be when, Doctor?
A, Between the end of October and the 1st of January. Probably early
December, or something like that We did not at that time <fl*iTn that it was
not feasible, and I believe that I have never claimed that the hydrogen bomb
was not feasible. But I have indicated, starting with early 1950 * * * very
strong doubts of the feasibility of anything that was then being worked on.
These doubts were right
Q. Did you indicate such doubts prior to the GAO meeting of 1949?
A. In 1948 we had a GAG meeting and in that we didn't say it was not
feasible, but I think we said it didn't look good. Something
Q. Doctor, pardon me. I am, talking about you. Did you say it was not
feasible or it didn't look good?
A. As a member and Chairman of the General Advisory Committee, I said
it didn't look good until some time in 1948.
Q. 1948.
A. Yes. This was a specific model and all of this is about a specific model.
We will try to do this without classified stuff.
Q. Was that still your view at the time of the GAO meeting of October 29,
1949?
A. That it didn't look good?
Q. Yes.
A. If it had not been, we would not have said it would take 5 years and an
imaginative and concerted attack.
229
Q. Doctor, would you come back to the centers we are talking about?
A. Right.
Q. I think you have mentioned the moral grounds. May I ask a question
about that before we proceed to something else?
Did you continue your attitude in respect to the moral grounds subsequent
to the GAG meeting of October 29, 1949?
A. I think we need to distinguish sharply as to whether I expressed in
official reports or in dealings with the Government any desire to reraise the
decision.
Q. Doctor, you and I are getting along fine. That was going to be my next
question, so will you answer that, too?
A. I am quite sure we did not ask to have the decision reconsidered.
Q. Did you subsequent to the President's decision in January 1950 ever express
any opposition to the production of the hydrogen bomb on moral grounds?
A. I would think that I could very well have said this is a dreadful weapon,
or something like that. I have no specific recollection and would prefer it, if
you would ask me or remind me of the context or conversation that you have
in mind.
Q. Why do you think you could very well have said that?
A. Because I have always thought it was a dreadful weapon. Even from
a technical point of view it was a sweet and lovely and beautiful Job, I have
still thought it was a dreadful weapon.
Q. And have said so?
A. I would assume that I have said so, yes.
Q. You mean you had a moral revulsion against the production of such a
dreadful weapon?
A, This is too strong.
Q. Beg pardon?
A. That is too strong.
. Q. Which is too strong, the weapon or my expression?
A. Your expression. I had a grave concern and anxiety.
Q. You had moral qualms about it, is that accurate?
A. Let us leave the word "moral" out of it.
Q. You had qualms about it.
A. How could one not have qualms about it? I know no one who doesn't
have qualms about it
Q. Very well. Clause 3 of that sentence, "By claiming there were insufficient
facilities and scientific personnel to carry on the development." Is that true?
A. That is true in a very limited and circumscribed way. There were some
conflicts of scheduling between fission weapon development and thermonuclear
development. Where the thermonuclear development was directed toward the
essential problem of feasibility, or what appeared clearly to me to be the
essential problem of feasibility, I never had or could have any doubt that this
should take priority, because that was the order under which we were operating.
Q. That this— which should take priority?
A. That the thermonuclear development. Where it was a question of what
appeared to me a fruitless byline, there I did question the relative priority
of such bylines and rattier of Immediate fission weapon developments.
Q. Did you ever claim that there were insufficient facilities and scientific
personnel to carry on the development of the fusion weapon?
A. Certainly not in that bald form, because it was not true. I never believed
it and I therefore don't believe I could have claimed it.
Q. "(4) and that it was not politically desirable." Did you make such a
claim?
A. That was certainly a better statement of the general import of the GAG
report— of the annex to the GAG report^-than moral grounds.
Q. Did you continue to express those views subsequent to the President's
decision of January 1950?
A After the President's decision, I appeared on a broadcast program with
Mrs. Roosevelt and Lilienthal and Bethe, and what I said indicated I was not
entirely happy, perhaps, with the procedures by which the decision was arrived
Q. Would you tell us what you said?
A. I can get hold of it.
Q. Give us your best recollection of it, Doctor.
A. I said that the decision is like the decision to seek international control
of atomic energy or the decision to proceed with the hydrogen bomb had compli-
230
cated technical background, but they also had important moral and human
consequence; that there was danger in the fact that such decisions had to be
taken secretly, not because the people who took the decisions were not wise,
but because the very need, the very absence of criticism and discussion tended
to corrode the decision making process. That these were hard decisions, that
they were dealt with fearful things, that sometimes the answer to fear could
not lie in explaining away the reasons for fear. Sometimes the only answer
for fear lay in courage.
This is probably not very accurate, but we can easily provide you with that.
Q. About when was that, Doctor, that you made those statements?
A. I would guess that it was within 2 months of the 1st of February 1950.
Q. Did you make any other public statements along those same lines?
A. Not quite. In addressing the Westinghouse talent search here in Wash-
ington—this is a group of young people ostensibly who get rewarded for doing
well in high school and get sent on to college, attended by dignitaries — I talked
about science and in the initial paragraph I said that I was not going to talk to
diem about the problem of the statutory requirements for AEG fellowships, or
the problem of the hydrogen bomb. These were things that I hoped would not
be in their minds very much when they grew up. I was going to talk to them
immediately about pure science.
Q. Did you make any other public statements along those lines? Pardon me.
About when was that that you made that statement?
A. I believe I said no more than this, but we also have a record of that
Q. About when did you make that statement?
A. That would have been in the spring of 1950.
Q. Did you make any other public statements along those lines?
A. We have an almost complete record— -I tfrimr a complete record— of every-
thing public. I am not remembering anything else right now.
Q. Doctor, you know, do you not, that you are a physicist who is largely
admired and whose words have great weight with other physicists, don't you?
A. With some.
Q. Beg pardon?
A. With some physicists.
Q. With many physicists; don't you?
A. Eight
Q. And that is especially true of younger physicists?
A. I know some old physicists.
Q. Some old physicists ; too.
A. I don't think it is essentially true of younger physicists, because I am not
longer in a very extensive— the people who study with me or even under my
auspices are not as they were before the war, a large fraction or a substantial
fraction of the theoretical physicists in the country. They are a very small
fraction.
Q. But as of 1950, you were certainly
A. No, this is still true.
Q. Pardon?
A. This was true then.
Q. But in 1950 you were pretty much a hero to a substantial group of physicists
in this country; weren't you?
A. I should think that your knowledge of that was as complete as mine
Q. Wouldn't you agree with that statement, Doctor, laying aside your modesty?
A. Well, you read to me yesterday— no, you told me yesterday— and could
today have read in the papers a letter from one physicist who seems not to have
regarded me as a hero by 1950.
^1: Sf**1801?- If Jon don't mind my interrupting a second about procedure, I
think this can be off the record.
Mr. GBAY. Yes.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. GRAY. Would you proceed.
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Doctor, we were talking about your standing and influence with psysicists
as of 1950. Would you not agree, sir, that you were & hero to a very substantial
party of physicists as of 1950? »BUWMI
(Mr, Garrison left the room.)
The WITNESS. I don't know. I would think a judgment of what my position
was in others' eyes should be left out of this. p°»oon
231
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. What?
A. A judgment of how I appeared to people should be left to those to whom I
appeared, rather than to me.
Q. Well, let us put it this way. Wouldn't you agree that anything said by
you would have great weight with a great number of nuclear physicists?
A. Would have some weight with quite a few people, physicists and non-
physicists.
Q. Doctor, let me ask you, sir, da you think that public statements which you
have told us about and which you have summarized, tended to encourage other
physicists to work on the hydrogen bomb?
A. I should think that they were essentialy neutral. I coupled the hydrogen
bomb and the decision to seek international control of atomic energy first, so that
there was no substantive criticism of the decision. In the effect I merely referred
to the fact that the hydrogen bomb had been a very controversial thing as had
the National Science Foundation fellowships.
Q. You certainly didn't think those expressions by you were going to encour-
age physicists to work on the project?
A. They were not intended to affect what physicists did on the project at all.
Q. Doctor, I didn't ask you what you intended. I am asking you what you
reasonably believe would be the result of those statements.
A. I reasonably believe that the result of those statements would be nil as far
as the activities of professional physicists on the hydrogen bomb project or any
other aspect of the Atomic Energy Commission work.
Q. Had a great many physicists at or about that time asked yon your views
on whether or not the hydrogen bomb should be produced?
A. Not a great many ; no.
Q. Had some?
A. Before the President's decision?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes ; some had.
Q. Who?
A. I told you about Bethe and Teller and their visit. Lawrence sent on Serber.
That was about the same time. This was before the QAC meeting. Alvarez dis-
cussed it with me. Bacher discussed it with me. Lauritsen discussed it with
me. Von Neumann discussed it with me.
Q. Babi?
A. Rabi was a member of the general advisory committee.
Q. Did he discuss it with you before the meeting?
A. At least we referred to it. I don't know much of a discussion we had.
Q. DuBridge?
A. Before the meeting?
Q. Yes.
A. I have no recollection of that. It is possible ; I think it unlikely.
Q. Conant? Of course, I know Conant is a chemist and not a physicist.
A. Conant told me he was strongly opposed to it.
Q. Did you express any views to Conant?
A. I believe not.
Q. In other words, he told you what his views were before you expressed yours
to him?
A. He told me what his views were before mine were clearly formulated.
Q. I believe you testified the other day that at the time you heard from Conant,
either by mail or orally, that you were in some doubt about the matter, that you
had not made up your mind.
A. Yes; that is right.
Q. How long before the GAG meeting was that?
A. I don't remember. Certainly not more than a month. It could not have
been more than a month, and it probably was of the order of a week.
Q. The next sentence of General Nichols* letter : "It was further reported that,
even after it was determined as a matter of national policy to proceed with devel-
opment of the hydrogen bomb, you continued to oppose the project and declined
to cooperate fully in the project"
Are the statements made in that sentence true?
A. Let us take the first one.
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I did not oppose the project. Let us take the second one.
Q. You mean after
A. After the decision was made, I did not oppose the project. -
232
Q. Very well. Let us take the second one.
A. I would need to know what cooperate fully, who asked me to cooperate and
what this meant, was before I could answer it. I did not go out to Los Alamos
and roll up my sleeves, and maybe that is what cooperating fully means. I would
like to know what this does mean.
Q. Did you ever tell Teller that you could not work on the project?
A. I told him I was not going out to Los Alamos to work on it.
Q. Did you ever tell him that you could not work on it at all?
A. That is far more sweeping than turned out to be true, and I doubt if I would
have said it.
Q. What work did you do on the project?
A. I did my official Job of learning about it and advising about it and thinking
about it.
Q. You mean official job as chairman of the GAO?
A. Bight, and of other committees.
Q. Of learning about it?
A. And of advising about it and of thinking about it.
Q. Whom did you advise?
A. The Atomic Energy Commission.
Q. You mean the members of the Commission?
A. The Commission as a body.
Q. Did you do any scientific work on the project? By that I mean calcula-
tions. The kind of scientific work you did on the atom bomb.
A. No; not with anything like that intensity. I checked some qualitative
things so I would be fairly sure I understood them. I did very little scientific
work on the atom bomb after I assumed the direction of the Los Alamos labora-
tory.
Q. You made the decisions there, didn't you, Doctor?
A. I did. In this case I won't say I made the decision— it was not my re-
sponsibility— but I certainly helped to make the decision which I believe got
the thing started in the right direction. I didn't have the ideas. There were a
great many ideas I didn't have about the atom either.
Q. The next sentence, I believe, you already commented on. That refers to
the statement that you caused the distribution of the report at Los Alamos
You said that you did not do that ; is that right?
A. Right.
Q. The next sentence refers or is the statement that you were instrumental
in persuading other outstanding scientists not to work on the bomb. I believe
you deny that ; is that correct?
A. I think I would be glad to deny it. I would like to know what outstanding
scientist I might have persuaded not to work on the bomb.
Mr. GRAY. I suppose the question could be answered. Did you attempt to
persuade anyone not to work on the hydrogen bomb ?
The WITNESS. No.
By Mr. EOBB :
Q. I will read you the last clause of that: 'The opposition to the hydrogen
bomb, of which you are the most experienced, most powerful, and effective
member, has definitely slowed down its development"
Let us break that down. Would you agree that you are or were the most
experienced, most powerful, and most effective member of the opposition to the
hydrogen bomb?
A. What time are we talking about?
Q. At any time.
A. Well, I would say I was not the most powerful, I was not the most experi-
enced, and I was not the most influential. But, if you take all three factors
together, perhaps I combined a little more experience, a little more power, and a
little more of influence than anyone &se.
Q. At what time?
A. I am thinking of the period between the Russian test and the President's
decision.
Q. How about after the President's decision?
A. There was not any opposition to the hydrogen bomb
Q. Weren't you still opposed to the development of the hydrogen bomb?
JOL. ^IO.
Q. Do you think your opposition and the opposition of the group of people
'
233 !
A. I find it very hard to Judge. I have testified— let me testifr as follows:
There are two parts to a development like this. One is to have sensible ideas.
These are partly a matter of scientific analysis and partly a matter of invention.
The other is to get plants built, material produced, equipment shoved around,
and a host of technical and technological developments carried out.
With the atom bomb the pacing factor was the second. We could have had the
atom bomb as far as ideas went considerably earlier than we could have it as
far as hardware went
(Mr. Garrison returned to the room.)
The WITNESS. With the hydrogen bomb I believe that the pacing factor was
good ideas. If they had occurred earlier, the physical development of the
weapon would not have been quite as rapid as it was in fact, coming at a time
when a great many of the auxiliary things had already been done. If they had
occurred later, the development of technology which had occurred would not
have done us any good. I therefore do not believe that any substantial delay
in the actual date of our first successful thermonuclear test, * * * derived from
the 3 or 4 months of deliberations. Whether the GAG was responsible for these
3 or 4 months of deliberations or whether that would have occurred in any case,
I do not know.
By Mr. BOBB :
* * * * * * *
Q. I believe you testified that you learned that Fuchs had told the Russians
that we were working on the hydrogen bomb ; is that right?
A. No. What I learned was that Fuchs had told them of some technical points.
Q. Having to do with the hydrogen bomb?
A. Having to do with the hydrogen bomb.
Q. I believe Fuchs was present and took part in a conference at Los Alamos
in the spring of 1946 ; is that correct?
A. Right. I don't know the date. I couldn't go to it. I was invited, but I
could not go.
Q. Did you see a report of it?
A. I believe I did, not a very detailed report.
Q. That conference reviewed
A. What was then known.
Q. What was then known?
A. It was full of mistakes.
Q. In all events, presumably, what Fuchs knew, the Russians knew.
A. Right
Q. Now, I have a note here, Doctor, that you testified that there was a sur-
prising unanimity— I believe that was your expression— at the GAG meeting
of October 29, 1949, that the United States ought not to take the initiative at
that time in an all-out thermonuclear program. Am I correct in my under-
standing of your testimony?
A. Right
Q. In other words, everybody on the committee felt that way about it?
A. Everybody on the committee expressed themselves that way.
Q. Beg pardon?
A. Everybody on the committee expressed themselves that way.
Q. How many people were on the committee?
A. There were 9 on the committee ; 1 man was absent in Sweden.
Q. Who was that?
A. Seaborg.
Q. Where was he from, Doctor?
A. University of California. He worked during the war at the University
of Chicago.
Q. He did not get to Washington at all?
A. Not at that meeting.
Q. So you didn't know how he felt about it?
A. We did not
Q. You didn't know either how he felt about it He Just was not there.
A. He was in Sweden, and there was no communication with
Q. Beg pardon?
A. He was in Sweden, and there was no communication with
Q. You didn't poll him by mail or anything?
A, This was not a convenient thing to do.
234
Q. No, sir. I believe, Doctor, that you afterward testified along those same
lines before the Joint Committee of the House and Senate on Atomic Energy, that
there was unanimity but that Dr. Seaborg was not heard there; is that right?
A. It is true, and I suppose I was asked.
Q. I see.
A. I may add that at later meetings, which Seaborg did attend, he expressed
himself with great reserve and indicated that he would prefer not to say any-
thing one way or the other on the hydrogen-bomb issue.
Q. Now, Doctor, I believe you testified the other day that in 1942 you foresaw
the possibility of developing a thermonuclear weapon ; is that right?
A. Yes ; we discussed it much of the summer of 1942.
Q. That was at Berkeley?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you also discuss it at a meeting at Chicago?
A. I don't recollect that, but it is quite likely.
Q. I believe you said that you were quite enthusiastic at that time about the
possibilities ; is that correct?
A. I tM"fr it would be better to say that we thought it would be much easier
than it was.
Q. The thermonuclear weapon was worked on at Berkeley?
A. Thought about— Just thought about.
Q. When you got down to Los Alamos the thermonuclear was one of the first
things that you began to work on?
A. It never occupied a large part of the laboratory's effort. It could not.
But it was kept on the back burner throughout the war.
Q. I believe you said you had one building, one of the first buildings con-
structed was— what do you call it, cryogenics building?
A. Cryogenics building, which we used for quite different purposes.
Q. But it was built for the purposes of working on the thermonuclear,
wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Work continued on the thermonuclear at Los Alamos under your direction
throughout the war, didn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Then in 1944, Doctor, you applied for a patent on the thermonuclear bomb,
didn't you?
A. I have forgotten that.
Q. Did you?
A. We discussed it, and I do not know whether this actually went through.
Was this with Teller and Bethe? If it was with Teller and Bethe, then I think
it went through.
Q. The patent was granted in 1946, 1 believe.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember that now?
A. Yes. I was simply not sure whether we had gone through with it or not.
Q. And then, I believe, your testimony was that even after you left Los
Alamos in 1945, the work on the super continued there?
A. Yes; it did.
Q. And of course that had your approval and support?
A. Yes; it did.
Q. I believe you testified at the first meeting of the GAC the matter of the
thermonuclear was discussed, is that correct?
A. Bight.
Q. And you encouraged the Commission to get on with the work, as you put
it, is that right?
A. Yes. I think specifically what I testified was that we considered whether
this long-range and very unsure undertaking— it is very difficult and which we
thought of then as 5 years or more— whether thinking about that and working
on it would hurt or harm the other jobs at Los Alamos. We decided that it
would probably not hurt or harm, but on the contrary help.
Q. So they should get ahead with it.
A. So we encouraged them to do this.
Q. We use the expression 'thermonuclear weapon." By that you meant a
weapon of vastly more power than the atom bomb, did you not?
A. The original picture was that. Other pictures came in during the first
year or so of the Commission and also looked very practical,
Q. When we say
235
A. You would like to leave out the small thermonuclear weapons if there are
such things.
Q. Yes. But the thing you were talking about in 1942, and working on at Los
Alamos
A. Would he a very hig explosive.
Q. A tremendous explosive. I don't know whether it is classified or not hut
10,000 times the power of the atom bomb, or something like that.
A. Anyway, very large.
Q. That would not be an exaggeration, would it, 10,000 times?
A. This I think is classified.
Q. Very well. Some weapon to use the technical expression in what we call
the megaton range, is that right?
A. That is right.
Q. That is what you had in mind beginning in 1942?
A. That is right.
Q. Doctor, in your work and discussions in 1942, in your work on the thermo-
nuclear weapon at Los Alamos in 1943 to 1945 and in your application for the
patent of 1944, and in your advice which you as chairman of the GAG gave to the
Commission to get on with the work on this thermonuclear, at all those times
and on all of those occasions, were you suffering from or deterred by any moral
scruples or qualms about the development of this weapon?
A. Of course.
Q. You were?
A. Of course.
Q. But you still got on with the work, didn't you?
A. Yes, because this was a work of exploration. It was not the preparation of
a weapon.
Q. You mean it was just an academic excursion?
A. It was an attempt at finding out what things could be done.
Q. But you were going to spend millions of dollars of the taxpayers* money on
it, weren't you?
A. It goes on all the time.
Q. Were you going to spend millions if not billions of dollars of the taxpayers'
money Just to find out for yourself satisfaction what was going on?
A. We spent no such sums.
Q. Did you propose to spend any such sums for a mere academic excursion?
A. No. It is not an academic thing whether you can make a hydrogen bomb.
It is a matter of life and death.
Q. Beginning in 1942 and running through at least the first year or the first
meeting of the GAC, you were actively and consciously pushing the development
of the thermonuclear bomb, weren't you? Isn't that your testimony?
A. Pushing is not the right word. Supporting and working on it, yes.
Q. Yes. When did these moral qualms become so strong that you opposed the
development of the thermonuclear bomb?
A. When it was suggested that it be the policy of the United States to make
these things at all costs, without regard to the balance between these weapons
and atomic weapons as a part of our arsenal.
Q. What did moral qualms have to do with that?
A. What did moral qualms Have to do with it?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. We freely uged the atomic bomb.
Q. In fact, Doctor, you testified, did you not, that you assisted in selecting the
target for the drop of the bomb on Japan?
A. Bight.
Q. You knew, did you not, that the dropping of that atomic bomb on the target
you had selected will kill or injure thousands of civilians, is that correct?
A. Not as many as turned out
Q. How many were killed or injured?
A. 70,000.
Q. Did you have moral scruples about that?
A. Terrible ones.
Q. But you testified the other day, did you not, sir that the bombing of
Hiroshima was very successful?
A. Well, it was technically successful.
Q, Oh, technically.
A. It is also alleged to have helped end the war. .
Q. Would you have supported the dropping of a thermonuclear bomb on
Hiroshima?
236
A. It would make no sense at all.
Q. Why.
A. The target is too small.
Q. The target Is too small. Supposing there had been a target in Japan big
enough for a thermonuclear weapon, would you have opposed dropping it?
A. This was not a problem with which I was confronted.
O. I am confronting you with it now, sir.
A. You are not confronting me with an actual problem. I was very relieved
when Mr. Stimson removed from the target list Kyoto, which was the largest
city and the most vulnerable target I think this is the nearest thing that was
really to your hypothetical question.
Q. That is correct Would you have opposed the dropping of a thermonuclear
weapon on Japan because of moral scruples?
A. I believe I would, sir.
Q. Did you oppose the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima because of
moral scruples?
A. We set forth our
Q. I am asking you about it, not "we."
A. I set forth my anxieties and the arguments on the other side.
Q. You mean you argued against dropping the bomb?
A. I set forth arguments against dropping it
Q. Dropping the atom bomb?
A. Yes. But I did not endorse them.
Q. You mean having worked, as you put it, in your answer rather excellently,
by night and by day for 3 or 4 years to develop the atom bomb, you then argued
it should not be used?
A. No ; I didn't argue that it should not be used. I was asked to say by the
Secretary of War what the views of scientists were. I gave the views against
and the views for.
Q. But you supported the dropping of the atom bomb on Japan, didn't you?
A. What do you mena support?
Q. You helped pick the target, didn't you?
A. I did my Job which was the Job I was supposed to do. I was not in a
policymaking position at Los Alamos. I would have done anything that I was
asked to do, including making the bombs in a different shape, if I had thought
it was technically feasible.
Q. You would have made the thermonuclear weapon, too, wouldn't you?
A. I couldn't.
Q. I didn't ask you that, Doctor.
A. I would have worked on it.
Q. If you had discovered the thermonuclear weapon at Los Alamos, you would
have done so. If you could have discovered it, you would have done so, wouldn't
yon?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. You were working toward that end, weren't you?
A. Yes. I think I need to point out that to run a laboratory is one thing
To advise the Government is another.
Q. I see.
A. I think I need to point out that a great deal -that happened between, '45 and
'49—1 am not supposed to say to what extent— but to a very, very massive
extent, we had become armed atomically. The prevailing view was that what
we had was too good— too big— for the best military use, rather than too small
Q. -Doctor, would you refer to your answer, please, sir? One further Question
before we get into that
Am I to gather from your testimony, sir, that in your opinion your function
as a member and chairman of the GAG included giving advice on political
policies as well as technical advice?
A. I have testified as to that
Q. Would you repeat It for me, sir?
A. I will repeat it Our statutory function was to give technical advice.
Q. Yes, sir.
A. We were often asked questionss which went outside of this narrow frame
sometimes we responded, sometimes we didn't. The reason why the general
advice, I would call it, editorializing rather than political advice, contained in
our annexes was in the annexes and not in the report because it did not seem
a proper function for the General Advisory Committee to respond in these
terms to the question that had been put to them.
237
Q. Doctor, is it a fair summary of your answer — and I refer you to page 37,
and the following pages of your answer— that what the GAG opposed in its
October 29, 1949, meeting was merely a crash program for the development of
the super?
A. Yes. I think it would be a better summary to say we opposed this crash
program as the answer to the Soviet atomic bomb.
Q. What did you mean by a crash program?
A. On the basis of what was then known, plant be built, equipment be pro-
cured and a commitment be made to build this thing irrespective of further
study and with a very high priority. A program in which alternatives would
not have an opportunity to be weighed because one had to get on and because
we were not going to sacrifice time.
Q. Doctor, isn't it true that the report of the GAG you wrote, didn't you
A. I wrote the main report ; yes.
Q. Isn't it true that the report of the GAG and the annex to which you sub-
scribed unqualifiedly opposed the development of the super at any time?
A. At that time.
Q. At any time?
A. No. At least, let us say we were questioned about that in a discussion with
the Commission, and we made it quite clear that this could not be an unqualified
and permanent opposition. I think that in the reading of the report without
the later discussions and reports it could be read that way. But in the light
of what was later said, it could not be read that way.
Q. Didn't the annex to which you subscribed say in so many words, "We
believe a superbomb should never be produced"?
A. Yes; it did.
Q. It did say that?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you interpret that as opposing only a crash program?
A. No. It opposed the program. Obviously if we learned that the enemy was
up to something, we could not prevent the production of a super bomb.
Q. What did you mean by "never"?
A. I didn't write those words.
Q. You signed it, though, didn't you?
A.' I believe what we meant— what I meant was that it would be a better world
if there were no hydrogen bombs in it. That is what the whole context says.
Q. Doctor, don't you think a fair interpretation of the record and the annex
which yon signed was an unqualified opposition to the .production of super at
any time or under any circumstances?
A. No ; I don't
Q. That is your view?
A. Yes.
Q. In all events, Doctor, you did say in your report that no one could tell
without an actual test whether the super would work or whether it wouldn't,
is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. You testified that yon had no intimation from Dr. Seaborg prior to the
GAG meeting of October 29, 1949, as to what his views on the subject were. I
am going to show yon a letter taken from your files at Princeton, returned by
yon to the Commission, dated October 14, 1949, addressed to you, signed iGlenn
Seaborg, and ask you whether yon received that letter prior to the meeting of
October 29, 1949.
A. I am going to say before I see that that I had no recollection of it
Q. I assumed that. May I interrupt your reading of it a moment?
A. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I have been told by the classification officer that
there are two words here that I must not read. They are bracketed, and I am
showing them to Dr. Oppenheimer, and when I read the letter I shall leave them
out, but I want Dr. Oppenheimer to see them.
The WITNESS. I would be sure of one thing, and that is if that letter reached
me before the meeting, I read it to the committee.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. The letter was dated October 14, 1949.
A. So it almost certainly reached me.
Q. So presumably unless it came by wagon train, it reached you, didn't it?
A. Right
238
Q. I will read tnis letter :
"UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
"RADIATION LABORATORY,
"Berkeley 4, OaKf.9 October 14, 1949.
"DR. J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER,
"The Institute for Advanced Study,
"Princeton, N. J.
"DEAR ROBERT : I will try to give you my thoughts for what they may be worth
regarding the next GAO meeting, but I am afraid that there may be more ques-
tions than answers. Mr. Lilienthal's assignment to us is very broad; and it
seems to me that conclusions will be reached, if at all, only after a large amount
of give and take discussion at the GAG meeting.
"A question which -cannot be avoided, it seems to me, is that which was raised
by Ernest Lawrence during his recent trip to Los Alamos and Washington. Are
we in a race along this line and one in which we may already be somewhat
behind so far as this particular new aspect is concerned?"
Q. He was talking about the thermonuclear, wasn't he?
A. It would be obvious to me he was.
Q. Continuing : "Apparently this possibility has begun to bother very seriously
a number of people out here, several of whom came to this point of view inde-
pendently. Although I deplore the prospects of our country putting a tremendous
effort into this, I must confess that I have been unable to come to the con-
clusion that we should not Some people are thinking of a time scale of the
order of 3 to 5 years which may, of course, be practically impossible and would
surely involve an effort of greater magnitude than that of the Manhattan
project. My present feeling would perhaps be best summarized by saying that
I would have to hear some good arguments before I could take on sufficient
courage to recommend not going toward such a program.
"If such a program were undertaken, a number of questions arise which
would need early answers. How would the National Laboratories fit into the
program? Wouldn't they have to reorient their present views considerably?
The question as to who might build neutron producing reactors would arise.
I am afraid that we could not realistically look to the present operators of
Hanf ord to take this on. It would seem that a strong effort would have to be
made to get the duPont Company back into the game. It would be imperative
that the present views of the reactor safeguard committee be substantially
changed.
"I just do not know how to comment, without further reflection, on the
question of how the present 'reactor program' should be modified, if it should.
Probably, after much discussion, you will come to the same old conclusion that
the present four reactors be carried on, but that an effort be made to speed up
their actual construction. As you probably know, Ernest is willing to take on
the responsibility for the construction near Berkeley of a" — and then I omit
the two words — "heavy water natural uranium reactor primarily for a neutron
source and on a short time scale. I don't know whether it is possible to do
what is planned here, but I can say that a lot of effort by the best people here
is going into it. If the GAG is asked to comment on this proposal, it seems
to me clear that we should heartily endo'rse it. So far as I can see, this pro-
gram will not interfere .with any of the other reactor building programs and
will be good even if it does not finally serve exactly the purpose for which it
was conceived; I have recently been tending toward the conviction that the
United States should be doing more with heavy water reactors (we are doing
almost nothing). In this connection, it seems to me that there might be a dis-
cussion concerning the heavy water production facilities and their possible
expansion.
"Another question, and one on which perhaps I have formulated more of a
definite opinion, is that of secrecy. It seems to me that we can't afford to
continue to hamper ourselves by keeping secret as many things as we now do.
I think that not only basic science should be subject to less secrecy regulation
but also some places outside of this area. For example, it seems entirely
pointless now to hamper the construction of certain types of new piles by keeping
secret certain lattice dimensions. In case anything so trivial as the conclusions
reached at the recent international meeting on declassification with the British
and Canadians at Chalk River is referred to the GAG I might just add that I
participated in these discussions and thoroughly agree with the changes sug-
gested, with the reservation that perhaps they should go further toward remov-
ing secrecy.
239
"I have great doubt that this letter will be of much help to you, but I am
afraid that it is the best that I can do at this time.
"Sincerely yours, Glenn" and below that in typing, "Glenn T. Seaborg."
So, Doctor, isn't it clear to you now that Dr. Seaborg did express himself on
this matter before the meeting?
A. Yes, it is clear now. Not in unequivocal terms, except on one point, and
on that point the General Advisory Committee I think made the recommendation
that he desired.
Q. But he did express himself, didn't he?
A. Absolutely.
Q. In a communication to which he apparently had given some thought, is
that correct?
A. Right, and to which no doubt at the time I gave some thought.
Q. That is right. You have no doubt that you received this before the Gen-
eral Advisory Committee meeting, is that correct?
A. I don't see why I should not have.
Q. Why did you tell the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy
when you testified on January 29, 1950, that Dr. Seaborg had not expressed
himself on the subject prior to the meeting?
A. I am sure because it was my recollection.
Q. That testimony was given in January 1950, wasn't it?
A. That is right.
Q. And this letter had been received by
A. Let me add one point. We had a second meeting on the hydrogen bomb
which Seaborg attended and we asked him how he felt about it, and he said he
would prefer not to express his views.
Q. But weren't you asked, Doctor, or didn't you tell the Joint committee
that Dr. Seaborg had not expressed himself on this subject prior to the meeting
of October 29, 1949?
A. I would have to see the transcript. I don't remember that question and
the answer.
Q. If you did make that statement, it was not true, was it?
A. It is clear that we had an expression, not unequivocal, from Seaborg,
before the meeting of October 29.
Q. Doctor, did you hear my question?
A. I heard it, but I have heard that kind of question too often.
Q. I am sure of that, Doctor, but would you answer it, nevertheless?
Mr. MASKS. Isn't Dr. Oppenheimer entitled to see the testimony which is
being referred to, instead of answering a hypothetical question?
Mr. ROBB. It is not a hypothetical question.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. If you told the Joint committee, sir, that Dr. Seaborg had not expressed
himself prior to the meeting of October 29, 1950, that was not true, was it?
A. It would depend, entirely.
Q. Yes or no.
A. I will not say yes or no. It would depend entirely on the context of the
question. The only two things in this letter that Seaborg is absolutely clear
about is that we ought to build certain kinds of reactors and we ought to have
less secrecy. On the question of the thermonuclear program ne can't find good
enough arguments against it, but he does have misgivings.
Q. All right, Doctor. You told this Board this morning that Dr. Seaborg did
not express himself prior to the meeting of October 29, 1949.
A. That is right That was my recollection.
Q. Was that true?
A. No, that was not true.
Q. You told the board this morning
Mr. GBAY. Are you pursuing the Seaborg matter now?
Mr. ROBB. I thought I would come back to it, sir.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be fair since the question was
raised, because of the implications that may be left that the actual questions
put to Dr. Oppenheimer by the joint committee about Dr. Seaborg should be read
into the record with sufficient context to show what it was about. Otherwise,
we are left with a possible misapprehension as to what really did take place.
I don't know. I have never seen the transcript.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, that is impossible unless we have a meeting of the
Joint committee and they authorize that to be done. But Dr. Oppenheimer this
30-ms— 54 16
240
morning as the board no doubt heard, recalled that he had so testified before
the joint committee.
The WITNESS. I had testified ; I had not so testified.
Mr. ROBB. The record will show what the doctor testified.
The WITNESS. If I testified that I recall so testifying, I would like to correct
the transcript.
Mr. ROBB. That was not correct, either?
Mr. SILVEBMAN. He didn't say it.
Mr. ROBB. All right. The record will show what he testified to.
Mr. GABRISON. What is the procedural requirement for reading into the record
the questions from that transcript?
Mr. ROBB. That transcript will not be released, as I understand it, without
the vote of the committe to do so, Mr. Garrison, which is why I was not able
to read Dr. Oppenheimer what he said.
The WITNESS. I think a lot depends on the nature of the question. Had
Dr. Seaborg made up his mind, had he concurred with your view, or so on. It
is clear from this letter he wanted to hear a discussion about it. That he saw
it was a very tough question.
Mr. ROBB. May I ask the doctor one more question before we take a break on
this Seaborg matter.
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, are you sure that you read Dr. Seaborg's letter to your committee,
the GAG committee, at the meeting of October 29, 1949?
A. Since I forgot the existence of the letter, obviously I cannot remember
reading it. I always read communications on matters before us to the committee.
Q. Is there any reflection in the report of the committee tbat Dr. Seaborg had
expressed himself in any way about this matter?
A. No, there certainly is not.
Q. I beg pardon?
A. There isn't.
Mr. ROBB. All right.
Mr. GABBISON. May I ask the chairman whether the board has before it the
transcript of the joint committee testimony? I ask merely because of the fact
that if it has been released to the board
Mr. GBAT. Let me respond to your question this way, Mr. Garrison, and say
that after recess, which I propose to call in a moment, I 'should like to respond
to that.
We will now recess.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GBAT. I would like to pursue the question which Mr. Garrison raised
Just before the recess.
The board does not have before It a complete transcript of the testimony
which was under discussion.
(Mr. Marks not present in the room.)
Mr. GBAT. However, I can say to Dr. Oppenheimer and his counsel that the
board does understand from a source it believes to be reliable that Dr. Oppen
heimer was asked a question with respect to the extent of unanimity of the
views of the members of the GAO with respect to what we have been describing
as the crash program. I am not sure whether it was so referred to in the
testimony, but there was this question.
In response to the question Dr. Oppenheimer stated that he thought it was
pretty unanimous view, that one member of the committee, Dr. Seaborg, was
away when the matter was discussed, and that he had not expressed himself On
it, and further saying that the other members will agree with what he has said.
The WITNESS. That is a little different from what I was told I said. I was
told I said explicitly that Seaborg had said nothing about the matter before
the meeting. This was several months after the meeting and I was asked whether
Seaborg had expressed his views in connection with this meeting. I would think
that the proper answer to that was not so far from what you quoted me as
saying.
Mr. GBAT. We are trying to develop what actually the facts were in the case,
and I believe you did testify that you had no communication with respect to this
matter from Dr. Seaborg or at least you said you did not recall a communication
I believe.
The WITNESS. Is that what it says in the transcript?
Mr. GRAT. No ; I think that is what you said earlier this morning.
241
The WITNESS. I would like to make a general protest I am told I have said
certain things. I don't recall it. I am asked if I said these what would that be.
This is an extremely difficult form for me to face a question. I don't know
what I said. It is of record. I had it in my own vault for many years. It is
not classified for reasons of national security, this conversation, and I have no
sense that I could have wished to give any impression to the joint congressional
committee other than an exposition because when I testified I knew for a fact
that the decision had been taken, I testified in order to explain as well as I
could to the committee the grounds for the advice, the color of the advice, the
arguments that we had in mind. It was not an attempt to persuade them. It
was not in any way an attempt to alter the outcome. It was an attempt to
describe what we had in mind. A few minutes after I testified, I believe, or
shortly after I testified, the Presidential announcement came out, and I knew
what it was going to be. So this was not a piece of advocacy. It was a piece
of exposition.
I would like to add one other thing. Having no recollection of the Seaborg
letter, I cannot say that I did this. But it would have been normal practice for
me at one of the meetings with the Commission not merely to read the letter
to the committee, but to read the letter or parts of it relevant to our discussion
to the Commission and the committee.
By Mr. EOBB :
Q. In other _words, Doctor, if you didn't read this Seaborg letter to your com-
mittee, it would have been quite unusual?
A. Yes.
Q. Doctor, will you help me a little bit on physics. I notice Dr. Seaborg in
this letter talks about the reactor program. Was that program a necessary step
in the development of the thermonuclear weapon?
A. It was thought to be.
Q. What was done, or what did the General Advisory Committee advise or
urge to be done in respect of a reactor program subsequent to the President's
decision of January 1950.
A. Already in the October 29 report we urged that a reactor program to produce
these neutrons, the number of which is classified, be expedited. We, however,
said that this should be done not for the purpose of the super program, but for
many other purposes. We urged that the thing be built
I believe after the Presidential decision, we urged that the reactor program
be flexible because it was already apparent at that time that the ideas as they
existed in October 29, 1949, were undergoing very serious modification. If you
wish me to refresh my memory on the precise points, I would be glad to. I have
not done so.
Q. Doctor, am I correct in my memory of your earlier testimony that the
reactor program was one thing that you are now and were at that time dissatis-
fied with and did not go very well?
A. That is quite a different thing. That is the development of reactors for
power.
Q. That was something else?
A. That is something quite different. This is a production reactor. I would
not say that we were satisfied with the production reactor picture.
Q. It is a heavy water reactor, is what you need for this program?
A. No, not necessarily. It is a possible way of going about it
Q. What progress was made in developing the reactors that were necessary
for the hydrogen bomb?
A. That were then thought to be necessary?
Q. Yes.
A. Great progress.
Q. They were built, were they?
A. Yes.
Q. At Hanford?
A. No.
Q. Is that classified, Doctor?
A. It is in all the papers. They were built at Savannah River.
Q. I see.
A. They were built I think with the early development and study undertaken
at the Argonne Laboratory and the duPont laboratory facing into the engineering
and construction phases.
Q. Doctor, I want to show you a copy of a letter also taken from your files
that you had at Princeton and' turned back to the Commission. This is a copy
242
of a letter dated October 21, 1949, bearing the typewritten signature Robert
Oppenheimer, addressed to Dr. James B. Conant, president, Harvard University :
"Dear Uncle Jim :" I ask you if you wrote that letter.
A. October 21, 1949?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I would like to look it over.
Q. Certainly. That is why I handed it to you, Doctor. I want you to look
it over carefully. Take your time.
A. I wrote this letter.
Q. You wrote that letter.
A. Can we read it in full?
Q. I am going to. You sent this letter on or about October 21, 1949.
A. I have no- reason to doubt it.
Q. Doctor, in this letter as in the other, the classification officer has expur-
gated a few words which are indicated by brackets. Will you look at them now
so you will know what they are when I read it?
A. Yes. Could we paraphrase this by saying for a number of applications
of military importance?
Q. I will tell you what, Doctor. When I get to that point, I will stop and you
paraphrase it, because you can paraphrase that sort of stuff better than I can.
"Dear Uncle Jim:
"We are exploring the possibilities for our talk with the President on October
30th. All members of the advisory committee will come to the meeting Satur-
day except Seaborg, who must be in Sweden, and whose general views we
have in written form. Many of us will do some preliminary palavering on
the 28th.
"There is one bit of background which I would like you to have before we
meet When we last spoke, you thought perhaps the reactor program offered
the most decisive example of the need for policy clarification. I was inclined
to think that the super might also be relevant. On the technical side, as far as
I can tell, the super is not very different from what it was when we first spoke
of it more than 7 years ago : a weapon of unknown design, cost, deliberability
and military value. But a very great change has taken place in the climate
of opinion. On the one hand, two experienced promoters have been at work, 1. e.,
Ernest Lawrence and Edward Teller. The project has long been dear to Teller's
heart; and Ernest has convinced himself that we must learn from Operation
Joe that the Russians will soon do the super, and that we had better beat them
to it"
What was Operation Joe, the Russian explosion?
A. Right
(Mr. Marks entered the room.)
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Of September 1949?
A. Right
Q. Continuing your letter: "On the technical side, he proposes to get some
neutron producing heavy water reactors built; and to this, for a variety of
reasons, I think we must say amen since" — now would you paraphrase?
A. There were three military applications other than the super which these
reactors would serve.
Q. "* * * and many other things wOl all profit by the availability of neutrons.
"But the real development has not been of a technical nature. Ernest spoke
to Knowland and McMahon, and to some at least of the joint chiefs. The
joint congressional committee, having tried to find something tangible to
chew on ever since September 23d, has at least found its answer. We must
have a super, and we must have it fast A subcommittee is heading west to
Investigate this problem at Los Alamos, and in Berkeley. The joint chiefs
appear informally to have decided to give the development of the super over-
riding priority, though no formal request has come through. The climate of
opinion among the competent physicists also shows signs of shifting. Bethe,
for instance, is seriously considering return on a full time basis ; and so surely
are some others. I have had long talks with Bradbury and Manley, and with
Von Neumann. Bethe, Teller, McCormack, and LeBaron are all scheduled to
turn up within the next 36 hours. I have agreed that if there is a conference
on the super program at Los Alamos, I will make it my business to attend.
"What concerns me is really not the technical problem. I am not sure the
miserable thing will work, nor that it can be gotten to a target except by ox
cart. It seems likely to me even further to worsen the unbalance of our present
243
war plans. What does worry me is that this thing appears to have caught the
imagination, both of the congressional and of military people, as the answer to
the problem posed by the Russian advance. It would be folly to oppose the
exploration of this weapon. We have always known it had to be done; and it
does have to be done, though it appears to be singularly proof against any form
of experimental approach. But that we become committed to it as the way to
save the country and the peace appears to me full of dangers.
"We will be faced with all this at our meeting; and anything that we do or
do not say to the President, will have to take it into consideration. I shall feel
far more secure if you have had an opportunity to think about it.
"I still remember my visit with gratitude and affection.
"ROBERT OPPENHEIMEE.
"Dr. JAMES B. CONANT,
"President, Harvard University, Cambridge 38, Mass.19
Doctor, would it appear to you from that letter that you were in error in your
previous testimony that you had not expressed your views to Dr. Conant before
the meeting of October 29, 1949?
A. Yes.
Q. Beg pardon?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you wish now to amend your previous answer that Dr. Conant reached
the views he expressed to you without any suggestion on your part?
A. I don't know which preceded which.
Q. Is there any indication to you in this letter which I have just read that
Conant had previously expressed any views to you?
A. I would say there is an indication that there had been discussion between
us. I am not clear.
Q. Why were you writing to Dr. Conant before the GAG meeting on this thing?
A. I think the letter explains that
Q. You were not trying to propagandize him, were you?
A. No.
Q. Do you agree with me that this letter is susceptible of that interpretation
that you were trying to influence him?
A. Not properly; not properly so susceptible.
Q. You notice in this letter, Doctor, that you referred to Dr. Seaborg's letter,
so you had it at that time, didn't you?
A. Right
Q. And that must have been the letter we read this morning, is that correct?
A. I would assume so.
Q. Would you agree, Doctor, that your references to Dr. Lawrence and Dr.
Teller and their enthusiasm for the super bomb, their work on the super bomb,
that your references in this letter are a little bit belittling?
A. Dr. Lawrence came to Washington. He did not talk to the Commission,
He went and talked to the joint congressional committee and to members of the
Military Establishment. I think that deserves some belittling.
Q. So you would agree that your references to those men in this letter were
belittling?
A. No. I pay my great respects to them as promoters. I don't think I did
them justice.
Q. You used the word "promoters" in an invidious sense, didn't you?
A. I promoted lots of things in my time.
Q. Doctor, would you answer my question? When you use the word "pro-
moters" you meant it to be in a slightly invidious sense, didn't you?
A. I have no idea.
Q. When you use the word now with reference to Lawrence and Teller, don't
you intend it to be invidious?
A. No.
Q. You think that their work of promotion was admirable, is that right?
A. I thin* they did an admirable job of promotion.
Q. Do you think it was admirable that they were promoting this project?
A. I told you that I think that the methods — I don't believe Teller was in-
volved, Lawrence promoted it—were not proper.
Q. You objected to them going to Knowland and McMahon?
A. I objected to their not going to the Commission.
Q. Knowland and McMahon, by that you meant Senator Knowland and
Senator McMahon.
A. Of course.
244
Q. Did yon go to any Senators about this?
A. I appeared before the Senate at their request in my statutory function.
Q. Did you go to any Senators privately about it?
A. Certainly not before discussing it with the Commission. I do not know
whether I discussed it with Senator McMahon. If so, it was at his request.
Q. You said certainly not before discussing it with the Commission. Did you
after discussing it with the Commission go to any Senators privately about it?
A. Privately?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I don't remember whether I talked to McMahon or not.
Q. Did you go to the President about it?
A. No.
Q. You mention in this letter a meeting with the President. Did that take
place?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever talk to the President about the matter?
A. No.
Q. Do you know whether or not Mr. Lilienthal did?
A. It is in the public press that he did and he told me that he did.
Q. Did you discuss the matter with him before he went to see the President?
A. The time that is in the public press is when he and Acheson and Johnson
went over to call on the President.
Q. That was just prior to the President's decision?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you discuss the matter with Lilienthal before that meeting?
A. Before the meeting of October 29?
Q. Before he went to see the President.
A. We discussed it many times between October 29 and the President's
decision.
Q. Did you brief Mr. Lilienthal on your views about the thermonuclear weapon
before he went to see the President?
A. We talked, over and over again — I don't believe it was ever a question of
briefing — and I don't have — I am fairly sure that this description of any talk
we had was wrong.
Q. Is there any doubt in your mind that when he saw the President, Mr.
Lilienthal expressed to the President your views on this matter?
A. That he spoke my views to the President?
Q. Yes.
A. I have no idea.
Q. Did you talk with him after he had seen the President?
A. At this meeting of three people?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes. He came back and told us about it I think this was actually the
general advisory committee, rather than me.
Q. Didn't Mr. Lilienthal report to you in substance that the views he expressed
to the President were the same ones you entertained?
A. I don't remember that way of saying it. If it was, it would have been the
committee and would have referred to the mass of documents, reports and so on,
between the 29th of October and that time.
Q. Was there any doubt in your mind that Mr. Lilienthal shared your views
on this matter of the thermonuclear?
A. We knew that he was opposed to the crash program. I was never entirely
dear as to the components of this opposition.
Q. Was there any question is your mind that in reaching that view Mr.
Lilienthal gave great weight to your advice?
A. He gave some weight to it. I doubt if he gave inordinate weight to it
Q. Aren't you sure, Doctor, that Mr. Lilienthal necessarily relied very heavily
on you for advice in this matter?
A. The matters that engaged his interest were not primarily the technical
ones. On technical things of course he relied on our advice.
Q. Doctor, you begin your letter to Mr. Conant, whom you address as "Dear
Uncle Jim" with thisi sentence : "We are exploring the possibilities for our talk
with the President on October 30."
Wouldn't that indicate to you that you were opening this subject with him
for the first time, that is, with Dr. Conant for the first time?
A. That would indicate that we had discussed it earlier.
Q. It would?
245
A. Yes, sir. Otherwise, I would have said we are thinking of going to see
the President, or what would you think of going to see the President. It refers
toward the end to a visit.
Mr. QBAT. May I ask, is this visit to the President a visit of the GAG?
The WITNESS. Sure. We went to see him occasionally. This was a terrible
fiat. We had in mind that maybe we ought to go over to see him. We decided
that this had better be handled through the responsible organs of the Govern-
ment and not by a group of outside advisors, and we did so. Whether this was
the Commission's view or our view, I don't remember.
By Mr. Boss :
Q. Doctor, how did you know that Dr. Lawrence had talked to Senator Knowl-
and and Senator McMahon, and some at least of the joint chiefs?
A. This was gossip and I have forgotten who gave it to me. Possibly Rahi,
but I am not sure. I know that Lawrence talked to Eabi on his way home
from Washington and I would assume that he told him something about it.
Q. You say here, "The climate of opinion among the competent physicists also
shows signs of shifting." What did you mean the "the climate of opinion"?
A. What people were thinking.
Q. What were they thinking?
A. What they were thinking about the desirability of stepping up this pro-
gram, I should think.
Q. You mean that up to then competent physicists had been opposed to it?
A. Had not been excited by it.
Q. Had not been enthusiastic.
A. Eight.
Q. Now they were beginning to get more enthusiasm for it, is that correct?
A. Yes. I don't know whether enthusiasm or a feeling of necessity or so. I
don't know the detail.
Q. Did that cause you alarm?
A. No.
Q. Wasn't that what you were expressing to Dr. Conant in this letter?
A. I was telling him in what form that I thought the problem would come
before us, what the surrounding circumstances were.
Q. How did you know that Bethe was seriously considering return on a full-
time basis?
A. He came to visit me at Princton and talked to me.
Q. "And so surely are some others"; whom did you have in mind?
A. From the way that sounds I would say I had no one specific in mind.
Q. Doctor, how many reactors of any kind were built while you were chairman
of GAO?
A. I don't know. I will start to think. A dozen and a half or something like
that.
Q. How many physicists did you discuss this matter of the thermonuclear with
prior to the meeting of October 29, 1949?
A. I clearly can't answer that question.
Q. A large number?
A. No ; not a large number. I have tried to think of the ones that stuck in my
memory. I have forgotten some things.
Q. Did you talk to Dr. Rabi?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you see him and where?
A. Either in Princeton or New York.
Q. Did he come to see you?
A. I don't remember. We saw a great deal of each other.
Q. What was his attitude on the thermonuclear at the time you talked tt? him
prior to the meeting?
A. I believe, to put it as accurately as I can, it was one of somewhat quizzical
enthusiasm.
Q. What did you say when you found that out?
A. I don't think I said much.
Q. Did you encourage him in his enthusiasm?
A. I don't see how I could have, but I dont remember the words I used.
Q. tfou said you talked to Dr. Serber.
A. Yes.
Q. He came to see you at Princton, didn't her?
A. He was sent by Lawrence.
Q. Sent by Lawrence and Alvarez?
246
A. Sent by Lawrence.
Q. Berber told yon lie was going to work on the thermonuclear, didn't he?
A. No.
Q. Bid he come to ask you whether you would work on it or not?
A. I never fully understood the mission. He said he had come to discuss it.
Q. Da you know whether or not, prior to his seeing you, Serber had said that
he would Join the project and work on the thermonuclear?
A. I don't know. I had the impression that he had not made a commitment of
such a kind and didn't intend to.
Q. Didn't he tell you he had come to see you to enlist your responsibility for
the project?
A. To enlist my support for it.
Q. Yes, sir.
A. No; I don't think so.
Q. What had Lawrence sent him to see you for?
A. To discuss it with me.
Q. Just to discuss it with you?
A. Yes.
Q. That is aU?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you encourage Serber to work on it?
A. No ; I don't think I did.
Q. Did you discourage him?
A. No; I don't think I did.
Q. Did he work on it?
A. No ; I don't believe he did. He may have a little.
Q. Did you talk with Dr. DuBridge about the matter before the meeting?
A. I think so, but I am not quite sure.
Q. Do you know what his view on it was before the meeting?
A. No.
Q. You didn't hear?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Did you talk with Bacher about the program before the meeting?
A. Is that one of the names that is in the list?
Q. What list?
A. The list in my letter to Conant I have forgotten.
Q. No. You talked with Bradbury, Manley, -and von Neumann, you say in this
letter.
A. Right
Q. Do you recall whether you talked to Bacher at all?
A. No ; I don't. I did talk to him at a later stage, I remember very well.
Q. Were your long talks with Bradbury, Manley, von Neumann individual
talks, or did you talk in a group?
A. With von Neumann, since he was right next door, it would be alone, and
with Bradbury and Manley it would have been together.
Q. Can you tell us anything about what you said to them?
A. No ; I can't. I would guess I mostly asked them.
Q. Would it not be reasonable, Doctor, to conclude that you expressed to them
substantially the same views you expressed to Dr. Conant in this letter of
October 21?
A. The situation was a little different. I would think that I would have got
Bradbury to tell me as much as he could rather than to tell him what I thought.
Q. Doctor, you say here you have had long talks; presumably you talked too,
didn't you?
A. I always do.
Q. Yes. So isn't it a fair conclusion, Doctor, that in your long talks with
Bradbury, Manley, and von Neumann you expressed the same feelings and the
same views which yon set out in writing to Dr. Conant?
A. I very strongly doubt it. The relations were quite different. With Conant
we had a problem of advice before us. The views that I expressed there are
not the views the committee adopted. The background was something I thought
he ought to know about. I would guess that with von Neumann, Bradbury,
and Manley— anyway, with Bradbury and von Neumann— the talk would have
been much more on technical things. I remember von Neumann saying at this
time: "I believe there is no such thing as saturation. I don't think any weapon
can be too large. I have always been a believer in this." He was in favor of
$oing ahead with it.
Q. Did he afterward work on the project?
247
A. He did.
Q. Do you recall what views you expressed to Serber when he came to see you-
at Princeton?
A. I would think possibly not far from those I expressed here, that this was
a thing that one had to get straight, but it was not the answer. I am conjectur-
ing now. An honest statement would be to say I don't recall.
Q. Did you talk to Dr. Alvarez about the thermonuclear program about this
time?
A, I think I did more than once.
Q. What views did you express to him about it?
A. I remember once when I expressed negative views, but I think in a rather
indiscreet form of telling him what other people were saying.
Q. Would you tell us about that occasion and when it was?
A. The occasion I remember is during the GAC meeting. Alvarez and. Serber
and I had lunch together. The discussion was in midprogress, and we had not
reached a conclusion. I said quite strongly negative things on moral grounds
were being said.
Q. Did you specify what those negative things were?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Those were your views, too, weren't they?
A. They were getting to be in the course of our discussion.
Q. You felt strongly negative on moral grounds, didn't you?
A. I did as the meeting came to an end. I think the views that are expressed
in the letter to Conant probably are as measured and honest as any record could
be, and I think my attempt to reconstruct what I thought at one or another
moment in this time of flux would be less revealing than what you have read out
loud.
Q. Do you recall what Berber's attitude was at the time of this luncheon?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall whether or not Serber subsequently opposed the development
of the thermonuclear?
A. I know of no such opposition.
Q. In all events he did work on it
A. He worked on it very little but not very hard or effectively.
Q. But not what?
A. Not very hard or effectively.
Q. Doctor, you have testified, I believe the report of the GAO reflects, that it
was impossible to tell without a test whether a thermonuclear device would
work or not ; is that correct?
A. Right.
Q. Did there come a time when some tests of a thermonuclear bomb were
scheduled.
A. In October of 1952? That is the time?
Q. I think so; yes.
A. Bight
Q. Did you suggest that that test be postponed?
A. I would like to haul off.
Q. Like to what?
A. I would like to pull back a little back.
Q. Very well.
A. I was then a member of this panel of the State Department. Another
member was Dr. Bush. He told me right before— well, very early in the meeting
of the panel — that he had been to see the Secretary of State about his anxieties
of the timing of this test I did nothing whatever about it. When the panel was
meeting during the summer and late autumn, we discussed this matter as rele-
vant to our terms of reference in great detail. The panel insisted that we make
our views known as to the advantages and disadvantages of the scheduled date
to the Secretary. So we did.
I also inquired of Bradbury about what a postponement of a week or 2 weeks
or so on would mean in a technical sense. I believe this is the summary of all
that I had to do with it. The scheduled date was November 1, before the presi-
dential election. It was at a time when it was clear that whatever administra-
tion was coming in was different from the outgoing administration.
Q. You did favor the postponement of the test ; is that right?
A. No ; I think that is not right. I think I saw strong advantages in not hold-
ing it then and many strong disadvantages. I reported both.
Q. You were at that time a member of the State Department panel on dis-
armament; is that right?
248
A. Yes.
• Q. In fact, you were chairman of the panel, weren't you?
A. I was.
Q. Did your panel make a report on this matter of the postponement of the
test?
A. It discussed it with the Secretary of State. It made no report.
Q. You made no written report?
A. Bight.
Q. Didn't you favor the postponement of the test, Doctor?
A. I have explained to you that I saw strong arguments for it and strong
arguments agaiast It. I didn't think it was my decision or my job advocacy.
Q. I understand that, Doctor. I am asking for your opinion at the time. I
thinfe it is a rather simple, plain question. Did you or did you not favor post-
ponement of the test?
A. My candid opinion was that it was utterly impractical to postpone the test
but that we nevertheless owed it to the Secretary of State what we thought was
involved in holding it at that time.
Q. Was one factor which you thought perhaps made a postponement ad-
visable the reaction of the Soviet to the test?
A. We thought that they would get a lot of information out of it
Q. How long was it suggested that the test be postponed, it if was postponed?
A. Until the new administration either before or after its assumption of
office could conduct it or could be involved in the responsibility for it
<J. Doctor, we are agreed, I take it, that in the absence of a test it was
impossible ever to determine whether a thermonuclear would or would not
work ; is that right?
A. To be sure. At that stage, let me say we had quite different designs. I
reported to the President that, although you could not be certain of the per-
formance of any one design, it was virtually assured that this could be done.
The situation was wholly different in 1949 where the doubts would have been
of a very much, more acute character with that model. However, you don't have
a weapon until you proof-fire it.
Q. No. Even in 1949, Doctor, could anybody have said that the thermonuclear
would not work in the absence of a test?
A. I could say a specific model would not work, and that has been said,
wholly without a test
Q. Could you in 1949 have said that no model of a thermonuclear could be
made that would work?
A. Of course not. You can't say that nobody will ever t.hinv of anything.
I have the memorandum of the panel on this subject. It has no restricted data
in it If the panel would like a copy of that memorandum, I can make it
available.
Mr. GARRISON. You mean the board.
The WITNESS. If the board would like a copy of the memorandum, I can make
it available. I don't have it with me because, although not free of restricted
data, it obviously is a -classified document
Mr. GKAY. Yes.
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. One further matter, Doctor, so the record will be complete. It is a fact,
is it not, that you opposed the establishment of a second laboratory?
A. The General Advisory Committee and I opposed the plans during the
winter of 1951-452— the suggestion then made— but we approved the second labo-
ratory as now conceived because there was an existing installation, and it could
be done gradually and without harm to Los Alamos. There is a long record of
our deliberations.
Q. I understand tkat. There was a proposal made in 1951 to establish a
second laboratory for the purpose of working on the thermonuclear.
A. Bight
Q. And for various reasons which you have explained you and the committee
opposed the establislunent of that laboratory.
A. That is correct •
Q. Do you think now that the reasons that you advanced then were sound
ones?
A. Yes. I think if we had thought that it was possible to take an existing
Commission facility that was working on something that didn't amount to any-
thing and convert it gradually into a weapons facility, the arguments we had
then would not have applied. The proposal was to found something new in
249
some new desert, and this we thought could not be done without taking a big
bite into Los Alamos.
Q. Who proposed establishing it in some new desert?
A. This is the way in which the Commission presented it to u&— a second
Los Alamos.
Q. The fact that it was established in some new desert would have made it
much more difficult to get personnel, would it not?
A. That is right
Q. Did you suggest an alternative that they might establish it in some place
other than a desert?
A. No. We suggested lots of places that were open to the Commission to
get work on various aspects of this problem, and that Los Alamos used some
contracting and delegation to a very much greater extent than they had. This
is different only in a minor way from the arrangement now made in California.
Q. Doctor, at the outset of your testimony, you took an oath to tell the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.
A. Yes.
Q. Are you fully conscious of the solemn nature of that oath ?
A. Yes.
Mr. GABRISON. Mr. Chairman, is this necessary?
Mr. GRAY. I think the chairman would have to say that the witness took the
oath and had read to him the penalties prescribed. I see no reason for the
record to reflect this question being asked again.
Mr, ROBB. Very well. That is all I have at the moment, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GABBISON. Perhaps we could take a 5-minute recess.
Mr. GRAY. It will be perfectly all right, because I have a couple of questions
that I would like to ask and maybe the board members do. But a recess is
quite satisfactory.
Mr. GABMCSON. You would like to continue questioning Mr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. Let us get that over with.
Mr. GRAY. Part of this, Dr. Oppenheimer, to complete what seems to be a
slight gap — at least my first question, this was in relation to the statutory
function and mission of the GAG, and the question of whether there were de-
partures from the technical and scientific advice.
I think twice you observed that the GAC on occasion failed to respond to
questions.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Or did* not respond. There is no implication in my question.
The WITNESS. Did not respond to nontechnical questions.
Mr. GRAY. That is correct. Could you give an example of that kind of thing?
The WITNESS. Yes. We were asked whether the Armed Services or the
Commission should have custody of atomic weapons. We didn*t answer that
question. We simply gave a few technical comments on it We were asked
sometimes questions about organization.
Mr. GRAY. I see. I think that is what I had in mind.
My next question is one which was not fully developed, I think, in the ques-
tioning of counsel. I don't think it is a new matter, and I think it is pertinent
to the whole problem.
Is it your opinion, Doctor, that the Russians would not have sought to
develop a hydrogen bomb unless they knew in one way or another, or from
one source or another, that this country was proceeding with it?
The WITNESS. That was my opinion in 1949. As of the moment I have no
opinion. I don't know enough about the "history of what they have been doing.
Mr. GRAY. I don't think my question relates so much to historical events as
to a view of the international situation and the problems with which this country
was confronted. Would it not have been reasonable to expect at any time since
the apparent Intentions or the intentions of the U. S. S. R. were clear to us that
they would do anything to Increase their military strength?
The WITNESS Right
Mr. GRAY. Whatever it might be.
The WITNESS. Oh, sure.
Mr. GRAY. So you don't intend to have this record suggest that you felt that
If those who opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb prevailed that
would mean that the world would not be confronted with the hydrogen bomb?
The WITNESS. It would not necessarily mean— we thought on the whole it
would make it less likely. That the Russians would attempt and less likely
that they would succeed in the undertaking.
250
Mr. GRAY. I would like to pursue that a little bit That is two things. One,
the likelihood of their success would we all hope still be related to their own
capabilities and not to information they would receive from our efforts. So
what you mean to say is that since they would not attempt it they would not
succeed?
The WITNESS. No. I believe what we then thought was that the incentive
to do it would be far greater if they knew we were doing it, and we had suc-
ceeded. Let me, for instance, take a conjecture. Suppose we had not done any-
thing about the atom during the war. I don't think you could guarantee that the
Russians would never have had an atomic bomb. But I believe they would not
have one as nearly as soon as they have. I think both the fact of our success,
the immense amount of publicity, the prestige of the weapon, the espionage they
collect, all of this made it an absolutely higher priority thing, and we thought
similar circumstances might apply to the hydrogen bomb. We were always
clear that there might be a Russian effort whatever we did. We always under-
stood that if we did not do this that an attempt would be made to get the
Russians sewed up so that they would not either.
Mr. GRAY. Further with respect to the hydrogen bomb, did in the end this
turn out to be a larger weapon than you felt it might be when it was under
discussion and consideration in 1942 and 1943?
The WITNESS. We were much foggier in 1942 and 1943. I think your imagi-
nations ranged to the present figures.
Mr. GRAY. I think I should disclose to you what I am after now. I am pur-
suing the matter of the moral scruples. Should they not have been as important
in 1942 as they might have been in 1946 or 1948 or 1949 ?
The WETNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. I am trying to get at at what time did your strong moral convictions
develop with respect to the hydrogen bomb?
The WITNESS. When it became clear to me that we would tend to use any
weapon we had.
Mr. GRAY. Then may I ask this : Do you make a sharp distinction between
the development of a weapon and the commitment to use it?
The WITNESS. I think there is a sharp distinction but in fact we have not
made it.
Mr. GRAY. I have gathered from what you have said, this was something that
underlay your thinking. The record shows that you constantly, with greater
intensity at varying times perhaps, encouraged the efforts toward some sort of
development, but at the point when it seemed clear that we would use it if we
developed it, then you said we should not go ahead with it. I don't want to be
unfair, but is that it?
The WITNESS. That is only a small part of it. That is a part of it. The other
part of it is, of course, the very great hope that these methods of warfare would
never have to be used by anybody, a hope which became vivid in the fall of 1949.
The hope that we would find a policy for bringing that about, and going on with
bigger and bigger bombs would move in the opposite direction. I think that is
apparent in the little majority annex to the GAG report.
Mr. GRAY. Was it your feeling when you were concerned officially and other-
wise with a possible disarmament program that the United States and its allies
would be in a better bargaining position with respect to the development of some
sort of international machinery if it did not have the hydrogen bomb as a
weapon in the arsenal, or is that relevant at all?
The WITNESS. The kind of thing we had in mind is what one would do in 1949
and 1950.
Mr. GRAY. This is quite a serious line of questioning as far as I am concerned,
because it has been said — I am not sure about the language of the Nichols
letter — at least in this proceeding and later on in the press, that you frustrated
the development of the hydrogen bomb. That has been said. There have been
some implications, I suppose, that there were reasons which were not related to
feasible, to cost, et cetera.
The WITNESS. Right. I think I can answer your question.
Mr. GRAY. Very well.
The WITNESS. Clearly we could not do anything about the nonuse or the
elimination of atomic weapons unless we had nonatomic military strength to
meet whatever threats we were faced with. I thinly in 1949 when we came to
this meeting and talked about it, we thought we were at a parting of the ways,
a jfcrting of the ways in which either the reliance upon atomic weapons would
increase further and further or. in which it would be reduced. We hoped it
251
would be reduced because without that there was no chance of not having them
in combat.
Mr. GBAY. Your deep concern about the use of the hydrogen bomb, if it were
developed, and therefore your own views at the time as to whether we should
proceed in a crash program to develop it— your concern about this — became
greater, did it not, as the practicabilities became more clear? Is that an unfair
statement?
The WITNESS. I think it is the opposite of true. Let us not say about use.
But my feeling about development became quite different when the practica-
bilities became clear. When I saw how to do it, it was clear to me that one
had to at least make the thing. Then the only problem was what would one
do about them when one had them. The program we had in 1949 was a
tortured thing that you could well argue did not make a great deal of technical
sense. It was therefore possible to argue also that you did not want it even if you
could have it. The program in 1951 was technically so sweet that you could not
argue about that. It was purely the military, the political and the humane
problem of what you were going to do about it once you had it.
Mr. GBAY. In further relation to the October 29 meeting of the GAC, I am
asking now for information : From whom did the GAC receive the questions
which the Commission wished the GAC to answer?
The WITNESS. The Commission met with us. I think there was probably a
letter to me from Mr. Lilienthal. This is not certain, but probable. But the
record will show that.
In supplement of the letter calling us to the meeting, we were addressed by
the Commission at the outset.
Mr. GBAY. This communication signed by Mr. Pike, Acting Chairman, the date
of the letter was the 21st.
The WITNESS. Right.
Mr. GRAT. So in part your instructions, if I may use that term, at least came
from a letter. I am unable to read it In this letter there were raised a lot
of questions. In your reply I believe to General Nichols and certainly your
testimony here, you say that the GAC was asked to consider two questions : One,
are we doing all we should; two, what about the crash program.
My question is was it in a meeting with the Commission that the agenda or
proposed agen'da items were refined to these two?
The WITNESS. I would think that we would have been charged, so to speak,
by the Commission with its formulation of what it wanted us to do.
Mr. GBAY. And it was your clear understanding as Chairman that what they
wanted you to do in that meeting
The WITNESS. Was to answer those two questions. I would be unhappy if
many of the questions in Mr. Pike's letter remained urianswered in our answer,
but I don't remember. It doesn't matter.
Mr. GBAY. I would like to ask about one of these questions. This is not sur-
prise material for Dr. Oppenheimer.
Do you remember, Dr. Oppenheimer, whether, when you went into your meet-
ing, you expected to consider cost of the super in terms of scientific personnel,
physical facilities arid dollars?
The WITNESS. We outlined in our answer— I don't know whether we expected
to, I have seen our answer just two days ago — in our answer we have four items
saying what it would require to carry out the program.
Mr. GBAY. I see. a
The WITNESS. Perhaps not the dollars. We were not very good on dollars.
Mr GBAY. May I ask you now to turn your mind to an entirely different kind
of thinfe the Chevalier incident, in which it would appear that at that time and
under those circumstances within the framework of loyalty generally— loyalty
to an individual, broader loyalty to a country, and I am not talking about es-
pionage—in that case considerations of personal loyalty might have outweighed
the broader loyalties. .
The WITNESS. I understand that it would appear that way. It is obvious
from my behavior that I was in a very great conflict. It is obvious that I de-
cided that with regard to Eltentori the danger was conceivably substantial and
that I had an obligation to my country to talk about it In the case of Cheva-
lier, I would not think that I regarded it as a conflict of loyalties, but that I put
too much confidence — put an improper confidence in my own judgment that
Chevalier was not a danger. .
Mr GBAY. Another instance which has been discussed in the proceeding, the
testimony with respect to Dr. Peters and your subsequent letter to the Bocbester
252
newspaper. In writing that letter, which perhaps was motivated by a desire not
to hurt the individual, or to make restitution
The WITNESS. Not to get him fired, anyway.
Mr. GBAY. Not to get him fired — again was this the same kind of conflict that
you had with respect to
The WITNESS. No ; I think this was almost wholly a question of public things.
Personal things were not involved. He was a good scientist doing according
to everyone's account no political work of any kind, doing no harm, whatever
his views. It was overwhelming belief of the community in which I lived that
a man like that ought not to be fired either for his past or for his views, unless
the past is criminal or the views lead TH™ to wicked action. I think my effort
was to compose the flap that I had produced in order that he could stay on and
that this was not a question of my anguish about what I was doing to him.
Mr. GBAY. As you know, this board is asked to consider present and future
circumstances. Do you feel that today where there became a conflict between
loyalty to an individual and a desire to protect him and keep his job or have him
keep his Job — whatever it might be — and a broader obligation, and I consider
it to be broader is the reason I put it that way, that you would follow this same
kind of pattern with respect to other individuals in the future?
The WITNESS. The Chevalier pattern ; no, never. The Peters pattern I do not
believe that I violated a broader obligation in writing the letter. It was for the
public interest that I wrote it.
Mr. GBAY. Ton make a distinction between what is said about a man' in ex-
ecutive session— we are talking in terms of loyalty— and what is said about a
man for public consumption. Do you think on the basis of the same facts it
is appropriate to say one thing in executive session, and another thing for public
consumption'?
The WITNESS. It is very undesirable. I wish I had said more temperate,
measured and accurate words in executive session. The it would not have been
necessary to say such very different words publicly.
Mr. GBAY. I suppose my final question on that is related to the view you held
at one time that a cessation — correct me if I mistake this — of Communist ac-
tivities, as distinguished from Communist sympathies, was important in con-
sidering a man for important classified work. Is that your view today?
The WITNESS. No ; I have for a long time been clear that sympathy with the
enemy is incompatible with responsible or secret work to the United States.
Mr. GBAY. So it would not be sufficient to say to a man, stop making speeches,
stop going to meetings ; that would not be enough?
The WITNESS. It was not in fact sufficient before. It was sufficient only if
it was a man whose disengagement was dependable.
Mr. GBAY. Disengagement as far as activities are concerned.
The WITNESS. And to some extent conduct Today it is a very simple thing,
It seems to me, and has been for some years. We have a well-defined enemy.
Sympathy for him may be tolerable, but it is not tolerable in working for the
people or the Government of this country.
Mr. GBAY. One other question, which relates to the record, and your reply to
General Nichols, and that is with respect to whose initiative it was which led to
the employment of Dr. Hawkins as assistant personnel officer or whatever his
title was. Do you now recall whether you simply endorsed the notion of his
employment, or whether you
The WITNESS. No ; I said in my earlier testimony that I relied rather heavily —
that I relied on Hawkins' testimony under oath— that he had been asked for by
the personnel director. I don't recall how the discussion started.
Mr. GBAY. Finally, and this is much less important than some of these other
questions, when in 1946 you resigned from the ICCASP, in your letter of resigna-
tion you referred to your disagreement with their current position with re-
spect to the extension of President Roosevelt's foreign policy, despite the many
constructive and decisive things that this organization was doing; I wondered
what you had in mind.
The WITNESS. I wondered when I heard it. There is In my file a reference
to a panel of the committee that was advocating and speaking for a National
Science Foundation ; though that is only one thing, It has always seemed a con-
structive one.
Mr. GBAY. Because you had testified that you did not know too much about
what they were doing and had not been active.
The WITNESS. This seems to be the only record I have.
Dr. EVANS. Dr. Oppenheimer, did the Condon letter have much weight with you
in changing your position on that security committee?
253
The WITNESS. The Peters thing?
Dr. EVANS. Yes.
The WITNESS. No. The letters that had weight with me were from Bethe
and Weiskopf. They were written in very moderate and dignified
Mr. EVANS. Condon did write a letter about it?
The WITNESS. He did, and it has been published in the papers. It made me
angry.
Dr. EVANS. Another question : From a political point of view, did you con-
sider the super a bad project even if it could be made?
The WITNESS. I think your record says that if we could have a world without
supers it would be a better world.
Dr. EVANS. Did you consider the fact that there would not be many targets
for a super?
The WITNESS. We did indeed. We discussed that. We said we had many
more than the Russians. We said we were more vulnerable to it, and went into
the questions of delivering it by ship and so on.
Dr. EVANS. There is one other question that I want to ask and perhaps you
won't answer this and can't, and I wouldn't want you to in that case. Did you
reach the conclusion that the super would work purely from a mathematical
point of view. In other words, you had not tested it as yet?
The WITNESS. At what stage is this? When I did reach that conclusion?
Dr. EVANS. Yes.
The WITNESS. Yes. I didn't reach the conclusion that the precise designs
and details embodied in our first thing would work as well as it might, but I
reached the conclusion that something along these lines could be made to work.
Dr. EVANS. That is all.
Mr. GABEISON. Could we just have the last question read?
Dr. EVANS. I can restate it. Did you reach the conclusion that the super
would work from a purely mathematical point of view because they had not
made the test
Mr. GABBISON. Excuse me.
The WITNESS. I believe in our report to the President we said though there
is always in matters of this kind the possibility that a specific model will fail,
we are confident that this program is going to be successful.
Dr. EVANS. There was a delicate boundary there that you could not be quite
sure?
The WITNESS. You can never be quite sure of anything in the future.
Mr. GRAY. It is 12 :15 and you asked for a recess.
Mr, GABEISON. I don't think a recess is necessary.
(Discussion off the record.)
(Witness excused temporarily.)
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Glennan, do you care to testify under oath? You are not re-
quired to do so.
Dr. GLENNAN. I don't understand you.
Mr. GRAY. Do you care to testify under oath?
Dr. GLENNAN. I would be glad to.
Mr. GRAY. All right, sir. Would you be good enough to stand and hold tip
your right hand? What is your full name?
Dr. GLENNAN. Thomas Keith Glennan.
Mr. GRAY. Thomas Keith Glennan, do you swear that the testimony you are
to give the board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Dr. GLENNAN. I do.
Whereupon, Thomas Keith Glennan was called as a witness, and having been
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
Dr GRAY. Now, you will forgive for an elementary lesson but I think I should
remind you of the provisions of section 1621 of title 18 of the United States
Code, known as the perjury statute, which makes it a crime punishable by a fine
of up to $2,000 and/or imprisonment up to 5 years for any person stating under
oath any material matter which he does not believe to be true. It is also an
offense under section 1001 of title 18 of the United States Code, punishable by
a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years or
both for any person to make any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation in any matter within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United
States.
I should also like to make the request that in the event it is necessary for you
to discuss any restricted data in your testimony, that you let the chairman know
before any disclosure for reasons which probably are obvious.
254
I think those are the instructions I am to give you, so you may proceed.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Mr. Glennan, would you state your full name for the record?
A. Thomas Keith Glennan.
Q. You are president of Case Institute in Cleveland?
A. lam.
Q. Dr. Glennan, there was handed to me just now an affidavit by you which
I will give you.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I had not thought to suggest to Dr. Glennan
that he would read the statement which he has prepared because I had preferred
to go along in the ordinary way by question and answer, but in the recess I
discussed the matter with Dr. Glennan, and I thought in the interest of time it
might be well if he would read this and then respond to any questions that
anybody might like to put to him.
Mr. GRAY. We should be glad to have him read it.
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Mr. Glennan, is this statement that you prepared your own in toto?
A. Without question.
Q. Did you receive any drafting assistance from anyone representing Dr.
Oppenheimer?
A. No. The only drafting assistance I received was a question that I raised
myself as to restricted data that might be in here, and with the help of Mr.
Beckerley this morning I changed part of one sentence to remove that.
Q. I simply ask you to speak of the work you have done with Dr. Oppenheimer,
your relations with him and your views about him.
A. That is right.
Q. Perhaps you would read this statement to the Board.
A. My name is Thomas Keith Glennan. I am 48 years old and I am president
of Case Institute of Technology in Cleveland, Ohio. From October 1, 1950, until
November 1, 1952, I was on leave of absence from Case, and served during that
period as a member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. I have
read somewhat hastily the pertinent parts of a letter addressed recently by the
General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission to Dr. J. Robert Oppen-
heimer. That letter recites certain incidents reported by the FBI presumably
which have caused serious questions to be raised by certain persons concerning
the loyalty of Dr. Oppenheimer to the United States of America.
Shortly after taking office as a Commissioner, I met Dr. Oppenheimer for the
first time. During the ensuing years our meetings were limited to those days
when the General Advisory Committee was in session, to discussions at Prince-
ton in mid-June 1951, which I shall mention later, and to such other group
meetings which may have occurred at the offices of the Commission in Washington
during the period noted. My contacts with Dr. Oppenheimer since November
1952 have been limited to correspondence at infrequent intervals.
My earliest recollection of a General Advisory Committee meeting had to do
with a review in late 1950, as I recall it, of the first two important Atomic Energy
Commission expansion programs.
If I might interpolate, I would say the first of the two important Atomic Energy
Commission programs.
I was impressed as a new member of the Commission by the expressions of
satisfaction on the part of Dr. Oppenheimer and other members of the General
Advisory Committee, and I recall comments to the effect that the General
Advisory Committee under Dr. Oppenheimer's chairmanship had been urging ex-
pansion in the fissionable materials and weapons field for some time. About this
same time I first became aware of the problems posed for the Commission and in
particular for the Los Alamos laboratory by the findings of the theoretical group
there, that requirement for special materials appeared to be such that there
would result a substantial reduction in the production of fissionable materials
Q. Perhaps you could read it a little more slowly.
A. I learned, too, something of the disagreements that had taken place in late
1949 within the Commission itself, and within the General Advisory Committee,
on the question of pursuing vigorously prosecution of the thermonuclear program.
While it was apparent that certain moral questions had been raised in addition
to questions of technical feasibility in these earlier debates, it seemed clear to
me that the technical problems and the tremendous cost in terms of decreased
255
Plutonium production had been of very great concern to the scientists involved.
In the balance was the question of exploiting at all possible speed the very
promising developments in the fission field, and the rapid buildup of a stockpile of
great effectiveness against the diversion of effort and material to an as yet un-
proven thermonuclear device.
It is to be remembered that theoretical studies and calculations were pro-
ceeding during this period f ollowing on the President's decision to proceed with
the diffusion program in early 1950.
In the late spring of 1951, certain studies made at Los Alamos by Teller,
Nordheim, and others, began to show promise. A meeting was called, I believe
jointly by the Commission and the General Advisory Committee, for the purpose
of reviewing these new propulsions. The meeting was held at the Institute for
Advanced Study at Princeton around the 19th and 20th of June 1951. The top
level of scientific personnel available to the Commission were in attendance, as
were all the Commissioners. It was this meeting that gave new hope to all for
the thermonuclear program. It is my recollection that Dr. Oppenheimer par-
ticipated with vigor and that there was never apparent to me at that time or
subsequently anything in his actions or words that indicated anything other than
a recognition of important new theoretical findings, and the necessity for pursu-
ing vigorously these promising new leads.
It is true that Dr. Oppenheimer opposed the immediate establishment of a
second weapons laboratory. So did I, and on the ground that Los Alamos was
in the best possible position to push forward on the new propositions. To create
a new laboratory would have been a crushing blow to the morale of the Los
Alamos staff members and much valuable time would have been lost Need for
expansion of research effort was apparent, however, and studies were begun
shortly thereafter to determine the best methods by which such expansion could
be accomplished.
In the meantime Los Alamos pressed forward with great urgency to develop
fusion devices for early tests of the new theories.
I cite these instances because it may be that accusations of disloyalty have
been made against Dr. Oppenheimer
Mr. BOBB. Mr. Chairman, I hate to interrupt the witness, but I feel it my duty
to call to the attention of the Chairman, the provisions of the procedure that no
witness will be permitted to make an argument from the witness stand. I ap-
prehend that Dr. Glennan is about to make such an argument. I am not of
course intending to suggest that Dr. Glennan is not doing anything he does not
believe to be entirely proper, but the board procedures do provide under section
4.15, paragraph (f ) "nor will the board permit any person to argue from the
witness stand." I merely want to bring that to the board's attention, for
whatever it might be worth.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, Dr. Glennan, I believe, is about to state his
opinion. Surely the Chair will not consider this to be an argument.
Mr. GBA.Y. I would like to ask Dr. Glennan if all of his statement is directing
•himself specifically to the paragraph in the Nichols letter which you referred to
at the outset, reporting certain positions, attitudes, and so on, of Dr. Oppenheimer,
with respect to the development of the hydrogen bomb.
The WITNESS. Since, Mr. Chairman, my knowledge of these matters is limited
largely or limited wholly, I should say, to the time I was on the Commission, I
am dealing principally with that question.
Mr. GRAY. Do you have something farther?
Mr. GABBisoisr. I was going to make the general observation, Mr. Chairman,
that in the case of many, if not most of the witnesses who will follow Dr. Glennan,
I have asked them to recall the circumstances under which they had occasion to
work with Dr. Oppenheimer, the extent to which they knew him, what they did
together, what their views of him as a man and an American were as a result of
their contacts with him, and all this item to be highly pertinent to the question,
the ultimate question of judgment which this Commission has to make.
Mr. BOBB. Mr. Chairman, I thoroughly agree with that.
Mr. GARRISON. One of the basic questions in weighing a man's loyalty and
citizenship is what sort of things has he done for his country in a time when the
country is hard beset by foreign intentions.
Another test is what men of standing and eminence and character believed him
to be on the basis not merely of reputation— community reputatton-4>ut on the
basis of actual contacts with Mm.
I can't conceive that any question would arise in the mind of the Chairman
as to the relevance of testimony of this character.
808S13— 54 17
256
Mr. GRAY. I don't believe that counsel, Mr. Robb, has raised a question of
relevance.
Mr. ROBB. Of course not.
Mr. GRAY. He has addressed himself to the procedure which is not generally
too well defined. Did you want to say something?
Mr. ROBB. I thoroughly agree with all that Mr. Garrison has said. I have no
intention of suggesting that those matters should not receive full discussion
before this Board. I merely felt it my duty, Mr. Chairman, as I apprehended
that Dr. Glennan was launching into what can be described as an argument,
rather than a recital of facts and circumstances. Of course, I am afraid that
this is something we get into when a witness does read a prepared statement
It is rather difficult for counsel to control what he says and it is very apt to
become an argument or a speech rather than testimony. .
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, I really am amazed that this question should
be raised. ^ ,
Mr. GBAY. I think in this case, if only in the interest of economy of time, I am
going to ask the witness to proceed with his prepared statement and we can argue
these procedural questions later.
Mr. GABBISON. I myself often thought of that provision of the rules, Mr.
Chairman, during some of the questioning that has taken place, but I have
refrained from raising it
The WITNESS, May I proceed, sir?
Mr. GBAY. If you will.
The WITNESS. I cite these instances because it may be that accusations of
disloyalty have been made against Dr. Oppenheimer in part because of his
disagreements with others because of the feasibility of one technical program
compared with another, or one method of attack on a problem as compared with
another. At no time did I then nor do I now know of any evidence that would
indicate that Dr. Oppenheimer had been disloyal. Disagreements of this kind
on technical and administrative matters are not sufficient ground for accusa-
tions such as have been made. Rather they are the normal phenomena in
development matters of this nature.
Of the history of Dr. Oppenheimer prior to 1950 I have only limited knowledge
and can make no comment. In light of his diligence in the prosecution of the
Commission's program and insofar as my personal contacts with him have been
revealing, I believe Dr. Oppenheimer to be a loyal citizen of the United States.
By Mr. GABBISON.
Q. And on the basis of these contacts, would you say that his continued em-
ployment as a consultant would be clearly consistent with the interests of
national security?
A. I would.
Mr. GABBISON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROBB. I have no questions.
Mr. GBAY. Does any member of the board have any questions?
Mr. MOBGAN. No.
Dr. EVANS. No.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much.
The WITNESS. Thank you.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GABBISON. If it is agreeable with the board, Dr. Compton will not take
long. Would you like to hear him now ?
Mr. GRAY. I think we might proceed with Dr. Compton.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. GRAY. Do you wish to testify under oath? You are not requested to do so.
Mr. COMPTON. I am perfectly willing to do so.
Mr. GRAY. Will you stand, please, and raise your right hand? What are your
initials?
Dr. COMPTON. K. T.
Mr. GBAY. K. T. Compton, do you swear that the testimony you are to give
the board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you God?
Dr. COMMON. I do.
Mr. GRAY. I must call your attention to the provisions of the perjury statutes
which make it a crime punishable by fine up to $2,000 and/or of imprisonment up
to 5 years for any person to state under oath any material matter which he does
not believe to be true, and also call your attention to the fact that It is an
offense under the statutes punishable by fine of not more than $10,000 or im-
257
prisonment for not more than 5 years or both for any person to make any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statement or representation in any matter within the
Jurisdiction of an agency of the United States.
I should also, Dr. Compton, if it becomes necessary for you to make any
reference to or to disclose restricted data in your discussion here, ask that you
inform me in advance of the necessity to do so.
Finally, I should point out to you that we treat the proceedings of this board
as a matter which is confidential as between the Atomic Energy Commission and
its officials and agencies and Dr. Oppenheimer and his representatives, and we
hope that witnesses will be guided accordingly, as far as the press and others
are concerned. Mr. Garrison.
DIBECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GABBISON.
Q. Dr. Compton, you were the president of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology from 1930 to 1948, 1 believe?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would you state briefly some of the positions which you have held In the
Government having to do with the defense effort?
A. Probably most important of those was as a member of the National De-
fense Research Committee from 1940 to 1945 when I was in general charge of
the developments in radar, fire control and instruments. Part of that time and
only an early part of that time had to do with the atomic energy program.
I was later in 1945— in the first half of the year— a member of Secretary
Stimson's Committee on Atomic Energy which was advising President Truman.
That was the committee which George Harrison of New York Life was chairman.
Then in 1946, I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board
on the first Bikini atom bomb test, and a member of the President's Evaluation
Committee on that same test.
Then between a year and 2 years ago I was a member of the Committee under
Lewis Strauss which was appointed by the late Senator McMahon to consider
certain problems having to do with the capital facilities for atomic energy.
In that connection we made some appraisal of the work at Savannah River
and at Paducah. The committee was disbanded, however, shortly after Senator
McMahon's death.
I should also mention that I was in 1947 and 1948 chairman of the Research
and Development Board in the Department of Defense immediately following
Dr. Bush in that position.
I think those are the principal positions.
Q. Thank you. You first met Dr. Oppenheimer at Goettingen, I think you
told me, in 1926.
A. That is right, November and December 1926. He was there as a post
graduate student I was there as a visitor working on a manuscript, and I saw
quite a bit of Dr. Oppenheimer at that time.
Q. You yourself were trained as a physicist?
A. Right
Q. Would you tell the board the nature of the undertakings in which Dr. Op-
penheimer and you have worked together?
A. Starting with Goettingen, our first undertaking— we were a committee of
some 20 American graduate students— to organize a Thanksgiving dinner to pay
back the social debt to our German professors who had been very hospitable to
us. That had its amusing incidents, but it has nothing to do with the atomic
energy work.
I have met Dr. Oppenheimer at professional meetings frequently from time
to time. The last meeting with him until this morning that I can recall was at
Princeton in his office where I had been asked by Miss Shaver, the president of
Lord and Taylor, to try to prevail on Einstein to accept one of the Lord and
Taylor awards, and I called on Dr. Oppenheimer for advice on how best to ap-
proach Professor Einstein. My only contact that I can recall with Dr. Oppen-
heimer having to do with the atomic energy project was while on Secretary
Stimson's committee in 1945.
One of the problems before us was to try to estimate the amount of time that
it would take a foreign country, and particularly Russia, to produce an atomic
bomb. At that time we called in 2 groups on 2 separate days. One group con-
sisted of the presidents or chief engineers of the industrial companies that had
been most engaged in the production of the atomic bomb plants, that is Eastman,
duPont, Carbide and Carbon Chemicals, Westinghouse, as I recall.
258
The other meeting was with a group of scientists— Fenni, Oppenheimer, Ernest
Lawrence, and my brother, Arthur. There may have been one other. I am not
quite sure. It was at that meeting that as a result of those conferences that we
came to the very rough estimate that it would require Russia a minimum of 5
years and a maximum of 20 and probably 10 to produce an atomic bomb.
In that connection, the predominant factor was not scientific information,
because we realized that the Russians could get that as well as we could, but it
had to do with industrial capacity— machine tools, to make tools, production of
electronic control equipment, capacity to produce certain chemicals with the
desired degree of purity, and things of that sort
Q. I think Dr. Qppenheimer was a member of the Atomic Energy Committee of
the Research and Development Board under William Webster when you were
Chairman of the Research and Development Board.
A. That is correct.
Q. Based on your acquaintance with Dr. Oppenheimer, your knowledge that
you have of him, what would you say as to his loyalty to the United States?
A. I have never had any question of it. I have no question of it now. He is
completely loyal.
Q. Again based on your experience with him and your knowledge of him, would
you say that his continued employment as a consultant to the Atomic Energy
Commission would be clearly consistent with the interests of national security?
A. So far as I know the situation, I would say yes. I think I would have to
qualify that by this fact While my personal impression, my faith is sound,
it would have to be subject to derogatory evidence that I don't know anything
about, which I take it is the purpose of this committee to investigate.
Q. Of course, that goes without saying. I am asking you for your judgment
simply based on your own personal feeling about him and knowledge of fr?™.
A. Yes.
Q. As to that, you are clear in your mind.
A. Perfectly clear, yes.
Q. What in your Judgment would be the effect, if any, on the scientific com-
munity if Dr. Oppenheimer Js clearance were to be revoked?
A. I believe — and I feel very certain of this— that there would be a shock,
there would be a discouragement, there would be confusion. I think the result
would be very bad.
Q. Bad for the country?
A. For the country.
Mr. GARRISON. That is all.
Mr. ROBB. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GBAT. Thank you very much, Doctor.
The WETNESS. I would like to say this. If anything should come up later in
connection with things in which my past contact with Oppenheimer might
raise questions for future evaluation, I would of course be glad to come down
and appear if I can be of any help.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GRAY. We are now in recess. I hope we can start at 2 o'clock.
(At 12 :55 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m.)
APTERNOOW SESSION
Mr. GRAY. The proceeding will begin. Do you wish to testify under oath,
Mr. Lansdale? You are not required to do so.
Mr. LAITSDALE. I have no wish at all in that respect. I leave that to counsel
or to the Board.
Mr. GRAY. I might say to you the board imposes no requirement All the
witnesses to this point have testified under oath.
Mr. LANSDALE. Then let us keep it uniform.
Mr. GRAY. Would you stand and raise your right hand.
John Lansdale, Jr., do you swear that the testimony you are to give the Board
shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. LANSDAIE. I do.
Mr. GRAY. Now, Mr. Lansdale, I am required to call your attention to the
provisions of the United States Code which make it a crime punishable by fine
and imprisonment for any person to state under oath any material matter
which he does not believe to be true and to remind you it is also an offense under
the code punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both for any person to make
any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or representation in any matter
within the Jurisdiction of an agency of the United States.
259
I should like to ask that in the event it becomes necessary for you to disclose
what you believe to be classified data during your testimony you should advise
me before such disclosure in order that we may take certain steps.
Mr. LANSDALE. May I in that regard rely on Mr. Rolander because it has been
since 1945 that I have had any acquaintance with what is classified or what is
not.
I have heretofore adopted the practice that I considered everything I did was
classified. I know that is not really true any more.
Mr. ROLANDER. Mr. Chairman, I think specific reference is being made with
reference to restricted data, which is more in terms technical data. Mr. Lansdale,
with respect to matters which were previously classified would probably be
considering investigative data which was at that time classified. That would
not at this time be considered as classified.
Mr. GRAY. Perhaps I was in error to raise the question here. But you wffl
be on the alert, Mr. Rolander.
Mr. ROLANDER. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Finally, Mr. Lansdale, I should point out to you that this Board
considers the proceedings strictly confidential between the Commission and its
officials and Dr. Oppenheimer and his representatives and witnesses. This
Board takes no initiative in the release of any information. Speaking for the
Board I express the hope that witnesses will take the same view of the situation.
Mr. LANSDALE. This witness will.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Garrison.
Whereupon, John Lansdale, Jr., was called as a witness, and having been duly
sworn, was examined and testified as f ollows :
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Mr. Lansdale, you are presently a member of the law firm of Squire,
Sanders, and Dempsey in Cleveland, Ohio?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You attended Virginia. Military Institute and after that the Harvard
University Law School?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And during the war you were the security officer for the Manhattan Dis-
trict at Los Alamos?
A. The question is inaccurate. I was responsible to General Groves for the
overall security and intelligence of the atomic bomb project, not technically the
Manhattan District which was an administrative organization.
Q. But you were the top security officer for the atomic bomb project?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would you tell the board how you happened to get into the security work
which you were charged with by General Groves?
A. I believe General Groves advised me that he requested me to take charge
of that work because I had previously, before the Army had been given respon-
sibility for the atomic bomb project, made a security investigation at Dr. Conant's
request at Berkeley and thus by that accident I was one of the very few Army
officers who had any knowledge of the existence and nature of the project.
Q. Dr. Conant asked you to undertake this study of the situation at Berkeley
in 1941, as I recall.
A. It was either in December 1941 or January 1942.
My recollection is a little fuzzy on the precise date but it was right in that
time.
Q. And you were attached at that, time to Gen. Robert Lee in G-2?
A. Yes.
Q. In the counterintelligence work?
A. I was in the so-called Counterintelligence Branch of the Office of Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff.
Q. Will you tell the board about your discussions with General Groves about
Dr. Oppenheimer's background and about his clearance?
A. I cannot recall precisely when we first began to discuss Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. May I interrupt you one minute?
A. Yes.
Q. I would just like to ask you if you have discussed the subject matter of
your general scope of testimony here today with representatives of the Com-
mission who are assisting the board in its deliberations as well as with us?
A. That is right I think it fair to say
Q. I don't mean every question I am going to put has been discussed.
260
A. I think it fair to say that I have not discussed with the Commission staff
my testimony as such. I have very briefly last night and at greater length
some days or weeks ago answered to the best of my ability every question that
I could that they had about this background.
Mr. EOBB. Mr. Chairman, for the sake of continuity In the record, I wonder
if I might put one question at this point?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
Mr. BOBB. Did we not also permit you to refresh your recollection by looking
at certain portions of the file with which you had been concerned?
The WITNESS. Oh, yes.
Mr. ROBB. That is all.
The WITNESS. There were several documents which you gave me to read to
refresh my recollection and to mutually try to arrive at facts which were not
apparent in the record.
In any event, Dr. Oppenheimer had been on the project prior to the time that
the Army took over. When the Army took it over, the security was virtually
nonexistent and the program of personnel clearance was practically nonexistent.
I won't say It did not exist because it did, but it was very incomplete. One of
the first things that we did was to attempt to get some investigation and set up
some program for the clearance of the personnel that were received with the
project, as it were.
I, myself, never was until fairly late in the game transferred to the Man-
hattan District I remained with G-2 and performed my duties as a supervisory
matter along with my other duties in G-2.
Then Lieutenant Calvert was assigned to the Manhattan District as the se-
curity officer and he conducted the clearance program.
In connection with that we received reports, primarily from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, as I remember, concerning Dr. Oppenheimer's associations and
relatives, as well as himself. These caused us, needless to say, a great deal of
concern. I may be inexact in my dates, but my recollection is that this took
place about the time that Los Alamos was being established and my recollection
is that they had not yet moved up on the Hill, but still had the office or laboratory
dowpa in Santa Fe while we were constructing a road up there.
I, brought up these, because of Dr. Oppenheimer's prominent position as the
head of the Los Alamos laboratory, to the attention of General Groves and we
discussed them at some length.
General Groves' view was (a) — I wonder if I am permitted to say— I don't
know what his view was, of course, as I only know what he told me.
Mr. GBAT. You certainly can say what he told you.
The WtnsrESs. I would like to correct that. Obviously I don't know what was
in the man's mind. All I know is what he told me.
General Groves' view* as I recall expressed, was (a) that Dr. Oppenheimer
was essential; (b) that in his judgment— ^and he had gotten to know Dr. Oppen-
heimer very well by that time— he was loyal; and (c) we would clear him for
this work whatever the reports said.
I will confess that I myself at that time had considerable doubts about it.
Because of our worry, or my worry, let us say, about Dr. Oppenheimer, we con-
tinued to the best of our ability to investigate him. We kept him under sur-
veillance whenever he left the project. We opened his mail. We did all sorts
of nasty things that we do or did on the project
I interviewed him myself a number of times. As I recall, the recommendations
of the security organization headed up by Captain Calvert were adverse to Dr.
Oppenheimer. They recommended against clearance.
By Mr. GAKBISON:
Q. Who was Captain Calvert?
A. I think his official title was District Security Officer. He was on General
Nichols', then Colonel Nichols, staff. In any event, I 'folly concurred with General
Groves as our investigation went on with the fact that Dr. Oppenheimer was
properly cleared.
Now, you asked to relate our discussions. That is difficult. Our discussions
spread over many, many months. They continued when the name
Mr. GEAT. Excuse me, please. Did you say I asked to relate the discussions?
The WITNESS. No; Mr. Garrison did.
Mr. G&&Y. Excuse me. A moment ago I thought when you asked whether you
were privileged to say what General Groves said, I said that was all right.
The WITNESS, No. I think that was your question, wasn't ft?
Mr. GABBISON. Yes, it was.
261
The WITNESS. I remember that I asked General Groves early in the game
what would he do If it turned out that Dr. Oppenheimer was not loyal and that
w«e could not trust him? His reply was that he would blow the whole thing
wide open.
I do not mean to imply by that, that our conclusions as to clearance were neces-
sarily dictated by indispensability. I wish to emphasize it for myself. I reached
the conclusion that he was loyal and ought to be cleared.
By Mr. GABRISON :
Q. You did have certain employees, did you not, that the project had at Los
Alamos who were kept on the basis of what might be called a calculated risk?
A. Tes; that is true. That is true of Los Alamos and other parts of the
project
Q. Certain people who were known or believed to be Communists?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why did the project employ some people of that character?
A. My only answer to that is that we continually had to exercise judgment
as between obvious all out security and the necessities of the project. It must be
remembered that the Germans were far ahead of us in the development of an
atomic bomb. We believed that the nation which first obtained one would win
the war. We were under, believe me, very terrible feeling of pressure. Every
security decision we made with reference to important people was made in
that background.
We had a number of persons who we believed were very likely to be Communists,
who we were persuaded were doing such useful work and such important work,
that good judgment required that we keep them and let them do their work and
surround them and insulate them to the best extent of our ability. That is what
we did in a number of cases.
I can't answer it any better than that
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer was not in that category of calculated risk, I take it?
A. Not in my judgment, no*
Q. Did you ever know of any leakage of information from any of the persons
of the sort you have mentioned to the outside?
A. We never discovered any leakage of information from those persons that we
deliberately kept as a calculated risk. I don't mean to assert that there was
none. We discovered none and we used every effort we could to make it difficult
for them.
For example, with many of them we made it perfectly obvious that we were
watching their every move so as to be sure that if they desired to pass information
they would go to extraordinary lengths to do so and thus make it easier to detect.
Q. Did you know of any leakage from the Los Alamos project, apart from that
which has become public property?
A. Apart from the inexcusable Greenglass case, I now recall none that we
knew of. Oh, we had a mail censorship program set up and we were continually
picking up the things in letters that we thought ought not to go out and which
we intercepted. Those were the kind of things which may recollection is that
we didn't regard as deliberate attempts at security violation.
Q. Los Alamos was operated on a noncompartmentalized basis, was it not?
A. Generally speaking that is true. Indeed that was the purpose of the estab-
lishment of Los Alamos.
Q. Would you explain that a little more fully?
A. My recollection is that we had originally planned to put Los Alamos at Oak
Ridge. Indeed that was the original purpose of the acquisition of so much of
the land down there before we understood how big the project was going to be.
Dr. Oppenheimer and various of his associates were quite strong in their feel-
Ing that the fastest and best progress could be made if we could find a place where
.the principle of compartmentalization which we had adopted generally for the
whole project could be laid to one side, at least so far as the important people
on the project were concerned.
It was believed that the establishment of the laboratory in an isolated place
where means of egress and ingress could be easily controlled and means of com-
munication monitored should be done, if feasible.
We did have certain compartmentalizatton there. As I remember, we had the
so-called technical area where the actual laboratories were, and as I recall we had
two kinds of badges, for example; those who could get in there and those who
could not To that extent we had compartmentalization.
Q. You visited the project frequently, did you not?
A. Many times, yea
262
Q. Did you form any judgment as to the wisdom in an overall point of view
of the establishment of Los Alamos as a community in which work could be car-
ried forward in the relatively free and less cramped manner that you have
described than would have been the case at Oak Ridge, for example?
A. Let me answer that this way. I do not conceive that I had then, nor do I
have now sufficient technical knowledge to enable me to measure the difference
between the speed of accomplishment and not. To my mind then, simple logic
dictated that it must be so, and I saw no reason to change my mind.
I wish to add that I thought then and later events as the project went on proved
that this theory of an insulated city in the middle of a desert is more easily postu-
lated in theory than it is carried out in actual practice. But nevertheless we
did a fairly good job in that regard.
Q. Was the job of administering this community a difficult one in your judg-
ment as you observed it?
A. It certainly was. The commanding officers were changed very rapidly.
Q. What would you say as to the nature of the scientists and their human char-
acteristics, as you saw them at work on the project in relations to the problem
of administration?
A. The scientists en masse presented an extremely difficult problem. The rea-
son for it, as near as I can judge, is that with certain outstanding exceptions they
lacked what I called breadth. They were extremely competent in their field but
their extreme competence in their chosen field lead them falsely to believe that
they were as competent in any other field.
The result when you got them together was to make administration pretty diffi-
cult because each one thought that he could administer the administrative aspects
of the Army post better than any Army officer, for example, and didn't hesitate
to say so with respect to any detail of living or detail of security or anything else.
I hope my scientist friends will forgive me, but the very nature of them made
things pretty difficult.
Q. They were slightly restive under the confinement of the isolated city.
A. Very. As time went on, more so. Toward the latter stages it became in-
creasingly difficult to sit on the lid out there. During the early stages, no.
Q. What was Dr. Oppenheimer's policy as an administrator in relation to keep-
ing the morale going and keeping the natural resttveness of these people within
bounds? Was he helpful?
A. So far as I observed it, he was very helpful. The difficulty primarily arose
from those that were one step below him, let us say, in the scientific side. Dr.
Oppenheimer himself so far as security matters with which I was particularly
concerned was extremely cooperative.
Q. Could you give the board a little picture of the actual security measures
which were enforced there at Los Alamos?
A. Yes. In the first place, physically we had— I have forgotten how many-
some troops, a guard company or two companies, wasn't it, and we maintained
patrols around the perimeter. We established a system of monitoring telephone
calls and mail. We established a post office, you might say, down in Santa Fe
in an office. We censored all mail on a spot check basis, and the mail of the
more important scientists and those upon whom we had derogatory information
100 percent. We maintained, at least in the early days— later it became a spot
check basis, as I remember — a continual monitoring of all means of communica-
tions, telephone calls, and the like.
We attempted to be as careful as we could in the clearance of personnel who
were sent there. It is quite true that there, as in other places, we stretched
our clearance procedure when the pressure was on for personnel.
Those who have not been through it cannot conceive, again I say, the extreme
pressure we were under — when the recruitment program was on, and when we1
were actually building the weapon, not to let people go, because the clearance
procedure took a long time, or it seemed so to those who were responsible for
getting ahead with the job.
I have forgotten precisely what our restrictions were on visitation, but people
were not permitted to go on trips unless It was officially necessary. We had
rather rigid restrictions even on visiting Santa Fe. Those, I remember, were
among the restrictions that we Pimply had to relax as the project went on.
We countered that by placing men of our organization in all of the hotels in
town as desk clerks and the like and covering the city of Santa Fe as best we
could.
We tried to make it the securest of our institutions. The inexcusable Green-
glass case indicates that it was not so secure after alL
263
Q. What do you recall of your interview with Dr. Oppenheimer on what we
call here the Chevalier incident, if you know what I have reference to?
A. Yes. That is one of the things which I have had the advantage of reading
the transcript of some weeks ago and glancing at one page of it again last night
I should say that I talked to Dr. Oppenheimer many times. In that par-
ticular case the interview was when he was in Washington and I now believe
that the interview took place in General Groves* office, although that is a recon-
struction. I have no precise recollection of it except that it was in Washington.
Do you wish me to relate the substance of it?
Q. Yes.
A. The substance of it was that Dr. Oppenheimer had advised our people on
the west coast that an approach had been made to someone on the project to
secure information concerning the project, and that the approach had been
made by one Eltenton who was well known to us — from Bltenton to a third
person and from the third person to the project
From reading the transcript and having my attention called to memoranda
by Mr. Bobb and Mr. Rolander, the information was that the contact was with
three persons. It is perfectly obvious that was the story. It is a curious trick
of memory but my recollection was one and that the one person was Dr. Oppen-
heimer's brother, Frank Oppenheimer. I have no explanation as to how I
translate it from three into one.
I called General Groves last night and discussed it with him in an attempt
to fathom that and I can't figure it out But the record shows clearly that
there were three.
My effort was to get Dr. Oppenheimer to tell me the identity of the person
that was later identified as Chevalier. In that I was unsuccessful. Perhaps
I was not as resourceful a questioner as I might have been. In any event I
could not get him to tell me. That is the sum and substance of it
I came back and told the general that it was up to him, that he just had to
get the information for us, which the general undertook to do and later reported
back the information. That goes on for pages. I am quite sure that I inter-
rogated hi™ concerning other persons on the project I am quite sure it is a
long statement as I read it in the transcript. Our discussion covered a wide
range. That is my present recollection.
Q. Was there any other instance in which Dr. Oppenheimer did not give you
information that you asked for?
A. I don't recall any.
Q. Would you class this incident as an illustration of the characteristic of
the scientific mind that you spoke of a while back as deciding in their own minds
what properly they should do, what was required to be done in the public interest?
A. Yes, I think that is a fair statement. I think this whole incident is a good
illustration of that. I will confess that I was pretty fed up with Dr. Oppen-
heimer at that moment because of the background against which we were working
of the Weinberg case out on the west coast and the difficulties that we were
having with this Federation of Architects, Engineers — what is the name of that
thing— FAECT— who were well organized in one of the oil company laboratories
out there and had been making efforts to organize the radiation laboratory at
Berkeley.
I had previously in connection — let me say it this way — in connection with
Dr. Oppenheimer's recruitment program, the names of one or two persons who
figured prominently in the attempted or actual espionage incident on the west
coast were among those that were slated for transfer to Los Alamos.
In order that there could be the least possible furor about it, I went out to
Los Alamos to talk to Dr. Oppenheimer so that there would be no pressure upon
the part of him or his people to bring these persons out there. At that time I
told Dr. Oppenheimer something of our difficulties in Berkeley. How much I
cannot now recall except that I would have told him as little as I thought I
needed to.
The fact that I had to do that indicates the kind of people we were dealing
with, because these persons, and Dr. Oppenheimer was no exception, believed
that their judgment as to what people needed to know, as to what was security
and the like was as good or probably better than others.
It was subsequent to that conversation that Dr. Oppenheimer then, I assume,
realizing the seriousness of the situation, advised our people on the west coast
of this attempt coming out of the FAECT, because Eltenton was well known
to us as a Communist, active in the Communist apparatus on the west coast, and
a member of this laboratory group, this FAECT.
264
Dr. Oppenbeimer then told us that Eltenton had made this approach. It was
perfectly plain that Dr. Oppenheimer believed that it was quite unnecessary to
our security problem to know the names of the person or persons — the one who
later turned out to be Chevalier— got this contact with.
To my mind it was a sad exhibition of judgment, and an exhibition of ego
that is quite unwarranted, but nevertheless quite common. That is the way I
regarded it then. It did not endear him to me at the time. That is the sort
of incident that it appeared to me to be.
Q. He did regard it as important and in the national interest for him to impart
information that had come to him about Eltenton?
A. I assume that he did, otherwise he would not have done it.
Q. He took the initiative in doing that?
A. That is my recollection. My recollection is that he went to Lyle Johnson
who was then the security officer at the Badiation Laboratory. Am I correct
about Lyle's position then? I believe he was the security officer there. We
had a very large organization on the West Coast, the investigative organization
headed by Boris Fash, and I think Lyle Johnson was the security officer of the
laboratory. In any event he was in the security organization at that time.
Q. Dr. Qppenheimer has testified to a visit that he paid Jean Tatiock in 1943
on a trip away from the project. Dr. Oppenheimer knew that he was under
surveillance like everybody else when he left the project, did he not?
A. I assume that he did.' • We never told M™, But I assume he realized it
Q. Was it common knowledge that these security regulations applied to
travel outside the project?
A. That question I can't answer. It was certainly common knowledge that
travel outside of the project was not permitted except upon official business and
prior terms. There were certain persons that we made no effort to conceal
the fact from that they were under surveillance for the reason I mentioned.
Dr. Oppenheimer was not in that category. We never advertised to him that
he was under surveillance.
Our people, as I recall, who were handling that problem believed that he was
aware of it
Q. Did he make any other visits outside of the one I mentioned to other
people that you know of?
A. Of course, he made visits to many people.
Q. Let me take that back. Any people unconnected in some way with the
governmental effort?
A. As I recall, his trips at that time were primarily for recruiting personnel.
We were aware of his visit to Hiss Tatiock, I guess it was, and I do not now
recall any other visit to persons that might be on the suspect list, let me put it
that way. The record may dispute me on that, but I certainly don't recall any.
Q. To go back a moment to the Chevalier conversation, it has been testified
here that after Dr. Oppenheimer told General Groves about Chevalier that
certain telegrams were sent by you and General Nichols, I think in December
1943, still referring to three contacts.
A. That is right. One of those was shown to me last night.
Q. Do you have any explanation of that? Is it possible that you yourself
having had three in mind may have concluded that still obtained, or was there
anything more precise about it that you can remember?
A. I have been dredging my memory yesterday and today particularly about
that Unquestionably Dr. Oppenheimer told us there were three. The record
shows that beyond dispute. There is no question that at a later time— at least
at a later time— we were Informed that there was one only and that one was
Frank Oppenheimer, because I remember distinctly going over to the FBI
and visiting Mr. Tamm who was then, I believe assistant to J. Edgar Hoover,
and Mr. Whitson, who was the FBI Communist expert, that it was Frank
Oppenheimer and that we had got that information, or that General Groves
had obtained that information on the express term that it would not be passed on.
General Groves told me that, but I found it necessary to violate General
Groves' direction in that regard and to give to the Bureau the identity of
Frank Qppenheimer.
Whether the General went back again at my request, or on his own and talked
further with Dr. Oppenheimer, whether the General and I reached the con-
clusion that it must have been Frank, I don't know — we discussed it many
times — yet I distinctly remember this condition of secrecy.
' Dr. EVANS. Did you say General Groves told you that it was Frank Oppen-
heimer?
265
The WITNESS. Yes, sir; it is my recollection that General Groves told me it
was Frank Qppenheimer. What mystifies me, gentlemen, is that the record shows
three and there is a complete gap there. There is no record at all of Frank or
anything else. Yet nothing could be clearer in my memory than of that incident
of going over at night and talking to Tamm and Whison. Nothing could be
clearer in my memory than General Groves' direction that I was not to pass it
on to anybody, which I promptly violated in a very unmilitary manner.
That gap or jump I have no explanation for. My memory is a complete
blanlfc
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. Would it refresh your recollection or stiU further confuse you if I were
to say to you that my recollection oJt the conversation with General Groves about
this was that Dr. Oppenheimer named Chevalier to him as the man, but that he
General Groves, suspected that it was?
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, may I interpose here? We had General Groves here
yesterday called by Mr. Garrison and he was not asked about this. It is entirely
all right with me if Mr. Garrison wants to put testimony in this way. But if this
is to be done, I think General Groves should be brought back and asked about it
personally.
Mr. GABBISON. I am not putting in this as testimony.
Mr. ROBB. That is the effect of it
Mr. GABBISON. As I recall General Groves' testimony yesterday he said that
the whole thing was so confused in his mind that he could not make head or tail
out of it.
Mr. ROBB. If that is the case, then I don't think Mr. Garrison ought to attempt
to refresh the recollection of a witness by quoting General Groves.
The WITNESS. Can I say this, or volunteer it? Last night it was around 11
o'clock when I left here and got back to the hotel room when I called General
Groves on the telephone for the purpose of rehashing this very thing. As a
result of my conversation with him, I am no further informed than I testified
to. That is all I can say.
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. Is it possible that General Groves told you that he thought it was Frank
rather than that it was Frank?
A. Yes ; it is possible. I say it is possible because it would have been char-
acteristic of the General. The General had superb judgment in that regard.
He was frightenlngly right an immense number of times in making such judg-
ments. It is possible. It would have been characteristic of M™,
Q. Do you know of any other instance in which Dr. Oppenheimer was ap-
proached by anybody on the subject of obtaining information of improper
character?
A. No.
Q. I dont mean to imply that in this particular interview about Chevalier
about which he has testified that Chevalier asked him for information. He has
testified to the contrary. I didn't mean to inrply my my question any doubt as
to that testimony.
What I merely wanted to ask you is whether in your surveillance of him out-
side of the project, did you have any occasion or did any approach to Mm come
to your knowledge on the part of anybody with respect to the subject of obtaining
information outside of what we are talking about?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Do you know whether Dr. Oppenheimer requested the employment of his
brother, Frank, on the project?
A. No; I don't know. My impression is that Frank was already on it when
the Army took over, but I would not be sure about that.
Q. You had many interviews with both Dr. Oppenheimer and his wife during
the course of the work on the project?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you endeavor in these interviews to form the most accurate and
thorough going judgment possible as to his political orientation? I will come to
Mrs. Oppenheimer later. Did you search to find out what you could about his
attachment or lack of attachment to Communist ideology?
A. Yes, sir; that was the purpose of my talks with htm. I was working on
that all the time.
Q. What judgment did you form as to his political convictions at this time,
that it, at the time of the project?
266
9. May I qualify your question? You asked me as to my Judgment as to his
political convictions. I formed the judgment that he was not a Communist.
Q. How did you form that Judgment?
A. I would like to continue with that. My working definition of a Communist
is a person who is more loyal to Russia than to the United States. That is the
definition I formed very early during my work on the Communist problem in the
War Department, and which I still think is a sound definition. You will note
that has nothing to do with political ideas.
Unquestionably Dr. Oppenheimer was what we would characterize— tnd as
hide bound a Republican as myself characterizes— as extremely liberal, not to
say radical. Unfortunately, in this problem of determining who is and who is
not a Communist, determining who is loyal and who is not, the signs which point
the way to persons to be investigated or to check on are very frequently political
liberalism of an extreme kind. The difficult judgment is to distinguish between
the person whose views are political and the person who is a Communist, because
communism is not a political thing at all*
Q. You had an extensive experience in that kind of interrogation throughout
the war, did you?
A. Yes, sir; I certainly did.
Q. Did you have enough experience at it to feel as confident as men can be
about their judgments?
A. I believe so. I was a lot younger then than I am now, and I am sure I
had more confidence in my judgment then than I have now.
Q. About many things?
A. About many things. But my job in the War Department and up until the
time I officially moved over to the atomic bomb project and severed all con-
nections with the War Department in January 1944, was primarily concerned
with the formation of judgment as to who were or were not Communists in the
loyalty sense in the Army.
Q. You were satisfied on the basis of these interrogations and of all that yon
knew about Dr. Oppenheimer from surveillance and all other sources that he was
not a Communist as you have defined one in the sense of being more loyal to
Russia than to the United States?
A. Yes.
Q. You were satisfied that he was a loyal American citizen?
A. Yes.
Q. Putting the Interests of his country first?
A. I believed that.
Q. Did you form the same judgment about Mrs. Oppenheimer?
A. Yes, in a different sense. Mrs. Oppenheimer, I believed then had unques-
tionably been either a member of the Communist Party or so dose to it as to be
substantially the same thing. Her first husband had been
Q. You say "had been." When?
A. In the thirties, as I recall. As I recall, she had been an organizer out In
Ohio somewhere during the depression. Her first husband had been— what is
his name?
Q. Ballet
A. DaUet Had been in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade during the Spanish
War. That was always, particularly those who went in early and stayed long,
a pretty fair index of then current attitude of people. Her background was not
good. For that reason I took as many occasions as I could to talk to Mrs.
Oppenheimer.
As I recall Mrs. Oppenheimer's background and associations subsequent to
the thirties, they had not been different from that of Dr. Oppenheimer— or
materially different— from that of Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mrs. Oppenheimer impressed me as a strong woman with strong convictions.
She impressed me as the type of person who could have been, and I could see
she certainly was, a Communist. It requires a very strong person to be a real
Communist.
I formed the conviction over many interviews with her and many discussions
with her that she had formed the conviction that Dr. Oppenheimer was the most
Important thing in her life and that his future required that he stay away from
Communist associations and associations with people of that ilk.
It was my belief that her strength of character— I thin* strength of char-
acter is the wrong word — her strength of will was a powerful influence in keeping
Dr. Oppenheimer away from, what we would regard as dangerous associations.
Q. Did you have any doubt as to her own disassodation from the Communist
Party?
267
A. No; I don't think I did.
?" £?dJ? h®rPrior disassociation from the party before coming to the project?
A. inat is right.
9* *°* r?Sard?d Mrs. Oppenheimer on the basis of your interrogation of her
ana all that you knew about her as loyal to the United States of America?
A. Yes ; I did. I want to qualify that by saying that I think— no, I won't
qualify that at all. The answer is yes.
Q. If you had the decision to clear or not to dear Dr. Oppenheimer today,
based upon your experience with him during the war years and up until the
time when your association with him ended, would you do so?
A. J will answer that, yes, based upon the same criteria and standards that
we used then. I am making no attempt to interpret the present law. Those
criteria were loyalty and discretion.
Q. What would you have to say as to his discretion as you saw it?
A. I think it was very good. We always worried a little bit about how much
he talked during his recruitment efforts. Certainly there were times when as a
security officer I would have judged the amount of information that he felt he
had to give to induce somebody to come on to the project to have been indiscreet
That is always a question of judgment and it was in the line of duty, so to speak.
Q. Apart from the problem of recruitment, what would you say?
A, Yes ; I believed him to be discreet. I thought it was indiscreet of him to
visit Miss Tatlock.
Mr. GABEISON. That is all at the moment, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GEAT. Mr. Bobb.
GROSS EXAMINATION
By Mr. KOBB :
Q. As I understand it, Mr. Lansdale, you are not offering any opinion as to
whether or not you would dear Dr. Oppenheimer on the basis of presently
existing criteria?
A. That is a standard that is strange to me. I don't know what it is. If
somebody would interpret it for me— isn't it getting pretty hypothetical?
I believed on the basis of information I had then that Dr. Oppenheimer was
loyal and discreet. I have not changed my mind, although I have no knowledge
of events transpiring since sometime in 1945.
Q. You said that you thought Oppenheimer's discretion was very good, is
that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You had no doubt, did you, that Jean Tatlock was a Communist?
A. She was certainly on our suspect list. I know now that she was a Com-
munist. I cannot recall at the moment whether we were sure she was a Com-
munist at that time.
Q. Did your definition of very good discretion indude spending the nigfcit with
a known Communist woman?
A. No; it didn't. Our impression was that that interest was more romantic
than otherwise, and it is the sole instance that I know of.
Q. Were there some people called Barnett that you knew about on your suspect
list?
A. That name doesn't ring a bell with me.
Q. Were the Berbers on your suspect list?
A. Yes; sir.
Q. High on it?
A. Fairly so ; yes.
Q. Was Dr. Oppenheimer intimate with them?
A. They were on the project at Los Alamos. The social life of that project,
isolated as it was, was very dose. The Serbers were, as I remember, friends
of the Oppenheimers.
Q. They were friends of his?
A. That is my recollection.
Q. Were there some people named Morrison on your suspect list?
A, Yes.
Q. High on it?
A. Phillip Morrison?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I think so. I don't think he was out at Los Alamos. Was he?
Q. Yes ; I believe he was. Were they also good friends of the Oppenheimers?
A. That I don't recall May I stop? I am not supposed to interrogate the
interrogator, am I?
268
Q. Was tnere a man named David Hawkins on your suspect list?
A. Yes; I believe so in a mild sort of way. I mean he was one of those per-
sons we felt uneasy about without having anything definite.
Q. You have since learned that Hawkins had been a Communist?
A. From what I read in the newspapers.
Q. Was he an intimate of Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I don't now recall him as being. I know he came out to the project for
personnel work.
Q. Wasn't he sort of Dr. Oppenheimer's legman and assistant?
A. My recollection was that David Hawkins was regarded as extremely im-
portant to the recruitment program which was one of Dr. Oppenheimer's primary
responsibilities and in that sense, yes.
Q. He was working right close to Dr. Oppenheimer.
A. So far as recruitment is concerned, that is my recollection.
Q. Were there some people named Woodward on your suspect list?
A. I' believe so, although I remember nothing more about them.
Q. By the way, when you say suspect list, you mean people who were suspected
of being Communists or close to Communists?
A. Or that we were uneasy about it Perhaps suspect list should be security
list
Q. Yes.
A. People concerning whom we took more or less risk on, depending on the
circumstances and the times.
Q. Were the Woodwards intimates of Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. As I told you, I remember the name. I remember nothing more about them
now. Perhaps if you could recall some instance to me, I would remember.
Q. Was a man named Lomanitz on your suspect list?
A. Oh, very much.
Q. He was one of your top suspects, wasn't he?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was he dose to Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I don't recollect that he was. My recollection of Rossi Lomanitz is that
he was a student of Dr. Oppenheimer. He was at the Radiation Laboratory until
we had him inducted into the Army and thus got M™ off the project
Q. Do you recall Dr. Oppenheimer protesting about his induction?
A. I recall Dr. Oppenheimer raising a question about it Indeed if I recall
that was the occasion of at least one of my talks with Dr. Oppenheimer, that is,
to ask him "for goodness sake to lay off Lomanitz and stop raising questions
about it"
Q. In other words, he had been raising questions about it?
A. My recollection was that he had. Lomanitz was regarded as a brilliant
young man and the people like Earnest Lawrence and Dr. Oppenheimer did not
want to lose him. I remember Earnest Lawrence yelled and screamed louder
than anybody else about us taking Lomanitz away from Mm.
Q. Was a ma" named Bohm on your list?
A. Yes.
Q. Was he a friend of Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I have no recollection about that. He also came from Barkeley. I assume
Dr. Oppenheimer must have known him.
Q. Was a man named Weinberg on your suspect list?
A, Bight at the top of the list
Q. In fact, Weinberg gave information to Steve Nelson, didn't he?
A. That is our belief. We proved to our satisfaction that he gave information
to Store Nelson for money.
Q. What was the relationship between him and Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. My recollection is about the same as Lomanitz,
Q. Now, Mr. Lansdale, when did you come into the Army?
A. May 1041.
Q. What had been your expereince prior to going into the Army?
A. Lawyer.
Q. How old were you then, sir?
A. I was born in 1912. 29, wasn't it?
Q. Had you had any previous experience as a security officer or investigator?
A. No, sir, not other than in connection with trying law suits. I was a trial
lawyer. . .
Q. In other words, you were not a professional?
A. I certainly was not
269
Q. How long had you been in the Army before yon went on to this security
work?
A. About S minutes.
Q. What was your rank when you started out?
A. First Lieutenant I was a reserve officer in the field artillery by reason of
graduation from VMI.
Q. After your interview of September 12, 1943, with Dr. Oppeuheimer did you
submit a copy of that to General Groves?
A. The record so shows. I have no present recollection of it.
Q. You have no doubt that you did?
A. I have no doubt that I did.
Q. Did you have any doubt that prior to doing that you read it over to make
sure it was an accurate reflection of what had been said in your interview?
A. I have no doubt that I read it over and I would have made any changes
that I felt were erroneous in substance, but as I remember that was a recording.
I would have made no attempt to correct English or reconstruct garbled portions.
Q. But had you found anything in there which was not in accord with what had
been said? In other words, had the stenographer not correctly transcribed the
recording, you would certainly have made the correction, would you not?
A. I can only say I am sure I would. We are reconstructing now. I have no
present recollection.
Q. I don't expect you to recall now independently, Mr. Lansdale. But as your
past memory recorded, you have no doubt that transcript was accurate, do you?
A. No ; I really don't
Q. Mr. Garrison asked you some questions about the scientific mind in relation
to that interview that you had with Dr. Oppenheimer and you responded, I think,
that Dr. Oppenheimer's attitude might well have been a manifestation of the
workings of a scientific mind; is that correct?
A. Oh, yes; of which I came up against many examples.
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer has testified here before this board that he lied to you
in that interview. You would not say that lying was one of the manifestations
of a scientific mind, would you?
A. Not necessarily, no.
Q. It is not a characteristic
A. It was certainly a characteristic to decide that I didn't need to have
certain information.
Q. No. But the question is, Mr. Lansdale, you would not say that scientists
as a group are liars, would you?
A. No. I don't think persons a? a group are liars.
Q. No.
A. I certainly can't over emphasize, however, the extremely frustrating, almost
maddening, let me say, tendency of our more brilliant people to extend in their
own mind their competence and independence of decision in fields in which they
have no competence.
Q. You were undertaking at the time you interviewed Dr. Qppenheimer to
investigate what you believed to be a very serious attempt at espionage, it
that right?
A. Yes. Let me put it this way. No. "Yes" is a fair answer.
Q. Ayifl Dr. Oppenheimer*s refusal to give you the Information that you asked
him for was frustrating to you?
A. Oh ; certainly.
Q. You felt that it seriously impeded your investigation, didn't you?
A. Certainly. But he wasn't the first one that impeded my investigation, nor
the last
Q. Mr. Lansdale, do you have any predisposition or feeling that you want
to defend Dr. Oppenheimer here?
A. I have been trying to analyze my own feelings on that
Q. I notice you volunteered that last remark, and I wondered why.
A. I know, and it was probably a mistake. I have attempted as nearly as
I can— as nearly as It is possible—to be objective.
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I do feel strongly that Dr. Oppenheimer at least to the extent of my
knowledge is loyal. I am extremely disturbed by the current hysteria of the
times of which this seems to be a manifestation.
Q. You think this inquiry is a manifestation of hysteria?
A. I think
Q. Yes or no?
270
A. I won't answer that question "Yes" or "No." If you are tending to be that
way— if you will let me continue, I will be glad to answer your question.
Q. All right.
A. I thiflfr that the hysteria of the times over communism is extremely
dangerous. I can only illustrate it by another dangerous attitude which was
going on at the same time we were worrying about Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty.
At the same time over in the War Department I was being subjected to
pressure from military superiors, from the White House and from every other
place because I dared to stop the commissioning of a group of 15 or 20 undoubted
Communists. I was being vilified, being reviewed and rereviewed by boards
because of my efforts to get Communists out of the Army and being frustrated
by the blind, naive attitude of Mrs. Eoosevelt and those around her in the White
House, which resulted in serious and extreme damage to this country.
We are going through today the other extreme of the pendulum, which is in
my Judgment equally dangerous. The idea of what we are now doing, what
so many people are now doing, are looking at events that transpired in 1940
and prior in the light of present feeling rather than in the light of the feeling
existing then.
Now, do I tMttir this inquiry is a manifestation of hysteria? No. I think
the fact that so much doubt and so much — let me put it this way. I think the
fact that associations in 1940 are regarded with the same seriousness that
similar associations would be regarded today is a manifestation of hysteria.
Q. Now, Mr. Lansdale, it is true, is it not —
A. By golly, I stood up in front of General McNary then Deputy Chief of Staff
of the Army and had him tell me that I was ruining peoples' careers and doing
damage to the Army because I had stopped the commissioning of the political
commissar of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, and the guy was later commissioned
on direct orders from the White House.
That stuff that went on did incalculable damage to this country, and not the
rehashing of this stuff in 1940. That is what I mean by hysteria.
Q. How do you know what this board is doing is rehashing old stuff?
A. I don't know. That is what I have been
Q. That is what?
A. That is all that can be had from me because that is all I know.
Q. Mr. Lansdale, it is true, is it not, that the security officers down the line
below you in the Army hierarchy were unanimous in their opposition to the
clearance of Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Virtually so, yes. I say virtually so because I cannot precisely now recall
that it was unanimous. Certainly Captain Calvert— I believe he was then a
captain, who was then the security officer — I am quite certain recommended
against it. He was Colonel Nichols' security officer. I am quite certain Colonel
Pashfeltso. I should think that the answer was yes.
Let me add this : That had I been confined to the bare record, I might possibly
have reached the same conclusion. In other words, if Dr. Oppenheimer had
not been as important as he was, I would certainly have stopped with the record
and used my every endeavor to persuade the General that Dr. Oppenheimer
ought to be dispensed with.
However, in view of his importance to the project we made a tremendous effort
to reach a settled conclusion in our own minds. At least I did, and I am sure
the General did.
Q. You mean if he had not been an important figure you would Just have dis-
carded him as a nubbin and gone on to something else?
A. Oh, absolutely.
Q. Did you receive reports from the security officers at Los Alamos and
Berkeley?
A. I undoubtedly received many reports from them. Let me say this. Our
organization administratively was that all of those reports went to Oak JEtidge
which was the district engineer's office — first to New York and then when they
moved to Oak Ridge, there. All of those reports did not come up to me. How-
ever, from Los Alamos they all came directly to me because we held that more
or less outside of the ordinary course of administration.
Q. By the way, Mr. Lansdale, you said a little while ago that you now believed
your interview of September 12 took place in the office of General Groves. How
did you have your memory refreshed about that ?
A. Well, by this process. My memory was that it was in Washington. My
memory was clear on that. It was reported to me that Mrs. O'Leary, who .was
the general secretary, seeing that transcript, believed that ijt lopfcefl, like her
271
typing. We had a concealed microphone in the General's office which we had set
up for these purposes.
Dr. Oppenheimer tells me his recollection is that it was in the General's office.
He recalled to my mind that I had met him at the train and gone up with him
and that I clearly rememher.
That is how I reconstruct it. It certainly happened either there or in my office
at the Pentagon.
Q. When did Dr. Oppenheimer tell you that?
A. Last night
Q. He remembered that?
A. He remembered that it had occurred in General Grove's office.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I would be an hour or so more in examining Mr.
Lansdale. I see that it is almost 3 : 30, the time that the board indicated it
planned to recess. However, I am at the disposal of the board.
The WITNESS. It is pretty important that I get through today.
Mr. ROBB. I am sure you realize there are some things that are pretty important
to go over.
The WITNESS. Certainly. I am at your disposal and prepared to go into the
night or return at a later date, but I have some court commitments for the rest
of next week.
Mr. GRAY. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. GRAY. Let us break now for 5 minutes.
(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)
Mr. GRAY. Will you proceed?
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Mr. Lansdale, in referring to the scientific mind, were you basing your
appraisal of a scientific mind upon your experience with that mind as repre-
sented by people like Lomanitz, Bohm, and Weinberg?
A. No. People like Ernest Lawrence and Fermi and Oppenheimer, and A. H.
Compton, and the numerous people in the Metallurgical Laboratory.
Q. Karl Compton?
A. Karl Compton I had very little contact with.
Q. Mr. Lansdale, I want to show you a memorandum dated September 2, 1943,
entitled, "Subject : J. R. Oppenheimer. Memorandum for Lt. Col. Pash, and a
covering memorandum from Colonel Pash to you, signed P. de S., dated Septem-
ber 6, and ask you if that came to you in your official capacity?
A. Yes, my initials are on it, also General Groves' initials. I have no present
recollection, you understand, of it
Q. I understand.
A. But unquestionably it did.
Mr. GARRISON. May we see that?
Mr. ROBB. Yes.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. You have no doubt that you gave consideration to that memorandum in
your appraisal of Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I didn't examine the content of it
Mr. ROBB. Could the witness see the memorandum, please, Mr. Garrison. You
are going to have plenty of time to look at it. I am trying to get along here
in a hurry, Mr. Garrison.
Mr. GARRISON. I understand.
The WITNESS. Oh, yes, I am quite sure.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Whowas"P.deS."?
A. That undoubtedly was Peer de Silva, who for some period of time, and I
assume during this time, was security officer at Los Alamos.
Q. Was he a regular Army officer?
A. That is right. I believe he was a first lieutenant. He may have been a
second lieutenant.
Q. He was afterward Colonel de Silva.
A. That I don't know.
Q. He was a professional ; was he not?
A. Oh, yes. He was a professional soldier. He was not a professional se-
curity officer, if that is the implication, except that we were all professionals.
803313—64 18
272
•Q. He was certainly more of a professional than you were ; wasn't he, Colonel?
A. In what field?
Q. The field he was working in, security.
A. No.
Q. No?
A. No.
Q. He was a graduate of West Point ; wasn't he?
A. Certainly. I am a graduate of VMI, too. You want to fight about that?
Q. No, sir, I don't want to fight with you. I will show you a memorandum
dated August 12, 1943, memorandum for General Groves, Subject : J. R. Oppen-
heimer; signed John Lansdale. Did you write that memorandum?
A. That is unquestionably my signature. Let me read it
Mr. ROBB. May we go off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
The WITNESS. Yes, I not only wrote this memorandum ; I now recall the inter-
view. As a matter of fact, this is the
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. You are talking now about the memorandum of what?
A. Memorandum dated August 12, 1943, from me to General Groves, con-
cerning J. R. Oppenheimer. This appears to be when I went out and made
a trip to quiet people down about Lomanitz. We were having a great deal of
trouble with Ernest Lawrence about taking Lomanitz away from him. Then
Dr. Oppenheimer got in the picture, and I just went out to quiet things down.
Q. Colonel, I detect a slight tendency on your part to blame Lawrence for
Lomanitz exclusively. Isn't it a fact that Dr. Oppenheimer was also very much
exercised about Lomanitz?
A. I don't recall that he was exercised about Lomanitz — yes, he was exer-
cised about Lomanitz. We got word through Peer de Silva as I recall that
Oppenheimer was raising a question about us permitting Lomanitz to be in-
ducted into the Army. I suspect he didn't know we were moving heaven and
earth to get him inducted. Our main row with Lawrence, we had more trouble
with Ernest Lawrence about personnel than any four other people put together.
Q. I will show you a photostat of a memorandum dated September 14, 1943,
a memorandum for the file, subject "Discussion by General Groves and Dr.
Oppenheimer," which bears the typewritten signature "John Lansdale, Jr., Lt.
Col., Field Artillery." Did you write that memorandum?
A. I unquestionably did. Unquestionably I did write it.
Q. Does that memorandum or can you say with assurance that that memo-
randum accurately reflects that you had been told by General Groves about a
discussion which he had had about Oppenheimer?
A. Of course not. All I can say is that I would have attempted as accurately
as I could to record the substance of our conversation.
Q. That is what I mean.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, I really am getting disturbed about the problem
we face of not knowing really what these questions are about. We haven't been
supplied with copies of these.
Mr. ROBB. I will hand it to you right now.
Mr. GABBISON. If we can stop for a minute while we read them— I don't want
to delay matters, but I have to protect my client as a lawyer.
Mr. ROBB. That is right. I have plenty of time.
Mr. GBAY. You will have an opportunity to read them. As I understand the
questions which Mr. Robb has put they have been questions for identification,
rather than substance.
Mr. GAKRISON. He is beginning to ask him questions about them, and I haven't
the slightest idea what is in them.
Mr. GBAY. You have them before you now.
Mr. ROBB. You have them all now ; have you not?
Mr. GABBISON. There is an awful lot to read, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. Do you propose to ask questions about the contents ot the
memoranda?
Mr. ROBB. No.
Mr. GABBISON. We may ourselves wish to ask questions now that they have
been introduced. You have asked to put them all into the record instead of
reading them in, off the record, with knowledge that Colonel Lansdale apparently
can come back next week.
Mr. ROBB. I don't know whether lie can or not You called him here. I didn't
him.
273
Mr. OARRISON. Yes, it is your request to put them in the record without read-
ing them.
Mr. ROBB. Do you want me to read them into the record and keep Colonel
Lansdale here? I will do it.
Mr. GRAY. Just a minute. We will read them into the record.
Mr. GAEEISON. I think we should.
Mr. ROBB. It is entirely all right with me. I am trying to accommodate Mr.
Lansdale.
Mr. GRAY. The record will show at this point that Mr. Morgan, a member of
the board, is forced to leave the proceedings.
Mr. GABBISON. Not permanently.
Mr. GRAY. No.
(Mr. Morgan left the room.)
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, just for the sake of regularity even for 3
minutes, do you think it wise to proceed with a board member absent? There
may be questions on this
Mr. GRAY. I take it that he will have the record before him, or the record will
be available to him. He is leaving town.
Mr. GARRISON. He is not coming back now.
Mr. GRAY. No, he is not coming back this afternoon. The board is trying to
accommodate you and your witness. We can easily adjourn at this time and ask
Mr. Lansdale to come back Monday.
Mr. GARRISON. We were told, Mr. Chairman, that you were going to adjourn
at 3 :30 this afternoon.
Mr. ROBB. And we sat overtime to accommodate ^Mr. Lansdale.
Mr. Chairman, it is quite obvious that it is going to take me I don't know how
long to read these memoranda into the record, and it is now quarter of four, and
I don't see any possibility of finishing with Colonel Lansdale this afternoon.
Mr. GRAY. Certainly as far as Mr. Morgan's absence is concerned, it cannot
be affected by reading memoranda into the record which he could read. There
is no point in his hearing the memoranda. I am sure of that So- would you
proceed?
Mr. ROBB. Yes, sir. I will read the first memorandum that I showed Colonel
Lansdale.
"HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY,
"OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2,
"Presidio of San Francisco, OaUf.
"In reply refer to: (GIB) September 6, 1943, Subject: J. R. Oppenheimer.
"To: Lt. Col. John Lansdale, Jr., room 2C 654 Pentagon Bunding, Wash-
ington, D. C.
"1. Enclosed is a report on the evaluation of J. B. Oppenheimer, prepared in
this office by Capt Peter deSilva, now engaged in evaluation of the DSM project
"2. This Office is still of the opinion that Oppenheimer is not to be fully trusted
and that his loyalty to a Nation is divided. It is believed that the only undivided
loyalty that he can give is to science and it is strongly felt that if in his position
the Soviet Government could offer more for the advancement of his scientific
cause he would select that Government as the one -to which he would express
his loyalty.
"8. This Office does not intend to evaluate the importance or worth of Dr.
Oppenheimer as a scientist on the project. It is the responsibility of this Office
to evaluate fri*n from any possible subversive angle. Because of this the enclosed
report is being submitted for your information.
" ( Signed) "Boris T. Pash.
"BORIS T. PASH,
"Lt. Col. M . I., Chief, Counter Intelliffence Branch,.
"For the A C of S. G-2."
"HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY,
"OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2,
"Presidio of San Francisco, CaUf.
"In reply refer to: (CIB) September 2, 1943, Memorandum for: Lt Col.
B T. Pash
'"Subject : J. B. Oppenheimer.
"1. With regard to recent developments in the espionage case centering about
the DSM project, the part played by J. B. Oppenheimer is believed to take
274
on a mare vital significance than has heretofore been apparent. Briefly, It may
be said that subject has Just recently brought himself to the fore by volunteering
scraps of Information which are of vital Interest to the Investigation being
conducted by this Office. In conversation with Lt. L. E. Johnson, he had said
that he had good reason to suspect that the Soviet Union was attempting to
secure information about the project. In a subsequent conversation with Lt.
CoL Pash, subject elaborated on the matter and disclosed that about 4 months
ago a Shell Development employee, one Eltenton, on behalf of a Soviet consular
attache1, had contacted a U. 0. professor who in turn had attempted, on at least
three occasions, to secure sources of information within the project who would
transmit the information to Eltenton, who in turn would supply it to the Soviet
consular agent, all to be done Informally in order to circumvent a State Depart-
ment policy of not cooperating with the Soviet Union, which policy Is influenced
by certain unnamed State Department officials who were supposed to be anti-
Soviet and who would not allow such action to be taken openly. Oppenheimer
claims he does not condone such methods, and is satisfied that no information
was passed by those channels. He did not disclose the name of the professor,
as he thought that such an action would be unethical and would merely disturb
some of his associates who were in no way guilty of any wrongdoing. Roughly,
the above has been the extent of Oppenheimer's most recent activity.
"2. The writer wishes to go on record as saying that J. R. Oppenheimer
is playing a key part in the attempts of the Soviet Union to secure, by espionage,
highly secret information which is vital to the security of the United States. An
attempt will be made to show the reasons for the above statement. It has been
known, since March 29, 1948, that an overt act of espionage was committed by the
Soviet Union. Subject's statements indicate that another attempt has been
made, through Eltenton, Oppenheimer, himself having a rather lengthy record
of Communist sympathy and activity, has actively engaged in the development
of a secret project. Most of his friends and professional associates are Com-
munists or Communist sympathizers. He himself has gone on record as saying
on two occasions, to Lieutenant Colonel Lansdale and to Lieutenant Colonel
Pash, that Communist activity on the part of a project employee is not com-
patible with the security necessary to the project To quote him, "and that Is
the reason I feel quite strongly that association with the Communist movement
is not compatible with the Job on a secret war project, it is just that two loyalties
cannot go." To Lieutenant Colonel Lansdale, he said that he knew that two
Los Alamos employees had at one time been Communists, but that he was
satisfied that they no longer were. Yet during the long period during which
he has been In charge of the project, and in spite of the fact that he is perfectly
competent to recognize the Communist attitude and philosophy, and further in
spite of the fact that he, by choice as well as by professional necessity, is close
to his key associates, and again In spite of the. fact that he claims, in effect,
not to feel confident of the loyalty of a Communist— in spite of all this, Oppen-
heimer has allowed a tight clique of known Communists or Communist sympa-
thizers to grow up about him within the project, until they comprise a large
proportion of the key personnel In whose hands the success and security of
the project is entrusted. In the opinion of this officer, Oppenheimer either must
be Incredibly naive and almost childlike in his sense of reality, or he himself is
extremely clever and disloyal. The former possibility is not borne out in the
opinion of the officers who 'have spoken with him at length.
"3. To go further, the supposition will be raised that subject has acted reason-
ably, according to his own viewpoint, and has voluntarily come forward and
preferred valuable information (re Eltenton, etc.). To examine the background
for such an action we find several incidents which may have had an influence
on his action. First, the news of Lornanitz's cancellation of deferment was made
known to Oppenheimer, together with the surmise, on Lomanitz's part, that his
(Lomanitz's) radical activities had been investigated. Shortly thereafter, an
officer from the Military Intelligence Service, War Department, called on him
at Los Alamos. Both of the above actions were necessary and desirable, but
nevertheless they could not avoid indicating to Oppenheimer that, very prob-
ably, some sort of a general investigation, more extensive than a routine security
check, was under way. If he is disloyal, as believed by the writer, the most
obvious and natural move would have been exactly what he actually did do —
on his next trip to Berkeley he let it drop to Lieutenant Johnson the piece of
information Indicating knowledge of an attempt at espionage, knowing that he
would subsequently be contacted for further details by someone probably con-
nected with the Investigation. As it was absolutely necessary and such contact
was made, whereupon subject elaborated on the Incident, but in such a manner
275
f
as to indicate that there was nothing seriously wrong, and never once indicating
that espionage might have been involved.
"Although he had every opportunity to do so, he did not mention the fact that
Steve Nelson visited him and solicited cooperation; instead, he revealed the
channel of communication in which Eltenton played a part. He declined to name
the professor involved, possibly intending to dole out that bit of information
at a later date. He determined very definitely that Military Intelligence was
conducting an investigation, and chose to cooperate to a certain extent, dis-
closing only what he desired to and relying on this apparent spirit of co-
operation, together with his importance to the project, to protect himself. It
is not inconceivable that he could, by intelligent manipulation, actually exercise
a strong control over the extent and direction of the investigation. Add to the
above proposition the fact that Oppenheimer, until alerted to the fact that an
investigation was in progress, made absolutely no attempt to inform any
responsible authority of the incidents which he definitely knew to have occurred
and which he claims, he did not approve. To go further, he apparently made no
attempt to resolve, for his own conscience and satisfaction, any doubts con-
cerning the Communist affiliations of some of his employees whom he knew
to have been so affiliated at one time. At no time, to the knowledge of this
officer, has Oppenheimer attempted, in any way, to report any such affiliation,
known or suspected, for the information of the Army, nor has he taken anyone
into his confidence concerning his views on the subject. None of this was done
until it became obvious to him that an investigation was being conducted,
and that unless he made the first move, he would ultimately be questioned,
and would not be in the favorable position of having offered the information.
"4. It is the opinion of this officer that Oppenheimer is deeply concerned with
gaining a worldwide reputation as a scientist, and a place in history, as a
result of the DSM project. It is also believed that the Army is in the position
of being able to allow him to do so or to destroy his name, reputation, and
career, if it should choose to do so. Such a possibility, if strongly presented to
fr*™, would possibly give him a different view of his position with respect to
the Army, which has been, heretofore, one in which he has been dominant
because of bis supposed essentiality. If his attitude should be changed by such
an action, a more wholesome and loyal attitude might, in turn, be injected into
the lower echelons of employees. It is not impossible that a thorough review
of the general opinion holding Oppenheimer irreplaceable might result in lending
strength to the argument that he is a citizen working for the United States,
in this case represented by the War Department, and not an individual who
cannot be held or restricted, while continuing independent scientific endeavor,
to the normal definition of loyalty to his country.
"(Signed) P. DBS."
I wonder if Mr. Rolander might spell me on this reading, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. Very well. Would you identify it?
Mr. ROLAOTKER, This memorandum is dated August 12, 1943.
"WAR DEPARTMENT,
"MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE,
"Washington.
"Memorandum for General Groves :
"Subject: J. R. Oppenheimer.
"1. Upon a recent visit to Los Alamos this officer had an opportunity for
some private discussion with J. R. Oppenheimer on matters of general interest.
During the course of this discussion the subject of the withdrawal of the
deferment of G. R. Lomanitz came up. Mr. Oppenheimer stated that his
interest in Lomanitz was purely scientific. He stated that Lomanitz was about
to be made a group leader, and that he was engaged upon a type of work with
which only 2 other persons were thoroughly familiar, and these 2 persons are
now working for Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer believed that if Lomanitz's services
were lost, B. 0. Lawrence would request Oppenheimer to release one of the
latter's men for work at Berkeley. This Oppenheimer is unwilling to do, and
wishes to avoid any issue in this respect with Lawrence.
"2. Oppenheimer stated that he knew very little about Lomanitz and had not,
except upon one occasion, had any relationship with him other than that of
professor and student, and, subsequently, employer and employee on the project
Oppenheimer stated that at the time he asked Lomanitz to come on the project,
Lomanitz visited Oppenheimer at his home and did what Oppenheimer character-
ized as 'a good deal of soul searching/ Oppenheimer stated that he meant by
this that Lomanitz was of the opinion that a very terrible weapon was being
276
developed, and was fearful that there would not be adequate international
control of this weapon. Furthermore, Lomanitz wondered whether his sense
of duty did not require him to make a more direct contribution to the war effort
by joining the Army or working in the shipping yards or some similar establish-
ment Oppenheimer stated that he gave Lomanitz 'a good talking to1 and told
him very definitely and strongly that the project was important to the war
effort, and that it must have his complete loyalty. Oppenheimer further stated
that he told Lomanitz that he must forego all political activity if he came on to
the project Oppenheimer stated that he put this very strongly. He had previ-
ously stated that he knew that Lomanitz had been very much of a Bed as a
boy when he first came to the University of California, but he professed to have
no knowledge of his activities.
"3. Oppenheimer stated that 2 days later Lomanitz told him that he wanted
to go onto the project, and accepted all of the conditions laid down by Oppen-
heimer. Oppenheimer was curious as to why we were taking the action that we
did, and also wondering if after Lomanitz was inducted into the Army he could
not be returned to the project either as a Reserve officer or as a soldier.
"4. This officer told Dr. Oppenheimer that it was believed to be necessary to
avoid making any further requests for deferment for Lomanitz because he had
been guilty of indiscretions which could not be overlooked or condoned. This
officer stated that these had nothing to do with any political activity. Oppen-
heimer was further told, however, that since the occurrence of the indiscretion
upon which action was based, steps have been taken to determine rather com-
pletely Lomanitz's activities, and that it could be said that in the course of
this investigation it had been learned that Lomanitz had not ceased his political
activities. Oppenheimer said 'that makes me mad.'
"5. There then ensued a general discussion of the Communist Party. Oppen-
heimer was told that from a military intelligence standpoint we were quite
unconcerned with a man's political or social beliefs, and we were only concerned
with preventing the transmission of classified information to unauthorized
persons, wherever that person's loyalties might lie, or whatever his social,
political, or religious beliefs might be. He we told that the underlying princi-
ples behind all of our security measures were that the United States so far
as the development of any device or technique was concerned, was the sole
party interested, although the benefit of the employment of any devices would,
of course, redound to the benefit of all persons on the same side as this country.
"6. Oppenheimer concurred in the general principles stated, but stated that
he did not agree with us with respect to the Communist Party. He stated that
he did not want anybody working for him on the project that was a member of
the Communist Party. He stated that the reason for that was that 'one always
had a question of divided loyalty.' He stated that the discipline of the Com-
munist Party was very severe and was not compatible with complete loyalty to
the project. He made it clear he was not referring to people who had been mem-
bers of the Communist Party, stating that he knew several now at Los Alamos
who had been members. He was referring only to present membership in the
Communist Party.
"7. A general discussion then ensued in which Oppenheimer deplored the
manner in which the Russians had let their people 'down in France and in the
United States.'
"7a. The opportunity to secure the names of the former members of the party
known to Oppenheimer did not present itself, due to the entrance of a third
party.
"Note: J. R. Oppenheimer gave every appearance of sincerity in this discus-
sion. He was, however, extremely subtle in his allusions, and there was a
good deal of delicacy evidenced both by this offtcer and by Dr. Oppenheimer
in pursuing this discussion. Upon reviewing the discussion after leaving Dr.
Oppenheimer, this officer came to the conclusion that what Dr. Oppenheimer
was trying to convey was, in the case of Lomanitz, that Lomanitz had been wor-
ried about his obligations to the party, and that Oppenheimer had told him
that he must give up the party if he came on the project. This officer also
had the definite impression that Oppenheimer was trying to indicate that he
had been a member of the party, and had definitely severed his connections upon
engaging in this work. On the whole, it seemed that Oppenheimer, in a rather
subtle way, was anxious to indicate to this officer his position in that regard.
" ( Signed) JOHN LANSDALB, Jr.,
"Lieutenant Colonel, Field Artillery, OUef, Review Bremen, CIG, MIS,
"(Far the A. O. of S., G-2)."
277
The next communication is dated September 14, 1943.
"Memorandum for the file.
"Subject: Discussion by General Groves and Dr. Oppenheimer.
"1. During a recent train ride between Cheyenne and Chicago, General Groves
and Dr. Oppenheimer had a long discussion which covered in substance the fol-
lowing matters:
11 (a) Dr. Oppenheimer stated that because he felt responsible for the em-
ployment of Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz, and had secured a promise from him as
a condition of employment to cease all outside activities and particularly those
of a political nature, he wanted to have a talk with him. While Oppenheimer
did not know the cause of objection by the Army to Lomanitz he did know that
he had been indiscreet and that he was still engaged in political activities. Dr.
Oppenheimer said that the interview with Lomanitz was very unsatisfactory*
and that Lomanitz was defiant. Oppenheimer was sorry that he had ever had
anything to do with him, and he did not desire any further connection with him.
"(&) Oppenheimer also had a talk with Joseph Weinberg and David Bohm.
This interview was sought by the latter two persons. They stated to Oppen-
heimer that they were disturbed by the evident pressure being brought to bear
to force the induction of Lomanitz into the Army, and that inasmuch as they
were close to Lomanitz and interested in union activities they wanted Oppen-
heimer's advice as to whether they should resign their positions and seek
employment elsewhere where their talents would be more appreciated.
"c. Oppenheimber told them that if they had continued to adhere to the promise
made by them to him that they would cease all political activities, including Com-
munist Party activities, then they had nothing to fear. Oppenheimer called E. O.
Lawrence in at this point and secured from Lawrence confirmation of his previous
statements. Dr. Oppenheimer stated at one point that Weinberg had expected
to go to site Y but that it was never his (Oppenheimer's) intention to have him
there.
"d. Some discussion was had about Dr. Oppenheimer's previous relations to
Colonel Pash and Lieutenant Johnson about the Soviet attempt to secure informa-
tion which had come to Oppenheimer's attention some time ago. Oppenheimer's
attitude was that he would give the name of the intermediate contact at the
University of California if pressed to do so, and told by General Groves that we
had to have it, but that he did not want to do so because he did not believe that
any further contacts had been made and was confident that the contacts that
had been with the project had not produced any information. He intimated
further that it was a question of getting friends of his into difficulties and causing
unnecessary troubles when no useful purpose could be served. In this con-
nection it should be noted that General Groves asked Oppenheimer generally
about several people at the University of California, among whom might be the
contact, which had been supplied to him by Colonel Pash. Among these names
was A. Flannigan, who now appears from subsequent developments to be the con-
tact With respect to Mannigan, Oppenheimer stated that he did not know him
except casually, but that he had the reputation of being a real 'RedV
"Oppenheimer stated that Mrs. Charlotte Serber came from a Communist
family in Philadelphia, and probably at one time had been a Communist herself.
However, he did not think that she was at this time. It is thought that he said
that he had no intimation that Professor Serber was or had ever been connected
with the Communist Party. Oppenheimer reiterated his previous statements
that membership in the Communist Party was incompatible with employment on
the project because of the divided loyalty which it involved. He expressed the
opinion that transmission of information to any outside person or party on the
part of the people on the project would amount to treason.
"/. Oppenheimer categorically stated that he himself was not a Communist
and never had been, but stated that he had probably belonged to every Com-
munist-front organization on the west coast, and signed many petitions concern-
ing matters in which Communists were interested. He stated that while he did
not know, he believed that his brother, Frank Oppenheimer, had at one time been
a member of the Communist Party, but that he did not believe that Frank had
had any connections with the party for some time.
"g. He stated that his wife, Katherine, was born and raised in Germany, was
a first cousin once removed of General Kietel of the German Army and that her
mother had at one time been engaged to marry him and that her family were
still on amicable terms with the Kietel family. He stated, also, that his wife's
first husband had been' killed in Spain while fighting for the Loyalist armies,
278
and that he understood that he had been a 'good guy.1 No opinion was expressed
by Oppenheimer as to whether this first husband had been a Communist.
"JOHN LANSDALE, Jr.,
"Lt. Colonel, Field Artillery, Chief, Review Branch, GIG, MIS."
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I have perhaps a dozen more questions that I should
like to ask Mr. Lansdale. If Mr. Garrison will agree to go ahead in the absence
of Mr. Morgan, I will do so with the Chair's consent. Otherwise I will hold
them up.
Mr. GARRISON. Quite agreeable.
Mr. GRAY. I want to make certain of this now, Mr. Garrison. You raised the
question.
Mr. GARRISON. I did, and I now waive it, Mr. Chairman, in the interest of
proceeding.
Mr. GRAY. All right.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Colonel, you spoke of your surveillance you instituted at Los Alamos and
Berkeley; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Is is not your testimony or your belief, is it, Colonel, that that surveillance
would have prevented the passing of information?
A. No ; it would have, we hoped, detected and provided us with the oppor-
tunity to prevent it.
Q. No surveillance could prevent a man from passing a note to another man
at some time during the 24 hours of the day, could it?
A. No necessarily ; no. Of course not.
. Q. This man David Greenglass that you mentioned was an employee at Los
Alamos?
A. He was in a military organization we called the SED. I cannot recall
what those initials stand for.
Dr. OPPENHEIMER. May I coach the witness? Special Engineer Detection.
The WITNESS. That is correct.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. How long was he there?
A. I don't know. I don't remember. He was in a group of technicians, as
I remember, machinists and the like. We formed this organization due to the
shortage of personnel in order to recruit from the Army people with special
skills that were needed at Los Alamos. All that I recall about David Greenglass
is what I read in the papers or what I heard from Rolander and others during
the Rosenberg trial. He is certainly an example of one we missed.
Q. Yon certainly learned, didn't you, that Greenglass and Fuchs from Los
Alamos had given to the Russians the entire story of our work at Los Alamos,
or substantial portions of it?
A. I certainly learned that they passed information. The characterization as
the whole story or not, I have no
Q. You certainly learned that they passed vital information to the Russians?
A. I certainly learned that they passed a sketch, as I remember, of the
implosion device— is that the right term? All I know is what Rolander told me
in New York.
Q. You learned that subsequently from talking to Mr. Rolander and reading
the newspapers?
A. That is right
Q. You did not learn it while you were the chief security officer?
A. I sure didn't.
Mr. ROBB. That is all. Thank you.
Mr. ROLANDER. Mr. Chairman, may the record indicate that discussions relative
to Greenglass and Rosenberg was during the preparation of the case that was
presented in New York.
The WITNESS. Yes ; the Rosenberg spy trial.
Mr. GRAY. I see. I have a couple of questions.
Do I 'understand that the security measure which were Instituted, that trips
away from Los Alamos, I understood you to say, had to be cleared in advance, '
and did yon also say it had to be on official business?
The WITNESS. Yes. My recollection may not be exact on this. I know we
attempted particularly at the very start to restrict any trips away from Los
Alamos to official business or something like a death in a person's family where
279
it appeared to be necessary to let them go. As time went on, that became more
relaxed. I can't measure the precise time, of course.
Mr. GRAY. This is a change of subject now. In your discussion of the char-
acteristics of scientists, I think I am correct in my recollection that you said you
felt that Dr. Oppenheimer was making a decision which he felt he was competent
to make with respect to the disclosure of the names of the persons who were
approached by the unknown intermediary?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. I am simply asking this for the record. Weren't you seeking the
name of the person who approached the person?
The WITNESS. I was seeking both ; yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. That answers my question. You were seeking both the name of
the three, if there were three, and also the individual who subsequently turned
out to be
The WITNESS. Chevalier. Certainly, that we regarded obtaining that as more
important than obtaining the ones that were approached, although I don't want
to say we didn't regard that as important
Mr. GRAY. I believe that clears the record. I believe when you read the
transcript the emphasis was on the other.
The WITNESS. I see.
Mr. GRAY. This reverts to your observations about the swing of the pendulum.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Certainly I think you are entitled to and should express your
opinions about such matters. However, I wonder if you know the statute under
which, or the regulations under which, this board is created?
The WITNESS. At one time I have read them, sir. I was familiar with them
at the time they were enacted, but I have not looked at that in years. The other
night one of these gentlemen here told me what the language was, but for the
life of me I could not quote it now. .„.,. «r
Mr. GRAY. I really wouldn't expect you, frankly, to be familiar with it. We
are charged, as I understand it, to consider the problem put before us with
respect to the character, loyalty, and associations of an individual. These
are the criteria in the act
The WITNESS. Character, loyalty, and association.
Mr. GRAY. My question of you is perhaps of a philosophical nature. I tnint
you rather suggested that this board should not concern itself with associations
perhaps in the thirties or forties?
The WITNESS. I did not intend to convey that. Certainly the board should
concern itself with that. What I intended to convey was that the appraisal or
evaluation of associations in the forties must be viewed in the light of the
atmosphere existing then and not in the light of the atmosphere existing at the
present time.
Mr. GRAY. You did not mean to suggest that it was your opinion that you
could only consider current associations in determining problems of this kind?
The WITNESS. Of course not Always our starting point, our leads to people
who are disloyal, are such things as associations. For example, you can hardly
put your finger on a scientist or a university professor or people who tend to
get into civic affairs, you can hardly find one anywhere who is now in his
fifties or so that has not been on at least one list of an association which was
later determined to be subversive or to have leanings that way. Nevertheless,
those associations are most frequently the starting point or the leads for investi-
gation go to further. You always have the question of determining the signifi-
cance of those: (a) the significance at the time of them, (&) whether, assuming
that there was a sinister significance it has continued.
I have never, strongly as I have felt and acted .with reference to communism,
never adopted the assumption, once a Communist sympathizer, always a Com-
munist sympathizer. One of the finest things that Soviet Russia ever did for us
was the quick switch of the on again off again with Germany. That did more
than anything else to tell the men from the boys in the Communist Party. It
would be a terrible mistake to assume that, once having had sinister associations,
a man was forever thereafter damned. Yet, once you uncover those, you must
always exercise Judgment That Judgment is always made up of a large body
of intangibles. It is seldom you get anything concrete.
I am being a little vague, I know, but the whole subject is vague.
Mr. GRAY. Because of your observation— I don't disagree with what you
state as a philosophy at all— I am pointing out that you have come a long way
to be a witness to testify with events with which you are familiar, all of which
took place some years ago.
280
The WITNESS. Oil, yes.
Mr. GRAY. But, under the terms of the act and the regulations under which
this board was constituted, they are all relevant. That was my point
The WITNESS. I don't mean to convey they are not
Dr. EVANS. Colonel, I think you overstretched the meter when you said all
professors have something like that in their background.
The WITNESS. I said "almost"
Dr. EVANS. That is not true. Did you find men like Compton, Conant, Fermi,
Bohr, and Hildebrandt, the peculiar type scientists?
The WITNESS. What I referred to as the scientific mind?
Dr. EVANS. Yes.
The WITNESS. I would except from that A. H. Compton. A. H. Compton in my
opinion frankly is one of the finest men I ever knew. He has breadth and
Judgment.
Dr. EVANS. You are talking about Arthur and not Karl?
The WITNESS. Yes. I scarcely knew Karl Oompton. I Just met him.
Dr. EVANS. I would like to ask you another thing. Do you think loyalty to an
individual is of more importance than loyalty to a country?
The WITNESS. No, sir; I don't. One of the characteristics of war and near
war is the existence of that fact— loyalty to the country takes in my Judgment,
and ought to take, precedence above all. There are those that feel differently.
We are all familiar, of course, with the device of placing a person in the position
of choosing between loyalty to someone near and dear and loyalty to country,
and different people react differently to it, depending upon their strength of
character and feeling of patriotism and the like.
Dr. EVANS. I would like to ask you one more question.
The WITNESS. I have never been in that position, so I can only speak
theoretically.
Dr. EVANS. Do you as a rule dislike the scientific mind? Is it a peculiar thing?
The WITNESS. I will say this, that during the war I came very strongly to dis-
like the characteristics which it exhibited.
Dr. EVANS. That is all.
REDIBEOT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. I have Just one question, Mr. Lansdale.
Referring back to the confused incident of the Chevalier matter, what would
you say, on the basis of your total experience with Dr. Oppenheimer, would be
your general opinion as to his veracity?
A. There is no question that— I don't believe that he lied to us except about
this one incident— my general impression is that his veracity is good. I don't
know of any other incident
Q. Just so there is no possible implication in the record, he had no responsi-
bility for Mr. Greenglass in any way, shape, or form, did he?
A. I don't believe so. I will take full responsibility for that one. That was
the outstanding blunder of the century.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Colonel Lansdale, as a lawyer are you familiar with the legal maxim,
"Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus1'?
A. Yes ; I am. Like all legal maxims, it is a generalization, and not of par-
ticular significance when applied to specifics.
Q. When you are trying a jury case and the veracity of a witness is in question,
do you request the court to give an instruction on that subject?
A. Oh, certainly ; don't you?
Q. Certainly, I want to know what you do.
A. The instruction usually is that the jury may, but does not have to, take
that as an indication, and the judgment is to be exercised in the particular case.
. Q. And when you are trying a jury case and you examine a witness on the
opposite side and you demonstrate that he has lied, don't you argue to the jury
from that that they should disregard his evidence?
A. You are speaking now as to what I as an advocate do?
Q. Yes.
A. It depends on circumstances ; usually I do.
Q. Sure. Any lawyer worth his salt would.
A. Particularly if it is my belief.
281
Q. Yes, sir.
Mr. ROBB. That is alL
Mr. GEAT. The testimony will be made available to you here in the building.
That, I think, answers the one question we discussed.
Mr. GARRISON. This afternoon.
Mr. GEAT. Yes.
Mr. ROLANDEB. I don't know whether it will be available this afternoon. I
understood he wanted to review the material tomorrow. Will that be incon-
venient?
Mr. GARRISON. I want to get on it this afternoon so we perhaps can get done
with it by tomorrow.
Mr. GRAY. The second question was, you asked for permission to hear the
recordings. As I understand, there is available to the board a recording of the
Pash interview. So far as I know, the recording of the Lansdale interview is not
available ; but, if you desire, the board with Dr. Oppenheimer and counsel will
listen to the record on Monday if this is important to you before you start
redirect examination.
Mr. GARRISON. As to the Pash recording, how are we to hear that?
Mr. ROBB. Right here.
Mr. GRAY. I think we must hear it in the proceeding. I believe that disposes
of the two questions you asked?
Mr. GARRISON. Yes. Thank you very much.
Mr. GRAY. We will meet again at 9 : 30 on Monday morning.
(Thereupon at 4: 35 p. m., a recess was taken until Monday, April 19, 1954,
at 9: 30a.m.)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER or J. EGBERT OPPENHEIMER
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
BUILDING T-3, EOOM 2022,
Washington, D. #., Monday ', April 19, 1954.
The above entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to recess
before the board, at 9 : 30 a. m.
Personnel Security Board : Mr. Gordon Gray, chairman ; Dr. Ward
V. Evans, member; and Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Roger Eobb, and C. A. Rolander, Jr., counsel for the
board; J. Robert Oppenheimer, Lloyd K. Garrison, Samuel J. Silver-
man, and Allen S. Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer;
Herbert S. Marks, cocounsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
(283)
PROCEEDINGS
Mr. GRAY. We will start the proceedings.
I should like the record to reflect that Mr. Morgan, who, as yon all recall,
found it necessary to leave the proceedings before we completed our work on
Friday, has read carefully the transcript made of the proceedings, especially that
portion which took place in his absence, and is thoroughly familiar with what
transpired. Is that correct?
Mr. MORGAN. That is correct.
Mr. GRAY. I think the record ought to show that.
Now, Mr. Bobh.
Mr. ROBB. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rathman is here and will play these records for us. Counsel for Dr.
Oppenheimer have been furnished with two copies of the transcript to follow.
I would suggest that in the event that anyone at any time wishes any portion
of the recording played again, so that we may check it, if you will Just so
indicate, we will do that. Of course, that includes the reporter. I understand it
is most difficult for a reporter to take this down on a machine. So if the reporter
wishes to stop and have something played over again, that will be done. Of
course, Mr. Garrison, anything that he wishes to be played over if he will
Just indicate it will be done.
Mr. GARRISON. Suppose we find, Mr. Chairman, as we listen to this, what
seems to us to be variances between sound and text Should we make a note of
those as we go along?
Mr. GRAY. I think that would be the proper procedure.
Mr. ROBB, I think that would be the only way to do it, Mr. Garrison.
Mr. Rathman, would you begin to play the records?
I might say, gentlemen, for your benefit, to assist you, at the beginning of this
record you will hear some door slamming and seat creaking and so on, and
some introductory gabble, which is not important here. I suppose people are
coming into the room and sitting down. The transcript, which begins, 'This
is a pleasure," does not begin for perhaps 80 seconds.
- Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, could we have read into the record the first
paragraph of the transcript that will not appear in the sound?
Mr. ROBB. Do you wish me to do that, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. GRAY. If you would.
Mr. ROBB. "San Francisco, California, August 27, 1943.
"Memorandum for the Officer in Charge.
"Subject: D. S. M. Project.
"Re: Transcription of Conversation between Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer, Lt CoL
Boris T. Fash, and Lt. Lyall Johnson.
"Transmitted, herewith, is the transcript of conversation between Dr. J. R.
Oppenheimer, Lt. Col. Boris T. Fash, and Lt. Lyall Johnson held in Lt. Johnson's
office in the new class room building, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.,
on August 26, 1943. It is to be noted that in some places the conversation was
very indistinct and that the running commentary may be indecisive in these
places, but the substance of the material discussed is, herewith, presented :
"FASH. This Is a pleasure, because I am interested to a certain extent in activi-
ties and I feel I have a certain responsibility in a child which I don't know any-
thing about. General Grove has, more or less, I feel placed a certain responsi-
bility in me and it's like having a child, that you can't see, by remote control.
I don't mean to take much of your time
"OppicKH&ncER. That's perfectly all right Whatever time you choose.
"PASH. Mr. Johnson told me about the little incident, or conversation, taking
place yesterday in which I am very much interested, and it had me worried all
day yesterday since he called me up. I thought if he. could
"OPPENHEIMEB. I was rather uncertain as to wnether I should or should not
talk to T»*n>- I am unwilling to do it without authorization. What I wanted to
tell this fellow was that he had been indiscreet. I know that he had revealed
information. I know that saying that much, might in some cases embarrass
hi™, it doesn't seem to have been capable of embarrassing him, to put it
bluntly. ,-.,-• . . - ; ' .
(285)
286
"PASH. That is not the particular interest I have. It is something a little
more, in my opinion, more serious. Mr. Johnson said that there was a possibility
that there may he some other groups interested.
"OPPENHEIMER. I think that is true, but I have no first-Mud knowledge and
that would not be, for that reason, very useful to me. I thmk it is true that a
man whose name I never heard who was attached to the Soviet consul has indi-
cated indirectly through intermediaries people concerned in this project, that
he was in a position to transmit, without any danger of a leak or anything of
that kind, or a scandal, information which they might supply."
Dr. EVANS. That is one correction that you passed over. That "intermediary"
and not "intermediaries."
Mr. ROBB. And that is true, instead of that.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. GABEISON. The only comment I would make, Mr. Chairman, is that in
quite a number of places, I think I marked 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, there were scraps of
talk that were not recorded here because of the speed. Also here a word and
there a word was either dropped out in the speed of the transcription or the
order was sometimes inverted a little bit I am not saying that this alters
the substance, but I do think that if there comes a passage
Mr. ROBB. That is true. Mr. Chairman, I think this suggestion Is a very ex-
cellent one. I am sure if there is any matter of substance which counsel finds
of recording which he feels is different from the transcript, I trust he will indi-
cate, that we may play the record again, and also that we will agree on it Will
you do that, Mr. Garrison?
Mr. GARRISON. I want to make it clear that we are not attempting, and we
can't on one playing, to authenticate the entire record.
Mr. ROBB. Very good. Shall we go ahead, Mr. Garrison?
(Mr. Rathman resumed playing back the recording.)
"OPPENHEIMER. Since I know it to be a fact "
Mr. GARRISON. There seem to be some words in the conversation which do not
appear in the transcript immediately prior to the sentence reading, "Since I
know it to be a fact." This conversation apparently dealing in some way with
the Soviet consulate.
[Recording:]
"Since I know it to be a fact, I have been particularly concerned "
Mr. GRAY. I think what was said there is that Dr. Oppenheimer is saying it
might be assumed that a man attached to the Soviet consul might be doing this.
"But since I know it to be a fact, I have been particularly concerned." That is
my interpretation.
Mr. GARRISON. It is something like that, Mr. Chairman. I was not exactly
clear. We might have it once more, if you don't mind.
• [Recording:]
"I will take it assumed that a man attached to the Soviet consul might be
doing this. But since I know it to be a fact I have been particularly concerned
about any indiscretions which took place in circles close which might be in
contact with it. To put it quite frankly, I would feel friendly to the idea of the
Commander in Chief informing the Russians who are working on this problem."
Mr. MARKS. May we stop at this point?
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I think it quite clear from the recording that
the sentence read, "I would feel friendly to the idea of the Commander in Chief
informing the Russians that we are working on this problem."
Mr. GRAY. I would have to ask that it be played again.
[Recording:]
"I will take it to be assumed that a man attached to the Soviet consul might
be doing this, but since I know it to be a fact, I have been particularly concerned
about any indiscretions which took place in circles close to the consul or which
might come in contact with it. To put it quite frankly, I would feel friendly to
the idea of the Commander in Chief informing the Russians that we were work-
ing on this problem. At least I can see that there might be some arguments for
doing that, but I do not feel friendly to the idea of having that— I think that it
might not hurt to be on the lookout for it"
Mr. GARRISON. May we stop at that point. Is the chairman satisfied that the
phrase was "informing the Russians that we were working on this problem"?
MT.BOBB. That is the way I heard it
Mr. GRAY. It is not clear to me, but I think it is clear that the word simply
was not "who." Precisely what the word or words might have been, I am not
sure, but my inclination is to feel that it is as you suggest
287
Mr. GABBISON. Counsel would agree?
Mr. ROBB. That was my understanding of it, Mr. Garrison.
Mr. GARRISON. That it did read "informing the Russians that we were work-
ing."
Mr. ROBB. I think it is.
Mr. GARBISON. Either one, it doesn't matter, Mr. Chairman. I would point
out that in the cross-examination of Dr. Oppenheimer, this particular phrase
was picked out of the transcript about informing the Russians, as it reads here,
"who are working on this problem," as if there were something sinister about it.
It came as a great surprise to Dr. Oppenheimer, and I think the record now
should explicitly show that this was an error in transcription and that any
notion that the Russians were then working on this problem was simply not
suggested in this conversation.
Mr. ROBB. I wouldn't go so far as that, sir. I think the record shows that
the recording says. I think that is as far as we can go.
Mr. GRAY. I think there is agreement between counsel as to what seems to be
the correct transcript now on this point Certainly speaking for the Board, I
don't think we can draw any conclusions into the record at this point, Mr.
Garrison. I think the record ought to be clear as to what the language was.
Mr. GARRISON. I want to make clear that any inference drawn from the pre-
vious cross-examination is now to be wiped out.
Mr. GRAY. I should think that you would wish — on redirect, if I can use that
term — to come back to this point. Certainly the record now will reflect what
the concensus is as to this language. I am just hesitant to accept an interpreta-
tion of counsel as a part of a board conclusion at this time. What we are doing
is correcting the record as I understand it. You are certainly free to come back
to this.
Mr. ROBB. Will you start at the beginning?
[Recording:]
"OPPENHEIMER I probably know this. I will take it is to be assumed that a
man attached to the Soviet consul might be doing this, but since I know it to be
a fact, I have been particularly concerned."
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, might I interpose at this point. I think it is pretty
clear now, Mr. Garrison, that the beginning of that sentence is, "I would take it
that it would be assumed that a man attached to the Soviet consulate might be
doing this, but since I know it to be a fact" ; isn't that the way you heard it?
Mr. GABBISON. That is about the way I heard it
Mr. ROBB. Did you hear it any differently than that?
Mr. GABBISON. I think that is about correct.
Mr. GRAY. While we are in this interruption, my interpretation of the record-
ing is that the word "aides" should have been "circles".
Mr. GABBISON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROBB. I had already corrected that in my transcript.
Mr. GRAY. Would you proceed, Mr. Rathman.
[Recording:]
"I would take it that it is to be assumed that a man attached to the Soviet
consulate might be doing it, but since I know it to be a fact, I have been par-
ticularly concerned about any indiscretion which took place in circles close
enough to come in contact with it. To put it quite frankly, I would feel friendly
to the idea of the Commander in Chief informing the Russians that we were
working on this problem. At least I can see that there might be some arguments
for doing that, but I do not feel friendly to the idea of having it moved out the
back door. I think that it might not hurt to be on the lookout for it.
"PASH. Could you give me a little more specific information as to exactly
what information you have? I mean, you can readily realize that phase would
be, to me, probably of interest as pretty near the whole project is to you.
"OKPENHECMER. Well, I might say that the approaches were always through
other people, who were troubled by them, and sometimes came and discussed
them with me; and that the approaches were always quite indirect so that I
would feel that to give— well, to give more, perhaps, than one name, would be
to implicate people whose attitude was one of bewilderment, rather than one of
cooperation. I know of no case, and I am fairly sure that in all cases where I
heard of it, these contacts would not have yielded a single thing. That is as
far as I can go on that
"Now, there is a man whose name was mentioned here a couple of times. I
do not know of my own knowledge he is involved as an intermediary. It seems,
sosais— 54 id
288
however, not impossible, and if you wanted to watch him, it might be the appro-
priate thing to do. He spent a number of years in the Soviet Union. I think
he is a chemical engineer. He was— he may not be here— he was at the time
I was with hiyrr here employed at the Shell Development. His name is Eltenton.
I would think that there was a small chance that— well, let me put it this way—
I think he has probably been asked to do what he can to provide information.
Whether he is successful or not, I don't know. But if he talked to a friend
of his who was also an acquaintance of one of the men on the approach, that was
one of the channels by which this thing went on.
Now, I think that * * * asked to do what he could to provide information.
Whether he was successful or not I couldn't know. But he talked to a friend of
his who was also an acquaintance of one of the men on the project, and that
was one of the channels by which this thing went. Now, I think that to go
beyond that would be to put a lot of names down of the people who are not only
innocent, but whose attitude is 100 percent effective.
"PASH. Now, here's a point You can readily realize that if we get informa-
tion like that we have to work in an absolutely discreet manner. In other words,
we can't afford -to indicate
"OPPENHEXMER. That you are concerned.
"PASH. That we are concerned or through whom we get information.
"OPPENHEIMEB. Naturally.
"PASH. However, any n
[End of recording.]
Mr. GRAY. I should like to record my observation about some .of these words
here.
Mr. ROBB. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. First of all, it is pretty clear to me going back to this earlier
paragraph that the language should be "informing the Russians that we were
working on this project"
Mr. ROBB. That is correct
Mr. GRAY. Then in the third paragraph, I believe' in the first sentence, it
should read, "Well, I might say that the approaches were always to other people"
rather than "through other people".
Mr. ROBB. I would like to have that played back.
Mr. GRAY. Will you play the beginning of this again, please?
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, so that we do this in the same order, I listened
to these words that were in the middle of the sentence beginning, "At least I
can see that there might be some arguments for doing," I then heard these
words, "I don't know whether it could or could not be done, but I don't like the
idea of having them moved out the back door."
Mr. ROBB. I don't know. There are some words in there that I didn't get
Let us see, and we will play it again. I hope these records don't get worn out
while we are playing them.
Mr. GARRISON. I hope we don't have to play the whole thing through Just for
this one thing.
Mr. ROBB. No; that is right at the beginning.
[Recording:]
"It must be assumed that a man attached to the Soviet consulate might be
doing this, but since I know it to be a fact, I have been particularly concerned
about any indiscretions which took place in circles dose to the consul or which
might come in contact with it, because to pat it quite frankly, I would feel
friendly to the idea of the Commander in Chief informing the Russians that we
were working on this problem. At least, I can see that there might be some
argument for doing that I don't know whether it could or not have been done,
but I don't like the idea of having it moved out the back door. I think that
it might not hurt to be on the lookout for it"
"PASH. Could you give me a little more specific information as to exactly
what information you have? I mean, you can readily realize that phase would
be, to me, probably as interesting as pretty near the whole project is to you.
"OFPENH&iMER. Well, I might say that the approaches were always to other
people, who were troubled by them, and sometimes came and discussed them
with me."
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, it is quite plain that the sentence reads, "I might
say that the approaches were always to other people"; is that correct, Mr.
Garrison?
Mr. GARBXSON. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Then a few minor ones.
289
Mr. ROBB. May I say with Mr. Garrison's help I do find the phrase "I don't
know whether it could or could not be done, but" comes in.
Mr. GBAY. "I am not friendly to the idea of having it move out the back door/9
Mr. ROBB. That is right.
Mr. GBAY. Further in that third paragraph, I think that the third sentence
would read, or portions of it, "and that the approaches were always quite in-
direct." The word "always."
Mr. GABBISON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GBAY. In the fifth line, very minor, the word "attitudes" should be "atti-
tude," singular.
Mr. ROBB. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. Down about the middle of that paragraph, "He spent quite a num-
ber of years in the Soviet Union."
Mr. GABBISON. I also heard the words "He is an Englishman" in there.
Mr. ROBB. That is in here. Isn't it?
Mr. GABBISON. No, "He spent"— I have interlineated "He is an Englishman"
or "He is English".
Mr. ROBB. I think that is in there some place, but that is not very important.
Mr. GABBISON. No.
Mr. GBAY. There are a couple of other places. The word "is" should have
been "was" and "the project" should be "this project."
Mr. GAKBISON. The sentence reading, "I tMnk there is a small chance," I think
the "is" there, that the word was "was." That is after the word "Eltenton."
"His name is Eltenton." "I would think there was a small chance."
Mr. GBAY, That is correct.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Garrison, is there any question that
the voice we hear in the paragraphs marked "0" is Dr. Oppenheimer?
Mr. GABBISON. Not so far.
Mr. GBAY. Are we ready to proceed? While he is fixing that record, a very
minor one, I think Colonel Pash said "absolute discreet manner" rather than
"absolutely".
Mr. GABBISON. I am not bothered with that type of correction, Mr. Chairman.
[Recording:]
"That we might get which would eliminate a lot of research work on our part
would necessarily lead to the conclusion anything we are doing.
"OPPENHEIMEB. I am giving you the one name I think — I mean I don't know
the man attached to the consulate. I think I may have been told or I may not
have been told. But I have actually forgotten. He is—and he may not be here
now. These incidents occurred in the order of about 5, 6 or 7 months.
"JOHNSON. I was wondering, Dr. Oppenheimer, if there was a particular per-
son, maybe a person on the project that you were trying to pump information
from — that if we knew who those were, would at least know where to look for a
lead, not from the standpoint of .fellow hate, but looking at a certain picture.
"PASH. Here is the point that I would feel
"OPPENHEIMEB. I would feel that the people that tried to get information
from were more or less an accident and I would be mattrig some harm by saying
that.
"PASH. Yes. Here's the thing. We of course assume that the people who
bring this information to you are 100 percent with you, and therefore, there is no
question about their intentions. However, if
"OPPENHBIMBB. Well, I will tell you one thing "
[End of recording.]
Mr. EVANS. Was that word "lead" or "leak".
Mr. GABBISON. I thought it was "leak".
Dr. EVANS. It is 'lead" here.
Mr. GABBISON. Yes. It sounded like "leak" to me.
Dr. EVANS. It sounded like "leak" to me. "I was won'dering, Dr. Oppenheimer,
if there is a particular person— maybe a person on the project that you were try-
ing to pump information from — that if we knew who those were, would at least
know where to look for a leak"
Mr. ROBB. Play that again, please.
[Recording:]
"These events occurred of the order of five, six, or seven months ago.
"JOHNSON. I was wondering, Dr. Oppenheimer, if there is a particular per-
son,—maybe a person on the project that you were tryin'g to pump information
from,— that if we knew who those were, would at least know where to look for
a leak, not from the standpoint of fellow hate, but looking at a certain picture.
"PASH. Here's the point that I would feel
290
"OPPENHEIMEB. I would feel that the people that if they tried to get informa-
tion were more or less an accident and I believe I would be making some harm
by saying that.
"PASH. Yes. Here's the thing— we of course assume that the people who bring
this information to you are 100 percent with you, and therefore, there is no
question about their intentions. However, if
"OPPENHEIMEB. Well, I will tell you one thing. I have known two or three
cases, and I think two of them are the men with me at Los Alamos. They are
men who are very closely associated with me.
"PASH. Have they told you that either they thought they were contacted for
that purpose or they actually were contacted for that purpose?
"OPPENHEIMEB. They told me that they were contacted.
"PASH. For that purpose.
"OPPENHEIMER. That is, let me give you the background. The background
was — well, you know how difficult it is with the relations between these two al-
lies, and there are a lot of people who don't feel very friendly toward Russia,
so that the information — a lot of our secret information, our radar and so on,
doesn't get to them, and they are battling for their lives and they would like
to have an idea of what is going on. This is just to make up in other words for
the defects of our official communication. That is the form in which it was.
"PASH. Oh, I see.
"OPPENHEIMEB. Of course, the actual fact is that it is not a communication
that ought to be taking place. But it is matter of carrying out a policy which
was more or less a policy of the government and the form in which it came as
that could an interview be arranged with this man Bltenton who had very good
contact with a man from the Embassy attached to the consulate who was a very
reliable guy. That is his story. And who had a lot of experience in microfilm
work.
"PASH. Well, now, I may be getting back to a systematic picture here. But
do you mind? These people whom you mentioned, two are down with you
now. Were they contacted by Bltenton direct ?
"OPPENHEIMEB. No.
"PASH. Through another party?
"OPPENHEIMER. YeS.
"PASH. Well, now, could we know through whom that contact was made?
"OPPENHEIKER. I think it would be a mistake—"
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, could we stop?
Mr. ROBB. I have several corrections, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GBAY. Very welL
Mr. ROBB. In the first paragraph on that page, Mr. Garrison, we pretty well
agreed on, and the second.
Mr. GABBISON. Except I would Just like to note the phrase "not from the
standpoint of fellow hate," that there were quite indistinguishable words that
accompanied that. I don't know what the words were.
Mr. GBAT. I would question myself that the words were "fellow hate."
Mr. ROBB. I don't know.
Mr. GABBISON. There were other words not in there.
Mr. ROBB. I might say that the "J" indicated there Is Lieutenant Johnson who
was also present In the third line on that page of the transcript, as I heard it,
it is, "These instances occurred of the order of about 5, 6, or 7 months ago," is
that correct?
Mr. GARRISON. That is right
Mr. ROBB. As I heard it in the paragraph marked "H", the word "lead" should
be "leak". The words "fellow hate" I don't pick that up.
The next paragraph marked "0", as I heard it, read "I would feel that the
people that they tried to get information from." Did you get that, Mr. Garrison?
Mr. GABBISON. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. I think that was dear.
Mr. ROBB. The next paragraph marked "O".
Mr. GABBISON. While we were on that paragraph, after the word "accident,"
there were some words interpolated by Mr. Pash that- did not come through on
the transcript.
Mr. ROBB. Yes; that is correct. The next paragraph marked "O", as I got it,
reads, "Well, I will tell you one thing. I have known of two or three cases, and
I think two of the men were with me at Los Alamos." Did you get that?
Mr. GABBISON. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. "They are men who are very closely associated with me."
Mr. GABBISON. Correct
291
Mr. EOBB. Then the next large paragraph marked "0", reads as I got it In
the third and fourth lines, "There are a lot of people that don't feel very friendly
to Russia" instead of "toward the Russians". Did you get that?
Mr. GABEISON. I did.
Mr. GBAT. It is "a lot of people who don't feel very friendly.
Mr. ROBB. Yes, sir.
Mr. GABBISON. That is right
Mr. ROBB. In the last paragraph on that page, as I got it, it reads, "Of course,
the actual fact is that since it is not a communication which ought to be taking
place, it is treasonable, but it was not presented in that method."
Mr. GABEISON. Right after that word "method" I had some words
Mr. ROBB. That didn't come through. Yes, sir. "It is a method of carrying
out a policy which was more or less a policy of the Government and the form
in which it came was that an interview be arranged with this man Eltenton
who had very good contacts with a man from the embassy attached to the con-
sulate who was a very reliable guy, and who had a lot of experience in microfilm
work or whatever."
Mr. GABRISON. That "or whatever," I would like to have it played again. I
think there was another word or two after the word "whatever."
Mr. ROBB. I think so, but I didn't get it. "In microfilm work" and also after
the word given there were 2 or 3 words that I didn't get.
[Recording:]
"* * * a policy which was more or less a policy of the Government, and the
form in which it came was that could an interview be arranged with this man
Eltenton, who had very good contacts with a man from the embassy, attached
to the consulate, who was a very reliable guy, that is his story, and who had a
lot of experience in microfilm work, or whatever.
"PASH. I may be getting back to a little systematic picture"
Mr. ROBB. Will you stop there? Mr. Garrison, I don't know whether you got
it the way I did, but I thought I heard "who was a very reliable guy," a kind of
parenthetical story, "That is his story."
Mr. GABEISON. Yes.
Dr. OPSENHEnoER. After "whatever" it said "the heU."
Mr. ROBB. Thank you.
Mr. GABEISON (reading). "A lot of experience in microfilm work, or whatever
the hell."
Mr. ROBB. Dr. Oppenheimer is certainly the best expert on his own voice.
Mr. GBAT. In the next paragraph when he plays that, I think the word "two"
right in the middle, on the top of page 4, "two are down there" should be "who".
Will you play that again?
[Recording:]
"PASH. Well, now I may be getting back to a little systematic picture, but do
you mind. These people whom you mentioned, who were down there with yon
now, were they contacted by Eltenton?
"OPPENHEIMER. No.
"PASH. Through another party?
"OPPENHEIMEB. YeS.
"PASH. Well, now, could we know through whom that contact was made?
"OPPENHBIMEB. I think it would be a mistake"
Mr. ROBB. I still got a "two".
Mr. GABRISON. I thought it was "who."
Dr. EVANS. I thought it was "who."
[Recording:]
'TASK. These people whom you mentioned, who were down with you nowj,
were they contacted by Eltenton direct?
"OEPENHHSMER. NO.
"PASH. Through another party?
"OPPENHEIMER. Yes.
"PASH. Well, now, could we know through whom that contact was made?
"OPPENHEMCER, I think it would be a mistake"
Mr. ROBB. I don't know.
Dr. EVANS. I would like to know how many of us thought it was "who" and
how many thought it was "two." I thought personally it was "who.w
Mr. GRAY. Let us make this the last time.
[Recording:]
"I may be getting back to a little systematic picture here, but do you mind?
These people who you mentioned, two are down there with you now, were they
contacted by Eltenton direct?
292
"OPPENHEIHEB. NO.
"PASH. Through another party?
"OPPENHEIMER, YeS.
"PASH. Well, now, could we know through whom that contact was made?
"I think it would be a mistake"
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Morgan thinks it is "two" and I could flip a coin.
Mr. ROBB. I don't know that it is terribly important
Mr. GARRISON. I don't know, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROBB. Why don't we put "who?" and "two?' in the transcript Is that
all right, Mr. Garrison?
Mr. GARRISON. It is all right with me. I would note also there are some words
after systematic picture indicated by the dots that don't appear.
Mr. ROBB. That is something like, "getting back to a little systematic picture,
if you don't mind."
Mr. GARRISON. Something like that. I would observe that those are the first
dots we have seen in this transcript although we have all agreed that there are
some words and passages that don't appear in quite a number of places.
Mr. ROBB. All right
[Recording:]
"I think I have told you where the initiative came from and that the other
things are almost purely accidental, and it would involve people who ought not
to be involved in this.
"PASH. Yes. Well, this would not involve the people but it indicates to us
Eltenton's channel. We would have to know that this is definite on Eltenton,
and we of course naturally
"OFPENHEIMER, It is not definite in the sense that I have seen him do the
thing.
"PASH. NO.
"OPPESTHEIMER. He may have been misquoted.
"PASH. That is right
"OPPENHEIMER, I don't believe so. Now, Eltenton is a member of the FAECT.
Whether or not
"PASH. That is the union?
"OFTEN HJCTMEB, That is the OIO. He is a man whose sympathies are certainly
very far left, whatever his affiliations, and he may or may not have regular
contacts with a political group. I doubt it. In any case, it is a safe thing to
say that the channels that would be followed in this case are those involving
people who have generally been sympathetic to the Soviet and somehow con-
nected peripherally with the Communist movement in this country. That's
obvious. I don't need to tell you that
"PASH. Yes. The fact is this second contact— the contact that Eltenton had
to make with these other people is that person also a member of the project?
"OPPENHEIMER. No.
"PASH. That also is an outsider?
"OPPENHEIMER, It's a member of the faculty, but not of the project
"PASH. A member of the faculty here? Eltenton made it through a member
of the faculty to the project
"OPPENHEIHER. As far as I know, these approaches were — there may have
been more than one person involved. I don't know.
"PASH. Here's how I feel about this leftist inclination. I tT"'"fr that whether
a man has 'left' or 'right' inclinations, it is his character which is back of it —
if he is willing to do this, it doesn't make any difference what his inclinations
are. It is based on his character primarily and not
"OPPENHEIMER. Yes. A thing like this going on, let us say, with the Nazis
would have a somewhat different color. I don't mean to say it would be any
more deserving of attention or any more dangerous, but it would involve prob-
ably different motives.
"PASH, Yes.
"OPjMflHJuiMEB. I'm pretty sore that none of the guys here with the possible
exception of the Russian, who is doing probably his duty by his country— but
the other guys that were just— they didn't do anything, but they were con-
sidering the step which they would have regarded as thoroughly in line with
the policy of this Government, and just making up for the fact that there were
a couple of guys in the State Department who would block such communications.
You may or may not know that in many projects we share information with the
British and some we do not, and there was a great deal of feeling about that
and I don't think that the issues involved here seem to people very different
293
except that of course the people on the project realize the importance and the
whole procedure gets away from them.
"PASH. Now, do you feel"
[End of the recording.]
Mr. ROBB. I noticed a few minor corrections, but none I think that is worth
talking about, unless Mr. Garrison has some.
Mr. OKAY. I have one that may be minor, but perhaps it should be noted. In
the paragraph that the CIO union, in the fourth line, I believe that the language
was "a safe thing to say that the channels that would be followed in this case"
instead of "to be f ollowed." Did you get that?
Mr. ROBB. I didn't get that Did Mr. Garrison get that?
Mr. GARRISON. No. Mr. Marks said he did. We accept that Could I in the
same paragraph note that after the words "I doubt it" by Mr. Oppenheimer,
I heard an interjection by Mr. Pash, saying, "Here is the way I feel about this
case/' and then it carries on with Mr. Oppenheimer saying. "It is a safe
thing to say,"
Mr. ROBB. I think that is true,
Mr. GARRISON. I mention that because here is the word "case" which is put
in Dr. Oppenheimer's mouth which in fact came from Mr. Pash. I don't think
it alters the substance.
Mr. ROBB. I think Dr. Oppenheimer did use the word "case." It appeared
that Colonel Pash, interrupting Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr. Oppenheimer keeping
on talking, I heard Dr. Oppenheimer's voice saying, "In any case", although I
don't know that it is important
Mr. GARRISON. You heard the word "case" twice.
Mr. ROBB. Yes.
Mr. GARRISON. You heard the word "case" again?
Mr. ROBB. I thought I did, yes. Do you want to play it over again?
[Recording:]
"He may have been misquoted.
"PASH. That is right
"OppENHEiMBB. I don't believe so. Now Eltenton is a member of the FAECT.
Whether or not
"PASH. That is the union
"OppBNHEraER. That is the CIO union. He is a man whose sympathies are
certainly very far left, whatever his affiliation is, and he may or may not have
regular contacts with a political group. I doubt it
"PASH. Here is the way I feeL
"OPPENHEIMER. In any case, it is a safe thing to say that the channels that
will be followed in this case are those involving people who have generally been
sympathetic to the Soviet n
Mr. ROBB. I don't know who said it, Mr. Garrison.
Mr. GRAY. It is my impression that there was an interruption by Colonel
Pash, and Dr. Oppenheimer did say "In any case, it is a safe thing." I don't
know that it is important
Mr. ROBB. I don't think it is important.
Mr. GOAT. I do think there are 2 things I should point up in the fifth para-
graph, about the middle of that paragraph, where I believe Dr. Oppenheimer
said, "might block such communications" rather than ''would."
Mr. ROBB. Yes, I heard that, too.
Mr. GARRISON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. In the last line of that paragraph, I don't think the words
"gets away from them" are correct The word "gets" is not correctly tran-
scribed, but I can't tell what it was.
Mr. GARRISON. That whole last line to me is rather indistinct There were
some words that don't appear and I don't quite get the sense of it
Mr. ROBB. I don't either, Mr, Garrison, but I don't think it is terribly
important
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I would just make this suggestion perhaps in
view of the time pressure under which we are all laboring. Possibly the chairman
in order to save the time of the board would think it appropriate that we might
make an arrangement with counsel on the other side to continue this playing
at some time that would not take up the time of the board, and bring to the
board and read into the record any changes that we agree upon. I think we
probably would have no difficulty in doing that I don't press that
Mr. ROBB, That might be possible, unless the board wishes to participate in
this.
294
Mr. GRAY. I am sorry to engage in a time consuming procedure, Mr. Garrison,
but I am inclined to think that if there are to be any changes in the record, the
board regrettably must hear them. I am sorry about the delay involved.
[Recording :]
"PASH. Do you feel that would affect — and there could be continued attempts
now to establish this type of contact?
"OPPENHEIMER. I haven't any idea.
"PASH. You haven't any idea?
"OPPENHEIMER, As I say, if the guy that was here may by now be in some
other town and all that I would have in mind is this. I understood that this
man to whom I feel a sense of responsibility, Lomanitz, and I feel it for 2
reasons. One, he is doing work which he started and which he ought to con-
tinue, and second, since I more or less made a stir about it when the question
came up, that this man may have been indiscreet in circles which would lead
to trouble. That is the only thing that I have to say. I don't have any doubt
that people often approached him, with whom he has contacted, I mean whom
he sees, might feel it their duty if they got word of something, 'to let it go
further and that is the reason why I feel quite strongly that association with
the Communist movement is not compatible with the job on a secret war project,
it is just that the 2 loyalties cannot go.
"PASH. Yes. Well
"OPPENHEIMEB, That is not an expression of political opinion. I think that
a lot of very brilliant and thoughtful people have seen something in the Com-
munist movement, and that they maybe belong there, maybe it is a good thing
for the country. They hope that it doesn't belong on the war project.
"PASH. I get your point. I don't want to seem to you insistent. I want to
again I think explore the possibility of getting the name of the person on the
faculty. I will tell you for what reason. Not for the purpose of taking him
to task in any way whether it is unofficially, officially, or openly or what, but
to try to see Eltenton's method of approach. You may not agree with me, but
I can assure you that that is one of the more important steps.
"OPPENHEIMEB, I have to take the following points of view: I think in
mentioning Bltenton's name I subsequently said about the man that I think
that he may be acting in a way which is dangerous to his country, and which
should be watched. I am not going to mention the name of anyone in the same
breath, even if you say that you will make a distinction. I just can't do that,
because in the other cases, I am convinced from the way in which they handled
the thing that they themselves thought it was a bad business.
"PASH. These other people, yes, I realize. But here is the point, doctor ; if
that man is trying to make other contacts for Bltenton.
"OPPENHEIMER. Yes.
"PASH. You see, it would take us some time to try to—
"OPPENHEIMEB. My honest opinion is that he probably isn't, that he ran into
him at a party and they saw each other or something and Bltenton said,
"Do you suppose you could help me. That is a very serious thing, because we
know that important work is going on here, and we think this ought to be avail-
able to our allies, and would you see if any of those guys are willing to help
us with it, and then it wouldn't have to be so much." [Inaudible.]
Dr. EVANS. There was one place there, "not for the purpose of taking him
to task in any way, whether it be unofficially, officially or openly."
Mr. GABBISON. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. I think one of the more important steps Colonel Pash said, one of
the most important steps. Did you get that?
Mr. GARRISON. I didn't have it.
Mr. SEDVERMAN. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. There was an overriding remark of Dr. Oppenheimer in which he
said, "I understand that." Did you gentlemen catch that?
Mr. GABBISON. Yes.
Mr. MABKS. Yes. The word "subsequently" I understood as "essentially."
Mr. GABBISON. Yes. "Subsequently" should read "essentially" in the next
paragraph. "I think in mentioning Eltenton's name I essentially said about the
man."
Mr. ROBB. I didn't get that.
Mr. GABBISON. In the paragraph at the top 'where he said that is not an
expression of political opinion, I think a lot of very brilliant and thoughtful
people have seen something in the Communist movement, and that they maybe
belong there, and that maybe it is a good thing for the country.
295
Mr. ROBB. I think so. I thought I heard instead of "they hope it doesn't
belong," "I hope it doesn't belong on the war project." Did you get that?
Mr. GARRISON. I didn't.
Mr. SILVERMAN. It was very indistinct.
Mr. ROBB. I think it was "I."
Mr. GABBISON. I heard some words after "war project" that I couldn't get.
Also, some of the words in the next Pash paragraph at the end after one of the
more important steps.
Mr. ROBB. Most important steps.
Mr. GABRISON. Most.
Mr. ROBB. Dr. Oppenheimer said "I understand" after that
Mr. GABBISON. Yes. Then instead of "I have to take," it is "I wish" — did you
get that— I understand that, but I have to take the following point. That is
already your correction.
Mr. ROBB. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. Are there any other suggestions about that portion? I have no
more. Will you proceed, Mr. Rathman.
[Recording:]
"PASH. Were these two people you mentioned, were they contacted at the
same time?
"OPPENHEIMER. They were contacted within a week of each other.
"PASH. They were contacted at 2 different times.
"OPPENHEIMEB. Yes, but not in each other's presence.
"PASH. That is right And then from what you first heard, there is some-
one else who probably still remains here who was contacted as well.
"OPPENHEIMET. I think that is true.
"PASH. What I am driving at is that there was a plan, at least for some length
of time, to make these contacts — and we may not have known all the contacts.
"OPPENHEIMEB, That is certainly true. That is why I mentioned it. If I
knew all about it, then I would say forget it. I thought it would be appropriate
to call to your attention the fact that these channels at one time existed.
"PASH. Yes.
"OPPENHEIMER. I really think that I am drawing a line in the right place.
"PASH. You see, you understand that I am sort of — you picture me as a blood-
hound on the trail and that I am trying to get out of you everything I possibly
can.
"OPPENHEIMER. That is your duty to a certain extent
"PASH. You see what I mean.
"OPPENHEIMER. It is also my duty not to implicate these people, acquaintances,
or colleagues of whose position I am absolutely certain— myself and my duty
is to protect them.
*TASH. Oh, yes.
"OPPENHEIMER. If I thought that— I won't say it— it might be sligthly oft.
"PASH. Well, then, here's another point, doctor, if we find that in making these
various contacts that we get some information which would lead us to believe
that certain of these men may have either considered it or still are considering
It, mind you. I do not even know these men, so it can't be personal.
"OPPENHEIMER. No. Well, none of them that I had anything to do with even
considered it. They were just upset about it. They have a feeling toward this
country and have signed the Espionage Act ; they feel this way about it for I
think that the intermediary between Eltenton and the project, thought it was
the wrong idea, but said that this was the situation. I don't thtnir he supported
It In fact, I know it.
"PASH. He made about at least 3 contacts that we know of.
"OPPENHEIMER. Well, I think that's right, yes.
"PASH. And 2 of those contacts are down there. That means we can assume •
at least that there is one of these men contacted still on the project here.
"OppENHEiMER. Yes, I believe that this man has gone or is scheduled to go
to site X.
"PASH. This third man?
"OPPENHEIMER. I think so.
"PASH. Well, why can't you cross that line. I certainly appreciate this much.
"OPPBNHEIMER. I think it is a thing you ought to know.
*TASH. Oh, no doubt
"OPPENHEIMER. I think it is probably one of those sporadic things and I do
not think— I may have no way of thinking it was systematic but I got from
the way it was handled, which was rather loosely, and frankly if I were an agent
I would not put much confidence in people who are loose-mouthed or casual."
296
Mr. GRAY. Are there any observations about that portion of the transcript?
Dr. EVANS. The word "Oppenheimer" was after 'Doctor1'.
Mr. GARKISON. The sixth paragraph, "Dr. Oppenheimer : I really think I am
drawing a line in the right place." That phrase "a line in the right place" I
didn't get
Mr. ROBB. Something about a line.
Mr. GABBISON. Something about it.
Mr. ROBB. If he plays it over enough, it will come out in the right place, but I
don't know. I have not played it over enough. Do you want to play it again?
Mr. GARBISON. I don't think so, unless we find something more difficult. I
just want to say I didn't even get it
Mr. ROBB. I think in the paragraph below that where it says, "It is also my
duty not to implicate these people, acquaintances, or colleagues" and so on— I
think the and so on is correct.
Mr. GARBISON. That is correct. And after the people "and who are".
Mr. ROBB. I think so.
Mr. GABBISON. There are some indistinct words in Mr. Fash's previous 2
sentences at the end. Then coming down, "Dr. Oppenheimer : If I thought that—
I won't say it— It might be slightly off,'1 and some indistinct words.
Mr. ROBB. That is right
Mr. GABBISON. Then the next paragraph, "They were upset about it".
Mr. ROBB. That is right
Mr. GABBISON. Then some indistinct words followed that.
Mr. ROBB. I think so.
Mr. GRAY. On that paragraph
Mr. GABBISON. All the rest of it seemed to me just fuzzy.
Mr. GBAT. The word "even", I think, was not in that paragraph in the first
line. While none of them that I had anything to do with considered it, they
were just upset about it, is the way I heard it
Mr. GABBISON. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. Do you want that paragraph played again?
Mr. GABBISON. I am not sure it would do any good.
Mr. ROBB. Let us try it
[Recording:]
"PASH. Certain of these men may have considered it or are still considering
it (mind you, I don't even know these men, so it can't be personal) .
"OPPENHEIMER, None of these that I had anything to do with even considered
"PASH. Yes.
"OPPENHEIMER. They just were upset about it They have a feeling toward
this country and have signed the Espionage Act; they feel this way about it for
I think that the intermediary between EUtenton and the project, thought it was
the wrong idea, but said that this was the situation. I don't think they sup-
ported it In fact, I know it
"PASH. He made about at least 3 contacts that we know of."
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Garrison, I got "have a feeling" "Espionage Act", "intermediary
between Eltenton and the project thought is was wrong idea," "was the situation"
and there are some words in between there that are indistinct. Is that the
way you heard it?
Mr. GABBISON. More or less. I am frank to say I would not feel confident
Mr. ROBB. I did hear "intermediary." wHuwew.
Mr. GABBISON. I hear that.
Mr. ROBB. "Project1' and ''wrong idea." "I don't think he supported it In fact,
I know it" I heard that
Mr. GABBISON. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. Perhaps it is not too important
ar^-^^so*;,N(iw' on ^ next P**6' the t*1** ^a f<rart* Paragraphs.
"This third man?" "That is right" I am not quite sure of that **&**•
Mr. ROBB. Shall we have it again?
Mr. GABBISON. Yes.
[Recording:]
"PASH. He made about at least three contacts that we know of.
"OPPENHEIMER. I think that's right, yes.
* i***^^ 2 of t^ese contacts are down there. That means we can assume
at least there is one of these men contacted still on the project
HmcEB. Yes. I believe that this man has gone or is scheduled to go to
This third man)
297
"OPPENHEIMER. I think 80."
Mr. EOBB. AU right Mr. Garrison?
Mr. GARRISON. I heard the words '*This third man". I heard some indistinct
words at the end of the preceding sentence. "That is right," I didn't hear.
Mr. ROBB. That is unquestionably there. Will you play it again?
[Recording:]
"PASH. This third man?
"OPPENHEIMER. I think so."
Mr. ROBB. That is right.
Mr. GARRISON. I heard something like picture.
Mr. ROBB. I fli*"fr that is the picture.
Mr. GARRISON. Something like that
Mr. ROBB. It could be.
Mr. GARRISON. Why don't we pass it?
Mr. ROBB. One thing, Mr. Chairman. I noticed on the other page.
Mr. GARRISON. Gould I have it once again.
[Recording:]
"Yes, I believe that this man has gone, or is scheduled to go to site X.
"PASH. This third man?
"OPFENHEIMER. I think so."
Mr. SILVERMAN. I thought he said, "I think so."
Mr. GARRISON. It sounded this time more like, "I think so." I really Just don't
know.
Mr. GRAY. It would appear, would it not, whether Dr. Oppenheimer said,
"That is right", or "That is the pitcure", or "I think so*', that he was not indi-
cating disagreement with Colonel Pash at that point?
Mr. GARRISON. I wouldd take that to be so.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I did notice one thing in the record. It mentions
on page 7 of the transcript on the fourth line from the top, as I heard it, it
reads, "What I am driving at is that means that there was a plan."
Dr. EVANS. I thought it was "is". It doesn't matter at all.
Mr. ROBB. Did you get that, Mr. Garrison?
Mr. GARRISON. No.
Mr. ROBB. You don't want to hear that again?
Mr. GARRISON. No.
Mr. ROBB. You won't agree on that?
Mr. GARRISON. I don't think it is important enough, to play again.
Dr. EVANS. I don't either.
Mr. ROBB. All right
Mr. GRAY. Are we ready to proceed with the next portion?
[Recording:]
"I would not think that this was a very highly organized or very well put
together plan but I don't know and I was very much afraid when I heard of
Lomanitz' indiscretion that it might very well be serious. I hope that isn't the
case.
"PASH. You mentioned that this man may be a member of the FAEGT. Do
you think, as a representative of the organization, he would sort of represent
their attitude or do yon think he is doing that individually?
"OPPENHEIMER. Oh, the FAECT is quite a big union and has all sorts of
people in it. I am pretty sure and I don't think it is conceivable that he could
be representing the attitude of the union
"PASH. Well, I don't know enough about it to
"OPPENHEIMER. I think that— well, I don't know. I think at one time they had
a strong branch up at the Shell Development Research Laboratories, the FABOT,
and I believe it is the union which has got organized on the hill.
"JOHNSON. Yes, it has been around for some time.
"PASH. This man Eltenton is a scientist?
"OPPENHEIMER. I don't know. I would guess he is some sort of a chemical
engineer.
"PASH. Would he be in a position to understand the information furnished him?
"OPPENHEIMER. I don't know that either. It would depend on how well it was
furnished. I mean he has some scientific training and certainly if you sat down
with him and took a little time. My view about this whole damn thing, of course,
is that the information we are working on is probably known to all the govern-
ments that care to find out The information about what we are doing is prob-
ably of no use because it is so damn complicated. I don't— I mean I don't agree
that the security problem on this project is a bitter one, because if one means by
the security problem preventing information of technical use to another country
298
from escaping. But I do think that the Intensity of our effort and our concern of
the international investment involved — that is information which might alter the
course of the other governments, and I don't think it would have any effect on
Russia [inaudible]. It might have a very big effect on Germany, and I am con-
vinced about that and that is as everyone else is.
"PASH. Oh.
"OPPENHEIMEB. To give it roughly what we're after and I think they don't need
to know the technical details because if they were going to do it they would do it
in a different way— they wouldn't take our methods— they couldn't because of
certain geographical differences, so I think the kind of thing that would do the
greatest damage if it got out would just be the magnitude of the problem and of
the time schedules which we think we have of that kind.
"PASH. To answer your question— Bltenton if you were picking a man which
would be an intermediary he wouldn't be a bad choice, I would mention he had
some kind of chemical engineering Job in Russia. He was trained in England,
also in Russia 4 or 5 years and things like that. Does he speak Russian, do you
know?
"OPPENHEIMER. I don't know. I don't know. He speaks with a slight English
accent.
"PASH. If it is necessary would you mind and would it interfere with your
work if I would have
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I know the paragraph marked "P" in this transcript
on page 9 about a third of the way down is actually Dr. Oppenheimer speaking,
"To answer your question" and so on. Colonel Pash made some interruption and
then Dr. Oppenheimer continued. Did you get that?
Mr. GABBISON. No ; I didn't
Mr. ROBB. Page 9, "To answer your question— Eltenton if you were picking a
man which would be an intermediary he wouldn't be a bad choice." That is
obviously Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. GABBISON. Dr. Oppenheimer's voice does come in there.
Mr. ROBB. That is Dr. Oppenheimer speaking there and not Colonel Pash.
"Mr. GABBISON. I am not sure the words "To answer your question"
Mr. ROBB. Could we play that?
Mr. GRAY. Before we play it back, let me make a couple of other observations.
In the first paragraph on this page, the fifth line from the end of the paragraph,
"and our concern of the 'national' Investment involved," rather than the "Inter-
national" investment.
Mr. ROBB. Yes, sir.
Mr. GABBISON. Our concern with, I think it was also.
Mr. GBAT. Yes.
Mr. GABBISON. And some words after the word "escaping" that were indistinct,
and before the word **but."
Mr. ROBB. I think so.
Mr. GABBISON. And the dots after the word "Russia" contained some words.
Mr. GBAT. Would you play that portion again?
Mr. ROLANDEB, The last third.
Mr. GABBISON. Before we do that, perhaps we could make one or two observa-
tions so that we can be listening to it.
Mr. GBAT. Yes.
Mr. GABBISON. In the next Oppenheimer paragraph, there are some indistinct
words to begin with, and "to give it roughly," I thought it read "To give the Rus-
sians" or "To give to- Russia."
Mr. ROBB. It could be.
Mr. GABBISON. And I think they don't— that seemed to me fuzzy.
Mr. GBAT. Let us listen to that again.
[Recording:]
"[Inaudible.] It might have a very big effect on Germany, and I am con-
vinced about that and that is as everyone else is.
"[Inaudible.] And I think they don't need to know the technical details, be-
cause if they 'were going to do It, they would do it in a different way. They
wouldn't take our methods (inaudible) so I think the kind of thing that would do
the greatest damage if it got out would just be the magnitude of the problem and
of the time schedules which we think we have, that kind of thing.
To answer your question, Bltenton
. "PASH. Uh huh.
"OEPENHEIMEB. To answer your question — Eltenton if you were picking a man
to be an intermediary would not be a bad choice. He had some kind of chemical
299
engineering Job in Russia. He was trained in England, be was in Russia lor
4 or 5 years (inaudible).
"PASS. Does he speak Russian, do you know?
"OFPENHEiMER. I don't know. (Inaudible) with a slight English accent"
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Garrison, did you catch that now? that the "P" paragraph
should be really Dr. Oppenheimer?
Mr. GABBISON. Yes.
Dr. EVANS. And that is "roughly" and not "Russia"?
Mr. ROBB. I think it is.
Mr. GRAY. I think in that paragraph the language "Ha was trained in Eng-
land, was in Russia 4 or 5 years," rather than "also in Russia."
Mr. ROBB. I got it "and in Russia."
Mr. GRAY. It does make a little difference to say he was trained in Russia or
was in Russia.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I heard it the way the Chairman did.
Dr. EVANS. So did I.
Mr. ROBB. Was in Russia.
Mr. GRAY. He was trained in England, was in Russia 4 or 5 years.
In the preceding paragraph, in the interests of grammar, I think actually
what Dr. Oppenheimer said at the end of that paragraph, "and of the time
schedules which we have, that kind of thing," this is very unimportant.
Mr. Robb (reading) : "which we have— that kind of thing."
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we might take a o-minute recess.
We have a very serious problem about our witnesses. Dr. Bethe is here in
town ready to testify. So is Mr. Gordon Dean. Dr. Kennen is here from out
of town, Dr. Buckley, you remember we talked about last week, is here. Dr.
Fisk is here from New York, and General Osborne is also here. I just at this
point don't know what to suggest. Obviously if we go through this at the
rate we are, it will consume most of the rest of the morning and some of this
testimony will be quite of considerable length and I think quite important to
the Board. I know it would be informative to the Board.
Mr. GRAY. I would like to ask the board members a question -about a ruling
that you may recall I made earlier about the necessity for us to hear with
counsel the remainder of this transcript. My reaction was that, as I stated, if
there were to be any changes, we should hear the discussion, but it does occur
to me after having thought about it, if counsel agree, there is no problem. In
the event there is disagreement and it seems to be a material matter, then
perhaps we should hear those portions about which there is disagreement. I
would want to make sure that the Board would agree with that different kind
of ruling on that question.
Mr. MORGAN. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Is that all right, Dr. Evans?
Dr. EVANS. I was certainly in accord with you that we ought to go over
this thing together, but if it is necessary, I shall agree to do it the other way.
Mr. GRAY. I am sure that counsel will be diligent. To the extent that counsel
can agree, I think it would appear to be pretty clear and if you cannot, perhaps
we shall have to hear the disputed portions. Is that satisfactory to you?
Mr. ROBB. Yes, sir. I might suggest that in viftw of the fact that we will be
changing our methods of operation as it were, I think we ought to attempt to
get a complete transcript on which we can agree, so it will be all set out at one
part of the record because the record will be hard to understand.
Mr. GARRISON. I think it is important that the record indicate what has taken
place.
Mr. ROBB. Yes.
Mr. GARRISON. I think we should agree and stipulate on the changes we
should make and bring that back to the Board for its approval and incorporation
in the record, and that the whole document in its original form should go in the
record.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I might say I also think that the Lansdale trans*
cript should also be set up in the record at the same time. I don't think there
is any need to read that, because counsel lias had it and has read it. Mr. Lansdale
testified about it on Friday.
Mr. GARRISON. I would like when we have time to read it into the record,
because there are some comments, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to make
about some passages in it as we go along. I think the transcript as a whole
gives a rather ftesh impression, and rather a different one of the whole interview.
There are some things in it that are really quite worth a moment of thought
300
as we go along. Not for the purpose of correction, but for the purpose of Illus-
trating what I think took place.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions as to whether counsel should
read a transcript and at the same time make an argument about it. It seems
to me that the transcript ought to be before the board for such use as the Board
wants to make of it. I assume that there will be an appropriate time at the
close of these proceedings when counsel can make his argument.
Mr. GARRISON. All right. I withdraw that, Mr. Chairman. But I would like
to have it read, because I think it is important for the board to hear it
Mr. GRAY. The board has read it, I assume. You want to read it aloud?
Mr. GARRISON. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. If a request is made for that procedure, I think we will f ollow it
so that it will at the appropriate time be read. I do not tWrfc we ought to
interrupt at this point to read it
Mr. BOBB. No, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Let us take a recess in any event.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, at the end of the recess, I think we would be
prepared to have Dr. Bethe.
Mr. GRAY. All right
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GRAY. Do you wish to testify under oath? You are not required to do so.
Mr. DEAN. I would be happy to, if that is the custom.
Mr. GRAY. All the witnesses have.
Mr. DEAN. I shall be glad to.
Mr. GRAY. Would you stand and raise your right hand. Gordon Dean, do you
swear that the testimony you are to give the board shall be the truth; the whole
truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. DEAN. I do.
Whereupon Gordon Dean was called as a witness, and having been first duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. It is my duty, Mr. Dean, to say to you that in the event that it
becomes necessary for you to discuss restricted data in your testimony, you
should advise the chairman of the board of any such disclosure. We would ap-
preciate your cooperation in that respect
A further observation I should like to make to you is that the proceedings and
record of this board are regarded by us as strictly confidential between the
Commission and its officials and Dr. Oppenheimer and his representatives and
associates, .and that the Commission will take no initiative in the public release
of any information relating to these proceedings. I tfHnir on behalf of the board,
I express the hope that witnesses may take the same attitude about it
I think perhaps for the record also that it is my duty, Mr. Dean, to remind you
of the penalties under the perjury statutes. I should be glad to read a summary
of those provisions, but I assume yon are thoroughly familiar with them.
The WITNESS. I am familiar with them.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Garrison.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Mr. Dean, you are a member of Lehman Brothers in New York?
A. I am.
Q. And you served on the Atomic Energy Commission from May 1949 to
June 1958?
A. That is correct
Q. And you were appointed Chairman, when was that, August 1950?
A. I think it was the latter part of August— no, the early part of August or
the last part of July. I have forgotten the exact date. It was the summer of
1950.
Q. When did you first become acquainted with Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I had never met Dr. Oppenheimer until I came to the Commission. I met
him for the first time when I as a member of the Commission met with the Gen-
eral Advisory Committee of which he was then the Chairman.
Q. Could you give the board a general picture of the positive work of the
General Advisory Committee during Dr. Oppenheimer's chairmanship, as you
saw it By positive, I mean what the GAO did to build up and strengthen the
military position of the country.
A. I assume that some of this may be repetitious. The General Advisory
Committee was established by law. The members were appointed by the Presi-
dent They selected their own chairman. This was the way in which Dr.
301
Oppenheimer, having once been appointed by the President, was made chairman
of that committee.
They used to meet about every month and a half to 2 months. I think the
minimum requirement was four times a year, but they met much more frequently
than that. They sometimes have special called meetings so that they would
get together on occasions as much as perhaps 3 weeks apart if the occasion
Justified it.
They also worked through subcommittees of the General Advisory Committee.
There was one on weapons. The General Advisory Committee is essentially a
committee of senior scientific people. There were a few exceptions. There were
from time to time outstanding businessmen on it But primarily It is a senior
scientific advisory group to the Commission, and so specified in the law.
They have been very active. They were every moment from the time I went
on the Commission. It was a very important committee and contributed very
much in guidance to the Commission on very difficult problems that we had,
particularly scientific problems.
Q. What was the attitude of the committee under Dr. Oppenheimer's chair-
manship with respect to the expansion of our atomic facilities?
A. In every case— and I might say this to give you just a little bit of history—-
the Atomic Energy Commission underwent a series of expansions of its facilities.
By expansions, I mean this : The design, the construction, and the putting into
operation of large reactors, such as those out at Hanford, to produce plutonium
or tritium or other products. The expansion of the large gaseous diffusion
plants which gives you your uranium 235. In other words, when you are talking
about facilities, you are talking about facilities which give you * * * the
Plutonium and U-235 fissionable material.
All of these expansions were blessed by the General Advisory Committee. I
know of no instance where there was an expansion program beginning with the
summer of 1949 when we went into building a new gaseous diffusion plant at
Oak Eidge, up until the latest big expansion of 1953, which was a $3 billion
expansion program, I know of no instance when the expansion program was not
thoroughly backed by the General Advisory Committee and heartily backed.
Q. Did they help to suggest and initiate expansion programs?
A. This I would almost have to go back and refer to the minutes of meetings
to tell you where an expansion program initiates. It is very hard to put your
finger on it. A need arises, and there are many huddles. Probably the records
would show that some had originated with the GAC but on this I am not sure.
We certainly consulted with them each time when we were thinking of an
expansion program. They always blessed it
Q. You spoke of the weapons subcommittee. Was Dr. Oppenheimer a member
of that?
A. I think he was a member of the weapons subcommittee the entire time I
was on the Commission. He was certainly very active in it, it was the most
active committee of the GAC. I should say this so far as the GAC and weapons
are concerned: I would think that at least 50 percent, and perhaps much more
of its time was spent in the weapons field. There was far more interest on the
part of GAC on the weapons program at Los Alamos and the production of
fissionable materials than in any other phase.
Q. Do you recall a conversation with Dr. Oppenheimer in the spring of 1950
about a bucket of neutrons?
A. I do.
Q. Can you say something about the significance of that and of Dr. Oppen-
heimer's view about what ought to be done?
A. The reference to neutrons was really a suggestion. He spoke of it in the
slang term— a bucket of neutrons. What he really meant was that what the
Commission needed more than anything else were some reactors in which
neutrons could be put to their best use. This was in a sense the idea behind
the Savannah River design and the Savannah Biver reactors, which were dual
purpose. I am not sure whether that is classified or not. Let us end it there.
That was the reason behind the Savannah Biver reactors.
It was in the spring of 1950 that we were considering an expansion program
which could carry us either into a strong A-program or a strong H-program,
depending on what our research and development program showed.
Mr. GRAY. Did you say the spring of 1950?
The WJTOTSS. The spring of 1950. That is when we were getting together
and wrapping up the kind of expansion program, in order to take care of a
stronger A and H program. This is when we first began to think of how we
302
could build the Savannah River reactors. It was an entirely new design. That
was put through Congress, as I recall, in the matter of about 90 days in the late
spring and early summer of 1950.
Mr. GRAY. This is before you became a member of the Commission.
• The WITNESS. It began to be discussed while I was a member, and then I had
to present the program to the Congress in either the late summer — it could have
been early fall of 1950.
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. You became a member of the Commission in May 1949?
A. Yes; in May 1949.
Mr. GRAY. I beg your pardon. I had the years confused. You were on the
Commission when all of this developed.
The WITNESS. Yes ; I am not testifying to anything I did not see or experience
myself.
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer was helpful in connection with this strengthening of the
program you have devised ?
A. Always. There was one big problem that we had and that was precisely
what kind .of design for the Savannah River reactors. * * * That went back and
forth many times, but it was a question simply of the economics of buying
neutrons, so to speak.
Q. There was a meeting in June 1951 at Princeton in connection with the
H-bomb program?
A. There was. If I could give you a little history before we get to that June
meeting, I would like to go back to the fall of 1949. I think it is necessary to
have in the back of your mind before you talk about this June meeting in Prince-
ton, in the fall of 1949, the Russians, we learned, this was September, had
exploded their first A bomb. Dr. Oppenheimer, along with 2 or 3 other persons,
were brought in here * * * and came up with the conclusion that there was no
question but that the Russians had exploded an A bomb.
Then the question became one of having lost our monopoly, if we ever had it,
what should we do to intensify the atomic energy program of this country.
Many things were suggested, including bringing in certain corporations with
certain know-how, such as the duPont Co., which was done, and they did
eventually build the Savannah River reactors.
Work on the thermonuclear weapon, many other things, I cant list them all,
they can be found in a classified statement which I made before the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy in a closed session. If you have occasion to refer to
that, I remember being asked the question, "What do you do now" and I listed
about 8 or 10 things.
Mr. GRAY. What was the approximate date of that?
The WITNESS. That would be in the fall of 1949. This started quite a dis-
cussion inside the ABC as to what priority should be given to a thermonuclear
weapon.
The only thing that we knew about in this field at that time was one method
of approach, which unfortunately if it is to remain classified, I cannot describe,
but I will try to do it in unclassified language.
There was one way of approaching the problem. Nobody had ever built such
a gadget Nobody had ever accumulated enough materials to actually fire a
gadget of this kind, as it was then thought of. Nevertheless, there was a feeling
on the part of some, including myself, that an effort to go into the thermonuclear
or fusion field was something that we could not overlook.
Here was a new field. Here was a potential source of great energy. While we
didn't know what the gadget might look like when we got through, certainly
it should have a high priority in the shop. There were others who felt differ-
ently. This was a matter of much discussion. There were discussions at that
time between the General Advisory Committee and the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion. Most of the General Advisory Committee, all of them, decided that we
should not go ahead under a high priority in the thermonuclear field at that time.
The reasons as I recall them were several. There was, I think, in the back-
ground on the part of some what I would call a visceral reaction
Mr. ROBB. Pardon me?
The WITNESS. Visceral, tummy— of going into a field such as this at this point,
when these people had developed an A bomb. They had seen it used successfully.
Our A bombs were getting stronger every year. Our stockpile was growing.
303
By Mr. GABRISON :
Q. Excuse me.
A. I am trying to describe the events of 1949 and relate them later to- the June
meeting.
Q. I think since we started on this fall of 1949, we better postpone the discus-
sion of the Princeton meeting. I asked you about that only to give the general
picture of the work of the GAG.
A. All right.
Q. I think it is best we continue now. Since you started on this, I think per-
haps it is more appropriate anyway chronologically to take it. Are you now
beginning to describe the attitudes of the members of the GAO at their October
1949 meeting?
A. I am as best I recall them.
Q. Then suppose we have it understood that you are now telling the board
the general nature of what the GAG reported to the Commission. I would like
to go just for a minute into the question of the scope of the report of the GAG
to the AEG, and ask you whether in your opinion the GAG exceeded its statutory
functions or just how you looked upon the role of the GAG as an adviser to the
Commission.
A. The GAO used to be concerned sometimes that it was perhaps exceeding
its strict statutory functions. This was never too important to me. I always
felt that if we could get the wisdom of the people who were on the General
Advisory Committee, we should have it So what their statutory function as a
committee was was not important to me.
In this instance, in the fall of 1949, it was not a question of anybody exceeding
authority. The then Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Lilienthal, had asked
the General Advisory Committee very specifically to review this question of
whether we should attach a high priority to a thermonuclear or fusion program.
They were asked this question. They were asked to consider it at their meeting
which took place in October 1949.
They did consider it. I think they considered little else, I think for about 3
days, than this issue. They came in with their report to the effect that they felt
it was a mistake.
The reasons that they gave I suppose appear in the minutes of the General
Advisory Committee, but we had many discussions and those don't appear in
the minutes.
The reasons were many. I said there was one, a visceral reaction at first. If
I am not departing from the role of witness, I would like to give you my under-
standing of that reaction.
These were men who had developed the A bomb. Oppenheimer had the big
hand in it, as you know. He also had a hand in the measures for the international
control of atomic energy, and served on the board, and was a coauthor
Q. By the board, you mean the Lilienthal panel?
A. The Lilienthal panel which later substantially was turned into the Baruch
Plan in the U. N. They were hopeful at that time that you would not have the
world in the position where you had two great powers simply stockpiling weapons
and no solution to the problem. Consequently, after 2 or 3 years of rather
frustrating dealings with the Bussians, when this proposal of building another
bigger one hit them, as some said, as the answer to our national security, I think
it rather floored them and disgusted them. They lived through the A bomb.
They tried to get international control. If this was the only answer to the
problem, namely, of building bigger H bombs, this was not a satisfactory answer
for those people. I think it was a stomach reaction along those lines.
I did not agree with it, but I fltlnir I can understand it.
Q. You are referring to those members of the GAG who were atomic scientists.
A. That is right, and specifically I would say to Oppenheimer and also to
Fermi and others who sat on the board and Conant, because they had all been
in the program. There were other reasons, however, beyond the tummy reasons
for opposing it at that time. You don't decide to manufacture something that
has never been invented. Nothing had been invented. No one had any idea
what the cost of this thing would be in terms of plutonium bombs. As the
debate or discussions waged in the fall of 1949, we had so little information
that it was very difficult to know whether this was the wise thing to do— to go
after a bomb that might cost us * * * plutonium bombs, and then after 2 or
3 years effort find that ft didn't work. That was the kind of problem. So there
were some economics in this thing.
304
There was another reason. This was how much of a diversion of Los Alamos-
energies, scientific energies, could you safely divert to a project which might or
might not succeed when the ball was rolling so beautifully in your A bomb
program, and we were getting more bang out of our fissionable material, more
weapons for the same amount of fissionable material
Those were all considerations. There may have been others in there that I
have overlooked, but those are the principal ones.
The unknown "quantity was very much there. You don't build bombs by
memoranda. We could write and discuss and interchange papers all night long
and still we were in the dark on this thing.
Mr. Strauss and I at that .time felt quite strongly we nevertheless should
embark on this.
Q. This is after the GAO report?
A. This is after the GAG report The GAO had another meeting shortly after
the October meeting. I think they came together in a matter of 3 or 4 weeks,
and as I recall they reiterated their stand of the October meeting.
The Commission realized — if I can turn from that now for the chronology—-
this was a decision which could not be and should not be made alone by the
Atomic Energy Commission. It was something that had to be resolved eventually
by the President. He should make it only after consulting with the Secretary
of Defense and the Secretary of State. So instead of taking a vote, a vote as
such as I recall was never taken on this issue — we did get together and try to
write a paper for the President's guidance— we, as the Commission, in that we
attempted to find as many things as we could agree on, premises that we believed
to be true, and we wrote those down first Then we wrote down what might
be called a majority report and a minority report Then we all added individual
opinions. So the President could have everything before him.
The paper was given to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense.
They had a meeting and the Commission was ordered to go on a high priority
thermonuclear research development, and this .was done.
Once the President made the decision, I know of no instance where it could
be said that the members of the General Advisory Committee, or any individual,
opposed that program. I know of many instances where they helped it and
at great pains.
This leads me, I think, into the June meeting.
Q. Perhaps just before we get there, there was a problem of recruitment of
physicists.
A. There was a problem.
Q. After the President's go ahead order, was the GAG, specifically Dr. Oppen-
heimer, helpful in that respect?
A. The story did come to me once through Dr. Teller that he was fearful
that he would not get much help out of Dr. Oppenheimer in this recruitment
program. I said to Dr. Teller, UI think what you should do is go up and see
Dr. Oppenheimer, and see if he cannot give you some help." So he did. He
went to Princeton. My recollection is— I can't give you the exact date on this—*
I do recall his going to Princeton and I do recall Dr. Oppenheimer giving him a
list of some 10 or 12 names at least of people he thought would be helpful in
this program. Teller later advised me that these people were all either at
Princeton or the advanced institute, and that he was not able to get any of
them to leave. That is the story on recruitment
I did several times in appearing before the General Advisory Committee in
the summer of 1950 and the spring of 1951, the winter of 1950, ask them for
names of people that we could get into the program from universities, from
private industry and so forth, and some names were given to me. Some we
were successful in getting ; others we were not. I know of no instance, however,
where anyone was discouraged from working on the program by Dr. Oppenheimer.
During the spring and summer of 1950, some rather striking developments
came along in the A-bomb program. Remember our stockpile at that time was
not as big as we would like to have had it These developments were very big.
I think the GAG went out to Los Alamos in the summer of 1950, the weapons
committee, and worked with Dr. Bacher, who was then on leave from Cal Tech,
and spending some time as a consultant at Los Alamos. Out of this summer's
work land it is hard to credit to any one person, came some very significant
developments which as I say* increased * * * our stockpile of A bombs. This
was happening at the same time that the H program looked very discouraging.
'Supplied in declassifying to clarify deletion.
305
Some studies had been made by Dr. TJlam at Los Alamos and he ran some
samplings which made it look as though an H bomb built along the lines that
were talked about in the fall of 1949 just could not be done, or if done it would
be at such a great cost in A bombs that you couldn't pay the price.
These things were happening. The H-bomb program looked bad. Every re-
sult was discouraging. The A-bomb program was improving. However, in the
spring of 1951, we started a series of tests. By that I mean test explosions.
We opened in a jury rig fashion on the Nevada proving ground. As I recall
in that year we shot something like 14, 15, maybe 16 bombs altogether. Pour
at Ertfwetok in the spring of 1951, and quite a few in Nevada. Some of these
bore some relationship to a possible H program, and notably one shot which was
fired in May of 1951 at Eniwetok, which I can't describe without using classified
information.
After that explosion I thought it was high time that we got together all the
people who had any kind of a view on H weapons. Of course, there were many
views among the scientists. By views, I don't mean views as to whether you
could have one, but views of whether you could have one and how you would
get it
I talked, as I recall, to 2 or 3 of the Commissioners and said wouldn't it be
good if we could get them all around a table and make them all face each other
and get the blackboard out and agree on some priorities.
We did do that We asked Dr. Oppenheimer, as chairman of the Weapons
Committee of the GAC, to preside at the meeting. We had at that meeting
in Princeton in June of 1951 every person, I think, that could conceivably have
made a contribution. People like Norris Bradbury, head of the Los Alamos
laboratory, and 1 or 2 of his assistants, Dr. Nordheim, I believe, was there from
Los Alamos very active in the H program. Johnny von Neumann from Princeton,
one of the best weapons men in the world, Dr. Teller, Dr. Bethe, Dr. Fermi,
Johnny Wheeler, all the top men from every laboratory, sat around this table
and we went at it for 2 days.
Out of the meeting came something which Edward Teller brought into the
meeting with his own head, which was an entirely new way of approaching a
thermonuclear weapon. * * *
I would like to be able to describe that but it is one of the most sensitive
things we have left in the atomic energy program * * *. It was just a theory
at this point. Pictures were drawn on the board. Calculations were made,
Dr. Bethe, Dr. Teller, Dr. Fermi participating the most in this. Oppy very
actively as welL
At the end of those 2 days we were all convinced, everyone in the room, that
at least we had something for the first time that looked feasible in the way of
an idea. * * *
I remember leaving that meeting impressed with this fact, that everyone around
that table without exception, and this included Dr. Oppenheimer, was enthusi-
astic now that you had something foreseeable. I remember going out and in 4
days making a commitment for a new plant. * * * We had no money in the
budget to do it with and getting this thing started on the tracks, there was
enthusiasm right through the program for the first time. The bickering was
gone. The discussions were pretty well ended, and we were able within a
matter of just about 1 year to have that gadget ready.
It had to be shipped to Eniwetok. We had to lay it on the task force and it
was fired in November 1952.
Since then there have been many others fired out in the Pacific in this field.
That is the significance of the June meeting. It was the first time that all
competent people in this program that could contribute anything sat around the
same table and finally came up with something they all agreed on. That is
when it began to roll and it rolled very fast then.
That is the chronology of it
Q. Mr. Oppenheimer was the chairman of the meeting and presided?
A. He presided at the meeting and participated actively in the meeting and
left the meeting enthusiastic. I recall talking with him afterward, and he was,
I could say, almost thrilled that we had something here that looked as though
it might work. * * * I might say, that the gadget which we originally thought
of in 1949 probably never would work and would have cost in terms of A bombs
a price we could never have paid.
Q. You remember the Crouch incident with which the board here is familiar?
A. The first recollection I have of that, I guess the only one
Q. I am not asking you to recite what it was, because the board knows all
about it
306
A. Yes, I remember the Grouch Incident If yon mean by that his testimony
in California.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. After that was brought to the attention of the Commission, did the Chair-
man ask you to go through Dr. Oppenheimer's personnel file and inquire into
the whole question of his clearance?
A.. I wonder if you could refresh my recollection on the date. Was this about
the summer of 1950?
Q. It was in May of 1950, in the spring of 1950.
A. As I recall it, it was before I became chairman. I may have been acting
chairman that day in the absence of the chairman. The Crouch incident was
brought to my attention. I thought it was something that we ought to talk to
Dr. Oppenheimer about
I asked our general counsel, Mr. Volpe, to talk to Dr. Oppenheimer about this
Crouch incident I wanted it delicately done in the first place. I had no idea
whether Crouch was telling the truth or not. He did, and reported back to me
that he had gone into this at great length with Dr. Oppenheimer, and that no
such meeting as Crouch had described, which was as I recall a kind of a meet-
ing of a Communist cell to recite the party line, that was supposed to have taken
place somewhere in Berkeley back in 1940 or so, no such meeting had ever taken
place.
He said, "I won't say that I didn't meet Crouch at some cocktail party or
something like that, because we had plenty of people around the place, but no
such meeting as this, you can be sure."
"I never sat in on any Communist meeting or Communist cell meeting." This
picture as I recall is a small group of 4 or 5 people had gone off in a room in a
house and talked over the Communist Party line.
Q. Did you go through Dr. Oppenheimer's personnel file?
A. I did. This is the first occasion I ever had to look at Dr. Oppenheimer's
personnel file. Ordinarily Commissioners don't go through the files of people
unless there is some real reason. Here, however, was a person who was chairman
of the committee ; he had been cleared in 1947 by the Commission, and I for the
first time picked it up and went through it personally myself.
I then asked Dr. Oppenheimer if he could come in and see me about this, and
I personally asked him about the Crouch incident He said substantially what I
have said he said in reply to Mr. Volpe, and I believed Mm.
Q. Did you continue to read matters that went into his personnel file after
this?
A. I told the security officer, I believe, or perhaps my secretary, that anything
coming from the FBI concerning Dr. Oppenheimer I wanted to see, and file in
my own mind at least
Two or three did come in. Because .here was a file with a lot of early associ-
ation evidence, I thought he was too- important a man for me to overlook him,
and it was my responsibility as Chairman, also. So I did see, I am sure, every
memorandum from the FBI. But there were only 2 or 3, and there was nothing
particularly new in them, as I recall, from that point on.
Q. What was your belief as to Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty after you had been
through the file and had talked with him?
A. There was no question in my mind — I must say when I first looked at the
file, I had doubts, largely growing out of these early associations— but there
was never any doubt in my mind after I examined the file and based partly
on my knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer, which was very close, there was never
any doubt as to his loyalty in my opinion. None. That decision had to be made
one way or the other. It could not be half way. There were some very un-
pleasant early associations when you look at them in retrospect, but as far as
his loyalty I was convinced of it, not that the file convinced me so much, but the
fact that here was a man, one of the few men who can demonstrate his loyalty
to his country by his performance. Most people illustrate their loyalty in nega-
tive terms. They did not see somebody. Here is a man who had an unusual record
of performance. It is much broader than I have indicated so, far.
Q. Would you state to the board your general impression of his character
as well as his loyalty, his integrity and sense of discretion? How would you rate
those qualities?
A. I would say that he is a very human man, a sensitive man, a very well
educated man, a man of complete integrity in my association with MW. And a
very devoted man to his country, and certainly to the Commission. No question
of these tilings in my mind.
307
Q. Would you say a word about Dr. Oppenheimer's interest in military defense
in late 1952 and early 1953 in connection with operation Lincoln, for example? I
don't want you to go into great detail.
A. I will Just say a word about that because I was not particularly identified
with project Lincoln. Dr. Oppenhedmer had many advisory posts to the Secre-
tary of State, Secretary of Defense, and advisor, if not a member, of the Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy of the Research and Development Board, and others,
and participated in many studies. When he left — when his term had expired —
as chairman of the GAO in the summer of 1952, he particularly turned his atten-
tion to defense measures against A bombs and spent a very large share of his
time on such questions as the necessity for an adequate radar net, early warning
radar system, on certain civilian defense measures, and on the importance of
interception, and as always the importance of our capacity to deliver our bombs.
From the very beginning I recall this is one of Dr. Oppenheimer's great worries,
that our Air Force would not stay up at the level of our bomb production, that
some day we might find ourselves short of delivery. So he was concerned with
all four of those things.
Q. You have sat on the Security Council since President Eisenhower's election?
A, Several times on special things.
Mr. GRAY. Would you repeat that?
Mr. GABBXSON. I asked frtm if he had sat on the Security Council under the
present administration.
Mr. GRAY. The National Security Council?
Mr. GABBISON. Yes.
The WITNESS. The Chairman is not a member of it. But as questions caine up
touching on atomic energy the Chairman of the AEC, which I was at the time,
v/as invited over to participate. I guess there were four or five occasions, per-
haps more, in the spiring of last year when I did sit in on the National Security
Council on atomic matters.
By Mr. GABEISON :
Q. Did Dr. Bush and Dr. Oppenheimer come before the Council when you were
sitting on it?
A. They appeared one day, yes. They made a presentation, the nature of
which I am sorry I am a little hazy on. I think it had mostly to do with what
at that time was perhaps loosely called operation Candor, and with civilian
defense and other defensive devices.
Q. In all of your contacts with Dr. Oppenheimer, has he ever underestimated
the Russian threat in your opinion?
A. Never. From the very earliest times Oppenheimer has been worried very
much about, first of all, the lack of reliability of the Russians. He showed some
frustration in our inability in the early days to work out a system and he never
underestimated the Russians. A lot of our people have, but this is one man
who never did.
Q. Do you remember a discussion with Dr. Oppenheimer in the fall of 1950
about his chairmanship of the GAO?
A. Yes. This was after I was Chairman. Dr. Oppenheimer came to me one
day— his term had to run until August of 1952, 1 think.
Q. As a member?
A. As a member. He was then Chairman. He said he knew that we had had
quite a disagreement on the H-bomb program, back in 1949 and whether it should
have a high priority. He told me that he thought that this had perhaps hurt his
effectiveness on the General Advisory Committee, and that he was prepared to
get off if for one moment I thought that this effectiveness had been so hurt that he
could not serve.
I thought about it for a few moments—in fact, I had thought about it before —
and I told him that I thought that the General Advisory Committee would defi-
nitely lose, and so would the Commission, if we lost him from it at that time,
and that I felt as one who had disagreed with him on the thermonuclear program
that his effectiveness perhaps had been hurt in some quarters and some people's
opinions, but not in mine. I would miss him very much if he left.
When 1952 came around, he had served his time and he said, "I have been on
too long. I think newer heads should be brought into the program," and he said,
"I hope you would not urge the President to reappoint me." So I sent a letter
to the President saying that these three members, Conant, DuBridge, and Oppen-
heimer were leaving. I prepared a draft of the letter for the President to sign
for each one of them thanking them for their services, and that was the end of
Dr. Oppenheimer's term.
308
Q. Summing up your convictions about Dr. Oppenheimer, you have testified
to his loyalty and to his integrity and character with full knowledge of what you
told us about your reading of his personnel file. I take it, also, that it goes
without saying that you have read the Commission's letter which initiated this
proceeding?
A. The charges? Yes, I have.
Q. The Commission refers to them as items of derogatory Information, and
not as charges.
A. That is right I read that letter.
Q. On the basis of that knowledge and your experience with him, in your
opinion is he or is he not a security risk?
A. He is not a security risk in my opinion. If I had so considered him a
security risk, I would have initiated such a hearing long, long ago. I think
his usefulness has been impaired by all this. I don't know how much he can
contribute farther to his country, but I would hope we would get the maximum
out of him. I am certain that he is devoted to his country and if given an oppor-
tunity to serve, will serve and effectively as always.
Mr. GABBISON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
By Mr. RQBB:
Q. Mr. Dean, Dr. Oppenheimer has testified before this board in substance
that in 1943 he became aware of an attempt at Russian espionage against the
atomic bomb project He has further testified that when interviewed about
this matter by intelligence officers of the United States Army, he told these
officers a fabrication and tissue of lies.
He has also testified -
A. May I ask, are you quoting from some testimony? '
Mr. GRAY. Just a minute, please.
Mr. GAEEISON. Mr. Chairman, I want to object in the strongest terms to the
form of the question which counsel has put. I think it is impossible to present
to this witness the questions about the Chevalier incident without really
thoroughly going into the whole case and Incident in all its ramifications. I
think the question gives an utterly false summation of what actually happened
in the total Chevalier incident which is the only way that it can be looked at
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Garrison can go into it if he wishes, I think I have the right
to put the question to the witness in the form of an assumption, if not otherwise.
Mr. GRAY. I take it you are objecting to the question, Mr. Garrison?
Mr. Garrison. I am objecting to any question to this witness that tries to put
to him the Chevalier Incident without going into it in the kind of shape that the
matter has come to this board. It involves the whole question of his relations
with Chevalier, of his initiating the information about BJltenton, of the views
of General Groves and Colonel Lansdale. This whole thing has a very long and
complicated story. To say here to this witness as a fact that Dr. Oppenheimer
did this and that in respect to the Chevalier incident seems to me most unfair.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, there is not the slightest doubt that Mr. Oppenheimer
did testify that he lied to Colonel Pash and Colonel Lansdale, not once, but
many times, and that his statements -
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman -
Mr. ROBB. May I finish — and his statements to those officers constituted a
fabrication and tissue of lies, and he knew when he was lying, he was Impeding
the investigation in progress. There is no question in the world that the record
shows that
Mr. GAKBJSON. Mr. Chairman, this whole business of the so-called lies over and
over again was in fact nothing but one story. He told this story to Colonel
Pash. He told part of it, that we have reference to here, to Colonel Lansdale.
By breaking up the component parts of that story into separate questions,
counsel in his cross examination made this appear as if one lie after another
had been told.
It lies heavy on my conscience that I did not at that time object to 'the
impression that was trying to be conveyed to this board of a whole series of lies
when in fact there was one story which was told.
Mr. GRAY. Let me ask Mr. Garrison this question. Is it clear that the
record shows that there was a fabrication?
Mr. GABBISON. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. I wonder if Mr. Robb can proceed from that point on his question
in a way that it would not be objected to?
309
Mr. ROBB. I can't keep Mr. Garrison from objecting, Mr. Chairman, Just so
we nave no doubt about it, I will read from the record at page 488:
"Isn't it a fair statement today, Dr. Oppenheimer, that according to your
testimony now you told not one lie to Colonel Pash, but a whole fabrication
and tissue of lies?
• "A. Right
"Q. In great circumstantial detail, is that correct?
"A. Right."
I submit my question on the basis of that is perfectly fair.
The WITNESS. I don't know what the question is at this point
Mr. ROBB. Of course you don't
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, it really does not convey at all what this was
about The question of whether Chevalier told 3 men or 1, whether Bltenton
had a contact at the consulate or didn't, whether the consulate had some micro-
film or didn't, all that was of an irrelevant character of what the security officer
wanted to find out, which was Chevalier's name. The substance of this whole
thing is that Dr. Oppenheimer did not for a long time, and he has regretted
and has said so explicitly, revealed the name of Chevalier, which was what the
security officers wanted. These incidental details about whether there were
8 men or 1 had nothing to do with the problem that the security officers were
faced with. I think that is the question that counsel has put to Dr. Oppenheimer
in that form was an unfair one which distorted the record, and I should have
objected to it at that time.
Mr. GBAY. I would like to say, Mr. Garrison, that frankly the Chairman of
the Board does not know what the question is, and I have heard the witness
observe that he does not I don't know what the question is. The argument
to the Chairman by counsel in the presence of the witness pretty well estab-
lished a background perhaps to which you are objecting to in the first place.
There has been a discussion of this incident I should like to ask if Mr. Robb
will put his question, and I will give Mr. Garrison an opportunity to object to
the question.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Mr. Dean, I am going to ask you to assume that Dr. Oppenheimer testified
before this board that in 1943 he became aware of an attempt at Russian espio-
nage against the atomic energy project, and assume that he further testified
that when interviewed about this matter by intelligence officers of the United
States Army, he told these officers a fabrication and tissue of lies, and assume
that he further testified that when he told these lies, he knew that by telling
them, he was impeding the investigation of Russian espionage.
Now, if Dr. Oppenheimer so testified in substance, would that cause you to
change your opinion about him?
A. As a security risk, then, or a security risk today?
Q. Now.
A. None. There must have been some reason for it
Mr. GAEBISON. Mr. Chairman, I think the assumptions in his question amount
to the same thing as putting to the witness a question as to something which
is only a fraction of Dr. Oppenheimer's testimony. One would have to add to
that and assume that he initiated the whole matter by bringing to the attention
of the security officers that there was a man called Eltenton who ought to be
watched because he had a contact and a way of transmitting information.
One would have to assume also that the contact was a colleague at the Uni-
versity of Dr. Oppenheimer's in whom he had complete personal confidence, and
ultimately told the name of that friend of his, notwithstanding his belief in his
innocence, to General Groves. All of that has also to be assumed because all
of that is part of this thing we are talking about
Mr. GBAY. I should like to ask in view of the answer of the witness whether
it doesn't make any difference now.
The WITNESS. I am sorry I answered before you had the opportunity to object
Mr. GBAY. I don't think as far as this witness is concerned the additional
fact which then would bring on certain others in fairness in the record, for
example, the disclosure of the name was under orders, and things of that sort,
Jbut I think all of that, Mr. Garrison, in view of the answer of the witness
Mr. GABBISOW. Mr. Chairman, I will yield on this point I didn't actually
hear the witness' answer.
Mr. GRAY* I would gather the witness1 answer was favorable to Dr. Oppen-
heimer. It was so intended, was it not?
310
The WITNESS. Yes. My answer was, do you mean a security risk then or now.
The questioner said "A security risk now", and I said none.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. I believe you added he must have had a reason for it, is that right?
A. I don't know all the circumstances. When I say he must have had, I
would say I would t^^> there would be some reason for it, is a better way
to put it.
Mr. GSAY. I don't know whether we could get into the question for the reason
for it without going into the whole record.
The WITNESS. I frankly don't know the reasons.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Would you have thought he was a security risk at that time?
Mr. GABRISON. Mr. Chairman, that is a highly hypothetical question based on
a complete lack of understanding what this is about. How can he possibly
testify what his Judgment was on an incomplete fragment of the record.
Mr. ROBB. I though the witness had some distinction in his mind. I thought
it fair to ask him what it was.
Mr. GBAY. The witness indicated a distinction about his testimony, and has
said that he would find it difficult to address himself to that question without
knowing the circumstances, if I understood his testimony.
The WITNESS. That is it.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Now, Mr. Dean, you spoke of a conversation you had with Dr. Edward
Teller concerning Dr. Oppenheimer.
A. Yes. In connection with recruitment?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. Could you fix the date of that conversation?
A. I had difficulty in fixing the date of it. It would be some time in 1950
or 1951. That I am sure. I can't quite place it, though, because Dr. Teller
was in and out of Los Alamos so many times during this period, back at the
University of Chicago, out to California, back at Los Alamos, that I don't recall
the exact times when he was trying to recruit. It may have been in 1951 at
a time when he was trying to get support for a second laboratory. It may
have been that late.
Q. Who was trying, sir?
A. Teller.
Q. Would you tell us the substance ef that conversation? You mentioned
it, but I don't think you told us very much about it
A, That particular conversation is only one little piece in a long story of
the second laboratory, and I had many with Teller.
Q. Did you have many with Dr. Teller in which Dr. Oppenheimer was men-
tioned?
A. I would not say many. His name probably came up in two or three con-
versations.
Q. Would you give us the substance of those conversations?
A. I wouldn't want to quote on these. I can give you the tenor or the setting
for these conversations. That is about all I can do. Teller undoubtedly felt
that Oppenheimer was wrong in his original decision on the thermonuclear
program in 1949.
Q, You mean to oppose it?
A. To have voted against giving it that priority at that time. Teller was an
optimist in this field and thought that things could be done. He was very
active in recruiting. He told me that he thought he would not get much help
out of Oppenheimer. He may even have intimated that Oppenheimer would
discourage people from coming.
Q. Did he so intimate?
A. Yes, I think that is a fair statement
Q. What did he say about that?
A. He said he feared that he might I said the way to resolve that is to gg
up and see him.
Q. Did he say why he feared that?
A, No. If he did, I can't recall precisely why.
Q. Did yon ask him?
311
A. No, because I knew the two personalities so well. Two men that had
little different views on things and how to do things. I was anxious to keep
Teller and I was anxious to get the most out of Oppenheimer. So I said, "Go
up and ask Oppenheimer if he will give you some names." Oppenheimer, as I
recall it, gave him a list of 10 or 12 names. Then Teller came back and re-
ported that they were all people at Princeton, which would be normal to have
most of the names at least picked from the place where he was teaching^ and
that he was unable to get any of them to come.
Q. You said at Princeton; you mean they were all working under Dr.
Oppenheimer at Princeton?
A. Not necessarily. They were either at Princeton University or the Insti-
tute of Advanced Studies.
Q. If they were at the institute, they were under Dr. Oppenheimer.
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. And Teller reported back he could not get any of them to come?
A. That is right
Q. Did he say what reasons they had given him for not coming?
A. No.
Q. Did he attribute their not coming to Dr. Oppenheimert influence?
A. No, he did not. He left an inference that Oppenheimer might have been
responsible, but he did not say so in so many words.
Q. You gathered that from what Teller stated?
A. Yes. But I also knew the difficulty of getting anybody at that time to go
to work with Dr. Teller at a laboratory which had not been created, and which
was completely unplanned, site unselected, the organization for which had not
been outlined, and so forth.
Q. You mentioned a second laboratory.
A. Yes.
Q. That question came up, I believe, in the fall of 1951, did it not?
A. That is about the time.
Q. Subsequent to the Princeton meeting.
A. Yes.
Q. I believe you told us at the Princeton meeting everybody agreed that you
had the right gadget to make thermonuclear.
A. Well, we hoped we did. It looked promising.
Q. In all events, Dr. Oppenheimer thought so?
A. That is right. Everyone around the table did.
Q. In the fall of 1951, Mr. Dean, the GAC recommended against the establish-
ment of a second laboratory, didn't it?
A. I would have to refer to the minutes. I would caution you on this, If I
may. When you refer to second laboratory, I think it is well to define the
terms, because the second laboratory, so-called, had been mentioned to many
people. To some it meant a possible second Los Alamos at a new site in an
isolated spot with some 2,000 to 8,000 scientific people in the laboratory, and
equipment which would be necessary, which means a capital investment of
$110 million. That is what Los Alamos is. To some people it meant that kind
of a lab. To other people, it meant a very small laboratory specializing in
nuclear fission, low temperature and metallurgy, and to be rather hastily put
together, perhaps in Colorado, a place somewhere near Denver and Boulder.
To other people it meant an Air Force laboratory at Chicago, which would
be turned into a thermonuclear lab. This had some support from the Air
Force people.
To me — and we debated this at some length — it had to be if it was ever going
to work a place that was already established if you were going to save time.
It had to be a place where you had to have a man in there who commanded
respect, that Teller would work for and work with, and be comfortable working
with. There was only one place that I could finally fasten on that fitted this,
and this was to work under Ernest Lawrence at an established place, that is,
you had a Radiation Lab. You had another site which we were using for other
purposes, some 30 miles away at Livermore and that is eventually what was done.
So when people speak of second labs, and the controversy concerning second
labs, I think it is important that in each case to make them define their terms.
They meant entirely different things, some of which in my opinion were wise
and some of which were not wise.
Q. I understand that Mr. Murray, one of the Commissioners, and Dr. Teller,
did present to the General Advisory Committee a proposal for a second labora-
tory in December 1951. Do you recall that? »«
A. Not specifically, but it is quite possible.
312
Q. In their memorandum which I believe was prepared by Dr. Teller, it was
stated, "The very rapidity of recent progress"
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, may we see this?
Mr. ROBB. No, sir.
Mr. GARRISON. I am asking the chairman if we may have a copy of this docu-
ment to see what is being read from and what the nature of it is.
Mr. GRAY. I will have to inquire as to the security.
Mr. ROLANDER. The document itself is classified. I think the portion he is
reading may he read without disclosing security information.
Mr. GARRISON. I submit that the document be shown to Mr. Dean who is cleared
for security information.
Mr. ROBB. Much of this may be obviated if Mr. Garrison would wait until
I complete my question before interrupting me.
Mr. GRAY. I would suggest that Mr. Robb read his question and see if you
feel that there is any difficulty about it, Mr. Garrison.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I might say in general that I had understood that
this was not a court proceeding, and I was going along on that assumption. I
think it is clear I have refrained from making the slightest objection to any of
Mr. Garrison's questions or testimony or anything. I don't care what form Mr.
Garrison puts his questions. I assume this is not a court proceeding. But if
Mr. Garrison is going to stick on technicalities and turn this into a proceeding
according to the strict rules of evidence, I think we ought to have it understood
here and now.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, it certainly was our understanding that this
was to be an inquiry and not a trial
Mr. GRAY. That is correct
Mr. GARRISON. I do most earnestly say to the Board that the only objections
that I have raised with respect to cross examination which at times in this
room has taken on the atmosphere of a prosecution than anything else, which
I have not though perhaps I should have objected, the only questions I have
raised have seemed to me to be of a rather basic character, where a scrap of a
document has been read from without either the witness or ourselves knowing
what was the content of it. I think if you will examine the Pash and Lansdale
transcripts, as I know you will in full, you will find that the things taken out of
context have been given not really a fair impression. This to me is rather
elementary and not a technical matter.
Mr. GRAY. With respect to those documents, of course they will be in the
record. The Chair does not know from what document Mr. Robb is reading or
whether it can be made available. I repeat, I suggest that he read the question
and if the witness finds it confusing or alien to him, he can so indicate. Then
if you object to the question being put, I should like to hear from you.
Mr. GARRISON. All right.
The WITNESS. Could you tell me again Mr. Robb what is the memo purported
to be dated, to and from?
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. It is a memorandum from Commissioner Murray and Dr. Teller to the
GAD. What I am going to do is ask you if you recall this was the position
those two gentlemen took. If you don't, that is the end of it. I am advised
that they stated in their memorandum : "The very rapidity of recent progress
is evidence of potentialities which have been neglected for years, and which will
not be. fully exploited unless a new laboratory is established."
Do you recall any such argument as that being made for a new laboratory?
A. There were many arguments along this line, and it is quite possible that
some such thing was said. I am sure that the matter came before the GAC
in one form or another. It is consistent that Tom Murray and Teller should
be for a second laboratory of some kind because they both felt very strongly
about it, as I did, as a matter of fact, but it was a question of where, when
and who.
Q. The second lab which Teller and Murray were for was the second lab to
work on the thermonuclear, is that right?
A. This is not dear. Perhaps the document may clear It up as to what kind
of lab they are talking about at that point
Q. What is your best recollection about it, sir?
A. Ton see, there are two kinds of labs you could have to work on the
thermonuclear. One is an across the board laboratory such as Los Alamos,
with all of its departments : a test division, physics division, a chemistry divi-
313
sion, a metallurgical division, and all the other divisions which make an inte-
grated laboratory. This is one way, and perhaps this is the best way to have a
thermonuclear laboratory if you had the time, because so many of the problems
that touch on fission bear on fusion. * * *
So theoretically if you had Jlme and money and everything, you would build
another Los Alamos.
We didn't feel we had that. I don't know whether this particular proposal
was that broad or whether it was the kind of proposal that Teller and I talked
about several times, which was simply a very specialized laboratory empha-
sizing low temperature work and some metallurgy. That is why I think you
have to define your terms on this. If there is anything in the document which
describes what type of lab at that point, then I can do it. But just a second
lab, with all the labs we had at that time, was
Q. In any event, Mr. Dean, did there come a time when the General Advisory
Committee did take a position on the establishment of a second laboratory for
whatever purpose?
A. Yes, I believe they did. I cannot recall at this moment, and I wish my
recollection could be refreshed by some document, what the issue was before
the GAG at that time. If it was an across the board, another Los Alamos, I
am sure they said no to It, because I do recall many discussions saying who would
you get to run it? Where would you recruit the men who knew about weapons,
who were all at Los Alamos at that time except a few people in specialties at
some of the universities, such as Ohio State, which had a very strong low tem-
perature group and so forth. But virtually all the people that would contribute
to this would be people who were working for us in the weapns lab with a few
outsiders. So I am sure that the GAG at that time, however the issue was
presented to them, concluded that Just didn't make sense.
Q. Do you remember when that was?
A. I don't really. It could have been either the fall of 1951 or all the way
through 1952, because it seems to me it was a matter
Q. Did there come a time
Mr. GABBISON. Gould we have the date of that memorandum?
Mr. BOBB. This memorandum is a compilation of memoranda, but the particular
memorandum I was referring to was prepared December 19, 1951.
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. Mr. Dean, did there come a time when you yourself as Chairman of the
AEG wrote to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy respecting
the establishment of a second laboratory?
A. I am sure there must have been, but I don't have the documents.
Q. Do you recall when that might have been?
A. If you will give me some hint as to what I said in it, I could perhaps
time it
Q. Frankly I don't have your entire letter, but I will try to give you a hint.
A. All right
Q. I don't know whether this is classified or not. Is it, Mr. Rolander?
A. I did write a letter on this whole thing on the second lab at one time.
Just what must be done about it, and how to do it, and so forth. But it seems
to me that was internal.
Q. I am told I can read this.
"January 9, 1952." Does that accord with your memory?
A. No, it doesn't, but go ahead. We will get the substance.
Q. "The creation of a dual laboratory such as Los Alamos would dilute
scientific talent and introduce difficult problems of coordination. Further,
because of the disassociation of talent and effort between two laboratories, the
rate of progress would be reduced.
"We further feel that the division of talent between Los Alamos and a
competing laboratory would at this time retard rather than accelerate the de-
velopment program. Scientists of the caliber necessary to man and administer
another laboratory for the prosecution of the development programs similar in
scope to Los Alamos are limited in number."
Do you recall something about that?
A. Yes, that would be my view today.
Q. That was a fair statement of your position at that time?
A. Yes. If you are talking about another Los Alamos, and I think I kept say-
ing such as Los Alamos all the time.
Q. Where had you received your information as to the availability of scientists
necessary to man another laboratory?
314
A. This I bad to live witli every day.
Q. Had you obtained some of it from Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I don't recall. We may have had conversations, but you can be sure that
I also talked to all of the top scientists about this topic. This would be Von
Neumann and members of the Commission like Smyth. It would be Dr. Ral>i,
who was quite helpful in recruiting a few people for us. It certainly would not
be attributed to one man. This was something you had to keep on top of all
the time.
Q. Do you remember subsequent to that, I think in February 1952, when the
General Advisory Committee again recommended against the establishment of
a second laboratory?
A. I don't recall that specific date, but it would not be inconsistent with what
I know, that they took a position against another Los Alamos.
Q. Did the General Advisory Committee ever recommend in favor of a second
laboratory of whatever kind, Los Alamos or anything else?
A. I reported eventually— I can't say this was my solution, undoubtedly some
of the other Commissioners helped with it— my idea was, finally after this had
all been worked out, that if you were going to have a place where you could
put Teller and some of the other people to the best use, and if they were not at
Los Alamos, the best place was under Dr. Ernest Lawrence out on the west coast.
I did not quite know what the shape of this laboratory was going to be when
It first started out.
Q. Excuse me, Mr. Dean. I asked you whether or not the GAO made any
recommendation, not what you said. What the GAG did.
A. About the second lab?
Q. Yes.
A. If by the second lab you mean the Berkeley
Q. Any kind of lab.
A. They certainly did not frown on putting Teller out under Lawrence, and
that is what the second lab as it turned out to be was.
Q. When did that take place?
A. This took place, I would say, about a year after the spring of 1951 shot.
I fix that date because the men who went out from Lawrence's lab — I am sorry
I have forgotten this man's name — Dr. York went out and did some tests in
the spring of 1951 on the shot that dealt somewhat with thermonuclear processes.
They came back, quite an equipped group of able young men. Here was a
nucleus, and it happened to be in Lawrence's lab. You could put Teller in there.
I recall we put this to the GAG and everybody felt that it was fine. We had
found a place where Teller was happy and could work. I think this was the
reaction.
Q. About when was that, do you remember?
A. I say I think this must have been about a year after the shot in the spring
of 1951, which would put it somewhere over perhaps May of 1952.
Q. Where was that place that Teller worked — Livennore?
A. That is where he was put to work, yes, sir.
Q. Was there an establishment set up there?
A. There had been an establishment there before. That is another attractive
thing about it. It had some buildings. We had some barracks. We had a big
armory that we could use Immediately. We got some instruments in very fast.
It recruited very rapidly under Lawrence, York, Teller.
Q. Did you expand those facilities substantially?
A. Yes, they were expanded very fast.
Q. Did you spend a great deal of money on it?
A. We spent, I think perhaps — I could not give you the dollar figure — I imagine
something like $11 million— No, I don't dare risk a figure.
Q. In other words, it became a very substantial establishment?
A. Yes,
Q. I believe you said you. had no difficulty in recruiting for it.
A. We were recruiting an entirely different group at this point. We were
recruiting men for that laboratory, I would say practically aU of whom came
immediately out of school. They were young Ph. D.'s and some not Ph. D.'s.
We did not get in that laboratory any of the people, as I recall, that we originally
thought of as being available for use on a thermonuclear project, like Seitz — oh,
the names slip me. None of those people went to Berkeley. What they did was
under Lawrence's administration, with Teller as the idea man, with York as
the man who would pick up the ideas and a whole raft of young imaginative
fellows yon had a laboratory working entirely — entirely— on thermonuclear work.
315
Q. That laboratory was devoted entirely to thermonuclear?
A. Yes, but one thing that must not be forgotten is that— throughout the
whole second lab thing— may I elaborate here on a background?
Q. Go ahead. I am not sticking to the rules of evidence.
A. One of the big problems of setting up a second lab and what kind of a lab
was this, was always this : The morale of Los Alamos. Los Alamos, let us not
forget this, is the laboratory which has been responsible for all of the research
in the development of our A bombs, and all of the research and development
until recently on the thermonuclear weapons. They have all come out of Los
Alamos. I always feared and many others feared that if you made any drastic
move which struck at Los Alamos morale, or if you inferred for one moment
that they were not working their hearts out, because believe me, they were
proving it with their results, you had a real problem in this weapons develop-
ment field. That was one of the touchy things about setting up a new labora-
tory. Who was going to man it. What kind of a lab would it be, and what
would it do to Los Alamos? That was the big fear I had.
Q. Mr. Dean, when you did set up this laboratory at Livermore
A. It worked out very well.
Q. It didn't impair morale at Los Alamos?
A. No. Los Alamos rolled very fast as it always has rolled. I think it worked
largely because of Teller getting along very well with Dr. Lawrence. These
things are a question of human relations. They got along extremely well.
Q. In fact, Mr. Dean, wasn't there a healthy spirit of competition between
Los Alamos and Livermore after you set up Livermore?
A. I don't know it produced any more weapons, but there probably was a
good sense of competition.
Q. And you have already said you had no trouble of getting personnel.
A. Not of the type I described. These were not the specialists that we wanted
to get in the early days for the real rush. Very few of those ever came. Those
people never went to California later on.
Q. How long would you say that the discussion went on before you finally
established that lab at Livermore? How long did this discussion about estab-
lishing a second laboratory, whatever you want to call it, go on— a year?
A. It could have been a year, yes. In the meantime, however, Los Alamos
was doing the work and that is what we are testing today in the Pacific.
Q. Is that laboratory at Livermore independent of Los Alamos, or was it?
A. Yes, it is independent except that you have to have a very close liaison
for test schedules and everything else.
Q. I understand that
A. Very close relations. But it is independent of Los Alamos. It should be
pointed out that the University of California is the contractor for Los Alamos,
and the University of California is also the contractor to the Commission for
the Livermore lab, but only in that sense are they related.
Mr. GRAY. Let me Interrupt How much longer do you think you will take?
Mr. RQBB. Probably 10 or 15 minutes, maybe more, depending on Mr. Dean.
(Discussion off the record.)
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Mr. Dean, I have in my notes that you testified that all expansions of the
atomic program were blessed by the GAC beginning in 1949. You were not
thinking about the second lab in that connection, were you?
A. No. When I speak of expansion programs, I am speaking of the erection
of facilities with which to make bombs, and that is either plutonium or U-235
for the most part.
Q. You mentioned Dr. Oppenheimer's attitude on project Lincoln. That was
the project to discuss the defense of the continental United States, was it?
A. Yes; I believe that is a fair description. This was not done under the
auspices of the Commission, and I was not close to Lincoln. I just read the
report when it was finished.
Q. That was done under the auspices of the Army?
A. Somewhere in the Department of Defense. Which agency did it, I don't
know. Perhaps Air Force.
Q. Did you learn what theory Dr. Oppenheimer espoused in that connection?
A. I would hate to be examined on the Lincoln report. I really don't have
a good recollection of it
Q. Do you recall— if you don't, you can say so, of course— do you recall
whether or not he espoused what might be described as a Maginot line type of
316
A. I don't know what Maginot line means.
Q. I mean a fixed defense.
A. No. I mean does it mean in terms of radar defense?
Q. No ; a fixed defense as distinguished from a strong offensive striking force.
A. I cant say.
Q. You don't recall?
A. I just don't recall.
Q. You mentioned Dr. Oppenheimer's connection with the * * * detection
program. Were you familiar with that?
A. Oh, yes.
V ******
Q. May I interpose here, Mr. Dean, I am reminded that, if you get into clas-
sified material, would you be good enough to indicate so that we can take the
appropriate steps?
A. I won't consciously do it. Sometimes I have a question because these things
change from day to day. Why don't we Just call it Air Force?
Mr. ROBB. This has been gone into on direct examination, and I would like to
ask some questions about it
Mr. GAEEISOH-. I was not under the impression I had.
Mr. ROBB. Yes. Didn't you say something about Dr. Oppenheimer's connection
with the * * * detection program?
The WITNESS. In this one instance. I stated he was called back in the fall of
1949 to make an appraisal of the Russian bomb.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. And you told something about what his appraisal was, didn't you?
A. That they had shot one.
Q. I want to ask same questions about that.
Mr. ROBB. I am told that these questions will involve confidential classified
material.
Mr. GRAY. In that event we will have to excuse counsel and anyone else who
is not cleared for the disclosure of classified material.
Mr. GABBISOW. Is the classification officer clear that this has to be answered
only off the record?
(Discussion off the record.)
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Mr. Dean, do you recall that there were * * * methods of * * * detection
which were discussed at that time?
Mr. BEOKEELET. I don't see how one can get into this without disclosing in-
formation presently considered by the Department of Defense as classified.
Mr. GRAY. I am sorry, Mr. Garrison ; you will have to be excused, although
Dr. Oppenheimer will remain.
Mr. GABBISOET. I assume that this has relevance.
Mr. ROBB. I would not ask the question if I did not think so, Mr. Garrison.
(Counsel left the room.)
(Classified transcript deleted.)
(Counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer returned to the room.)
Mr. GBAY. I think counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer should know that in the
judgment of the chairman of the board — I would ask the other board members
to listen to this— nothing transpired of consequence in absence of counsel. Do
you agree? •
Dr. EvAirs. I do.
Mr. MoBffACT. I do.
Mr. ROBB. The witness said he didn't know much about that subejct.
Mr. GBA.Y. That is correct
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Mr. Dean, you testified somewhat about conversations you had with Edward
Teller about Dr. Oppenheimer, did you not?
A. As to recruitment; I think so.
Q. I have the impression that Dr. Teller was inclined to be critical of Dr.
Oppenheimer in those conversations ; is that right?
A. The best I can recall is the inference he left from what he said that he
feared that Oppenheimer would not be helpful in recruiting men for Mm.
Q. That is what I thought you said. Didn't you have any conversations with
other nuclear physicists who were also critical of Dr. Oppenheimer because of
Dr. Oppenheimer's attitude on the thermonuclear?
317
A. I can recall three people, and I would urge you very much to have then,
in front of you as witnesses and for the Board to call them. One would be Dr.
Ken Pltzer — I say three, and I can't recall them— I would certainly say Teller.
Those were about the only two.
Q. Alvarez?
A. I never heard Luis Alvarez speak
Q. Lawrence?
A. No, No. I don't recall any conversations with Ernest Lawrence about Op-
penheimer. There may have been some.
Q. You mentioned Dr. Pitzer. What was his conversation about Dr. Oppen-
heimer, and when did it take place?
A. It was not a conversation. It was some letters and a speech he made in
which he voiced criticism of the GAO. I think he may have named Dr. Oppen-
heimer and Conant by name, but it was quite clear he meant these two gentlemen.
Q. What was the substance of that criticism?
A. It was general — I think the speech was given to refer to one document —
before some teachers in the Long Beach schools shortly after Pitzer left the
Atomic Energy Commission. The general criticism, although he was somewhat
specific in certain particulars, was that the General Advisory Committee was not
imaginative enough. I remember 2 or 3 things that he criticized. One was that
they were very conservative. He may have implied criticism of the Commission
as well. I have forgotten this. That is, in setting the standards for the reactors,
that we required too much isolation. I seem to recall that he advocated a re-
actor that would blow up so we would find out what would happen, so we would
finally know.
There were other items in the speech that were critical. I don't recall any of
them in the weapons field, however.
Q. Critical of whom?
A. GAC.
Q. That would include Dr. Oppenheimer.
A. Yes. He undoubtedly meant Oppenheimer, as I read it.
Q. You said that he suggested that the Commission was requiring too much
isolation on your reactors.
A. That is right I remember specifically he mentioned the Wahluke slope,
which is a large area of sagebrush on the other side of the Columbia Kiver from
the Hanford works. He thought we should have completely opened up the
Wahluke slope to irrigation and therefore farming and therefore to people. We
were far too cautious in having a safe area around reactors.
Q. Was his suggestion that by locating reactors so far out in the wilderness
you were making it difficult to get personnel?
A, No.
Q. Then why did he object to putting reactors out in wilderness?
A. He thought the day was coming very fast when you ought to be thinking
about central-station powerplants. If you are going to get in that region, you
ought to have them down near the middle of town. If we took undue safety
measures, we were far too cautious.
Q. Did any scientist ever suggest to you that while you were on the Commission
that you were putting your laboratories and reactors too far away, way out in
the woods, so you couldn't get people?
A. No ; not to get people, but that we were just unduly safe and we required too
much land. We had some 200,000 acres in Idaho and the same at Hanford.
Q. Mr. Dean, what I was trying to get it, why did it make any difference to a
scientist if you had 10 acres, 10,000, or 10 million acres?
A. I think Pitzer at that time was arguing that we were far too cautious in
our safety standards, far too cautious. That was the general gist of his criticism.
His speech is available. He wrote in some other periodical I can't place it.
Q. Now, Mr. Dean, you testified that you read what you described the file on
Dr. Oppenheimer.
A. The then file.
Q. That was the Atomic Energy Commission's clearance file?
A. Yes. It was a collection of all FBI reports and things that came in.
Q. How many volumes was it?
A. I don't recall.
Q. One?
A. I have no idea. I have no idea whether it was 1 or 2 or 3.
Q. How long did it take you to read it?
A. I have no idea.
318
Q. An hour or 2 hours?
A. I just don't recall. I have no idea. I may have taken it home. I have
forgotten.
Q. Did you read any files of the Manhattan Engineering District?
A. Yes. I recognized when I saw this list of derogatory information many
things that were in that file.
Q. In that file?
A. Yes.
Q. Where did you get that file?
A. From our security officers, as I recall.
Q. It was in your file?
A. In the shop.
Q. You are sure ahout that?
A. Yes ; it was.
Q. If I told you that file had been over at the FBI since 1946, would that
change your answer?
A. It would not, because that is not the file I read. I read the file, if you are
imputing to me or suggesting that I did not read a file on Dr. Oppenheimer,
including the early derogatory, you are wrong.
Q. Of course you had a file. I am trying to find out which one you read.
A. This I couldn't tell you.
Q. You don't know whether you read the Manhattan Engineering District files
or not?
A. I can't recall whether it was so labeled. It had material in it dealing with
the earlier days.
Y. Yes; those were reports.
A. As I recall, FBI reports.
Q. Did you see any transscripts of question-and-answer interviews with Dr.
Oppenheimer?
A. I have seen interviews with the FBI in that file.
Q. But those were not questions and answers, were they?
A. As I recall, they were summaries of testimony.
Q. You said you, I believe, talked to Dr. Oppenheimer about this Crouch
matter?
A. Yes.
Q. And he told you he had never sat in on any Communist meetins?
A. There was a specific meeting that was referred to by Crouch.
Q. I know. I have a note here in quotes : "I never sat in on any Communist
meeting." Did he tell you that?
A. I wouldn't be sure of the exact words. What he did tell me was that he
never sat in any meeting such as this that Crouch had talked about
Q. Did you ask him whether he had ever been to any Communist meeting?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Would that have been a natural question to ask him?
A. It might have been.
Q. But you don't recall whether you did or not?
A. I don't. I was dealing entirely with new evidence which came up in the
Crouch episode.
Q. Yes.
A. That is all I interrogated him* on.
Q. But you were undertaking to evaluate him as a security risk, weren't you?
A. I had to do that every day.
Q. As a part of that evaluation, wasn't it important to you to know if he had
not attended the meeting described by Crouch, whether he might have attended
the other similar meetings?
A. It was not particularly important to me to know what kind of meetings
he attended in 1941. I had known the man 11 years before. ,
Q. As far as you were concerned, he might have attended a dozen Communist
Party meetings in 1941?
A. I had no evidence from the file.
Q. But you said it was not important to yon what meetings he attended in
1941; is that right?
A. It certainly was not important to me at that time because the only question
in my mind was, Is Crouch telling the truth about a specific meeting?
Q. That is what I am getting at If he had not attended the Crouch meeting,
you were not concerned with how many other similar meetings he attended.
A. That was not the issue before me at that time.
319
Q. Would you answer my question?
A. All right.
Q. If he had not attended the Crouch meeting, you were not concerned with
how many other Communist meetings he might have attended?
A. At that time, no ; I was not.
Q. Mr. Dean, I will read you the question and answer. I have before me,
Mr. Dean, which I received from a reliable source, and having been Wash-
ington—^
A. There are both kinds, reliable and unreliable.
Q. You will know that the testimony at the executive sessions of Congress
cannot be released without a vote of the committee, and so forth.
A. Yes.
Q. I have reason to believe that the following took place at a meeting of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on February 21, 1952. I will read you this
and ask you if you remember it and if you have any comment to make on it.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I make the same objection to reading from
documents that can't be shown and looked at. He says he has reason to believe
they represent what took place.
Mr. GRAY. I would ask counsel whether he can summarize what lie under-
stands to be the situation.
Mr. ROBB. I will try it that way.
By Mr. ROBB:
*******
Mr. GRAY. Let me interrupt again. It is now after 1 o'clock.
Mr. ROBB. That is my last question. It is entirely up to Mr. Dean how long
he talks, unless he suggests something in his answer that makes me ask another
question.
The WITNESS. It depends on what you mean by inertia. It was known in the
Los Alamos lab and long before the Los Alamos lab, perhaps 20 years before
Los Alamos was created, and maybe much before that, that one way of getting
terrific amounts of energy was through the fusion process. But no one foresaw
a way to do it because you could not get the heat to fuse. There is a story I
remember running into when I first went to the Commission about a scientist
going to the mayor of Moscow, I believe, and saying, "If you will give me all
the electrical energy that lights the city of Moscow, in one night, I will somehow
concentrate this and bring about a fusion reaction." It had been written
about. I don't know how he was going to do this, but that was the idea. It has
been written about in popular form. The principle was well known.
But at the end of the war, as you know from history, Los Alamos just like
everything else in our defense effort slowed down. The boys came home and
literally the scientists went home . It was at a low state of morale. We were
working on a A-bomb. There was no incentive particularly at this ttme to
develop an H-bomb.
The incentive came, it seemed to me, for the first time — although some theoreti-
cal work was being done — you just don't make an H-bomb. You go out and
measure the cross sections of various elements and combinations of elements.
There is a lot of fundamental work that goes on before you even think of
developing a gadget.
The incentive came in 1949 to develop the H-bomb. This came almost entirely
from the A-bomb explosion by the Russians. What do you mean by inertia at
Los Alamos? The A-bomb program was going. Should you divert your people
to an H-bomb program at that point? Nobody else did anywhere in our Defense
Establishment. We cut down our Navy, we put it in mothballs and all these
things happened because the war was over. You don't get incentives out of a
peacetime situation such as you had at the dose of the war.
The Russians gave us an incentive to work on something, and we went to it.
The delays or inertia are not realistic. They are not good words to describe
what transpired. We never saw anything that really had a chance until the
Princeton meeting in June of 1951. We never had a chance.
You will always get some scientists to say, "I tTiitrk I know a way to do," and
you always give him a chance to draw it out and spell it out and interrogate him.
But all the competent people in our program, even those enthusiastic for H-bomb
program, say, in the spring of 1950, were pretty blue people because it didn't
look like you could do it unless you came up with a new idea.
The new idea came up in the Princeton meeting in June of 1950. I don't
know what words you apply -to situations like that that -are complicated. Inertia
aossis— 54 — 21
320
probably is not a good word. There was no incentive to do it There was every
incentive to make your A stockpile strong.
Mr. ROBB. One further question is suggested, Mr. Chairman.
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. Mr. Dean, do you know anything about an order in December 1952, to
move Dr. Oppenheimer's papers back to Washington?
A. December 1952? Yes, it was done on my orders.
Q. Why was that?
A. Because his Job had terminated as chairman of the GAC. I thought that
it was only proper that all the papers which Dr. Oppenheimer had in his
capacity as chairman should be brought into Washington. As I recall, I sent
up Mr. LaPlante and Mr. Roy Snapp, Mr. Bolander may have gone up, 1 or 2
people to inventory those papers and remove from the files the GAG things.
We were actually thinking of another facility for the then chairman, Dr. Rabi,
and we were exploring whether it should go to Columbia.
Q. When did Dr. Oppenheimer's job as chairman expire?
A. August 1952.
Q. He was at that time consultant to the Commission, was he not, in 19
December 1952?
A. In December 1952, he was a consultant. I don't know to what extent he
consulted, but he was a cleared consultant.
Q. Did you move those GAC papers out or did you change your mind about it?
A. No, we moved out all those that dealt with that We did not take things
that he had to have as a consultant and he was a consultant at four or five
places. None of this was done for security matters, but as a matter of good
administration. The papers necessary for the Chairman of GAO we removed
because we had a new Chairman.
Mr. BOBB. That is all.
Mr. GRAY. I have a couple of questions, Mr. Dean, if I may. I am sorry to
hold you here.
The WITNESS. It is all right.
Mr. GRAY. I am confused— not altogether from your testimony— but I am
generally confused about the instructions to the GAO for the October 29, 1949,
meeting.
The WETNESS. I did not formulate those so my recollection is a little hazy.
Mr. GBAY. Were you then Chairman?
The WITNESS. I was not chairman. I was a member. I went on in May
as a member, Mr. Lilienthal was then chairman. Then the meeting took place
in October 1949.
Mr. GBAY. From what you say you can't dear up my confusion very much, if
you don't know.
The WITNESS, I might be able to if I saw a document Is there a document?
Mr. GBAY. There is a letter.
The WITNESS. Usually we write the GAC, Mr. Chairman, in advance of a
meeting and we say, "We would like to have your views on so many topics,"
and it is usually about a page or two page letter. That is customary. I would
think that was done in connection with the October meeting.
Mr. GBAY. There was a letter signed by an Acting Chairman at one point. I
don't recall whether he is to be a witness here or not, Mr. Pike.
Mr. GARRISON. I believe so, Mr. Chairman. I have not heard from him.
Mr. GBAY. Actually you were not in charge at that time.
The WETNESS. No, I was not
Mr. GBAY. You said following the Princeton meeting, the members of the GAC,
or some of them, if this is a correct quotation, went to great pains to help out
in the H-bomb program. Do you remember saying that?
The WITNESS. Yes, they were certainly enthusiastic. It would be hard for me
to explain precisely what they did.
Mr. GBAY. The great pains is adequate for me. I am trying to identify people
rather than effort Was Dr. Oppenheimer one of those who went to great pains
in your Judgment?
The WTTNESS. He certainly expressed enthusiasm.
Mr. GBAY. I will put my question this way: Did you mean to include frit" in
that earlier statement?
The WETNESS. Yes, definitely. I never saw a meeting and we had many with
more unanimity.
Mr. GBAY. This is not a meeting. This is following the meeting. Yon said
fn your direct testimony that many of the GAO members present at that meeting
321
helped at great pains with the program, and you Intended to include Dr
Oppenheimer?
The WETNESS. I did, yes.
Mr. GRAY. This is a change of pace. Do you recall who the security officer of
the Atomic Energy Commission was at the time yon examined the files, whatever
they were, with respect to Dr. Oppenheimer?
The WITNESS. We had a hiatus in thereabout that time which would be Admiral
Bingrich. I am not sure when I had this conversation with Dr. Oppenheimer
on the Crouch matter that Captain Waters had taken office or not.
Mr. GRAY. I had in mind the time that you examined the files.
The WITNESS. That is the one I have reference to.
Mr. GRAY. I suppose the record will reflect.
The WITNESS. I just don't recall. The record will reflect who was the security
officer.
Mr. GRAY. You made the observation that Dr. Oppenheimer was cleared in
1947 by the Atomic Energy Commission.
The WITNESS, Yes.
Mr. GRAY. I am a little confused as to any direct action on that point, although
the record may show something to the contrary.
The WITNESS. The only reason I can say anything about it is that I had
occasion to look it up once to make sure about the clearance.
Mr. GRAY. It is your recollection
The WITNESS. I was not there, but I remember something in the files showing
that there had been Commission action in 1947.
Mr. GRAY. That is what I was confused on as to specific Commission action.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I have a letter from the General Manager about
that, stating that there was official action. I should like to introduce it in the
record after lunch.
Mr. ROBBL I think you already did.
Mr. GARRISON. I guess I did. I think you are right
Mr. SILVERMAN. There is a stipulation on the first day, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Dean, we had an earlier witness before the Commission who
testified that never once In his long service in the Government did he have any
drafts of communications prepared for him, and he never wrote a letter which
he had not personally written and so forth. You said that yon drafted a letter
for the President to send to Dr. Oppenheimer. Did he use the draft?
The WITNESS. He did.
Mr. GBAY. You were asked the question whether you felt that Dr. Oppenheimer
today is a security risk, and your answer was clearly in the negative. There
seemed to be no question.
The WITNESS. That is correct.
Mr. GRAY. That is against the framework of the Atomic Energy Commission
Act of 1946, the terms of which you are familiar with?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. One final question and I am through. At one point you said that
there was criticism of the GAC by some scientists and you named one or two.
The WITNESS. Dr. Pitzer, I think.
Mr. GRAY. In that connection you said of course that meant Dr. Oppenheimer.
Did you mean to say that meant Dr. Oppenheimer? Did you mean to say it
included him?
The WITNESS. I meant it included Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. GBAY. I would like to be clear on this point
The WITNESS. Yes; I am sorry I left that impression. I know it certainly
included Dr. Oppenheimer. It included Dr. Conant and it may have Included
all of the GAO. It would certainly have included Dr. Oppenheimer. I don't
have the document, but that is certainly the impression I had at the time It
came out
Dr. EVANS. Mr. Dean, I am somewhat confused, and I am asking for informa-
tion to clear my own mind, as to what we are doing here. I have been on a num-
ber of these committees, and we had certain qualifications to go by, loyalty,
association and character. Let us take loyalty. Just what does that mean?
The WITNESS. To me?
Mr, EVANS. Yes. Does that mean loyalty to your friend, loyalty to your
country, or both?
The WriNEsa No. When I use the term 'loyalty" and when t testified that
I believed Dr. Oppenheimer without equivocation was loyal, I meant loyal to
his country, that he has given very strongly of his time and energies, that he
322
has so far as I have been aware always attempted to come up with the answer
to any trouble, and there have been hundreds which were presented to him which
were strengthening his country, rather than weakening his country. That is all
I mean by loyalty.
Dr. EVANS. Associations ; do we have to go by that?
The WITNESS. I think associations definitely must be weighed in any of these
things. It Is a question of the weight that is attached.
Dr. EVANS. I am just asking for information.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Dr. EVANS. It becomes so fogged up in my own mind I don't quite know what
I am doing.
The WITNESS. If you wish my opinion on this, I think associations have to be
weighed. I think they have to be weighed, however, very carefully in the light
of the circumstances and the time in which the association was made. I am not
sure had I first seen Dr. Oppenheimer as a young man in the late twenties and
early thirties, and met him in the atmosphere of Berkeley in 1939 and 1940,
whether I could clear Dr. Oppenheimer. I feel entirely different about him
having watched Win closely over a period of 4 years, and having evaluated
quite carefully his service to his country, and certainly to the Atomic Energy
Commission. I think the associations must be weighed in those circumstances.
Dr. EVANS. Of course, all scientific people know the value of a man like Dr.
Oppenheimer. I am just trying to get these things cleared up so that I can act
like an intelligent Individual. If a man would be more loyal to his friends than
he would be to his country, I don't know where I am.
The WITNESS. I think Dr. Oppenheimer, if I can volunteer this, the loyalty of
which I speak is loyalty to his country. I think that is uppermost. I might
even say he might be more loyal to his country than his friends. I am sure he
would be because he ranks it higher.
Dr. EVANS. I have no more questions.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I realize how late the hour is. Would you
indulge me in two questions and that will be all?
Dr. GRAY. Yes.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GARBISON :
Q. I think you said in interviewing Dr. Oppenheimer about the Crouch
incident you had no concern — this was a question put to you by counsel about
inquiring into other possible meetings of the past that he might have it. Did
you mean by that that you didn't care about past associations?
A. No. I didn't mean to leave that impression. The impression I meant to
leave was this, that I had no occasion at this time to evaluate anything par-
ticularly except this current piece of information. I did take occasion, however,
to go back on the file which had already been in the Commission and on which
he had been cleared in 1947, and went through it, and I saw this association
evidence.
Q. You were asked whether you knew well the two personalities of Dr.
Teller and Dr. Oppenheimer. This question was asked in connection with Dr.
Teller's attempt to recruit men for the project. You have already talked about
Dr. Oppenheimer's personality. Would you give us your impression of Dr.
Teller's personality, particularly with reference to the problem of recruitment?
A. Dr. Teller is a very, very able man. He is a genius. There is no question
about it. He has contributed much in the way of ideas to our weapons develop-
ment He is a very good friend of mine, and I admire him. He is a very diffi-
cult man to work with, as sometimes happens. Dr. Teller did not work well
at Los Alamos, and left there on two occasions. I was responsible on both
occasions for getting him to go back. I was finally responsible, I think in part,
for finding a haven for Dr. Teller, because we needed him. But you can't break
up a whole Los Alamos laboratory for one man, no matter how good he is, and
that was a problem. I don't want to be too derogatory in my appraisal of Teller,
because I could not sing his praises enough as to his contributions. He is not an
administrator. I am sure when he went out to recruit there are people saying,
"AH right, Edward, we will work with you some place, but somebody has to run
the show. Somebody has to pick up the papers and take the administrative
load." Teller is not that type of person. So I can conceive that Edward would
have great difficulty in recruting people. I think if you will call upon some of
the people from Los Alamos, they will give you the same impression. It is not
that they don't like Edward. It is not a question of likes or dislikes. It is a
question of his personality. You have to find a peculiar environment in which
he does his best work.
323
RE-CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. Was one reason why Dr. Teller left Los Alamos that he felt that not enough
emphasis was being given to the thermonuclear?
A. I suppose that might be said to be true. He certainly differed with the
head of the laboratory, Dr. Bradbury, as to the organization of a thermonuclear
setup. I tended to think that Bradbury's judgment on the organization of
which he was head was better than Teller's so far as organization went. Yet
we wanted Teller in the program somewhere. That was a problem.
Q. Dr. Teller did think that not enough emphasis was being given to the
thermonuclear, didn't he?
A. Yes. Dr. Teller has thought of some other things which were not true.
Q. Yes.
A. Such as the type of weapon which was thought of in 1949 was a good
weapon. We know today it would never have been a good weapon. I admire
him for his enthusiasm and optimism and pushing the frontiers of knowledge in
order to get some kind of gadget, but I am glad we didn't go after that particular
weapon.
Q. Now, Mr. Dean, the answer to my question was "yes," wasn't it?
A. State it again.
Q. Dr. Teller felt that not enough emphasis was being given to the thermo-
nuclear?
A. Oh, I suppose that is true ; not his kind of emphasis.
Mr. ROBB. That is all. Thank you.
Mr. GRAY. We will recess now, gentlemen,
I would like to thank Mr. Dean for coming before us.
Mr. DEAN. It's a pleasure.
Mr. GRAY. We will reconvene at 2 : 30.
(Thereupon, at 1 : 25 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 : SO p. m., the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. MASKS. Mr. Garrison has asked me to say that he had told this panel at
one of the hearings last week, which I did not attend, what my part was in this
case. Subsequently he consulted with me again, and told me that the conduct
of the proceedings was turning out to be a very much more massive undertaking
than he had planned for and asked me whether I would help more actively, and
I agreed to. He has asked me this afternoon to carry on until he can rejoin the
proceedings. He is now taking care of some other business connected with the
case.
Mr. GRAY. The next witness is Hans Bethe. Do you wish to testify under
oath, Dr. Bethe?
Dr. BETHE. Yes ; I do.
Mr. GRAY. You are not required to, but all the witnesses have. Would you
be good enough to stand and raise your right hand, please?
Hans Bethe, do you swear that the testimony you are to give the board shall
be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Dr. BETHE. I do.
Whereupon, Hans Bethe was called as a witness, and having been first duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
Mr. GRAY. Will you be seated, sir.
It is my duty to remind you of the penalties provided by the United States
Code, by the statute known as the perjury statute. I should be glad to read
those, if you think it necessary, but I gather you are familiar with them?
The WITNESS. I don't think it would be necessary.
Mr. GRAY. Second, I should like to request that if in the course of your testt
mony you should disclose any restricted data, I would ask you to notify me in
advance, so that we might take appropriate steps if the circumstances require.
I was about to say we have a classification officer present, but we don't, so I
would ask you therefore to be careful in that respect.
Finally, I should say to you that the proceedings and record of this board are
regarded as confidential between the Commission and its officials, and Dr.
Oppenheimer and his representatives and witnesses. The Atomic Energy Com-
mission will not take the initiative in any public releases relating to these pro-
ceedings, and on behalf of the board, I express the hope that witnesses will take
the same view of the matter.
Would you proceed now, please.
324
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. MASKS :
Q. Dr. Bether, will you please Identify yourself and give a little account
of your professional background?
A. I am a professor of physics. I have been a professor at Cornell University
since 1935. I have been at Cornell all the time except daring the war years
when I was absent on war work, including a prolonged stay at Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratory.
I am also this year the president of the American Physical Society.
Q. Ton are a member also of the National Academy of Science?
A. I am.
Q. Are you an American citizen?
A. Yes.
Q. By naturalization?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you come to this country?
A. In 1936.
Q. And where did you come from?
A. I came originally from Germany. I left Germany In 1933 because of the
Nazi persecutions when I knew that I could not hold office under the Nazi
regime. I first went to England and then came to this country.
Q. Since the war years have you had an connection with the atomic energy
program?
A. Yes ; I have. I have been a- consultant to several laboratories of the
Atomic Energy Commission. I have spent most of my consultations for the
Los Alamos Laboratory. I have almost regularly spent summers at Los Alamos
since 1949, I believe. I have taken off a whole semester in the spring of 1952
to help the Los Alamos work.
Q. How would you describe your role, as that of a consultant?
A. I am a consultant on matters of theoretical physics. I believe I am one
of the chief consultants in theoretical physics to Los Alamos.
Q. What was your first acquaintance with Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I first met Dr. Oppenheimer very briefly during a meeting of the German
Physical Society at a regional section of it in 1929.
Q. When was your next connection with him?
A. The next that I remember was in 1940 on the occasion of a meeting of the
American Physical Society at Seattle, Wash.
Q. What have been your associations or contacts with him since that time?
A. I have seen him quite frequently, especially we bad a very deep association
during the Los Alamos time, during the war, when he was the director of the
laboratory, and I was the leader of the theoretical division of Los Alamos.
Q. How often have you seen him since the war?
A. I would say an average of perhaps three times a year, some years more,
some years less.
Q. Have 'these contacts since the war had anything to do with your official
connections with the atomic energy program?
A. Yes, many of the contacts had. Some were purely on matters of physics
outside the atomic energy program, but many of our contacts have been connected
with the atomic energy program, I in my capacity as consultant to Los Alamos,
and he in his capacity as chairman of the General Advisory Committee, not that
these contacts were also formal, in a meeting of the Advisory Committee, but
we often talked about these matters.
Q. Dr. Bethe, have you read the letter of General Nichols and Dr. Oppen-
heimer's reply?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. How far back does your own familiarity with Dr. Oppenheimer's political
associations and activities go?
Q. And what do you know about them?
A. I heard about his political inclination in 1938 from some good friends of
ours, Dr. Weisskopf and Dr. Placzek, who is mentioned in Dr. Oppenheimer's
answer letter, and I understood from them that he was inclined rather tor
to the left
Q. Coining to the work on the atomic bomb, would you tell us briefly about
the part that you and he played in the work on this subject before Los Alamos
was formed and then subsequently during the Los Alamos days?
325
A. Our association began in 1942, on this matter. Dr. Oppenbeimer called
together a group of theoretical physicists, to discuss the way how an atomic
bomb could be assembled. This was a small group of about seven people or
so. We met in Berkeley for the summer of 1942. We first thought it would
be a very simple thing to figure out this problem and we soon saw how wrong
we were.
Q, What about Los Alamos? When did you Join the Los Alamos group?
A. Between that time and Los Alamos, the first was the time when Los
Alamos was being created. It was a very hard task to create this laboratory.
Most scientists were already involved in war work very deeply and it required
somebody of very great enthusiasm to persuade them to leave their jobs and
to join the new enterprise of Los Alamos. I think nobody else could have done
this than Dr. Oppenheimer. He was successful in getting together a group of
really outstanding people.
At Los Alamos, as I mentioned before, we had very dose relations because I
was the leader of one of the divisions, one I believe of seven divisions. We met
almost daily, certainly at least once a week.
In Los Alamos again I want to say how difficult a job it was and it seems
to me that no enterprise quite as hard as this had ever been attempted before.
I believe that Oppenheimer had absolutely unique qualifications for this job
and that the success is due mostly to him and mostly to his leadership in the
project.
Q. What were some of the factors that made it so difficult?
A. There were many. One was in the technical work itself.
Q. I simply wanted to indicate the nature of the difficulty.
A. It was that all the time new difficulties came up in different connections,
new technical difficulties which had to be solved.
Q. Apart from technical difficulties.
A. Apart from that, one great difficulty was that scientists are great indi-
vidualists, and many of the scientists there had very different ideas how to
proceed. We needed a unifying force and this unification could 'only be done
by a man who really understood everything and was recognized by everybody
as superior in Judgment and superior in knowledge to all of us. This was our
director. It was also a matter of character, of devotion to the job, of the will
to succeed. It was a matter of judgment of selecting the right one among
many different approaches. It was a matter of keeping people satisfied that
they had a part in the laboratory, and we all had the feeling that we had a
part in the running of the laboratory, and that at the same time at the head
of the lamoratory somebody who understood more than we did.
Q. Was there any notable exceptions to this?
A. There were a few notable exceptions. There were people who were dis-
satisfied. Among them was Dr. Teller.
Q. Why was he dissatisfied?
A. He had
Q. By the way, am I right that he was on your staff?
A. He was on my staff. I relied — and I hoped to rely very heavily on him
to help our work in theoretical physics. It turned out that he did not want
to cooperate. He did not want to work on the agreed line of research that
everybody else in the laboratory had agreed to as the fruitful line. He always
suggested new things, new deviations. He did not do the work which he and
his group was supposed to do in the framework of the theoretical division.
So that in the end there was no choice but to relieve W?™ of any work in the
general line of the development of Los Alamos, and to permit him to pursue
his own ideas entirely unrelated to the World War II work with his own group
outside of the theoretical division.
This was quite a blow to us because there were very few qualified men who
could carry on that work.
Q. Tuning to another subject, Dr. Bethe, what was the attitude of Dr.
Oppenheimer with respect to the requirements of security at Los Alamos?
A. He was very security minded compared to practically all the scientists.
He occupied a position very much intermediate between the Army and the
scientists. The scientists generally were used to free discussion and free dis-
cussion of course was allowed in the laboratory completely and this was one
of the reasons for putting it at the remote place. However, many of us did
not see sometimes the need for the strictness of the requirements and Dr.
Oppenheimer was, I think, considerably more ready to see this need and to
enforce security rules.
326
Q. Is that what you mean by occupying a position intermediate between the
scientists and the Army.
A. That is what I mean.
Q. Let me ask you, Dr. Bethe, if you can speak of it, what views did the
scientists have about the moral or humane problems that many people haye
discerned in the atomic bomb program at Los Alamos.
A. I am unhappy to admit that during the war— at least— I did not pay much
attention to this. We had a job to do and a very hard one. The first thing we
wanted to do was to get the job done. It seemed to us most important to con-
tribute to victory in the way we could. Only when our labors were finally com-
pleted when the bomb dropped on Japan, only then or a little bit before then
maybe, did we start thinking about the moral implications.
Q. What did you think about that or what did the scientists generally think
about it?
A. There was a general belief that this was a tremendous weapon that we had
brought into the world and that we might have been responsible for incredible
destruction in the future. That we had to do whatever we could to tell people,
especially the people of the United States, what an atomic bomb meant, and
that we should try as much as possible to urge an international agreement on
atomic weapons in order to eliminate them as weapons from war if this could
be agreed to by all the major nations.
Q. I would like to come back to that subject, Dr. Bethe, but first let me ask
you whether you were familiar at the time — that is, at the close of the war —
with the problems that were posed by the so-called May-Johnson bill for domestic
control of atomic energy?
A. I was, yes.
Q. Was that bill a subject of interest and discussion at Los Alamos, and if
so, in what terms?
A, It was to a considerable extent, although not as much as some other labora-
tories of the Manhattan District. Most of the scientists at Los Alamos were
opposed to the May-Johnson bill.
Q. Why?
A. It perpetuated Army control which we had felt was rather irksome and
work was perhaps not conducive to the best results in research during peacetime.
It included a lot of very severe and unprecedented stipulations as to punish-
ments for almost any move a scientist might make. Finally, it seemed to us that
it made it very much harder than necessary to achieve international control,
which seemed to us the most important aim.
Q. Do you know what position Dr. Oppenheimer took on this subject?
A. Yes. Dr. Oppenheimer supported the May-Johnson bill, and he was very
much attacked for this by some of his colleagues. I personally did not feel very
strongly, by the way. He supported the May-Johnson bill because he thought
that this was the only way to preserve the laboratories as running units to
continue the work for the time being, rather than to have an Interim during
which the laboratories might disintegrate.
Q. Dr. Bethe, I would like to return now to this subject of international control
of atomic energy which you mentioned. Did you observe as time went on, that
is, from the close of the war during the next couple of years, any change in
attitudes on the part of scientists and on the part of Dr. Oppenheimer on this
subject?
A. Yes ; definitely so.
Q. Would you speak of that?
A. Dr. Oppenheimer was one of the members of the Lilienthal board which
worked out the American plan for international control
Q. What date was that?
A. That was in the spring of 1946. I can't put it very much closer. In the
early spring of 1946. Then he was an advisor to Mr. Baruch who was the Ameri-
can representative to the United Nations. At all these times he put a great effort
into working out a plan which would give this country some measure of security
from future atomic war.
However, the actual negotiations started in the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission and it was soon evident
Q. That would still be in 1946?
A. That was still in 1946. It started in June 1946, I think. It was soon
evident, at least to Dr. Oppenheimer, that the Russian attitude was very
inflexible.
327
Q. How do yon know that, Dr. Bethe? It was soon evident, you say.
A, I have known it as a fact only as of January 1947.
Q. What happened then?
A. In January 1947, 1 made a visit to Berkeley to give some lectures, and Dr.
Oppenheimer and I had some conversations— quite long conversations— about the
fate of the atomic energy control plan. He told me then that he had given up all
hope that the Russians would agree to a plan which would give security and in
particular
Q. Security to whom?
A. To all of us. To us, I suppose, as well as to them. Particularly he pointed
out how much the Russian plan was designed to serve the Russian interests and
no other interests, namely, to deprive us immediately of the one weapon which
would stop the Russians from going into Western Europe; if they so chose, and
not give us any guarantee on the other hand that there would really be a control
of atomic energy, not give us any guarantee that we would be safe from Russian
atomic attack at some later time.
I have heard him talk about this subject quite often, the first time in January
of 1947.
Q. What were your own views at that time?
A. I had not seen things very clearly. I still had considerable hope that
international agreement could be achieved, and I know now that I was quite
wrong. In fact, I saw right then that I was quite wrong. I was quite pessi-
mistic at that time, but I thought this was such an important subject that the
Russians would finally have to see that it was in their interest, as well as ours,
to have a real control plan with some teeth in it
Q. Did your own views change?
A. My own views changed, and I think perhaps partly influenced by the
discussion I had with Dr. Oppenheimer. I certainly thought that there was not
much hope and I certainly agreed that the Russian plan was all that Dr. Oppen-
heimer had represented it to be.
Q. Dr. Bethe, let me go back for a moment. I thtnlc you said that you had
been told in the late thirties that Dr. Oppenheimer's, I think you used the phrase
"extreme" left wing political views. That was between the time when you first
met "Mm in 1929 and your later closeness to him?
A. Yes.
Q. When you again met Dr. Oppenheimer, after this brief meeting that you
described in 1929, what were your own observations about his political orientation?
A. They were very surprising to me.
Q. When would this have been?
A. That was in 1940. At the Physical Society meeting in Seattle, Wash., we
had a long evening in which political matters were discussed. This was in
late June, I believe, of 1940. It was just after the fall of France, and I felt
very deeply that a great catastrophe had happened to the world. At this con-
versation, Dr. Oppenheimer talked for quite a long time in this same sense.
(Mr..Garrison entered the room.)
The WITNESS. He told all of us how much France meant to the western
world, and how the fall of France meant an end of many things that he had
considered precious and that now the western civilization was really in a
critical situation, and that it was very necessary to do something to save the
values of western civilization.
By Mr. MASKS :
Q. Coming back, now, to the postwar period, you told us that you were con-
sultant at Los Alamos after you left Los Alamos. In that connection did you
observe what, if any, influence the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic
Energy Commission had on the course of events at Los Alamos Laboratory?
A. I could observe this to some extent, perhaps not enough because I was
not at Los Alamos between January of 1946 and the summer of 1947.
Q. Just tell us about the period from 1947 on. What was the influence, if
you know of it, of the General Advisory Committee on the course of events.
A. I know that the General Advisory Committee always was very helpful to
Los Alamos, and that the Los Alamos people repeatedly told me that one could
always get support for the best ideas in weapons development at the General
Advisory Committee. It was that organization in the Government which had
the greatest knowledge about these matters, and from what I know about the
Los Alamos work, every important development in weapons which was done at
Los Alamos was strongly supported by the General Advisory Committee.
328
Q. From the end of the war to the latter part of 1949, did you have any part
in thermonuclear research at Los Alamos?
A. Not much. I mainly worked on fission weapons. However, there was
some minor application of thermonuclear principles which was worked on at
Los Alamos during the summer of 1949, and in which I participated. This
turned out very useful later on.
• Q* After the explosion of the Russian A bomb, was there any change in the
character of your work?
A. Yes.
• Q. Would you describe what happened?
-A. Should! :
Q. As to yourself. .
A. In October of 1940 1 had a visit from Dr. Teller at Los Alamos.
Q. You were at Los Alamos?
A. Not he was at Los Alamos. I was in Ithaca. He came to visit me as he
was also visiting several other scientists, and he tried to persuade me to come
to Los Alamos full time, and to help evolve full scale thermonuclear weapons.
Q. Dr. Bethe, there has been some talk in these proceedings about the General
Advisory Committee meeting towards the end of October of 1949.
.A, May I go on?
Q. .1 beg your pardon. I am sorry.
A. At the -time Dr. .Teller visited me, I had very great internal conflicts what
I' should ;do. ; Dr. Teller was presenting to me some ideas of his technical ideas
which seemed to make technically more feasible one phase of the thermonuclear
program. I was quite impressed by his ideas.
On the other hand, it seemed to me that it was a very terrible undertaking
to. .develop a still bigger bomb,. and I was entirely undecided and had long
discussions with my wife.
• Q. When.did this occur?
A, This was early in October, as far as I remember. It may have been the
middle of October, but some time between early and middle of October. What
I should do? I was deeply troubled what I should do. It seemed to me that
toe. development, of thermomhuclear weapons would not solve any of the dif-
ficulties that we found ourselves in, and yet I was not quite sure whether I
should refuse.
: Q; Did you consult Dr. Oppenheimer about what to do and if so, approximately
wfcei? - . „
A. I did consult Dr. Oppenhetaer. In fact, I had a meeting with him to-
gether with Dr. Teller. This was just a few days later, I think only 2 days
later, or 8, than my first meeting with Dr: Teller. So this would again be
around the middle of October, and perhaps a little earlier. I found Dr. Oppen-
heimer equally undecided and equally troubled in his mind about what should
be done, I did .not get from him the advice that I was hoping to get. That is,
I did not get.from him advice from either direction to decide me either way.
He mentioned that one of the members of the General Advisory Committee,
namely Dr. Conant, was opposed to the development of the hydrogen bomb, and
he mentioned some of the reasons which Dr. Conant had given. As far as I
remember, he also showed me a letter that he had written to Dr. Conant As
far £8 I remember, neither in this letter nor in his conversation with us did he
take any stand.
Q. What did you do about the invitation that Teller had extended you?
A. About 2 days after talking to Dr. Oppenheimer I refused this invitation.
I was influenced in making up my mind after my complete indecision before by
two Iriends of mine, Dr. Weisskopf and Dr. Placsek. I had a very long and
earnest conversation with Dr. Weisskopf what a war with the hydrogen bombs
would be. We both had to agree that after such a war even if we were to win
It, the world would not be such, not be like the world we want to preserve. We
would lose the things we were fighting for. This was a very long conversation
and a very difficult one for both of us.
I first bad a conversation with Dr. Wiesskopf alone and then with Weisskopf
and Placaek together on the drive from Princeton to New York. In this con-
versation essentially the same things .were confirmed once more. Then when
I arrived in New York, I called up Dr. Teller and told him that I could not come
to jQin Ms project
Q, Wh^a would this have been, approximately?
A. 'FritiH can't give you any much better date than before. It was certainly
quite some time before the General Advisory Committee meeting. I don't know
329
whether it was 2 weeks before or 10 days before. It may hare been 8 weeks
before. I could establish the date if this Is important
Q. Since that time, however, yon have done work on the thermonuclear pro-
gram, on the H bomb? t
A. I have indeed.
Q. When did that begin?
A. This began after the outbreak of the Korean war.
Q. What have you done since then, describing it just in general terms?
A. In June of 1950, when the Korean war broke out, I decided that I should
put a full effort on Los Alamos work and in particular should work also on
thermonuclear weapons. I offered to Los Alamos to do active work at times
when I was at Los Alamos, but also when I was at Cornell This offer was
accepted. I have done work with an assistant who I supplied from among my
own students. I believe this work has been recognized as contributing.
Q. Are you saying that continuously from the outbreak of the Korean
trouble
A. Essentially continuously. I worked of course only part time as long as I
was at Cornell Then I was at Los Alamos at more frequent intervals since
then. I mentioned before that I spent a whole 8 months there from February
1952 to September, which was a critical period in the development of the first
full scale thermonuclear test which took place in November of 1952, as you
well know.
I also went there at other times during the summer. I went usually for a
month in the winter, and I worked in between at Ithaca.
Q. When you did finally decide in the summer of 1950 to go to work on the
thermonuclear program, what became of the inner troubles that you had previ-
ously that contributed to turning down Teller's original offer?
A. I am afraid my inner troubles stayed with me and are still with me, and I
have not resolved this problem. I still feel that maybe I have done the wrong
thing, but I have done it
Q. You have done the wrong thing In what?
A. The wrong thing in helping to create a still more formidable weapon,
because I don't think it solves any of our problems.
Q. During the early part of 1950, that is, after you turned down Teller's
invitation, but before you went to work at Los Alamos, on the thermonuclear
program, you made some public statements, I believe, in the press. You wrote
an article which I believe was published in the Scientific American, and the
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, setting forth your views about the thermonuclear
problem.
Would you describe briefly what you regarded as the alternative to going
ahead with the thermonuclear program?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I am speaking now of the period from the end of 1949 to the middle of
1950.
A. Yes. I thought that the alternative might be or should be to try once
more for an agreement with the Russians, to try once more to shake them out
of their indifference or hostility by something that was promising to be still
bigger than anything that was previously known and to try once more to get an •
agreement that time that neither country would develop this weapon. This is
enough of an undertaking to develop the thermonuclear weapon that if both
countries had agreed not to do so, that it would be very unlikely that the
world would have such a weapon.
Q. Can you explain, Dr. Bethe, how you reconciled that view Just described
of wanting to make another try at agreement with Russia, with the view that
you described a little while ago in which you expressed the feeling that nego-
tiations with Russia on the A bomb were hopeless?
A. Yes. I think maybe the suggestion to negotiate again was one of despera-
tion. But for one thing, the difference was that it would be a negotiation about
something that did not yet exist, and that one might find it easier to renounce
making and using something that did not yet exist to renounce something that
was actually already in the world. For this reason, I thought that maybe there
was again some hope. It also seemed to me that it was so evident that a war
fought with hydrogen bombs would be destruction of both sides that maybe even
the Russians might come to reason.
Q. Didn't you feel that there was a risk involved in taking the time to negotia-
tion which might have given the Russians the opportunity to get a head start
on the H-bomb?
330
A. There had to be a time limit on the time that such negotiations would
take, maybe a half year or maybe a year. I believe we could afford such a head
start even if there were such a head start. I believed also that some ways could
have been found that in the interim some rsearch woulfl go on in this country.
I believed that also our armament in atomic bombs as contrasted to hydrogen
bombs was strong enough and promised to be still stronger by this time, that, is,
by the time the hydrogen could possibly be completed, so that we would not be
defenseless even if the Russians had the hydrogen bomb first
Q. Do you have any opinion, Dr. Bethe, on the question of whether there has
been in fact any delay in the development and the perfection of thermonuclear
weapons by the United States?
A. I do not think that there has been any delay. I will try to keep this un-
classified. I can't promise that I can make myself fully clear on this.
Q. Try to, will you?
A. I will try. When President Truman decided to go ahead with the hydrogen
bomb in January 1950, there was really no clear technical program that could
be followed. This became even more evident later on when new calculations
were made at Los Alamos, and when these new calculations showed that the
basis for technical optimism which had existed in the fall of 1949 was very
shaky, Indeed. The plan which then existed for the making of a hydrogen bomb
turned out to be less and less promising as time went on.
Q. What interval are you now speaking of?
A. I am speaking of the interval of from January 1950 to early 1951. It was
a time when it would not have been possible by adding more people to make any
more progress. The more people would have to do would have to be work on the
things which turned out to be fruitful.
Finally there was a very brilliant discovery made by Dr. Teller. * * * It was
one of the discoveries for which you cannot plan, one of the discoveries like the
discovery of the relativity theory, although I don't want to compare the two in
importance. But something which is a stroke of genius, which does not occur
in the normal development of ideas. But somebody has to suddenly have an
inspiration. It was such an inspiration which Dr. Teller had * * * which But
the program on a sound basis.
; Only after there was such a sound basis could one really talk of a technical
program. Before that, it was essentially only speculation, essentially only Just
trying to do something without having really a direction in which to go Now
things changed very much * * *. After this brilliant discovery there was a
program.
Q. Dr. Bethe, if the board and Mr. Robb would permit me, I would like to ask
you somewhat a hypothetical question. Would your attitude about work on the
themonucleair Pfopam in 1949 have differed if at that time there had been
SXS*^* la?^at fl***** or brilliant inspiration, whatever you call it,
that didnt come to Teller until the spring of 1951 ?
.. , A. It is very difficult to answer this.
Q. Don't answer it If you can't
A. Ibelieve it might have been different
Q. Why?
ermonuclear reactions
?
dedslon' he would never ******
ha<J been in fact a directive from Presi-
1 Supplied for clarity.
331
dent Truman to the GAG not to discuss the reasons of the GAG or any of the
procedures, and Dr. Oppenheimer held to this directive very strictly.
Q. Did you consult him about the article?
A. I don't think I consulted him at all about the article. I consulted him
about the statement that we made. As far as I remember, he gave no opinion.
Q. On the basis of your association with him, your knowledge of him over
these many years, would you care to express an opinion about Dr. Oppenheimer's
loyalty to the United States, about his character, about his discretion in regard to
matters of security?
A. I am certainly happy to do this. I have absolute faith in Dr. Oppenheimer's
loyalty. I have always found that he had the best interests of the United States
at heart. I have always found that if he differed from other people in his
Judgment, that it was because of a deeper thinking about the possible conse-
quences of our action than the other people had. I believe that it is an ex-
pression of loyalty— of particular loyalty— if a person tries to go beyond the
obvious and tries to make available his deeper insight, even in making unpopular
suggestions, even in making suggestions which are not the obvious ones to make,
are not those which a normal Intellect might be led to make.
I have absolutely no question that he has served this country very long and
very well. I think everybody agrees that his service in Los Alamos was one of
the greatest services that were given to this country. I believe he has served
equally wen in the GAG in reestablishing the strength of our atomic Weapons
program in 1947. I have faith in him quite generally.
Q. You and he are good friends?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you expect him to place his loyalty to his country even above his
loyalty to a friend?
A. I suppose so.
Mr. MASKS. That is all.
GROSS EXAMINATION
By Mr. KOBE:
Q. Doctor, when Dr. Teller came to see you in 1949, were you at Ithaca then,
sir?
A. Yes.
Q. And then you and Dr. Teller went down to Princeton to see Dr.
Oppenheimer?
A. We went down separately, but we met again to Princeton.
Q. May I ask, Doctor, why did you pick Dr. Oppenheimer to consult about this
matter?
A. Because we had come to rely on his wisdom.
Q. Doctor, you spoke of Dr. Teller at Los Alamos as always suggesting
new * * * (ideas).
A. Yes.
Q. It was a new * * * (idea) suggested by Dr. Teller which resulted in your
success in producing the thermonuclear; wasn't it?
A. This may be true, and some of his suggestions certainly were extremely
valuable.
Q. Yes, sir.
A. There were other suggestions which turned out to be very much to the
contrary. Dr. Teller has a mind very different from mine. I think one needs
both kinds of minds to make a successful project I think Dr. Teller's mind runs
particularly to making brilliant inventions, but what he needs is some control,
some other person who is more able to find out just what it is the scientific fact
about the matter. Some other person who weeds out the bad from the good
Ideas.
* * * as soon as I heard of Dr. Teller's new invention, I was immediately
convinced that this was the way to do it, and so was Dr. Oppenheimer. I should
mention a meeting which took place in 1951, in June, at which Dr. Oppenheimer
was host. At this meeting the final program for the thermonuclear reactions was
set up. At this meeting Dr. Oppenheimer entirely and wholeheartedly supported
the program.
Q. Doctor, how many divisions were there at Los Alamos?
A. It changed somewhat in the course of time. As far as I could count the
other day, there were 7, but there may have been 8 or 9 at some time,
Q. Which division was Klaus Fnchs in?
A. He was in my division which was the Theoretical Division.
Mr. BOBB. Thank you. That is all.
332
Mr. GRAY. I have some questions, Dr. Bethe. Early in your testimony in
response to a question from Mr. Marks about cooperation and happy atmos-
phere—these were not your words or his—you said there were certain notable
exceptions.
The WITNESS. Bight
Mr. GRAY. You named Dr. Teller.
The WITNESS. Bight
Mr. GBAT. Could you name certain other of the notable exceptions?
The WITNESS. I can recall only one person. That was Dr. Felix Bloch, who
left the project after some time and went to a radar project instead. He was at
Los Alamos only for a 'short time. Otherwise, I can't recall any exceptions.
' • Mr. GRAY. This is a matter of information, perhaps. I was interested, how-
ever, in one of your objections to the May-Johnson Act, on the ground, and I
think I use your words, "that it provided punishments for almost any move a
scientist might make/'
The WITNESS. Bight
Mr. GBAY. What do you have in mind?
The WITNESS. When you read the document— I am afraid I didn't read it
from* beginning to end — the thing which was most conspicuous to us was that
that listed a large number of things that were to be considered a security vio-
lation and set down very harsh penalties, unprecedented penalties, I believe, for
these,
Mr. GRAY. What kind of things were the penalties imposed for? That is what
I am trying to get at I am not familiar, I am sorry to say, with the provisions.
The WITNESS. I don't know that this is terribly important, and I should not
insist' on it too much. It said if you betray some secret— if some secrets leak out
by negligence, then you go to prison for 10 years. If you do it with the intent
to hurt, the United States, the penalty is death, and so forth and so on. The
things that were mentioned were definitely things that should be punished.
It only seemed to us that the punishment was perhaps a little harsh and a little
too much emphasized in the bill.
. Mr. GRAY. I don't want to pursue this too far, but your characterizations of
these actions as almost any move a scientist might make, you mean any treason-
able move which by carelessness might be the equivalent, I suppose?
The WITNESS. No, it would require much less than that. It would require an
act of slight negligence rather than any callousness.
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. But I don't TOSh to insist on this.
Mr. GBAY. Very well. Also in response to a question from Mr. Marks you
said that you were very much surpised in 1040, soon after the fall of France— I
believe you said this— Dr. Oppenheimer's political reorientation— the phrase is
mine, not yours— and you cited as an example and you cited as conviction that
an extraordinary effort needed to be put forth to save western civilization.
r. The WETNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. T believe you were asked that question by Mr. Marks in the context
of Dr. Oppenheimer's earlier very leftwing views.
The WITNESS. Precisely.
Mr. GRAY. Other than the fall of France were there indications in his con-
versation—the long conference you had— in 1940 which would indicate a change
in these extreme or very leftwing views?
Oaie WITNESS, i am not ^3 fl^t I recall any other motivation. I am sure
that the fall of France was uppermost in all our minds, and that this was the
dominant theme. I don't know what other motivation Oppenheimer went through
to, change his mind.
Mr. GRAY. I really was not concerned so much with motivations as whether
yon^ged a Codification of the extremeness of his leftwing views.
. ^he AfrrapBss. I certainly did not It did not come up even as a part of the
conversation t$at his views were leftwing at this time. That is, as you recall,
this was in the time of the Busso-German Pact I don't believe the pact was
mentioned. Maybe it was. If so, it must have been mentioned in the same con-
text, in the same spirit as the fall of France, namely, that it was a most deplorable
thing. There was nothing in the conversation which indicated any leftwing
pri^tati^ttatthatjHme. In fact, the opinions of experts were the exact opposite
01 the party line,, ,. •
Mr. GRAY. Ma/I again refer to your conversations with Dr. Teller and with
Ifr. O^penh^mer in October 1949, at which time you Were deeply troubled as to
wlj£?M^ryon 8llonMl ga **<* or *notlld a*ala work— what was ifr-at Los Alamos?
Xne WITNESS* Bight
333
Mr. GBAY. Did yon get far enough along in your thinking, Dr. Bethe, and in
your discussions with Dr. Teller, to talk in terms of what the salary might be
if you went back to Los Alamos?
The WITNESS. We did discuss this. Even though I was not at all decided
whether I wanted to go, I wanted to discuss the things sufficiently so that at
least external circumstances would be reasonable if I went. ' • . . .
Mr. GEAY. So that at the time your mind was at least open to the point tbat
the shape and form and nature of the Job was interesting at least
The WITNESS. Right
Mr. GEAT. May I ask, then, how long after this conversation with Dr. Teller
in which salary and other conditions were discussed was it that you began
making speeches and writing the bulletins opposing work on the hydrogen bomb,
or is that a clear question?
The WITNESS. That is perfectly clear. This was 3 months later.
Mr. GRAY. Three months later?
The WITNESS. Three months and a little.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Marks asked you a question about
The WITNESS. May I make one more remark in this connection?
Mr. GBAY. Yes, indeed.
The WITNESS. During the time when the Government was in the process of
deciding whether to go ahead with the program, I felt and I think all scientists
felt that we must not make speeches. This does not mean that we held any
different opinion. But during this time it was a secret deliberation of the Gov-
ernment and it was not in the public domain and we therefore restrained our-
selves from expressing our opinion — metfcuously— ^ in any way.
Mr. GEAY. So that your speeches in opposition came after the President's
decision? • •
The WITNESS. They came after the President's decision. They could not
come before the President's decision. This does not mean that the President's
decision changed my mind in any way.
Mr. GEAY. I tM*nfc you made it dear in your testimony that you feel that fol-
lowing the Presidential decision there was no delay in the development of the
hydrogen bomb.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. Can you say the same thing about the period from 1945 until
January 1950?
The WITNESS. This Is a very difficult question. I think one would have to
take the periods apart I believe, let me say in the beginning, first of all that
there was in the end no delay.
Mr. GBAY. You mean taking the years from 1945 to 1950, or whenever it was?
The WITNESS. 1952. ;
Mr. GBAY. That there was no delay? ' •? "
The WITNESS. Yes. One of the ingredients in my saying so is that in order
to have a successful thermonuclear weapon you first need to have an extremely
good fission weapon. You cannot make a success of a thermonuclear weapon
without that As you know, the fission weapon is used as a trigger to provide
the heat in the thermonuclear weapon. This is public knowledge. Anything
beyond that I cannot say. It is necessary to have extremely good fission wea-
pons and what Los Alamos laboratory did in all the time until 1950, early in
1950 and indeed later, too, was a continuous and very spectacular improvement
in fission weapons, so much so, as President Eisenhower announced in his United
Nations speech, that the power of the fission weapon has increased 25 fold since
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Therefore, this work was all in the direction that was necessary to bring
success in the thermonuclear program.
Now, then, in the first period from the end of the war to the beginning ,of; the
AEG, that is, to January of 1947, Los Alamos was in a state of disintegration,
and Los Alamos, just like our Armed Forces, was declining in strength, -All of
us wanted to go home just as all the boys from oversea wanted to go home, 'and
as their mothers wanted them to come home. So everybody wanted to go-towe.
Also, we wanted to give a chance to the international organizations. ::>Ptris
changed completely when the ABO took over in the beginning of 1947, and from
then on really a strong program in weapons development was started.
I should say in all fairness that in all this program Dr. Teller played a very
important role and did not show any deviations, as I criticized during the War
time period. Even so, it needed some time to build up the streaigth of the
laboratory.
334
It was impossible for the laboratory to do very many things at the same time
in 1947 or 1948, let us say. All the same, some research was going on all the time
on some phases of thermonuclear reactions.
I mentioned before that one particularly promising, although minor applica-
tion of such reactions, was actively worked on in the summer of 1949 when I
was there, and it had then been worked on for some time. It actually turned out
that this was more useful in the end than would have been a concerted attack
on what was then believed to be the main subject
Mr. GBAT. You think that the demonstration of genius on the part of Dr.
Teller * * * — I know I am asking a question that you can't answer, but I will
ask it anyway— do you think if the GAO in 1947, when it was constituted, had
concluded as the President concluded in January 1950, that it is possible that
Dr. Teller's stroke of genius might have come sooner * * *. It had no relation
to the atmosphere, facilities and those things. I know this is a very difficult
question.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. If it is not clear to you, I am addressing myself to the point that
it has been said in many places that the attitude of the GAO did in fact delay
successful work. I believe this has been said. You are familiar with that
The WITNESS. I am familiar with that.
Mr. GRAY. I am trying to address myself to that point.
The WITNESS. It is awfully hard to answer. It is true certainly that a stroke
of genius does not come entirely unprepared and that you get ideas only on the
subjects that you are working on. If you are working on other subects, let us
say fission weapons, you probably won't have any inspiration about thermonu-
clear weapons. It is true on the other hand that two quite important suggest-
ions or discoveries were made on thermonuclear problems during the time when
Los Alamos was not actively working on these. I cannot name them in an un-
classified session.
One of them was the thing that I mentioned repeatedly, the minor application,
as I call it, of thermonuclear principles. I think it is quite obvious that only
when there is a concerted effort can there be the atmosphere in which you can
have big ideas. Whether we would be farther ahead or less far ahead, I don't
know.
Mr. GBAY. I was aware that was a difficult question. I have only two more,
Doctor.
You testified that at one period you were hoping that it might be possible
to prove that thermonuclear weapons were just simply not possible.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. I assume, then, that you were hoping that if they were not possible
in this country they could not be possible in the U. S. S. R.?
The WITNESS. Precisely.
Mr. GBAY. Did you have any reason to hope that the Russians were not taking
a contrary view to yours? You were hoping that it could not be possible.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. Would it be unreasonable to suppose that the Russians might have
been taking the contrary view?
The WITNESS. That they were hoping that it was possible?
Mr. GBAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. I am quite prepared to assume that, but I don't know.
Mr. GBAY. So that there was a double hope that we couldn't do it and also
that they couldn't, but we had no basis for believing that they would not make
every effort, I assume?
The WITNESS. That is true. In the times when everybody was very pessi-
mistic about the outcome of our own effort, that is, in the year 1950 essentially,
I was often hoping that the Russians would spend their efforts on this problem
and that they would waste their efforts on this problem.
Mr. GBAY. My final question, I think, relates to Mr. Marks' last question to you.
In the light of your intimate personal acquaintanceship with Dr. Oppenheimer
and within the framework of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, you have no 'doubts
about him with respect to his loyalty, his character, his discretion, which were
the three areas which Mr. Marks put the question to you.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. In order to complete the record, because there is another con-
sideration which the act imposes and that is, associations, would ycu answer
also affirmatively to the question including the test of associations?
335
The WITNESS. Those associations that I personally know about I certainly
heartily approve. The associations which I mentioned
Dr. EVANS. What was that?
The WITNESS. I said that
Mr. GRAY. The associations he knows about he would heartily approve.
The WITNESS. The associations in the dim past of the late 1930's and maybe
early 1940's I certainly cannot approve, but I think they are superseded by a
long record of faithful service and that one has to judge a man according to
his actions, recent actions, which are, as far as I know, all in the public domain
and all perfectly known and open to scrutiny.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of questions but would you rather
I save them until Dr. Evans finishes?
Mr. GRAY. Yes. Dr. Evans, do you have any questions?
Dr. EVANS. Yes. Dr. Bethe, for the record— we can look it up, but you can
tell us— where did you do your university work?
The WITNESS. I studied at the Universities of Frankfort and Munich In Ger-
many and got my Ph. D. in Munich in 1928.
Dr. EVANS. Have you taken out any patents on these types of weapons?
The WITNESS. I believe I have a patent or two on fission weapons. I don't
believe I have any on the thermonuclear weapons.
Dr. EVANS. What are your political views? You are a citizen of the United
States?
The WITNESS* Yes. This is perhaps
Mr. GBAY. Excuse me.
Dr. EVANS. Do I have a right to ask that?
Mr. GRAY. Perhaps it may be that the witness would be entitled to have a
little bit of understanding. I don't know that the question— excuse me. If the
witness objects to answering, he can.
Dr. EVANS. Maybe I should not ask this question.
The WITNESS. I have no objection at all. I have never had any association
with a leftwing organization whatsoever. My political views are best described
by Adlai Stevenson's views.
Dr. EVANS. He is from Chicago.
The WITNESS. Bight
Dr. EVANS. I want to ask you one other question.
Being a normal man and a good man, I take it, do you still in the back of
your head have these moral scruples about these things?
The WITNESS. I do.
Dr. EVANS. That is all.
Mr. ROBB. I think there are a couple of questions suggested by the chairman's
questions.
Mr. GBAY. If you will, I want to see if Mr. Marks has any questions.
Mr. MARKS. I have a couple, but either way.
Mr. GRAY. Suppose you proceed.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION^
By Mr. MARKS:
Q. I neglected to ask you one question, Dr. Bethe. When was the next time
after your meeting with Dr. Oppenheimer in 1940 that you saw him?
A. I saw him for a day in 1941.
Q. When and where as that?
A. That was in New Mexico on his ranch on the 24th of July, as far as I know.
Q. You had some reason for fixing that date?
A. Yes. There was a previous case in which Dr. Oppenheimer was accused
of having attended a meeting in Berkeley some time in July. He asked m'e to
establish the date of my visit, and I tried to do that I must confess that I came
only within 2 or 3 days, and the exact date was supplied to me.
Q. Supplied to me?
A. Supplied to me by a friend of Dr. Oppenheimer. But I came within 2 or
3 days.
Q. You mean
A. On my own investigation. I did not
Q. I think you better tell us the whole thing, because I don't know it
A. Well, I was asked to find out when I had visited Dr. Oppenheimer so thafc
I could, if necessary, testify to that I made some searching of my own memory.
808818—54 22
336
I could establish a date of the 1st of August wlien I met Dr. Teller for a summer
vacation, and I calculated back that some time in the early twenties of July I
had been at Dr. Oppenheimer's ranch.
I furthermore knew the hotel in which I stayed the night after, and I made
sure that I could find out from the hotel register what day we had Sjtayed there,
if need be, but they were reluctant to do this, because it was some 12 years back.
Then before I had any chance to go further into this, I was told that it was
the 24th of July.
Q. Ton mean that the hotel register was the 24th of July?
A. The hotel register was not searched, but an independent search— there
were other events which took place during my visit— namely, Dr. Oppenheimer
was kicked by a horse. It was possible to establish that date.
Q. And you remember that you were there?
A. I remembered that
• XJ. So when you said a friend of Dr. Oppenheimer's supplied the date, what
you meant was that a friend of Dr. Oppenheimer told you what date It was the
horse kicked him?
A. Bight
Q. I think I may have phrased a question ineptly in relation to your speeches
and your articles in early I960. In answer to a question of mine did yon say
that those statements and articles opposed work on the H bomb program?
A. No; they did not. They only deplored that such a thing would be made,
and they expressed the hope that we would never use it The statement said
that we were hoping that the United States would never use the H bomb until
it was used against us first. I don't know whether that is a good scheme. I
think it should be understood as a desperate attempt to reconcile an accomplished
fact of the H bomb program, which we did not want to oppose with our deeply
troubled conscience.
Mr. MASKS. May I identify for the record, in case the board should wish to
refer to this article, so we are sure that we are all talking about the same thing.
I have reference to a press release which was reported in the New York Times,
Sunday, February 6, 1950, and I have reference to an article that was published
in the April issue of 1950 of Scientific American, and a reprint of that article
which appeared in the April issue of the same year in the Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists.
Mr. ROBB. Do you want to show them to the witness, Mr. Marks?
Mr. MASKS. Yea, I think that would be a good idea.
The WITNESS. Yes, I remember these.
Mr. BOBB. I might say, Mr. Chairman, I think those are articles in the file
that yon have before you.
Mr. BOLANDER. The Scientific American article is in the file.
Mr. MASKS. Mr. Silverman has suggested that he recalls some reference earlier
in the proceeding to a patent that was mentioned relating to thermonuclear
devices in which you and Dr. Teller and Dr. Oppenheimer were all involved. Do
you have any recollection of that?
The WITNESS. I am sorry, I don't
Mr. MASKS. That is aft
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Doctor, I suppose it is a truism that you don't have ideas about things like
thermonuclear weapons on the atomic weapons without working on them?
A. That is certainly true.
Q. And you really can't tell whether they will work without experiment
can you?
A. You can tell pretty well by purely theoretical investigations.
Q. But in the last analysis you have to try them out?
A. In the last analysis you have to try them out I think it is a matter of
record that the General Advisory Oommittee has always been strongly recom-
mending tests on atomic weapons.
am a uttle bit confused abouj the two periods we have
January
A, Yes, sir.
Q. I am not entirely clear as to
Los Alamos in respect to the thermonuclear.
837
but who was working on it at Los Alamos, and how much work were they doing?
Could you help us on that?
A. I will try. It was definitely a matter of very minor priority. It was car-
ried on, that is, one line of work was carried on mainly by summer consultants,
particularly by Dr. Nordheim. Another line of work was proposed by Dr. Teller.
I don't remember exactly when, but it was probably about in 1948. I am not sure.
That was worked out quite actively. I would say some 20 percent or so of the
work of the theoretical division went into that from then on.
Q. I find in the file here some notation, which I can't vouch for, but perhaps
you can tell me whether it is right or not, "That during that period from the spring
of 1946 until January 1950, the work being done at Los Alamos on the thermonu-
clear was being done by Dr. Richtmyer, who worked for approximately 8 months
on the problem.
A. Yes.
Q. Dr. Nordheim who worked approximately a month, and Dr. Teller, who
worked approximately 2 months, and in addition there were perhaps 2 or 3 com-
puters who worked for a full year. Would that sound about right to you?
A. This would sound about right for the one development that I spoke of, which
1 said was done by summer consultants. I would have thought from my recol-
lection that Dr. Nordheim had worked on it more than that. But on the other
hand, it is true that Dr. Richtmyer worked on it. I think this is a fairly good
description of what went on on this one development The other development
Q. Would you wait just a moment? I am told I cannot ask you the question.
Go ahead.
A. The other development— I am perfectly prepared to later on after we finish
the unclassified part, to answer classified questions.
Q. We are trying to stay unclassified, and it is quite easy with me, because I
don't know much about this technical part of it
A. Yes, sir. The other development which I talked about which I called the
minor application of thermonuclear principles was really one of the functions of
the theoretical division. That is, of the division which generally was in charge
of doing the thinking, the theoretical thinking before matters were put into the
development stage. This, as far as I remember, was supported by the GAQ. On
this I gave the figure which I mentioned before of about 20 percent I know of
2 people who worked on this, Dr. Langmire and Dr. Rosenbluth.
Q. Was that at Los Alamos?
A. Yes; at Los Alamos.
Q. How long did they work on it?
A. To the best of my recollection about a year before the fall of 1949. However,
I may be wrong.
Q. That would be from the fall of 1948 to the fall of 1949.
A. Yes; this may be about right I am afraid I don't remember it in all detaiL
Q. So you would add those two gentlemen and their period of work to the
names and the periods I read you.
A. Not only that, but there were several others of less standing involved in this,
and I should mention that these two, apart from Dr. Richtmyer, and apart from
the head of the theoretical division, are probably the most able members of the
theoretical division*
Q. One further matter. Do you remember perhaps in May 1952 preparing a
history of thermonuclear development?
A. I certainly do.
Q. For whom did you prepare that?
A. I prepared it for Mr. Dean, who was then the Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission. However, not on his request, but rather to state the history as I
saw it, and as most people at Los Alamos saw it
Q. At whose request did you prepare it?
A. At my own.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer discuss it with you?
A. No.
Q. He did not talk with you at all about it?
A. No.
Mr. ROBB. That is all Thank you.
Mr. MASKS. May I ask a couple of more questions?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
338
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. MARKS :
Q. I would like to be sure, Dr. Bethe, that I understand the sense in which you
made the statement about which the chairman has also questioned you, I believe,
that the motivation you had in going back to work in the summer of 1950 on the
thermonuclear problem was the hope that you could prove it would not work.
Did you mean that you hoped you could prove by argument that it would not work,
or that you could discover it as a law of nature in the sense of the theory of rela-
tivity or another scientific theory that it was impossible?
A. Hardly quite as conclusively as the theory of relativity, but rather that I
could make an argument that the methods that we could conceive of for such
development would all not work. That there were laws of nature which doomed
such an attempt to failure.
Q. Would that process which you now describe of work on which you launched
have been an indispensable part of discovering what would work?
A. I think so ; yes. I don't know whether it was indispensable because Teller
dispensed with it. Teller was able to make his invention without having had a
conclusive discussion of all the possibilities.
Mr. MASKS. That is alL
Mr. GBAY. Thank you very much, Dr. Bethe.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GRAY. We will take a recess.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Bethe, we have asked you to come back to clear up something
for the record which I think needs to be done. Mr. Robb will do it very quickly.
Dr. Hans Bethe resumed the stand as a witness, having previously been duly
sworn, was examined and testified further as follows :
FURTHER KE-OEOSS-BXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Doctor, I revert to your talk about the report you prepared in May 1952.
A* xes.
Q. I asked you if you talked with Dr. Oppenheimer before you prepared it and
you said that you didn't and I accepted that, of course.
A. Yes.
Q. I find after you left the room in the file a letter which is marked "Top
Secret," but I want to show it to you. It is addressed by you to Dr. Oppenheimer
on May 28, 1£52, and apparently attached to a copy of your report to Mr. Dean,
dated May 28, 1953.
Just so there be no misunderstanding in the record I want you to look at this
and give any comment you may have.
A. This seems to say that we did talk about it As far as I remember it was
merely that I reported to him that I was writing such a document. It was cer-
tainly not initiated by him and the contents that should be in it were not
discussed with him.
Q. And you sent him a copy of the report?
A. I did.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Classification Officer, if I get into something here, will you
please stop me.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. I notice you refer to a visit to Griggs. Who was Griggs ?
A. Mr. Griggs was the chief scientist to the Air Forces.
ay
'SA1;*116 *?"* ^J*? was much ^asaton of the past record of Los Alamos and
much discussion of the question- whether a second laboratory for weapon* i work
Sh0?i£ Opeaed* B, seemed to m *** some ratter false inf onnitioiwas Tcur-
0 l art
on* i wor
B, seemed to m *** some ratter false inf onnitioiwas Tcur-
p£wl* Part^ariy ^ the Air Forces and one of the^ersons
Gri r^^nent £ *? ^ou of ^ Force OBtoto w* Dr.
Griggs. Theref ore, I went to see him to clear up the past Los Alamos
and also to discuss generally the function of themonu^^p^^
Q. What was his view on the second laboratory? w
A. He was very much for it
Q. You were against it?
A. Yes.
339
Q. Yon say in your letter to Dr. Oppenheimer : "As you know, I visited Griggs
yesterday morning." Had you talked to Dr. Oppenheimer about visiting Griggs
before you went to see him?
A. I obviously had.
Q. Do you remember what your conversation with Dr. Oppenheimer was?
A. I am afraid I don't but it probably ran somewhat similar to what I Just
told you : That I wanted to clear up these matters. By the way, Dr. Oppenheimer
opposed the second laboratory much less than I did, if at all.
Q. I will show you the letter so you will get the context and maybe I can
phrase a question that won't be overruled by our friend the security officer.
Doctor, I notice you speak of the atmosphere calming down considerably in
this matter. What were you talking about there?
A. I will try to remember. I am not sure I can.
Q. If you don't, just tell us you don't and that is the end of it.
A. I may have referred to the general controversy of whether atomic weapons
work was being pursued— no ; I mean thermonuclear work— was being pursued
sufficiently effectively at Los Alamos. This was our main concern at the time.
It was believed by Dr. Oppenheimer and myself and by the members of the
Atomic Energy Commission that Los Alamos was doing a very good job on
thermonuclear weapons at that time, and this was borne out by the success of the
test in November of 1952.
Dr. Teller, I think, was conducting a campaign to establish the contrary. I
believe this was the matter I am talking about
Q. I notice in here again referring to your visit to Griggs, which you say took
from 10 a. m. to 12 : 30, you said you were surprised because your conversation
with him was quite pleasant?
A. Right
Q. What did that refer to, Doctor?
A. Dr. Griggs had been very much of an exponent of the view that Los
Alamos was not doing its Job right and very much an exponent of the view that
thermonuclear weapons and only the biggest thermonuclear weapons should
be the main part of the weapons arsenal of the United States. I had very
much disagreed with this, with both of these points, and so I expected that we
would have really a very unpleasant fight on this matter. We didn't.
Q. I see you mention in the first paragraph of your letter "very peaceable
and enjoyable dinner with Dr. Oppenheimer" and the talk you had with him.
Had you discussed with him at that dinner your forthcoming visit to Griggs.
I don't know whether this was discussed at the dinner or otherwise. That was
up at Princeton, was it?
A. I remember the dinner was here in Washington during the meeting of the
American Physical Society. I may be wrong.
Mr. ROBB. That is all. Thank you, Doctor.
FUETHEE REDIRECT EXAMINATION
ByMr.MABKs:
Q. Dr. Bethe, what kind of a second laboratory did Griggs favor?
A. Well, he favored a second laboratory to work on weapons and such a
laboratory was then established at Livermore very shortly after all these con-
versations took place, namely, in July of 1952.
This laboratory has been getting all the credit for thermonuclear development,
wliich is unjustified.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. I mean by that that the majority of the weapons which have been de-
veloped and which are being tested now in the Pacific and the most powerful of
them were developed exclusively by the Los Alamos Laboratory.
Q. Dr. Bethe, you said, as I understood your remarks, that you disagree with
Griggs about the desirability of relying exclusively on thermonuclear weapons?
A. I did not say exclusively. Predominantly.
Q. Was this because of moral considerations?
A. Yes. It was my belief that If and when war ever comes that it is most
Important not to overdestroy the enemy country, but to fit the weapon In each
case to the target and to attempt the best accuracy that one can on bombing
so as to make a minimum of destruction compatible with gaining the objective.
It was on this that we disagreed.
Q. I am afraid I don't understand you. Did you mean atomic weapons
could do the Job?
340
A. Yes, sir. Supposing you have, for instance, a city which contains two
industrial plants which you want to bomb, each of which could be knocked out
by a 100 kiloton atomic weapon correctly placed, you could also use a 5 million
ton thermonuclear weapon to hit them both, which would reduce the problem for
the Air Forces because they would have to fly only 1 plane instead of 2.
It seemed to me that both from moral considerations and for the consideration
of the state of the enemy country after the war, which we traditionally take
care of in some way, it was important to choose the former alternative and not
the latter.
Mr. MAKES. That is all,
Mr. GBAT. Thank you very much, Dr. Bethe.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, I will ask Dr. Fisk to come in.
In the division of labor, I will ask my partner, Mr. Silverman, to put the ques-
tions to him.
Mr. GBAY. May I have your initials?
Dr. FISK. James B. Fisk, F-i-s-k.
Mr. GRAY. Do you wish to testify under oath?
Dr. FISK. Yes.
Mr. GHAT. Would you then please stand and raise your right hand?
James B. Fisk, do you swear that the testimony you are to give the board
shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Dr. FCSK. I do.
Mr. GBAY. Will you sit down, please, sir. I must remind you of the existence
of the perjury statutes. I will be glad to describe to you the penalties imposed
if you wish, but I assume you are familiar with them.
Dr. FISK. I think I am familiar with them.
Mr. GRAY. Second, I should ask that if it becomes necessary in the course of
your testimony to make any reference to or disclose any restricted data, I would
ask that you notify the board in advance so that we can take appropriate steps
if that becomes necessary.
Hnally, I should say that we consider the proceedings and record of this
board as a confidential matter between the Commission and its officials and Dr
Oppenheimer and his representatives and witnesses, and that the Commission
will not take the initiative in releasing anything about these proceedings to the
We express the hope that will also be the attitude of the witnesses who are
appearing.
Mr. Silverman, would you proceed.
Whereupon, Dr. James B. Fisk was called as a witness, and having been duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVERMAN:
Q. What is your present position in private employment?
A. I am vice president in charge of research at the Bell Telephone Labora-
Q. What is your present position with the Atomic Energy Commission?
A. Member of the General Advisory Committee.
Q. How long have you been a member of the General Advisory Committee?
A. I was appointed in the fall of 1952.
Q. Will you tell us what previous positions you have held with the Atomic
Energy Commission?
JL From February 1, 1W7 until September 1948, 1 was Director of the Division
of Research of the Atomic Energy Commission. Subsequent to that I was for
a year or perhaps a little longer a consultant to the General Manager
Q. When did you first meet Dr. Oppenheimer?
w^^l^^^f met **' OPP^^e* ^ any other than a very casual way
T^ftJ131!* was I08* bef °re y°u assumed your position as Director of the Besearch
Division?
A. Yes.
^ Q. After that did you work with Dr. Oppenheimer with any degree of dose-
-A. Boring the time I was Director of the Division of Besearch I saw Dr.
occaslons> ^a11* to connection with the work of the
341
Q. At that time lie was chairman of the GAC?
A. At that time he was chairman, yes.
Q. Did you also serve on committees with Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Subsequently to that time I have been on the Science Advisory Committee
in the Office of Defense Mobilization of which he was an initial member, and
on various committees, such as visiting committees to Harvard University and
things of that sort
Q. What was the visiting committee to Harvard University?
A. Physics Department. In fact, those are the only two that I should cite.
Q. You mean the Science Advisory Committee and the visiting committee to
Harvard?
A. Yes,
Q. What is the period of your joint service on the Science Advisory Committee
as far as you can recall?
A. I should say the overlap was a matter of something under a year. Approxi-
mately a year, I would say.
Q. When was that?
A. Quite recently.
Q. Do you recall about the time that you assumed your position as Director
of the Division of Research in the early part of 1947 there was discussion about
what to do about Los Alamos?
A. This was, I believe, the most important problem that I came in contact with
at that time in the Commission—the health and vigor of Los Alamos.
Q. Would you tell us something about what the problem was and what was
done about it with particular reference to what you know about what Dr. Oppen-
heimer did?
A. I can say a few rather general things here which I think may be of sig-
nificance. The Commission had just, of course, come into existence. Los Alamos
at that stage, with all of the rehabilitation of science and scientists following
the war, many people going back to their normal pursuits and normal homes,
Log Alamos was in a state where there was a real question as to whether or
not it could survive. There was a great deal of attention paid to its growth,
regaining of strength not only on the part of the Commission itself and the staff,
but on the part of the General Advisory Committee. This was a very principal
question.
Many of us spent many, many days in Los Alamos with people, attempting
to keep the staff together, formulating its program and doing the things that
would give it real life and vigor. In all of these activities, the General Advisory
Committee was extremely helpfuL Dr. Oppenheimer in particular was extremely
helpful and thoughtful about the cirrcumstances which could bring the laboratory
back to life.
It seems to me, if I may add this, that the health and vigor of Los Alamos
today is a very direct result of the activities of those times. I believe it is the
strongest laboratory the country has.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer play any part in connection with the research work
that was done by the ABC?
A. The principal activity for which I had a direct responsibility in the Com-
mission, although all of us were doing a great variety of things in those days,
was the research program. This was something that was inherited in part
from the Manhattan District but it was something in another sense that had
to be started in some parts anew. There were new national laboratories being
formed, such as Brookhaven, such as the new Argonne Laboratory, and the
whole problem here was to generate a research program that would keep Ameri-
can science and particularly the science that was relevant to the Commission's
activities strong and vigorous.
There were many problems that came up day by day and in many, many cases,
as Director of the Research Division, I turned to the General Advisory Com-
mittee for assistance and always got very good advice and yery strong support
for those things that made sense in my judgment
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer play a role in this advice and assistance that you got
from the GAC?
A. A very prominent role, both in terms of the formal activities of the General
Advisory Committee itself and in terms of many informal contacts where I
felt free to call upon him and where I saw him in the Washington offices.
The examples that one could cite are almost too numerous to detail, but all
of this added to a feeling for strengthening science in the United States and
science in its relevance to the Commission's overall program.
342
Q. Have you formed an opinion as a result of your contact with Dr. Oppen-
tieimer, and your knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer with respect to his integrity,
his loyalty and any other factors that might bear on his being a security risk?
A. Yes, I have. I have a very high opinion of all of these factors and I
would go on to say that I know of no more devoted citizen in this country.
Mr. SILVERMAN. I have no further questions.
CROSS EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, is the Bell Laboratory the one that Dr. Kelly is the head of?
A. He is the president, yes.
Q. Is he the Dr. Kelly that appeared here the other day?
A. Yes. He is my senior.
Mr. ROBB. Thank you ; that is all I care to ask.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Dr. Fisk. We very much appreciate your
coming.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask General Osborn to testify
next because I think we can get through with him this afternoon.
Mr. GRAY. All right.
May I ask for your initials?
General OSBORN. Frederick H. Osborn. I usually don't use the initial. Fred-
erick Osborn.
Mr. GRAY. Do you wish to testify under oath?
General OSBORN. Yes, I do, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Would you be good enough to stand and raise your right hand?
Frederick Osborn, do you swear that the testimony you are to give the Board
will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
General OSBORN. I do.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you. Will you be seated, sir?
It is my duty to remind you of the penalties provided by the statutes, that is,
the so-called perjury statutes. Unless you wish, I will not recite these penalties.
I assume you are familiar with them.
General OSBORN. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. I should also like to ask that if in the course of your testimony
it becomes necessary for you to discuss restricted data you will inform the
Chairman in advance.
Finally, I should say that we consider these proceedings as a confidential
matter between the Atomic Energy Commission and its officials and representa-
tives and Dr. Oppenheimer, his representatives and associates, and that the
Commission will not take the initiative in releasing anything publicly about
these proceedings. We express the hope that this will be the view of the wit-
nesses as well.
Whereupon, Frederick Osborn was called as a witness, and having been duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
DIREOT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GARRISON:
Q. General Osborn, I just want to ask you a few questions about your wartime
experience and service. You were a member and chairman of the President's
Advisory Committee on Selective Service in 1940, were you not?
A. Yes.
Q. And chairman of the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and
Recreation beginning in March 1941?
A. I was appointed by Mr. Stimson to that post.
Q. Then you were promoted by General Marshall to brigadier general?
A. I was commissioned by General Marshall.
Q. As brigadier general and later you were promoted to major general in 1943?
A. That is right.
Q. You were Director of the Information and Educational Division of the
USA, the United States Army?
A. Yes.
Q. And resigned from the Army in 1945?
A, That is right.
Q. And then you were appointed Deputy Representative of the United States
on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, 1947 to 1950?
A. That is right.
343
Q. And it was in that connection that you had a close acquaintance and work
ing relationship with Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. That is right
Q. I want to just ask you a few questions about that experience of yours and
I would like to ask you rapidly a few questions that will bring us to the his-
torical point about which you are to testify.
The Baruch plan had been presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission in the fall of 1946, is that right?
A. That is right.
Q. The plan was approved in December 1946, by every one but the Russians
and their satellites?
A. There may have been some small nations in abstention — I forgot-4>ut
it was approved in effect by all the nations except the Russians and their
satellites.
Q. And after that, the Commission adjourned?1
A. That is right
Q. And Mr. Baruch shortly afterwards resigned his position as the United
States representative on the Commission?
A. Yes.
Q. And then during the winter the resignation was not filled?
A. For the first 2 months it was not filled.
Q. And you were asked by General Marshall to take on the job of Deputy
United States Representative on the Commission, succeeding Mr. Baruch?
A. That is right
Q. That was in February 1947?
A. He told me he had a job for me and would I take a job, was I free to take
a job on February 22, and I said I always would take a job, whatever he asked
me to do. Then he sent for me to come to Washington on the 28th of February
and told me what the job was. I was sworn in on Friday
Q. March 7?
A. Yes, March 7, Friday, a week later. All Fridays.
Q. And at about that time on that day or shortly thereafter, did Dr. Oppen-
heimer get in touch with you at Acting Secretary Acheson's request?
A. I had come down on Friday, March 7. I remember these dates because
Washington's birthday was when we gave an honorary degree to General Mar-
shall at Princeton, which was the 22d. I came down the following Friday. I
came down to be sworn in on Friday, March 7.
While I was in Dean Acheson's office, or waiting outside — I was back and
forth from Dean Acheson's office ; he was then Assistant or something or other
Secretary of State to General Marshall, tiding over '—Dr. Oppenheimer called
me from San Francisco. I had not known Dr. Oppenheimer before. I had
simply known his name and knew who he was. He said that he wanted to see
me.
Shall I go on?
Q. Yes.
A. I said "I am new to this job ; I know nothing about it Would it be better
if we waited a couple of weeks until I was acquainted with the job."
He said, "No, I want to see you right now. Will you be in Washington or
New York tomorrow?*'
I said, "Yes, of course, I will see you if you want to come on, but it is a long
trip to take."
He said, "I would like to see you."
We made a date to meet at the offices of the Atomic Energy Commission in
New York the next day, Saturday. I went back to New York. Dr. Oppen-
heimer flew in from the coast and arrived early Saturday morning and met me
at half past 11. I had a car and drove him to my country place up at Garrison
across from West Point because I was spending the weekend there. He spent
Saturday and Sunday with me. We drove back at 3 o'clock on Sunday be-
cause I was going to meet with Baruch.
Q. D*d he get in touch with you at Acheson's request?
A. No. He knew from Acheson I had been appointed. It was on his initiative,
I am pretty clear, that he wanted to see me.
What he wanted to see me about is this. The general tenor I remember quite
clearly. I don't remember the exact words. I remember the general tenor clearly
because It was very interesting.
1 Inaccurate.
344
Q. What was the key question facing the United States representative at that
time? In fact, what was the key question facing the Commission?
A. I know now what the question was. I am not sure that I knew then because
I was Just getting started. The key question was whether the negotiations
should be continued.
Q. With the Russians?
A. With the Russians in the United Nations, the Russians having turned down
the Baruch plan. They had not vetoed it ; they had abstained but not agreed
The Baruch plan was very general in its statement It was not a detailed plan.
They had turned down the general principles of the plan. The question was,
should the United States agree to continue the negotiations in the United
Nations?
Dr. Oppenheimer came on to tell me that there were two very serious dangers
In continuing negotiations. The general background was that he was now
certain, after watching the Russians for 3 or 4 months, that the Russians had
no intention of accepting any plan for the control of atomic energy— interna-
tional control of atomic energy— which would mean lifting the Iron Curtain.
He had come to the conclusion that their behavior showed that they were not
going to lift the Iron Curtain, * * * for to do so would mean the end of the
regime.
Yet he felt certain that, if the. Iron Curtain was not lifted, any plan of inter-
national control would be exceedingly dangerous to the United States. What he
was afraid of was that if we continued these negotiations we would make some
compromises which without our fully realizing it would put us in the position
of having accepted an agreement for the control of atomic energy, possibly with
prohibition of bombs, without in reality the Russians having lifted the Iron
Curtain.
There would be some system where we would accept compromises which would
put the United States in a very dangerous position of not really knowing what
was going on in Russia, whereas the Russians would know all about what was
going on here.
This was the first danger he foresaw, and he talked about this. This was
the purpose of his trip. He also felt that this continuation of negotiations was
something that the Russians would be glad to use the United Nations as a
medium for propaganda, and this propaganda they could use against us, and
it would be just as effective as any propaganda we would get by insisting on
the Baruch plan.
So he was for discontinuing the negotiations.
Q. Then you consulted representatives of the French
A. I went back to New York and I saw McNaughton, the Canadian represen-
tative, a very able man, and Cadogan, the British representative, and Parodi,
the head of the French delegation.
Q. What was their attitude?
A. They all felt very strongly that the negotiations should continue. They
said they really had not a good look at the Baruch plan, they had not taken
much part in drawing it, they did not know what it would look like if it was put
in more detailed form. They said they would be in an impossible position in
their own countries if they agreed to calling off the negotiations.
Senator Austin told me that he had been called to Washington to attend a
meeting of the President's Executive Committee on the Regulation of Arma-
ments, which was commonly called RAC, composed of Patterson, Forrestal, Lilien-
thal, Acheson, possibly Lovett. I think Lovett was not present at that meeting.
I know he was not present at the meeting, and I am not sure whether he was
still Secretary for Air. I guess he wasn't. Anyway, it was composed of Patter-
son, Forrestal, Lilienthal and Acheson.
I asked Austin if I could go to this meeting with him in Washington. He said
yes, he would take me along. Austin felt very strongly that we should continue
negotiations. He came to this meeting and he said that we should continue
negotiations * * *.
Forrestal said, 'This is a lot of bunk," and so did Patterson. '
Q. How about Acheson?
A: Acheson didn't take any part.
Mr. ROBB. This is a lot of what?
The WITNESS. A lot of bunk. Forrestal was perfectly outspoken, and so for
that matter was Patterson * * * He said we should not go on with the negotia-
tions.
345
I asked if I might speak. I said I agreed with Austin that we should continue
the negotiations for quite different reasons. 1 felt the Russians had no inten-
tion seriously and they would not agree to any form of control that we could
accept, but that I had talked to * * * the British, the French and Canadian
representatives and these men were very insistent that we continue negotiations.
I thought if we were properly on our guard we need not make any bad mistakes
or endanger the situation, and it would be very injurious to our international
position to take a lone position, refusing to negotiate.
Forrestal said, "That makes sense to me ; what do you thing, Bob?" Paterson
said, "I think we should go ahead if this is the reason and if we do it without
eyes open.'*
Acheson said he was opposed to our going ahead. Lilienthal said that he
agreed. Acheson said, "If you feel this way, it is all right * * * to go ahead."
So the next time I saw Dr. Oppenheimer— I forget when it was, fairly soon —
I told him I had a part in this decision to go ahead notwithstanding his advice.
I told him the reasons. He said, "Well, I had information which he had not
taken into account, that he had not talked to any of the representatives of the
other countries, naturally."
He said, "I was the boss of this situation and, if this was the decision, this
was the decision. He would go along with it and I could count on him for
any help I felt he could give us."
I then asked Dean Acheson if I might appoint a committee of consultants.
I think it was on quite an informal basis— simply consultants who would meet
with me in New York when I felt I needed their advice. On that committee I
asked to serve Dr. Oppenheimer, Jim Conant, General Groves, Bacher, and
Dr. Tolman, who died a year later (and I think Lincoln Gordon).1
By Mr. GABBISOW:
Q. Chester Barnard?
A. Yes.
Q! And General Farrell?
A. Yes. (And Lincoln Gordon was on it. He had been on Baruch's staff.
He was a professor at Yale or Harvard, and I think he was on it for a while.) *
This committee was wonderful and also the attention and interest they gave
it Oppenheimer and Conant said that any time we needed them they would drop
anything they were doing and would come on for consultation.
When we were coming close to a decision as to what detailed spelling out
we should do of the Baruch plan, I always consulted this committee. While
I don't remember particular things that were said at committee meetings,
Dr. Oppenheimer's position consistently through the first year when we were
spelling out the Baruch plan in detail was that we must be very careful not to
give up anything. If we lost the proposal in the Baruch plan which had
already been too much weakened— the original proposal of the Acheson-Lilien-
that plan that there must be international ownership and management of these
plants— if we lost this, we would begin to get in an increasingly weakened
position and he would be very scared of it
So I think we strengthened the position that had already been weakened.
It had already gone to the question of whether there should be inspection being
left a little indefinite. I think we strengthened it under Dr. Oppenheimer's
urging and that of other members of the committee.
Q. By the summer of 1949, or in the summer of 1949, did Dr. Oppenheimer
make any comments in your consultant's committee which you have just been
describing about the state of affairs in relation to the Baruch plan and the
Russians?
A. By the summer of 1948 we went to the General Assembly in Paris with
quite a well completed detailed outline of the Baruch plan— still called the
Baruch plan, if you want, but it was the United Nations plan by this time—
and under instructions of General Marshall, very specific and written, that
we would try to call off the negotiations and, if we could not call them off
entirely, then further talks should be put in the hands of the six sponsoring
powers so it would not any longer be done in public and these ridiculous meet-
ings which the Russians were using wholly for propaganda by this time would
be avoided.
1 Inaccurate.
346
We were successful to have the negotiations transferred to the so-called six
sponsoring powers who had originally sponsored the setting up of a commission.
During 1949 we held occasional meetings of the sponsoring powers. I had my
committee and the individual members of it in from time to time.
*******
Q. From these contacts with Dr. Oppenheimer during these 2 years, 3 years
actually, did you form an impression of his character and his quality as an
American citizen?
A. I formed the impression of a man most consistent and determined in his
desire to protect the United States against what he considered a very dangerous
situation, a great number of dangers in these negotiations, and willing to take
infinite pains to see that we didn't fall into any of these traps.
Hence I considered him a man of real patriotism and very consistent character
and great loyalty because, after all, the very first thing I did, knowing nothing
about this situation — when 2 weeks after he had taken the trouble to fly out
from California — I had gone against his advice without telling him what I was
doing. This made no difference. He just stuck at what he considered his Job
of seeing that we didn't fall into any pitfalls on this thing.
Q. By going against his advice, you have reference to your testimony that,
after consulting with the British, French, and Canadians, you favored con-
tinuing negotiations with the Russians?
A. Yes. He remained intensely loyal. It has always struck me. I have
been in a good many jobs, and this is not always the case when you cross a
man at the beginning.
Mr. GAKRISON. That is all.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. General, that was before the Russians exploded their A-bomb, was it?
A. Yes; all of this was before. I think they didn't explode their A-bomb
until 1950.
Q. Yes.
Mr. GARRISON. 1949.
Mr. ROBB. 1949; I beg your pardon.
The WITNESS. Was it December of 1949?
Mr. GARRISON. September.
Mr. ROBB, September.
The WITNESS. I don't remember any activity on the part of the consulting
powers after that time. We had really stopped meeting. I was on part time
then. I resigned in December or the 1st of January, effective January 31, 1950.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GABBISON :
* ***** *
Q. Do you remember a talk which Dr. Oppenheimer gave to the United Nations
Committee in 1947? You don't have any recollection of that?
A. I remember his appearing. I am trying to think when that was. I remem-
ber that we asked him — one of the things that McNaughton, of Canada, wanted
to do was to get Dr. Oppenheimer to appear, but I forget just what period it was
in our negotiations. I think we had several scientists speak to the Commission
to inform them about the situation. I don't remember what he said ; I am sorry.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Evans, do you have any questions?
Dr. EVANS. No.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, General Osborn. We appreciate your
appearance.
The WITNESS. Thank you, sir.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, might I take 1 minute on the record. I would
like to renew my request that copies of the transcript be given to us daily. I
made arrangements with the reporter for two copies from now on.
Mr. ROLANDER. That is correct.
Mr. GABBISON. The point I would like to make is this. It is very, very diffi-
cult for us to work on these transcripts in the anteroom outside. I spent the
Easter weekend in there, and it is not easy for us to work outside of our offices
on these things, as you can well understand. I really don't know what this
347
problem about classification is, but it does seem to me that we should be in the
position every day to have transcripts and to have them so counsel might take
them out of the building and work on them because it is very, very difficult for
us here.
Mr. ROLANDER. May I say that I and the classification oflScer also worked this
weekend to try to get these transcripts reviewed. I think we are in a position
to give you volumes 1 and 3 tonight. Some of the other volumes are creating
some problems. We find we may, in order to eliminate any need for a classifica-
tion stamp, have to scissor or remove a sentence or two or a paragraph or two,
of course with the knowledge of counsel. I think this might aid us in getting
the review completed more quickly.
Mr. GARRISON. I would rather take something that had some scissor holes in it
if I could take it out of the building, assuming I could know what the scissor
holes consisted of.
Mr. ROLANDER. Our problem is that so many other agencies have been men-
tioned in this proceeding. Although everyone has attempted to refrain from
discussing restricted data, information having interest to other agencies and a
programmatic interest has come up in the record which we feel is necessary to
examine quite carefully.
We will attempt to scissor these transcripts and see if we can't move them a
little more quickly. But as of tonight I think we can only assure you volumes
1 and 3, and by working tonight perhaps tomorrow we can assure you other
transcripts.
Mr. GARRISON. I am sure you have been working hard on it Aren't these
references to other agencies chiefly in Dr. Oppenheimer's direct testimony?
Mr. ROLANDER. Of course, General Groves' testimony, Mr. Dean's testimony
this morning also had certain items. I don't have the transcript in front of me,
Mr. Garrison. We have, of course, provided a man here so that you can work
at any hour that you want to. You are aware of that, of course.
Mr. GARRISON. Yes. I appreciated Mr. Williams' being here all day yesterday.
I brought hi™ lunch in a bag.
Mr. ROBB. I might say that I have felt the same difficulty because I have to
come down to the safe to look at anything. I can't take anything home with me.
Frankly, I have not had time to read the transcript.
Mr. GABBISON. May we take out of the building the Pash and Lansdale inter-
views? They are marked unrestricted.
Mr. ROBB. It is all right with me.
Mr. ROLANDER. It is not a part of the record yet.
Mr. ROBB. I see no objection.
Mr. GARRISON. We were going to try to agree on that. It is kind of late now.
Do you think- we should do it this afternoon? That is, on the recording.
Mr. ROBB. Yes ; I understand.
Mr. GABBISON. I feel kind of weary.
Mr. ROBB. I do, too.
Mr. ROLANDEB. May I say one other thing about the transcript. We will
place on top of the transcript a list of obvious errors. We, of course, have not
tried to correct a misspelling unless it is an error of substance. If you see any
errors in addition to the ones we have noted, you can tell us.
Mr. GABBISON. I assume, Mr. Chairman, if counsel can give the board a stipu-
lation of correction of obvious errors in the record, it won't be necessary to take
the time of the board during the proceedings.
Mr. GRAY. The Board would be glad to receive it in that manner.
Mr. ROBB. I might say that I think on the whole the reporter has been doing
a splendid piece of work.
Mr. GABBISON. I Join in that
Mr. GRAY. If there is nothing further at this time, we will recess until 9 : 30
in the morning.
(Whereupon, at 5: 15 p. m., a recess was taken, to reconvene at 9: 30 a. m.,
Tuesday, April 20, 1954.)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
BUILDING T-3, EOOM 2002,
WasMngton, D. #., Tuesday, April #0, 1954.
The above entitled matter came on for hearing pursuant to recess,
before the board, at 9 : 30 a. m.
Personnel Security Board : Mr. Gordon Gray, chairman ; Dr. Ward
V. Evans, member: and Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Roger Kobb, and C. A. Rolander, Jr., counsel for the
board; J, Eobert Oppenneimer, Lloyd K. Garrison, Samuel J. Silver-
man, and Allen B. Ecker, counsel for J. Eobert Oppenheimer ; Herbert
S. Marks, cocounsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
(349)
PROCEEDINGS
-Mr. GRAY. First of all, I have a telegram from an individual named C. S.
Kuntz, 4507 North Dover Street, Chicago 40, Illinois. His telegram to me said,
"Please wire date of Oppenheimer hearing as wish to testify. Was employed
under Dr. Oppenheimer 1943 through 1946, respectiYely."
I am informed that Mr. Kuntz has indicated that he wishes to testify for, if
you will allow me to put in that way, Dr. Oppenheimer. I pass it along for
whatever value it may be to you. If you do not propose to call "Mm, perhaps
I should communicate and tell him that we will not need him as a witness. Can
you answer that question now?
Dr. OtFENHEiMEB. Can I hear the spelling of the name?
Mr. GRAY. K-u-n-t-z.
Dr. OPPENHEIMER. I don't recollect him.
Mr. GRAY. Obviously he was someone who worked with you in the laboratory.
Mr. GARRISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing it to our attention.
Mr. GRAY. Perhaps you would want to talk about this.
Mr. GARRISON. As far as I now know, we certainly have no intention of calling
him.
Mr. GRAY. Very well. The other thing I want to discuss is the question of the
redirect examination of Dr. Oppenheimer. You will recall, I guess it was on
Friday, we had a discussion of this and because of the presence of witnesses,
specifically including Mr. Lansdale and Dr. Glennan, I guess, one of whom I
think was already on his way, or who was in the city at the time, out of con-
sideration for their problems, we said that we would hear them. You will recall,
however, that I indicated that the board wished to proceed with the redirect
examination of Dr. Oppenheimer at the conclusion of the cross examination with
these interruptions for convenience.
The board feels very strongly that a good deal of confusion, at least in our
minds, could be eliminated by getting back to Dr. Oppenheimer right away and
seeking in so far as possible to have his testimony, redirect, and any recross
examination, not fragmented and interrupted.
I understand that Mr. Kennan is here and at the moment is waiting to testify,
and of course we will hear him. Perhaps I should ask if there are any other
witnesses on hand this morning?
Mr. GARRISON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lilienthal is here from New York.
Mr. Sumner Pike is here from Maine. Dr. Fermi is arriving at noontime from
Chicago. Professor Zacharias is here from Boston. Dr. Conant has cabled over
that at 2 o'clock this afternoon he had to make plans because of the complicated
nature of his witness here. Professor Ramsey from Harvard is here.
What our problem very simply has been is this: When we got the transcripts
Friday afternoon, it was just physically not time over the weekend — I didn't
get through more than a portion of one volume of the cross examination my-
self— with the difficulties of trying to arrange for these witnesses and all the
rest impinging, and also the problem of analyzing what had become quite a
complicated record with the bringing in of the elaboration of various names and
places and dates of recollections, and then the procedure that had been adopted
of asking Dr. Oppenheimer questions on the basis of what he recalled in the
past and then producing documents, some of which had been taken from his
own files on a classified basis, and suddenly declassified, all this produced a very
complicated and difilcult record to analyze.'
It has been purely a problem of time. I don't want to ask Dr. Oppenheimer to
testify until we really are prepared, and he is thoroughly ready to do it. I want
very much to cooperate with the board in this. I would think that today the
calendar is really beyond our
Mr. GRAY. It would sound so.
I would suggest, then, that we proceed with the witnesses who are here or on
their way here today and start tomorrow morning with Dr. Oppenheimer again.
I want to ask about Dr. Conant. You started to mention him.
S08S1&— 54- 28 (351)
352
Dr. EVANS. Is he here In Waslilngton?
Mr. GABBISON. Yes, lie is. He will be here today at 2 o'clock. We can talk
over our problem during the lunch hour.
Mr. GRAY. All right May I ask at this point only for an indication as to what
is involved in time, because I think the board will probably call some witnesses,
and they have to be alerted, I suppose, or should be, I am sure.
Could you give an indication of who are yet to come before the board as wit-
nesses called by Dr. Oppenheimer? This is not for any purpose other than time.
Mr. GABBISON. I understand. Yes, we have 10, I think, outside of those I
mentioned today. General McCormack, Walter Whitman, Dr. Rabi, Dr. von
Neumann, President DuBridge, Dr. Bacher, Dr. Lauritsen, I think President
Killian, Mr. Hartley Rowe, and Mr. Harry Winne, and Norris Bradbury.
Dr. EVANS. That makes how many in all?
Mr. GABBISON. That is 11 with Bradbury.
Dr. EVANS. In addition to the ones for today.
Mr. GRAY. That is after today.
Mr. GABBISON. I would rather doubt, if it is possible for us to get prepared for
redirect and I suppose some more cross examination of Dr. Oppenheimer this
week, I should think that it would not be possible to hear all these witnesses this
week. We had hoped to be able to do so, because we knew how much the board
desired not to have to come back nor do we ourselves wish to come back, either.
But I do think as we are going it means that there will be probably one day or
possibly a day and a half overflow of testimony beyond what we can do in this
one week.
Mr. GBAY. I thtTtir it is impossible to say that with any certainty at this point.
Mr. GABBISON. Does the board have any present idea as to when it will recon-
vene for the sake of hearing witnesses that it wishes to call.
Mr. GRAY. I would expect at this point that we would proceed next week for
that purpose. I don't think there will be too many witnesses. Perhaps we
should proceed.
Mr. GABBISON. Gould you inform us who they are going to be?
Mr. GBAY. Yes, we will give you an indication. The board has not come
to any final, conclusion. For one thing, up until this point I don't think that we
have known all the witnesses for certain whom Dr. Oppenheimer wishes to call.
I am sure some of these the board would have called if he had not called them.
Mr. GABBISON. I think this is the original list that I gave you away back, Mr.
Chairman. I think there may have been one or two additions since the very
first day*
Mr. GBAY. Yes.
Dr. EVANS. Did you mention Dr. Bush?
Mr. GABBISON. I forgot him.
Dr. EVANS. I thought you did.
Mr. GABBISON. That makes 12. He can come on 15 minutes notice, so I had
htm on the side.
Mr. Chairman, I think this is Just about it as I gave it to yon the first day.
Mr. GBAY. All right. Can we proceed with Mr. Kennan.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Marks will examine Mr. Kennan.
Mr. GBAY. All right
What is your full name?
Mr. KENNAN. George Frost Kennan.
Mr. GBAY. Do you, wish to testify under oath? You are not required to do so.
Mr. KENNAN. I would be quite prepared to testify tinder oath.
Mr. GBAY. All the witnesses have to this point Would you then stand, please,
and raise your right hand?
George Frost Kennan, do you swear that the testimony you are to give the
board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help yon
God?
Mr. KENNAN. I do.
Whereupon, George Frost Kennan was called as a witness, and having been
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Will you be seated, please.
It is necessary for me to point out to you the existence of the so-called perjury
statutes. I shall be glad to give you an indication of the penalties if you wish.
The WITNESS. I don't think it is necessary, sir.
Mr. GRAY. I want to bring them to your attention.
I should also like to ask that in the event probably unlikely in this case, that
it is necessary for you to disclose any restricted data in your testimony, that
353
you advise me before such disclosure, in order that we might excuse any un-
authorized persons.
Finally, I should like to point out to you that the proceedings and record of
this board are regarded as strictly confidential between the Atomic Energy
Commission and its officials participating, and Dr. Oppenheimer, his representa-
tives and witnesses. The Commission will take no initiative in the public re-
lease of any information relating to these proceedings, and we express the hope
that will be the attitude of witnesses.
Mr. Marks.
DIBECT EXAMINATION
By MB. MASKS :
Q. Mr. Kenyan, will you please identify yourself and give the board briefly
your professional history? I am told that you should be addressed as Ambas-
sador Kennan, but that does not come quite naturally to me. If I may, I would
like to call you Mr. Kennan.
A. I am now a Foreign Service Officer retired. I grew up in Wisconsin. I
had my early schooling there, went to Princeton University and went almost
immediately from Princeton University into the Foreign Service of the United
States, where I served for 27 years without interruption. I retired from the
Foreign Service last July, and am now on a regular retired status.
Q. And what is your present position, if any?
A. I am at present a member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton,
and in residence at the institute, engaged in certain research and writing work—-
scholarly work.
Q. Will you please describe in a little more detail the highlights of your ex-
perience in the Foreign Service?
A. I served first for a year or two in Geneva and Hamburg as a vice consul,
and then was selected— this was away back in 1928— AS one of the first group
of men to be trained for special work in the Soviet and Russian field. We were
at that time given rather a thorough course of training, usually 3 or 4 years of
it I was sent to the University of Berlin where I spent 2 years and took the
diploma of the Oriental Seminary in Berlin, and after that I was put as a re-
porting officer in Berlin first in the legation of Riga before we had any relations
with the Soviet Union, and after 1933 in the Embassy in Moscow.
Since that time I have had the status in the service of a specialist on Soviet
affairs. I have served on 4 different occasions in the Embassy in Moscow in
various ranks, the last time as ambassador.
Q. W!hen was that?
A. That was in 1952. I have had other service, relating to the Soviet Union,
such as the so-called Russian desk in the State Department in 1937 and 1948. So
I have been pretty closely in contact with Soviet problems for most of my career.
Q. What other main Foreign Service have you had?
A. I have served for many years in Germany.
Q. When was that?
A. In addition to my studies there in the earlier years, I studied during the
war — or rather I served during the war — from the outbreak of war until Pearl
Harbor, after I was interned for a time, so that I had nearly 3 years of wartime
service in Germany. Also service in Austria and Czechoslovakia and in Portugal.
Q. Prior to your retirement, what was your last position in the Department
of State here?
A. My last position was Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
Q. Prior to that?
A. Prior to that I was from 1947 to 1950 Director of the Policy Planning Staff
of the Department of State and from the beginning of 1950 until the middle of
that year counselor of the Department of State. My last official position was
that of counselor of the Department of State, a position that I had only for
6 months in 1950.
Q. Could you describe in Just a very few sentences what your responsibilities
were as head of the policy planning staff and as counselor of the State
Department?
A. The Policy Planning Staff was established by General Marshall in the spring
of 1947. I was asked to found it and to determine its composition and its pro-
cedures and to head it initially,, and did so. We were an advisory staff to the
Secretary of State. We were there to advise him on questions with regard to
which he might seek our advice or on such major questions of foreign policy
and especially long term policy as we ourselves thought were in an advisory
opinion to the Secretary.
354
The staff is still in existence. Its methods of work have changed from time
to time, but has remained as a permanent unit of the Department of State, and
is tile only body as far as I am aware in the framework of the staff which has a
universal competence. Its competence is not restricted to any geographic area
or functional area.
Q. When you were counselor, what does the term "counselor" mean? Is that
like Assistant Secretary or Under Secretary?
A. Counselor again is the senior advisor to the Secretary of State who has
no operational responsibility in the sense that he has no division or administrative
apparatus under him. He is in purely an advisory capacity. The title has
existed for many decades, and is usually a man who is kept there simply on the
basis of his personal experience and qualities which it is felt might be useful to
the Secretary, possibly to the President as an advisor.
Q. In the hierarchy, am I right in understanding that the post of counselor
is equivalent to or just under that of Under Secretary?
A. Yes, sir. It has varied. I would say it has always been between the
2d and the 4th place in the Department of State, depending on the Secretary
of State and the counselor and the arrangements made at the moment.
Q. I should have asked you at the beginning a matter which I suppose every-
body knows about, but which we ought to inquire about for the record-
Are you the author, I think it is fair to say, of a rather famous article, called
"Sources of Soviet Conduct"?
A. I am. The article was written privately for Mr. Forrestal In December
1946 and January 1947. He had asked me for a review of another paper that
he had obtained from another source on this subject, and I told him I can't
comment on that, but I would be glad to give him my own views, and did in
this paper.
Later Mr. Armstrong, who was head of the Council on Foreign Relations and
editor of the magazine Foreign Affairs, asked me if I had anything along this
line that I could submit for publication, and I did on the condition that it would
be published anonymously.
To my horror, the article actually appeared after I had taken over the
policy planning staff under General Marshall, and the authorship of it leaked,
and it caused quite a sensation when it did appear. As far as I know, It did
no damage. It had been duly cleared by the Department of State so General
Marshall never held it against me. I was the author of it.
Q. I don't think Mr. Robb will object to my asking you if it has not been
generally regarded as a rather robust statement of the situation of the United
States with respect to the peril that we faced vis a vis the Russians.
A. It was an attempt to analyze the reasons for a pattern of Soviet behavior
which surprised many people in this country in the months immediately follow-
ing the war, and to suggest
Q. You mean an unfriendly policy? .
A. Yes, and to suggest an approach to this problem on our part that would
be hopeful and helpful.
Q. I would like to turn now to a more specific subject and ask you what you
have had to do with the problem of Soviet espionage, Soviet infiltration of agents
into the United States, problems of security?
. A. In the early days before our recognition of the Soviet Government when a
number of us worked on the Baltic States in reading the Russian press
Q. Do you speak and read Russian?
A. I do, sir, yes. We were rather shocked to observe the names and statements
of Americans or people who held themselves out as Americans, but who were
giving statements for the press in Moscow of an extraordinary nature, and ones
that indicated that their allegiance was to the Soviet Union and not to this
Government
Mr. ROBB. Could we have the date on this, Mr. Marks?
The WITNESS. I would say roughly in the years between 1929 and 1938. At
that time we were concerned, about it. I personnally brought some of these
names to the attention of the Government back here, and raised the question
as to whether passports could not be denied to these people because it seemed to
me evident that they, had expatriated themselves in every sense of the word,
subjectively.
We ran up against the snarls of legislative provisions and procedural provisions
of the Government, and I don't believe anything was done about it at that time.
After the recognition of the Soviet Union during the thirties, this continued, I
must say. to be a source of concern to practically all of us, I think, who were
355
professional officers in this field, and serving in Moscow. We saw people about
whose intentions and activities we had great doubt There was not much that we
could do about it then from our position, except to try to see to it that those
people were not used in the Embassies and that they were handled with due dis-
cretion by Embassy people. In other words, our concern there was primarily
with the security of our own mission.
I may say that I think the Moscow Embassy was the first mission of our gov-
ernmental service to institute proper security precautions in time of peace. We
were the first people so far as I am aware who always had our code books accom-
panied day and night by an American in the room and never left them in the safes
alone, and things of that sort.
By Mr. MASKS :
Q. When did you start these security practices?
A. From the day the mission arrived in Moscow in March 1934. We were aware
of the fact
Q. You went in with the first mission?
A. I was there prior to it. I made the physical arrangements for its arrival
I was there in the fall of 1933. We were very much aware that we could not de-
pend on the Moscow employees, that we had to assume that all employees were
sent by the Soviet police, and we could depend on no custodial employees to be
secure, and we had to rely on our own sources.
We brought 9 Marine sergents with us and tried to set this thing up on our
own hook as a sound show from the point of security.
Q. What experience, if any, have you had with intelligence work using that
in the somewhat broader sense than you have been speaking?
A. What I am about to say is a matter which I think violates no classification
or any document in the Government, but is not one which I have ever spoke
about publicly, and I say it only for the information of the board.
*******
Q. Were you also mindful in those experiences of the earlier insights and
perceptions that you had had with the nature of and difficulty of relations with
Soviet Russia?
A. I felt that the earlier experience with Soviet problems and especially the
security problems concerned with work in the Soviet Union stood me in a very
good stead in Portugal. Russian espionage then was not our problem. It was
Germans we were facing during the war. But it was, I believe, partly because
of the experience I had with Soviet matters that I was selected to do this Job
of wartime coordination.
Q. In what*connections have you known Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I first met Dr. Oppenheimer so far as I can recall when I was Deputy for
Foreign Affairs. That is equivalent to Deputy Commandant for Foreign Affairs
at the National War College here in Washington in 1946. Dr. Oppenheimer
lectured there. I was in charge of political instruction generally. I heard the
lecture and was very much impressed by the eminence, clarity and precision
and scrupulousness of thought by which it was characterized.
I then took over this responsibility as head of the Policy Planning Staff in
the Department of State, and in the ensuing years until the summer of 1950,
when I left the Department of State, I met Dr. Oppenheimer on numbers of occa-
sions in the course of my work. Those occasions were practically all ones or
almost all ones on which we had to work on the formulation of foreign policy
in fields that required the collaboration of other departments of Government and
notably the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense.
The main fields with which I was concerned were those of the international
control of atomic energy, and the straightening out of our relations with our own
allies, particularly the British, and the Canadians, in matters affecting our ability
to obtain raw materials for the conduct of our atomic energy program here.
In attempting to meet the problems of foreign policy that arose out of those
questions, we found it necessary to sit down together with representatives of the
Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission, and to work as a group
in determining our governmental positions. In the course of those consultations,
I sat several times at least in rooms here in Government offices with Dr. Oppen-
heimer and participated in consolations in which he also participated. Some of
those meetings I chaired. I remember at least one which he chaired. It depended
on where we met.
Q. Were these matters on which you sat of importance? How would you.
describe them?
356
A. I would described them as matters of the greatest delicacy and of, I think,
quite vital importance to the conduct of our entire atomic energy program in this
country. They were all matters which were given the highest possible security
classification at the time, and I do not recall that we ever had any leaks about
them. They were conducted in complete secrecy.
Q. Were these matters in which issues arose involving actual or potential con-
flicts between positions and alternatives that our Government was considering
and those that you would have expected or knew that the Russians were taking?
A. Only with respect to the international control of atomic energy was that
true. I must say the bitterest problems after the time that I came in, the ones
that preoccupied me most, were ones involving our effort to straighten our rela-
tions with our own allies and to place them on a satisfactory basis.
Q. In connection with the latter type of problems, were the positions that you
were working toward, positions that you expected or knew to be uncongenial
to the Russians or hostile to the Russians?
A. The very reason we worked so hard on these matters and took them so
seriously
Q. When you say "these matters"?
A. The questions with relation to our allies at that time. The very reason
we worked so hard on them and took them so seriously was that we were aware
that if the questions involved were not solved in some satisfactory manner,
the only people who could gain by that would have been the leaders of the
Soviet Union. They would have derived the greatest possible satisfaction and
profit to their own foreign political purposes had these negotiations not been
successful and had real differences and ugly differences been permitted to
develop between ourselves and the British and the Canadians. I fhinfr the
reasons for that are obvious. * * *
Q. These problems that you are talking about, then, concerned the raw
materials or at least in part concerned the raw materials problem?
A. That is correct
Q. Raw materials for atomic energy.
A. That is correct They did. A collaboration was required between the
2 governments, and at the time that I came into these matters in 1947, it
seemed evident to me that that collaboration was very seriously threatened by
the way that events had developed to date, and it was time that both our
Government and the British Government gave them the most serious thought
We did that I think it fair to say that we were successful in tiding these
relationships over a very crucial and difficult period, primarily the period of the
years of 1948 and 1949.
Q. You are confident that the Russians would have profited greatly if the
result had been opposite?
A. Yes. I can assure you that the source of my own alarm and concern
about these matters was the conviction that if we failed to solve the problems
involved, the Russians would be the gainers.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer have a role of any importance in these deliberations
that you have described?
A. He was one of a number of officials, people in our governmental estab-
lishment, who were concerned with these matters. I say in our governmental
establishment; I do not recall exactly what his position was at that time, but
he was In councils of the Government about such matters, sat in on a number of
these discussions, at least 2 or 3 that I recall specifically, I think.
Q. That is on raw materials?
A. On raw materials. It is my recollection and a very vivid recollection that
his participation was extremely helpful to us, so must so that I am not sure really
whether we would have been able to do what we did at all without his help.
Q. I would like to remind you, Mr. Kennan, that I think during the period
2r yef£? thftt yon are ra^rias to Dr. Oppenheimer was for the most of the
time Chairman of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy
Commission,
A. Yes.
Q. As a result of your experience with Dr. Oppenheimer in the cases that
you have reference to, what convictions, if any, did you form about him?
A. I formed the conviction that he was an immensely useful person in the
councils of our Government, and I felt a great sense of gratitude that we had
2r ~5Lv? *£ al2e to *** that m the co^se of all these contacts and dellbera-
.ttons within the Government I never observed anything in his conduct or his
words that could possibly, it seemed to me, have Indicated that he was animated
by any other motives than a devotion to the interests of this country
357
Q. Did you ever observe anything that would possibly have suggested to you
that he was taking positions that the Russians would have liked?
A. No. I cannot say that I did in any way. After all, the whole purpose of
these exercises was to do things which were in the interest of this country,
not in, the interests of the Soviet Union, at least not in the interests of the
Soviet Union as their leaders saw it at that time. Anyone who collaborated
sincerely and enthusiastically in the attempt to reach our objectives, which
Dr. Oppenheimer did, obviously was not serving Soviet purposes in any way.
Q. Have you said that he contributed significantly to the results?
A. I have, sir.
Q. Mr. Kennan, is there any possibility in your mind that he was dissembling?
A. There is in my mind no possibility that Dr. Oppenheimer was dissembling,
Q. How do you know that? How can anybody know that?
A. I realise that is not an assertion that one could make with confidence about
everyone. If I make it with regard to Dr. Oppenheimer it is because I feel and
believe that after years of seeing him in various ways, not only there in Govern-
ment, but later as an associate and a neighbor, and a friend at Princeton, I know
his intellectual makeup and something of his personal makeup and I consider
it really out of the question that any man could have participated as he did in
these discussions, could have bared his thoughts to us time after time in the
way that he did, could have thought those thoughts, so to speak, in our presence,
and have been at the same time dissembling.
I realize that is still not wholly the answer. The reason I feel it is out
of the question that could have happened is that I believed him to have an
intellect of such a nature that it would be impossible for him to speak dishonestly
about any subject to which he had given his deliberate and careful and pro-
fessional attention.
That is the view I hold of him. I have the greatest respect for Dr. Oppen-
heimer's mind. I think it is one of the great minds of this generation of
Americans. A mind like that is not without its implications.
Q. Without its what?
A. Implications for a man's general personality. I think it would be actually
the one thing probably in life that Dr. Oppenheimer could never do, that is to
speak dishonestly about a subject which had really engaged the responsible atten-
tion of his intellect. My whole impression of him is that he is a man who when
he turns his mind to something in an orderly and responsible way, examines
it with the most extraordinary scrupulousness and fastidiousness of intellectual
process.
I must say that I cannot conceive that in these deliberations in Government
he could have been speaking disingeniously to us about these matters. I would
suppose that you might just as well have asked Leonardo da Vinci to distort
an anatomical drawing as that you should ask Robert Oppenheimer to speak
responsibly to the sort of questions we were talking about, and speak dishonestly.
Q. Mr. Kennan, in saying what you have just said, are you saying it with an
awareness of the background that Dr. Oppenheimer has, the general nature of
which is reflected in the letter which General Nichols addressed to him, which
is the genesis of these proceedings, and his response?
A. I am, sir.
Q. How do you reconcile these two things?
A. I do not think that they are necessarily inconsistent one with the other.
People advance in life for one thing. I saw Dr. Oppenheimer at a phase of his
life in which most of these matters in General Nichols' letter did not apply.
It seems to me also that I was concerned or associated with him in the examina-
tion of problems which both he and I had accepted as problems of governmental
responsibility before us, and I do not suppose that was the case with all the
things that were mentioned in General Nichols' letter about his early views
about politics and his early activities and his early associations.
I also think it quite possible for a person to be himself profoundly honest
and yet to have associates and friends who may be misguided and mislead and
for who either at the time or in retrospect he may feel intensely sorry and
concerned. I think most of us have had the experience of having known people
at one time in our lives of whom we felt that way.
Q. I fofrmr one might interpret this correspondence that J have referred to* as
going even further than that. I won't go into what has been testified here or a
characterization of that which has been said in this room, but in the corre-
spondence itself, an incident is referred to— I assume you have read the corre-
358
A. I have in a cursory way as a newspaper reader reads it in the newspapers.
Q. An incident is referred to in 1943, in which it is said that an approach
to Dr. Oppenheimer was made under circumstances suggesting that the ap-
proach was somehow connected with a possible effort by the Russians to secure
information or to secure information in their behalf, and that for some months
thereafter he failed to report this incident
What effect does that failure on his part which he freely admits was wrong
have on your present thinking about it?
A. Mr. Marks, I have testified about him here as I have known him. I can
well understand that at earlier periods in his life conflicts of conscience might
have arisen as I think they could with any sensitive person between his feelings
about his friends— perhaps his pity for them— and his governmental duties.
On the other hand, I would also be inclined to bear in mind the fact that in
1943 the Soviet Union was hardly regarded by our top people in our Government
as an enemy. That great masses of American materials were being prepared for
shipment to the Soviet Union, many of them I assume involving the transmission
of official secrets. I could imagine that the implications of this may not at
that time have appeared to be so sinister as they do today in retrospect, and I
could also imagine if after all the information was not given in this particular
instance, the man in question might have felt that no damage had been done
to the Government interest, and that the question of the men who had initiated
such a request might be better perhaps left to their own consciences and to the
process of maturity in their own development.
I don't know. I can imagine those things. For that reason I would hesitate
to make definite judgments on the basis simply of what I read in the letter of
indictment.
Q. Would it change your opinion if I were to suggest to you that when Dr.
Oppenheimer did report this incident to security officers on his own initiative,
as it turned out, he didn't tell them everything about it. He still withheld the
name of the friend and told them a story that was not the whole truth.
A. Mr. Marks, I do not think that that would alter anything on the statement
that I just made prior to your question. I might only add to it that I could well
conceive that Dr. Oppenheimer might have done things which he would think in
retrospect were mistakes or which others would conclude in retrospect were
mistakes, but that would not preclude in his own instance any more than it would
in the case of any of the others the process of growth and the ability to recognize
mistakes and to learn from them and to make fewer in the future. What I
have said about his activities, his personality, the cast of his mind during the
years when I knew him would I think not be affected.
Q. These convictions that you have expressed about him, the confidence that
you have expressed in him, what part is played in that Judgment by the experi-
ence that you had as a Soviet expert?
A. I think a considerable part. One of the convictions that I have carried
away from such experience as I have had with these matters in the field of Soviet
work concerning the Soviet Union is that these things cannot really be Judged
in a fully adequate way without looking at the man as an entirety. That is I am
skeptical about any security processes that attempt to sample different portions
of a man's nature separate from his whole being. I must say as one who has seen
Robert Oppenheimer now over the course of several years, and more latterly
outside of Government, that I have these feelings and entertain them on the
basis of my estimate of his personality and his character as a whole
Q. Are they feelings or are they convictions?
A. They are on my part convictions, sir.
Q. Mr. Kennan, let me turn now to a quite different subject. In your capacity
as head of the policy planning staff in the State Department, were you ever con-
sulted about the problem of the hydrogen bomb which came up, to refresh your
recollection of the date, toward the end of 194-9?
A. Yes, I was consulted by the Secretary of State in that connection, although
I was not asked and could not really properly have been asked to give an opinion
to him officially as to whether we should or should not proceed to the develop-
ment of this weapon. r
My recollection is that
Q. Would you wait Just a minute? I need to ask Mr. Garrison a question.
May I have a 30-second interval here? I need to ask Mr. Garrison about a
matter.
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
Mr. MAKKS. Thank you very much.
359
By Mr. MASKS :
Q. I was about to ask you what were the circumstances under which you were
consulted.
A. I can only give my recollection here, and I must say my recollection of all
these official matters at that time are somewhat telescoped and entirely capable
of being in error with regard to details. But the recollection is simply this.
When it was first made known to the Secreatry of State that there was a tech-
nical possibility of going ahead with the development of this weapon, at least
to the extent the Government now had before it a decision as to whether to
develop the weapon or not
Q. The question of making it.
A. The question of making a decision as to whether to attempt to develop the
weapon or not When that state of affairs was first brought to the attention of
the Secretary of State, he at a very early stage there asked me into his office.
My recollection is that Dr. Oppenheimer was there, and there may possibly have
been one or two other people, but I do not remember who they were. We spoke
about this and the only thing I can remember, I think, of that conversation is
that we were all agreed that regardless of how the decision might fall, it was
important that this Government should reexamine its position with respect to
the international control of atomic energy to make sure that nothing had been
left undone from our side to get international agreement about these weapons,
before we proceeded with this program of the hydrogen bomb.
In other words, we wanted to make absolutely certain that before launching
on this new phase of the atomic weapons race, our position in the United Nations
on the international control of atomic energy was the best position that we
could devise, and most hopeful one.
The Secretary of State asked me to reexamine this question, to have another
look at our international negotiation position as we had exposed it in the United
Nations bodies with regard to the international control of atomic energy, and to
see whether that was still sound, whether anything had happened in the cir-
cumstances of the preceding 2 or 3 years since we had advanced it to change the
assumptions on which it rested, whether there was anything more that we could
now propose which might have a chance of putting an end to the atomic weapons
race instead of facing us with the necessity of going ahead with this.
I did look at this problem in the course of the ensuing weeks and my recollec-
tion is that I gave my opinion to the Secretary of State in January 1950 on that
subject
Q. I take it that on at least one or perhaps more occasions in the course of
carrying out this assignment or at least the initiation of it you heard Dr. Oppen-
heimer express his views.
A. I recall going to Princeton in the fall of 1949 on one occasion. I had several
things to do there. I called on Dr. Oppenheimer at the Institute if my memory is
correct, and we discussed it then. I was also once at some time in that period — I
don't know exactly when — asked to appear before the General Advisory Com-
mittee of the Atomic Energy Commission, simply as a consultant They wanted
to hear my views. They asked me questions. The questions related primarily
to the present state of our relations with the Soviet Union, the state of what we
called the cold war. I replied as frankly as I could to them.
Q. What impression did you get, if your remember it, of Dr. Oppenheimer's
views?
A. I would not be able to quote his views in memory or in any detail or in
any great accuracy. I can only say that the general impression I carried with
me was the impression of a man who was greatly troubled by what he felt to be
the extremely solemn implications of this decision.
Q. That is the pending decision?
A. The pending decision. Who realized that it was one the implications of
which might carry very far. That it was almost impossible to predict where
we might end up if this sort of a race with weapons of mass destruction were
to go on indefinitely, and therefore was greatly troubled and concerned to arrive
at the most enlightened and sound decision that could be made.
Q. Did he try to sell you on any view?
A. It is not my recollection that he did. I fear that I talked more about my
own views here than he did about his with regard to this* subject But I do not
have the recollection that he endeavored to persuade me that any answer to this
problem was the right one or the wrong one. To me, then, we were still at a
preliminary stage in it. The entire effort really on the part of both of us then
was to try to identify the considerations that were relevant to the problem to
360
see what we had that we could really hang onto in approaching the decision.
Q. When it came time for you to give the Secretary of State your views or
your analysis of the problem, what did you report to him, and when was it
approximately?
A. I reported to M™ approximately in the month of January, I would think
around the middle of the month or shortly after.
Mr. BOBB. 1960?
The WITNESS. 1950, yes. The gist of my own views was simply this : I felt
that this Government was in no way in good position to make any great decisions
with regard to either the international control of atomic energy or actually with
regard to its own weapons program before it gained greater clarity in its own
mind as to the purposes for which it was holding what were sometimes called
the A, B, C, weapons in general. By that I am thinking of the weapons of mass
destruction, the atomic, chemical, and so forth. It seemed to me that there
was unclarity in the councils of our Government as to the reasons why we were
cultivating and holding these weapons. The unclarity revolved around this
question. Were we holding them only as a means of deterring other people
from using them against us and retaliating against any such use of these weap-
ons against us, or were we building them into our military establishment in
such a way that we would indicate that we were going to be dependent upon
them in any future war, and would have to use them, regardless of whether they
were used against us first
By Mr. MASKS:
Q. Have we not taken the position that we would only use thjem for purposes
of retaliation?
A. It is not my impression that we have, and it was not my impression at that
time that there was any such determination in the councils of the United States
Government
On the other hand, if I remember correctly, I was able to cite statements that
had been made by some of our high military leaders— I think both in the coun-
cils of this Government and in the NATO councils of Europe — which indicated
very strongly that we were getting ourselves into a position where we would
have to use these weapons as forward military weapons, regardless of whether
they were used against us.
The point that I tried to emphasize to the Secretary of State related, of course,
directly to the question of international control about which I had been asked.
I told him that I thought we ought first to face this problem. It was my belief
that we should hold these weapons only for purposes of retaliation and as a
deterrent to their use against us. That anything else would get us into a race
with these mass destruction weapons to which I could see no end, which I was
afraid would distort the thinking of the public mind about problems of foreign
policy and military policy in this country if it were permitted to proceed. So as
I say, I favored the holding of these weapons only for purposes of retaliation and
as a deterrent.
Whether that came out clearly in my report to the Secretary of State, I do not
know, because that was not actually the question that was asked me. But I am
sure it was implicit in what I said to the Secretary, and by the same token I
think it was implicit that we ought really to make this other decision before we
made decisions about the hydrogen bomb.
Q. Mr. Kennan, you will have to explain a little more to me at least what you
conceived to be the relevance of clarification of this question to the question of
whether or not we ought to proceed with making hydrogen bombs.
A. Yes. As I saw it, the relevance was this. If you were asked, should we or
should we not proceed to the development of a whole new range of more power-
ful atomic weapons which was involved in the hydrogen bomb decision, you had
to ask yourself how much do we need the weapons of mass destruction in gen-
eral. That is the first question that had to be faced, because if you already had
enough, perhaps you didn't need the hydrogen bomb at all. I could not see how
you could answer the question of how much do we need until you had answered
the question of why are we holding these weapons anyway, and what do we
expect to accomplish with them.
If you were holding them as deterrents and for purposes of retaliation, really
for purposes in order that they might not be used against you, then what you
needed was merely enough to make it an unprofitable and unpromising under-
taking on the part of anyone else, the Russians in particular, to use these weapons
against us. .
361
If on the other hand you were going to regard them as an Integral part of
forward American military planning and something on which we would be
dependent in a future war, regardless of the circumstances of the origin of
that war, then you came up with a different answer or you might come up
with a different one in regard to the hydrogen bomb.
Q. So the point you are making is not that you were opposed to the hydrogen
bomb necessarily, but only it seemed to you that it was essential first that this
other subsidiary question should be clarified?
A. That is correct. I must say that personally while I was not competent
to form a finished opinion on this and was never called upon to do so, I had not at
that time seen the evidence that what we already held in the old and regular
atomic bomb, If I may speak of it that way, was not enough to make it a fruit-
less undertaking from the standpoint of Soviet policy to launch a war on us with
In other words, I considered the burden of proof to rest on that point It
seemed to me you would have to prove that we could not do the job with the
weapons we already had, and to my knowledge that was never demonstrated
to me at the time. Perhaps the answer might have been one thing or the
other, but I had never seen the proof.
Mr. MASK:. I think that is all, Mr. Robb.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Mr. Kennan, that was a most interesting discussion. I certainly have
enjoyed it
A. Thank you, sir.
Q. Mr. Kennan, I was interested in your description of your security pre-
cautions which you took over in Russia. I believe you said you brought in six
Marine sergeants to assist.
A. That is correct, sir.
Q. How did you happen to turn to the Marines, rather than the State Depart-
ment?
A. The person who deserves the credit for that was Ambassador Bullltt, our
first ambassador to the Soviet Union. Mr. Bullitt had very strong feelings
about security and had, I believe, had something to do with the Navy. I asked
to be excused here; at one time or another he was Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, or in any case he knew people in the Naval Establishment, and he asked
President Roosevelt to arrange it and get Marine sergeants.
Q. He was something of an expert on Russian espionage, wasn't he?
A. At least he was very security conscious, by that time, and was helpful,
I must say, in that way.
Q. Did you give these Marines a pretty thorough checking over before you
brought them into the Embassy?
A. I don't believe so. These things were rather primitive compared to our
present standard today. We left that to the command staff of the Marine
Corps.
I must say, though, I think they were very hearty and loyal Americans,
the fellows we got Our difficulties with them were not ones of security. They
were other kinds.
Q. I can imagine that Supposing you had learned that one of these Marines
or anybody else who had to deal with your security matters said that he had
recently been a member of the Communist Party, but had left the party Just
before coming to your Embassy ; would you have had him around?
A. I think our tendency would certainly have been to urge that he not be in
the Moscow Embassy at that time. He would presumably have had still some
contacts with people in Moscow which would have been undesirable.
Q. Or if he had any close conections with the Communist Party, I assume
you would not have been very enthusiastic about having him around them,
would you?
A. That is correct, for our purposes there in the embassy.
Q. Have you had much experience, Mr. Kennan, with Ctommunlste— I just
don't know how to express it—are you familiar with Communist dogma or
technique?
A. I think I am, sir. I have had about 20 years of reading the Soviet press
and some times other press organs with the view to determining whether they
reflected that type of dogma or not I feel I have a certain familiarity with it
Q. Would you place much weight in a statement of a Communist that he just
362
left the party or had disassociated himself with it hef ore coming on some secret
work for the Government?
A. I would certainly regard it as a factor very seriously relevant to fitness
for office, but one to be examined individually. You asked a moment ago about
the case of our Embassy out there. Mr. Bullitt for whom I had the greatest
respect, and about whose security I never had the faintest doubt, had been
married to the widow of John Reed, who was the first prominent American
Communist, I suppose, in this country. We didn't find that a source of worry
with regard to Mr. Bullitt.
Q. No, I am talking rather than matrimonial association, more active associa-
tion with the Communist Party. Would you tend to view with considerable skep-
ticism a statement of a man who admitted that he had been an active member
of the Communist Party or had been active in Communist affairs, a statement
of such a man that he had just left the Communist Party or left the Communist
affairs on the eve of coming to work in ttfe Embassy? Wouldn't you view that
statement with some skepticism?
A. I think we would have regarded it as a factor which meant that there was
a certain burden of proof to demonstrate that the man's value to us was very
great, and that this could be satisfactorily explained away, and we had something
that we could depend on in judging that he was now a person whose loyalty we
didn't need to worry about
Q. Just for the record, Mr. Kennan, I think it is plain, but was it 1946 that
you had these discussions with Dr. Oppenheimer down at the War College?
A. I don't recall discussions down there except possibly after his lecture, but
it was in 1946 to my recollection that he lectured there, and that I first met him.
Q. Was that the year when you were taking various positions which Mr.
Marks said would not be accepted by the Russians with much favor? Was that
the year 1946?
A. No ; it was the following year.
Q. 194T?
A. 1947.
Q. Mr. Kennan, ot course you don't know anything about what Dr. Oppenheimer
testified before this board, do you, sir?
A. I know nothing whatsoever about it, sir. I have not discussed It with
anyone.
Q. Coining to your discussion of the problem which confronted you gentlemen
when you were deciding whether or not to go ahead with the hydrogen bomb, do
I understand, Mr. Kennan, that your thought is that whether we wanted the
hydrogen bomb merely for retaliation or whether we wanted it for affirmative
action, if I may put it that way, in either event we wanted the bomb?
A. No. My feeling is that until you decided that first question, you didn't
know whether you wanted the bomb or not.
Q. I see.
*******
Q. Which bombs are you talking about?
A. Even the old-fashioned kind. You must remember that these men since
the Revolution in these 38 years that have transpired since the Revolution have
with great trouble and pain succeeded in building up a certain amount or a
considerable amount of industry in Russia. That is their pride and joy politi-
cally. That is the thing that they claim they were going to do, to industrialize
this country. Their aim has been to catch up with and overtake America, and
their great boast is that in a primitive and partially underdeveloped country,
they have succeeded pretty much with their own resources in producing now
major industry.
*******
Q. Mr. Kennan, did you have any view in 1950 as to whether or mot the
Russians would attempt to develop the hydrogen bomb whether we did or not?
A. I do not recall specifically. I think I may have doubted that they would
proceed to the development of it, and I think I may have been in error on that
point, as I look at It today.
Q. Do you have any doubt now that they would have whether we did or not?
A. I am still not sure that they would have because I am not sure— I don't
know enough about the scientific and the economic aspects of this problem — to
know how worthwhile they would have regarded it It may perfectly well be
that they would have said the hydrogen bomb will call for this and this amount
of investment in scientific personnel and materials, and perhaps we would be
better off to put that investment into the older type of atomic weapons.
363
Q. That was more of a scientific question that you were not qualified to
deal with.
A. I was not qualified to deal with it.
Q. I would like to ask you a question as an expert on diplomacy, Mr. KCTTIHT*.
Supposing the Russians had developed the hydrogen bomb, and had got it and
we didn't have it ; what would then be our position vis-a-vis the Russians in any
negotiations?
A. That, of course, is a key question and a very penetrating one. It is one
which I have had occasion to argue many times with my friends here in Wash-
ington. I do not think that the position would have been so much different
from what it is today. The Russians have for reasons which I don't think
include any altruism or any thing like that, or idealism, but they have been
very, very careful not to use the weapons of mass destruction as a threat to other
people. I don't recall any time that the Russians have ever threatened as a
means of political pressure to use these weapons, to use these weapons against
anybody else. On the contrary, their position has been consistently all along that
they were holding them— whether this is true or not, it has been their public
position — that they were holding them for purposes only of retaliation and
deterrents and would not use them unless they were used against them.
It would be a change of Soviet policy if they were to attempt to use any of
these weapons as a means of pressure. I have also always held doubts — I realize
this is a very difficult thing to express— as to whether the fact that perhaps
one party had weapons of this sort a little more destructive or greatly more
destructive than the other would nevertheless change this situation so vitally.
We did, after all, have the old type of bomb. We had some means of delivery.
I think the world would have gone along pretty much the same, I have in mind
in making that judgment the fact that atomic weapons are not the only weapons
of mass destruction that exist. There are also extremely ugly and terrible
biological and chemical weapons, at least we have been allowed to *M-nk there
are, and if the Russians want to create destruction in this country solely for
the sake of destruction, I think there are other means by which they can do it
than the hydrogen bomb.
Q. You don't feel, then, that we would have been at any disadvantage as
against the Russians if they had the hydrogen bomb and we had not?
A. I am not absolutely certain. I cannot give you a fiat negative answer to
that. Perhaps we would have been. Perhaps I have been wrong about this.
But I think that our position with regard to them has depended much less on
the mathematical equation of who has this and who has that in the way of
weapons of mass destruction than we think it has. After all our problems with
them as I have seen them on the political side were very much the same in the
days when we had the monopoly of the atomic weapon as they are today to
my way of thinking. They are pretty much the same old problems. I really
do not suspect these people, Mr. Robb, of a desire to drop this thing on us
just out of some native contrariness or desire to wreak destruction for destruc-
tions' sake In this country. I think they are people who fight wars for very
specific political purposes, and usually to get control over some area or terri-
tory contiguous to what they already have.
I have often had occasion to say that there is only one real question that
interests these people, I mean the Soviet leaders, and that is the question of who
has the ability to haul people out of bed at three in the morning and cause
them to disappear without giving any accounting for them, and where. In
other words, who can exercise totalitarian police power over a given territory,
and where can you do it. That is what they are interested in knowing. They
think that everybody else rules the way they rule. They are always interested
in the territorial problem. For that reason I don't think that these weapons
play such a part in their thinking as they play in ours. They want to know not
only how to destroy territory, but how to get control of it, and dominate it and
run; people.
Q. Of course, you will agree that if you were mistaken in that evaluation, it
would be a very serious mistake.
A. I agree and for that reason I have, I believe, always had a certain caution
with regard to my own views.
Q. Yes, sir. Mr. Kennan, you spoke of the Russian policy as manifested to you.
Do you believe the Russians were sincere in their manifestations to you of
their policy?
A. Oh, no. We have never drawn our judgments of their policy from a literal
interpretation of their words. There is no reason why these people should ever
364
have been sincere In anything that they said to a capitalist government. They
may have been on occasions, but there is no real reason for it.
Q. Putting it in the language of the ordinary man, you just can't trust them,
isn't that right?
A. That is correct. They do not really expect to be trusted.
Mr. ROBB. Thank you very much.
Mr. GRAY. May I ask you some questions, Mr. Kennan?
First of all, may I assume that you are familiar in general terms with the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and therefore some of the framework within which
this Board is operating? I would be glad to go into it, if you wish.
Against that background, and with all the facts which are coming before us
in these proceedings, you are aware, of course, that this board faces very difficult
decisions. I don't want to make statements for you but would you think that
we face very difficult decisions in this proceeding?
The WITNESS. I do. There is no doubt about it.
Mr. GRAY. I am sure you are here to be helpful in this inquiry. I trust,
therefore, that you will not misapprehend any questions I ask which are quite
serious and relate to some of the deeper issues involved.
You have testified, I think, without reservation as to your judgment of Dr.
Oppenheimer's character and loyalty as you have known hi™ and on the basis
of your knowledge.
The WITNESS. That is right, sir.
Mr. GRAY. In your experience in Government, have you ever known well any
persons whose loyalty and character you respected and admired about whom it
developed that you perhaps were later mistaken on account of issues we are
talking about in this inquiry?
The WITNESS. I am wracking my memory here. I can recall people I have
respected and admired who later turned out to be even in my own opinion unfit
for Government service by virtue of personal weaknesses. I do not recall
anyone who was ever a friend of mine and with whom I had any degree of
association in the discussion of political matters relating to the Soviet Union
who later turned out to be a person unfit for Government service by virtue of
any disloyalty or of any ideological weakness. I cannot recall any such person.
There have been 1 or 2 times, Mr. Chairman, when I have been obliged to
draw to the attention of the Government circumstances with regard to Govern-
ment employees which seemed to me to point to a likelihood that they were
not loyal American citizens. I have done that on occasions. I was not competent
to make a final decision as to whether they were or were not But I have had to
report circumstances which looked to me to be suspicious and I believed were.
But those were people with whom I was not closely associated. They were
minor employees. What I happened to know about them were things I was able
to observe in the course of official work.
Mr. GRAY. If you were today director of the policy planning staff and there
came to you from a staff member or from some other source, perhaps even the
Secretary of State, that a certain individual had been made a member of the
policy planning staff who had had dose Communist associations as late as the
late thirties or perhaps early forties, would you seriously consider adding such
a persontoyour staff today?
The WITNESS, it would depend, Mr. Chairman, on what I would think were
his possibilities for contribution to the staff and to what extent the negative
points on his record had .been balanced out by a record of constructive achieve-
ment and loyalty. I might say by way of example that when I first set up the
staff I rejected one man who had been recommended to me actually by higher
authority in the Government because he had appeared as a character witness
for a man who- was convicted as being a Communist, and I thought at best his
judgment was bad. But I rejected in that instance this man who had no previ-
ous record of experience in the Government, I was not under the impression that
his contribution would be a major one, or that it would be worthwhile doing
it in that case. s
I must say if it were a person of outstanding capabilities and especially a
person who had in addition to the negative factors rendered distinguished
service to the Government, then I would want to look at it very hard
.-XL^T' J *ssum® to** tt ifc were a secretary, for- example, or clerical
assistant, that it would be easier for you to decide that the person should not
be employed.
The WITNESS. I would think that would be correct
365
Mr. GEAT. So I gather that yon feel that perhaps the application of individual
Judgment increases with the stature and importance of the individual concerned.
That is perhaps not a clear question.
The WITNESS. I do feel this, that the really gifted and able people in Govern-
ment are perhaps less apt than the others to have had a fully conventional life
and a fully conventional entry, let us say, into their governmental responsibili-
ties. For that reason I think that while their cases have to be examined with
particular care, obviously for the reasons of the great responsibilities they
bear and the capabilities for damage in case one makes a mistake, nevertheless
it is necessary to bear in mind in many cases, especially people who have great
intellectual attainments— because those attainments often it seems to me do not
always come by the most regular sort of experience in life, they are often the
result of a certain amount of buffeting, and a certain amount of trial and error
and a certain amount of painful experience — I think that has to be borne in
mind when one uses people of that sort.
I agree it presents a special problem, not an easy one for the Government
I have the greatest sympathy for the people who have to face it
Mr. GRAY. You in your testimony referred to the possible conflicts of con-
science a man might have and you used the expression, I think, pity for friends
who perhaps have been misguided. I am not sure those were the words, but the
general import
You perhaps are aware that under the act, one of the criteria imposed by the
language of the act seems to be the associations of an individual. I know yon
feel that past associations must be weighed in the light of more recent conduct
and other factors you have stated.
Would you feel continued association with individuals falling in this category
for whom one would have pity and with respect to whom one might have had
conflicts of conscience, was important at all in the situation?
The WITNESS. I would think, Mr. Chairman, that it is a thing which would
have to be explained, but I find great difficulty in accepting the belief that a
man must rule out all those associations, whether or not they engage in any
way his official responsibilities. I thtnfc there are certainly times when they are
to be avoided. I suppose most of us have had friends or associates whom we
have come to regard as misguided with the course of time, and I don't like to
think that people in senior capacity in Government should not be permitted or
conceded maturity of judgment to know when they can see such a person or
when they can't. If they come to you sometimes, I think it is impossible for yon
to turn them away abruptly or in a cruel way, simply because yon are afraid of
association with them, so long as what they are asking of yon is nothing that
affects your governmental work.
I myself say it is a personal view on the part of Christian charity to try to
be at least as decent as yon can to them.
I realize that it is not advisable for a man in a position of high security to be
seen steadily with people about whose loyalty there is a great doubt, unless
they happen to be intimates in his family or something like that
Mr. GRAY. But when you say intimates of his family, you mean blood relation-
ships?
The WITNESS. Something of that sort.
Mr. GRAY. Or marital relationships and things of that sort.
The WITNESS, Yes.
Mr. GRAY. You said an individual should not decline to see such a person if
the approach were made by such other person. Would yon think it would be
questionable if a person in a high position took the Initiative himself in seeing
one of his former associates about whom there might be some question?
The WITNESS. It is difficult for me to judge in the absence of the knowledge
of the circumstances.
Mr. GRAY. I understand.
The WITNESS. I am aware of this as a very difficult problem of professional
ethics. It seems to me once or twice I have had conflicts of this sort myself, but
I know that in these cases I would always like to have felt that my superiors in
Government had enough confidence in me to let me handle that problem ac-
cording to my own best conscience. I do worry about the sort of schoolboy
relationship to one's friends and acquaintances which gets involved if you apply
too rigid standards of security in that respect
Mr. GRAY. But you would always feel that in any conflict between loyalty to a
friend and obligation to government, it would not be a conflict difficult to
resolve?
366
The WITNESS. No, sir ; it would not. There is only one way in which it can be
resolved, and that is in favor of the Government. If that is impossible, then I
would say a man should resign. He should not permit himself to remain in the
Government with any conflict of loyalties of that sort.
Mr. GRAY. One of the hard facts of our times of course is the inevitable
conflict of the requirements of what we generally refer to as security and what
we like to think of unlimited freedoms of man's mind and conscience. This is
maybe a major dilemma of our times, at least in this country.
The WITNESS. May I add one thought to what I said before in reply to your
question?
Mr. GBAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. I see as one of the most difficult aspects of this problem the
trouble that the individual Government official has in arriving at an assessment
of the reliability of his friends. I have continued to accept as friends some
people who have been criticized publicly and on whose reliability some sus-
picion has been thrown publicly in this country, because I myself have never
seen yet the proof that those charges were correct, and have not considered
myself in a position to arrive at a negative Judgment about this. I have felt
that until it is demonstrated to me that people who are friends of mine really
have been guilty of some genuine derelection of their duty to the Government or
their loyalty to the Government, it is not for me to jump to conclusions about it,
and out of a timidity lest my name be affected with theirs to cut off social
relations with them.
I must say when it is demonstrated to me that anyone has been so derelict,
then I have no desire to continue the friendship or the association, and especially
if I were in Government service I would consider it quite out of the question.
But there have been many instances in which one has been torn between the
fact that doubts have been raised, but proof has not been given. There I feel
that the burden of proof so far as one's relations with one's friends is concerned
is on the accuser. Unless it is demonstrated to me that my friend in some way
offended against the law or against his governmental duty, I am slow to drop
my friend myself.
Mr. GEAY. I would like to move back to the question of your attitudes toward
the development of the hydrogen bomb in the period before the President's
decision to proceed in January of 1950. Had you been told, Mr. Kennan, in
1949, for example, by a scientist whose Judgment and capability you respected
that it was probable that a thermonuclear weapon could be developed which
would be more economical in terms of the use of material and cost and the rest
of it than the equivalent number of atom bombs, would you have then been in
favor of developing the hydrogen bomb?
The WITNESS. I would not have favored developing it at least until a real
decision had been made in this Government about the role which atomic weapons
were to play generally in its arsenal of weapons. I would have had great
doubts then about the soundness of doing it. That comes from philosophic
considerations partly which I exposed to the Secretary of State, which did not
I might say meet with his agreement or with that of most of my colleagues and
the future will have to tell, but it seemed to me at the end of this atomic weapons
race, if you pursued it to the end, we building all we can build, they building
all they can build, stands the dilemma which is the mutually destructive quality
of these weapons, and it was very dangerous for us to get our public before the
cuiflmmft, that the public mind will not entertain the dilemma, and people will
take refuge in irrational and unsuitable ideas as to what to do.
For that reason I have always had the greatest misgivings about the attempt
to insure the security of this country by an unlimited race in the cultivation
of these weapons of mass destruction and have felt that the best we could do
in a world where no total security is possible is to hold just enough of these
things to make it a very foolish thing for the Russians or anybody else to try
to use them against us.
Mr. GBAY. So you would have been in favor of stopping production of the A
bomb after we had reached a certain point with respect to the stockpile?
The WITNESS. That is correct
Mr. GBAY. Whatever that might have been?
The WirNEsa No ; and I didn't consider myself competent to determine exactly
what that point was. I have never known the number of our bombs nor the
real facts of their destructiveness or any of those things.
Mr. GBAY. Knowing the Russians as you do— perhaps as well as any Ameri-
can—would you have expected them to continue to improve whatever weapons
they may have within limitations of economy, scientific availability and so forth?
367
The WITNESS. My estimate is that they would have cultivated these weapons
themselves primarily for the purpose of seeing that they were not used, and
would have continued to lay their greatest hopes for the expansion of their power
on the police weapons, the capacity to absorb contiguous areas, and on the con-
means of inttmidating other p**16 and
Mr. GRAY. I have one final question. Were you opposed to the use of the
atom bomb?
The WITNESS. I knew nothing about it sir, until I read it actually in the Soviet
papers in Moscow, that it had been used.
Mr. GRAY. You were in Moscow?
The WITNESS. I was in Moscow at the time and therefore could not look at
it—I could look at it only retrospectively. I must say that personally I am not
at all sure that we were well advised to use it. I have great fears of these
things.
5£* S?*7* Do y0u think we Perhaps were ill advised to develop it?
The WITNESS. No; that I don't think.
Mr. GRAY. I said I had Just one question and I am sorry I am going to ask
you another. The atom bomb was many times as powerful as any explosive
we had prior to its development. The same is true, I suppose, of the H bomb.
I don't know what the geometric progressive relationship would be, but that is
unimportant You had a serious question about proceeding with the hydrogen
bomb. No question that we should have done what we did with respect to the
development of the atom bomb.
Is the different attitude on this due to the fact that perhaps an atom bomb
properly placed could take care of a target and that a larger bomb would be un-
necessarily large. Is it size? Is that the distinction you make? Is it because
the civilian population may be involved more deeply?
The WITNESS. It is because of the wonder on my part as to whether we did not
already have enough of this sort of terrible ability to commit destruction. At
least I had not seen it proven to me that we needed more perhaps. Perhaps
there again with some of us civilians it becomes hard for us to absorb the math-
ematics of destruction involved in these things. To my mind the regular old
bomb made a big enough bang, as big as anybody could want. I found it diffi-
cult—you see what has worried me, Mr. Chairman, about going ahead with this
is that we would come to thinv of our security as embraced solely in the math-
ematics of whatever power of destruction' we could evolve, and we would for-
get our security lies still very largely in our ability to address ourselves to the
positive and constructive problems of world affairs, to create confidence in other
people.
I am convinced that the best way to keep our allies around us is not to pay
outwardly too much attention to the atomic weapons and to the prospect of war,
but to come forward ourselves with plans that envisage the constructive and
peaceful progress of humanity. I realize that while we do that we have to
preserve an extremely alert and powerful defense posture at all times. But I
believe in preserving that posture to the maximum, and talking about it to the
minimum, and then limiting ourselves in our foreign policy primarily to the
constructive rather than negative objectives.
I have feared that if we get launched on a program that says the only thing
we are concerned to do in' the development of atomic weapons is to get as much
as possible as rapidly as possible, that the attentions of the public and the Gov-
ernment will become riveted to that task at the expense of our ability to conduct
ourselves profitably in positive aspects of foreign policy. That has been the
nature of my worry.
I have never felt a great degree of certainty about this and I have always
realized it was a very difficult problem. But it did seem to me at that time, and
it seems to me still in retrospect, that one could doubt the desirability of going
ahead with this weapon then from motives which were very serious and respect-
able motives. In other words, one could doubt it out of a devotion to the inter-
ests of our country. At least I feel that I did. Very often today when I read
the papers, it seems to me that some of the things I feared at that time are be-
ginning to develop in some degree.
Dr. EVANS. Mr. Kennan, there are a couple of questions I want to ask you.
You will admit, I suppose, that at one time in his career, Dr. Oppenheimer dis-
played that he was a rather naive individual. You will admit that, won't you?
The WITNESS. That I think is apparent from the exchange of correspondence
that I read in the papers.
308813— 54 - 24
368
Dr. EVANS. Now, another question. Because a man has had some com-
munistic connections, he might be placed sometimes in an entirely different
position in regard to security from a man that had not had those connections
would be placed, is that true?
. . The WITNESS. I think that is cored It appears in a different light.
Dr. EVANS. You understand the position that this board is in, don't yon?
The WITNESS. I believe I do, sir.
Dr. EVANS. We have to decide on these things in regard to character, asso-
ciations and loyalty. This is not a job that any of us sought You understand
that
The WITNESS. I do.
Dr. EVANS. We didn't want it
The WITNESS. I do.
.. Dr. EVANS. I don't want it today. We all know Dr. Oppenheimer's ability.
Nobody knows better than I do. This act mentions certain things— character,
associations, and loyalty. It doesn't say in there anything about the outstand-
ing ability which is mentioned here so much. You understand that point, don't
you?
The WETNESS. Yes.
Dr. EVANS. Perhaps the act ought to be rewritten. I don't know. I Just
want you to understand the position we are in. It is not a pleasant position.
The WITNESS. I do, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Now, just one other question. You opposed this hydrogen bomb
on two grounds— on moral grounds and on the fact it was so big it would be
like using a sledge hammer to Mil a mosquito. Is that true?
•The WITNESS. I have never conceived them really as just the moral ground
because I didn't consider that. After all, we are dealing with weapons here,
and when you are dealing with weapons you are dealing with things to kill
people, and I don't think the considerations of morality are relevant I had
real worries, sir, about the effects of this on our future policy and suitability
of oar future policy.
Dr. EVANS. That is all.
REWBEOT EXAMINATION
By Mr. MASKS:
<5. Mr. Kennan, I would like to f ollow up briefly the question that you were
asked by Dr. Evans about the problem which this board faces, and the test it
has to apply in discharging its rather awesome responsibility, is one in which
it has to assess, as I read the act, character, associations and loyalty of the
individual, advise the Commission whether the Commission should determine
that permitting the individual to have access to restricted data— a term which
I believe you understand — will not endanger the common defense and security.
In answer to a question— I think it was addressed to you by the Chairman—
about the relationship between a case involving a stenographer-— Mr. Eobb asked
you about a ease involving a Marine— the natural question also arises whether
different standards should apply to an extraordinary individual.
I would not suggest to you any question which implied that different stand-
ards should apply, but I would like to explore your own views about what
standards you had in mind when you said that in relation to gifted individuals,
it was common to find that they had unconventional backgrounds, and that there-
fore, as I understood it, a different type of inquiry was required for evaluation.
Could you explain a little bit more fully what you had in mind?
A. It is simply that I sometimes think that the higher types of knowledge
And wisdom do not often come without very considerable anguish and often a
very considerable road of error. I think the church has known that Had
the church 'applied to St. Francis the criteria relating solely to his youth, it
•ttbuld not have been able for him to be what he was later. In other words, I
think very often it is in the life of the spirit; it is only the great sinners who
become .the great saints and in the life of the Government, there can be applied
ttie analogy.
I'havfe often said it is the people who have come to their views through the
Questioning of other things who have the highest and firmest type of understand-
ing in the Interests of. the Government. At any rate, it seems to me that the
exception people are often apt not to fit into any categories of requirements
that it is easy to. write into an act or a series of loyalty regulations.
I feel that one ought to bear that in mind. I realize the problem for the
Government as to how it is to do it, and technically it is not always easy. It
is a dangerous thing to talk exceptions because nobody can define again by
369
category who is an exceptionally gifted person and who is not. The attempt
is often invidious and involves the creation of an invidious distinction.
I am not sure it can be formalized, but I have always felt that the United
States Government has to realize that it has a real problem here, particularly
with the people who have the greater capacities. There is need here for con-
siderable flexibility, and as I say at the outset, I think for a looking at the man
as a whole and viewing his entire personality and not Judging portions of it.
I am afraid that may not be a very clear answer to what you asked.
Q. Many people would say, Mr. Herman, that you are a gifted individual. I
know of nothing to suggest that you came to the Government and remained in it
for so many long years of great service as the result of any unconventional back-
ground. How do you reconcile those things?
A. I consider myself to be a fortunate man. At the age of 23, at a time when
many American young people of good education were drifting into what I
think was an unsound approach to life, I was sent out to the Baltic States. I saw
the square where the Bolshevik commissars had only recently been shooting their
hostages. I saw the building on Elizabeth Street in the cellar of which they
had done their torturing. I was affected from the beginning by a sense of the
grotesque injustice of taking a whole class as they did, the bourgeoisie of these
countries, and punishing them Just because they were classifiable as bourgeoisie.
I must say I was so affected by what I saw of the cruelty of Soviet power that I
never could receive any of its boasts about social improvement with anything
other than skepticism. I think that experience helped me a great deal at an
early date, and helped me to avoid mistakes that I might otherwise have made.
Later it fell to me very deeply in Russian literature and German literature,
and I have had to go through all that. It has developed in me as I fhJnTr in long
foreign residence it does — I was abroad 18 years, and a deep acquaintanceship
with the thinking of other people — it has involved me sometimes in conflict when
I come home. I find myself tending to be critical sometimes of conditions in our
country more than other people are, and it is a thing which I have had to fight
within myself. Probably what you can say in reply to your question is that I
have been lucky in the first place, and secondly, I have been able to conceal the
difficulties on the intellectual road I have gone more than other people have
been able to, to keep them within myself and fight them out myself.
Q. Let us leave you out of It.
A. Yes.
Q. Do I understand what you have been saying is that in your experience more
frequently than not the extraordinarily gifted individual realizes the fulfillment
of his potential as a result of background that has involved many unconventional
elements?
A- I fo^ir it is often that you get that. I must say that when people are
really gifted, those who have what you might call genius of some sort, intellectual
or artistic, it is hard for them to arrange their relationships to live in minor
matters and in a manner which is wholly conventional I think we have seen
that all through time. Again, I would like to emphasize I do not underrate the
seriousness of the problem that it poses for the Government when these people
are used for Government work. But I think it is a problem that should be
regarded as such.
Q. Mr. Kennan, you have been asked questions in a framework that implies at
least that they are addressed to you by the board in the light of the rigorous
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act. I hope I am not out of order in saying
that as a lawyer I cannot believe that the Atomic Energy Act intended to deny
to the Atomic Energy Commission the services of gifted people.
I ask you to consider in the light of that statement this question: In your
opinion, and based on all of the experience which you have described here this
morning, are the character, associations and loyalty of Dr. Oppenheimer such as
to bring you to a determination that permitting htm to have access to restricted
data will not endanger the common defense and security?
A. Mr. Marks, I cannot anticipate, of course, the judgment of this board, and
the same information is not available to me as is available to the board. I
would consider my own opinion one not founded as well as will be the opinion of
the board. I can only Judge on the basis of what I have seen, which is a portion
of the evidence.
Q. Of course.
A. On that basis, I may say that I myself have no doubt whatsoever about this,
and on the basis of what I know I would be entirely in favor. I think it flows
from what I have said here earlier. I have forgotten how your question was
worded.
370
Mr. ROBB. Could we have it read back?
(Question read by the reporter.)
The WITNESS. May I then simply rephrase my answer from the beginning
here, and ask that it be regarded as the answer to this question.
On the basis of what is known to me of Dr. Oppenheimer's qualities, his
personality and his activities during the period that I have known him, I would
know of no reason why he should not be permitted to have access to restricted
data in the Government.
RE-CROSS-EXAMINATION
ByMr. ROBB:
Q. Mr. Kennan, I gather that you say— and I think quite properly— that of
course you don't know what information may be available to the board.
A. Quite so.
Q. Of course, you would agree there might be things known to the board which
if known to you would change your answer to the question.
A. Certainly.
Q. Mr. Kennan, we have discussed somewhat the criteria and so on of these
security procedures and tests. In a case where the question of individual
security clearance was involved, assume that the evidence was more or less in
equipoise, who do you think ought to have the benefit of the doubt — the Indi-
vidual or the Government?
A. I think unquestionably, sir, the Government should have the benefit of the
doubt. In saying that, if I may Just say so, I am animated by the reflection
that the Government's interest might also be torn, that the Government might
have need of the man, and that interest should also be recognised.
Q. I am not saying to you, sir, that the evidence here is in equipoise ; I am
Just assuming that.
A. I understand.
Q. Mr. Kennan, I would like to ask you another question in your role as an
expert on diplomacy which I perhaps should have asked you before.
What in your opinion would be the effect and would have been the effect
in 1950 on our allies if the Russians had had the thermonuclear weapon and we
had not. Do I make myself clear, sir?
A. Yes, sir. I imagine that it might to some extent have been an unfortunate
one. I do not think decisively unfortunate. I think it would have depended
on what we might have been able to say to them about the adequacies of our
existing stockpile of atomic weapons.
Q. Would you tell us what you mean by "unfortunate"?
A. Unless we were able to demonstrate to them that what we already held in
the way of atomic weapons was sufficient to make it most unlikely that even
the Russian hydrogen bomb would be used against ourselves or our allies, then
I would consider that the effect on our allies might have been unfortunate. But
I would remember that the allies have never been, it seems to me, as conscious
of the importance of atomic weapons as. we have.
Q. Putting it again in the language of the well known man of the street, if
the Russians had had the thermonuclear weapon and we had not, the result
might have been that some at least of our allies would have been scared off from
us, is that right?
A. Yes, sir. That is certainly one of the considerations that would have had
to be taken into account in deciding whether to go ahead with the weapon or not.
. Q. Mr. Kennan, you mentioned— I don't recall the exact language you used
but I think the substance of it was—that there were some friends of yours that
you suspended until their guilt was proven, or something of that sort?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you mind telling us. who you had in mind?
A. A number of my colleagues in the Foreign Service have had the experience
of seeing charges or insinuations advanced against them in the public print
here, and of having to face congressional charges or congressional investigations
of one sort or another. That is the only point I wish to make. I have not done
anything to terminate my associations with those men Just on the basis of the
fact that the charges were raised against them. I have waited to see whether
anything would be proven. I prefer to give my friend the benefit of the doubt
until something was
Q. Have there been some in respect of whom the charges have been proven?
A. There have been two who have left the Department of State— two or
three — but I am not sure that charges were proven. I really would have to
371
ransack my memory to recall exactly the way these cases went I believe they
all left in an honorable way. Doubts were raised and their names were men-
tioned publicly.
Q. You had faith in them?
A. In every case that I have in mind here I have had— at least I have never
seen the evidence that these men were not loyal Government servants, and in
the absence of that evidence I tried not to jump to any conclusion.
Q. Now, would you mind telling us who they were?
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I think it is an unfair question to ask this
witness to discuss other people in the Government, and I don't see what possible
relevance it can have to the inquiry of this board.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I asked the witness if he would mind. That is
why I asked him that way.
Mr. GRAY. The witness certainly would be given the privilege of declining to
answer this question if he wishes without any significance being attached to
it.
The WITNESS. Mr. Chairman, if at any time the board feels the need for the
names of these people, I would be very happy to give it. But otherwise, I think
at the present time I would prefer not to mention them. The names are fairly
well known ones.
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. May I ask you this, sir, and certainly this gentleman has been much men-
tioned in the public press.
Mr. GAERISON. Mr. Chairman, I really object to this. I see this proceeding
into a line of questioning which by some form of suggestion as to names of people
who have been adversely discussed in the press being brought in here with some
suggestion that this somehow is connected with Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. GRAY. I make this observation, Mr. Garrison, that the testimony of a
witness which has been given with clarity and conviction and I think rather
eloquently is based, as I understand it, on his own subjective judgment with
respect to the character, loyalty and associations of Dr. Oppenheimer. Is that
a fair statement?
TheWmrass. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. I ttn'nV that if there are cases or similar situations in which the
judgment of the witness has proven not to be borne out by the facts, that it is
pertinent to this inquiry.
Mr. GABBISON. I withdraw the objection, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. I want to make it clear that I am sure that the board does not
wish a lot of names brought in here by the heels.
Mr. ROBB. Oh, no.
Mr. GBAY. I don't interpret that to be the point.
Mr. ROBB. No, that is exactly the theory I put the question to.
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. Was Owen Lattimore one of your associates or friends?
A. No, he was not. I never had any personal acquaintance with him.
Q. He would not be one that you included?
A. No, he would not be included. The men I had in mind were associates of
mine in the Foreign Service, and one in particular who has been in a number
of congressional and loyalty board hearings. I have testified in those hearings
as I have in this one. So far to my knowledge he has never been found guilty
by any board or formal branch of an agency of the Government of anything
reprehensible to him. I have continued to see him and know him as a friend.
Q. Were you called as a witness by him, sir?
A, Yes, but if I may say so, initially over my own objections because I was
then an official of the Department of State, and I felt that the loyalty board
should ask me as an official for my opinion, feeling that I owed my loyalty
entirely to the interest of the Government, and not to the man as a party in a
dispute.
Q. Have you testified in any other so-called loyalty hearing?
A. Yes. I testified in one. Again it was the case of a Foreign Service officer
who asked me to testify in his behalf and to read 1,200 pages of his reports, and
to tell the board that they did not contain evidence of Communist loyalty.
I told him that I would prefer, as an official of the Department of State, not to
do that at his request, but would be happy to do it at the board's request He
did get a letter from the board asking me to do that. The result is that I had
to go through 1,200 pages of material and gave the board an opinion.
372
Q. I am sure the board here understands the difficulty you had in reading
1,200 pages. That is all I care to ask.
Mr. GBAY. Dr. Evans I believe has 1 or 2 questions.
Dr. EVANS. Mr. Kennan, in answer to one of the questions that was asked you,
I think you stated in effect, or at least you implied that all gifted individuals were
more or less screwballs.
The WITNESS. Let me say that they apt to be, if I may.
Dr. EVANS. Would you say that a large percentage of them are?
The WITNESS. No, sir ; I would not say that they are screwball, but I would say
that when gifted individuals come to a maturity of judgment which makes them
valuable public servants, you are apt to find that the road by which they have
approached that has not been as regular as the road by which other people have
approached it. It may have had zigzags in it of various sorts.
Dr. EVANS. I think it would be borne out in the literature. I believe it was
Addison, and someone correct me if I am wrong, that said, "Great wits are near
to madness, dose allied and thin partitions do their bounds divide."
Dr. Oppenhedmer is smiling. He knows whether I am right or wrong on that
That is nil.
Mr. GBAX. Mr. Kennan, you certainly would not be prepared to testify that all
professors are screwballs, would you?
Dr. EVANS. I am worried about that, because it has been brought up 2 or 3
times. I am getting a little sore about it
Mr. GBAY. One further serious question. These gifted people about whom there
has been a very considerable discussion here, as you say, in many cases arrived
at judgments, attitudes, convictions after all sorts of experience. You feel, how-
ever, that the unusual person or gifted person who has traveled perhaps a differ-
ent road than most other people can at one point reach a stability on the basis
of which there can be absolute predictability as to no further excursions?
The WITNESS. Let me say at a point where there can be sufficient predictability
to- warrant his being accepted by the Government for public service*
Mr. GBA.Y. Thank you very much, Mr. Kennan. We appreciate you being here.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GBAY. We will take a recess, gentlemen.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GBAY. Do you wish to testify under oath? You are not required to do so.
Most all witnesses have.
Mr. TiTT.TENTHAL. I prefer to.
Mr. GBAY. Would you stand, please, and raise your right hand.
David E. Lilienthal, do you swear that the testimony you are to give the Board
shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. T/rT.TTBNM»HAT., J Q*0.
Whereupon, David E. Lilienthal was called as a witness, and having been first
duly sworn, was examined and testified as f ollows :
Mr. GBAY. You are no doubt familiar with the so-called perjury statutes. I
should be glad to read the penalties, if you wish.
The WITNESS. I am familiar with them.
Mr. GBAY. I should like to say to you, Mr. Lilienthal, that if during the course
of your testimony, it should develop that you are about to discuss restricted data,
I would appreciate your letting me know so that the necessary security precau-
tions might be taken.
The further observation I would have to you is that we treat these proceedings
as confidential between the Atomic Energy Commission officials and Dr Oppen-
heimer and his representatives and witnesses. The Commission will initiate no
public^ releases with respect to these proceedings and we express the hope that
witnesses will follow the same course.
The WITNESS. Yes, I certainly shall not initiate any public statement
DIKEOT EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVEEMAN :
Q. Mr. Lilienthal, tfhat is your present occupation?
x T - I *¥?* Vttv&te business in New York City as adviser on industrial matters
«%SrtS ^^^Si^Tco*80 a co<porate offlccr M chatenan
Q. Do you have any Government employment or position at this time?
A. I do not • *
<J, You were formerly Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission?
373
A. I was between late October 1946 and the 15th of February 1950.
Q. I think you said at 5 p. m.
A. Yes; at 5 p.m.
Q. When did you first meet Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. On the occasion of the bringing together of a board or panel— a board of con-
sultants or panel— by the Department of State in January 1946. That panel was
organized under a committee called the Secretary of State's Committee.
The purpose of the panel and the directions of the panel were to seek to find
some basis for a plan or program for the international control of atomic weapons.
There were five members of this panel designated, I think, by the Secretary of
State, or perhaps by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, and Dr. Oppen-
heimer was one of those panel members.
Q. And you were the chairman of the panel?
A. I was the chairman of the panel. The other members were Mr Harry
Wtnne, vice president of General Electric Co. at that time, Dr. Charles A.
Thomas, who was then executive vice president of the Monsanto Chemical Co.
and now its president. Mr. Chester Barard, then president of the New Jersey
Telephone Co., and Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. Will you tell us something of how much contact you had with Dr. Oppen-
heimer during the work on this panel?
A. The panel was convened and met briefly with the Secretary of State's
Committee. Perhaps I should indicate the personnel of that committee. This
was the first meeting with Dr. Oppenheimer. That committee consisted of
Under Secretary Acheaon— perhaps Assistant Secretary at that time— John
McCloy, Gen. Leslie R, Groves, President Conant of Harvard, and Dr. Vannevar
Bush, Chairman of the Joint Research Board of the Defense Establishment.
That meeting with this top committee was briefed and then this board of
consultants virtually lived together for 6 or 7 weeks until we finally presented
our report to the committee which we reported.
Q. When you say you virtually lived together, you mean you spent substan-
tially all the time together?
A. Yes, with the exception of a few breaks, we had committed ourselves to
devote all of our time to this problem until we either said we couldn't think of
anything useful or same up with a report.
This we did, so we worked together here as a group. We traveled about the
country* seeing the various atomic energy installations, for some of us the first
time— Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, Hanford, and so on.
In this process of course we came to know each other quite welL We then
came back to Washington and spent a good many days in the process of Jointly
drafting our report.
Q. Was Dr. Oppenheimer active in this work?
A. Yes, he was indeed.
Q. Would you tell us something about the positions that Dr. Oppenheimer
took and the work he did in the drafting of that report, particularly as it bears
on his attitude toward the problem presented by our relations with Russia?
A. I think the theme of this group in which Dr. Oppenheimer's views con-
tributed substantially was that we should try to absorb the facts about atomic
energy and see if we could not come up with some practical, we hoped, and
workable and acceptable system of control and protection for the United States
and for the world. So Dr. Oppenheimer's approach as the rest of us was first
to ascertain the facts as a matter of technology and so on. Of course, in that
respect he and Dr. Thomas were really teachers for the rest of us. Then as to
policy, I can recall perhaps a few illustrative instances.
Dr. Oppenheimer — and there was unanimity on this but he certainly probably
initiated the idea, and certainly pressed it and elaborated it— which relates to
the attitude of Russia and Soviet communism, the first idea we discussed was
that of international inspection of countries in the United Nations, to see whether
they were carrying on atomic weapon enterprises.
This we rejected and an important part of our reasoning for rejecting it was
that it was not a foolproof method. Something more than inspection would be
necessary, that without international ownership and control of the raw mate-
rials and the operations in the atomic energy field, the United States could not.
trust the Russians merely by inspection to comply with the requirements of this
scheme.
The actual development of this idea that inspection was inadequate to pro*
teet ourselves from the Russians or was an inadequate idea to go before the
world— the protection of the. world— was largely formulated by Dr. Qppenbetmtir
374
and technical associates of his like Dr. Bacher, who had studied the physical
problem of the ease with which inspection could be avoided by an operating
organization in Russia as distinguished from having a United Nations operating
and management team running the plant, that periodic inspection was not a
foolproof system.
Q. In your view was the report of that panel one that was reasonably soft
or what have you in respect to the hope of cooperation or with respect to what
one could expect from the Russians?
A. We tried to make it as nearly foolproof as we could. There was early
discussion that any proposal that a United Nations operating organization
should operate a gaseous diffusion plant within Russia would obviously con-
flict with the Russian views about the Iron Curtain and access of foreigners and
soon.
The question was raised first by Mr. Winne, as to whether it made any sense
to make a proposal which we were pretty sure the Russians would reject We
concluded, and I took responsibility for this idea initially, that we should pre-
sent an idea we could stand for, leaving the question of whether it should be
submitted to the Russians with a rather strong likelihood of it being rejected, to
others.
It was our Job to develop a workable foolproof system. Therefore, to answer
your question about denominating this, I th*"fr we did devise what would be
called a tough program. This was reviewed later by Mr. Baruch and his
associates. They accepted these essentials and they too were insistent on what
Mr. Baruch called a foolproof system, a tough system.
Q. And Dr. Oppenheimer was in accord with this tough system?
A. Yes, and contributed a great deal to it
Q. When did you say you became Chairman of the AEC?
A. I think it was the 28th of October 1946.
Q. Some time after you became Chairman was the question of Dr. Oppen-
heimer's past associations and his left wing activities and so on called to your
attention?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Will you tell us the circumstances of that, please?
A. The board will recall that there is a kind of grandfather clause in the
Atomic Energy Act, by which those who had been cleared under the Manhattan
District continued to hold their clearances— I have not looked at this provision
for some time— but the effect Is to hold their clearances until a reexamination
by the FBI .was made, and the question is reexamined on the basis of new addi-
tional Information, or something to that effect So we had a number of such
reexaminations coming to us.
I have located the date of March 8 as being the date on which I appeared—
give or take a day or so— a call from Mr. Hoover saying he was sending over
by special messenger an important file involved in this reexamination.
I received this file. It related to Dr. Oppenheimer. It contained in it a great
deal of information from the Manhattan District, and perhaps some subsequent
investigation. I called, the commissioners together on the 10th. The day of
Mr. Hoover's call appears to be Saturday. In any event, I called the com-
missioners together on a Monday, March the 10th, in the morning, I believe.
The existence of this sort of information I did not know up until that time
and I don't think any of us did, unless perhaps Dr. Bacher did.
Q. You say you called the Commission together. Who was present at the
meeting?
A. My recollection is that all the commissioners were present. This would
be Dr. Robert F. Bacher, who was at the Los Alamos project during the war
Sumner T. Pike, Louis L. Strauss, and Wesley W. Waymack. '
Q. Will you tell us what happened at that Commission meeting?
A. Commission conference would be the best description because it continued
for some time. It was very informal. We had this file which I requested all
the commissioners to read. It was not necessary to request them to because it
was obviously a matter of great interest and importance. Instead of delegating
this to someone else, it seemed dear that we should do the evaluating, since the
responsibility of deciding what should be done, if anything, was \rars, So we
did begin a reading of this file around the table in my office in the New State
Bulldog, and then later as time went on, members would take all or parts of
their file to their offices and so on.
One ot the first things that was observed was that although this file did con-
tain derogatory information going back a number of years, it did not contain any
375
reference, as far as I recall, or at least any significant reference, to the work
that Dr. Oppenheimer had done as a public servant.
Q. Let me interrupt you for a moment You have seen the Commission's
letter of December 23, 1953, which suspended Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance.
A. I have.
Q. So far as you can recall what is the relationship between the derogatory
information contained in that letter and the material that was before you sent
to you by Mr. Hoover in 1947?
A. From my careful reading of the Commission's letter and my best recollec-
tion of the material in that file, and the charges cover substantially the same
body of information
Q. Except for the hydrogen bomb stuff, of course.
A. Tes, up to the point of 1947, 1 suppose.
Q. You were saying that you found that the file contained derogatory infor-
mation, but did not contain affirmative matter, shall we say?
A. It did not contain any information about those who worked with Dr.
Oppenheimer in the Manhattan District. So we asked Dr. Vannevar Bush, who
we knew had been active in the pre-Manhattan District enterprise, as well as
since that time, and Dr. James Conant, both who happened to be in town, to
come in and visit us about this file. They expressed themselves about Dr.
Oppenheimer and his loyalty and character and associations and particularly
the degree to which he had contributed to the military strength of the United
States.
I called Secretary Patterson, or someone did, to ask him to request General
Groves, under whom Dr. Oppenheimer had served, be asked to supply a state-
ment about his opinion about Dr. Oppenheimer and the circumstances under
which he was selected and kept as director of the laboratory.
We discussed this with Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant during that day and I think
into the next day.
Q. Did you ask Dr. Bush or Dr. Conant for anything in writing?
A. I don't know whether they volunteered or whether we asked, but cer-
tainly they did provide written statements more or less following the line of
their oral statements.
Yesterday I had an opportunity, to read these and refresh my recollection on
them. I take it they are in the files.
Mr. SH.VEBMAN. Does the board have Dr. Bush's letter and Dr. Conanfs
letter?
Mr. GRAY. I am sure we do.
Mr. ROLANDER. They are a part of the files.
Mr. GRAY. Was there also a written statement by General Groves?
Mr. SILVERMAN. That is already in the record at page 582, or something like
that Unless there is some other written statement I don't know about.
Mr. GRAY. I am asking for information.
Mr. ROLANDER. General Groves' statement was read into the record the other
day.
The WITNESS. Then there was a letter from Secretary Patterson to us on the
same subject
Mr. ROLANDER. That is a part of the file.
Mr. SILVERMAN. I wonder if this might not be an appropriate time to read
those into the record, sir.
Mr. ROBB. Go ahead.
Mr. SILVERMAN. I don't have them.
Mr. ROBB. The file contains a letter of General Groves which has been read
Into the record. A letter from Mr. Conant and a letter from Mr. Patterson. I
am sure somewhere in here there is a letter from Mr. Bush. The chairman has
it now. It also contains for your information— when that was received, I am not
sure— the citation which accompanied the medal for merit which was awarded
to Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. SILVERMAN. That I think has already been read into the record.
Mr. ROBB. I think so. But that is in the file.
The WITNESS. As I recall, this was on the recommendation of General Groves.
I probably had seen it at that time.
Mr. ROBB. The medal for merit citation apparently was sent to Mr. Lilienthal
and a letter from George M. Msey dated March 14, 1947.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Did it say who Mr. Elsey was?
Mr. ROBB. I can't read it here, "Commander, USNR." I guess he was secre-
tary or something of the board.
376
The WITNESS. If I may, I can identify him. He was in the White House
staff, assistant to Clark Clifford.
Mr. ROBB. I will read it if you want.
"THE WHITE HOUSE,
"Washington, March 14, 1947.
"Memorandum for : Mr. Lilienthal.
"The members of the Medal for Merit Board who recommended to the Presi-
dent in January, 1946, that Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer he awarded the Medal for
Merit, were : Owen J. Roberts, Chairman, William Knudsen, and Stephen Early.
"Richmond B. Keech, Administrative Assistant to the President, was secretary
to the hoard.
"General Knudsen has since resigned as a member of the board and has been
succeeded by Chief Justice D. Lawrence Groner of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. Mr. Keech, although no longer Admini-
strative Assistant to the President, remains secretary to the board.
"A copy of the Executive order and a copy of the regulations governing the
Medal for Merit are enclosed.
"Respectfully,
"GEOBGE M. BLBET,
"Commander, U8NR."
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I would like at this point to read the letters from Dr. Bush
and Dr. Conant and Secretary Patterson.
Mr. ROBB. I have here the original of the letter from Dr. Bush dated March
11, 1947. The original of the letter from General Groves dated March 27, 1947,
which I believe is already in the record.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. That is already in the record.
Mr. ROBB. The original of the letter from Mr. Patterson dated March 25, 1947.
The original of the letter from Mr. Conant dated March 29, 1947. I will 'hand
these all to you, sir.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Thank you very much. With the permission of the board
Mr. GBAY. Excuse me for the interruption. I think we will proceed with the
presentation of these letters and then break for lunch. I am afraid if our ex-
perience with other witnesses is any indication, we will probably have to ask
you to come back after lunch, Mr. Lilienthal.
The WITNESS. I would like to express the hope that I would be able to finish
today so I can get back to work, but I, of course, will be back after lunch.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SILVEBMAN. It is agreed that tfcese letters will go into the record.
Mr. Robb has already identified the letters. They will be read into the record.
THhey will be transcribed into the record at this point, the letter of March 11,
1947, on the letterhead of the Joint Research and Development Board to Mr
David E. Lilienthal, Chairman, signed "V. Bush, Chairman." The letter of
March 24, 1947, on the War Department letterhead already read into the record
once, and I see no reason to read that in again.
The letter of Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War, on War Department let-
terhead, stamped secret, I may say, to Hon. David E. Lilienthal. The letter of
March 29, 1947, from Dr. Gonaut to Mr. Lilienthal
(The letters are as follows : )
"THE JOINT RESEABOH AND DEVELOPMENT BOABD
Mf ^ TO T "Washington 85, D. 0., March 11, 1947.
"Mr. DAVID E. LILIENTHAL,
"Oh&frman, Atomic Energy Commission,
"New War Department Building, Washington 25, D. C.
"DEAB MB. LILIENTHAL : At our conference yesterday you asked me to comment
concerning Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, and I am very glad to do so.
"Dr. Oppenheimer is one of the great physicists of this country, or of the
world for that matter. Prior to the war he was on the staff of the University
of California, and was regarded as leader in the theoretical aspects of atomistics
and similar subjects of physics. Shortly after the Army entered into the de-
velopment of atomic energy, he was given a very important appointment by
General Groves. This appointment made him director of the laboratory at Los
Alamos, which was in all probability the most important post held by any
civilian scientist in connection with the entire effort General Groves undoubt-
edly made this appointment after a very careful study of the entire affair from
all angles, as this was his custom on important appointments.
377
"Subsequent developments made it very clear that no error had been made in
this connection, for Dr. Oppenheimer proved himself to be not only a great
physicist, but also a man of excellent judgment and a real leader in the entire
effort In fact, it was due to the extraordinary accomplishments of Oppenheimer
and his associates that the job was completed on time. Subsequent to the end
of the war Dr. Oppenheimer has had a number of important appointments. He
was invited by Secretary Stimson as one of the scientists consulted by the secre-
taries of War and Navy in connection with the work of the Interim Committee.
He was appointed by the State Department as a member of the board which
drew up the plan on which Mr. Baruch based his program. He has recently
been appointed by the President as a member of the General Advisory Committee
of your organization. I have appointed him a member of the Committee on
Atomic Energy of the Joint Research and Development Board. All of this has
followed from his extraordinary war record in which he made a unique and
exceedingly important contribution to the success of the war effort of this
country.
"I know him very well indeed and I have personally great confidence in his
judgment and integrity.
"Very truly yours,
"(Signed) V. BUSH, Chairman.91
"WAS DEPARTMENT,
"Washington, March 25, 1941.
"Hon. DAVID B. LUIENTHAL,
"Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission,
"Public Health Service Building, Washington, D. 0.
"DEAB MB. LUJCENTHAL: In connection with your inquiry about Dr. J. Robert
Oppenheimer, a member of the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic
Energy Commission, I am glad to furnish the following information :
"It is my understanding that Dr. Oppenheimer is a leading physicist of the
world. During the war he held the key post of Director of the Los Alamos
Laboratory under the Manhattan district project, which as you know was the
enterprise under the War Department responsible for development of the atomic
bomb. His performance in that post, under direction of General Groves, was a
brilliant success.
"For his exceptionally meritorious service, he was recommended by General
Groves to receive the Medal for Merit in August 1945. . This recommendation
was approved by Secretary of War Stimson, and the award was made by the
Medal of Merit Board appointed by the President
"Dr. Oppenheimer was also appointed by the War Department to be a member
of the Advisory Panel of Scientists, to assist the Interim Committee designated
by Secretary Stimson in May 1945, to recommend policies in regard to the atomic
bomb and to suggestion legislation concerning atomic energy. I met Dr. Oppen-
heimer several times in the course of this work and received a most favorable
impression of his ability, judgment, character, and devotion to duty.
"Dr. Oppenheimer was recently appointed by Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman
of the Joint Research and Development Board of the War Department and
Navy Department, to be a member of the Committee on Atomic Energy under
that board.
"I am enclosing with this letter a memorandum submitted to me by General
Groves relative to the loyalty of Dr. Oppenheimer.
"In conclusion, I should say that from my knowledge of the work that he has
done toward making the atomic bomb a success and in other matters related
to atomic energy, I have confidence in his character and loyalty to the United
States.
"Sincerely yours,
"(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON, Secretary of War,"
378
"HAVARD UNIVERSITY,
^Cambridge, Massachusetts, March 87,
"MB. DAVID E. LHJENTHAL,
"Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission,
"Washington 25, D. C.
"DEAR MB. LTLIENTHAL: I am writing you this letter because I understand
certain inquiries have been made in regard to the loyalty of Dr. J. Robert Oppen-
heimer.
"It is quite unnecessary for me to recite in this letter the tremendous contribu-
tion to the war effort made by Dr. Oppenheimer. As director of the Los Alamos
Laboratory he carried a heavy responsibility both of a scientific and technical
nature and as an administrator faced with an extremely difficult problem. He
fulfilled his duties in an admirable manner. I think it can be said that he is 1 of
the 3 or 4 men whose combination of professional knowledge, hard work, and
loyal devotion made possible the development of the bomb in time to end the
Japanese war.
"My first personal acquaintanceship with Dr. Oppenheimer started in the sum-
mer of 1941. From then until the present day I have seen him intimately and
discussed with him all manner of questions. During the war I visited Los
Alamos frequently and in. so doing came to know him very well. Since the war,
I have discussed not only atomic energy for industrial and military purposes, but
all phases of the international problem of control. Likewise, our conversation
has ranged over the whole field of American politics and foreign policy. There-
fore, I feel sure that the statements that I make about him are based on an
intimate knowledge of the man, his views, and his emotional reactions,
"I can say without hesitation that there can be absolutely no question of Dr.
Oppenheimer's loyalty. Furthermore, I can state categorically that, in my
opinion, his attitude about the future course of the United States Government in
matters of high policy is in accordance with the soundest American tradition.
He is not sympathetic with the totalitarian regime in Russia and his attitude
towards that nation is, from my point of view, thoroughly sound and hard headed.
Therefore, any rumor that Dr. Oppenheimer is sympathetically inclined toward
the Communists or toward Russia is an absurdity. As I wrote above, I base this
statement on what I consider intimate knowledge of the workings of his mind.
"At the time of Dr. Oppenheimer's entering the work on atomic energy, I heard
that there was some question of his clearance by the security agencies. I under-
stand that was based on his associations prior to 1939 and his 'left wing1 sympa-
thies at that time. I have no knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer previous to the
summer of 1941, but I say unhesitatingly that whatever the record might
show as to his political sympathies at that time or his associations, I would not
deviate from my present opinion, namely, that a more loyal and sound American
citizen cannot be found in the whole United States.
"Very sincerely yours,
11 ( Signed) JAMES B. CONAOT, President:9
Mr. GRAY. The record will show that the members of the board have read these
letters. Each member of the board has read all of these letters.
Can you give me an indication, Mr. Silverman, of what length of time your
questioning may consume? I am not going to try to hold you to it
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I understand that, sir. All lawyers know that there is no
more unreliable answer than that of a lawyer as to how long he is going to
take. I would guess that our direct examination will probably consume approxi-
mately an hour. I used the word "guess" hi its sharpest meaning.
Mr. GRAY. Let us proceed now for 15 minutes and then take a break for lunch.
By Mr. SILVERMAN.
Q. Who was present at this conference of the Commissioners on March 10th
or thereabouts?
A. My recollection is that all the Commissioners, and that from time to time
we may have— I am not dear on this— but we probably called in the acting
security officer and other staff people. I am rather vague on that
Q. Who were the members of the Commission that were present?
(Discussion off the record.)
The WITNESS. All the members of the Commission.
379
By Mr. SILVEBMAIT:
Q. Did yon give the names of them?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank yon. Did yon then take the matter up with anyone in the office of
the President?
A. Yes. This would be March 11, on the Tuesday following the Monday I
have referred to, Dr. Bush and I made an appointment with Clark Clifford, the
President's counsel, and asked him to call the President's attention to this file.
The reason for doing this was that we were a little uncertain about our role
here. The members of the GAG under the law were appointed by the President
and not by the Commission. They were not subject to Senate confirmation, but
they were Presidential appointees. It seemed important to call this matter
to his attention to make sure that the President was made aware of this file.
This was the purpose of our call.
It was left that Mr. Clifford would advise the President and would send word
to us if there were further questions that the President had.
The reading of the memorandum from Commander Elsey refreshes my recol-
lection on one of the things that was said either over the phone or in conversation,
that his Medal for Merit Commission had knowledge about Dr. Oppenheimer. I
didn't' know there was this citation that was sent at that time. I think it was
later that week that Mr. Clifford phoned me, or Dr. Bush, and I may have gone
back— I am not too dear on this— 4>ut fn any case, the President was advised
and the President didn't express any views about what should be done. He
did not express the view that the clearance should be canceled or that he should
remove Dr. Oppenheimer or anything of that kind.
Q. Did you do anything further in an effort to decide what you should do
about this problem?
A. We discussed the matter together. We interrogated and conversed with
our associate, Dr. Bacher, because he was an intimate associate — he was actually
deputy to Dr. Oppenheimer at Los Alamos during most of the period of the
Los Alamos Laboratory, and had therefore a day to day working knowledge of
him— and he expressed his view about Dr. Oppenheimer. I think I called on
the chairman of the Military Liaison Committee, who at that time was General
Brereton, and advised that the question had been raised. General Groves was
a member of the Liaison Committee at that time and could inform the committee
to the extent that the committee wanted further information.
I t^nfr that covers what was done at that time, except that we readied a
conclusion. The conclusion was that on the whole set of circumstances, there
did not seem to be any occasion for cancelling or withdrawing the clearance or
taking any other action.
Q. This of course was after the Atomic Energy Act was in effect?
A. Yes. We were organized under the Atomic Energy Act There was one
further thing that we decided we should do, and that was to communicate with
Mr. Hoover, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for the purpose
of seeing whether there was anything that had come in this file since he called
me or whether we were properly construing the facts in the file. I did call on
Mr. Hoover. I have refreshed my recollection on this obviously or I wouldn't
remember it without it It was on the 25th of March. My office diary shows that
I called on him on the 25th of March, and discussed this file with him.
Q. Will you tell us of that discussion?
A. Whether Mr. Hoover had one of his associates there or not, I am not sure,
but from the Commission it was Mr. Joseph Volpe, Jr., Deputy General Counsel
at that time. I am not too dear, but I think the acting security officer was with
us, whose name was Tom Jones. My recollection is not too dear here. My
recolledon of that conversation is as follows :
First there seemed to be general agrement, or I expressed the view that here
was a man who had certainly contributed a great deal to the military strength
of the United States under circumstances of great difficulty and so on. Everyone
we had consulted who had worked with him and naming them, Dr. Bush, General
Groves and so on, were dear that this was true, that he had done a good job.
Mr. Hoover said there could not be any question about that
Then the question was discussed as to the relevance, as to the weight to be
given this long series of associations with left wing and crackpot and communistic
sorts of organizations or people of which the record contained a great deal of
information. On this I reported to Mr. Hoover that we would like to know
whether there was something in this that we had missed but that our evaluation
of it was that on the whole record in view of what had happened since that time
380
that Dr. Oppenheimer had proved by his work, by his activities, by the things
he had done for this country, that he was not only loyal, but that he had charac-
ter that made him suitable as an employee of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Then Mr. Hoover said— this is my impression— of course, Mr. Hoover makes
it a point not to evaluate these reports. I have dealt with him on a number of
these things. He very likely did not evaluate it. But when I asked him if there
was anything that we had missed or any implication that we had not seen that
perhaps he, with his closer knowledge of the file might see, he said, well, the
only reservation he had was that he didn't like that episode about— what is his
name, a French name.
Dr. EVANS. Chevalier.
The WITNESS. Yes, Chevalier. That Oppenheimer did report it finally, but he
waited an awful long time, and he crittzed that He was quite critical of it
Of course, I completely agreed with that
Beyond that there was no further comment about the file. So we left with no
suggestion from Mr. Hoover that further investigation ought to be carried on
or that the file was incomplete, that there were things we didn't know about
I think that is the last
By Mr. SELVEBMAN :
Q. Was there any suggestion by Mr. Hoover that the explanation Dr. Oppen-
heimer had given of that incident was not correct, or don't you remember?
A. My recollection is that his criticism was that he should have reported this
to the authorities at once, instead of waiting. I have forgotten how long it was,
but it was an intolerable period. It was weeks, I think. That was the point of
v^g comment
Q. After that, did you report the result of this Interview to your fellow
Commissioners?
A. Yes, Either I wrote a memorandum about It, or Mr. Volpe did. I in-
quired at the Commission yesterday and find that they were not able to locate
such a memorandum, but did locate a memorandum to the files which I had not
seen, from Mr. Jones. That is the only one that they have been able to dig up.
I think there is a report by Yolpe as well, but it has not been located yet
Mr. SILVBBMAN. May I inquire, do you have Mr. Volpe's report?
Mr. ROBB. No, sir, I have one by Mr. Jones. Do you want to read it in the
record?
Mr. SILVERMAN. No, I think not at this point.
The WITNESS. I did read that yesterday and I am familiar with its contents.
By Mr. SILTORMAN :
Q. As a result of Mr. Volpe's report— was Mr. Jones present at the conference
of the Commissioners?
A. He didn't say so in his memorandum and I am not clear on this. I am rather
assuming that he must have been but he reports what he understood went on.
He very likely was. I am a little fuzzy about that
Mr. SILVEEMAN. In the interest of continuity, we might Just as well put
Mr. Jones' memorandum In.
Mr. BOBB. I might say, Mr. Chairman, by way of explanation that of course
ordinarily the Atomic Energy Commission treats as confidential any discussions
between it and its representatives and Mr. Hoover. However, I think since the
witness has gone Into this matter, that it is entirely appropriate for me to read
this memorandum:
"Office Memorandum United States Government.
"Date: March 27, 1947.
Mnn A • IJHJffc
"From: T. XX Jones (ink Initials TO J).
"Subject: J. Robert and Frank Oppenheimer.
"At a meeting held on Tuesday, March 25, 1947, between representatives of
the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
attended both by Mr. Lilienthal and Mr. Hoover, there was some discussion on
the case of the Oppenheimer brothers. Certain comments made by Mr. Hoover
appear of particular interest
"Concerning Frank, Mr. Hoover consistently expressed himself as feeling
that there was no question of his—'* the word as typed did not have the "tin"
in front of It and the "un" is written In longhand, and beside the word is written
In again in longhand "TOJ"— "undesirability. Although Mr. Hoover would
doubtless dislike to be put in the position of evaluating the information on
Frank, nevertheless it is felt that the impression he left at this meeting should
381
be caref ully considered if at any future time it is proposed to reinstate Frank's
clearance for Restricted data.
"In the case of J. Robert, those present all seemed keenly alive to the unique
contributions he has made and may be expected to continue to make. Further,
there seemed general agreement on his subversive record * * * that while he
may at one time have bordered upon the communistic, indications are that for
some time he has steadily moved away from such a position. Mr. Hoover him-
self appeared to agree on this stand with the one reservation, wtych he stated
with some emphasis, that he could not feel completely satisfied in view of J.
Robert's failure to report promptly and accurately what must have seemed to
him an attempt at espionage in Berkeley.
"Mr. Lilienthal mentioned that the general question of J. Robert Oppen-
heimer's clearance had been discussed with Secretary Patterson, General Groves
and Drs. Bush and Conant, and that all four were writing letters to him Endors-
ing J. Robert Oppenheimer. Mr. Hoover said he would be glad to have such
letters for the completion of his files and was told that he would be provided
with copies.
" (r*oTE.— Original copy placed in J. Robert's File. Cc placed in Frank's File. ) "
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. Does that accord with your recollection?
A. Not quite, but it certainly is not very far off. Where my recollection
varies with this is not that Mr. Hoover was not critical of the Chevalier incident
and the laxity of reporting, but I don't recall his saying that he was not satisfied
with the man. My recollection was that he was not satisfied with the way
Oppenheimer had behaved in not reporting this promptly. Except for that, I
think- roughly— I certainly left with the impression that Mr. Hoover would have
said about J. Robert what he said about Frank if he felt that this qualification
was a very strong one. He certainly did not say that.
Q. You reported back to your fellow Commissioners this conversation with
Mr. Hoover?
A. Yes. I am a little puzzled why this memorandum was not sent to the
Commission or me and why it went to the files and that is why I think there
is also a memodanum from Volpe to the files because that was our regular
practice.
Q. As a result of this review and discussion with Mr. Hoover and so on,
that you have described, what did the Commission do?
A. The Commission concluded not to cancel or whatever the term is, not to
cancel the clearance— I suppose that is the way to say it. I believe the form
this took was a decision to continue the clearance. I think that is the way it
took. Actually it was not until August that I find in the minutes of the Com-
mission any reference to that action. The reference in August relates to Feb-
ruary, and I am sure the Secretary was wrong. If was actually in March.
Mr. ROBB. How is that again?
The WITNESS. In August
Mr. SILVEEMAN. Perhaps we could have this a little more precise. I will
call the attention of the board and of Mr. Robb to pages 80 and 81 of the record
in this case at which point Mr. Garrison referred to a letter he had from Mr.
William Mitchell, general counsel, dated January 15, 1954, that the Commission
win be prepared to stipulate as follows for purposes of the hearing:
"On August 6, 1947, the Commission recorded clearance of Dr. J. Robert
Oppenheimer, which it noted had been authorized in February 1947."
Mr. ROBB. That is correct. I thought Mr. Lilienthal thought that was not
right
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Mr. Lilienthal will now state what he was saying.
The WITNESS. I find that 'the minute entry of this clearance which should
have appeared in the minutes of February or March, at the time that it took
place, actually appears as far as I can tell in the minutes of August as of March.
Mr. ROBB. As of February.
The WITNESS. As of February.
Mr. ROBB. It is February, is it not?
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I got it
Mr. ROBB. I am agreeing with you, but apparently Mr. Lilienthal is not
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Mr. Lilienthal is agreeing with all of us. The minutes show
the thing and his recollection of the date is different
THE WITNESS. I think there is a very easy explanation.
382
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Would you give it, please?
A. The Secretary of the Commission in August was Mr. Bellsley, who had the
chore of bringing the minutes up to date during the period when the Commission
was on the Hill most of the time on confirmation hearings. He himself had
not attended these early and informal meetings, and I think this probably
accounts for the fact he thought it was February. It could not have been
February, because the file did not reach us until March. But the minutes, of
course, are right and state it was in February.
Q. Was the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy familiar with Dr. Oppen-
heimer's report?
A. Yes ; you mean the commitee with this file?
Q. N^t this file, but this record.
A. They were certainly familiar with Dr. Oppenheimer. He was an advisor
to the committee.
Q. Did they know about his left wing activities, or don't you know?
A. I don't know about them as of this time. Later on this file was trans-
mitted to the Joint Committee and examined by them, along with a lot of other
files.
Mr. GRAY. If (you are not on the file any further, I will ask that we recess
for lunch.
(Thereupon at 12 :50 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 : 00 p. m., the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. GRAY. The proceeding will begin.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, could I talk to you for a moment about
procedure?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
Mr. GARRISON. I have had literally 3 minutes to talk to Dr. Oppenheimer about
this problem; and no time to consult with my associates. This is what I would
like to suggest to the board about Dr. Oppenheimer's direct examination. I
would like to state the request first and then give you my reasons.
I would like to ask the privilege of the board to adjourn at lunch time tomorrow
and carry through with the witnesses in the morning, some of whom are going
to have to spend the night here even though they were scheduled for today, and
give us an afternoon oft so we can do some work and then put Dr. Oppenheimer
back on the stand, if that is the right term, on Thursday morning and as much
of the day as you wish to devote to him.
I think our redirect examination will not be very extensive. I know that
there will be cross-examination after that
Now I would like to state the reason for this. It is not that I have any need
of elaborate, preparation, but I and my associates are too physically and
emotionally worn down by having to do all the work outside of these hearings
at night that I am Just not really in a position to do what counsel should do,
which is to sit down quietly with Dr. Oppenheimer and go over the transcript
and make a preparation.
I don't want to expand on that plea unless the board wants me to go into it
further. I am Just telling you that I am nearly at the end because of the
pressures that have come upon us all.
I know of the board's most earnest desire, and I know the time problem that
Mr. Robb faces, cut off from his practice— I am cut off from mine, too — and I
don't want any special favors. I Just want a chance to have a little time. I
would be most loathe to make that request if I felt that thereby I would be
forcing the hearings into another week. But as I look at the calendar and
note what progress we have been making I think it is now clearly not going
to be possible to have both redirect and the balance of the witnesses concluded
by Friday night,
I might suggest a possible alternative which would not lose even half a day,
and that is to put Dr. Oppenheimer back on the stand Monday morning. Per-
sonally I would prefer to have it on Ofhursday and then be done with it But
I Just can't do this thing tonight for tomorrow. I Just can't, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. You made the request of the board and I think before I respond
to it, I would feel that I should consult the other members of the board about
the request I don't want the record to reflect my consulation with the members
of the board.
Mr. BOBB. May I say before the Board withdraws that Mr. Garrison courteously
presented this to me in private conversation and asked me my views upon it,
and I told him that although I could recognize his difficulties that I nevertheless
could not endorse his request because I felt that such a procedure was somewhat
out of the ordinary and unusual and I was extremely anxious that this hearing
should both in substance and in form take a normal course.
Is that about what I said to you?
Mr. GABBISON. Yes, indeed, Mr. Bobb, and it is a fair comment.
I think I said in return that this was an inquiry and not a trial, and Mr. Bobb
agreed with that. I understand that in a trial the reasons for continuing the
redirect of a witness after the cross is the natural thing to do before a jury or
a judge. Most trials at law involve fairly simple issues of fact. Here we are
dealing with a man's whole life and it is quite a different thing, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. The board will withdraw for a moment.
(Whereupon, the board withdrew from the hearing room.)
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Garrison, the members of the board have discussed your request,
and as I have expressed to you several times, we are concerned aboiijt the frag-
mentation which has been involved in the proceeding and continue to be concerned
about it
Our personal preference, I think, as individuals and collectively would be to
proceed and not to take an afternoon off because every day we take off now, it
seems to us, adds another one on the end, and that involves problems for every-
body concerned.
On the other hand, I believe the record of these proceedings reflects clearly
to this point our desire that every courtesy and consideration and every possible
effort as fairness be demonstrated to Dr. Oppenheimer. I am authorized by
my colleagues on the board to say for them and for myself that whereas we
regret very much this development and this kind of interruption, failure to be
able to keep witnesses on as the whole story unfolds as they can tell it, never-
theless we, pursuant to your request and out of consideration for Dr. Oppen-
heimer will recess at the lunch hour tomorrow or as soon thereafter as time
may be required to finish the witnesses who are here and will proceed on
Thursday morning with the redirect examination of Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. GABBISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that very much.
Part of the problem that we have faced with the witnesses was our desire to
follow your own request at the start of the proceedings so we have no gap at
all, and so we have tended to overload the witness schedule.
Mr, GBAT. I understand.
Mr. GABBISON. Since they do come from out of town, it makes it unusually
difficult For example, Dr. Fermi is here as scheduled and he has a Chicago
plane to make. Mr. Lilienthal has to be in Camden tonight Dr. Conant has
appointments with the Secretary, and so forth.
If it is possible to do so, we would like to put Dr. Fermi on after Dr. Conant
because he is going to be very short and has only one thing to talk about, but
if you would very much prefer to resume with Mr. Lilienthal we will do it
that way.
Mr. BOBB. Mr. Chairman, I am doing the best I can to accommodate Mr. Garri-
son, but I am supposed to examine these witnesses to develop facts. Although
I appreciate Mr. Garrison's problem, it is extremely difficult for me to listen
to 1 witness for 15 minutes and then have him leave the stand and hear some
other witness and ask frim questions and then come back to the first witness
and maybe have him go off and finally get around to examining the first wit-
ness. It is almost impossible to do that properly.
I do think that once we get Mr. Lilienthal back on the stand he ought to stay
there until he is through.
Mr. GABBISON. I didn't mean to break him up in fragments again. I meant
to sandwich Dr. Fermi in between the two fragments of Mr. Lilienthal. I don't
press it at all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GBAT. It seems to me that once Mr. Lilienthal is off the stand, Dr. Conant
and Dr. B^rmi come in. I am sorry to use the expression on the stand. As
a witness in the proceeding. We with respect to any other witness we Just
won't interrupt them any more, Mr. Garrison.
Mr. GABBISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. GBAY. Do you wish to testify under oath?
Dr. CONANT. Yes, I would be glad to.
Mr. GBAY. You are not required to,but all witnesses to this point have.
803818—54 2ft
384
Would you then please stand and raise your right hand?
James B. Conant, do you swear that the testimony you are to give the board
shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Dr. CONANT. I do.
Mr. GRAY. Would you be seated, please, sir.
It is my duty to remind you of the existence of the so-called perjury statutes
I should be glad to give you more detailed information about them if that is
necessary. I assume that it is not
Dr. CONANT. Quite so.
Mr. GEAT. I should like to ask you, Dr. Conant, if it becomes necessary in
your testimony to refer to restricted data, that you let me know in advance so
tf>at we may take necessary security precautions.
My final observation to you at this point is that we treat these proceedings as
confidential between the Commission and its officials and Dr. Oppenheimer and
his representatives and witnesses. The Commission will take no initiative in
any public release with respect to these proceedings. We are expressing the
hope that each witness will take the same view.
Dr. CONANT. Good.
Whereupon, Dr. James B. Conant was called as a witness, having been duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
DUKEOT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. Dr. Conant, Just for the record, you are the United States High Commis-
sioner to Germany?
A. That is correct.
Q. And formerly president of Harvard University?
A. Quite so.
You are appearing here at our request?
A. Yes, sir, at your request
Q. Would you state very briefly the course of your acquaintance with Dr.
Oppenheimer?
A. As I recall it, I must have met Dr. Oppenheimer for the first time in the
early discussions of the atomic bomb affair and then followed, of course, his
work at Los Alamos and my capacity as scientific advisor to General Groves in
which I was at Los Alamos quite often.
After the end of the war I saw him again in connection with the so-called
Acheson-Ldlienthal report I consulted with him occasionally in that connec-
tion and then again when the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic En-
ergy Commission was established we met and he was elected chairman.
From then on I saw him quite often in connection with those meetings. Then
later when he was elected an overseer of Harvard I saw him in that connection.
I should say a few years ago he was on an informal committee of which I was
chairman, the committee on the present danger.
Q. You have read the Commission's letter of December 28, 1953, which ini-
tiated these proceedings containing the derogatory information about Dr.
Oppenheimer?
A. Yes, I have read it
Q. Have you a comment to make on it?
A. Yes, I have. I would like to comment on it I would like to comment on one
section particularly. Somewhere in the letter it says that the substance of the
information which raises the question concerning your eligibility for employ-
ment, referring to Dr. Oppenheimer, on atomic energy work, is as follows, and
then later it says that it was farther reported that in the autumn of 1949 and
subsequently you strongly opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb;
one, on moral grounds ; two, by claiming it was not possible ; three, by claiming
that there were Insufficient facilities and scientific personnel to carry on the
development; and four, that it was not politically desirable.
Well, it seems to me that letter must have been very carelessly drafted, if I
may say so, because if you take those two statements together, of course, it
would indicate that anybody who opposed the development of the hydrogen
bomb was not eligible for employment on atomic energy work later.
I am sure that no one who drew that letter could have intended that, because
such a position would be an impossible position to hold in this country ; namely,
that a person who expressed views about an important matter before him, as a
member of the General Advisory Committee, could then be ineligible because of a
security risk for subsequent work in connection with the Government I am
385
sure that argument would not have been intended. If it did, it would apply
to me because I opposed it strongly, as strongly as anybody else on that com-
mittee, that is, the development of the hydrogen bomb. Not for the reasons
that are given there.
If I might say so they are a rather caricature of the type of argument which
was used in the committee in which I participated. I should say I opposed it as
strongly as anybody on a combination of political and strategic and highly
technical considerations. I will go into that later to some degree although I
don't think this is the place to justify the conclusions of the General Advisory
Committee. It would be a long story.
It seems to me that clearly the question before you here is the question rather,
is the implied indictment, I submit, namely, because of the information in the
first part of this letter— Dr. Oppenheimer's association with alleged Communist
sympathizers in the early days in his youth— that that somehow created a state
of mind in Dr. Oppenheimer so that he opposed the development of the hydrogen
bomb for what might be said reasons which were detrimental to the best interests
of the United States, because they were interests of the Soviet Union which he In
one way or another had at heart.
That, I take it, is the issue which I take it is before you in part in considering
this letter. It is to that that I would like to speak for, I think, I have some
evidence that convinces me that any such charge is completely ill founded.
If it were true that Dr. Oppenheinier's opposition to the development of the
hydrogen bomb were in any way connected with a sympathy which he might
have had with the Soviet Union, or communism, then surely many other actions
and decisions which he was involved in over the period of years in which I was
associated with him would have likewise been influenced by any such point of
view.
The record is quite the contrary. I just call your attention to a few facts
probably already before you— actions of Dr. Oppenheimer, participation in
decisions,. all of which were strongly detrimental to the interests of the Soviet
Union after the close of the war.
We can start with the time shortly after the Acheson-Lilienthal report when
an attempt was made through the United Nations to get an agreement with
Russia on the control of atomic bombs.
As I recall it, Dr. Oppenheimer was early associated with Mr. Baruch and
then later with Mr. Osborn in that series of negotiations. I was only tan-
gentially associated. I was called in from time to time by Mr. Osborn. I
remember sitting in one or two meetings. I can't give yon the dates because I
haven't had time to look any of this up, and I don't keep records.
At that time we had a number of discussions which were early, you see, in
the development of the postwar period, with Dr. Oppenheimer and with others.
At that time it seemed to me that Dr. Oppenheimer's appraisal of the Russian
menace, of the Soviet situation, was hard headed, realistic, and thoroughly anti-
Soviet, designs which even then were quite clear with their expansion into the
free world.
That would be my first basis for believing that his attitude at that time was
thoroughly loyal to the United States and thoroughly opposed to the Soviet Union
and communism in every way.
Then coming to the period when he became chairman of the General Advisory
Committee. Again this is probably well known to you. There is no restricted
information here. I am going to speak in general terms.
Yet, as Winston Churchill later said, it was the possession of the atomic
bombs in our hands that prevented, so he believes, Russia being at the channel
ports during that period of history. There was a great deal to be done. Dr.
Oppenheimer was a vigorous proponent as chairman of the committee of getting
ahead and putting that shop in order.
Los Alamos was revivified. From then on all the decisions of the committee,
with possibly the exception of this controversial thing about the hydrogen bomb
would, I think, be shown entirely on the side of arming the United States. There
was only one possible enemy against whom it was being done— it was the Soviet
Union.
There are many other matters if I had a chance to go over the records of the
General Advisory Committee.
As seems implied in this Indictment that Dr. Oppenheimer was influenced by
pro-Soviet and anti-United States views, he would not have taken the views
he (Jid. I named just two that come to me.
One is a matter on which I think I can take some credit of calling to the
ittention of the Advisory Committee of getting ahead rapidly on methods of
detecting any explosion that might occur in the atomic field by the Russians.
[ remember Dr. Qppenheimer may have picked that up before I did; he may
have had the suggestion before I did, although I don't think so, and taking steps
In the committee to see that something would be done in that regard.
Clearly anybody that was influenced by any point of view in favor of the
Soviet Union could hardly have done that.
Another matter — the development of smaller atomic bombs which could be
used for tactical purposes ; support of the ground troops which in my judgment
Qf military strategy seemed to me of great importance. That was a matter
which I know he pushed vigorously in the committee. He made strong state-
ments about it. I think he was very, active.
There again it seems to me is an illustration of a definite action taken by
this man which contradicts what seems to me the implied thesis in this part
of the indictment.
There is a final matter which is not connected with the General Advisory
Committee but which is of rather a personal nature. I spoke to the committee
on the present danger. That was a group of men that came together informally
to make a public committee, started in the fall of 1950. The Korean War was
going in a bad way. We believed that the United States Government was not
taking proper steps to put itself in a strong military position, particularly with
respect to the defense of Europe on the ground.
Late that year or early in 1951 we put out some statements urging Universal
Military Service and urging that we send more troops to Europe, generally the
policy which has become the policy of the United States. Dr. Oppenheimer was
asked to Join that committee. He joined it He subscribed to all those doctrines
which were most vigorously anti-Communist. He spoke to at least one, I think,
informal gathering where we were trying to raise some money to get ahead
with a little of our propaganda work. Perhaps it is unnecessary to put on the
record that I must admit that we had no success with our doctrine of Universal
Military Service, but that is another story.
As far as the defense of Europe on the ground is concerned, things have fol-
lowed the way we at least advocated.
Q. There was put in evidence here, Dr. Conant, a letter which Dr. Qppen-
heimer identified as one written to you shortly before the meeting of the General
Advisory Committee in October 1949, in which he addressed you as "Uncle Jim"
and talked about the question of the hydrogen bomb and the forthcoming meet-
ing.
When I showed you that letter, as I did
A. Yes, you showed me that last night.
Q. A copy of it, I mean. Did you have any recollection of having received it?
A, No, I had not I did not remember it. I couldn't say that when I saw it.
I suppose It was delivered. It must have been a classified document I was
very fussy about not taking classified documents when they came to the office.
If I received it, I must have taken it right down to Washington. I don't say
I didn't see it, but I have no remembrance of it I would not have known about
it if you had not called it to my attention.
Q. Do you remember any discussion with Dr. Oppenheimer one way or another
before the October meeting?
A. No, I am afraid my detailed recollection of that period is very hazy. I
think there were two meetings at least of the General Advisory Committee
Q. One in October and one in December?
A. Yes. There was certainly plenty of discussion in those meetings. Those
I remember pretty well, but when and where I first discussed this matter, where
I first heard [of It, Is not clear In my mind. Whether I walked into it, or whether,
as implied by that letter, it was before, or whether it was some other source
of information, I am sorry I Just don't remember.
Q. How did Dr. Qppenheimer as chairman of the General Advisory Committee
conduct the meetings?
Av He was an excellent chairman, but I hope he won't take it amiss if I
say he ran them like a faculty meeting. There was a great deal of discussion
and a great dfeal of talk. They were the most lengthy meetings I ever sat in on
to mya1?6- ^y consumed an tin-Godly amount of time, but they covered the
ground from A to Z.
Q. Coming now to the meeting of October 29, 1949, when you first discussed
tne hydrogen bomb, upon whose technical advice did you rely?
387
A. I can't be sure of that meeting because, as I say, my memory of that period
is not accurate enough to spot the meeting and the discussions, and so on. As
I said, in my comment here a minute ago, I was moved in my opposition to this
in signing the statement of the General Advisory Committee, which I have not
seen since, by a mixture of political, strategic, and technical considerations.
Those technical considerations are extremely detailed, but judging from some
things I have read in general in the press, completely misunderstood.
Of course they concerned the question of what kind of large weapon to
make and what was the cost and what were the opportunities of doing it, and
what were the probabilities.
When it came to a question of the nuclear physics in which I am by no means
an expert, I always counted on Dr. Fermi's judgment. With all due respect to
all the other members of the committee, I felt he was both experimentally and
theoretically the man whose judgment was to be relied on. Indeed his record
during the development of the atomic bomb I consider one of the most extraordi-
nary pieces of scientific correct calculations I can image. The story is a
perfectly amazing one.
Q. Would you state very briefly for the board the reasons which lead yon to
make the recommendation which you did make on the subject of the hydrogen
bomb?
A. It is a very complicated thing. I think it would take a long time to do
a detailed inquiry into that. Some day if the Government wants to set that
up, I should be glad to take the time, but I would have to go back into the record.
Therefore, what I shall do is only a general sketch. With all due respect to
Dr. Gray and his colleagues, this would take a board, which included a nuclear
physics expert, to assess the questions of whether the technical part of this
decision was right or wrong.
On the general strategic and political grounds there were some of the same
reasons which we subsequently brought to a head on the committee on the present
danger, namely, this was supposed to be an answer to the fact that the Russians
had exploded an atomic bomb.
Some of us felt then, and I felt more strongly as time went on, that the real
answer was to do a job and revamp our whole defense establishment, put In
something like Universal Military Service, get Europe strong on the ground,
so that Churchill's view about the atomic bomb would not be canceled out. •
One of the considerations was that this was sort of a Maginot Line psychology
being pushed on us. On the technical ground the question was the investment in
preparing certain materials which I am not going into, which are restricted,
which seemed at that time necessary ; the use of materials which I don't want
to mention, which would be used up.
The question was when you expended a certain amount of manpower and
energy and material, would you actually from the point of view of delivering
blows against a potential enemy be very much better off even if this line worked?
Of course, to do an assessment on whether we were right on the t*M»iiTii«Hii
ground you would have to then go into the subsequent developments which I
don't know about because I ceased being on the committee in August 1962* But
judging from what I read in the papers, some things have worked and presum-
ably along different lines from what we were then thinking.
Q. In March 1<M7 did Mr. Lilienthal as chairman of the Commission ask yon
for your opinion with respect to Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty?
A. Yes. I recall that this was at the time when Mr. Wilson who was general
manager, Mr. Lilienthal and the other members were up for confirmation in
the Senate. I think that is the right time. I remember Mr. Wilson and I think
Mr. Lilienthal coming to me, saying that we have been apprised that there are
some things in the record of Dr. Oppenheimer which indicate association with
alleged communists, some things of that sort, and we want to know whether
you are prepared to make a statement in regard to his loyalty.
I am pretty sure I didn't examine the file. I am sure I didn't I said that
"I don't know about the past, but I am glad to put on record what I now
believe, based on my knowledge of him since the early days of the war," and
there is such a letter in existence. I have not seen it.
Q. I have it here, Dr. Conant. It was brought into evidence this morning.
May I, with the board's permission, just read you the last two paragraphs.
The first four of the letter have to do with a recital of your acquaintance with
Dr. Oppenheimer and the circumstances of your writing the letter. Then you
went on to say : "I can say without hesitation that there can be absolutely no
question of Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty. Furthermore, I can state categorically
that, in my opinion, his attitude about the future course of the United States
388
Government in matters of higli policy is in accordance with the soundest
American tradition. He is not sympathetic with the totalitarian regime in
Russia and his attitude towards that nation is, from my point of view, thoroughly
sound and hard headed. Therefore, any rumor that Dr. Oppenheimer is sym-
pathetically inclined towards the Communists or towards Russia is an absurdity.
As I wrote ahove, I base this statement on what I consider intimate knowledge
of the workings of his mind. [Reading : ]
"At the time of Dr. Oppenheimer's entering the work on atomic energy, I heard
that there was some question of his clearance by the security agencies. I under-
stand that was based on his associations prior to 1939 and his 'left-wing* sympa-
thies at that time. I have no knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer previous to the
summer of 1941, but I say unhesitatingly that whatever the record might show
as to his political sympathies at that time or his associations, I would not
deviate from my present opinion, namely, that a more loyal and sound American
citizen cannot be found in the whole United States."
You wrote that?
A. Yes, I wrote that. I have every reason to believe I wrote it.
Q. Dr. Gonant, you formed your judgment at that time on your appraisal of
Dr. Oppenheimer as a total man?
A. Yes. That was based clearly on my acquaintance with him during the
Los Alamos project and this other period which I mentioned in which we
discussed the whole question of the control of the bomb, which gave me a chance
to explore many political problems which we would not have explored at Los
Alamos.
Q. Having in mind the Commission's letter of December 23, 1953, to which we
have referred on the one hand, and what Dr. Oppenheimer has done since March
1947 when this letter was written, do you have reason to modify or alter the
view which you expressed about him in March 1947?
A. No. I would think on the contrary the actions and decisions which I put
on the record here seem to me to make quite clear that he was party to many
actions on the part of the General Advisory Committee which were strongly
opposed to any Soviet policy. It makes more certain the statements I then
made based on what was after all a shorter acquaintance with him.
Mr, GARRISON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Bobb.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. Dr. Conant, at the outset of your statement you quoted from the letter from
Mr. Nichols to Dr. Oppenheimer, did you not?
A. Yes. Did I quote correctly?
Q. Did you quote that from memory?
A. No. I wrote it
Q. Did you copy it?
A. I copied it from the New York Times.
Q. Would you read it to me again?
A. As I wrote it, there is a place somewhere about a third of the way down
which says that the substance of the information which raises the question
concerning your eligibility for employment on atomic energy work is as follows —
is that correct?
Q. Go ahead.
A. Then there are a lot of other things and then comes: "It was farther
reported that in the autumn of 1949 and subsequently you strongly opposed
the development * * *"
Q. That is fine. That word "further" indicates, does it not, that that sentence
is tied in with other sentences in the same paragraph?
A. Yes, and to that extent it is the simplification that I spoke of. If you don't
emphasize the "further," it would appear— that would be an impossible thing,
and I am sure nobody intended it to mean so. Therefore, it was the implication
I was speaking to.
Q. Certainly you would agree that sentence must be taken in its context with
the rest of the paragraph?
A. Quite so. It was to that that I was speaking when I attempted to put in
evidence that which made me think such an implication was wrong.
Q. That is a rather long paragraph, taking almost a page of single spacing in
the letter, is it not?
(No response.)
389
Q. Doctor, referring to your letter to the Commission or to Mr. Lilienthal on
March 29, 1947, which Mr. Garrison read to you, the last sentence especially?
A. May I look at it?
Q. Yes. Have you a copy of it?
A. It is the first time I have seen it since I wrote it.
Q. "I have no knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer previous to the summer of 1941,
but I say unhesitatingly that whatever the record might show as to his political
sympathies at that time or his associations * * *" and so forth. By that did
you mean, sir, that even though the record might have shown that he had been
an actual member of the Communist Party that would not alter your opinion?
A. If he had been an actual member I would have been willing to bet that he
would have renounced the membership and be one of these people who had
changed his point of view, as some people have. I had no reason to believe
that any such charges were in there.
Q. No. I am trying to explore if I might Just how far you were going.
A. Political sympathies is not the same word as political associations.
Q. I understand that
A. It was political sympathies that seemed to be charged at that time.
Q. I am trying to find out how you defined the term.
A. You are asking me now rather than when I wrote that letter, because
it is pretty hard for me to say what I thought when I wrote this.
Q. I assume that you still stand back of that sentence now?
A. That is right
Q. Would it be your testimony now that even though Dr. Oppenheimer might
have belonged to the Communist Party in 1941 you still would make the same
statement about him?
A. Yes; provided there was not anything in the record to show that he
continued to be a member and he was an agent and so on. If you brought out
a lot of those facts which to my mind would be impossible considering the actions
he had taken, of course, anybody can be mistaken on those things.
Q. Of course, Doctor, you don't know what the testimony before this board
has been?
A. No, I don't
Q. Nor do you know what the record or file before the board discloses?
A. No. I only know what is in the letter of General Nichols.
Q. You spoke of the meeting in March 1947, which for your information I
will tell you, I think we agreed, was March 10, 1947. You met with the Com-
mission. Do you remember that? I believe you said Mr. "Wilson was there.
A. Did I? Where was this? I am sorry.
Mr. GR^Y. I thought Dr. Conant said Mr. Wilson and somebody came to
see him.
Mr. KOBE. Was that it?
The WITNESS. All I remember is that Carroll Wilson who was then the general
manager and I think Mr. Lilienthal came to see me.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. I see.
A. That is all I have a clear remembrance on.
Q. And asked your opinion?
A. They said here we are told something in the record is doubtful about
Dr. Oppenheimer, what do you think of him, and will you write a letter, and
I wrote it
Q. Did they at that time show you the record they were talking about?
A. To my memory they didn't
Q. Doctor, you spoke in your testimony of three factors which you consider
in connection with the atomic bomb: Political, strategic, and technical; is that
right?
A. Yes.
Q. When you referred to the strategic factor, did you refer to the military
strategy?
A. Yes. Military and political strategy run together pretty heavily, but I
had in mind the sort of thing I spoke of a moment ago. The strategic considera-
tions which are implied in that statement of Winston Churchill.
Q. Of course, Doctor, you don't pretend to be an expert on military strategy,
do you?
A. No, but I think I am entitled to an opinion on it
Q. Certainly. Most of us do* I am Just trying to find out what your political
field is.
390
A. Remember at that time all of us talked a great deal about the military
strategy involving atomic bombs and so on. J certainly am no expert on it
Q. Were there men who were qualified military strategists trained in that
particular field at that time who disagreed with you on your views?
A. I don't know that we had them on the committee. After all this thing
was a recommendation of a general advisory committee. It was going to be
bounced over many other hurdles. We were not setting policy. We were giving
our views. I am not prepared to say. I don't know that I discussed it at that
time. Subsequently I was quite aware of people who had different views.
Q. Subsequently you found out they did?
A. Certainly.
Q. Doctor, I am a little bit curious, if you don't mind, as to why you gentlemen
on the committee undertook to give advice as to military strategy?
A. I don't know. The General Advisory Committee is concerned with a great
many things. Nobody has to take the advice if they don't want to. It turned
out they didn't
As I recall the report, it was largely centered on the technical. I have not
seen the report since the day it was written. Certainly the things run together
terrifically on the question of what you expend money and manpower for.
We were a general advisory committee, not a technical advisory committee.
We ventured even to suggesting how they should reorganize the Commission.
Q. Yes. Tour comments, it seems to me, though, Doctor, had to do not with
technical matters or matters concerning the development of the bomb, but
rather with the use use which the military might make of the bomb. Would
you agree with that?
A. No. A great deal about the question of the use of manpower and money and
fissionable material— I guess that is not restricted— in the best use to make
weapons. The question of delivery of the weapons has always been a concern
of the General Advisory Committee.
Q. By delivery you mean on the enemy?
A. Yes. One of the things the General Advisory Committee most concerned
itself with from the start was the whole question of getting a position where
bombs could be delivered satisfactorily. It was also true at Los Alamos.
Q. In all events you did feel and you do now feel that considerations of military
strategy properly came within the function of your committee?
A. As a question of advice surely. They didn't have to take it if they didn't
want to.
Mr. ROBB. I think that is all I care to ask, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. May I ask a question or two.
Is your recollection that you didn't see any files?
The WITNESS. My recollection is that I didn't see any file on Dr. Oppenhelmer
at all.
Mr. GRAY. I don't know what the facts are, but I wouldn't want to leave the
record fuzzy with respect to this conference, whenever and wherever it took
place.
We had before us briefly this morning Mr. Lilienthal who testified, I believe,
that he called a meeting in Ms office with you and Dr. Bush to discuss this
matter. Do you remember discussing it in the presence of Dr. Bush?
The WITNESS. I certainly discussed the subject with Dr. Bush.
Mr. GRAY. Your recollection is not good?
The WITNESS. I have nothing to indicate that it is not correct I remember
Bush at the time wrote a letter, too.
Mr. GRAY. Yes, he did.
Tb& WITNESS. Bush and Groves both wrote letters. I don't remember whether
I discussed it with Bush in the presence of the Commission. That is not clear
in my mind. I remember writing the letter very clearly.
Mr. GRAY. Therefore, since you didn't see the file and you don't remember
any real discussion of the file, your Judgments with respect to Dr. obpenheimer
are based entirely on your association with him?
The WITNESS. Entirely on my associations with him from the period of Ifctt
on and based on my discussions with him, particularly after the war, on what
I would consider matters much more than technical but ones which would
bring out very definitely a man's sympathies or latent sympathies with the
Soviet Union, which you will recall at that time was a subject of considerable
debate with many people.
I found it refreshingly, from my point of view, hard headed and anti-Soviet
which was my view at the time and always has been. '
391
Mr. GRAY. At this time you were president
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Did you have experience of having put faith in a member of your
faculty, having supported him and defended him, not simply on the issue of
academic freedom but a little beyond that— your own faith in him — and then
firid yourself experiencing a situation such as at Minnesota with respect to
a man referred to as Scientist X, who appears in this proceeding? I am not
trying to relate it in that way.
Mr. BOBB. Weinberg.
The WITNESS. No. Obviously it could happen to anyone.
Mr. GRAY. I know of no instance myself.
The WITNESS. No, I don't recall.
Mr. GRAY. That could happen?
The WITNESS. It could happen, of course.
Mr. GRAY. Are you familiar, Dr. Conant, with the provisions of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946 within the framework of which we must carry on the
proceedings of this board and the fact that under the act the criteria apparently
are character, associations and loyalty of an individual. That a determination
must be made with respect to those with a finding that permitting an individual
to have access to restricted data will not endanger the common defense or
security.
I have expressed that badly, but these criteria are established and then they
must be met for clearance for access to classified material.
I am not asking you at this time to comment on the wisdom of these criteria,
but to ask you if you are aware that these are the criteria?
The WITNESS. I was not aware of the exact phraseology but some such
tilings.
Mr. GRAY. I would ask you, then, whether you feel that any board or any
Government official in trying to make an evaluation, as we believe we are called
upon to do, must take into account associations over a period of years in order
to make a finding with respect to this criterion of associations.
I ask this because I believe that your stated view, which was clear and
convinced, was that early associations were unimportant in the light of later
conduct.
The WITNESS. And by later associations, surely. I would have said quite
clearly that since the period I have known him that the associations from all
the evidence I had, yes.
What you are saying is that associations beyond a certain period might lead
you to inquire into later ones. But certainly it does not say in the act how
distant those associations. I assume it means the present character and the
present associations. Therefore, you are going back into the past in order to
extrapolate it into the present.
If I had known he had any associations— or a suspicion— I don't believe he
would— that would not have affected my statement; it is not only his views, but
talking with his then associations.
Mr. GRAY. You would not have too much information about associations.
The WITNESS. Not undercover in nature.
Mr. GRAY. Or generally speaking, would you? You met Dr. Oppenheimer in
GAO meetings- and panels.
The WITNESS. You are talking about the letter, or are you talking about my
present knowledge of hin\?
Mr. GRAY. At the time that you knew him.
The WITNESS. As of now, which is much greater than at the time in 1947
when after all I had known him only 6 years. Since then I have seen a great
deal more of him.
Mr. GRAY. We are called to make a recommendation as of now and not as of
1947.
The WITNESS. Quite so.
Mr. GRAY. So that we, you understand, have to take Into account all the mate-
rial which seems to be substantiated which is before us, perhaps some of which
you are not at all familiar with.
The WITNESS. Quite so. I am presenting to yon, to sum up, the evidence
which seems to me makes extremely Improbable the hypothesis called for by that
word "further", Mr. Hobb, which you called to my attention, of the hydrogen
bomb with the consequence of the early associations set forth In the letter.
That is what I was speaking to.
392
Mr. GRAY. A summary of your testimony might be that so far as you have
any knowledge about anything and on the basis of your best judgment you
consider that Dr. Oppenheimer's character, loyalty and associations are such
that he should have access to restricted data.
The WITNESS. Quite so. And I would give the specific items in which his
judgment was such that if he had been influenced by pro-Communist views, or
pro-Soviet views, he would not have taken those actions or decisions, and they
were quite serious. In other words, this is not a general expression of belief
based oa casual conversations, but participating in a great many, I would say,
fairly powerful anti-Soviet actions.
Mr. GRAY. Do you have any questions, Dr. Evans?
Dr. EVANS. Yes, a few.
Dr. Conant, you understand the position this board is in on this matter.
The WITNESS. I beg your pardon.
Dr. EVANS. You understand our position. We didn't seek this job.
The WITNESS. I can readily understand that
Dr. EVANS. We are trying to do the best we can.
The WITNESS. Quite so.
Dr. EVANS. Perhaps this advice to us should be rewritten now and say some-
thing about the present. What do you think about that? Do you think we
should go by this thing at all?
The WITNESS. I am really not here to advise you on what you should do. I
pray that is beyond my competence.
Dr. EVANS. In regard to character, associations and loyalty.
The WITNESS. You are probably a lawyer
Dr. EVANS. That is what it says here.
The WITNESS. I should imagine lawyers would argue what present, past and
so on, meant Far be it from me to enter into that argument
Dr. EVANS. I have nothing more.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GABBISON:
Q. Just one question, Dr. Conant Supposing that you were told that early in
1943 during the wartime project on which Dr. Oppenheimer served he had been
approached by a friend— I think you have heard of the Chevalier incident?
A. It is in the letter.
Q. That this friend had told him of Eltenton's channel for transmitting in-
formation to Russians, that Dr. Oppenheimer rejected emphatically any sugges-
tion that activity of this sort should be engaged in and spoke of it as treasonous ;
supposing that some months later, after a delay of some months, Dr. Oppenheimer
volunteered the information about Eltenton to security officers but refused to
disclose at their request and their urging the name of his friend who was the
intermediary and indeed suggested that the intermediary might have been some
unnamed other people; that later when he, having persisted in this refusal to
name this friend, knowing that the security officers were very anxious to ascer-
tain who it was, General Groves asked him to tell him, that he declined to tell
General Groves, that unless General Groves ordered it and General Groves said
he didn't want to order it, but to think it over and later General Groves did tell
him that he would order him unless he told him, and that Dr. Oppenheimer then
revealed the name of Chevalier; would the judgment which you have expressed
here about Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty, about his character, be altered?
A. It seems to me if I f ollowed this hypothetical— I assume it is hypothetical,
the way you are stating it— incident, if I sum it up, in that case the question
would have been that he had been negligent in taking steps necessary to bring
into prosecution somebody who had attempted to get information? Is that
roikghly what the charge would have been?
This is a fairly complicated story you are telling me with a good many yeses,
anas, and buts in it
<fc There was the element of delay In reporting it; there was the delay of not
frankly stating it and the circumstances when he did report it; there was the
element of declining to name the friend after he had been pressed to do so ; but
there was the dement finally of his revealing the name and also of his having
Initiated the whole business of revealing Eltenton's name.
A. Of course, any such thing like that would depend on the number of In-
stances. You are assuming this is the one instance.
393
Q. For the purpose of the question, yes.
A. I would suppose that the question that would be presented then with that is,
What were the motives at that time, and what did that show about his subse-
quent attitude in regard toward the Soviet Union? Did he do that at that time
for reasons of trying to protect the Soviet Union agent who was trying to get
information and did that indicate that he would continue to have an attitude
from then on about various matters connected with atomic energy which would
be not in the interest of the United States?
In view of all the things I mentioned, I would say that it didn't change it for
that reason. It stood by itself and had nothing else but conversation with the
man. You have to take the summation of evidence as you see it If I were
merely testifying here that I had known Dr. Oppenheimer in talks over these
years, and so on, and I thought he was a loyal citizen, I don't think my evidence
would be of the sort that I hope it is. By having participated with him in what
I believe to have been effective actions against the Soviet Union.
Mr. EOBB. May I ask one more question?
RE-CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Dr. Conant, as a distinguished scientist and scholar
A. I am not a distinguished scientist, but I am willing to be considered a
scholar ; thank you.
Q. As a scholar, you would agree, would you not, sir, that any conclusion,
that any opinion about a given problem, to be reliable, must be based on all the
relevant facts and all the relevant evidence?
A. Surely.
Q. And any opinion or conclusion which is not based on all the relevant facts
and all the relevant evidence might be fallible?
A. Yes ; but as a scholar I know, perfectly well there is no such thing as all the
relevant ; all the human beings can do is give their evidence and statement on
what seem to them the relevant things at the time.
Q. Precisely.
A. Therefore, I don't quite like the word "all" there, because that implies
an omniscience.
Q. All the available evidence?
A. All the available evidence.
Q, With that amendment, you would answer yes to both my questions?
A. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. Thank you.
Mr. GBAY. May I pursue this hypothetical question of Mr. Garrison's for a
moment, Dr. Conant? You suggested what issue that hypothetical situation
might raise, namely, that this might be an indication of an interest in protecting
the Soviet Union. I am not sure these were your remarks.
' The WITNESS. Or an act of the Soviet Union, if I got the quick summary of it
correctly.
Mr. GRAY. Or it might be interpreted as simply a desire to protect a friend.
The WITNESS. Yes. I would say a mistaken idea that you had to protect a
friend in those circumstances.
Mr. GRAY. If in this hypothetical situation as I think Mr. Garrison indicated,
the security officer was pressing for this information, very important perhaps
to the security officer who was charged with the security and who would not
have any reason to believe that perhaps friendship was Involved, the question
again— and I am relating this to the present and to the act — or I suppose a
question is : In any situation involving a divided loyalty or a conflicting loyalty,
the protection of a friend, and to the obligation one owes to one's government,
is there any question as to which should be
The WITNESS. Not in my mind. That is why as you recall, I said I wanted
to answer that question in the context that this was one incident and not
many. I think we all recognize in reviewing a long history of a person, people
can make errors. If they are single, they are one thing ; if they are multiplied,
they are quite a different picture.
Dr. EVANS. Dr. Conant, if you had been approached by someone for security
information, wouldn't you have reported it just as quickly as you could?
The WITNESS. I think I would have, yes. I hope I would have; let us put it
that way.
Dr. EVANS. That is alL
Mr. ROBB. May I ask one more question?
Mr. GBAY. Yes.
394
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. When you did report it, Doctor, you would have told the whole truth
about it?
A. I hope so.
Q. I am sure you would. Thank you.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Dr. Conant, suppose that in the hypothetical question Dr. Oppenheimer had
sincerely believed that his friend was incapable of lending himself to activity of
this character, and that loyalty to his Government was not in fact involved, so
that the fault was one of asserting his own judgment and deciding for himself
whether the interests of the country were involved, rather than following the
assurance of the security agent that it was, would you feel that the culpability
or the fault was of a different order than protecting a friend about whose loyalty
he was in doubt?
A. I take it that even this hypothetical question I am not asked to pass a moral
judgment on. I would be concerned with what does that action indicate in
regard to a question which I take it is here, which is the security risk of the
man in question. It seems to me that is what you have to put it in context with.
I am not going into the fine moral things as to whether people do things this
way or that way. Conflicting loyalties were involved. You asked me the ques-
tion how I would have resolved myself. I am quite frank to say I would have
resolved these the way I answered. If the question is having somebody else
resolve them, what does that show in view of a total record in regard to a
security question.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much.
The WITNESS. Thank you. I appreciate you for allowing me to come in at
this moment, because I am on a tight schedule, as you say.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GRAY. Let us proceed with Dr. Fermi, if he is here.
Dr. Fermi, do you wish to testify under oath?
Dr. FERMI. I would be glad to.
Mr. GRAY. The other witnesses have. You are not required. May I have
your full name?
Dr. FERMI. Enrico Fermi.
Mr. GRAY. Would you be good enough to stand and raise your right hand?
Enrico Fermi, do you swear that the testimony you are to give the board shall
be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Dr. FERMI. I do.
Whereupon, Enrico Fermi was called as a witness, and having been first duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Dr. GRAY. Would you be seated, please, sir.
I must point out to you the existence of the perjury statutes. I assume you
are familiar generally with those?
The WITNESS. More or less, yes.
Mr. GRAY. I should be glad to disclose the penalties if you wish.
The WITNESS. I will try not to be involved with them.
Mr. GRAY. May I ask if in the course of your discussion here it becomes neces-
sary for you to disclose restricted data, will you advise me before the disclosure,
because there are certain steps we would find it necessary to take in that event.
Also I say to each witness that we consider that these proceedings are a con-
fidential matter between the Atomic Energy Commission and its officials, and
Dr. Oppenheimer, his witnesses and representatives. The Commission will take
no initiative in release to the press anything about these proceedings and the testi-
mony, and we express the hope each witness will take the same view of the situ-
ation. Mr. Garrison.
Mr. MARKS. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of getting back to the interrupted
witness as quickly as possible, I win ask just a very few questions of Dr. Fermi.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. MARES:
Q. Dr. Fermi, would you be good enough to identify yourself for the record?
A. My name is Enrico Fermi. I am at present professor of physics at the
University of Chicago.
Q. Were you a member of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic
Energy Commission?
395
A. I was a member of the General Advisory Committee for a period of a little
bit short of 4 years, until December of 1950.
Q. You participated then in the deliberations of that committee concerning the
advice to the Commission on the thermonuclear program in the fall of 1949?
A. I did.
Q. Would you tell the board briefly what you can in an unclassified way about
those deliberations, the positions taken, the reasons for them?
A. Yes. I should perhaps mention the matter goes back to about 5 years, and
my recollection is partly vivid, partly a little bit uncertain, but I think I remem-
ber the essentials, which are about this way: That the committee was con-
fronted with 'forming an opinion whether it was the right time to start an all
out program for developing the hydrogen bomb.
Q. This would have been the meeting of October 29, 1949?
A. That I understand is the date, although I don't remember it on my own.
So we were confronted with this decision. I can testify naturally to my feel-
ings in this matter better than I can to those of other people. As far as I could
see the situation, I had the concern that the pressure for this development was
extremely inordinate, or at least so it seemed to me. I was concerned that it
might weaken the development of conventional atomic weapons which was then
picking up and essentially set it back for what seemed to me at the time a not
quite decided advantage on the other side. For that reason, and I believe that
these views must have been shared more or less by everybody in our group,
because a decision that it was not the right time to go in an absolutely overriding
way in that direction was, as far as I remember, unanimous.
There was a subsequent point on which some difference of opinion arose, and
I found myself in this connection in the minority together with Rabi. Again I
have no absolutely clear recollection. I have no doubt that the board has avail-
able the records of those meetings presumably where things are spelled out in
full detail. My recollection is that this divergence of opinion was on whether
to essentially declare or establish the policy not to go ahead with the program
or whether some circumstances could make us go ahead.
My opinion at that time was that one should try to outlaw the thing before it
was born. I sort of had the view at that time that perhaps it would be easier to
outlaw by some kind of international agreement something that did not exist.
My opinion was that one should try to do that, and failing that, one should with
considerable regret go ahead.
Q. Do you remember, Dr. Fermi, whether or not there was opportunity at those
meetings late in October 1949 with the freest and fullest discussion among
you— consistent with the rather brief time, few days?
A. Yes, I think so. I think everybody had a right to his own opinion and to
defend his own opinion.
Q. Was there a great deal of discussion and debate?
A. No doubt there was. I think we had some trouble and some soul search-
ing, all of us.
Q. There has been introduced in the record here a letter which was written by
Dr. Seaborg, around the middle of October 1949 to Dr. Oppenheimer which dealt
with the subject of the thermonuclear problem among other things. The letter
has been variously interpreted as to what it means. Do you have any recollec-
tion at all of that letter?
A. No, not from that time. In fact, as far as I am aware, the first time I
learned it from you was this afternoon.
Q. Seaborg was absent from that meeting?
A. Seaborg was absent, yes.
Q. Shortly after this meeting in October 1949, am I right that there was
another meeting of the GAG?
A. Yes.
Q. Within a month or so?
A. I don't remember, but within a relatively short time.
Q. And was Seaborg present at that next meeting?
A. I think so, yes. In fact, I remember, or I haye an impression or he gave
me the impression to be somewhat happy not to have been confronted with the
difficulties of contributing to what was a difficult decision. That was the im-
pression that he gave me at least.
Q. Shortly after this time — that would have been the end of 1949 — it was not
long after that you left GAG ?
A.- In the following summer. I suppose the last meeting must have been, In
the late spring.
396
Q. Do you have any memory of actions which the GAC took in that rather
brief interval?
A. My general impression is that we all had the concern that the conventional
weapons program should not be weakened and we tried to see that the various
provisions that were taken for furthering the hydrogen program would not be of
such a nature of interfering seriously with the conventional weapons program.
Actually I believe that this could be done and I am not aware that there has
been such a weakening.
Q. Do you have any impression that these actions that you took had the effect
of interfering with the program for the thermonuclear development?
A. No.
Q. Going back to the earlier period when you were a member of the GAG,
prior to the meeting on the thermonuclear device, would you describe very briefly
the position that Dr. Oppenheimer took with respect to the development, perfec-
tion and refinement of atomic weapons?
A. Yes. I think I can say very definitely that I always saw him push for all
the measures that could improve our positions in conventional atomic weapons,
and this includes seeing to it that exploration of ores would go ahead vigorously,
that production of primary materials would be expanded, that all the various
gadgets that go into this weapon would be streamlined as much as possible, that
varieties of weapons that could conceivably improve our military position would
be investigated and developed. I don't in fact in this respect remember any in-
stance in which I disagreed on essential points. We always found ourselves
very much together pushing in that direction together with the help of our col-
leagues. But perhaps Oppenheimer first and I, in somewhat second line, knew
perhaps more about the technical details of weapons than most other people of
the board knew, so that this task naturally f ell more precisely in our province.
Q. Would you say that these measures with respect to which you and Oppen-
heimer had a primary concern and role have had any significant effect on the
military power of the United States?
A. I would think so.
Q. Could you amplify that at all?
A. It is very hard to know what would have happened if something had not
happened. Still I feel that this action certainly has contributed, I think, in
focusing the attention of the Commission on the importance of certain actions,
in breaking certain bottlenecks that were retarding or limiting the production.
Advice I don't suppose is comparable to action in importance, but as far as
advice is of importance, I think it was in that direction definitely.
Q. One final question. In his role as chairman of the General Advisory Com-
mittee and conducting the meetings and the affairs of that committee, what op-
portunity did Dr. Oppenheimer afford to the other members of the committee to
express fully their views and to exert their influence?
A. I think perfect opportunity. Of course, he is a person who knows a great
deal about these things and knows how to express what he knows with extreme
efficacy, so naturally many questions just because of this preeminence and not
because so much of his sitting in the chair, he would naturally take a leading role.
But certainly everybody had a perfect freedom to act with his own mind and
according to his conscience on any issue.
Mr. MASKS. That is all, Mr. Bobb.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, how long were you on the General Advisory Committee?
A. About 4 years.
Q. Did you write the reports of the committee?
A. Did I do what?
Q. Did you write any of the committee's reports?
A. No ; I don't remember that I did.
Q. Who did?
A. Mostly the chairman, and he was helped by the secretary of the commit-
tee, who was at that time Dr. Manley.
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr. Manley were the ones who took care of that?
A. I think in most cases, as far as I know, the reports were written by them.
Q. And the report of the October 29, 1949, meeting, did Dr. Oppenheimer write
that?
A. Yes, I presume so. I imagine probably Babi and I Jointly wrote
Q. You wrote a separate report?
397
A. Wrote our brief minority opinion on a very partial issue of that meeting.
Q. When I said separate report, you wrote a minority opinion.
A. Yes; something of that kind.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Fermi, Dr. Conant has appeared before this board in the pro-
ceeding, and he was, I believe, at the same time a member of the General
Advisory Committee.
The WITNESS. That is correct.
Mr. GRAY. He testified that being primarily a scholar and secondarily a
scientist, he relied upon you for technical advice in these matters.
Can ydu recall, did he talk with you prior to that October 29th meeting about
the subject matter which was to be taken up at the meeting? Did he come to
you or seek your views on this principal issue which was to be before that
meeting?
The WITNESS. I don't remember that he did. My recollection would be that
we came into the meeting and some sort of general discussion started right
away in the open meeting. That is my impression. At least I don't remember
of any private conversations.
Mr. GRAY. You don't recall any conversation?
The WITNESS. No.
Mr. GRAY. Would you guess now on the basis of recollection that most of
the people who came to that meeting had their minds pretty well made up about
this issue, or do you think that they arrived at the conclusions which were
reflected in the various reports they signed as a result of the meeting?
The WITNESS. I would not know. I had and I imagine that many other people
had sort of grave doubts. It was a difficult decision. Even now with the benefit
of 5 years of hindsight, I still have doubts as to what really would have been
wise. So I remember that I had in my own mind definite doubts, and I presume
my ideas and I imagine those of other people, too, must have gradually been
crystallizing as the discussion went on. However, I have no way of judging.
Mr. GRAY. I know it is difficult to answer that question. The fact is that in
this particular case, Dr. Conant did not take your advice.
The WITNESS. I don't remember that we had any particular discussion out-
side the meeting.
Mr. GRAY. He didn't take the same position you did in this meeting.
The WITNESS. In that particular we were on different sides, that is correct
Mr. GRAY. I would like to have asked Dr. Conant this question. This is being
discussed in his absence.
Mr. GARRISON. May I ask a question for clarification relating to the chair-
man's question? It is my recollection that Dr. Conant said he looked to yon
for guidance on matters of nuclear physics, and for your judgment in those
matters, that is, primarily to you. When you say you took different sides in
this meeting, I want to make quite clear whether you mean with respect to what
ought to be done internationally and so forth, by the country on the one hand,
and what the technical situation was on the other.
The WITNESS. I see. I don't remember of any essential disagreement on the
technical situations. I suppose I think we expressed our opinion in terms, if 1
remember correctly, of a somewhat better than even probability. I think it was
a fair opinion at that time. I don't think one could have said or could have
guessed better than in those terms. In other words, it was not a foregone con-
clusion by any means, and we knew and we said that it was not a foregone
conclusion.
On the other hand, it was to be expected that perhaps Just with develoiHnent
and with some amount of technical luck the thing might be pushed through.
That was about the situation at the time; that, as far as I can recollect, we
all agreed with the situation. I don't believe there was any difference of
opinion on this line. ,_ . _
Dr. EVANS. For the benefit of the record, for some people that may not know
you as weU as I have known you, would you state where you were educated?
The WITNESS. Where I was educated?
The WITNESS. I was educated in the University of Pisa in Italy.
Dr. EVANS. And you taught over there?
The WITNESS. I taught not in Pisa ; I taught first in Florence, and then In
Borne for many years, until I came to this country, and I taught in this country
for 2 years in 1939— f or more than 2 years, 4 years or so at Columbia University,
since 1939, and then after the war Interlude, I have been teaching at the
University of Chicago.
398
Dr. EVANS. You were at Columbia University when the first knowledge came
out about the fission of uranium.
The WITNESS. Yes, that is right
Dr. EVANS. Do you believe, Dr. Fermi, that scientific men should be sort of
circumscribed in regard to scientific information that they may discover?
The WITNESS. I am sorry, I am not sure I got the question.
Dr. EVANS. Do you believe in circumscribing the scientific men in regard to
scientific information that they discover, that is, not permitting them to pub-
lish it?
The WITNESS. I see. The matter was this. In ordinary times, I would say
that scientific discoveries should be made public. At that particular time with
the war impending and critical political situations and so on, I joined with a
group of others, the leader of the group or the most active member of that
group was Leo Szilard, in a voluntary censorship to keep certain results that
could lead in the direction of the atomic bomb.
Dr. EVANS. Do you believe it is actually possible to conceal this kind of
information?
The WITNESS. Well, for a very limited time, yes. Forever, no.
Dr. EVANS. That is, you could have guessed a lot of this stuff if you had been
over in Rome?
The WITNESS. I think I might possibly have guessed some things, at least.
Dr. EVANS. That is alL
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Dr. Fermi.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GRAY. We will recess for a few minutes.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GRAY. Will you proceed, Mr. Silverman.
Whereupon, David B. Lilienthal, a witness having been previously duly sworn,
resumed the stand and testified further as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION — Resumed
By Mr. SILVERMAN:
Q. Mr. Lilienthal, would you care to describe briefly what situation you found
in general in the atomic energy establishment when you became chairman in
A. Perhaps some chronology will help. The war was concluded in early August
of 1945, and at that time the Congress began considering what should be done with
the atomic energy enterprise. It was a big concern without any guidance given
it by legislation or otherwise until over a year later, when the McMahon Act
was passed. So that in that period, there was the period of the Manhattan
district acting In a sense as a caretaker and the uncertainty resulted in things
that we found when we came into the enterprise.
When I first saw it was when the board of consultants visited the projects
in February of 1946. Deterioration had set in as one might expect. Scientists
had left the project in large numbers. Contractors had declined to go forward,
such as duPont. DuPont turned in its contract at Hanf ord. There was great
uncertainty. Morale was badly shot At Los Alamos we found the most serious
situation because although some very able men remained, the top management
of that project had left for the universities. We found a great many health
hazards and fire hazards that were very damaging to morale. * * *
From a management point of view, it was extremely difficult because the Army
had insisted that their officers should move back into their military posts. This
meant we had to try to find people to take their place. There was no inventory of
the properties. There was no accounting. This whole thing had been done
so hastily that it had not been possible to do that. These things made it very
difficult for the men who were operating to make head or tail of what they were
doing. The net effect of that was a very depressed state of mind.
As I say, this can be annotated at some length. This is what we found at the
time we began the enterprise in January 1946.
Q. Did you consider one of 'your first tasks and the most important task was
the rehabilitation of the atomic energy program?
A. Yes ; that was our duty. Beginning with personnel and trying to get people
A. Tea ; they were. By reason of the fact that the OAC included men of real
distinction in the scientific world and that the Chairman of the GAC had been
399
the former head of the Los Alamos project, they spent a good deal of time as
individuals and as a group trying to induce people to return to Los Alamos
or other undertakings in the Commission. We did make use of them in that way.
Q. What was the function of the GAG, as you understood it to he?
A. The law defines it as an advisory body on technical and scientific matters.
That was the role that by and large was followed. It was independent of the
Commission, set up as a statutory advisory body as distinguished from perhaps
the score of advisory bodies that we set up by administrative action. It had
its own secretariat. The secretariat acted between meetings.
The dealings with the Commission were rather formalized. But by and large
the roles were of two kinds. One, to review technical and scientific matters, and
second, to initiate scientific and technical matters.
Q. Did you feel that the GAG under Dr. Oppenheimer's chairmanship per-
formed that function during your incumbency in office?
A. Yes; I thought as an advisory group it worked very well, I don't mean
to say that we always agreed with the advice and this of course we didn't. The
GAO was very diligent in meeting frequently and in documenting their recom-
mendations and in keeping contact with the division heads and operating people
in the Commission between their meetings.
Q. Do you care to state the role and attitude of the GAG with respect to some
of the problems that faced you during your incumbency?
Mr. ROBB. Could I have that question read back?
(Question read by the reporter.)
The WITNESS. One can only select a few examples to respond to that.
In the weapons field they were most active. This was because the weapons
problems were the primary problems of the Commission in part and partly
because these men had special qualifications in that direction. They either
initiated or reviewed such tilings as efforts to revise the design of weapons in
order to get more weapons for the same amount of material, to increase the
destructive power of weapons, to boost their destructive power, to improve their
combat effectiveness in the direction of lightness and field manageability, matters
of that kind.
I thing the board will find problems of this kind treated in some detail all the
way through the GAC letters to us, and reports to us and our request to them
and the operations between the secretariat and Division of Military Applications
of the Commission, the Military Liaison Committee and others.
These are examples of the sort of thing they did.
By Mr. SILVERMAN:
Q. We have gone into that in the record with other witnesses.
I want to turn now to the situation as it existed after the Soviet atomic
explosion, I think, of September 23, 1949. Would you tell us very briefly what
our defense posture was as far as you can in unclassified terms with respect to the
ABC's function and responsibility?
.A. I will try to summarize this. The details of course are available to the
board.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, may I interpose just so the record may be clear. I
am not making any objection, of course. May I ask if the witness is about to read
a statement?
The WITNESS. No. I have some notes that would hasten the presentation.
Mr. ROBB. That is entirely all right. I just wanted the record to reflect if
you were reading a statement.
The WITNESS. I am not reading a statement, but from notes,
Mr. ROBB. Which I assume you made.
The WITNESS. Yes ; notes in my handwriting.
The situation on September 23, which I believe is the date which President
Truman announced the atomic explosion in Russia, as far as the AEC's program
for weapons was concerned was something like this:
A program for the expansion of weapon production had been under study by
the Military -Establishment and the AEG over a period of months, probably be-
ginning in February, and continuing through October 19, when President Truman
formally approved this expansion program. This was encouraged by the GAO,
and it was certainly a program that included additions to Oak Ridge and
elsewhere, additions to Los Alamos and so on.
As to the improvement of weapons, here too there was a program which had
been recommended by our Division of Military Application, had been approved
and amended in some ways by the General Advisory Committee, by Los Alamos
400
Laboratory, and it had a number of parts. These are rather important These
are found in these records, but I think it might serve to spell it out a little
in lay terms.
I have consulted with Mr. Beckerley privately about classification problems,
and he assures me that the way I will put it will not involve any classification
problem.
Mr. ROBB. If it does, Mr. Chairman, I assume Mr. Beckerly will raise his
hand or something?
The WITNESS. Yes. I have rehearsed this with him.
Mr. ROBB. I have no doubt that you will be all right.
The WITNESS. I want to be very careful about it, and that is why I have
asked him in advance.
This weapons improvement program which was in effect — that is, the program
had been approved or was actually in operation at Los Alamos and Sandia —
was of several parts. Among these parts were a program for an increase in
the numbers of atomic weapons through new design, an increase in the numbers
of weapons through greater material production, an increase in the numbers of
weapons through programs relating to raw materials, a program for increasing
the destructive power of the weapons over those at Hiroshima and Nagasaki
by a substantial factor, an improvement in the combat usefulness of the
weapons by reengineering these weapons.
This led to the establishment of the Sandia operation and my soliciting the
aid of the Bell Laboratories and the Western Electric on behalf of the Commis-
sion and the President to take over that operation in order that we might have
weapons that had field usefulness, as distinguished from weapons that it almost
took a Ph. D. in physics to handle, instead of a sergeant
This is an important story and I only refer to it The details, I am sure,
are in the file.
An improvement in problems associated with delivery. This concerns size
and weight and other matters of that kind of great importance. And finally,
plans for greatly stepped up power of weapons by a very large factor, by
certain innovations of design that had been worked on for some time, but were
at the point where a program for building such weapons was Just around the
corner.
The product of this stepped up program for this greatly heightened destruc-
tive power of weapons would produce a weapon which was so much larger
than the original weapons that we were advised that one such bomb would
take out almost any target in the world, and two would take out any target
I have consulted with Mr. Beckerley and I make this statement after that
consultation with him that President Eisenhower in his United Nations speech
on December 8 spoke of an attainment of a fission bomb— an A-bomb type —
of 25 times the power of the original bombs with an energy release of the order
of 500,000 tons of TNT equivalent Whether that bomb is the bomb that was
recommended by the GAG and the Division of Military Applications, and was
part of the program at the time of the Russian A-bomb, I don't know. I state
these facts, and I am assuming that this must be the fission bomb that was
planned at that time.
That was the program roughly that we had at the time of September 23. I
ought also to say that to the best of my knowledge the Commission had not
received, nor had any of the divisions any request from the Defense Establish-
ment for a weapon of unlimited size or destructive power, nor any request for a
weapon of greater destructive power than the stepped up fission bomb to which
I have just referred. That the Commission did not have a military evaluation
at that time of the military value of a hydrogen bomb or a bomb of size without
definite limit. That it had not before it no diplomatic or political evaluation of
the effect of such a weapon pro or con, on such matters of the cold war, or the
effect on our alliances and other diplomatic and international relations.
The board is familiar with the fact, and the records are here that the Com-
mission asked the GAC to assemble, especially to consider certain questions
affecting the Commission's duties grew out of the announcement about the
Russians' success with an A-bomb. Those questions roughly seemed to me
something like this :
Is this program that we now have and have under way adequate to fulfill our
duties? If not, what modification or what alternative course or alternative
courses should be pursued? Among those alternative courses, should an all-out
H-bomb program be instituted in order* that we should adequately and properly
fulfill our duty?
401
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. Mr. Lilienthal, the Chairman of the Board, I think it was, perhaps it
was Mr. Ronb, called our attention in the course of these hearings to a letter
signed by Mr. Pike as Acting Chairman of the AEC to the GAG, giving them
their instructions. Were those the only instructions that the Commission sent
or gave to the GAG with respect to this meeting?
A. My recollection is that prior to Mr. Pike's letter I wrote a letter, a rather
brief letter, setting out or asking them to assemble for consultation on the
consequences as far as the Commission's duties were concerned on this Rus-
sian A bomb. When the GAG did meet on October 29, the Commissioners or
some of us met with them initially, and I suppose to them orally indicating—-
not attempting to limit their considerations to technical matters alone, al-
though it was assumed that technical matters would be the basis for other
recommendations. There are two letters, therefore. One letter by Mr. Pike
is more in the nature of the usual letter we sent prior to every meeting in
which certain specific things are asked. The letter that I wrote is of more
general character.
Q. Did you also speak to Dr. Oppenheimer orally or don't you recall?
A. I think I called him by phone to ask him to sound out the committee
members, what was the earliest date when all the members could be present.
This, I think, was about the Sth or 9th of October.
Q. Have you recently seen that letter you wrote Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Yes, I saw it yesterday.
Mr. SILVEEMAN. Does the board have that?
Mr. GRAY. I don't think I have seen that letter.
Mr. ROLANDEB. What is the date of that, do you know?
The WITNESS. No, but it would perhaps be the 15th of October, or something
like that. I did see it yesterday in the big file.
By Mr. SILVERMAN:
Q. Proceed.
Mr. ROBB. If you wait Just a moment, perhaps we can get that letter. I
don't know.
The WITNESS. It is a fairly short letter.
Mr. ROBB. This seems to be it. October 11. I am told by Mr. Beckerley you
can read that into the record if you want to.
&y Mr. SILVEEMAN :
Q. Would you do so, please?
A. This is dated October 11.
Mr. ROBB. 1949.
The WITNESS. 1949. [Reading:]
"Dear Robert:
"We quite understand the General Advisory Committee's wish at its last
meeting to postpone making any specific recommendations to the Commission,
but rather to express its readiness to be called upon whenever it might appear
that it could help. We are very appreciative of that offer and we want and
need to avail ourselves of your counsel and guidance.
"The Commission is, of course, asking itself afresh in the light of operation
Vermont if the present, and presently planned, program constitutes doing
everything that it is reasonably possible for us to do for the common defense
and security.
"This is, I realize, a very large question, but it is the essential measure of
the Commission's responsibility and the question to which we are trying
to make certain there is a clear and affirmative answer. To that answer the
Committee has important contributions to make, and we would welcome your
advice and assistance on as broad a basis as possible. Do you think it would be
possible to assemble the Committee in the very near future to meet with the
Commission?"
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Pike's letter was subsequent, but I am told by Dr. Beckerley
that involves classified material, Mr. Lilienthal.
The WITNESS. Then there appears to be a memorandum from my secretary
indicating that Dr. Oppenheimer had phoned concerning this letter and sug-
gesting dates.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Pike's letter was October 21, 1949.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. ROIANDEB. Mr. Chairman, I am informed that operation Vermont refers
to Joe I, which was the first Russian explosion, for the clarity of the record.
402
Mr. GBAY. I hope it clears the record.
Mri ROBB. Do you want Dr. Oppenheiiner's answer to that letter in the
record?
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I haven't seen it. Do you think it bears on it, Mr. Robb.
Mr. ROBB. It might.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Let us have it in the record if there is any question about it.
Mr. ROBB. I will show it to Dr. Beckerley.
Mr. GBAT. While they are looking at the record, why was the Pike letter
written as Acting Chairman? This is a thing I am just curious about.
The WITNESS. I think I was probably away at the time the letter was prepared.
It perhaps was before each of these GAG meetings, our staff and the GAG secre-
tariat would get together and prepare a kind of agenda in the form of a letter,
questions that either they wanted to raise with us or either that we wanted to
raise to them. We sent this kind of staff letter and the Commissioners signed it.
If I were there, I would have signed it.
Mr. GBAT. I see.
Mr. ROBB. Dr. Beckerley says it is all right.
The WITNESS. This is October 14, 1949.
"Dear Mr. Lilienthal:
"Thank you for your good letter of October 11. I can well understand the
desire of the Commission to have us consider the overall program at this time.
We shall do our best to do so.
"It has proven possible to call the meeting on the 29th and 30th of October ;
that is the first day on which both President Conant, who is quite busy, and
Professor Fermi, who is in Rome, can possibly attend. It is not possible to
schedule a meeting date on which Dr. Seaborg can be with us since he has long
planned a trip to Sweden. I have, however, made arrangements to obtain from
him in writing, and, if necessary, consultation, his views on the subject of the
meeting. With the exception of Dr. Seaborg, I expect that all members of the
advisory committee will be able to come. Some of us will plan to be in Wash-
ington on the 28th for preliminary consultation. I think it best, however, that
the formal meeting not be called until the morning of the 29th. I regret that
this is a weekend ; that seems to be inherent in the makeup of the GAG.
"May I suggest that if there are any materials that it would be wise for us
to examine before meeting with the Commission on Saturday morning you
arrange to have them transmitted as early as possible; but in any event in
time to permit study before we actually come together. The secretary of the
committee, Dr. Manley, will be in Washington next week, and will, I am sure, be
glad to consult with the staff of the Commission on the preparations for the
forthcoming meeting.
"With every warm good wish, Robert Oppenheimer.
"Copy to Dr. John Manley."
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :.
Q. Will you tell us what happened thereafter?
A. There was one other thing. It is known to the board, hut I want to make
that in my remarks I take full cognizance of it, that the occasion for the
precise occasion for considering the H bomb either as a part of the program or
a supplement to the existing program was a memorandum from our fellow
Commissioner, Mr. Strauss, dated about October 5 or 6, which is in the record.
All of these documents added together represented the frame of the Commis-
sion's thinking at the time of the meeting on October 29th and 30th.
Q. Now, what happened at that meeting, as far as you can recall, or whatever
impressed you about it.
A. Some of the Commissioners, perhaps all, but certainly I, attended the
opening meeting or part of the opening meeting of the GAC, It was their meeting.
Their practice was to ask us in as observers or to ask us questions. If we wanted
to meet with them as our meeting, we would ask them to come to the Com-
mission's room. In this way it preserved the identity of the meeting being as
either a GAC meeting or AEC meeting. This was a GAC meeting.
I opened the conference by repeating as well as I can recall the substance of
tne paragraph in the letter that has been read into the record indicating that
we wanted their advice on whether our program as it had been approved, the
present program, the program in planning to which I referred, met the require-
ments of our duty, and if not, how it should be supplemented and in particular
should it be supplemented by an all-out program on the H-bomb as proposed
by Commissioner Strauss.
403
The GAG's report is in your record. The points that most impressed me
were two. Gne, the technical considerations that were discussed in the time
while I was in their meeting which did not by any means include the whole
meeting. Most of their meeting was in executive session, but there were
considerations of diversions of materials to another program, the H-bomb pro-
gram, which was problematical, discussion of whether such a weapon as the
hydrogen, deuterium, tritium, et cetera, weapon that was then under considera-
tion would improve our retaliatory strength sufficiently to justify the risks
involved in diversion of materials and other related points.
There was discussion of whether a weapon larger than the 500,000 tons
fission weapon that was in the works, half a million tons of TNT equivalent,
whether a weapon larger than that didn't go beyond the point of diminishing
returns in terms of the destruction it would effect.
There was a consideration of whether our program then was not the best
way to use the materials and the manpower that we had. These technical
considerations impressed me very much.
The second point that impressed me a good deal was one I had thought about
myself and others, of course, and that was a consensus among a number of 6AC
members that launching of a weapon larger than the stepped up weapon would
not give us a false impression of security and illusion of security that we had
gained a decisive or absolute weapon, an illusion of security which a number
of the GAG members attributed to our possession of the A bomb, an overvalua-
tion of the security that could be secured from large bombs alone as distinguished
from a balanced military establishment.
In any case the GAC's views and the ABC's views were submitted to the
President in writing on November 9. They are of course in this record.
By Mr. SILVERMAN:
Q. They may be in the files and not in this record.
A. Yes, they are In the files. In this report we tried to make the President's
job as easy as possible by agreeing on as many things as we could about the
facts. This was largely a staff paper prepared which we approved. There
is agreement in this report which you will find that went to the President on
a number of things
Mr. ROBB. This is the report that went to the President from the Commission?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. BOBB. Not the GAG report
The WITNESS. No. The GAG report was included in it. The Commission's
report began with an agreement, "Mr. President, we are in agreement com-
pletely on a number of the basic facts about this situation."
Mr. ROBB, Excuse me for interrupting.
The Wrmsss. I am sure this is a document if It is relevant is not so long
that the board may read it It is a classified report, of course.
Then we recognize, that is, the ABC, that this is not a question which the
ABC could decide. This is a question for the President. But we do indicate
what our views are. Mr. Strauss indicated, as indicated earlier, for an all out
program. Three of us, Commissioners Pike, Smyth, and myself, said in one
sentence we are not for this program — we are not at this time, I think are the
words that are used — and Mr. Dean had a position which I think might be
described as not quite at this time.
There was a preliminary thing that ought to be gone through. This is spelled
out in his own words in the report, and I won't take the time to review it if you
wish me to.
Just as an individual, if I may say so, I don't conceive that the question to
which I am to address myself is the wisdom or unwisdom of either of these
courses. At that time this represented the best judgment that each of us could
summon to this question prior to the consultations which took after this at
which time I had another chance to look at the problem in the light of the
State and Defense Department views.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. I tfifair it might be of some interest to know to what extent the Commis-
sioners and the Commission were relying on the GAG report. Also I am going
to ask yon about the National Security Council, or perhaps you will come to
that in your testimony directly, to what extent that relied on the GAG report
A. In this case I can only speak for myself. The other Commissioners either
have or will indicate the extent to which they relied on the GAG. It was my
404
view that technical considerations advanced by the GAG in the first part of
the report which deals with technical matters was very persuasive. I recog-
nized I was a layman but these were men of great competence, and the things
that they said were most persuasive to me. They included in their report state-
ments about matters that were not technical but which they asserted were
related to technical considerations, strongly planted, or expressions of that
kind.
Some of these impressed me, one of them particularly, that there was a point
of diminishing returns, that to announce publicly as apparently it was neces-
sary, the building of a weapon of almost unlimited size would be in conflict-
would put us in the eyes of our friends and potential friends in an unfavorable
light without compensating advantages to us, and similar considerations of
that kind.
Some of the members expressed themselves in various ways and which seemed
to me to have some validity. In my first report of views to the President I
laid considerable stress on that. Also on the concern I had then which was
increased a great deal after I served on the committee with the State Depart-
ment and Defense Department to which we were relying almost entirely upon
atomic weapons, upon large weapons.
That brings me then to the final stage in my own participation in this.
On November 19, that is 10 days after this report of the ABC and the views
of its individual Commissioners, the GAC report, and the views of its members,
went to the President, the President created a subcommittee of the National
Security Council to advise him further on this matter. That committee con-
sisted of the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, the Secretary of Defense, Mr.
Johnson, and myself. I would say that I had resigned and my resignation had
been approved by the President early in November to be effective, I think, the
first of December, but he asked me to stay on until this particular chore was
finished.
May I interupt to say that the report of November 9 and the record will show
or the file will show did not contain as of that date I think the views of Mr.
Smyth and Mr. Strauss, except as to their conclusions. They sent their memo-
randa a few days later or some time later, in any case. I consider that the
November 9 report supplemented by these subsequently filed statements as the
views of the ABC.
Returning then to the National Security Council subcommittee, this subcom-
mittee was set up by a letter from the President to the members of the sub-
committee, which is in the file, that I examined yesterday, and therefore is
available to the members of the board. It set up the considerations the Presi-
dent wanted weighed. It began a series of -staff studies and consultations,
recognizing that the issue was not really an AEC issue but a broad issue, as
broad as the powers and the functions of the Chief Magistrate htTngpif
We had meetings of this kind. I met along with Commissioner Smyth, whom
I asked to accompany me, because he was a scientist, and a technical man, as well
as a member of the Commission, and we met with General Bradley and others
of the Military Establishment. I should say that what impressed me most in
this consultation was later set out in the argument I sought to make to the
National Security Council and that was that General Bradley stated rather
flatly that they had no reserve except the A tiomb in the event of aggression
against us any place in the world. Later General Bradley stated this publicly
in a speech in Chicago in November before the Executives Club, I believe. It
was harrowing experience to me to be told this, and it made a great impression
on me in this respect. Right or wrong, this was the reaction I had. We had,
it seemed to me, falsely relied upon the security of simply a stockpile of A bombs,
that we had impoverished our Military Establishment— this was the period of an
economy drive— we were closing military establishments. Instead of drafting
boys, we were reversing the process. We were bringing our national budget
away down. This seemed to me really quite harassing in the light of the fact
that trouble might break out anywhere and as indeed it did break out in June
in Korea at which time, of course, our reliance on the atomic bomb was certainly
not a sufficient one.
From that time on a consideration was immediately given to a broadening
of our Military Establishment, instead of relying entirely on weapons of this
kind, and we moved in the other direction.
I mention tWs because I would like if it meets with the approval of the board
if they were to read— not that they won't have enough to read— but there is
in the file a memorandum of expression of my views to the National Security
405
Council on this point. It is not the wisest expression in the world, but it is cer-
tainly a reflection of the effect upon me of these various discussions within the
Government.
The thing that especially impressed me was that our earlier discussion of
what kind of a program we should have did not have the advantage of knowing
the limitations of the Military Establishment at that time. This has been
photostated and is in the file. It was originally classified by me as top secret.
It has been recently declassified but then reclassified as security information.
I am not just sure what that means. But it is not classified under the Atomic
Energy Act. If it is consistent with the procedures of the board, if portions
of that which represent only expression of my views rather than quotations
from State or Defense Department documents, if that could be read by the
board, or included in the record, I think it would complete the whole picture,
and iny own reaction is to this as a consequence of the considerations begun
September 28.
Mr. BOBB. May I make a statement about that?
Mr. GBAT. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. I believe you now have the original of this?
The WITNESS. Yes, it was transmitted to me by the secretary with Mr. Dean's
approval.
Mr. ROBB. Yes, sir. I have in my hand what I think is a photostat of that;
would you look at it and see if it is?
The WITNESS. Yes, that is a photostat of that document.
Mr. ROBB. I am advised, Mr. Chairman, that this memorandum which as the
witness has stated was originally classified top secret was thereafter changed
in classification on the side of the photostat which I have where there appears
the notation "Classification changed to confidential security information by
authority of Office of Classification by William E. Riley, Chief, Documents
Control Branch, Division of Security, April 1, 1953". Below that are some words
I can't make out.
On the bottom of that appears the notation in longhand signed by R. B. Snapp,
April 20, 1954, "The control records indicate this memo was retained per D. E.
Lilienthal's request by R. B. Snapp under unbroken seal until September 22,
1952, when with D. E. L.'s permission it was transferred to the general files
per Commission direction at meeting April 4, 1953."
I am informed that the photostat which I hold was made at the time the
original was turned over to Mr. Lilienthal for his personal file. Is that right?
The WITNESS. I didn't know that it was.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I am informed that Mr. Nichols, the general manager,
states that this memorandum contains so many references to matters concerning
other agencies than the AEC, that it is impossible to declassify it so that it
can be read in the open record of these proceedings. In other words, it does
contain restricted information. However, I think that Mr. Lilienthal's suggestion
that the board should consider it is sound, and I suggest that it might be in-
cluded in a separate classified record. It occurs to me that since the board
might want to inquire of Mr. Lilienthal about it, that it would not be amiss to read
it in such a record so that Mr. Lilenthal might be asked any questions which
might help the board in connection with this memorandum.
The WITNESS. May I interrupt. You used the term "restricted data." I
believe that is in error. I have a note from Mr. Beckerley which states there is
no restricted data within the meaning of the Atomic Energy Act in the
memorandum.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Lilienthal, I am just repeating what I was told by the General
Manager, by Mr. Mitchell, the General Counsel who took it up with the General
Manager. Would Mr. Mitchell care to correct me on that?
Mr. MITCHELL. You are quite right
(Discussion off the record.)
Dr. BEOKERLEY. The document is classified by virtue of its containing security
information other than restricted data.
Mr. ROBB. I think, Mr. Chairman, that this does contain information that the
board might well wish to have. I think that since it was prepared by Mr.
Lilienthal it would be appropriate that he could be here when the board is
considering it so they might ask any questions that might appear to be relevant.
Mr. SILVBEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I don't know what is in this thing because I
have never seen it. I am really concerned primarily just with the question, of
the extent to which the decision that was ultimately made was one that was based
on GAC advice, and to what extent it was based on other considerations. What
406
you decide to do about this memorandum, since I know nothing about it, I
really have no views about it. I would prefer to finish my direct examination.
If it then seems desirable to the board to read this into the record, there is
nothing I can do about it, because I know nothing about it.
Mr. GBAY. Suppose we proceed with direct examination. I am sure there will
be some questions that you will be asking and perhaps the board members, of
Mr. Lilienthal, and perhaps before we start that, we might take a look at this
and see if we wish to ask him any questions.
Mr. ROBB. That is right. It occurred to me that it would be well to have
it read, so Mr. Lilienthal could hear it, and have it fresh in mind so we might
ask any question against the background of Mr. Lilienthal hearing the memo-
randum and against the background of having ourselves heard it
Mr. GRAY. Will you proceed.
By Mr. SILVEEMAN :
Q. Would it be fair to say that in the decisions that were ultimately made
reliance was placed on the GAG at least by yourself as to technical matters—
Mr. ROBB. I hate to interrupt you, but may I interpose one further remark that
I myself saw this memorandum for the first time I think probably during the
midmorning and I have not yet myself had a chance to read it very carefully.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. You are 8 hours ahead of me.
Mr. ROBB. I have seen enough of it to know that the board ought to have it
before it
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. Would* it be fair to say that your reliance on the GAG was great as to
technical matters and the further away it got from technical matters, the more
your reliance was on other agencies, and, on your own judgment and on other
departments of the Government?
A. During the first phase of my participation in this matter before we had
any important contact with the military or any contact with the State Depart-
ment— obviously that didn't contribute to any views I had — I did have great
respect for the views of the GAG on technical matters. I took very much to
heart their statement that their conclusions were planted in technical consid-
erations. I had such respect for the wisdom of men like Gonant and Gppen-
heimer and Fermi and other men that I certainly paid close attention to what
they said on matters that were not technical. I think the best evidence I came
out with were the things I wrote at the time, some of which they would not
endorse and were not included in their views. It is hard to divide on these
things. I am sure of the importance I assessed to the technical view, and the
rest is another matter that is hard to define.
Q. This memorandum was dated January 31?
A. Yes.
Q. And you resigned February 15?
A. It took
Q. At least your resignation took effect February 15?
A, It was the third stage, that is right
Q. You did not ask to have your clearance continued?
A. No.
Q. So I take it you do not know whether the hydrogen bomb that we hear
about in the newspapers has any relation if any to the things talked about in
1949?
A. No, I have had no access to restricted data since that time, and no occasion
to use it
Q. As a result of your experience with Dr. Oppenheimer and your knowledge
of him, have you formed an opinion as to his loyalty, his integrity, his character,
all the other factors that go into forming a Judgment as to his loyalty, security?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. What is your opinion?
A. I have no shadow of a doubt in my mind that here is a man of good
character, integrity and of loyalty to his country.
Q. How would you assess him as a security risk?
A. I did not regard him up until the time my knowledge of the program ceased,
and had no occasion to regard him as a security risk. ^^
^J^JL^S* yotl already indicated that in March 1947 you consciously assayed
the situation and came to the conclusion that he was not a security risk?
n£ ^ $*£*$ £°* we ?ad ^ file betorft m and that was »* conclusion,
that In the light of the overall picture, taking everything into account, the minus
407
signs were very few Indeed, and the plus signs very great indeed, and I thought
he was a contribution to the security of the country. I have had no occasion
since that time to change that view.
Q. Has your experience with him confirmed that view?
A. My experience from that time did confirm that view. I am sure that it is
clear that he has made great contributions to the security of the country.
Mr. SILVERMAN. I have no further questions.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, it is about a quarter to five. May I ask the pleasure
of the board about proceeding?
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. GRAY. I think we will take a recess for a few minutes and then proceed
with the examination of the- witness.
Mr. ROBB. Yes, sir.
(Brief recess.)
(Classified transcript deleted.)
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Mr. Lilienthal, Dr. Oppenheimer just before his counsel came back in
suggested a question to be asked of you and I believe it was, do you recall a
discussion or a statement by General Bradley before the General Advisory
Committee at the October 29, 1949, meeting, is that right?
Dr. OPPENHEIMER. The only comment that I recall was in response to a
question about the military value of a bomb of virtually 1,000 times Hiroshima
and his response was, as I recall, that it would be principally psychological. I
don't recall how he defined that. That is the only recollection that comes to my
mind of that discussion.
Dr. OPPENHEIMER. May I ask one more question?
Do you recollect his account of our military position as of October 29, 1949?
The WITNESS. No, I recollect that description in a later phase of my activities
in the National Security Council subcommittee, but not at the meeting of
October 29.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Mr. Lilienthal, were the views expressed by you in this memorandum of
January 31, 1950, so far as you knew, in accord with the views of Dr. Oppen-
heimer at that time?
A. No, I don't know to what extent they were in accord. Consultations I had
with Dr. Oppenheimer in the GAG were more or less terminated after the
report. But there are things in this position that do relate to the views of
the GAC, such as the overreliance on large bombs.
Q. Did you discuss your appearance at this meeting with Dr. Oppenheimer
before you went there?
A. No ; I don't recall I did at all.
Q. Did you report to him afterward about it?
A. I will give you the rest of the events in answer to that. After this meeting
referred to we did go to the President. The President made his decision. I
then went back to the Atomic Energy Building where the GAC was in session
and reported the decision. That is the last I have had to do with the subject.
Q. Did you talk to Dr. Oppenheimer personally about this conference that you
had?
A. I don't believe so. I think the GAC or most of the members were in
session. It could be that I did. I do have the recollection of reporting to the
group as a whole. Whether I saw him separately, I am not clear.
Q. Do you have any reason to believe that the views expressed by you in
this memorandum differ from the views held by Dr. Oppenheimer at that time?
A. I haven't any way of really knowing. I can identify some of the views
that grew out of QAC recommendations in which Dr. Oppenheimer either led or
took part. But taking it as a whole I have no way of identifying it in that way.
Q. Did you believe on January 81, 1950, when you addressed your remarks to
this meeting, that the views you were expressing were in accord with the views
previously expressed by the GAC in their report?
A. It seems to me the GAC report, except as to its conclusion, and the views
I expressed in this memorandum and to the National Security Council sub-
committee do not coincide. They are not in conflict in some places, but they
certainly cannot be said to be identical. An examination of the GAC's report
I think will make that clear.
Q. Wherein do they differ?
408
A. I can't answer that without having the report before me, which you can do
as well as I. There are many points in here— for example, the powerless state
of our defense at this time was not included in the GAG report to the hest of
my recollection.
Q. I will reframe my question, then.
Did you believe at the time you addressed these remarks to this meeting that
the views you expressed with respect to the thermonuclear program were in
accord with the views of the GAG?
A. You see, I didn't think the issue was the thermonuclear program.
Q. I am asking you now.
A. I don't quite see how one can answer the question put that way. I didn't
think that was the issue. I hope I have made it plain in this memorandum. I
didn't think that was the central issue. I thought the central issue was getting
busy strengthening the security of this country which was in bad shape.
Q. You mean you were not talking about the thermonuclear program at this
meeting?
A. Of course I was, but I didn't think that was the central question.
Q. Whether it was the central question or not, you talked about it, didn't you?
A. Yes, of course.
Q. Do you have any doubt that what you had to say about the thermonuclear
program was in accord with the views of the GAG?
A. It certainly was in accord with the views as to the result that a crash-
should not be instituted. But the reasons for that and the conditions that I
had suggested grew out of my discussions with the Military Establishment and
with Dr. Smyth.
Q. I understand that The GAO made a report to your Commission setting
forth their views about what should be done with respect to the thermonuclear,
didn't they?
A. Yes.
Q. And you talked about that when you appeared at this meeting on January
31, 1950, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, was what you said at the meeting in any respect different from what
you understood to be the views of the GAG on the thermonuclear program?
A. I have tried to answer that by saying that as to the result
Q. The difficulties
A. It is the reasoning that I adduced was not the reasoning in substantial part
the reasons that are stated in the GAO's report and that is evident by reading it.
Q. Were your conclusions the same?
A. The net result was very close to being the same, namely, that we should
not proceed. But the alternative that I proposed was not the alternative that
the GAG proposed. I mean that is a very important distinction. I want to
be sure it is said that I benefited a good deal in my view from the discussions
and the GAG report, but the net result is quite a different argument.
Q. You have told us you were not in favor of a test program.
A. That is right, until we got ourselves in shape.
Q. Was the GAO?
A. No.
Q. So you were in accord on that.
A. That is right. The thing GAG didn't say, at least as I recall its report,
was to make this point that before we decide this question and commit ourselves
further to overreliance on weapons of this kind, we should make a stern reex-
amination of our position. That they did not say. That is what I have been
trying to say. I think that is an important qualification.
Q. Wasn't the GAG pretty unqualifiedly against developing a thermonuclear
at any time?
A. The best record of that is what they said, and I think the answer to that
is that 6 of them were flatly against it.
Q. Did you take any advice or get any information from the experts of the
GAG as to the feasibility of the thermonuclear?
A. Yes. They did supply us with their conclusion about whether it was
feasible or not.
Q. What was it?
A. That conclusion is written in this report to the President of November 9.
I would not undertake— it is before you. As I recall it says that the chances
of its being feasible are 5<W50, or something of that sort ^^™
Q. Maybe a little bit better than that, doesn't it say that?
409
A. I have forgotten but it is there in the report.
Q. Did you get any opinion as to the possible thermonuclear bomb capability
of the Russians?
A. I didn't understand you. Did I get from where?
Q. Did you get any opinion from the GAC or anybody else as to the possible
thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union?
A. I don't recall, except that the assumption was, without any discussion, that
the Russians were capable. It was only safe to assume that the Russians were
capable of producing a hydrogen bomb.
Q. It was just a question of time, isn't that right?
A. Yes, something of that sort. The only safe assumption was to believe that
in time they could do it.
Q. From whom did you get that information?
A. It was not a matter of information. It was an assumption that was
adopted.
Q. Didn't you check with the scientists? You did not know yourself, did you?
A. No, there were no intelligence reports that I can recall.
Q. Did you talk to any of the experts on the GAC about whether or not the
Russians might produce a thermonuclear?
A. I don't recall anything except that we started from that premise that in
time they could do it.
Q. Who is "we"?
A. Everyone who was discussing the matter, GAC, the ABC and so on. I think
that is what we advised the President. We were all agreed that was probably
the case.
Q. In other words, that was the opinion of the GAC, was it not?
A. Yes, that is right. Opinion is not quite the word because we didn't have any
facts. We just said we have to assume that they are capable of doing it
Q. You were not an expert on such matters.
A. No, I think the term "possible capabilities" was one way of expressing it.
I think we went further than that, and thought it was better to assume that it
was not only possible, but that they could do it
Q. Mr. Lilienthal, the question of whether or not the Russians could make a
thermonuclear is a pretty important factor.
A. Yes. You are using thermonuclear and we were talking about a hydrogen
bomb.
Q. You used the expression thermonuclear in your memorandum of January 31,
1950.
A. Yes, but I think the GAG referred to it as the "Super", which was the
hydrogen bomb.
Q. The question of whether or not the Russians could make the super was a
pretty important factor.
A. It was.
Q. So I assume you get the best opinion you could.
A, It was not a question of fact
Q. It was a question of opinion.
A. That is right.
Q. Whose opinion did you take? •
A. I don't recall but I assume it would be scientists or intelligence officers.
Probably the scientists, probably the GAC.
Q. Probably Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I rather you would not push me after I said I don't remember.
Q. I am sorry I have to push you because I want to get responsive answers.
A. I don't remember, but I am saying that this was the assumption on which
we proceeded.
Q. It would be reasonable that you did consult the men who knew most about
such matters, wouldn't it?
A. 'Yon can say that I have not said it
Q. Wouldn't it ?
Mr. SILVERMAN. Aren't we in argument now?
Mr. ROBB. I think the record is dear.
The WITNESS. Look, we told the President that is the basis on which we were
proceeding.
Mr. ROBB. What I am trying to find out is where you got your information.
I assume you did not get it from me, or Mr. Garrison.
Mr. GABBISON. He said he had no information.
410
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. I am trying to find out why you made the assumption.
A. I agreed with you that probably the opinion came from the GAO, but we
didn't have any information.
Q. Mr. Lilienthal, just so the record will be clear, this memorandum of January
31, 1950, you wrote and put in the AEO files, is that right?
A. That is right
Q. And at that time it was classified as top secret.
A. I classified it, yes.
Q. And then there came a time on April 1, 1953, apparently when that was
classified to confidential security information.
A. Yes.
Q. Did there come a time when you were given the original of that memo-
randum from the AEG files?
A. Yes. I called on the Chairman of the Commission, Gordon Dean, and
consulted with him about this. He asked the classification division and the
Secretary of the Commission to look into the matter, and some weeks later it was
sent to me by the Secretary of the Commission with a letter and a note from
Mr. Beckerley, the head of the classification division.
Q. Do you want to read that in the record? It is up to you if you want to
read it.
Mr. SELVERMAN. Does it advance our inquiry?
Mr. ROBB. I don't think so.
The WITNESS. The only thing that bothers me is whether we have to ask
counsel to leave. In any case, it expresses Mr. Beckerley's view about the
reclassification.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. When did you receive this from the Commission?
A. I don't have Mr. Snapp's letter.
Q. Would it appear on Mr. Berkerley's note?
A. No, this seems to be undated.
Q. About when?
A. I am sorry, it is dated ; October 6, 1953 is his note, and it was probably
mailed to me some time after that. That would be last November.
Q. Why did you want to get this from the Commission?
A. It was a statement of my views and I was quite anxious for my own pro-
tection to have access to a statement that I had written about my own views. It
seemed to me very important, and it is even more important now.
Q. Protection from what?
A. Protection of my record as to what my views were at that time. The
reason being that my views have been extemporized on in the press and else-
where, and I felt much easier having a record of just exactly what it was I said.
Q. I assume you have kept this confidential?
A. Yes, and I have kept it in a safe and so on. I plan to return it to the Com-
mission now that I know you have a photostat.
Q. Beg pardon?
A. I think now that it is in the record and you have a photostat of it, it is
probably just as well for me to return it to the Commission, or put it in a lock
box.
Q. I see. You thought when you got it back that this was the only copy?
A. No. I knew it had been photostated.
Mr. GRAY. Excuse me. I feel it my duty to point out to the witness that he
has made conflicting statements on the question of photostating. I don't care
what your answer is, but earlier you said you had not known it was photostated.
This is in your interest.
The WITNESS. Yes. The facts are these ; that this was put in a sealed en-
velope and filed. Then I inquired of the Secretary of the Commission, what
about that sealed envelope and he told me that it later had been opened and
had been put into the files of the Commission and had been photostated.
Mr. GRAY. I may have misunderstood you. I am sorry. But I believe the
earlier transcript perhaps when we were in executive session will reflect an
observation, maybe casual, that you had not known it had been photostated.
The WITNESS. I thank the Chairman. These are the facts.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Again, in the interest of clarifying the record, didn't you just say that now
that you have learned that the Commission had photostated this document, yon
might as well return the original?
411
Mr. SILVERMAN. Mr. Chairman, does this relevance the Inquiry relating to
Dr. Oppenheimer?
Mr. GRAY. The Chairman will make this observation. He is trying to do his
best to conduct a fair hearing, and when it appears to the Chairman that a
witness through inadvertence or somewhere else is in a position of perjuring
himself, I am going to call it to his attention.
Mr. GARRISON. You are right, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. I am sorry to use the word "perjury," but if at one point of the
testimony a witness says one thing and at another point he says directly contrary,
at one point the testimony is in error. I don't think it advances anything, the
protection of Mr. Lilienthal's appearance as a witness in this case.
Mr. SELVERMAN. I was not referring to your inquiry. I was referring to Mr.
Robb's question, Mr. Robb's question which was not related to that
Mr. ROBB. Will you read the question back, Mr. Reporter?
(Question read by the reporter.)
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. Just a minute. Bid the Chairman hear the question?
Mr. GRAY. The Chair is a little confused. Does the witness object to answering
this question?
Mr. SILVERMAN. Whatever is the easiest and the quickest way to do it.
Mr. GRAY. Let us dear the record.
The WITNESS. I had been told in a conversation with the secretary of the
Commission that he opened the envelope and put this in the file and had photo-
stated it. It was only yesterday that I saw that this was true, that I saw the
photostat in the file that was supplied to me yesterday afternoon in 3Vtr. Snapp's
office. I was then reassured that there was a photostat. I didn't want to leave it
simply on Mr. Snapp's general assertion. I now know that there is such a
photostat, because I have seen it
Mr. ROBB. May I repeat the question. In the interest of clarifying the record,
didn't you say a little while ago that now that you know that there has been a
photostat made, you may as well return the original.
The WITNESS. That is right. I now know because I have seen the photostat.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. You mean you learned for the first time yesterday that there had been a
photostat made?
A. For the first time I saw it, and was sure the information supplied me was
correct
Q. Now, may I, sir, go back to the beginning of your testimony in which you
gave an account of the events which took place in March 1947? I believe you
said that the file was delivered to you on a Saturday, March 8, is that right?
A. That is my recollection, yes.
Q. By messenger?
A. I don't recall It was delivered to the Commission. No, I do recall now.
My recollection is that I had a call from Tom Jones.
Q. Who was he for the record?
A. Tom Jones, who was the acting security officer at that time. My recollec-
tion is that he phoned me— I think this was a Saturday, a Saturday afternoon—
the file Mr. Hoover referred to in his telephone conversation to me had been
received.
Q. And then it was delivered to you?
A. It was delivered to me Monday morning.
Q. Monday morning?
A. That is my recollection. Monday the 10th. It was delivered to the Com-
mission, that is to Mr. Jones or some one on the 8th.
Q. And there was with that, I assume, a covering letter from Mr. Hoover, is
that correct?
A. I assume so.
Q. What you have referred to here as the file was the material you got from
Mr. Hoover, is that right?
A. Yes, that is right
Q. On either March the 8th or March 10th, whichever day you received it?
A. Yes.
Q. That is what you refer to as the file?
A. That is correct
Q. What did that consist of?
A. I can't recall except that was a very substantial file, that it contained the
kind of— a great deal of material from the Manhattan District, Intelligence DM-
412
sion, or whatever it was called, counterintelligence. It was a typical FBI file.
A typical FBI personnel file.
Q. I have before me what you received, Mr. Lilienthal. It appears to be a
12-page summary memorandum on J. Bobert Oppenheimer, and a 15-page sum-
mary memorandum on Frank Oppenheimer. Is that in accord with your recol-
lection of what you received?
A. No, it is not. I am sure you are obviously correct. My recollection was
that we had a big file. I didn't recall that there was a summary from the FBI.
Q. Is it now your testimony that you had received something in addition to
this summary memorandum from the FBI?
A. My recollection is that we did get— this is quite a while ago and I don't
recall the exact form in which it came.
Q. Would you describe these two reports as a file?
A. You mean as distinguished from a report?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. In view of what you have told me, a file or report I should think would be
equally descriptive. What you are suggesting is that this was a summary of the
content of the file, rather than the raw material of the file, and that apparently
is what is the case if that is what you say.
Q. The letter from Mr. Hoover, Mr. Lilienthal, see if this refreshes your recol-
lection, dated March 8, 1947, addressed to you :
"MY DEAR MB. LTT.TRNTHAL : In view of developments to date I thought it best
to call to your attention the attached copies of summaries of information con-
tained in our files relative to Julius Bobert Oppenheimer, who has been ap-
pointed as a member of the General Advisory Committee, and his brother, Frank
Friedman Oppenheimer, who was employed in the Radiation Laboratory at
Berkeley, Calif., until recently. It will be observed that much of the material
here contained in the attached memoranda was obtained from confidential
sources."
Having heard that, do you agree that what you got was the two summaries?
Mr. GAEEISON. Is that the whole letter?
The WITNESS. I don't know the distinction between the summary and the
report. But whatever you have there, if you have it, I received. In order to
refresh my recollection of this hearing, I asked for this file yesterday and was
told it was an FBI file and I could not see it. If I had seen it, my recollection
would have been refreshed.
By Mr. BOBS:
Q. You know, don't you, Mr. Lilienthal, that the rules for security hearings,
which I believe were adopted while you were chairman, provide that the con-
tents of FBI reports may not be disclosed?
A. Yes, but the rules of the Commission, as I understand, permit Commis-
sioners to have access to anything they had access to during the period of their
commissionershlp.
Q. I don't want to debate that with you.
A. I apparently am wrong if that is the regulation now, but that is what I
asked for.
Mr. GAEEISON. Mr. Chairman, since this is now the subject of discussion of
this record, I would like to request that we be furnished a copy of this summary.
Mr. BOBB. No, sir, I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I would have to object to that
I think we are in agreement with what was furnished, Mr. Lilienthal.
The WITNESS. You have it there.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Lilienthal has not received it, and you have told him he
received it, but he doesn't know what it is.
Mr. GBAY. I can't make a ruling about the availability of FBI documents. I
can't rule affirmatively in response to your request As of this minute I will
have to be guided by the security officer and the attorneys in this, Mr. Garrison.
Mr. BOBB. Mr. Chairman, the rules under which these hearings are conducted
provide that reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall not be disclosed
to the individual or to his representatives.
Mr. BOLANDEB. Mr. Chairman, we have a new reporter to spell the other re-
porter. Could he be sworn?
(The reporter, Harold B. Alderson, was thereupon duly sworn by the Chair-
man.)
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Now, after you received this material from Mr. Hoover, on Monday morn-
ing, do I understand your testimony that you presented it to the Commission,
is that right?
413
A. That is my recollection.
Q. And each of them read the material, is that correct?
A. During the course of succeeding hours, or a couple of days, each of them
did read it
Q. Didn't they read it right then?
A. That was my recollection.
Q. That they did?
A. They sat down and began passing it around, and took it to their offices,
and so on.
A. I think some of them stayed, and some of them took it to their offices for
further reading, and so on.
Q. Who was present at that meeting?
A. My recollection is that all of the members of the Commission were there,
and I have something of a recollection that Mr. Jones was there, Tom Jones.
Q. Was Mr. Wilson, the general manager, there?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Was anybody else?
A. I really don't recall, and I know the Commissioners were there. I am quite
sure they were.
Q. After you had digested this material that Mr. Hoover had sent you, did
you form any opinion as to whether or not the information contained in Mr.
Hoover's material was true or false?
A. Well, I don't know how to answer that. The information was like other
information and we had no way of determining whether it was true or false
and we did not see the people and the informants were anonymous and so on,
and so I don't know how to answer that question.
Q. Well, from that point on, did you proceed on the assumption it was true,
or did you proceed on the assumption it was false?
A. Well, I proceeded on the assumption, we proceeded to try to evaluate it,
some of it having a ring of veracity and some of it — for example as I recall
one of the reports, and I think it is in this report, the Informant turned out to be
a nine-year-old boy. If that is true in this case, it may not be, then obviously
you would say, "Well, this probably is not anything to rely on." But in other
cases the report would say that the informant "X" is someone the bureau has
great confidence in, and you would assume that that was true.
Q. Was the nine-year-old boy referred to in the material Mr. Hoover sent you
on March 8?
A. I had an impression, but this may have been some other file and as I
remember that as an illustration of how you have to evaluate these things.
Q. Well, now, having this material before you, I assume that contained cer-
tain allegations against Dr. Oppenheimer, didn't it?
A. It constituted derogatory information about Dr. Oppenheimer, that is right.
Q. And you say you proceeded to evaluate it?
A. We did our best to evaluate it.
Q. What did you do to evaluate it?
A. Well, in general, speaking for myself, I followed this kind of a rule, that
assuming that part of this material that has the ring of veracity to it is to be
true, and discarding that that looks rather unimportant, or perhaps not true,
does this derogatory information balanced against all of the other things one
knows about the man indicate that he is a security risk or he is a man who
would endanger the security of the United States. That is on the whole case.
Q. When did you go through that process?
A. As we were reading the file.
Q. You mean that morning?
A. Well, in the process of considering it, yes.
Q. When did you reach your conclusion on it?
A. I don't recall exactly. It was I think, probably, during the course of that
week, after we talked to Dr. Conant and these other people that knew Dr. Oppen-,
heimer well. There was a consensus that there was no occasion for us to cancel
this clearance by anything that we had seen. I don't think that there was any
question raised by anyone to the contrary, but in any case that was the feeling
that I had.
Q. Didn't you reach that conclusion the same afternoon?
A. That isn't my recollection because we did go to the President or Dr. Bush
and I went to the President the next day, but it could be that.
Q. In the process of reaching that conclusion, sir, did you go back to Mr.
Hoover to ask T>*m for further details about this matter?
414
A. We didn't immediately, no. We recognized the responsibility, and Mr.
Hoover had transmitted the most recent information he had and the respon-
sibility for evaluating and the conclusion was ours, and we did later think that
it would be wise to go and see whether we were misinterpreting some of this,
and that was the purpose of the visit later in March.
Q. But did you communicate with Mr. Hoover and say, "Mr. Hoover, here is
an item here that we wonder about What is your evidence to back this up?"
A. No, I don't think we did.
Q. You didn't do that in respect to any of these items, did you?
A. I don't think that was the practice.
Q. Did you do it?
A. No, I don't think we did.
Q. And I believe you have testified there were some items that you accepted
as true, and some you had doubt about?
A. Yes. I can't remember which was which, but I have the recollection
that some of these things were stronger and more clear than others, but the
whole picture was that of derogatory information about the man's post associa-
tions, and one episode that was worse than that
Q. Which was that?
A. Involving Chevalier.
Q. What do you mean, "worse than that," Mr. Lilienthal?
A. Well, this struck me as being the only thing, the thing in the whole record,
that would give the gravest concern, and for that, and the thing that dismissed
that concern from my mind was the fact that General Groves and Mr. Lansdale,
the security officer, at the time this happened examined this man on the question,
and were apparently satisfied that this was not or did not endanger the national
security, and the evidence to that was they kept him on. I can't add anything
to that. That seemed to me a very conclusive kind of a judgment about whether
he was dangerous or not.
Q. Now, on that same day, this is March 10 again, in the afternoon, you met
and talked to Dr. Bush, didn't you?
A. About what?
Q. Dr. Bush?
A. What is that?
Q. Didn't you meet and talk to Dr. Bush about Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Yes, and Dr. Bush was invited to meet with the Commission, and I don't
know whether it was that day or not, but it was about that time.
Q. And you wanted to get his opinion?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you show him this material from Mr. Hoover?
A. I can't recall.
Q. Then I believe you called in Dr. Conant, didn't you?
A. That is my recollection, yes, sir.
Q. Did you show the material to him?
A. I don't recall, I certainly discussed the context of it, but I doubt whether
he was asked to read the file.
Q. You mean you made Dr. Conant familiar with the material?
A. We tried to communicate to him what the nature of the derogatory infor-
mation was, and I am now, my recollection is not precise about it, but that is
my best recollection. We certainly conveyed to him the problem this report
or file represented.
Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Lilienthal, that that very day, March 10, 1947, after
talking with Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant, that you concluded that there was no
doubt as to Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty?
A. I don't recall whether it was that day, I am satisfied as to what the ulti-
mate conclusion was, but we did not entertain any doubts for any length of
time, and I for one entertained no doubt, speaking for myself, entertained no
.doubts at alL
Q. Now, thereafter, I believe you testified you talked to Mr. Clifford at the
White House about it?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was the purpose of your conference with him?
A. Well, we had in mind that Dr. Oppenheimer was an appointee of the
President, and unlike employees of the Commission he was an appointee of the
President as a member of the General Advisory Committee, and we ought to
make sure the President knew of the existence of this derogatory information,
and so as I recall Dr. Bush and I conveyed this information to Vm. and I
believe it was on the following day.
415
Q. By the way, Dr. Oppenheimer was appointed by the President in February,
wasn't he?
A. I don't recall, I thought it was earlier than that.
Q. At all events, it was prior to the time you receiver! this information from
Mr. Hoover, wasn't it?
A. That is my recollection.
Q. Did you suggest to Mr. Clifford that a special board be convened to review
this material?
A. No, we did not.
Q. Was that ever discussed with Mr. Clifford?
A. No, I believe not.
Q. Are you sure about that?
A. I am not sure, but I have no recollection of it.
Q. Was there any reason that you knew of for the appointment of a board
of any kind to review this material?
A. No. It didn't seem to me and I don't recall it seemed to anyone that there
was that much question about it. The reason for that of course is that this man
subsequent to the time of these events and these associations had done a great
deal for his country and to prove by his conduct that he was a loyal citizen of
the country. He wasn't just an ordinary unknown individual whose achieve-
ments were not well known to us and to the people we consulted.
Q. As to the creation of a board of any sort to evaluate this material, it was
never discussed between you and Mr. Clifford?
A. I don't recall, it could be, but I don't recall that. Mr. Clifford, my im-
pression is Mr. Clifford said he would advise the President, but Mr. Clifford
did not seem to take this seriously, and to the extent of requiring procedure of
that kind, but I could be quite wrong about that.
Q. Now, you were asked by — I forget which one of counsel was pitching at
that time, was it Mr. Silverman, I guess — but you were asked what the Joint
Committee knew about this material, and you said, as I recall, you didn't know
whether they did or not, is that right?
A. I said that at a later date, I am sure they did.
Q. Well, did you advise the Joint Committee of this development?
A. I don't recall, and I just don't have any recollection of that.
Q. Isn't it a fact that you did not?
A. Well, it may be, I just don't recall.
Q. Was there any reason why you shouldn't have?
A. Any reason why we should or should not have?
Q. Should not have?
A. Wel^ if we had had doubts about our responsibility in the matter, I am
sure we would have done so, but we didn't.
Q. Did you discuss the question of whether or not you should advise the Joint
Committee?
A. I don't recall, and we couldn't have submitted a file to them in any case,
because at that time the President's regulations forbade it, and later on when
the President's regulations were amended this file was available to them,
Q. Now, I believe you were asked whether or not the FBI statement that you
•received from Mr. Hoover contained all of the information about Dr. Oppen-
heimer, is that correct?
A. I am sorry, I didn't understand you.
Q. I will strike that question, it isn't very clear. I believe you were asked
whether or not on March 8 or 10, whichever it was, you had the complete story
or file from Mr. Hoover, and you said you did, is that right?
Mr. SiLVBOEtMAff. Is that a question or an answer?
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. Did you receive any further information from Mr. Hoover after you
received the first information on March 8 or 10?
A. My recollection is that we didn't, but I wouldn't be positive about it My
recollection is that this was the whole of the Information, whatever it was, the
file or report, it was delivered, and it is my recollection that that was the sum
total of what was delivered to us.
Q. Did you discuss this matter with counsel at the time, to get their opinion
on it?
A. I don't recall It sounds reasonable one should, but at a later date we
certainly discussed it with Mr. Volpe, because Mr. Volpe accompanied me on the
visit to Mr. Hoover.
8088318 ffi 27
416
Q. Who was Mr. Volpe?
A. At that time he was deputy general counsel.
Q. Who was the general counsel?
A. He was Mr. Herbert Marks.
Q. Who is here?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you go over it with Mr. Marks?
A. Well, I don't recall. I am sure we went over it with Mr. Jones, he was
present as the security officer and whether we went over it with counsel, except
this occasion of this visit to Mr. Hoover, I just don't remember. I think that
I might say at this point, the Senate Committee on Atomic Energy was holding
hearings on the confirmation of the Commission, and we were spending for 13
straight weeks most of my time up there, so that my recollection of the operations
of the Commission are not as clear as they might be.
Mr. GRAY. Let me ask a question on this point, Mr. Robb. Mr. Lilienthal, this
was important enough to go and talk with Clark Clifford at the White House
about, and was important enough for you to go back and talk with Mr. Hoover
about it, and are you sure you didn't discuss it with the deputy counsel of the
Commission?
The WITNESS. I would think that, I assumed I did.
Mr. GRAY. Wouldn't it be unreasonable to think that you had not discussed it
with counsel if you went to the White House, and to the Department of Justice
with it?
The Wrnrass. I really
Mr. GRAY. I am not asking you to recall something you can't recall. Well, I
am sorry, if you can't recall
The WITNESS. It depends, Mr. Chairman, on the functions of the general
counsel's office at that time, in relation to security matters. If they had
functions in that field
Mr. GRAY. Do you recall whether they did or not?
The WITNESS. My recollection is that those functions were confined to legal
questions rather than questions of evaluating the file. The security offce had
the responsibility for assisting the Commission in a staff sense on evaluation of
files. I think that that was the practice from then continuously, actually.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Now, the Atomic Energy Act required an FBI investigation of all personnel,
does it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you have the FBI investigation which had been made pursuant to the
act at the time you made this decision in March?
A. I can only tell you what my impression Is. The Atomic Energy Act required
a reexamination by the FBI and the bringing up to date of those people who had
had clearance under the Manhattan District Dr. Oppenheimer of course did
have such, and I have been assuming what I have been saying here in my recol-
lection is that this was that reexamfitation, his clearance up to this point having
been a Manhattan District clearance, and I could be wrong about that
Q. I believe you testified in response to a question by Mr. Silverman, that yon •
had read the letter of General Nichols to Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. To General Groves.
Mr. ROBB. This Is the difficulty of switching witnesses back and forth, and you
get confused.
Mr. SILVERMAN. The witness has only been here during his testimony.
Mr. ROBB. I understand, but I have been here through them all, and I am get-
ting confused.
Mr. SILVERMAN. You are not confused. General Nichols is the one,
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Have you read the letter from Mr. Nichols to Dr. Qppenheimer?
A. Yes, I have. *-*-—
Q. Do you recall in there the statement that Dr. Qppenlieimer had contributed
$150 a month to the Communist Party up to about April of 1942?
A. No, I don't recall that
Q. Well, do you recall whether or not you had any such allegation as that
before you in March of 1047?
A. Oh, no, I couldn't remember as fine a point as that, no, I don't recall It
not * Mar<* o£ 1947 y<m *•* at *
417
A. I know that we were supposed to have them, because the President's order,
I believe, directed their transfer, and the President's order of December 31, 1946.
It transferred the properties and so on of the Manhattan District to the AEC,
and that presumably included the files of the Manhattan District.
Q. Just so we can be clear about that, I have before me a memorandum dated
March 12, 1947, Memorandum to the File, signed by Bernard W. Menke, staff
security officer. Do you remember him?
A. I don't
Q. It refers to the FBI files, and I think under the rules I am not permitted
to read it, but I will read the part pertinent to this particular point.
"The complete Manhattan Engineering District files concerning J. B. Oppen-
heimer were sent to the FBI about July or August of 1946, at the time he left
employment controlled by the Manhattan Engineering District. This action was
apparently in accordance with some agreement, the parties to which are said to
have been General Groves, J. E. Hoover, and the Attorney General; under which
agreement the FBI, upon assuming exclusive investigative jurisdiction of a
person who departed from project work, received the full Manhattan Engineer-
ing District investigative file pertaining to that person. For this reason the
pertinent files are not available for reference in analyzing the instant summaries,"
From that you conclude, wouldn't you, that the old Manhattan Engineering
District files were not in your shop, so to speak?
A. No, apparently they had been transferred to the FBI
Mr. GRAY. Do you think you ever saw the Manhattan District files, Mr.
Lilienthal?
The WITNESS. I am beginning to doubt it, and if I had looked at this file before
I came to testify, I would be a little clearer.
Mr. GRAY. I don't think that there is anything here that indicates whether
you did or not see the Manhattan District file.
Mr. ROBB. I don't want to trap the witness, I am sure he didn't, because they
were not there.
Mr. GRAY. I believe in your testimony in response to questions from Mr. Silver-
man this morning, you did refer to the Manhattan District files. Is it possible
that you could have seen them at some other time, or some other channel?
The WITNESS. I don't think so. I was referring to this report as counsel
denominated it, as containing a summary as he points out of what all the Man-
hattan District files contain.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Now, was Mr. Carroll Wilson present at the meetings which were held
concerning this matter?
A. I don't recall. My recollection is that these were executive meetings and
those Mr. Wilson would not attend, but he might have attended. I don't really
recalL
Q. I have before me, taken from the files, the original of the memorandum
from Carroll I/. Wilson, general manager, to the file, and I will read it to you.
"United States Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C."
Mr. GABBISON. Shouldn't the reporter note the withdrawal of Dr. Evans?
Mr. ROBB. He is back here, so it is academic.
"United States Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, 25, D. 0. Memoran-
dum to the File: Carroll L. Wilson, general manager, Subject: J. Robert Op-
penheimer." There is a longhand note, "March 10, 1947, copy 1 and 2, Series 'B',
typed Security Ofilce, D. Dean."
"March 10, 1947: Summaries of information received on March 8 from the
FBI regarding J. Robert Oppenheimer and his brother Frank F. Oppenheimer,
were considered by the Commissioners in closed session this morning. This file
was accompanied by a letter dated March 8 from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover and the
file was delivered to Mr. Jones by the FBI on Saturday morning, March 8.
"The letter from Mr. Hoover transmitted a copy of what was described as a
summary of the FBI files concerning J. Robert Oppenheimer and his brother,
Frank IP. Oppenheimec. The summary consisted of material usually referred
to as derogatory.
"The Commission met in closed session and each of the Commissioners read
the rather voluminous summary and noted from the incompleteness of the ac-
count as contained in the summary that either it did not reflect the results of
a full investigation or did not contain all information bearing on the matter.
The Commission also noted that the evidence summarized which, as stated in
Mr. Hoover's letter, came from confidential sources, could seriously impeach
Dr. Oppenheimer and that as a consequence this matter was one in which not only
418
the Commission but also Dr. Bush as chairman of the Joint Research and De-
velopment Board and Dr. Conant as chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee
of the JRDB were also concerned. Furthermore, in view of the role of both
Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant in connection with the Manhattan project during the
war, and their association with Dr. Oppenheimer while he was director of the
Los Alamos Laboratory of the Manhattan project, it was felt that they should
be consulted promptly. Dr. Bush was reached by telephone and it was arranged
that he meet the Commission at -3 :15 p. m.
At 3 :15 p. m. the Commissioners met and were joined by Dr. Bush. The de-
livery of this file and the fact that it contained derogatory information were
reported to Dr, Bush although he was not shown the file. Dr. Bush stated that
he was not familiar with Dr. Oppenheimer's background prior to his joining the
Manhattan project in 1942, but that he had concurred in the choice of Dr. Op-
penheimer by General Groves for the important post of the Los Alamos Bomb
Laboratory and that he felt that Dr. Oppenheimer's exceptional performance
as director of that laboratory and subsequently in other roles advising the
Government on* the subject of atomic energy had clearly demonstrated his loy-
alty as a citizen of the United States and his integrity.
"Inasmuch as Dr. Conant had been closely associated with Dr. Oppenheimer
in connection with the Manhattan project, he was invited to sit with the Com-
mission and Dr. Bush for discussion of this matter and he joined the meeting
at about 3 :45. Dr. Conant stated that his association with Dr. Oppenheimer
dated from the beginning of Dr. Oppenheimer's connection with the Manhattan
project and that he was not familiar with the contents of any investigative files
concerning Dr. Oppenheimer's background. He stated that General Groves had
taken full responsibility for selection of Dr. Oppenheimer to head the Los Alamos
Laboratory and that it was certainly a matter of public knowledge that this lab-
oratory under Dr. Oppenheimer's brilliant and driving leadership had made an
enormous contribution to the war effort
"Inasmuch as General Groves had made the original selection of Dr. Oppen-
heimer, the chairman attempted to reach him by telephone but was advised that
he was en route by automobile from Florida to Washington and could not be
reached.
"Drs. Bush and Conant shared the views of the Commission that the record of
Dr. Oppenheimer's contributions to the country in this field during the last 4
or 5 years have been so outstanding that it could leave no doubt as to his loyalty.
It was further stated that, in view of Dr. Oppenheimer's unique position as an
authority in this field, if anything were permitted to occur which might
cause him to be lost to the Government in connection with atomic energy, 'it
would be a very serious blow to our progress in this field and would have very
serious consequences in the attitude of his fellow scientists towards this project
Even if no precipitous action were taken which would affect Dr. Oppenheimer's
continuance in his present efforts with respect to this project, any public disclo-
sure, either of the information contained in files or of the fact that such infor-
mation exists which is the subject of serious concern as to Dr. Oppenheimer's
qualifications, the consequences upon the leading scientists engaged in the project
would still be serious.
"In view of the interest of the War Department and the role of the War De-
partment in bringing Dr. Oppenheimer originally into this project, Drs. Conant
and Bush arranged to see Secretary Patterson later in the afternoon. They did
see him and he promptly agreed to contact General Groves.
"March 11, 1947: The Commission met this morning for further considera-
tion of the matters discussed yesterday in connection with Dr. Oppenheimer.
The Commission concluded tentatively (1) that on the basis of the
Mr. GASRISON. What is that?
Mr. ROBB (reading), "The Commission concluded tentatively, (1) that on the
basis of the information supplied by Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant concerning Dr.
Oppenheimer's outstanding contributions in this project and his consistent con-
cern for the security of this country in connection with his services as a member
of the JRDB Committee on Atomic Energy and as an adviser to the Department
of State, Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty was prima facie clear despite material con-
tained In the FBI summary ; (2) that as a result of his work for the Government
during the last 4 years he is now 1 of the best, if not the best-informed scientist
in regard to 'restricted data* concerning atomic energy; (3) that while under
these circumstances the questions raised by the summary did not create an issue
or any immediate hazard, it was essential to undertake promptly a full and reli-
able evaluation of the case so that it could be promptly disposed of in one way
or another.
419
"As a first step, it was decided to secure as promptly as possible written
expression of views from Dr. Bush, Dr. Conant, and General Groves as to Dr.
Oppenheimer's loyalty. As a second step, it was decided that the chairman
should confer with Dr. Bush and Mr. Clifford of the White House concerning
the establishment of an evaluation board of distinguished jurists to make a
thorough review and evaluation of the case. Inasmuch as Dr. Oppenheimer is
a Presidential appointee to the General Advisory Committee to the Commission,
the case is one in which the White House has a definite interest. In addition,
the matter is of interest to the Department of State inasmuch as Dr. Oppen-
heimer has served as an adviser to the Department of State on many phases of
atomic energy, including serving as a member the Board of Consultants to the
Department of State in the preparation of a plan for the international control
of atomic energy, and subsequently as an adviser to Mr. Baruch and more
recently as adviser to Mr. Frederick Osborne.
"At 3 p. m. today Dr. Bush and the chairman"— that was you, wasn't it?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. ROBB (reading). "Dr. Bush and the chairman met with Mr. Clifford and
advised him of the circumstances in connection with this case and discussed
with him the desirability of having a review of this case by a board of dis-
tinguished jurists or other citizens. The chairman proposed that there be
considered for membership on this board judges of the Supreme Court Mr.
Clifford stated that he was decidedly opposed to any move which would draw
members of the court into outside activities and felt that this case did not
warrant an exception to that policy. This policy would not preclude selection
of other jurists for temporary service on such an evaluation board if it were
deemed desirable that such a board be established. Mr. Clifford stated that he
would discuss the matter with the President and communicate with the chair-
man and Dr. Buslron Wednesday.
"The results of the discussion with Mr. Clifford were reported to the Com-
mission at a meeting at 5 p. m. this afternoon. At that meeting the general
manager reported that a detailed analysis of the FBI summary was in process
of preparation by the Commission's security staff as an aid to evaluation."
Have you any comment on that, Mr. Lilienthal?
The WITNESS. No. I haven't. It is quite evident that Mr. Clifford in the end
did not favor the idea of such a board, or perhaps we changed our minds, but
1 had forgotten that recommendation.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. You had forgotten that?
A. Yes. I think the thing that this does confirm is that the initial reaction
of the Commissioners was as stated, on the whole case, in view of the record
of service to his country, this did not raise questions in our minds but was a
case or matter that should be very carefully dealt with, and dealt with very
carefully in the evaluation process.
Q. But you would agree, would you not, sir, that in 1947 you and the Com-
mission seriously considered, and in fact were of the view that a board should
be impaneled to consider this matter?
A. It is quite evident from this memorandum that this was considered.
Q. And you thought enough of it to go to Mr. Clifford at the White House
and so recommend?
A. That is right
Q. In other words, you recommended in 1947 that the exact step which is now
being taken, be taken then?
AT We suggested it, and I think perhaps that is the import of the memorandum
as I recall, we suggested this to the White House.
Q. That step did not strike you as fantastic or unreasonable, did it?
Q. Now, did you talk with Mr. Clifford again about that matter of the board?
A! I don't recall, and I really dont
Q I will show you the original of a memorandum, on March 12, 1947, 11: 25
a. m., report of telephone conversation, at 11 : 20 with Clark M. Qfflord, Special
Counsel for the President -That is dated March 12, and it has "DEL" on the
bottom. Did you write that, Mr. Lilienthal?
(Whereupon, the document was handed to the witness.)
Mr. <JABBISON. Did you say, "Did he write it?"
Mr. ROBB. Did he dictate it?
Mr. GABBISON. This is a record that he purportedly made?
420
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Your answer is that you did dictate it?
A. Yes, it would appear that I didi, and may I read it?
Q. I am about to read it to you.
A. All right
Mr. ROBB. I will ask Mr. Rolander to read it
Mr. ROLANDER (reading). "March 12, 1947, 11: 25 a. m. Report of telephone
conversation at 11: 20 with Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel to the President:
I put in the call to Clifford. I told him that f ollowing the conference yesterday
afternoon with him, Dr. Bush and myself concerning an FBI report on a mem-
ber of the General Advisory Committee, it was Dr. Bush's and my understand-
ing that the status of the matter was as follows :
"That having presented the matter to the President by the method of pre-
senting it to Mr. Clifford, Mr. Clifford would lay the matter before the President
and advise us whether we should proceed to submit this matter to a board of
review of Judges or other outstanding citizens outside the Government, or what
course should be followed.
"I said that until we heard from him it was Dr. Bush's and my understand-
ing that the record would be supplemented by statements from Dr. Bush, Dr.
Conant, etc., and an analysis of the report made within the Commission, but
that no steps would be taken with respect to a board of review in this case.
Hie said that Dr. Bush's and my understanding in this respect was correct.
He said that after our conference he had briefly discussed the matter with
the President ; that it was a matter the President would want to thinir over ;
that it was presented at a time when the President (here I am relying on my
shorthand notes, taken during the conversation) was exceedingly busy on an
all-important matter, * * * Clifford said he, the President, will want to think
it over some; that the next few days the President will be away from Wash-
ington. He will have time to think it over and determine if the board of review
idea is the proper way to go about it.
"I told Mr. Clifford that we had not reported the receipt of this report on a
Presidential nominee to the Joint Committee or to its chairman ; I asked if he
had any comment on that. 'You have put it up to the President through me
and are awaiting his reaction after he has had time to give it some thought
Sou have done the 2 things that are right to do : (1) The Commission has made
an immediate check with the 3 individuals who know most about the situation —
Dr. Bush, Dr. Conant, and General Groves, and (2) you have presented the
matter over here. So far as I know that is all that you are under any reasonable
obligation to do." He said that we should therefore let the matter stand until
we hear from him. He said that if I had not heard from him by the time the
President returns to Washington, I should call and remind hi™ about it. He
said that if absolutely essential he could interrupt the President and get some
decision about the board of review at any time but that he didn't want to do so
unless it was absolutely urgent.
"I said that the man in question had been awarded a Medal of Merit, the
highest civilian award, for his war work ; it was my impression that these awards
were made by the President on the basis of recommendation by a distinguished
reviewing board. He said that the board initiated the recommendations and
reviewed them and then the President acted upon them. He said further that
he would supply a copy of this recommendation which could be made a part of
the record in this matter."
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Now, Mr. Lilienthal, this was a matter of grave import to you, wasn't it?
A. Yes it was an important matter, one of many important matters, that is
right.
Q. It was of sufficient importance, -and Important to you, that you took short-
hand notes on this conversation, and then dictated a memorandum about it,
is that right?
A. That is right.
Q. But it is now your testimony that you had completely forgotten any dis-
cussion with Mr. Clifford about a board of review?
A. It is.
Q. And you had completely forgotten that you even considered such a board?
A. Itis. I must say it Just entirely escaped my mind.
Mr. GABBISOK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that it seems to me
that the practice that is adopted here of asking, this was the same case with
Dr. Oppenheimer on his cross-examination, the Government in possession of
421
documents taken from here and there, including from their own files, in Dr.
Oppenheimer's case in Princeton, and knowing that they had, first asking them
to testify about something quite a while ago, without warning and without read-
ing the documents, and presenting them and saying, "Tell us what happened,"
and it seems to me that this is designed to try to make the witness look to the
board in as unfavorable a light as possible, and to make what is a lapse of
memory seem like a deliberate falsification. I regret that this kind of procedure
which is quite suitable in criminal prosecution and a court of law, when that
attempt is being made before a jury, I am sorry that it has to be made here.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, may I reply to that, as I take it to be some reflection
upon my professional integrity and my professional methods. Let me say
Mr. GARRISON. I have not questioned your integrity.
Mr. ROBB. I have no apology to make for the methods I am pursuing in the
cross-examination of these witnesses. It is an axiom that the greatest invention
known to man for the discovery of truth is cross examination, and I am pursuing
what Mr. Garrison should know are orthodox, entirely proper and entirely
legitimate methods of cross-examination. I make no apology to Mr. Garrison
or anyone else for the method I am pursuing, and I submit that I have been
entirely fair.
I asked the witness and I have taken him over these matters which I submit
are matters which, well, I won't make an argument on that point, and he has
said he did not remember them, and now I have read him these papers, and he
says that he forgot them.
The WITNESS. Mr. Chairman, may I make this comment, that in the great
multiplicity of things that went on at that time, it is not at all impossible that I
should not remember even as important a matter as this, but a simple way to
secure the truth and accuracy would have been to have given me these files
yesterday, when I asked for them, so that when I came here, I could be the
best possible witness and disclose as accurately as possible what went on at
that time. I am a little confused about the technique. The board wants the
facts, and the facts are in the file, and I asked for the file so I could be a better
witness, and it was denied me. So I just have to rely on memory during a very
troubled and difficult time on matters that are obviously important, but they
are not as important as many other things we were concerned with at that time.
It would help me a good deal, and I could be a much better witness if I saw
the files that I helped to contribute to make.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Garrison would agree that it is an entirely
fair comment to make that it is demonstrated that the memory of the witness
was not infallible.
The WITNESS. I would be the first to insist on that.
Mr. ROBB. Since we are depending largely on memory, I think it is a fair test.
Mr. SILVEEMAN. Why, when we have documents.
Mr. GARRISON. I thought the notion of an inquiry and not trial was to get at
the truth by the shortest possible route, and it seems to me the attempt to make
a witness seem to be not telling the truth, or his memory is not to be relied on
by this board, by the surprise production of documents, is not the shortest way
to arrive at the truth. It seems to me more like a criminal trial than it does like
an inquiry and I Just regret it has to be done here.
Mr. GBAT. Well, the board certainly will take cognizance of the comments of
counsel in respect to this matter, and I think that if counsel is not permitted to
engage in cross examination and simply relies on notes the witnesses may take
from documents in a file, there may be some difficulty in arriving at some evalua-
tions, and now on this particular point, it seems to me pertinent at least against
general and public discussions, with which counsel cannot be unaware, including
the New York Times story, the information for which was furnished by counsel,
it is repeatedly and publicly stated that the Commission and others cleared Dr.
Oppenheimer at the time that these were old charges rehashed, and completely
considered and evaluated at the time. It does seem important to me, at least
as chairman of this board, to find out exactly what did take place at that time.
Mr. GARRISON. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, in full. I want nothing but
the truth brought out here. And all of the truth about all of the things, and I
want complete cross examination, and I raise only the question of surprising
the witnesses with documents they themselves prepared which are in the file and
which the Government has, and it seems to me a shorter way of arriving at the
truth and a fairer way where a witness has prepared a document which the
Government has in its possession is to ask him if he prepared that document,
and to read it Into the record, rather than confuse him first by asking him about
422
things that he doesn't remember. That is the only point I make, and that limited
point, and I wish in no way to confine this inquiry. But it is an important point
though limited.
Mr. ROBB. May I proceed? I have two more questions.
Mr. GBAT. Ton are not going to confront the witness with any more documents?
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Was any board ever convened?
A. No, I am sure of that.
Q. Did you hear any more from Mr. Clifford about it?
A. I don't recall. We certainly didn't have a recommendation from him that
a board be convened or such a board would have been convened.
Q. Now, you testified, I believe, that I think in 1940 you were working on an
A bomb of vastly increased power, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. About 500,000 tons of TNT, is that right?
A. My recolection which I think is correct is that this was in the order of 20
to 25 times the Hiroshima which would work out to four or five hundred
thousand.
Q. One of those bombs— pardon me.
A. You used the words '"working on1' and what I think I said was a program
approved and being accelerated to that end, and I had assumed that the fission
bomb referred to by the President on December 8 was presumably that bomb.
Q. And one of those bombs would take out a small city and two would take out
a big one, was that right?
A. My recollection of the estimates that were made at that tune to us by
technical people, Dr. Bradbury, and so on, was that one such bomb would take out
all targets in the United States except perhaps a two to five— most of the large
cities of the United States, and two would take out any large city.
Q. Was there any reluctance or any hanging back on the part of scientists to
work on that bomb because of what we call moral grounds?
A. No.
Mr. ROBB. That is all.
The WITNESS. I wanted to ask a question about this document.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Which one, sir?
A. The document that I wrote, not that one, but the one that was referred to or
read into the record in the closed session. In that regard there is the dispo-
sition. I suggested, and I don't know whether this is in the record or not, but I
would like to get it clear that I suggested that it would be easier for me and more
convenient for me if this stayed in the Commission's files, and so I won't have
the responsibility of its protection, which is a fairly complicated business. Al-
though I have very great question in view of what Mr. Beckerley said about the
confidential nature of it, I don't want to take any chances on it. I haven't shown
this to anyone, but I have relied on its contents and an article appeared in the
October 4 issue of the New York Times, and I want to be sure that this is not
a surprise to the board. In the course of that article, I did not quote from this, I
recited the kind of arguments that were made at the time, but I did not disclose
any of the confidential information, I am confident But I would prefer to have
the document here, and I would like to renew my request, the request I made
to Mr. Snapp, that an effort be made to separate out these things which are
clearly not confidential at all and simple expressions of my views, and- those
things which they regard as possibly confidential, because they had not consulted
the State Department or the Department of Defense.
Then I would just like to leave this here, and not have the responsibility
of it.
Mr. GRAY. I have no objection to your recital. Actually I would suggest that
this is a matter between you and the Atomic Energy Commission, or at least the
security people in the Government, and not with the board as to what disposition
Is made of the original document. So I think whatever requests you make, don't
rely on this board to see that they are carried out with respect to the treatment
of the document.
I should also say, Mr. Lilienthal, that I for one did not know of the existence
of this document until we started our discussion of It, whenever it was today
Mr. GABBISON. May I say the same for counsel on this side.
Mr ROBB. I didn't either. The first I heard of the document was this
morning.
423
The WITNESS. There is one point, and the reason I mentioned it, is because
I did not want any question about the fact that I have relied upon the substance
of the statement of my view in this piece and relied upon the expression of
those views as reflected in this document. For an effort to state clearly in a
public article in the New York Times, what my position was at that time, and
the reason being that that position was, I thought, being unfairly presented,
and I just want to be clear as far as the board is concerned that that is no
failure to disclose that at the time I turned this back.
Mr. GRAY. I am sorry to have to address another couple of questions to you.
I apologize to everybody including my colleagues on the board and counsel. I
am still confused about the instructions to the General Advisory Committee
for the October 29, 1949, meeting. This, I think, is pertinent to the inquiry
because Dr. Oppenheimer, in his reply, says that the Atomic Energy Commission
called a special session of GAC, and asked to consider and advise on two related
questions.
First, it was whether, in view of the Soviet success, the Commission's progress
was adequate. Now, that is covered, I believe, in the letter which was read
into the record which you wrote the General Advisory Committee. Am I correct
in that?
Mr. ROBB. I think so.
Mr. GRAY. I am not trying to trap you.
The WITNESS. I must say that I am getting a little— that is my recollection
of it ; it was a short letter.
Mr. GRAY. And, if not, in which way it should be altered or increased, and
I think that that was correct; and, second, and now I am reading from Dr.
Qppenheimer's reply, whether a "crash" program for the development of the
super should be a part of any new program.
Now, in your letter which was read into the record, and in my recollection
of the letter signed by Mr. Pike, as Acting Chairman, I haven't yet found
any reference to this specific question as to whether a crash program in relation
to the super was put to the Commission.
Now, it is entirely possible.
The WITNESS. Was put to the GAC?
Mr. GRAY. I am sorry, was put to the GAC, and it may be fruitless to pursue
this at this point, and I would like somehow to be informed as to how that
second question actually was put to the GAG. It is Dr. Oppenheimer's recollec-
tion clearly that they were asked, or I believe he so testified, and he put it in
his letter, and I am not suggesting that they were not asked, but I am trying
to find out how they were asked. If you do not have any recollection, I do not
want to pursue it further with you now.
The WITNESS. I am sure it was presented to the GAC, but I must say I cannot
say exactly in what form.
Mr. GRAY. In security problems, generally, Mr. Lilienthal, was Mr. Tolpe a
person whom you frequently consulted? He accompanied you, I believe, to Mr.
Hoover's office in connection with this matter. Did you frequently consult him
generally and was he your security sort of person?
The WITNESS. He was consulted because legal questions frequently arose, and
he probably, and I can't recall precisely, he may well have been consulted on the
general questions of policy. This is just too vague in my recollection to know
just how that division of responsibility was made.
Mr. GRAY. I have one further question.
The WITNESS. I think perhaps if it is Important I could dig into the files
and try to illuminate that, but I haven't any recollection.
Mr. GRAY. I have one farther question, which relates to your feeling in early
1950 that it would be unwise to proceed with a program which would lead to a
test of the super ; is that stated correctly?
The WITNESS. Yes ; I stated it more extensively than that, but I thought
something ought to be done beforehand.
Mr. GRAY. I am about to come to that ; until there had been a rigorous reex-
amination of military plans and policies, were these things in your judgment
mutually exclusive. In other words, could not the reexamination have gone
forward simultaneously .with steps which might determine the feasibility of
the super?
The WITNESS. In this memorandum and in my statement to the National
Security Council, I tried to indicate why I felt that they could not.
Mr. GRAY. That they could not?
The WITNESS. That going ahead with this program would prejudice that
reexaroination, and I could well have been wrong about it, but that was the
424
view I had and that is what I said. In fact, no reexamination was made, but
in any case my concern was that once that decision was made the reexamination
wouldn't take place. Whether I was right or not, it was the view I had.
Mr. G»AY. I didn't understand that. Did it occur to you that, as it did to
some people who were active and informed in this program, proceeding with
further development might prove that the super was infeasible, or was not
feasible, or did you assume that if we really went ahead with it we could do
something about it?
The WITNESS. Well, I was as much concerned as anything with the effect of
an announcement that we were going in to an all-out program of that kind,
that that would prejudice the reexamination, and whether it came out that we
could make it or couldn't, that that would confirm the course we then pursued
or reliance, not upon really taxing ourselves, and really going to town with an
important military program, but going off on this same course again.
Mr. GRAY. That suggests that if you had to make a guess as to the feasibility
you would have guessed it was feasible.
The WITNESS. I think that I can't improve on the way in which we prevented
our conclusion on this to the President, that we were assuming that it could
be done.
Mr. GRAY. That answers my question.
Mr. SELVEBMAN. I have no questions, except for one I would like to ask
Mr. Robb.
Do we now have all of the documents on this clearance thing in 1947, or are
there later documents?
Mr. ROBB. There is one thing in the file, and do you want me to read it now,
iflcanfindit?
Mr. SILVERMAW. We might just as well have it complete.
Mr. GRAY. Is this something that needs to be read at this time?
Mr. ROBB. I can read it the first thing in the morning.
Mr. GBAY. Is it something that must be read in Mr. Lilienthal's presence?
Mr. ROBB. It may be. It is dated July 18, and I don't know whether it had to
do with this or not I will read it if you want me to right now.
"Confidential.
"Office Memorandum, United States Government
"To:G. Lyle Billsley.
"Prom : T. L. Jones.
"Subject: J. Robert Oppenheimer.
"Date: July 18, 1947.
"Herewith a complete investigative file on J. Robert Oppenheimer, upon whom
it is believed the Commission may not have formalized their decision. If the
Commission meeting minutes contain indication of Commission action, would
you kindly so advise? If they do not, I presume that you will wish to docket
this case for early consideration. Each Commissioner and the General Manager
have seen every report in this file with the exception of a summary of July 17,
and my memorandum for the file dated July 14, 1947."
In longhand there is "Joe Volpe: Time flies. Will you please go to work
on this?"
(Signed) "G. L. B."
Then also in longhand, "August 2d. Ret to Mr, Billsley by hand." Under-
scored twice. "Lyle : I looked over this file after you left it with me last night
My impression is that the Commission saw no need for formal action following
the meeting they had with Mr. Hoover referred to in Lilienthal's letter of
April 3 to the FBI Director. I assume that the information which has come in
since that time has been circulated among the (over) Commissioners for their
information. If Tom thinks the summary of July 17 and his file memorandum of
July 14 should be circulated, that should be done. In addition, I think that
you should check my impression of the status of this case with the Commission
itself, J.V.Jr."
425
And the next thing is on August 11, which I believe we had, but just so that
it will be all complete, I will read it :
"Office Memorandum.
"Date: August 11, 1947.
"From : T. L. Jones" Initials "TLJ."
"To: William Unna.
"Subject : J. Robert Oppenheimer.
"Authorization for granting final Q type security clearance to the subject Is
contained in minutes of the meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission at 10: 30
a. m., Wednesday, August 6, 1947. It is reflected in the minutes that this clear-
ance was granted during February 1947, but was reaffirmed because previous min-
utes failed to reflect the action. In addition, as you know, Dr. Oppenheimer was
previously cleared by the Manhattan District. Would you please make the
appropriate entry in your records."
Now, is that all there is?
Mr. SELVERMAN. What about the memorandum of July 14?
Mr. ROBB. That is the summary of an FBI file which I don't think I can read.
That is July 17.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Arid July 14, also.
Mr. ROBB. July 14:
"To File
"From : T. L. Jones." (Signed) 'TLJ'.
"Date: July 14f 1947.
"Subject : J. Robert Oppenheimer and Philip Morrison.
"July 10, 1947, in the course of a conversation with John Lansdale, Jr., former
chief of intelligence and security for Maj. Gen. Ralph R. Groves, you mentioned
the two subject cases with both of which he had contact during the war. In both
cases, in fact, Lansdale himself interviewed the men at some length. I did not
ask Mr. Lansdale for an official opinion on either case, and no doubt before
giving one should this ever be considered desirable, he would wish an opportunity
to review the cases and apprise himself of recent developments. However, his
rather casual comments seemed of interest and worth preserving in the files.
"These were that he was absolutely certain of the present loyalty of J. Robert
Oppenheimer, despite the fact that he doubtless was at one time at least an avid
fellow traveler, but that he felt that Morrison was a Communist. Lansdale has
not of course had occasion to review the recent reports on either man, as his re-
marks should probably be interpreted as reflecting his judgment at the time
of his most recent review of each case."
Mr. ROLANDEE. ThatisalL
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I want to apologize to the Commission for piling my straw
on top of it
Mr. GBAT. We will recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning. Thank you very
much, Mr. LilienthaL
The WITNESS. Thank you for your consideration in seeing me through today.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GBAY. We will adjourn.
(Thereupon at 7 : 45 p. m., a recess was taken until Wednesday, April 21, 1954,
at9:30a.nL)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER OF J. ROBERT OPPEXHEIMER
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
BUILDING T-3, ROOM 2022,
Washington^ D. C., Wednesday, April 21^ 1954*
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to recess,
before the board, at 9 :30 a. m.
Personnel Security Board : Mr. Gordon Gray, chairman; Dr. Ward
T. Evans, member: and Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present : Roger Robb and C. A. Rolander, Jr., counsel for tfie board ;
J. Robert Oppenheimer; Lloyd K. Garrison: Samuel J. Silverman;
Allen B. Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer; and Herbert S.
Marks, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
(427)
PROCEEDINGS
Mr. GBAY. The proceeding will resume.
Mr. Pike, do you wish to testify under oath? You are not required to do so.
Mr. PIKE. I would rather testify under oath.
Mr. GRAY. What is your fall name, sir?
Mr. PIKE. Snmner T. Pike.
Mr. GRAY. Sum-tier T. Pike, do you swear that the testimony you are to give
the board shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
Mr. PIKE. I do.
Mr. GRAY. Will you be seated, please, sir.
May I, perhaps unnecessarily, call you-r attention to the existence of the
perjury statutes. I am sure you are familiar with them.
I should like to request that if in the course of your testimony it becomes
necessaiiy for you to discuss or disclose restricted data you will notify the
chairman in advance so we can take necessary steps under those circumstances.
Mr. PIKE. I may have to ask Mr. Rolander whether things are restricted or
not because I have been away from this thing for 2% years and I don't know
what has been released.
Mr. GRAY. Please be free to make any inquiry about it
Mr. ROLANDER. We have Dr. Beckerley with us.
Mr. GRAY. The other thing I should like to say to you* sir, is that we treat
these proceedings as a confidential matter between the Commission and its
officials and Dr. Oppenheimer and his representatives and witnesses. The
Commission will initiate no releases with respect to this proceeding. We are
expressing the hope that each witness will take the same attitude.
Mr. PIKE. It bothers me a little bit in case there should be leaks as to what
attitude shall I take, but as far as it seems reasonable and possible, I will go
along with your feeling on it I will be the source of no leaks.
Mr. GRAY. I have simply stated the position of this board.
Mr. Garrison, would you proceed.
Whereupon, Sumner T. Pike was called as a witness, having been duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Mr. Pike, what is your present position?
A. I am chairman of the Public Utilities Commission in the State of Maine.
Q. Appointed to that by the Governor?
A. Yes.
Q. By the Governor and council?
A. Yes. The council f ollows very much the same confirmation procedure as
the Senate.
Q. Are you engaged in business in Maine, also?
A. Yes. I am a part owner of a couple of businesses.
Q. Sardines?
A. Sardines.
Q. You served on the Atomic Energy Commission from 1946 to the end of
1951, did you not?
A. Exactly to December 15, 1951.
Q. You were Acting Chairman the last 4 months?
A. No. It was between the time Mr. Lilienthal left which I think was in
February 1950, until Gordon Dean was appointed, I believe, in July of that
same year, for a few months.
Q. During this period you were well acquainted with Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you say something about the nature and extent of that acquaint-
anceship?
(429)
430
A. I first met Dr. Oppenheimer, I think, at the first meeting of the General
Advisory Committee— I don't remember the date of that— during that period,
which must have been late 1946 or early 1947 until the day I left. It happens to
be the day that they were meeting* I also saw him when they met in Washing-
ton, which was, I think, oftener than the statutory minimum of four times a year.
I sometimes saw him outside of the meetings and I sometimes saw him when
he was in Washington not at a meeting of the committee.
He was in town at times as a member of other boards and committees and
sometimes perhaps as just an individual. Outside of the office I saw him — well,
let me see, there was a period I think during the summer of 1947 when we
boarded at the Bohemian Grove Forest out in California. We were there 3 or
4 days. .
Q. Us being whom?
A. The Commission, its laboratory heads, some of the General Advisory Com-
mittee and several scientists like Dr. Wigner. I don't remember whether he
was a laboratory head or not at that time. At that period we were put around
at the various cottages and Dr. Oppenheimer, Mr. Lilienthal, and I were put in
the same cottage.
There were other times, once perhaps, or oftener, when the committee was
here I had them up to dinner between their meetings.
Q. The GAG?
A. The GAC, yes ; I saw Dr. Oppenheimer, I think, at Dr. Symth's house. I
believe that day I left I was going to see him again but there was -a bad snow-
storm and nobody could get to Dr. Smyth's. I have not seen him from then
until yesterday.
Q. The relations between the Atomic Energy Commission and the GAC were
of a fairly close character, would you say?
A. I should think so.
Q. Did you attend meetings of the GAC?
A. Yes. Their custom was to ask us in, usually once or twice during their
meetings, and then almost invariably at the end of their meetings, at which
time Dr. Oppenheimer would give us an oral review of the things that they had
been taking up and the results they arrived at Later, as I remember it, he
would send a written summary.
I don't think there was any meeting they had here that I did not attend in
part, except possibly when I was away on vacation or on Commission business.
Q. Did you attend a meeting in Princeton in the early summer of 1951 over
which Dr. Oppenheimer presided?
A. Yes.
Q. The purpose of that meeting was to push forward with
A. It was to pull together, as I remember it, various ideas that had developed
about hydrogen or fusion weapons. It was quite a substantial meeting. As
I remember it lasted the better part of 2 days.
Q. Mr. Pike, there has been a good deal of testimony here about the work of
the GAC, and I am going to try to avoid duplicating the record, so I will Just
ask you a general question.
Based on your observations and of the knowledge of the work of the GAC
and of Dr. Oppenheimer's chairmanship of it, did you form any impression as
to his own contribution to strengthening the country in the 6 years that you
have been talking about?
A. Yes ; I think the GAC under his chairmanship made a major contribution
to the work of the Commission and the Commission, I take it, was trying to
work for the good of the country.
Q. You have read the Commission's letter of December 23, 1953, which ini-
tiated these proceedings, containing the derogatory information about Dr.
Oppeuheimer?
A. Yes, I read the New York Times which I take it gave the full. letter.
Q. On the basis of your knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer and your experiences
with him, what is your opinion as to his loyalty?
A. I never had any question about his loyalty. I think he is a man of es-
sential integrity. I think he has been a fool several times, but there was nothing
in there that shook my feeling. As a matter of fact, it was a pretty good sum-
mary, it seemed to me, of the material that was turned over to us early in 1947
by the FBI, all except the last thing about the hydrogen bomb. Of course, that
was not in then.
Q. The letter and, I assume, the file contained data about past associations
of his.
A. Yes.
431
Q. In your judgment is his character and the associations of the past and his
loyalty such that if he were to continue to have access to restricted data, he
would not endanger the common defense or security V
A. No, I don't think he would endanger the common defense or security the
least bit
Q. You read about the Chevalier incident in the Commission's letter and Dr.
Oppenheimer's answer?
A. Yes.
Q. It is not clear as to how much of that story was in the file that you went
over in 1947. I assume you went over whatever the file was?
A. Yes.
Q. Personally?
A. Personally.
Q. And participated in the discussions with the other Commissioners?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Do you or do you not have any clear recollection of the Chevalier incident
as of that time? If you don't, don't try to
A. I don't think I have much beyond the summary of the letter of last week,
which was published last week. There was a lot more there. It was a pretty
thick file, but I don't remember exactly what was in the file.
Q. Hay I put to you a hypothetical question which I put to you, I think, last
night in order that you might have an opportunity to reflect on it. Supposing
that it were established in addition to the description of the incident as it
appears in the Commission's letter that after the conversation between Chevalier
and Dr. Oppenheimer in which Chevalier had informed him that Eltenton was
in a position to transmit secret data to Russia, that for several months Dr.
Oppenheimer failed to report the matter to the security officers ; that thereafter
he did on his own initiative report to the security officers, but revealed only the
name of Eltenton, and declined when pressed to do so to reveal the name of
Chevalier, was not frank in describing the exact circumstances of what had taken
place, added to £he story about Chevalier without mentioning many certain facts
which were not in the picture ; that later when again pressed to reveal the name
of Chevalier he again declined; that General Groves asked him to reveal the
name and he said he would not do so unless ordered ; that General Groves said
he didn't want to order him to do it, asked him to think it over and met with him
again and said he would have to order him unless Dr. Oppenheimer would tell
him the name and Dr. Oppenheimer finally revealed the name of Chevalier.
Assuming that this were established would this alter the opinion that you
have expressed here to the board about your present views of Dr. Oppenheimer's
loyalty and the propriety of his having continued access to restricted data?
A. No.
Q. Do you want to say why it wouldn't alter your opinion?
A. I think it was a bad incident. Taken alone it would have bothered me very
much, I suspect I have been party to incidents in my life that I rather not have
certainly taken out of context. This, woven into the context, however, of per-
formance under closer observation for him, many years and achievements of
such size as to warrant the gratitude of this country, I don't think it should be
given much weight at all.
Q. Turning to another topic of the H bomb for a moment, without going into
the details about which there is a great deal in the record, as I understand it in
reporting to the President the views of the Atomic Energy Commission about
whether to go forward with an all-out H-bomb program or not, following the
Russian explosion in the fall of 1949, there were several separate reports, were
there not?
A. There were. I think there were four.
Q. Would you Just say what they were? I mean who made these four re-
ports?
A. Strauss made one definitely for going ahead; Dean made another in which
he recommended some prior
Q. He already has testified.
A. Smyth and Lilienthal made another.
Q. Mr. Lilienthal has testified about that
A. I agreed with them that this was not the time to go on an all-out effort
but put in a supplementary memorandum which, as I remember, I had to put in
somewhat later on account of being on the 'coast I had to take a trip at that
time.
Q. You went to the coast after the discussion?
30881
432
A. After the discussion. I don't think I put in my separate memorandum
until I got back. That must have been about the middle of November.
Q. That was about 10 days after the meeting or something like that?
A. I think so.
Q. That went to the White House?
A. Yes. Whether it went to the Security Council or the President, I don't
know. I have to perhaps say here that I had not realized that I had any access
to records so I have not looked at any records since I left the Commission in 1951
and, of course, took none with me. I am relying completely on my memory as
to the time and dates.
Q. Do you remember the substance of the points that you made in that
memorandum?
A. I think so.
Q. Would you state them?
A. One of them was that we had no knowledge that the military needed such
a weapon. Another one was that the cost of producing tritium in terms of
Plutonium that might otherwise be produced looked fantastically high — SO to
100 times, probably, gram for gram.
The third one, and this sort of tied into the first, was, as we all know, that
the damage power of the bomb does not increase with the size of the explosion,
and it seemed that it might possibly be a wasted effort to make a great big one
where some smaller ones would get more efficiency.
I think I put in another one: That as between the fission work we were
doing and the fusion thing in question here, there were some good things about
the fission things. Up to that time and up to the present nobody has brought
up anything useful for mankind out of the fusion.
Q. Out of the fusion?
A. The fusion. In other words, I have never yet heard of any possibility
of anything beneficial coming from the hydrogen end of it.
Q. In terms of useful energy?
A. Other than as a weapon. Again I am going entirely from memory, but
I think that is what I put in my memorandum.
Q. These were your own independent views?
A. They were my own. They could not be completely independent because
the Lord knows we had been talking and discussing and, let us say, arguing
for well over a month at that time, possibly nearer 2 months. So the views
were the result of a great deal of discussion. I think they were my own. I
came with a slightly different set of reasons than the others, although I did
come out with the same recommendation as Lilienthal and Smyth did.
Mr. GABBJSON. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROBB. I have no questions.
Mr. GEAT. I have some questions, Mr. Pike.
I have been in the course of these proceedings pursuing something that has
been illusory and evasive as far as I am concerned, and it may be just because
I don't comprehend what has been said. This perhaps involves a matter of
recollection on your part, so, of course, you can testify only what you recall
about it
In Dr. Oppenheimer's reply, dated March 4, to General Nichols' letter, he
referred to the October 29, 1949 meeting of the General Advisory Committee and
indicated that this meeting was called to consider two questions. One was the
general questions in the light of the news about the Soviet success, was the
Commission doing all it should do, and if not, in what way should it alter its
course.
The second was to pursue the question of whether there should be a "crash"
program with respect to the Super.
The record shows that the then Chairman, Mr. Lilienthal, wrote a letter—
I am sorry I don't remember the date — to the General Advisory Committee,
which raised this first question.
Then the record shows that later in the same month, that is, October, there
was a letter— I can refer to that?
Mr. ROLANDER. Yes, certainly. You can show it to him.
Mr. GRAY. A letter dated October 21, 1949, signed by you as acting chairman
of the Commission, to Dr. Oppenheimer with respect to this October meeting
and asking certain questions, I believe, that the committee should address
itself to.
Mr. ROLANDEB (Handing letter to witness).
The WETNESS. I would not have remembered this in detail, but questions of
this sort were certainly miming through our minds at the time.
433
Mr. GRAY. Yes. Of course, there are a lot of questions raised in this letter.
The WITNESS. That is right.
Mr. GRAY. I have not looked at it very carefully recently, but I don't believe
this second question which I referred to and which appears in Dr. Oppenbeimer's
reply of March 4 certainly was asked in that form in this letter.
The WITNESS. Would you repeat that second question for me, Mr. Gray? In
reading I forgot what the second point was.
Mr. GRAY. Yes. Let me give you the exact language of that.
Dr. Oppenheimer's reply indicates that the Commission asked the General
Advisory Committee to consider and advise on two related questions, the second
of which is, and I am now reading from his letter, "whether a 'crash* program
for the development of the Super should be a part of any new program?"
WTiat I have been trying to identify for my own information in that accord
is how this second question got asked in that form. I don't believe it is raised
in that form by your letter.
The WITNESS. I don't see it there.
Mr. GRAY. I might say to you that I believe that Mr. Lilienthal testified that
his recollection was not good on this point. Am I correct on that? If I didn't
ask him this question it is because it was late and I was tired, because I have
really been trying to find out about it.
Mr. GABBISON. I think I remember, Mr. Chairman, that he testified he had
written the letter that raised the first of these two questions, and I myself
don't remember very clearly.
Mr. GRAY. My question of you is: Do you recall whether you met with the
committee and asked this second question about the "crash" program?
The WITNESS. I remember very distinctly the phrases "crash program" and "all
out program" being used almost interchangeably for some months. If I had
to rely on my unaided memory, and I guess I do, I would think that phrase
arose with Mr. Strauss. At least in my mind it ties in with what he wanted
to do.
In the meetings of the General Advisory Committee — of course, I am sure
you are aware from previous testimony— they were not held to the things which
the Commission asked them to do. I think there were several times when they
got here and either took up things not on the previously prepared agenda of their
own motion or something had happened between the time of the calling of the
meeting and the time that they got there that would be discussed.
As I remember it, they were reasonably formal and kept pretty full notes, but
I don't think there was any reason why a thing should not be discussed and
considered even though it had not been put on any agenda, like the calling of a
meeting of a board of directors or stockholders, you tell them what you know
should be discussed and then you leave room for anything new that may come up.
It seems to me that knowing there was a very strong recommendation for a
heavy program on what we now call the Super, I guess— but that is an old
name—this would inevitably have come up in the discussion called for by this
letter. I don't know whether I am helping you out or not.
The "crash program" or the "all out program," let us say, was an extreme of
one position. It seems to me, let us say, that was the position that Mr.
Mr. GRAY. It was the position that the Government of the United States ultt-
m TO/ WITNESS. I am saying at this time. The program as laid down by the
President in 1950, 2 or 3 months later, * * * was very shortly embodied in a
budget that was set up, an emergency deficiency bill, a very large size, in addition
to the one which we had already sent; up that year which had already strained
the imagination of the Appropriations Committee pretty strongly.
That was a heavy program, yes. I am trying to answer your question. I am
afraid I haven't very well. _. _.
Mr GRAY. I am afraid You haven't and I won't take any more of your time
in pursuing it. I don't think you can answer it. I think yon have indicated your
memory is not dear as to the letter or instructions.
The WITNESS. My impression is that this crept into the discussion and
probably got the name crash some where along the line because it was a con-
venient handle, just as the name of Super came along— I don't know where it
came from— but it became a convenient handle. '*«,«*
Mr GRAY I would like to turn to something else, If I may, Mr. Pike, andthat
is the consideration given by the Commission to the clearance of Dr. Oppen-
heimer in, I believe, March 1947.
The WITNESS. I think that Is right
434
Mr. GRAY. Is it your recollection that the Commission took formal action to
clear Dr. Oppenheimer? I might say that there is some confusion about this.
The WITNESS. I don't have any clear recollection that we took formal action to
clear him then. I think you are all aware that was a period of extreme confusion.
Mr. GBAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. When the confirmation hearings were going on on the Hill,
when the Commission was going through the initial throes of organization and
really had not started to organize. My memory is that even the minutes them-
selves had to be rewritten some months later, that is, the minutes of the meet-
ings. I may be wrong about that But if you told me that something was not
on the record as of that time, I would say I would not be at all surprised.
Mr. GRAY. I think the fact is that in August something was written which
purported to reflect action taken in March.
Mr. ROBB. February.
Mr. GABBISON. It said February.
Mr. GRAY. It said February when indeed whatever took place actually took
place in March. So there is a good deal of confusion. I don't think the record
is clear that there was formal action which cleared Dr. Oppenheimer in 1947.
I am Just asking you whether you are surpised to hear me say that the record
is not clear on that point?
The WITNESS. No, sir ; I am not I think both Mr. Beckerley and Mr. Rolander
were here during that period. This is off the particular subject of Dr. Oppen-
heimer. But as I remember it, Lyle Bellesly was succeeded by Boy Snapp as
secretary and Bellesly's records were in unsatisfactory shape and unsatisfactory
to everybody. I think Snapp went right back and took what he had, what he
could find, and wrote up things. There were a lot of ex post facto things In the
record.
I think you will find if you go through it there were a lot of things picked un
and a lot of things missed that should have been picked up.
Mr. GRAY. The fact is that the Chairman of the Commission discussed this
matter with people in the White House at about the time that the Commission
read these files.
The WITNESS. I am quite sure about that
Mr. GRAY. Is it possible that this kind of thing could have happened : That
the Commission knew that the Chairman had consulted the White House • that
the Chairman was perhaps expecting some further word from the White House-
that no further word ever came from the White House and that in fact nothinc
was ever done about the action on the clearance? '
The WITNESS. I suppose that is possible. Of course, that "as of" date was
before the delivery of this dossier ; the February date, if I am not mistaken.
Mr. GRAY. Yes ; the February date could not, I think, be correct
The WITNESS. I am not sure that it couldn't
MJ. GRAY. You mean it is possible that the clearance might actually have been
The WITNESS. I am not sure. For instance, the clearance of all the members
of the General Advisory Committee might have been made and considered in
Bebruary. I am not sure that it might not have happened that this was the only
case where a question was raised. This may have been kept in abeyance to see
whether that should have been confirmed until August
I am no clearer on the thing than our records are, but I think that is all in
tne realm of possibility*
Mr. GRAY. Did yon consider, however, this a serious thing at the time?
The WITNESS. Oh, yes, I did. I am sure we all did. There were five of us on
the Commission. As I remember it, this was a unanimous action eflveOTUSOn
Mr. GRAY. I am going to change my course now a little bit, Mr Pike
You testified that one of your reasons for not being enthusiastic about the all-
ktodPof^ *T ** faCt tbat tter6 had been expressed no ^tary need for tite
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Do you think it possible that a military need had not been expressed
to the Commission at that time because the military did not baveiny mrato
believe that it was feasible? The reason I ask that is that once it became fusible
Q °n that *** mmtary pec*to ^k* *** Is a
The WITNESS. I think you will find, or tliere should be in the documentation of
^T'H1?? ^ff**^ to *** of ** mmtary Uaison ooSSnK ttStot
expression of the military that such a thing was desirable. I don't remember tiie
435
date of it, of course. I remember distinctly seeing such a paper. Whether it was
in a meeting of the military liaison committee meeting or 'a Commission meeting,
I don't remember. * * *
I remember frankly in the back of my head thinking that I would like to get
these boys on the line. I think later they came on the line. You are perfectly
familiar with that. You were in that rat race at one time.
Mr. GRAY. My recollection is about the same as yours.
I suppose people in the military liaison committee at that time perhaps can
answer the question I put to you better than you could.
I want to ask you one other serious question. You say that as of 1049 and in-
deed as of today so far as you know, there seems to be no use other than a military
which might come out of these processes?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir ; I believe that is correct
Mr. GRAY. I am asking for information. I don't believe we had any testimony
on that.
The WITNESS. I am sure that there had been none suggested then. If there
have been any suggested since. I am unaware of it.
Mr. GRAY. In your official position you would be very much interested in that.
The WITNESS. I would. All I am saying is that a good many things have
happened since December 15, 1951, and, of course, I would not be aware of those.
I have had no security clearance. I think I have been in the Commission
Office once at their request and that was when the question came up of power
plant for the Paducah operation.
Mr. GBAY. Are there any questions, Dr. Evans?
Dr. EVANS. Yes. Mr. Pike, I understand that you did say that Dr. Oppen-
heimer made a number of mistakes?
The WITNESS. I think so, yes.
Dr. EVANS. I want to ask you another question. If you had been in Dr.
Oppenheimer's position when he was approached in this matter about giving
information to our enemies, you would have reported that immediately, would
you not?
The WITNESS. In 1943 I think I would have. I fortunately was not in the
position of having that question put up to me. But I think I would have.
Dr. EVANS. I wish you would explain. Do you think there is any military
need today for a Super?
The WITNESS. Yes, I believe there is, Doctor. I think if you go back and
get the document I think exists, you will see one or two reasons that I didn't
have In mind.
One of them, for instance, is that you get a much larger margin of error for a
miss. Something, for example, that will take a radius of 10 miles rather than
Imile.
Another one is that if you can get through you only put at risk 1 or 2 or 3
planes as against a flock of them to destroy a big target.
I can rationalize uses for the Super. I felt that the military desirability
of the Super ought to be estimated by military people rather than a bunch of
civilians like ourselves. I still think their views would be quite authoritative
with me.
Dr. EVANS. You wished in your own account here to go rather slow on this
Super, didn't you?
The WITNESS. I wished to get, as I testified later before the Joint Committee,
to get more facts before going out on a crash program.
I would like to bring in here one thing that was not very well considered In
the period we were talking about but had to come up some months later. I
think It was after Mr. Lilienthal left. I remember I was on that committee
of the National Security Council.
The order had been given and the question was not whether to go ahead
but how to go ahead. I brought up at that meeting my point of view which
was that this country could be in no more miserable position than to have a
successful development on our hands and then to have to spend 3 or 4 years
In building factories to produce the thing.
Therefore, in going ahead with the development we had to at the same time
go ahead with our factories or plants Just as though we were sure we were
going to have a successful development. That seemed to me always to be an
Inherent part of the development question.
You see why we would be In a miserable position. We had proven that it
could be done, and somebody else could have easily proven the same tiling at
the same time and 3 or 4 years to build plants would be a pretty tough period.
436
So it involved a major expenditure of time and money, effort and manpower
and it was not a thing to be gone into lightly. I wanted to get some im-
portant facts into the picture, all the facts that could be gotten, and I was
not willing to recommend a drive program until we had some of those facts.
Some of them came in if I am not mistaken. I think we got that military
appraisal or at least a military appraisal before the January 1950 decision
from the White House. I am not completely sure of that, but I think that was
in.
I don't know whether I have answered your question or not.
Dr. EVANS. Yes, I think you have. The thing that I was trying to get your
opinion on was as to whether A bombs as big as this and as costly as this would
mean that we ought to have a lot of targets on which to use them, whereas if
we only had a couple it would be like killing a mosquito with a sledge hammer.
The WITNESS. This was in my mind. I am afraid to give numbers would be
to get into a security point.
*******
Dr. EVANS. Thank you.
Mr. GRAY. I have Just one question suggested by Dr. Evans* question.
Your view was that we ought to know more about it. You were not Just
unalterably opposed?
The WITNESS. No. I think I put it in my memorandum which you should
have the qualification "at this time."
Mr. GRAY. Is it your recollection that most of the members of the General
Advisory Committee were opposed at any time?
The WITNESS. No, that is not my recollection, although I would, of course,
have to refresh my memory. That is not my recollection. I think they
brought in, as perhaps they properly should, some, let us say, political and
strategic and moral questions which frankly did not weigh very big with me.
As far as I am concerned there was not then and there is not now a great deal
of difference in morality between one kind of warfare and another. This stuff
never affected me very much. But I think the GAG did give it perhaps more
consideration than I did.
Mr. GRAY. Do you have any questions?
Mr. GARRISON. Just a few, Mr. Chairman.
FURTHER DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Speaking of what was before the GAC at their meeting on October 29, 1949,
in response to a question by the Chairman you said something to the effect that
the question of the crash program crept into the discussion, as I recall the
phrase.
I wonder if when you were talking about discussion you had reference to the
preliminary meeting between the members of the Commission and the members
of the GAC which started off the meeting, as I understand it, in accordance with
the regular practice?
A. No. I think what I was referring to was the various meetings of the
Commission during, let us say, the month or a little more than a month between
the announcement of the Eussian bang and this GAC meeting.
Q. In other words, in the Commission's discussions before the GAC meeting
the question of a crash program for the H-bomb was to the fore?
A. I think so. Let me bring another group in on that Don't forget that we
had a large arid a very able staff. We had the heads of the various divisions
in Washington and we had at our various outposts people who came in on short
notice. I am sure the Commission minutes will show who was at various
meetings and when, but I am completely clear in my memory that there had
been a lot of discussions. I am not completely clear in my memory exactly
when they took place and who was present at each one. That is a matter of
record and can be verly clearly and easily got at
Q. When the question was put to the GAC in Mr. LUlienthaTs letter asking
that consideration be given to whether in view of the Soviet success the Com-
mission s program w#s adequate and if not, in what way it should be altered
or increased, would it or would it not have been a natural outgrowth of that
fhfn^00^^^6 ttaWB and ** ^suasions that you had, to consider
the question of the hydrogen crash program ?
A. I think it would have been a natural thing. If you will remember the
hydrogen question had never been dropped. It had been in charge of a small
437
group headed by Ed Teller. Dr. Teller was never one to keep his candles
hidden under bushels. /He was kind of a missionary. I might say that perhaps
John, the Baptist, is a little overexaggeration. He always felt that this
program had not had enough consideration. Teller in my view was a pretty
single-minded and devoted person. I would guess that it would have suited him
completely if we had taken all the resources we had and devoted it to fusion
bombs.
He is a very useful and a very fine man, but I always thought he was kind of
lopsided, as a good man specialists are. This was one of the things that would
naturally have come into any involved discussion of what we ought to be doing.
I don't know whether I have answered your question or not.
Q. Just two more questions.
After President Truman gave the go ahead on the H-bomb program, did the
GAO, as you recall, cooperate with the Government and accept that decision
and move forward?
A. Yes. When you say move forward, one has to remember that some of
the developments in the early months were quite disappointing. The thing was
attacked, I think, wholeheartedly and we were not happy, not about cooperation,
but not happy about the results for some time.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer, so far as you yourself knew, do anything to delay
or obstruct the program?
A. Oh, no; rather the reverse.
Q. One final question.
When the Chairman was talking with you about the question of the 1947
clearance, you used the phrase "unanimous action." I would like to ask you,
leaving aside the question of dates and minutes, what you recollect of what the
commissioners actually did do. Did they sit around the table together and
consider the matter of Dr. Oppenhelmer's clearance and come to some view
about it, or how was it done?
A. They did what yon suggest I want to go back to a fundamental question
of Commission organization which came up very early when we met. I had
something to do with the result of it. There was a question as .to whether we
should not organize, let us say, something like the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission— so and so be in charge of this, and so and so be in charge of that, and
sort of departmentalize ourselves. That question was answered in the negative
and I was instrumental— I do not say I was the dominant factor, but I had
this experience on the Securities and Exchange Commission just after they had
abandoned that sort of division or labor system and the very unsatisfactory
results of that were in front of my mind — so that while naturally each one
perhaps would give a little more attention to the thing he knew best— Bacher,
let us say, was the physicist, I knew something about mining and raw ma-
terials, and so on. Yet, our actions were taken together and our responsibility
was both joint and separate and complete. In other words, while we asked for
advice and asked for help in a great many areas, the final responsibility was
always ours, and it was always joint and if anybody had a dissent, it was re-
corded in those meetings. So, if there was no dissent recorded, each one of us
was in on the decision and each agreed on it
Do I answer your question?
Mr. GABEISON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GBAT. Was any member of the Commission interested particularly in
security problems? You were interested in mining, for example. Do you re-
member whether any Commissioner at that time was?
The WITNESS. I would say that Commissioner Strauss had some background
in security problems when he was over at the Navy and perhaps took a more
direct interest than the rest of us. This security problem, I say say, was the
most nagging problem of all in a good many months of the Commission's
existence.
If you remember the law, it not only required an FBI investigation of new
employees but also required going over everybody who had been cleared by
the Manhattan project who was still working. This dragnet brought up quite
a few customers. I probably am exaggerating but it seemed to me as though we
took over half our time for the first 7 or 8 months on these distinct personnel
security problems.
Of course, there were physical security problems, such as a barbed wire fence
had rusted, or the grass had grown so that a fellow could slither through it
near one of the plants. This could not all be corrected at once. This was part
of the general neglect into which the project had fallen during the year or so
438
Congress had been trying to make up its mind as to what law to pass and the
further 3 months Mr. Truman was trying to draft five people willing to serve
on this Commission. The war was over, let us say, in August 1945, the Com-
mission was appointed in late October— I would guess the 2Sth— of 1946, .and
there was a period of slowdown which looked at that time when we came on
as though it might culminate disastrously. There were a lot of problems that
had come up. * * *
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Lilienthal testified that the Deputy General Counsel of the
Commission, Mr. Volpe, was active with him in considering Dr. Oppenheimer's
clearance.
Do you recall whether counsel of the Commission participated in this, Mr.
Pike?
The WITNESS. No, I don't.
Mr. GRAY. Would he have normally sat with the Commission when they con-
sidered these security cases?
The WITNESS. No. The counsel of the Commission like every other officer of
the Commission was called in when the Commission felt it needed him. Of
course, Volpe was a natural for this thing because he had done some security
work for General Groves before and had a general acquaintance I think with
the security problems in the Manhattan District
During this period, as I say, we had no security officer, or if we had one, I
don't remember who it was. You picked on the fellow who might be of some
help and Joe Volpe had some background in this sort of business.
Mr. GRAY. It was not because he was assistant counsel or deputy counsel, but
more because he had a background.
The WITNESS. That would be my belief; yes, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Mr. Pike, you spoke about the trouble yon had with investigating
the security. Did it seem to you that there was really more screwy people in
here than you would have expected to find ordinarily?
The WITNESS. No; I don't think so, Doctor. As I remember it, a great many
of the star customers had already gone. My best recollection is that of about
60,000 people on the job at that time, we had around 60 or 65— it sticks in my
memory as one-tenth of 1 percent — of people about whom there were questions
coming from a vague doubt to a fairly substantial doubt. Those figures may
not be exact but that is the range, I am sure.
Dr. EVANS. Thank you ; that is all.
Mr. GBAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Pike.
The WITNESS. Thank you, sir.
(Witness excused.)
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. GRAY. Let us get back on the record.
Mr. ROLANDER. As I said, Mr. Chairman, we have not had an opportunity to
review all of the transcripts of what we had hoped to be unclassified portions
of the hearing, so we have permitted Dr. Oppenheimer and his counsel to review
the transcripts here in the AEC building. As we complete our review we turn
the transcripts over to them by receipt. I have also permitted them to use
secretaries for the purpose, as I understood, to assist them in preparing ques-
tions and what materfial they needed o continue their presentation. I am
somewhat concerned, however, that if they bring stenographers in here that
they not make copies of the transcripts until thehy have been approved from a
classification standpoint.
I wanted to go on record as noting that some information may have to be
classified from a national defense standpoint. This information should be
protected from that standpoint as well as the confidential relationship between
Dr. Oppenhetmer and the Commission.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ecker and Mr. Topkis from my office have
been at my request making summaries of various portions of the transcript and
have the transcript as a whole in the room assigned to us and with a stenographer
at intervals to whom they have been dictating. Up to this point I had assumed
that there was no problem about this at all
I suppose in the nature of things there are bound to be where something in
the record needs to be cleared up a quotation here and there directly from the
transcript dictated to the stenographer to write up so that we can study it. It
is awfully hard for us to work here ourselves in that room.
Now, If there is a security question about the contents or about quotations
from the transcript, I would like to know what it is so we could have an under-
standing about it
439
Do I understand that these transcripts that we have been working on are
still in some way being reviewed?
Mr. ROLANDER. Yes, they are. They are being reviewed not only by our own
classification officer, but by representatives of other agencies.
Dr. BECKERLET. May I make a comment for the record.
We have made arrangements with the Department of Defense for review of
certain portions of the transcript Two or three people are coming over at
1 o'clock today. I hope we will be able to clean up all of the Defense Department
questions with respect to the transcripts to date at that time.
There is some intelligence data that has crept in in a few spots. I have taken
steps to have that reviewed. In addition there is some material which may
have sensitivity in the Department of State. This is also being reviewed at
the present time.
Mr. GARRISON. Have you any suggestion to offer about it?
Dr. BECKERLET. I would be happy to define the areas which I am quite sure
there are some questions about. Whether there is any classified information
in these particular sections, I don't know.
Mr. GARRISON. Could you mark the portions of the transcript that are being
reviewed for security purposes and then have it understood that we would not
make any quotations from those portions of the transcript?
Dr. BECKERLET. I certainly could; yes. I can identify the areas where there
is some possible sensitivity but in view of the fact that these are matters outside
of the purview of the Commission I have no way of knowing whether these are
or are not sensitive.
Mr. GARRISON. Could that be done with some expedition?
Dr. BEOKERLBT. Yes, I could do that right now, as a matter of fact from my
notes.
Mr. GARRISON. So that at lunch, let us say, we would know what those passages
or portions are?
Dr. BECKERLET. Yes. Could you indicate which parts of the transcript or are
you doing them in sequence?
Mr. GARRISON. We are doing them in sequence. I asked Mr. Topkis to begin
at the beginning, page 1, and give us a summary.
Mr. ROLANDER. Mr. Garrison has received volumes one and three. So it would
only pertain to volumes 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
Dr. BEGKERLET. Two is one of our more troublesome ones since it concerned
the witness* activities with the Defense Department
Mr. GARRISON. One and three are completely clear and can be taken out of
the building.
Mr. RORB. Those you have, Mr. Garrison?
Mr. GARRISON. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Let me suggest that I believe we are discussing matters which
really should be between counsel and the Atomic Energy Commission and its
officials on which I think this board can't make any ruling. I don't mind
hearing the discussion, but I think we are taking the time of the board to cover
material with which you ought to deal with Mr. Rolander.
Mr. GARRISON. Yes. There are volumes 5 and 6 of the transcript. When
will .we get those?
Dr. BECKERLET. Five has some material which I have asked State to look at
I can define the areas.
Mr. GARRISON. We had them to work on last night but not this morning.
Mr. GRAT. If this conversation is going to be pursued I am going to have the
board excused and let Mr. Rolander and Mr. Garrison discuss it.
Mr. GARRISON. It is relevant to the board because it is a part of the whole
procedural problem we do face, which we have to bring to the board's attention,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAT. Anything that is under the jurisdiction of this board should be
brought to the board's attention, but I cannot make a ruling on security matters.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, just one statement for the record. If there is
anything-— we will make our copies available to you of everything that we have
dictated or written up to this point— that we have extracted from the minutes
that has a security question, we want to make it perfectly clear that we will
return that to you.
Mr. ROLANDER. Fine.
Mr. GARRISON. That, then, can be worked out
Mr. GRAT. We will take a short recess.
(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)
440
Mr. &RAY. Would you stand and raise your right Land, please?
Mr. RAMSEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Do you wish to testify under oath?
Mr. RAMSEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. You are not required to do so, but all of the witnesses have.
Mr. RAMSEY. I am perfectly willing.
Mr. GRAY. Norman Foster Ramsey, Jr., do you swear that the testimony you
are to give the board shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?
Mr. RAMSEY. I do.
Whereupon, Norman Foster Ramsey, Jr. was called as a witness, and having
been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Will you be seated, please, sir.
It is my duty to call your attention to the existence of the perjury statutes.
I assume you are familiar with them.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. In the event, Professor Ramsey, it becomes necessary for you to
refer to restricted data in your testimony, I would ask you to let me know in
advance, so that we may take certain appropriate and necessary steps.
I should also observe to you that we consider this proceeding a confidential
matter between Atomic Energy Commission representatives and Dr. Oppen-
heimer, his witnesses and representatives, and the Commission will make no
public releases. It is our custom to express the hope to the witnesses that
they will take the same view.
The WITNESS. I might add one thing sir, that the chairman of my department
called in great concern that a newspaper reporter called Mm yesterday and
asked him if by chance I were to be a witness, and he said be wasn't sure, or
something like this, and this got reported in the paper that Professor Bainbridge
said I was to be a witness here. This is certainly not my fault and certainly
not his.
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GARRISON:
Q. You are a professor of physics at Harvard University?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You come from a military background?
A. Through my father. My father enlisted at the age of 16 in the Spanish-
American War. He then went to West Point. He served in World War I and
World War II, and is now retired a brigadier general.
Q. What were your wartime positions? Would you Just run over those
briefly?
A. I was consultant to the National Defense Research Committee. I was
doing radar research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, at MIT
Radiation Laboratory. I was an expert consultant to the Secretary of War in
the Pentagon Building with the Air Force during about 1942-43, and I was at
Los Alamos from 1943 to the end of the war, during which time I actually was
officially employed as an expert consultant to the Secretary of War, though I
worked completely within the Los Alamos location.
Q. What positions in the Government do you now hold?
A. No full-time position. I am a consultant to a number of the services,
that is, I am a member of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. I am a
member of the newly established Defense Department Panel on Atomic Energy.
Q. Excuse me. Is that panel in substance the successor to the atomic energy
responsibilities of the Research and Development Board?
A, Not in a certain sense a strict successor, but with the reorganization this is
what has been substituted for it. * * *
Q. When did you first meet Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I first met Dr. Oppenheimer in the summer of 1940.
Q. This was at a meeting of the American Physical Society?
A. That is correct, the Seattle meeting of the American Physical Society,
which was also on my honeymoon and Professor Zacharaias, who nad a car, we
had been riding with Trim, and Dr. Oppenheimer rode with us from Seattle to
Berkeley, and we stayed at Dr. Oppenheimer's house for approximately 2 days
in the early summer of 1940.
Q. This was at the time of the collapse of Ftance in World War II?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you have any conversations with Dr. Oppenheimer about that?
441
A. We had a number of conversations, and it is certainly difficult to reconstruct
all of them in any detail.
Q. I wouldn't ask you to.
A. On the other hand, I do remember some. In particular there were some
on that at which Dr. Oppenheimer expressed a very grave concern for the
French and the British and particularly a rather fondness for Paris, and the
trouble which it was very actively in at that time, though this was at the time
of the Russian-Nazi pact.
Q. At Los Alamos, when you were there from 1943 to 1945, what was your
particular job?
A. I was head of the so-called delivery group, which meant that this was the
group that was concerned with making sure that the Los Alamos weapon was a
real weapon, that is, something that could be carried in an airplane and dropped
from same.
Also, this meant I had charge of the relationship with the Army Air Forces,
and the 509th Bombardment Group, both in the testing of same and then ulti-
mately actually I was chief scientist at Tinian, where we assembled the two
atomic bombs used during the war. Actually the late Admiral Parsons was head
of the group at Tinian, and I was chief scientist under Admiral Parsons.
Q. To what extent was there compartmentalization at Los Alamos and what
would your observation be as to the general policy which was adopted there
about the division of labor among the groups?
A. I would say for the basic scientific developments, there was very little
compartmentalization for very good reasons. This was also true at the MIT
Radiation Laboratory. It had been discovered quite early in the war in a num-
ber of laboratories that inefficiency went up very rapidly with excessive compart-
mentalization. Actually at Los Alamos my own group, being somewhat more
over the direct scientific developments and also being considered one of the most
top secret tilings—particularly the fact that we were so far along that anyone
had any interest in relationships with the Air Force — for this reason we were
to a considerable degree compartmentalized. That is, we were never invited to
give reports at the staff seminars on what we were doing.
Likewise, when we were away from the place, we were in fact required by
security regulations to some degree to our embarrassment to be untruthful as
saying where we came from. We were not allowed to say we came from Los
Alamos. In fact, we had to say we came from other places.
Q. Would you care to make any comment upon the quality of Dr. Oppenheimer s
leadership at Los Alamos? I don't want a great deal of detail, but just your
impression.
A. Yes, sir. I saw it very obviously through the work and was most im-
pressed in every way. I tMnir he did a superb technical job, and one which also
made all of us acquire the greatest of respect and admiration for his abilities
and in view of this hearing I might also add his loyalty and his integrity.
Q. At the end of the war was there a problem of holding Los Alamos together?
A. Yes, a very great problem in that most of the key people in the laboratory,
like myself, were men fundamentally interested in pure science. For patriotic
motives we had by then been devoting 4 or 5 years of our lives since we had
really started in 1940 before the work working on things. We were indeed very
eager to get back to our research laboratories where .we would do the funda-
mental research that we were here to do. t
As a result everyone was very eager to get away. It was chiefly some rather
elloquent pleas on the part of Dr. Oppenheimer that kept many there together.
Actually I know of this in two ways. One, by the fact that for the initial pleas
in this direction I was not at Los Alamos since I was in charge of the group at
Tinian. Most of us there thought all of our friends would be rushing away
from Los Alamos with terrific rapidity. We arranged by cablegram for mov-
ing vans, asked our wives to arrange the movirig. As a matter of fact, when
we got back, we were in some degree of disgrace with the rest of our friends who
had the benefit of Oppenheimer's lecture of the importance of staying on.
I was actually one of the first people getting away from Los Alamos, and I
have been somewhat embarrased about this ever since. I was also told off
about this.
Q. During the controversy about whether to go ahead full steam on the H
bomb program or not, that is to say, roughly in the fall of 1949, and continuing
on until President Truman's announcement in January of 1950, you were a mem-
ber of the Air Force Science Advisory Board?
A. That is correct
442
Q. You did not take any official part in the formulation of policy about the
Hbomb?
A. No, sir.
Q. I just want to ask you one question
A. "We were, however, informed to a considerable degree of the technical
status of it. That is, we were given review meetings at Sandia.
Q. I want to ask you one question as a matter of interest. How did your
own mind at that time run on the question?
A. I found it a very difficult problem that I worried about a great deal, even
though I did not contribute to it. I would say roughly I was in the state of
schizophrenia, which was best described by saying I was actually 55 percent in
favor of going ahead, that is, I felt it was a development even with a crash pro-
gram was appropriate to, and 45 percent in my own mind against it. Again
this I also record as 100 percent loyalty. It was not a matter of loyalty versus
disloyalty, certainly from what I had been presented ; it was not a very useful
looking weapon that was being described * * * I better not go much further
Q. During the past 4 or 5 years, Dr. Oppenheimer, I think, has been chairman
of the committee of the Harvard Overseers to visit the Harvard physics depart-
ment?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you had some association with him in that connection?
A. Yes, I have had quite a few, chiefly on two different problems. The first
one was immediately following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Our de-
partment was very much concerned and worried with what was the best way
for our department to contribute to the country when the country was in a
state of emergency, at the same time doing its very important work also for the
country of training students. We had a number of discussions among our-
selves, and a particularly enlightening discussion with our visiting committee
under the chairmanship of Dr. Oppenheimer— the visiting committee includes
chiefly the various industrial physicists— and I think the help we got from them
was very great
During these conversations, Dr. Oppenheimer particularly eloquently ex-
pressed the problem that the United States was faced with, the threat that was
there from Russia and emphasized the importance of our doing work, particu-
larly by taking leave from Harvard for consultation' and also urged with the
President and provost, at least I am told of it later, the importance of allowing
members of our staff to take such leave. Indeed, they have been taking it.
I think on the whole we have averaged one or two men, usually about two
men, at any one time from our department on leave on one or an'other defense
project. Some, for example, on the H bomb. There is one at Livermore at the
present time.
Q. Did you have any discussions with Dr. Oppenheimer in his capacity as
chairman of the visiting committee about the question of Professor Wendell
Furry?
A. Yes, sir. We had numerous discussions. For background I should add that
our department had the misfortune of having one of the more famous of the
cases in one of the congressional investigations, namely, a member of the physics
department at Harvard, Professor Wendell Furry, in some early hearings of the
congressional committees, using the Fifth Amendment. He is no longer using
the Fifth Amendment He did in the early hearings. His first use was without
consultation with anyone. In fact, his lawyer said don't discuss this case with
anyone. They don't have immunity privileges. He is on his own, I am afraid,
on this kind of a matter, not too bright a fellow. He thought he should use the
Fifth Amendment which I personally greatly regret
After this was done we had extensive conversations with several members of
our visiting committee, particularly Oppenheimer as chairman. Oppenheimer
very vigorously deplored to both some of us in the department and also to Furry
himself the unwisdom of Furry's choice, and even the wrongness of Fairy's
choice in using the Fifth Amendment *u«y»
He also during the course of this expressed rather strong feelings about the
f&ct that Furry had been for really a fantastically long time amember of the
Communist Party.
I must admit that during these discussions which were quite extensive, the
kind in which we each shared views, to the best of my knowledge OpDenheimer's
views and my views, completely independently arrived at, we each had those
views at the time we first got together, were essentially identical ^^
Dr. EVANS. Did you suspect Furry of being a Communist before that time?
443
The WITNESS. I actually did not know Furry during the period he was a
Communist. He was out of the Communist Party when I first met him. I
certainly was not too surprised he was. Even in the first 2 years I knew him—
he has changed quite markedly— even those views were a little bit wild in my
opinion. I did not know and neither did other members of the department
know that he had actually been a member of the Communist Party.
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. I think he had been a graduate student at Berkeley?
A. He had, but I believe I am correct in saying he had not been a member
of the Communist Party at that time. I believe he joined only after he came
to Harvard.
Q, You were a consultant on Project Lincoln?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you have occasion in that capacity
A. There were several meetings. Actually I was a consultant in a sense
that did not work very hard on the project. I was chiefly called in on various
policy discussions. * * * I was consultant of this and chiefly sat in an various
meetings at intervals discussing policy.
Dr. Oppenheimer had been on the summer study group there which group I
was not a member of but which came out with I think some very important
suggestions for the defense of the United States, * * *.
In the same policy discussions we certainly discussed these to a fair extent
Throughout these again I had reaffirmed what I had known all along, the deep
feeling of loyalty and of concern which Dr. Oppenheimer felt for the United
States and very clearly that the thing of which he was afraid, the country of
which he was afraid, was Russia.
It was just as much as in the Pentagon Building. It was a case a Russian
bomber can take off from here and get through. It was not any sort of saying,
"Well, now, we better not consider the Russians to be our potential enemy."
Mr. GABBISON. That is alL
GROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, when did you first learn that you were going to be a witness here?
A. I first learned that I was to be a witness, I would say— it is hard to say —
roughly 3 weeks ago. I had heard of the charges— not of the charges— I had
heard that Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance had been suspended prior to that time. I
heard about that officially through the Air Forces in conjunction with my work
in the Scientific Advisory Board.
Q. How did you learn you were going to be a witness?
A. I learned by phone call from Mr. Garrison asking for an appointment,
which I admit I had no idea and we had the appointment. I can look up the
exact date in my calendar if it is important
Q. It is not important Did you discuss the matter of testifying with your
superiors?
A. No, sir. Universities operate in funny ways. I don't think we have par-
ticular superiors in this kind of matter.
Q. Did you tell anybody in the department?
A. I only told the chairman of my department as I was leaving to come
here.
Q. Who is that?
A. Professor Kenneth Bainbridge, who incidentally was the scientist in charge
of the first atom bomb tests in New Mezimo.
Q. You mentioned Dr. Furry, is it?
A. Yes; that is right
Q. He was at Harvard for some time?
A. I think he came to Harvard— the two dates I will get mixedr— I would say
he came to Harvard in 1936, and joined the Communist Party in 1938. No, he
would not have Joined in 1040. He came in about 1936.
Q. When did you know him?
A. I may have met him, It is one of these things you can't be sure when you
meet a person, I met him during the war at a Physical Society meeting but my
first knowledge of meeting hi™ to attach a name to him and know the man was
when I arrived at Harvard in the fall of 1947.
Q. And you knew him from then as an associate?
A. I knew him as an associate and very well.
444
Q. As a colleague?
A. A colleague, that is right.
Q. Did you suspect that he either was or had been a Communist?
A. If there had been any member of our department who would have been,
he would have certainly been the one. I must admit that it seemed to me
somewhat in some of our political arguments in my opinion he is not terribly
sound on them. I would like to get in the record I am a very strong opponent
of the Communists and have been.
Q. I gathered that.
A. On the other hand, Furry is being confronted with a real tough problem.
He has completely changed. Of this I know. He is also now an opponent of
the Communists.
Q. I see in Dr. Oppenheimer's list of publications on his PSQ a lot of
publications.
Mr. GRAY. Perhaps you better identify for the record what a PSQ is.
Mr. ROBB. Personnel security questionnaire. There are a lot of articles and
things.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. I see one here on the Theory of Electron and Positive, W. W. Furry, Phys.
Rev. 45, 245-262, February 15, 1934. Also Phys. 45, &M=3, 34^44, March 1,
1934. Would that W. Furry be Wendell?
A. This is the same Furry. I should add one thing on the basis of sworn
testimony on several committees from Furry, he was not a member of the
Communist Party at that time, and was not a member until 4 years subsequent
to that time. He joined in 1938. This is in the testimony of the McCarthy
hearing in Boston.
It is also in Furry's testimony to the Harvard Corporation which was in-
vestigating his case.
Q. Do you recall whether he said where he was when he joined the party?
A. He said he was at Harvard. I know which came first, but I don't know
the time sequence. I am sure it was in 1938 he joined actually.
Dr. EVANS. Did you have a communistic cell at Harvard?
The WITNESS. According to the testimony of practically everyone who was
in it there was a group of, I guess, about ten or so people in the period of
around 1938, chiefly, who were indeed members of the Communist Party. There
has been quite a lot of testimony about that group, sir, and by people all of
whom were away out of the Communist Party at the present time, and it
indeed emphasizes the point there are all sorts of ways of being Communist.
This was a high and idealistic group of people, completely foolish in my opinion,
naive and stupid, to have gotten into it, but nevertheless, they were a very high-
minded group which by the sworn testimony of all concerned, if anyone had
ever approached them and asked them to do anything even remotely treasonable,
they would not only have refused to do it, but they would have after a certain
degree of soul search, would have felt obligated to reportt t at that time. There
are just many ways of being foolish.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. You were at Los Alamos from 1943 to 1945?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was that a pretty closely knit group down there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I suppose among the physicists
A. A very fine group, too, I should say.
Q. And among the physicists everybody knew everybody else pretty well?
A. Fairly well, although as the lab got bigger, there were a number whom
you certainly did not know. I will name one offhand I did not know although
you subsequently get the impression that this is the most Important scientist
we had, and this is Fuchs. To the best of my knowledge he was never at the
lab. I had never seen him.
Q. Did you know a man by the name of Philip Morrison?
A. Yes; I did.
Q. How well did you know him?
A. I would say only moderately. He was not in my group. On the other
hand, lie worked quite closely with us at times. Incidentally, to the best of
my knowledge, he did a very good job there. Incidentally, he is at the present
moment a professor at Cornell University.
Q. Did you see any indication of Communist leanings on his part?
445
A. Yes ; I would say not necessarily at that time. There were many subjects
which we would argue and I would disagree. But they were friendly disagree-
ments. He thought I was a little naive and I thought he was a little naive.
Q. When did you discern indications of Communist tendencies on his part?
A. I don't know. I think I probably always considered him leftish and I
certainly never knew he was more than that. I might add by reputation even
before I met Dr. Oppenheimer, he had the reputation of being leftish. I certainly
never heard anyone say he had been a member of the Communist Party. I
think the same is true of Morrison.
Q. Did you know Charlotte Serber at Los Alamos?
A. Yes; I know her.
Q. What can you tell us about her Communist tendencies or otherwise?
A, I must admit on that I did not know that she had them. There is a certain
mannerism. Sometimes she had a characteristic of, or, maybe a little intellectual
snobbery at intervals, which I think some people have had, which incidentally
she has gotten completely over subsequently. I think there is nothing in the
political discussions that would have implied it. Actually I got to know her
better since the war than I did at Los Alamos so we lived more closely together
then. I have seen her as recently as a month ago.
Q. Where are they now?
A. Professor Serber is a professor of theoretical physics at Columbia Univer-
sity. He is also a consultant at the Brookhaven Laboratory for the Atomic
Energy and presumably thereby cleared.
Q. What about David and Frances Hawkins, did you know them at Los
Alamos?
A. I knew them. Again they were not among my intimate friends, but we
knew them. They seemed to be doing a good job, or he did. Actually she I can
place, and this is about all and I certainly— actually I had— I would not have
suspected— I was quite surprised when I learned Dave had been a member of
the Communist Party. In the case of Morrison, I had more political discussions.
I knew we disagreed more on things than with Dave. Actually it quite startled
me in his case. I don't think Dave and I ever had a political argument.
Q. What was his job down there?
A. He was in an administrative position. Here I better make sure I am truth-
ful on which my memory is a little vague. I think partly vague because of this
peculiar arrangement I had. I was there as a consultant to the Secretary of
War, and I did not go through the personnel channels. It is my impression
he had dominantly to do with personnel problems and sort of administrative
help and this kind of thing. He may have had to do with housing, though I don't
know.
Q. What about his wife. Did you know her?
A. Very little only. I would recognize her if I see her. That is about all.
Q. Did you know a man there named Robert Davis?
A. Yes; I did.
Q. What was his job?
A. Again he was in more the administrative. Later I knew his job best near
the end of the war, when he was indeed writing up something of the history or
something of this kind of the project
Q. Was that Davis or Hawkins?
A. I would have said Davis had something to do with that.
Q. Maybe he did.
A, Maybe I should appeal to higher authority. I am a little vague on that.
I might add on this it was felt that our end of the project was too secret and
it never got written up. I think I do know what Davis is doing now. Hawkins
was probably on the history. I would say that Davis was concerned, subject
to correction later, with editing a series of books on the technical projects
developed in the lab, the kind of thing that was to be published openly subse-
quent to the war. It was perfectly dear that my end of the work was never going
to be published which it never has been and I had very little to do with it.
Q. Did you come in contact with Davis very much down there?
A. I would say a reasonable amount at the end. We were not particularly
compatible people, not particularly incompatible.
Q. Did you see any indication on his part of Communist tendencies?
A. Not of Communist tendencies, of a slight glumness at intervals.
Q. Slight what?
A. Glumness. Perhaps an undue reserve. I don't know if this has to he a
Communist tendency. I didn't see anything. That is true of all concerned.
446
Q. You never suspected him of being a Communist?
A. I would never suspect. This is true of Morrison. He was more left in
his political views than I, but I would not suspect him to be a member of the
Communist Party.
Q. You would not have suspected that Hawkins was either, would you?
A. No; that is right
Q. Did you know a woman down there named Shirley Barnett?
A. Yes.
Q. Who is she?
A. She was the wife of the medical doctor. He was our pediatrician.
Q. Did she have a job there?
A. She may have. There was a period of time when it was felt for economy
of housing the wives were urged vigorously to take jobs within the technical
area. It was later realized in part that this was not as good economy as we
thought because the husband then at intervals had to wash the dishes, so the
wife could do less important work. I think for a period of time she probably
was employed.
Q. I don't expect you to remember all these things.
A. I will do my best.
Q. Do you recall at one time she was one of Dr. Oppenheimer's secretaries?
A. That may be. Pricilla Duffield was the principal of Dr. Oppenheimer's
secretaries. She was the one to whom we always went. It may very well be
she was.
Q. Did you know Shirley Barnett well?
A. Moderately; the best good summary is that we probably spent a total of
4 hours or 5 hours in conversation. You get to know a person fairly well, but
you don't get to know everything.
Q. Did you ever see any indication of Communist tendencies on her part?
A. No; there was no chance for a conversation to get that far. She is not
one who — some people you get to know well enough you can do it — in Oppen-
heimer's case, I would know it much better. None of these people did I know
as nearly as well as I knew Dr. Oppenheimer or Wendell Furry.
Q. Did you know Dr. Oppenheimer's brother Frank at all?
A. Yes; I did.
Q. How did you know him?
A. He was an employee at Los Alamos and an assistant to Dr. Bainbridge.
Q. Did you know that Frank had ever been a Communist?
A. Only after I read it in the newspapers.
Q. Were you surprised when you heard that?
A. Yes, although— yes, I was certainly surprised by this. There were prob-
ably other people at the lab I might have been more surprised about, including
myself.
Q. Did you know Mrs. J. Bobert Oppenheimer?
A. Mrs. J. Robert Oppenheimer? Yes, though not too well.
Q. Did you know she had ever been a Communist?
A. No, sir. Well, I did not know at Los Alamos. I was indeed told by Op-
penheimer himself, in fact in conjunction with the discussions pertaining to
Furry a year or so ago, that she had been a member of the Communist Party.
Q. Were you surprised when you heard that?
A. Well, I mean there is a surprise in each direction. It is quite conceivable ;
on the other hand I had no reason to anticipate it, and since the number is small,
I would say yes, I was generally surprised.
Q. Did you know Mrs. Frank Oppenheimer, whose name was Jackie?
A. I know her chiefly by name. I did not know her well ; no, sir.
Q. Did you know some people down there named Woodward ?
A. Woodward?
Q. Yes.
A. Not at Los Alamos or not well enough to be sure.
Q. Doctor, I wonder if you can help us a little bit You said that you were
a consultant or advisor to the Air Force in connection with an atomic matter.
A. I am a member of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. I am on the
Armament PaneL * * *
Q. How long have you been doing that for the Air Force?
A. I have been doing that for the Air Force I would say since about 1946,
practically since the end of the war.
Q. Doctor, could you tell us in 1949 there was a lot of discussion about whether
we would try the thermonuclear or whether we would not; what was the posi-
tion of the Air Force on this?
447
A. Our panel was consulted on it officially. On the other hand, this was one
on which we were given more Information because of the relationship to our-
selves, the official advising group for the Air Force, technical people within the
Air Force doing it. In general, certainly as the briefings were presented to us
of what was then available from the Air Force point of view, the delivery point
of view and what kind of Air Force could be useful, it was a pretty dismal propo-
sition. * * * This looked like a long time proposition.
Q. Did the Air Force want the thermonuclear weapon?
A. There were different people within it, and we saw the men who briefed us,
and they were of both opinions. It is my impression that the Air Force official
policy was yes, * * *.
Q. I am just asking for information because it had not been clear to me.
A. Particularly within the working groups of the Air Force with which we
operated, * * *.
I would not be surprised the same way I divide it within myself, sort of 55
percent probably for and 45 percent against.
Q. Did the Air Force finally take an official position as to whether they wanted
the weapon or whether they didn't?
A. This I cannot comment on. It was never referred to us. If I knew, I don't
remember. Eventually they have. They have a position now very strongly. They
very much want it now. This has been in our discussion. At what year and at
what time they decided they wanted it, I am completely unclear.
Q. Was there some debate, Doctor, about a strategic Air Force against a so-
called Maginot Line defense that you had anything to do with?
A. I had problems to do with the Air Force since about, since I went to the
Radiation Lab in 1941. Ever since that time there has been a very vigorous
debate about strategic bombing versus tactical versus air defense. This is a very
real problem the Air Force has to face. How does it distribute its funds. Within
the Air Force there is at all times a considerable amount of dissention on the
matter, ranging from the Strategic Air Command— each group essentially saying
it has the important thing. * * *
Q. Just so the record will be clear, Doctor, when you speak of a strategic air
force
A. We all agreed you need a strategic air force. Then it is essentially a matter
of how you cut a pie. Do you put practically everything in the strategic air force
with only a token air defense? Do you put an equal distribution or how do you
do it? I think most people will agree you need to have a large and strong strategic
air force. On the other hand, there are tactical problems.
Mr. GAEBISON. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to shut off discussion, and this is
all very interesting, but is it relevant to the problem before the board? I ask
this question only in the interest of time, because we have two more witnesses
waiting.
Mr. ROBB. I thought it was, Mr. Chairman, or I would not have gone into it.
I think there has been something said in the record by Dr. Oppenheimer, some-
thing about project Vista. Didn't it have to do with that?
The WITNESS. Project Vista had to do with essentially the ground forces, not
the Air Force. Essentially the problem of project Vista was given at Korea.
How do you do something about it This was very closely related also to the
Air Force. It was a joint project supported by the Air Force, as well as the
ground forces. * * *
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Project Lincoln.
A. That was another aspect of the same thing. It is an air defense problem,
continental defense. * * *
Q. Doctor, just so the record may be clear, may I ask you this question : When
you speak of a strategic air force, what is meant is not a striking force as dis-
tinguished from a defensive force?
A. Well, no. It is a striking force in general to strike rather deep. A tactical
air force is the one that strikes near the front lines of combat. The strategic
one is the one that bombs the cities and bombs the industrial sources. They get
confused. In the heat of battle they throw everything wherever it is most needed.
Q. Doctor, to pull this in briefly, do you know what Dr. Oppenheimer's position
was on these questions?
A. I believe I know. I have had a number of discussions with him on Jt. I
think I know fairly closely. This was the belief as mine that yon need all,
you need a balanced force, not exclusively or too overwhelmingly one. Too aeed
S08S1S— 54 20
448
a very strong strategic air command. I believe, however, he felt that too large a
fraction of the Air Force's moneys were going to that compared to the very small
amount that was going to the problem of air defense. I must admit I agree with
him. I am not sure that we would necessarily agree as to how much connection
needs to be made. He may want to do it more or less than I.
On this I am in complete agreement and so are many members of our advisory
committee board.
Q. In other words, the scientists tend to favor rather the continental defense
theory, Is that it?
A. No ; I would say they favor the balanced force theory which many people
in the military also favor, * * * I don't know of any scientist concerned with
military things who thinks that we should drop the strategic air force. Almost
all I know and it is my impression that Dr. Oppenheimer would also argue that it
should be the biggest part of the air force, but not the whole thing.
Q. I am cautioned that I should avoid getting into classified material on
that matter.
A. I think what we have said so far is all right, but we are getting close,
I agree.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer have any part in that?
A. Yes sir. * * *
Q! Can you without getting into classified material give us Dr. Oppenheimer's
position?
A. I think approximately. I think his position was that the defense of the
country as well as its ability to retaliate was a very important thing, which was
being underdeveloped. * * *
In order to strengthen our country, we needed to put more support behind this.
I might add that this is now to the best of my knowledge part of the official
policy of the United States.
Q. Was there more than one technique without getting into classified material?
A. There are a number of intermixed techniques in this. You use all. I
would say that the most important of the new ideas is the one you referred to
and I will avoid having to refer to it myself.
Q. Were there three fundamental techniques, Doctor?
A. The usual thing when you categorize things— if you name them, I will
agree with them maybe.
Q. I will ask a question that maybe will kind it up. Was there any technique
that Dr. Oppenheimer opposed?
A. I don't know. It is on the record that at least one time he opposed
development of an H-bomb.
Q. I am talking about this long range detection?
A. I don't know of any, no, sir. There may be, but I certainly do not know it.
Mr. OPPBNHEIMER. I know this is not a classroom, but the counse1 and the
witness are talking about two quite distinct things and therefore they are not
understanding each other.
Mr. BOBB. I realized that, too, on the last question. I don't think the witness
understood my question.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. I was talking about this long range detection matter, Doctor. I asked
you whether there was more than one technique for long range detection, and
I believe you said there was.
A. Sure,
Q. The question I asked you was there any technique that Dr. Oppenheimer
opposed?
A. Not to my knowledge. I thought you meant a nondetection technique.
Q. One further question. Was there a man down at Los Alamos while you
were there named David Greenglass?
A. I never met him, but I obviously read about him in the paper. I believe
be was a machinist.
Q. You didn't know him?
A. Never saw him.
Mr. ROBB. Thank you very much.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Ramsey, with respect to the compartmentalization versus
noncompartmentalization, I believe you indicated that this was a technique
which had been used in some other laboratories, and was found to be useful
as far as the expedition of work was concerned at Los Alamos?
The WITNESS. Correct
449
Mr. GRAY. Am I right, however, in recalling that you said that yon were
in a compartmentalized area?
The WITNESS. I would say semieompartmentalized.
Mr. GB^Y. Because of the extreme secrecy?
The WITNESS. And also from the lack of necessity of knowledge of technical
development The point of view that certainly most of us adopted was in the
best interests of the country, what will speed things versus what will risk
security. In my own group there wasn't much advantage to have the inter-
change that was so necessary to the development in the rest of the group, and
there was also this particular secret aspect that my group indicated how far
we were coming along.
Mr. GRAY. So in the absence of the desirability on the ground of expedition
of the work, compartmentalization was a security measure which was adhered to?
The WITNESS. Yes; I incidentally believe that what was done on the com-
partmentalization there was very good indeed, and the noncompartmentalization.
I think it would have been vastly later had it not been for that.
Mr. GRAY. One other question about Los Alamos. You were not allowed to
leave the premises without permission, is that correct?
The WITNESS. This varied a little from time to time. We always had to show
passes at the gate.
Mr. GRAY. No.
The WITNESS. For any extensive visit you had. I think you could go to Santa
Fe to do shopping without higher authority.
Mr. GRAY. Who was in charge of that?
The WITNESS. We showed our passes to the guard at the gate. I would say
probably Colonel de Silva.
Mr. GRAY. It would be the security people.
The WITNESS. Yes; it would be the security people.
Mr. GRAY. On your formula 5545, had you served on a committee or in some
other capacity at that time and in such capacity been required to vote on the
crash program, I assume that the 55 percent
The WITNESS. That is correct
Mr. GRAY. There comes a time when a man
The WITNESS. Has to make a decision, that is correct One important argu-
ment might have reversed the 55 the other way. I would have to face that
That is correct I would have voted in that time in favor of it
Mr. GRAY. You pretty well knew the various arguments?
The WITNESS. I think I knew most of them. I did not know all of them.
I certainly respected those people. There were many who disagreed with me,
Mr. GRAY. Yes ; I understand that Just in the interest of my understanding
the record, in talking about Dr. Furry, you said he could not have joined the
Communist Party in 1940. What did you mean by that?
The WITNESS. I can tell you what I mean. I realized this when I said 1940.
This was the time of the Nazi-Soviet agreement, and I do know also from the
testimony that he almost got out at that time. Actually he didn't get out at
that time. But he almost did. Essentially by that argument I am saying that
I think it would have been very unlikely that would have been the moment at
which he Initiated the move of getting in. It is because also I remember he had
been in before that period.
Mr. GRAY. Yes. I was trying to get that clear. Whether you are saying
that it could not have been 1940 had to do with your recollection or had to do
with an international situation.
The WITNESS. I would say it actually had to do with both. I think it was
dominantiy recollection. As I started to say this, I remember the 1988 date.
But what I know of him I think this would not have been the date he would
have chosen. It is the period of the collapse of France and the Nazi-Soviet Pact
I am sure he would not have chosen that as joining. He was very upset about
it, and in fact dropped going from all meetings.
Mr. GRAY. You said he almost resigned.
The WITNESS. Yes. As a matter of fact, If it were not that he moved so
slowly—it took him about a year to make up his mind to drop out by which
time Russia was an ally.
Mr. GRAY. There have been a lot of allegations about the fact that people
at Harvard and other institutions have been involved— I don't mean to single
out Harvard— but they have been.
The WITNESS. That is correct
Mr. GRAY. Of course, Dr. Furry's name has appeared publicly along
three others at the same time.
450
The WITNESS. There hare been a total of three. Actually one of them is no
longer teaching at Harvard. He was on a temporary appointment. One has an
appointment terminating this year. Furry is the only permanent member of the
tenure appointment in the Harvard faculty for which this is true.
Mr. GRAY. Were these others known to you?
The WITNESS. No; I never met any of them. Incidentally, Kaneman, our
other most conspicuous case, Furry has never met him. I am sorry they saw
each other at a hearing.
Mr. ROBB. Is that Martin Kaneman?
The WITNESS. It is a good question. I think it is Leon. I am quite sure.
Dr. EVANS. Dr. Ramsey, would you tell us about your undergraduate and
graduate education and where you had them.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir. I received my bachelor's degree from Columbia Uni-
versity. I was given a traveling fellowship by Columbia University to go
Cambridge University where I did the peculiar thing— the universities are dif-
ferent—I received another bachelor's degree from Cambridge University, sub-
sequently a master's degree. I came back and got my Ph. D. degree from
Columbia,
Dr. EVANS. Did you meet a Bernie Peters down there at Los Alamos?
The WITNESS. I certainly didn't meet him at Los Alamos. I met him at
Rochester subsequently, and I didn't realize he had been at Los Alamos.
Dr. EVANS. Did you meet Lomanitz down there?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Rossi?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Did you meet Weinberg down there?
The WITNESS. At Los Alamos?
Dr. EVANS. He was at Berkeley.
The WITNESS. I think he was at Berkeley. As a matter of fact, I never met
Weinberg.
Dr. EVANS. Did you meet Mr. Flanders down there?
The WITNESS. Yes ; he was a mathematician.
Dr. EVANS. Yes ; he was an electronic mathematician.
The WITNESS. He was in the computing. It was mathematics at first. It
gradually developed into electronics.
Dr. EVANS. Did he have his beard?
The WITNESS. He had his beard, and it startled the security guards no end.
Dr. EVANS. You say you knew Fuchs?
The WITNESS. Fachs, under sworn testimony I would have to say to the best
of my knowledge I have never seen the man, and I couldn't even prove he was
ever at Los Alamos.
Mr. GBAY. Forgive me for reminding you, that you are giving sworn testimony.
The WITNESS. That is correct I was about to say if I were, and realized that
I am.
Dr. EVANS. Some of these people that you knew down there in this cell at
Harvard, a number turned out later to be Communists.
The WITNESS. Yes; actually the only member of the group at Harvard that I
ever met was Furry. This was subsequent to his membership.
Dr. EVANS. You knew Hawkins, you said.
The WITNESS. Yes. I am sorry. At Los Alamos I knew the people I have
enumerated, including Hawkins.
Dr. EVANS. From what you know now, and thinking back, would you think you
are a very good judge as to whether a man is a Communist or not?
The WITNESS. I would say yes; I think on the following, I mean since you
were not trying to judge, you can guess some people might be and some were not.
I don't think you can explicitly with someone you don't know terribly well as
with all the ones I have enumerated, my conversation runs to maybe a total of
4 or 5 hours, I certainly would have had no claim with anyones enumerated
would I ever have felt in a position of saying they weren't I would not have
been in a position to claim they were or were not. Simply I didn't know them
well enough. I don't think ability to judge enters there. A person whom I
never met I can't say anything. A person whom I met only casually, chiefly to
talk; about the physics problems, is no way to judge.
Dr. EVANS. That is alL
Mr. GBAY. Mr. Garrison?
Mr. GARRISON. No.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much.
451
The WITNESS. Thank you. Sorry to hare taken so much of your time.
(Witness excused.)
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Rabt, do you wish to testify under oath?
Dr. RABI. Certainly.
Mr. GRAY. Would you be good enough to raise your right hand. I must ask
for your full name.
Dr. RABI. Isadore Isaac Rabi.
Mr. GRAY. Isadore Isaac Rabi, do you swear that the testimony you are to give
the board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
Dr. RABI. I do.
Whereupon, Isadore Isaac Rabi was called as a witness, and having been first
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
Mr. GRAY. Would you be seated, please, sir?
• I must remind you of the existence of the perjury statutes. I am prepared
to give you a description of the penalties if you wish, but may I assume you are
•generally familiar with the perjury statutes?
The WITNESS. I know that they are dire.
Mr. GRAY. I would also ask, Dr. Rabi, that you notify me in advance about
the possible discussion or disclosure of any restricted data which you may get
into or find necessary to get into your testimony.
The WITNESS. I hope to have the help of Dr. Beckerley on that.
Mr. GRAY. He is here and I am sure will be alert.
The WETNESS. I am confused about what has been declassified that I want
technical professional help.
Mr. GRAY. Finally, I should point out to you that we regard the proceedings
of this board as a matter confidential in nature between the Commission and its
officials and Dr. Oppenheimer, his representatives and witnesses. The Com-
mission will make no public release of matters pertaining to these proceedings,
and on behalf of the board, I make it a custom to express to the witnesses the
hope that they may take the same attitude.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr* MARKS :
Q. Dr. Rabi, what is your present occupation?
A. I am the Higgins professor of physics at Columbia University.
Q. What official positions do you have with the Government?
A. Let me see if I can add them all up.
Q. Just the most important.
A. At present as chairman of the General Advisory Committee, as successor
to Dr. Oppenheimer. I am a member of the Scientific Advisory Committee to
ODM, which also is supposed to in some way advise the President of the United
States. .
I am a member of the Scientific Advisory Committee to the Ballistics Research
Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Ground. I am a member of the board of
trustees of Associated Universities, Inc., which is responsible for the running of
Brookhaven Laboratory. I am a consultant to the Brookhaven National
Laboratory.
I was a member of the project East River, but that is over. I was at one
time the chairman of the Scientific Advisory Committee to the policy board of
the joint research and development board, and a consultant there for a number
of years. I am a consultant to project Lincoln.
That is about all I can remember at the moment
Q. That is enough. Speaking roughly, how much of your time do you devote
to this official work?
A. I added up what it amounted to last year, and it amounted to something
like 120 working days. So you might ask what time do you spend at Columbia.
Q. How long have you been a member of the General Advisory Committee?
4» Since its inception, I don't remember the exact date of my appointment but
I have been to every meeting. I may have missed one since the first
Q. When did you become chairman?
A. I became acting chairman when Dr. Oppenheimer's term was out By
our own custom the chairman is elected at the first meeting of the calendar year,
and I was elected chairman by the committee at the first meeting which I think
was in January of last year. I am not sure of the date of the meeting.
452
Q. Dr. Rabi, to what extent has your work as consultant in various capacities
in the Government overlapped or coincided with work that Dr. Oppenheimer was
performing at the same time and in the same general field?
A. Chiefly of course the General Advisory Committee and also to a degree
in project Lincoln, and particularly the summer study of, I believe, 1952.
Q. Summer study where?
A. This was a summer study at Cambridge on the question of continental
defense of the United States.
Q. How long have you known Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I think we first met in the end of 1928 and we got to know one another
well in the winter and spring of 1929. I have known him on and off since. We
got together very frequently during the war years and since.
Q. Do you know him intimately?
A. I think so, whatever the term may mean. I think I know him quite welL
Q. Dr. Rabi, if you will indulge me I would like to skip around somewhat
because as nearly as possible I would like to avoid too much repetition of things
that have already been gone into by others.
Will you describe the extent that you can what took place in the fall of
1949 insofar as the GAC was concerned or you are concerned in respect of the
question of thermonuclear program for the Atomic Energy Commission?
A. I can only give my own view and my own recollection. I have not prepared
myself for this by studying the minutes. I intended to, but I am on in the
morning rather than the afternoon. So I can give you Just my own recollection.
The thermonuclear reaction or as it was called the super was under intense
study from my very first contact with Los Alamos.
Q. When was that?
A. About April 15, 1943. At the establishment of the laboratory, Dr. Oppen-
heimer called together a group of people to discuss the policy and technical
direction of- the laboratory, and I was one of those who was invited to that
discussion. All through the war years and following that, that was a subject
of discussion and consideration by some of the very best minds in physics.
The problem proved to be an extremely difficult, very recalcitrant problem,
because of the many factors which were involved where the theory, the under-
standing of the thing, was inadequate. It was just a borderline. The more one
looked at it, the tougher it looked.
Following announcement of the Russian explosion of the A bomb, I felt that
somehow or other some answer must be made in some form to this to regain
the lead which we had. There were two directions in which one could look;
either the realization of the super or an Intensification of the effort on fission
weapons to make very large ones, small ones, and so on, to get a large variety
and very great military flexibility.
Furthermore, a large number, a large increase in the production of the
necessary raw materials, the fissionable materials and so on, or one could
consider both. There was a real question there where the weight of the effort
should lie.
Q. When would you say that this question that you are now describing began
to become acute in your thinking?
A. Right away.
Q. You mean with the Russian explosion?
A. As soon as I heard of the Russion explosion. I discussed it with some
colleagues. I know I discussed it with Dr. Ernest Lawrence, with Luis Alvarez,
and of course with the chairman of our committee, Dr. Oppenheimer. In fact,
I discussed it with anybody who was cleared to discuss such matters, because it
was a very, very serious problem.
That question then came up at the meeting of the General Advisory Committee,
Q. That would have been the meeting that began on October 29, 1949?
A. Yes. I do not recollect now whether this was the first meeting after the
announcement of the Russian explosion or whether there was an intervening
meeting.
Q. To refresh your recollection, Dr. Rabi, I think it has been in the record
here that there was a regular meeting of the General Advisory Committee Just
after or just at the time when the Russian explosion was being evaluated.
A. Yes. I recollect now. In fact, I was coming up on the airplane and
there was Dr. Oockroft, the director of Harwell— he didn't tell me what it was—
but he said you will read something very interesting in the newspaper.
Q. You were coming on the airplane from where?
453
A. From New York to Washington on the airplane. I ran into Dr. Cockrof t,
and he told me I would read something very interesting in the noon paper. When
I stepped off the plane there was the Star with this announcement.
Q. This meeting which you identified was more or less contemporaneous by
the official announcement of this Government that there bad been a Russian
explosion, was there any discussion at that time of the thermonuclear?
A. I would have to refresh my memory on that I can not say. I would be
astonished if there were not. I cannot say. I could go back and look. In fact,
we talked about it at every meeting.
Q. In all events, the interval between that meeting and the one on the 29th,
was very much on your mind?
Yes, sir.
Q. Do you have any recollection or impression as to the form in which the
question of what to do about the thermonuclear problem came up in your meet-
ing that began on October 29?
A. The way I recollect it now, without perusal of the minutes— in fact, I think
we kept no minutes of that meeting which is somewhat unfortunate under the
present circumstances — the way I recollect
Q. Do you know why no minutes were kept?
A. Because the discussion ranged so very widely. We were concerned during
that period, as I remember and we consulted with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we
consulted with representatives of the State Department and a whole lot of stuff
was there which we didn't feel should be distributed around. We decided not
to keep accurate minutes of the meeting.
What was the question again.
Q. I asked you whether you had any recollection or any impression as to the
form in which the question concerning the thermonuclear problem came before
you, that is, the GAG, at the meeting which began on October 29, 1949.
A. As I recollect it now— it is 5 years ago— the chairman, Dr. Oppenheimer,
started very solemnly and as I recall we had to consider this question. The
question came not whether we should make a thermonuclear weapon, but whether
there should be a crash program. There were some people, and I myself was
of that opinion for a time, who thought that the concentration on the crash
program to go ahead with this was the answer to the Russian thermonuclear
weapon. The question was, should it be a crash program and a technical ques-
tion: What possibilities lay in that? What would be the cost of initiating a
crash program in terms of the strength of the United States because of the
weakening of the effort on which something which we had in hand, namely, the
fission weapons, and the uncompleted designs of different varieties, to have a
really flexible weapon, the question of interchangeability of parts, all sorts of
things which could be used in different military circumstances.
Then there was the question of the military value of this weapon. One of
the things which we talked about a great deal was that this weapon as promised
which didn't exist and which we didn't know how to make, what sort of military
weapon was it anyway? What sort of target it was good for. And what would
be the general political effect
In other words, we felt— and I am talking chiefly about myself— that this
was not just a weapon. But by its very nature, if you attacked a target, it took
in very much more. We felt it was really essential and we discussed a great
deal what were you buying if you got this thing. That was the general nature
of the discussion.
Technical, military, and the combination of military political.
Q. Dr. Babl, if in the state of mind that you have described the question among
others had been put to you by the Commission or its chairman to consider an
appraisal of the then program of the Atomic Energy Commission of whether it
was adequate and if not, what to do about it, what you would have considered
a question in those general terms embraced.
A. Are you referring specifically to the thermonuclear weapon or to the whole
program?
Q. I am referring to anything that you t&ink of. Would that have embraced
the thermonuclear?
A. The thermonuclear weapon at Los Alamos went through ups and downs.
We spent a lot of time talking of how we could get some very good theoretical
physicists to go to Los Alamos and strengthen that effort We thought at times
of the effort as being such a distant thing that working on that kind of research
because it was a distant thing and new Ideas would evolve and would really act
as a ferment and sort of spark the laboratory. It was one of ffcose things where
454
you really didn't know how to find a way. Where experiments were really diffi-
cult to make and tremendously expensive.
With the ideas in hand it was very hard to know how to go at this thing,
even how to set up a crash program. But what we were concerned about on
the other hand, we felt that there was a very great inadequacy in the Commis-
sion's program with respect to the production process, the amounts of fissionable
material, and the amounts of raw material which were being produced, that
we were not spending enough money on that
We felt almost from the very beginning of an increase in Hanford. We
made a technical recommendation at the time of how more could be gotten out
of Hanford. About hastening the construction of certain chemical plants for
the purification of the material. It was our feeling that the resultant controversy
when the President ordered Savannah River that the whole controversy was
worth the thing.
Q. You are getting ahead of me.
A. You asked such a broad question.
Q. I am losing track of this. Just once more, to search your memory, and
if you haven't got any, all you have to do is say so—search your memory as to
the form in which, the nature of the circumstances in which there was before
the General Advisory Committee in the capacity as such at the October 29
Mr. Boss. 1949 meeting.
Mr. MASKS. I am sorry.
By Mr. MASKS :
Q. At the October 29, 1949, meeting. The sense that you were appropriately
considering the question of a crash program for the super. If you haven't got
any memory, say so.
A. The sense of whether we were considering a crash program for the super?
Q. Do you have any memory as to how that question was before you? Among
lawyers we say how did the question come up in the case.
A. You mean in detail how it came up? You mean who said what to whom,
when? That I don't remember. I am sure it was before us.
Q. You don't know who presented it?
A. How it was presented, whether it was first presented with our preliminary
meeting with the Commissioners, whether it was first suggested by Dr. Oppen-
heimer, and then confirmed in the preliminary meeting with the Commissioners,
and so on. I really don't remember. At other meetings we have minutes and
all this would have been spelled out
Q. To the extent that you can tell it without getting into any classified
material, what was the outcome of the GAG meeting of October 1949?
A. I will try to give it as best I can.
Q. Let me break it down. First, is it fair to say that the committee was in
agreement with respect or essentially in agreement with respect to the technical
factors involved in the thermonuclear situation?
A. It was hard to say whether there was an agreement or not because what
we are talking about was such a vague thing, this object, that I think different
people had different thoughts about it. You could just give a sort of horseback
thing and say, maybe something would come out in 5 years. It is that sort of
thing. I know in my own case I think I took the dimmest technical view of
this, and there are others who were more optimistic.
Q. I think it has been indicated here that there was some statement in the
report of the GAC at that time to the effect that it was the opinion that a
concerted imaginative effort might produce— that there was a 50-50 chance of
success in 5 years.
Mr. ROBB. In the interest of accuracy, I think the report says a better than
even chance. Let me check it to make sure.
Mr. GAEBISON. That is correct
By Mr. MASKS:
Q. Was that supposed to be a consensus of the views ?
A. More or less. When you are talking about something as vague as this
particular thing, you say a 50-60 chance in 5 years, where you don't know the
kind of physical factors and theory that goes into the problem. I Just want to
give my own impression that It was a field where we really did not know what
we were talking about, except on the basis of general experience. We didn't
even know whether this thing contradicted the laws of physics.
Q. You didn't know what?
A, Whether it contradicted the laws of physics.
455
Q. In other words, It could have been altogether impossible.
A. It could have been altogether impossible. The thing we were talking iiDout.
I want to be specific.
Q. I understand.
A. We were talking within a certain definite framework of ideas.
Q. To the extent that you can describe them now and confining yourself to
that meeting, to the extent that you can describe them without trespassing on
classified material, what were the recommendations o£ the GAG?
A. They were complicated. We divided into two groups. No, there were
some recommendations to which I think we all agreed, which were specific
technical recommendations.
Q. Can you say what they had to do with in general terms?
A. Certain improvements in weapons, the production of certain material
which would be of great utility in weapons and which we felt at the time might
be fundamental if a super were to be made. We recommended sharply si go-
ahead on that. We recommended certain directions of weapons and there was
a third important recommendation which I don't recollect now of a technical
nature.
Q. You have spoken of a division. What had you reference to there?
A. In addition to that there were supplementary reports on which Dr. Fenni
and I formed a minority, and the other six members present the majority. That
liad more to do with this sphere where the political and the military impinge.
One group felt— I don't like to speak for them because the record is there, but
my impression was— that this projected weapon was just no good as a weapon.
Q. Jou mean the particular weapon?
A. I am not talking from the technical but the military opinion. That it was
not of great military utility. The possible targets were very few in number,
and so on. I could elaborate on that if I should be asked, but I am speaking for
somebody else, and there is a record.
Q. That was the group with which you did not join?
A. Yes. Of this specific design, Dr. Fermi and I as I recollect it now felt that
in the first place as far as we could see from the question of having a deliverable
weapon one did not gain a tremendous amount. Secondly, we felt that the
whole discussion raised an opportunity for the President of the United States
to make some political gesture which would be such that it would strengthen
our moral position, should we decide to go ahead with it That our position
should be such that depending on the reaction, we would go ahead or not,
whatever going ahead were to mean.
Q. What made you think that it was appropriate for you to speak about these
rather nontechnical but more political, diplomatic and military considerations?
A. That is a good question. However, somehow or other we didn't feel it was
inappropriate. In our whole dealing with the Commission, we very often, or
most often, raised the questions to be discussed. In other words, we would
say we want to discuss this and this thing. Would you please provide us with
documents, would you 'bring individuals to talk to us on this, and we would
address the Commission on questions.
On the other hand, we didn't feel badly if they didn't act on our suggestions.
Sometimes they did and sometimes they didn't So we did not feel that this
was inappropriate. It would be very hard for me to tell you now why we
thought it was appropriate, but we thought so.
Q After this meeting of the GAG, the outcome of which you described -
A. I might add, to add to your feeling on this, the Joint Chiefs consented to
come and talk to us, and gentlemen from the State Department came and talked
to us. So we did not have the feeling all along that we were going far beyond
our terms of reference otherwise these people would not have showed up.
Q. If you can properly so so, Dr. Babi, to what extent and in what way did
the appearance of the Joint Chiefs or their representatives affect the course
of your thinking and your expression of view?
A. Oh, dear; that is very hard to remember. I can only talk for myself.
I, myself ; I don't want to talk for anybody. * * *
By .Mr.
Q. Did the GAG have any responsibility for seeing to it that the Joint \3biefs
W A6 Bfo/*We did meet fairly frequently with the Military Liaison Conwri tjm
Q. Is it fair to say that the GAG tried to keep the Military liaison Committee
fully informed? v
456
A. Our job was not to inform the Military Liaison Committee. Our Job
was definitely to talk to the AEC and as we interpreted it on the suggestion of the
chairman of the ABC at one time, to the President on some very special occasion.
We have tried then and since not to be the servant of the MOC or to work
directly through them or the joint congressional committee. Our job is to
work with the AEC as specified in the law and possibly with the President.
Q. After the President announced the decision to go ahead with the hydrogen
bomb in January of 1950, what attitude and what steps, if any, did the GAC
take with respect to the subject from then on?
A. I think we started talking about the best ways and means to do it.
It was a very difficult question, because here is a statement from the President
to do something that nobody knew how to do. This was just a ball of wax.
So we were really quite puzzled except insofar as to try to get people to go and
look at the problem.
Q. In that connection, did the GAC itself try to look into the problem?
A. Insofar as we could; yes. We had people who were quite expert and
actually worked on it, chiefly of course Dr. Fermi, who went back' to Los Alamos,
summers and so on, and took a lot of time with it. So we had a very important
expert right on the committee. Of course, Dr. Oppenheimer knew very well
the theoretical questions involved.
Q. Do you think the GAC had any usefulness in helping the work on this
particular subject?
A. I think it did; I think it had a great usefulness some way indirect and
some way direct, ways of trying to bring out the solid facts. It is awfully hard to
get at those facts. I recall particularly one meeting, I think it was in the
summer of 1950 at Los Alamos, I am sure of the dates, where we actually
got together all the knowledgeable people we could find, I think Dr. Bethe was
there and Fermi, to try to produce some kind of record which would tell us where
we stood. This was before the Greenhouse, test.
Q. You mean what the state of the art was at that time?
A. What the state of the art was, and where do we go from here.
Q. How many of he laws of nature on the subject were available?
A. What ideas and what technical information was available. We got this
report and it was circulated by the Commission in various places because there
was some kind of feeling that here the President is given the directive and some-
how something is going to appear at the other end and it was not appearing.
Q. If you can tell, Dr. Rabi, what was the connection or relation between
the meeting you have just described at Los Alamos and another meeting that
has been testified here which took place, I believe, in 1951, in the late spring
at Princeton?
A. That was an entirely different meeting. At that meeting we really got on
the beam, because a new invention had occurred. There we had a situation
where you really could talk about it. You knew what to calculate and so on,
and you were in the realm where you could apply scientific ideas which were not
some extrapolation very far beyond the known. This is something which could
be calculated, which could be studied, and was an entirely different thing.
Q. Why did it take that long?
A. Just the human mind.
Q. There was the President's directive in January 1950.
A. Wny it took this long? One had to get rid of the ideas that were and
are probably no good. In other words, there has been all this newspaper
stuff about delay. The subject which we discussed in the 1949 meeting, that
particular thing has never been made and probably never will be made, and
we still don*t know to this day whether something like that will function.
This other thing was something quite different, a much more modest and more
definite idea on which one could go.
Q. I interrupted you a while back when you displayed some enthusiasm with
the Savannah River project Would you try to fix in point of time when you
intended that expression of enthusiasm?
A. Just as soon as we got some more money to make more plants which
would make fissionable material and really here was a policy of containment * * *
I am quite sure that would have been unanimous in' the committee. Also,
there were certain technical devices to increase the production and we pressed
on that ' There was a very long delay just because of conservatism, and a new
contractor, and so on, in doing some of those things. But the pressure of the
G AC all along
Q. When you say all along, what do yon mean, 1947, 1048, 19497
457
A. At almost every meeting.
Q. Through all of those years?
A. That is right. Increased production of both fissionable material and of
raw material, and particularly we kept on recommending a facility for the
production of neutrons which we knew would be very useful in some way or
other without particularly specifying where the use would come.
Q. Was Savannah River regarded by you as one of the great answers to that
need which you have just described?
A. Oh, yes; I regard Savannah River as the way we answered the Russian
success.
Q. I don't know whether you said earlier what Dr. Oppenheimer's view was
about that.
A. I am quite sure that he was never in disagreement with that.
Q. Was never in disagreement?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he evidence your enthusiasm?
A. I tfrinfe so. He is not the same enthusiastic fellow as I am, but I was
quite sure he believed that it was a correct step.
Q. Dr. Rabi, there has been some questioning and some talk by other wit-
nesses about a subject which is somewhat obscure to me, but perhaps if I Just
identify it, you may be able to say something about it, namely, the question
of a so-called second laboratory. Is there anything that you can say properly
on that subject?
A. I will try and let Dr. Beckerley watch me on it.
Q. Maybe you better consult with Dr. Beckerley first
A. That question came up again and again. Los Alamos is an awkward
place and so on, and' various people kept on saying -
Q. May I interrupt you, Dr. Rabi. When the term "second laboratory* is
used, is it fair for me to assume that what is being talked about is the second
laboratory which will have something to do primarily with weapons?
A. That is what I am Curing about I am Just giving you my recollection
of a whole series of discussions which came up from time to time. That com-
petition is good. Los Alamos has been criticized for being too conservative
and stodgy. The suggestion that some other group utilizing talent which for
some reason or another was unobtainable at Los Alamos would be a good thing.
I, myself, I may say was not in favor of that, and my own reason was— and
1 1-™** Dr. Oppenheimer shared this reason, at least in part— that Los Alamos
was a miracle of a laboratory. If you had looked at the dope sheet of the
people that were there, you would not have expected in 1945 that it would be
Just a tremendously successful laboratory and of such a very high morale. It
was really a terifflc laboratory, just a miracle of a place.
As a result of establishing another laboratory, I was afraid that it would be
taken at Los Alamos as a criticism and taking chances of spoiling morale.
Those laboratories, as I think Mr. Morgan will know, largely depend upon the
few key people. If you are to lose them, you have lost the lab. So my own
feeling was, they are doing remarkably well and why upset the applecart
There was a possibility also that they would lose some personnel in a sort of
ne out in the expansion of the activities of Los Alamos, these
variouTtests and so on, that they used a lot of the contractors all over the
place They do a tremendous amount of subcontracting all over the plac*.
A! IS over the United States. One very good group in instrumentation was
do «.uu»v.. that some important contract
on^rsubTeTwMchTwonT'even enter was canceled there, ^P^™1^.^
came available, and I think it was a suggestion of the GAO that that group
should brcombined and another laboratory made whose chief terms of refor-
ence would be in the realm of instrumentation for the study of explosions.
Subseauently and I think not on the direct recommendation, although I am
not iu^SS the record, but this is my recollection, the terms of reference of
that laboratory were expanded, so that it became an actual second weapons lab-
oratory. I think in popular opinion such as Time magazine, and so on, it Is that
laboratory which produced the thermonuclear weapon. That is a lie.
Mr. GBAY. That is what, Doctor?
The WITNESS. That is a lie.
458
By Mr. MABKS :
Q. Do you mean by that to say that what has been produced came out of Los
Alamos?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. There has been a good deal, I think, of official information about the pres-
ent strength of the United States in relation to nuclear weapons, fission and
fusion. Is that in your opinion the result of work at Los Alamos?
A, Yes, it is my unqualified opinion.
Q. And not the second laboratory?
A. Not the second laboratory. The second laboratory has done very good
work on Instrumentation.
Q. There has also been some talk as a result of questioning in these proceed-
ings about the question of continental defense. Is there anything that you
can say properly about that subject, about your attitude on it, and about Dr.
Oppenheimer?
A. I can suggest the motivation and I think Dr. Oppenheimer and I agreed.
It is threefold. One, we think that to protect the lives of Americans is worth any-
body's while. Two, that one is in a stronger position in a war if one is fighting
from a protected citadel, rather than just being open and just a slugging match
with no defense guard put up. Thirdly, and it is more political, that the ex-
istence of such a defense would make us less liable to intimidation and
Behind this were some brand new ideas, at least new to me, which came from
some individuals in Cambridge, particularly Dr. Zacharias, which made such a
defense line possible at a reasonable cost
Q. Who is Dr. Zacharias?
A. Dr. Zacharias is a professor of physics at MIT. He is the head of their
division of nuclear science. During the war he was at the Radiation Laboratory
at MIT on radar. He spent a certain amount of time at Los Alamos. He was
the head of the * * * summer study for the Navy. * * *
Q. Are you sure you are not mistaken? * * *
A. Zacharias was the head of the Hartwell study. Then also he ran the sum-
mer study.
Q. When you speak of the summer study, you means the one that is popularly
called project Lincoln?
A. No, project Lincoln is a big project and laboratory which exists. The
summer study was a special group brought together for a limited period of time
of experts in different fields to look into the technical military question of the
possibilities of the defense of the United States.
Q. Were you and Dr. Oppenheimer concerned at all with that?
A. I tfrfok we each spent a week or so at the beginning and a week or so at the
end of this. We were not actually members of the working party.
Q. You were consultants?
A. Consultants.
Q. Does the attitude that you have described on the subject of continental
defense mean that you are opposed to a powerful strategic air policy?
A. As far as I am concerned, I certainly am not
Q. Am not what? .
A. Opposed to it. I am very much in favor of it I would like to see it more
effective than it is. * * *
Q. Are the two things compatible, the continental defense you are talking
about, and the strategic?
A. Absolutely. These are the 2 arms. One is the punching arm and the
other the guard. You have to have both, in my opinion.
Q. Do you know whether Dr. Oppenheimer's views are materially different
from yours on the subject?
• A; I don't think they are. I think his emphasis might be somewhat different
I don't think the views are different I think the emphasis might be different
Q. In what way?
A. Now we are getting into things which I would prefer not to answer.
Q. Why?
A. Because it comes into questions of actual strategy and tactics of which we
have special knowledge and I don't want to go into any details of that sort.
Q. All right. Just so that I will understand what you are saying, I take it
that you strongly favor, and to your knowledge Oppenheimer strongly favors,
a powerful strategic air policy.
A. Yes.
459
Q. And that you also favor an effective continental defense.
A. That is right
Q. And that you regard the two things as not incompatible?
A. No, no. I think they are just absolutely complementary. They both have
to be there. To put it in a word, a strategic air arm unless you are going to
prevent a war is a psychological weapon, a deterrent. But the other f ellow may
not be the same and you have to have some kind of defense before he does you
irreparable damage, and furthermore, your plans may not go as you expect.
They may miscarry. Unless you have a defense, you are not getting another
chance.
Dr. GRAY. Let me interrupt for a moment to ask you how much longer do
you think your direct will take?
Mr. MABKS. Just two more questions. If you would rather
Mr. GRAY. No, proceed.
By Mr. MASKS.
Q. Doctor, it can be gathered from the nature of these proceedings that this
board has the function of advising the Commission with respect to a determina-
tion that the Commission must make on whether permitting Dr. Oppenheimer
to have access to restricted data will not endanger the common defense and
security.
In formulating this advice, the considerations suggested by the Atomic Energy
Act to be taken into account are the character, associations, and loyalty of the
individual concerned.
Do you feel that you know Dr. Oppenheimer well enough to comment on the
bearing of his character, loyalty and associations on this issue?
A. I think Dr. Oppenheimer is a man of upstanding character, that he is a
loyal individual, not only to the United States, which of course goes without
saying in my mind, but also to his friends and his organizations to which he is
attached, let us say, to the institutions, and work very hard for his loyalties ; an
upright character, very upright character, very thoughtful, sensitive feeling in
that respect.
With regard to the question of association, I might say that I have seen the
brief form of what would you call it, the report of Dr. Oppenheimer?
Q. What is that?
A. It is some document about 40 pages which is a summary.
Q. When did you see it?
A. Some time in January.
Q. How did you happen to see it?
A. The Chairman of the Commission asked me to take a look at it.
Mr. GABEISON. What year?
The WITNESS. This year. I would say that in spite of the associations in
there, I do not believe that Dr. Oppenheimer is a security risk, and that these
associations in the past should bar him from access to security information for
the Atomic Energy Commission.
By Mr. MARKS.
Q. The report you speak of, is that in amplification of the letter of allegations
or derogatory information which you have read of General Nichols to Dr.
Oppenheimer?
A. I don't know whether it was made as an amplification.
Q. I am just trying to get some sense of what it is.
A. I don't know. I understood it to be a digest of a very big file.
Q. I didn't understand clearly, Dr. Babi. You used the phrase "bar him."
Would you mind repeating what you had in mind?
A. I will put it this way. If I had to make the determination, after having
read this and knowing Dr. Oppenheimer for all the years I would know him, I
would have continued him in his position as consultant to the Atomic Energy
Commission, which he was before. .
Mr. MARKS. That is all.
Dr. GRAY. Are you ready to proceed with the examination?
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, it is now about 1 : 15. I am going to take 45 minutes
anyway, and of course we have no lunch. I would much prefer to take a brief
break to get a cup of coffee and a sandwich before proceeding.
(Discussion off the record.)
Dr. GRAY. We will now recess until 2 o'clock.
460
•
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, is there any more news about the schedule for
next week? You said the board might be calling witnesses, and would let us
know what you have decided.
Mr. GRAY. I am afraid we will have to talk about that some at lunch, because
I don't have anything new at the moment.
(Thereupon at 1 : 05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 : 00 p. m., the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. GRAY. Shall we resume?
Mr. MASKS. It is agreeable to Dr. Oppenheimer that the proceedings continue
this afternoon without his presence.
Mr. GRAY. I just want to make it clear that it is a matter of his own choosing,
and of Mr. Garrison, that they are not present this afternoon for the remainder
of these proceedings.
Mr. MARKS. That is correct He may be back before we finish, but this Is a
matter of his own choosing.
Mr. GRAY. Would you proceed., Mr. Robb.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Dr. Rabi, you testified that in the fall of 1948, the problem of the super
program had your attention quite considerably.
A. Yes.
Q. And I believe you said that you talked with Dr. Lawrence and Dr. Alvarez
about it
A. Yes.
Q. Could that have been in October, just before the meeting of the GAO.
(Dr. Oppenheimer entered the room.)
Mr. GRAY. You are back now, Dr. Oppenheimer.
Dr. OPPENHEIMER. This is one of the few things I am really sure of.
The WITNESS. I can't remember the exact date. I think it was in the fall.
It was before the GAC meeting.
By Mr. ROBB.
Q. It was before the GAC meeting?
A. I am quite sure.
Q. Did Dr. Alvarez and Dr. Lawrence come to see you in New York?
A. That is right
Q. Together or did they come separately?
A. Together.
Q. What was the purpose of their visit to yon, sir?
A. Well, we are old friends. I don't remember what the purpose was that
they wanted to come up which I didn't find extraordinary. Physicists visit one
another. Both are people I have known for a long time. But we did talk on
this thing which was in our mind.
Q. Yes. To save time, didn't they come to see you with special reference to
the thermonuclear question or the super question?
A. That may have been in their minds. It may have been in their minds. We
got going on it right away.
Q. In all events, you talked about it?
A. That is right What was in their minds, I don't know.
Q. Do you recall what their views were on it as they expressed them to you
then?
A. Their views were that they were extremely optimistic. They are both
very optimistic gentlemen. They were extremely optimistic about it They had
been to Los Alamos and talked to Dr. Teller, who gave them a very optimistic
estimate about the thing and about the kind of special materials which would
be required. So they were all keyed up to go bang into it
Q. They thought we ought to go ahead with it?
A. I think if they had known then what we knew a year later, I don't think
they would have been so eager. But at that time they had a very optimistic
estimate.
Q. To help you fix the time, was that after the Russian explosion?
A. After the Russian explosion.
Q. Was that the main reason why they thought we ought to get along with
the thermonuclear program?
A. I don't know.
461
Q. Beg pardon?
- £* J ?°Al? j™^086^?- As J testified before, what I testified was tHat we
felt we had to do something to recover our lead.
Q. Did you express your view to them on that subject?
A. Yes, that we had to do something, and I think that I may have inclined—
this is something which I kept no notes and so on.
Q. I understand, doctor.
A. I think I may have inclined toward their view on the basis of the informa-
tion they said they had from Dr. Teller.
Q. Did you find yourself in any substantial disagreement with their views
as they expressed them then?
A. It wasn't the case of agreement or disagreement. I generally find myself
when I talk with these two gentlemen in a very uncomfortable position. I like
to be an enthusiast I love it. But those fellows are so enthusiastic that I have
to be a conservative. So it always puts me in an odd position to say, "Now, no.
There, there," and that sort of thing. So I was not in agreement in the sense
that I felt they were as usual, which is to their credit — they have accomplished
very great things— overly optimistic.
Q. Except for that you agreed with their thought that we ought to do some-
thing, as you put it, to regain our position?
A. That is right. I felt very strongly. I spoke to everybody I could properly
speak to, as I said earlier, talking about what we could do to get back this
enormous lead which we had at that time. This of course was one of the
possibilities.
Q. Was it before that or after that you talked to Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I really don't remember the sequence of events at that time and when I saw
Dr. Oppenheimer, whether he was away for the summer or I was, or what, I
wish I could testify. I don't keep a diary.
Q. I understand. All I want is your best recollection, doctor. Whenever you
talked to Dr. Oppenheimer, did he express his views on this matter?
A. It is very hard to answer. I Just don't recollect to tell you a specific time
at a specific place where I spoke to Oppenheimer.
Q. May I help you a little bit? It is difficult to separate what he might have
told you before the meeting with what he said at the meeting.
A. To which meeting are you talking?
Q. The meeting of October 29.
A. I don't really remember that we met before the meeting or immediately
before the meeting, or that he told me something of that sort. I just don't
remember. My actual recollection is that I learned the purpose of the meeting
at the meeting, but I am not certain. I just can't tell.
Q. At all events, the views expressed by Dr. Oppenheimer at the meeting were
not in accord with those expressed to you by Alvarez and Lawrence, were they?
A. No, the meeting was a very interesting one. It was a rather solemn meet-
ing. I must say that Dr. Oppenheimer as chairman of the meeting always
conducted himself in such a way as to elicit the opinions of the members and
to stimulate the discussion. He is not one of these chairmen who sort of
takes it their privilege to hold the floor; the very opposite. Generally he might
express his own view last and very rarely in a strong fashion, but generally
with considerable reservations. When he reported to the Commission, it was
always a miracle to the other members on the committee how he could sum-
marize three days of discussions and give the proper weight to the opinion
of every member, the proper shade, and it rarely happened that some member
would speak up and say, "This isn't exactly what I meant." It was a rather
miraculous performance.
Q. Doctor, as chairman of the 6AO, do you have custody of the minutes of
the GAG?
A. In what sense do you mean, sir? Do I possess them in my office in New
York?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. No, sir.
Q. Where would those be?
A. In the AEG building in our office.
Q. In all events there were no minutes of this October 29th meeting?
A. I don't think there were minutes. There was a report.
Q. Yes.
A. When we got down to a sort of settled procedure, we had the minutes.
But at the end of the meeting there was a verbal report from the chairman
GAG to the Chairman AEG and then a written report summarizing certain
462
conclusions and recommendations, and if there were differences of opinion, try-
ing to give the proper shade and tone, telling the date of the next meeting,
and if we know, the kind of questions we would like to take up at the next
meeting*
Q. Do you recall any mention at that meeting of October 29, 1949, of a com-
munication from Dr. Seaborg about the problem under discussion?
A. I can't recollect. I don't know. I might add it would not have been very
significant, because my feeling is now that we came into the meeting without
any clear ideas, that in the course of an extremely exhausting discussion to and
fro, examining all the possibilities we each became clearer as to what this thing
meant So anybody who didn't participate in the discussion wouldn't have got-
ten what we conceived at that time to be that kind of clarity.
Q. You said somebody from the Joint Chiefs came to talk to you. Do you
remember who that was ?
A. As I remember it, I think it was General Bradley. * * *
Q. Doctor, whose business was it to brief General Bradley, anyway?
A. I suppose the Military Liaison Committee.
Q. I see. You mean between the AEG and the Joint Chiefs?
A. Yes, that is the way of communication, I presume.
Q. Who was on that Committee?
A. That is a matter of record. I am sorry, I can't remember who happened
to be the chairman. The military personnel changed all the time. The chair-
man changed all the time. For the life of me, I can't remember at present who
it was then. * * *
Mr. GRAY, Just at that point, you mean with respect to A bombs, if I can
refer to it that way?
The WITNESS. The materials are similar.
Mr. GRAY. So you had in mind also the thermonuclear?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir, everything. * * *
Mr. ROLANDER. For clarity, you said Iowa ; did you mean Ohio?
The WITNESS. I meant Ohio. Thank you, Portsmouth.
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. You spoke of a meeting at Princeton in 1951, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. That was after Dr. Teller's discovery, if we may call it such, wasn't it?
A. At that point I wouldn't call it Dr. Teller's discovery. I think Dr. Teller
had a very important part in it, but I would not make a personal attribution.
Q. I was not trying to decide that, but merely to identify it It was after
some discovery was made which was extremely promising.
* * * Was there any discussion at that meeting as to whether or not the
President's directive to proceed with the thermonuclear permitted you to go
ahead with the development of that invention? Do I make myself clear?
A. No.
Q. Was there any discussion about whether or not you could go ahead with
the work on that invention, with the exploitation and development of it in the
terms of the President's orders or directive?
A. The only discussion, as I recall, sir, were the ways and means of going
ahead, and how to get certain questions settled. There were certain technical
questions of what would happen under certain circumstances in this design. It
was amenable to theoretical calculations by some very good mam. I think Dr.
Bethe went and did It
Q. But there was no discussion about whether or not the terms of the Presi-
dent's directive permitted you to go to work on that invention?
A. No, I don't recall any. It would be hard for me to see why there should
have been.
Q. Doctor, I notice this sentence In the report of the GAC of the October 29,
1949, meeting, which I am told I may read aloud :
"It is the opinion of the majority that the super program itself should not be
undertaken and that the Commission and its contractors understand that con-
struction of neutron producing reactors is not intended as a step in the super
program."
Doctor, were the neutron producing reactors to which you had reference there
the same type that were constructed at Savannah?
A. Yes, sir. They were constructed with that in mind. They were dual pur-
pose. The desiga could be optimized in one direction or another direction
* balance was mSe, as I remember.
463
Q. Is it appropriate to ask the doctor when they were constructed?
Dr. BECKERLEY. I think that is a matter of public record.
The WITNESS. It is a matter of record, and I would not try to test my memory
on that.
By Mr. EOBB :
Q. In all events, when they were constructed, they were constructed with a
view that they would be a step in the super program?
A. That they could be a step in the super program. We were in a wonderful
position, we could go one way or the other.
Q. Doctor, you said that the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
Mr. Strauss, in January of this year had asked you to take a look at the FBI
report which he had on Dr, Oppenheimer.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you mean to say by that that he asked you to come to his office for
that purpose?
A. We talked about the case, of course. He informed me of the thing.
Q. Yes.
A, He thought as chairman of the General Advisory Committee I ought to
know the contents of that report. I think if I had asked for the full report, I
would have gotten it. I may say that that record is not something I wanted to
see.
Q. No, I understand that
A. In fact, I disliked the idea extremely of delving into the private affairs in
this way of a friend of mine, but I was finally convinced that it was my duty to
do so.
Q. Certainly. What I had in mind, doctor, was that you did not mean to sug-
gest that Mr. Strauss sent for you and said to you in effect, "Look what I have
now."
A. Oh, no.
Q. I was sure of that
A. No.
Q. Did you go to see him on that occasion on your own volition or did he send
for you"?
A. I go see him every time I am in Washington and spend an hour or two with
him discussing all sorts of problems which refer to the GAG, ABO relations. I
am going to see him this afternoon if I get away from here in time.
Q. Certainly. Doctor, don't answer this question unless you want to, but did
you go to see Mr. Strauss on one occasion more or less in behalf of Dr.
Oppenheimer?
A. Just specially for that purpose?
Q. Well, among other purposes. You may have had other purposes.
A. We have talked about this every time I met him.
Q. Yes, I can quite understand that
A. Yes. I have talked to Mr. Strauss on this certainly in behalf of Dr.
Oppenheimer, but even more in behalf of the security of the United States. To
tell you frankly, I have very grave misgivings as to the nature of this charge,
still have, and the general public discussion which it has aroused* and the fear
that as a result of such a discussion important security information absolutely
vital to the United States may bit by bit inadvertently leak out I am very much
worried about that.
Q. Doctor, do you approve of Dr. Oppenheimer's course of giving the letter
from General Nichols and his reply to the newspapers?
A. I don't know his motives on that In his position, I think I would have
done the same thing.
Q. I Just wanted to get your views on it
A. Yes.
Q. You said, sir, that you would rather not answer with respect to the matter
of continental defense?
A. No, I did not ^ ^_
Q. May I finish my question? As to the difference in emphasis between you
and Dr. Oppenheimer?
A, No, sir, I dont recall I said that
Q. I misunderstood you. ^ ^
A. It was a possible difference in emphasis of the method of employment of a
strategic air force.
Q. Isee. That is what I was trying to say.
464
A. In the method of employment. In other words, this is a kind of military
question and runs into problems of target selection, things of that sort. For
that reason, since this is not just an ABO question for which I understand the
members of this panel are cleared, but refers to DOD questions, I would rather
not talk about it
Q. In other words, you feel that would be classified information which you
should not disclose even to the members of this board?
A. That is right. I don't want to skirt around and maybe fall into something.
Mr. ROBB. I see. I think that is all I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Rabi, you mentioned this morning that at the October 1949
meeting of the GAO, General Bradley came, to the best of your recollection, and
you said also there was a State Department man. Do you remember who that
was?
The WITNESS. I think it was Mr. Kennan.
Mr. GRAY. You mentioned a meeting at Los Alamos in the summer, I believe,
of 1950?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Dr. GRAY. That was before the Princeton meeting, of course, to which you
referred?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Dr. GRAY. Was Dr. Oppenheimer at the meeting in the summer of 1950?
The WITNESS. Yes, indeed. I don't remember exactly. The meeting, I think,
was a meeting of the Subcommittee on Weapons. I think there were three sub-
committees of the General Advisory Committee which were sort of specialized,
one weapons, one on reactor and one on research. I think that was the Weapons
Subcommittee. I don't recall the full attendance at that meeting, but Dr.
Oppenheimer was there.
Dr. GRAY. With respect to the development of the H bomb — I don't know how
to refer to it exactly, but you know what I am talking about — and the issue of
who was for and who was against, was it your impression that Dr. Oppenheimer
was unalterably opposed to the development?
The WITNESS. No, I would not say so, because after we had those two state-
ments, which were written by different groups which were put in, I distinctly
remember Dr. Oppenheimer saying he would be willing to sign both.
Mr. GRAY. My question was bad, because "unalterably" is a pretty strong word,
and you have already testified that subsequent to the President's decision he
encouraged the program and assisted in it.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. So I think this was a bad question.
The WITNESS. I was really testifying as to that time, that there were two
statements of attitudes which differed, and he said he would be ready to sign
either or both.
Mr. GRAY. He would have been willing to sign the one which you signed?
The WITNESS. That Fermi and I did, yes.
Mr. GRAY. Would you have considered those two reports absolutely consistent?
The WITNESS. No.
Mr. GRAY. Yourself?
The WITNESS. No. I just answered your question about being unalterably
opposed.
Mr. GRAY. There was a real difference?
The WITNESS: Yes, sir, there was a real difference. There was no difference
as far as a crash program was concerned. That they thought was not in order.
Mr. GRAY. I have one other question. You testified very clearly, I think, as to
your Judgment of Dr. Oppenheimer as a man, referring to his character, his loy-
alty to the United States, and to his friends and to institutions with which he
might be identified, and made an observation about associations.
As of today would you expect Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty to the country to take
precedence over loyalty to an individual or to some other institution?
The WITNESS. I just don't think that anything is higher in his mind or heart
than loyalty to his country. This sort of desire to see it grow and develop. I
might amplif> my other statement in this respect, and that is something we
talked of through the years. When we first met in 1929, American physics was
not really very much, certainly not consonant with the great size and wealth of
the country- We were very much concerned with raising the level of American
physics. We were sick and tired of going to Europe as learners. We wanted to
be independent I must say I think that our generation, Dr. Oppenheimer's and
my other friend that I can mention, did that Job, and that 10 years later we were
465
at the top of the heap, and it wasn't Just because certain refugees came out of
Germany, but because of what we did here. This was a conscious motivation.
Oppenheimer set up this school of theoretical physics which was a tremendous
contribution. In fact, I don't know how we could have carried out the scientific
part of the war without the contributions of the people who worked with Oppen-
heimer. They made their contributions very willingly and very enthusiastically
and singlemindedly.
Mr. GRAY. Perhaps I could get at my question this way. You are familiar, if
you have read the Nichols letter and read the summary of a file which Chairman
Strauss handed you, with the Chevalier episode to some extent, I take it.
The WITNESS. I know of the episode, yes.
Mr. GRAY, Would you expect Dr. Oppenheimer today to follow the course of
action he followed at that time in 1943?
The WITNESS. You mean refuse to give information? Is that what you mean?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. I certainly do. At the present time I think he would clamp him
into jail if he asked such a question.
Mr. GRAY. I am sorry.
The WITNESS. At the present time if a man came to him with a proposal like
that, he would see that he goes to jail. At least that is my opinion of what he
would do in answer to this hypothetical question.
Mr. GRAY. Do you feel that security is relative, that something that was all
right in 1943, would not be all right in 1954?
The WITNESS. If a man in 1954 came with such a proposal, my God — it would
be horrifying.
Mr. GRAY. Supposing a man came to you in 1943.
The WITNESS. I would have thrown him out
Mr. GRAY. Would you have done anything more about it?
The WITNESS. I don't think so. Unless I thought he was just a poor jackass
and didn't know what he was doing. But I would try to find out what motivated
him and what was behind it, and get after that at any time. If somebody asked
me to violate a law and an oath
Mr. GRAY. I hope you are not taking offense at my asking this question, but
this is a perfectly serious question because you have testified without equivoca-
tion, I think, and in the highest possible terms of Dr. Oppenheimer's character,
his loyalty, and with certain reservations about his early associations. As Mr.
Marks pointed out in the question leading to this testimony, these are things which
the Atomic Energy Act says must be taken into account in this matter of clear-
ance. I trust you understand this is a very solemn duty that this Board has been
given.
The WITNESS. I cerainly do, sir.
Mr. GRAY. There have been those who have testified that men of character and
standing and loyalty that this episode should simply be disregarded. I don't
think that is an unfair summary of what some of the witnesses have said. Do
you feel that this is Just a matter that is of no consequence?
The WITNESS, I do not think any of it is of no consequence. I think you have
to take the matter in its whole context. For example, there are men of unques-
tioned loyalty who do not know enough of the subject— I am talking now of the
atomic energy field— so that in their ordinary speech they don't know what they
are saying. They might give away very important things.
Mr. GRAY. That would be true of me, I am sure.
The WITNESS. It certainty has been true of a lot of military stuff that you see
published. It makes your hair stand on end to see high officers say, and people
In Congress say some of the things they say. But with a man of Dr. Oppen-
heimer's knowledge, who knows the thing completely, and its implications and
its importance, and the different phases, believing as I do in his fundamental
loyalty, I think to whomever he talked he would know how to stay completely
clear of sensitive information.
Mr. GRAY. In any event, I suppose
The WITNESS. I tfrfofr there is a very large distinction there.
Mr. GRAY. In any event, I believe you did testify that you would be quite
convinced— i am not sure you did— are you quite convinced that as of today
Dr. Oppenheimer's course of action would be in accord with what you would
do, rather than what he did in respect to the matter of this sort. I can't say
what a map will do, but we only can apply subjective tests in these matters
as far as your testimony as to character, loyalty and so forth, are concerned.
So tbls is all subjective, but would you expect without any real question in your
466
mind that today Dr. Oppenheimer would follow the kind of course that you
would approve of today with respect to this matter?
The WITNESS. I think I can say that with certainty. I think there is no
question in my mind of his loyalty in that way. You know there always is a
problem of that sort. I mean the world has been divided into sheep and goats.
I mean the country has been divided into sheep and goats. There are the
people who are cleared and those who are not cleared. The people against
whom there has been some derogatory information and whatnot. What it may
mean and so on is difficult. It is really a question in one's personal life, should
you refuse to enter a room in which a person is present against wiiom there
is derogatory information. Of course, if you are extremely prudent and want
your life circumscribed that way, no question would ever arise. If you feel
that you want to live a more normal life and have confidence in your own
integrity and In your record for integrity, then you might act more freely, but
which could be criticized, either for being foolhardy or even worse.
In one's normal course at a university, one does come across people who have
been denied clearance. Should you never sit down and discuss scientific matters
with them, although they have very interesting scientific things to say?
Mr. GRAY. No, I would not think so.
The WITNESS. That is the sort of question you, are putting, Dr. Gray, and I
am answering to the best of my ability.
Mr. GBAT. I am wondering whether it is, Dr. Rabi. Let me say this. I think
there is not anybody who is prepared to testify that he can spot a Communist
with complete infallibility. I know that there have been people who surprised
me that I had an acquaintanceship with who turned out to be Communists. I
don't think it is unfair to say that witnesses including Dr. Oppenheimer himself
have testified that there were people who later turned out to be Communists,
to their surprise, who they identified.
I am asking against the background of the security of this country which
must be paramount, it seems to me, perhaps unhappily, to any other consider-
ation or personal institution, can we afford to make it a matter of individual
Judgment as to whether a person is dangerous, in this case Mr Chevalier. I
don't know that he has ever appeared before any committee or anything else.
I don't know whether he is a member of the Communist Partly or not. It is
conceivable that he might have been. I am afraid I am making an argument
now, but it is all a part of this question. Against what I believe to be the com-
mitments involved in joining the Communist Party, can it be a matter of
individual judgment whether it does no harm to either fail to report what seems
to be an espionage attempt or to discuss in however clear terms information
which is of a classified nature. That is the most confused question you ever
had pu$ to you, and I think I should eliminate the last part in any event,
because the Chevalier incident did not, as I understand it, involve disclosure
of information. There was none of that involved. I don't want the record
to make it appear that I am implying that. This was simply a question of not
taking Immediate security precautions either in respect to reporting the incident,
a later matter of declining to disclose the name of the man who made the
approach and certain other less than frank aspects. I believe you| said you
did not think that was a proper course to follow, and you would expect Dr.
Oppenheimer to follow a different course today.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAT. Which implies, certainly, I think that you think lie should f ollow
a different course today.
The WITNESS. I can't say anything but yes. We have all learned a whole lot
since that time. A lot of things which were quite different at one time but
different in another. You have to become accustomed to life in this kind of life
when you are involved in this kind of information.
Mr. GRAY. You are saying that in your judgment Dr. Oppenheimer has
changed?
The WITNESS. He has learned.
Mr. GRAY. All right
. The WITNESS. I think he was always a loyal American. There was no
doubt in my mind as to that. But he has learned more the way yon "have to
live in the world as it is now. We hope at some future time thai the carefree
prewar days will return.
Dr. EVANS. Dr. Kabi, would you tell us something about your early education?
The WITNESS. I am a graduate of Manual Training High School in Brooklyn,
a graduate of Cornell University with a degree of bachelor of chemistry— rwe
are fellow chemists.
467
Dr. EVANS. I am glad you had some chemistry.
The WITNESS. I had an awful lot of chemistry. Then I worked after that
for a year in analytical laboratories, the Pease Laboratory, which were an
affiliate of the Lederle Laboratories in New York, and then for various things
for a lew years. I went back to Cornell, I think it was in 1923, for graduate
work in chemistry, but during the course of setting up my program, I decided
to change to physics. I spent a year at Cornell in graduate work and then
went to Columbia where I transferred, where I took my doctor's degree in 1927.
I am older than Dr. Oppenheimer, but his degree, I think, is older than mine,
or about the same vintage.
During that period I supported myself by instructing in physics at the College
of the City of New York. Then I got a fellowship from Columbia, and went
to Europe to study theoretical physics, first at Munich and then to Copenhagen,
and then to Hamburg.
While there I had an idea for an experimental problem and changed back
to doing experimental physics. After my experiment was done, I went to Leipzig
with Professor Heisenberg back to theoretical physics, where I first met Dr. Op-
penheimer briefly on his visit, and alter Dr. Heisenberg went to the United States
for a lecture tour, I went to Zurich, where Dr. Oppenheimer was working on
Stellar, and we found ourselves sympathetic.
At the end of that summer I went to Columbia as a lecturer in physics. I
have been at Columbia ever since, except for a 5-year period during the war. I
enlisted— enlisted is the wrong word—I left Columbia in November 1940 to join
the radiation lab at MIT, which was concerned with the production of micro-
wave radar, the research and development of microwave radar, and stayed there
throughout the war.
My connection with Los Alamos, I was never on their payroll, but went there
as a radiation lab man.
Dr. EVANS. Let me ask you another question that has nothing particularly
pertinent to this proceeding. Is George Pegram still active?
The WITNESS. Wonderfully. He is doing two men's work. He Is 78, you
know. Eecently he has had a heart attack. He is chairman of a committee
which handles all the research contracts which amount to many, many millions
for the university.
Mr. GBAY. I think the record will have to show that he is a native North
Carolinian.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir, a graduate ol Trinity College. His father was pro-
fessor of chemistry.
Dr. EVANS. I wish you would tell him that Dr. Evans asked about him.
The WITNESS. I would be delighted to.
Dr. EVANS. Now, another question. Were you as a scientific man particularly
surprised when you heard that the Russians had fired a bomb, or would you
have expected it? ,_ .
The WITNESS. I was astonished that it came that soon. I will tell you this
was a peculiar kind of psychology. If you had asked anybody in 1944 or 1945
when would the Russians have it, it would have been 5 years. But every year
that went by you kept on saying 5 years. So although I was certain they would
get it
Dr. EVANS. You were certain they would get it?
The WITNESS. I was certain that they would get it, but it was a stunning
Dr. EVANS. You would be pretty certain right now that they will get the
thermonuclear ?
The WITNESS. In time. What I am afraid of is this controversy over this
case may hasten the day because of the sort of attrition of the security or
technical information, all sorts of stuff appearing in the newspapers and maga-
zines and so on that sort of skirts around it You know you have a filter
system for information. You put bits and pieces together. {They already know
something. * * *
Dr. EVANS. You understand, of course, our position on this board, do yon not?
The WrrNEss. Yes; it is not your problem, but I think it is the problem ot
the Government of the United States.
Dr. EVANS. Did you know that some of the people that were educated with
Dr. Oppenheimer, listened to his lectures, and turned out to be Communists?
' The WITNESS. Educated with him?
Dr. EVANS. It was in that school that he conducted
The WITNESS. You mean who studied with him?
468
Dr. EVANS. Yes.
The WITNESS. I have heard that, but I can't— this is not direct information.
Dr. EVANS. You have met some Communists, have you, Dr. Rabi?
The WITNESS. I have met people who later said they were Communists. At
Los Alamos I met Mr. Hawkins, who said he had been a Communist, and this
other chap, what is the name, I can't remember at this moment. I certainly
knew Frank Oppenheimer from the time he was a kid in high school.
Dr. EVANS. You didn't meet any of those at the Radiation Laboratory like
Bernie Peters?
The WITNESS. I met Peters just fleetingly once or twice. I don't recall any
actual conversations with Peters.
Dr. EVAN.S. Dr. Rabi, if you were approached by someone attempting to secure
from you security information, would you report it immediately, or would you
consider it for quite a long time?
The WITNESS. Are you talking about April 21, 1954?
Dr. EVANS. Oh, no.
The WITNESS. What date are you talking about?
Dr. EVANS. I am talking about thje Chevalier incident. What date was that?
Mr. ROBB. Late 1942 or early 1943.
The WITNESS. I would like to have the question, since this is a crucial question,
put more fully so that I can answer the point rather than make up the question,
so to speak.
Dr. EVANS. You are giving me a big job, aren't you?
The WITNESS. This is not child's play here.
Dr. EVANS. If you had been working on security material, material that had a
high priority, and someone came to you and told you that they had a way of
getting that material to the Russians, what would you have done immediately?
The WITNESS. You mean if it was Just someone that I didn't know?
Dr. EVANS. No ; someone that you knew. Suppose I was a friend of yours
and I came and told you.
The WITNESS. And I thought* that you were a completely innocent party or
not? I think that is the nub of the question, what I would have done at that
time. I can't say what would have done at that time. I kind of think I would
have gone after it and found out just what this was about
Dr. EVANS. That is all.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. MASKS:
Q. Dr. Rabi, what do you mean you would have gone after it and found out
what this was about?
A. I would have tried to see that the proper authorities found out what these
people meant to do, what the thing was. I know a number of times during the war
I heard funny noises in my telephone and got the security officers after it.
Q. Dr. Rabi, Mr. Robb asked you whether you had spoken to Chairman Strauss
in behalf of Dr. Oppenheimer. Did you mean to suggest in your reply — In your
reply to him you said you did among other things—did you mean to suggest
that yon had done that at Dr. Oppenheimer's instigation?
A. No ; I had no communication from Dr. Oppenheimer before these charges
were filed, or since, except that I called him once to just say that I believed in
him, with no further discussion.
Another time I called on him and his attorney at the suggestion of Mr.
Strauss. I never hid my opinion from Mr. Strauss that I thought that this whole
proceeding was a most unfortunate one.
Dr. EVANS. What was that?
The WITNESS. That the suspension of the clearance of Dr. Oppenheimer was
a very unfortunate thing and should not have been done. In other words, there
he was; he is a consultant, and if you don't want to consult the guy, you don't
consult him, period. Why you have to then proceed to suspend clearance and
go through all this sort of thing, he is only there when called, and that is all
there was to it So it didn't seem to me the sort of thing that called for tin's
kind of proceeding at all against a man who had accomplished what Dr. Oppen-
heimer has accomplished. There is a real positive record, the way I expressed
it to a friend of mine. We have an A-bomb and a whole series of it, * * * and
what more do you want, mermaids? This is just a tremendous achievement.
If the end of that road is this kind of hearing, which can't help but be humiliat-
ing, I thought it was a pretty bad show. I still think so.
469
By Mr. MAKES :
Q. Dr. Babi, in response to a question of the Chairman, the substance of which
I believe was, was Dr. Oppenheimer unalterably opposed to the H-bomb develop-
ment at the time of the October 1949 GAC meeting, I think you said in substance
no, and then you added by way of explanation immediately thereafter the two
annexes or whatever they were -
A. During the discussion.
Q. During the discussion he said he would be willing to sign either or both.
Can you explain what you meant by that rather paradoxical statement?
A. No, I was just reporting a recollection.
Q. What impression did you have?
A. What it means to me is that he was not unalterably opposed, but on sum,
adding up everything, he thought it would have been a mistake at that time to
proceed with a crash program with all that entailed with this object that we
didn't understand, when we had an awfully good program on hand in the fission
field, which we did not wish to jeopardize. At least we did not feel it should be
jeopardized. It turned out in the events that both could be done. Los Alamos
just simply rose to the occasion and worked miracles, absolute miracles.
Mr. MAtt-g-ft That is alL
RE-CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, on the occasion when you were in Mr. Strauss* office, and he
showed you the report that you testified about, how long would you say that
meeting lasted?
A. I can't remember.
Q. A few minutes?
A. I don't know whether it was a few minutes or half an hour. If you were
Mr. Strauss, there are calls coming in all the time from all over, from the White
House, and what not
Q. Did you look at the report in Mr. Strauss' office?
A. No. I put it in an envelope and went to our GAG office. I read it there,
and then brought it back.
Q. Dr. Babi, getting back to the hypothetical questions that have been put to
you by the Chairman and Dr. Evans about the Chevalier incident, if you had
been put in that hypothetical position and had reported the matter to an intelli-
gence officer, you of course would have been told the whole truth about it,
wouldn't you?
A. I am naturally a truthful person.
Q. You would not have lied about it?
A. I am telling you what I think now. The Lord alone knows what I would
have done at that time. This is what I think now.
Q. Of course, Doctor, as you say, only God knows what is in a man's mind and
heart, but give us your best judgment of what you would do.
A. This is what I think now I hope that is what I would have done then. In
other words, I do not— I take a serious view of that— I think it is crucial.
Q. You say what?
A. I take a serious view of that incident, bat I don't think it is crucial.
Q. Of course, Doctor, you don't know what Dr. Oppenheimer's testimony before
this board about that incident may have been, do you?
A. No.
Q. So perhaps in respect of passing judgment on that incident, the board may
be in a better position to judge than you?
A. I have the highest respect for the board. I am not going to make any
comment about the board. They are working very hard, as I have seen.
Q. Of course, I realize you have complete confidence in the board. But my
point is that perhaps the board may be in possession of information which is not
now available to you about the incident
A. It may be. On the other hand, I am in possession of a long experience with
this man, going back to 1929, which is 25 years, and there is a kind of seat of the
pants feeling which I myself lay great weight In other words, I might even
venture to differ from the judgment of the board without impugning their
integrity at all.
Q. I am confining my question to that one incident, Doctor. I think we have
agreed that the board may be in possession of information from Dr. Oppen-
heimer's own lips about that incident which is not now available to you, is that
correct?
470
A. This is a statement?
Q. Yes.
A. I accept your statement
Q. And therefore it may well be that the board is now in a better position than
you, so far as that incident is concerned, to evaluate it?
A. An incident of that sort they may be. I can't say they are not. But on the
other hand, I think that any incident in a man's line of something of that sort
you have to take it in sum.
Q. Of course.
A. You have to take the whole story.
Q. Of course.
A. That is what novels are about. There is a dramatic moment and the
history of the man, what made him act, what he did, and what sort of person
lie was. That is what you are really doing here. You are writing a man's life.
Q. Of course, but as a scientist, Doctor, and evaluating, we will say, an explo-
sion you perhaps would be in a better position to evaluate an explosion having
witnessed it and having first-hand knowledge about it than somebody who had
not, is that right?
A. If you put it in that way, I don't know the trend of your question. I am
not fencing with you. I really want to know what you are getting at.
Q. I am not fencing with you either.
A. If you are saying that an eyewitness to something can give a better account
of it than a historian, that I don't know. Historians would deny it It is a
semantic question, but if you want to be specific about it
Q. I will put it this way. As a scientist, you would say that one having all
the facts about a particular physical manifestation or reaction would be in a
better position to evaluate that than somebody who did not have all of the facts
or might not know one of the facts?
A. A lot of the things about this are not the sort of things which you term
just facts. We have Mr. Morgan here, for example, who has been the head
of a big business which he built up. He gets as many facts as possible, but
I am sure beyond that there is a lot of experience and color which make his
judgment. In a court of law it might be something else. Ultimately you go
to a jury who have facts, and then they add a whole lot of things which your
heart identifies as facts and their experience in life to a situation. I was
afraid your question was tending, to put me in the position of a so-called fiction
scientist who looks at certain facts and measurements, and we are not talking
about such a "situation.
Q. Let me get back again to the concrete. Would you agree, Doctor, that in
evaluating the Chevalier incident one should consider what Dr. Oppenheimer
says happended in that incident, together with the testimony of persons such
as yourself?
A. Wait a minute. I didn't testify to that incident because I have only
heard about it.
Q. Together with testimony of persons, such as yourself about Dr. Oppen-
Leimer.
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. Very well; therefore, one who had heard Dr. Oppenheimer describe the
incident and had heard your testimony would be in a better position to evaluate
it than one who had not heard Dr. Oppenheimer describe it, is that correct?
A. I will put it this way. I think this committee is going into this and they
will be in as good a position as it is humanly possible to be for people who have
never met this man before to make a judgment about it. I certainly reserve
the right to my own opinion on this, because I am in the possession of a long
period of association, with all sorts of minute reactions. I have seen his mind
work. I have seen his sentiments develop. For example, I have seen in the last
few years something which surprised me, a certain tendency of Dr. Oppenheimer
to be inclined toward a preventive war. Nothing went all the way. But talk-
ing and thinking about it quite seriously. I have to add everything of that
sort. All sorts of color and form my own opinion. But I am not on this
board, and I think this board is trying to do what it can in this business of get-
ting testimony, the kind of people to come talk to them, the evaluation of the
people and the kind of insight, whether they are just loyal people or whether
they have thought about the problem, and so on. It is .a tough job. Bpt
nevertheless, I say I will still stick to my right to have my own opinion.
Q. Certainly, Doctor. To sum up, I suggest to you what I did to Dr. Conant,
and he agreed, that in deciding about a matter such as the Chevalier incident,
one must consider all the available relevant evidence, Is that right?
471
A. Certainly.
Q. And that would include what actually happened and what people such as
yourself, who know Dr. Oppenheimer, say about Dr. Oppenheimer.
A. You are talking about the job of the committee ; yes.
Q. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. Thank you, Doctor.
Mr. GBAT, Do you have any more questions?
Mr. MABKS. I think I better ask one more question, if the board will indulge me.
REDIBECT EXAMIXATION
By Mr. MARKS :
Q. Dr. Rabi, in view of the quite serious questions which quite properly have
been asked you in regard to this so-called Chevalier episode, I would like to try
to summarize for you what I understand the testimony to be, and ask you how
that would affect the opinions you have expressed.
As I understand the testimony, it is that Chevalier who was an old friend
of Dr. Oppenheimer, a member of the faculty in romance languages at the Uni-
versity of California, was at his house on an occasion in the early part of 1943,
and at that time Dr. Oppenheimer found himself at one point in the visit alone
with Dr. Chevalier, who said that he understood from Eltenton that Eltenton
had a way o.f getting information to the Russians. I thing it is fair to say that
the testimony is that Oppenheimer reacted emphatically in rejecting as wrong
any consideration of such a matter, and used very strong language to Chevalier,
and that Oppenheimer was thereafter convinced that Chevalier had entirely
dropped the matter.
Some months later after Los Alamos had been set up and Oppenheimer was
there as director, the security officer. Lansdale, mentioned to Oppenheimer that
there was trouble of some kind at Berkeley. The indication was that some of
the young physicists had committed indiscretions.
On the occasion of Dr. Oppenheimer's next visit to Berkeley he sought out the
security officers there, told them that he understood that there was trouble of
some kind, said that he thought that a man Eltenton would bear watching.
The next day the security officers asked Oppenheimer to talk to them further
about the incident. At that time they asked him to explain the circumstances
which had moved him to suggest the name Eltenton. Dr. Oppenheimer said that
there had been an intermediary.
The security officers asked him to name the intermediary. He declined to do
so. The security officers asked him whom the intermediary had approached.
Oppenheimer said people on the project, and in the course of a long interview
it appears that they suggested there were two or three such people. He did not
name himself or Chevalier as the people concerned.
In the course of a long conversation at that time with the security officers,
he mentioned also that a man at the Soviet consulate was involved, and there
was some reference to microfilm, although the transcript of the conference be-
tween Oppenheimer and the security officers is not clear as to the context in
which microfilms were mentioned.
Later Colonel Lansdale, a few weeks later, again interviewed Oppenheimer
and asked him to name the intermediary. Oppenheimer again declined, and
on all of these occasions he gave as his explanation that he didn't want people
to get in trouble who had acted properly and innocently, that he thought he was
revealing the name of the only person who could possibly be guilty of real
wrongdoing.
Some time after he refused to give the true story to Lansdale or give the names
to Lansdale, General Groves talked to him and asked him to name the inter-
mediary. On that occasion Oppenheimer said, "I wont give you the names unless
you order me to." Groves said, "I don't want to order yon. Think about It"
Shortly after that, Groves again came to Oppenheimer and said, "I need to have
the name. If you don't give it to me, I will have to order you to," and at that
time Oppenheimer gave the name of Chevalier as the intermediary.
In the course of questioning Dr. Oppenheimer about these circumstances, coun-
sel for the board put the question to him whether the story that he had told the
security officers on the occasion of the interview that I have described at
Berkeley wasn't a fabrication and a tissue of lies, and to this, I think, Oppen-
heimer responded, "Right."
A. Right it was.
Q. He accepted counsel's characterization. I may say that this occurred
in the course of a very thorough cross-examination.
472
Mr. ROBB. Have you finished, Mr. Marks?
Mr. MARKS. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, that was a rather long question.
Mr. MARKS. I was about to ask a question.
Mr. ROBB. I thought you were finished. It was a rather long statement, and
I don't want the record to show that I am accepting as a completely accurate
statement the entire circumstances but of course I am not going to object to it.
I have not objected to any question, and I don't intend to.
Mr. GRAY. Certainly it will be obvious in the record that this was stated as
Mr. Marks' summary.
Mr. ROBB. Yes, certainly.
Mr. GRAY. On that basis he will now ask the question.
Mr. ROBB. Certainly. I am sure Mr. Marks understands.
Mr. MARKS. I understand perfectly.
Mr. GRAY. That was not the question.
Mr. MARKS. No, it wasn't. I thought Mr. Robb wished to make a correction.
I understand exactly your point, Mr. Robb.
I ask you, Dr. Rabi, whether this account of my impression of the essentials
of what has been brought out here leads you to wish to express any further
comment?
The WITNESS. The only comment I can make on this right off is that it is
part and parcel of the kind of foolish behavior that occurred in the early part of
the record, that there were very strong personal loyalties there, and I take it
in mentioning Eltenton he felt he had discharged his full obligation. My com-
ment is that it was a very foolish action, but I would not put a sinister
implication to it The record is full of actions before Oppenheimer became the
sort of statesman he is now of that sort of thing.
By Mr. MARKS:
Q. Are you confident or are you not confident, Dr. Rabi, whichever it is — let
me put it this way. Are you confident that Dr. Oppenheimer would not make the
kind of mistake again?
A. I certainly am. He is a man who learns with extraordinary rapidity.
Q. Would you agree that incident involved a conflict in loyalties?
A. The question is whether to my mind, whether it involved a conflict of loyal-
ties within his own heart. I don't think it did in his own heart, at least from
what you tell me, and taking the sum total. Apparently Chevalier was a man
of whom he was very fond personally. They shared a mutual interest, I presume,
of French literature. I don't think I have met the gentleman. By pointing the
finger at Eltenton I think he felt that he had done the necessary thing for the
protection of security. I think if he thought about it more profoundly at the
time, and were not so tremendously occupied and burdened by the Los Alamos
problems, he might have seen that and this was certainly something that he
could not hope to keep quiet. It was a great mistake in Judgment and everything
else. He should have swallowed that bitter pill at once. But I read no sinister
implication in it
Q. Would you be confident or would you not be confident that today he would
resolve the question of his responsibility on the one hand to the country or the
public in a way that you would?
A. I think he would be very conscious of his position, not to impair his useful-
ness to the United States. Even though he might not have shared certain fears,
he would not have taken that particular responsibility of withholding that in-
formation and have run that particular personal danger of doing it. I think he is
just a much more mature person than he was then.
Mr. MARKS. That is all.
Mr. ROBB. May I ask one more question?
RE-CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. This is a purely hypothetical question, Doctor. I Just want to get your
reaction to it.
Suppose on all the evidence this Board should not be satisfied that Dr. Oppen-
heimer in his testimony here has told this board the whole truth ; what would
you say then about whether or not he ought to be cleared?
A. It depends on the nature of the sort of thing he withheld. There may be
elements of one's private life that do not concern this board or anybody else.
Q. Suppose the board should not be satisfied that he had told the truth or
the whole truth, about some material matter; what would you say then?
473
A. It would depend again on the nature of the material matter. If I agreed
that the matter was material and germane to this, then I would be very sorry.
Q. What?
A. I would be very sorry.
Q. You mean you would feel that they could not clear him?
A. I feel it would be a very tough question.
Q. Wouldn't you feel that they couldn't clear him, or would you rather not
answer that?
A. It is the sort of hypothetical question which to me goes under the terms of
a rather meaningless question, with all due respect, in the sense that I want to
know the material fact, and I would want — the reason we don't have an indi-
vidual but a board is that I would want to discuss it with others to help bring
out our own feelings, and so forth.
Q. Certainly.
A. So therefore I feel that to answer a hypothetical question in this way
without putting myself into the position as a member of the board, and what
would be the outcome of my discussions and weighing of this thing with the
other members of the board, I think an answer to that sort of thing is something
I could not give, because I haven't got the circumstances under which to answer
it.
Q. But the circumstances might be such
A. If you want to set me up on the board, then I would come out with an
answer.
Q. No, let me ask you one more question. The circumstances might be such
that you would feel that the board should not clear him if that happened?
A. There certainly are circumstances which I can picture where the board
could not clear him. You know the sort of evidence that Thoreau refers to of
finding a trout in the milk ; I am pretty sure it is adultery. I am not saying
there is no evidence where I would be doubtful. I would rather be more specific
about it
Mr. GBAY. I am sure that Dr. Rabi understands that this board has reached
no conclusion. The board has no review or position, and will reach none until
the hearings are concluded. I am not suggesting that counsel's question was
improper. I wish, however, to say for the record that it clearly is a hypo-
thetical question.
Mr. ROBB. That is why I prefaced it by saying it was hypothetical.
Mr. GBAY. I know you did. I know you didn't intend to lead Dr. Rabi to the
conclusion that the board had reached a conclusion on anything. I don't mind
counsel giving their view of the testimony on either side. I do object to anything
that suggests that this board has reached any kind of conclusion.
Mr. ROBB. Of course I had no such intention. That is why I prefaced my
question by saying this is indeed a hypothetical question.
I think that is all, Doctor. Thank you.
Mr. GBAY. We can now thank you very much, Dr. RabL
The WITNESS. Thank you, sir.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GBAY. Does that conclude your witnesses for today?
Mr. GABRISON. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. We will recess until 9 : 30.
Mr. GABBISQN. Could we make it 10?
Mr. GBAY. I would be glad to taife to the board about it. My inclination is
against it.
I am sorry. I would like to accommodate you, but the board feels we should
start at 9 : 80.
(Thereupon at 3 : 25 p. m., a recess was taken until Thursday, April 22, 1954,
at 9 : 30 a. m.)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
BUILDING T-3, ROOM 2022,
Washington, D. C.< Thursday, April 22, 1954.
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to recess,
before the Board, at 9 : 30 a. m.
Personnel Security Board: Mr. Gordon Gray, chairman; Mr. Ward
T. Evans, member; and Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Roger Robb, and CL A. Rolander, Jr., counsel for the
board; J. Robert Oppenheimer, Lloyd K. Garrison, Samuel J. Silver-
man; and Allan B. Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer; Her-
bert S. Marks, cocounsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
(475)
PROCEEDINGS
Dr. GRAY. Gentlemen, we will start. I am sure this is unnecessary, but I
would like to remind the witness that he is still testifying under oath in the
proceeding.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, after a superficial examination of the record,
which was not really quite completed, we reached the conclusion last night,
rather late last night, that the questions we had thought had not perhaps been
sufficiently covered, and that might need amplification or some further explana-
tion had been covered at one point or another in the record, and wishing to
avoid any unnecessary duplication or repetition of what has gone past, we
decided not to have any formal redirect examination, but to ask Dr. Oppen-
heimer to sit where he is sitting this morning and to respond to all questions
which you might wish to put to him upon any of the subjects of the inquiry.
Of course, he will be available for your questioning at any other timer also.
Mr. GRAY. The board accepts your decision as to procedure, of course, in
this matter. Do I understand that you have no questions to ask?
Mr. GARRISON. That is right, but we would welcome questions from the board
at this time or any time.
Mr. GRAY. I see. Mr. Robb, do you have any questions?
Mr. ROBB. I have nothing further to ask Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Evans?
Dr. EVANS. No.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Morgan?
Mr. MORGAN. No.
Mr. GRAY. I don't believe the board has any questions at this Hm**, Mr. Garri-
son. I wonder if we are ready to proceed with other witnesses?
Mr. GARRISON. I think after a very short recess, we shall be able, sir. I am
sorry to waste any time of the board, but I think you will understand.
Mr. GRAY. Absolutely, yes.
Mr. GARRISON. Professor "Whitman will be shortly here, I believe, and I think
Dr. Bradbury will also be shortly here. We will see what else we can do so as
not to needlessly waste time.
Mr. GRAY. Let us consider ourselves in recess until your next witnesses
appear.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GRAY. I think we may as well proceed at the moment, even in Mr. Morgan's
absence, because I am sure he will return by the time we get to any substantive
testimony.
Do you wish to testify under oath, Dr. Bradbury?
Dr. BRADBURY. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. What is your full name?
Dr. BRADBURY. Norris Edwin Bradbury.
Mr. GRAY. Would you stand and raise your right hand.
NORRIS EDWIN BRADBURY, do you swear that the testimony yon are to give
the board shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
Dr. BRADBURY. I do.
Whereupon, Norris Edwin Bradbury was called as a witness, and having
been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Would you be seated.
I shall briefly call your attention to the existence of the perjury statutes.
May we assume that you are familiar that there are such statutes with penalties?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. I should like to request that in the course of your testimony if it
becomes necessary for you. to disclose or advert to restricted data, you let me
know in advance so we may take necessary and appropriate steps.
(Mr. Morgan entered the room.)
Mr. GRAY. Finally, I should say to you that we consider these proceedings as
a confidential matter between the Atomic Energy Commission and its officials
(477)
478
and Dr. Oppenheinier, his representatives and witnesses. The Commission will
initiate no releases about these proceedings. In each instance on behalf of the
board I express the hope that witnesses will take the same view.
The WITNESS. It is understood.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Dr. Bradbury, what is your present position?
A. I am Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Los Alamos, N. Mex.
Q. Do you also hold any academic position?
A I am professor of physics at the University of California.
Q. How long have you been Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory?
A. Since October 1945.
Q. Dr. Bradbury, you have read the Commission's letter of December 23, 1953,
which suspended Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance.
A. Yes.
Q. Have you read his answer, too?
A. Yes, at least as I have seen it in the press.
Q. I want to draw your attention to that portion of the letter or direct your
attention to the matter relating to development of a thermonuclear device, the
hydrogen bomb as it has been called.
First, would you tell us, or would you describe for us something of the nature
of the thermonuclear research that went on at Los Alamos. I don't mean for
you to tell us what was done, but whether it was a matter that proceeded by
jumps, whether there were long periods when there was no thermonuclear
research, or whether it was continuous, and so on.
A. The possibility of using cheap fuels to make effective military explosion
Q. Excuse me. Could we have dates on this where possible so it would be
clearer to the board?
A. I will try to put dates in this.
Q. Yes, sir, so the board will follow you.
Mr. GBAY. Since you are interrupted, I am sorry, the security officer is always
properly quite nervous.
The WITNESS. I will be equally careful about this. In fact, I suspect I am as
conscious of these things as anyone.
Mr. GBAY. I am sure you are.
Mr. EOLANDEB. I did not mean to suggest that.
The WITNESS. The possibility of using cheap fuels of which the so-called
hydrogen bomb is an example was of interest at Los Alamos from its inception.
There was active research, investigation and exploration in this field during the
war years.
This interest continued after the war in a very active way ; not only was basic
fundamental nuclear fission done, in the relevant nuclear field, but experimental
groups having to do with techniques that might be applicable were carried on and
carried on actively. There were a number of conferences held during the years
immediately following the war. There was actually a system, essentially ther-
monuclear in nature, devised shortly after the war in 194&-47 for which tech-
niques were then not possible or appropriate to bring to fruition.
A number of people in our theoretical division kept an active interest in this
field. The basic difficulty which confronted everybody at that time was the
calculation difficulty, and indeed, no calculating machines existed that would
permit some of the particular problems to be explored.
This interest in the field was continuous and lasted up to the present time.
There were no gaps in it. I will say that following the Bussian explosion in
1949, the laboratory on its own initiative, of course, actively explored all its
areas of development, areas of research, to see if there were any that should be
given still further attention or more active attention in an attempt to reestablish
the lead which we thought we had enjoyed in the years following the dose of
the war.
Certainly the thermonuclear field in general at that time offered the only out-
standing promise, of reestablishing the technical lead if indeed it were a possible
field to bring to fruition.
At that time there were, let us say, grave technical concerns, not only with
the actual nature of the systems which had been thought of, that is to say,
whether or not they would indeed work in an effective fashion, but whether
tfcey would be useful in terms of vehicles that might be expected to employ such
devices.
479
As is the case with any technical development, further knowledge sometimes
brought increased pessimism or sometimes it brought optimism. The thermo-
nuclear field went through cycles of this sort.
The one thing that was clear at all times was that unless there was active
thought in this field, active exploration of it, that potentially useful ways to
make such a device would not he found.
Is that enough to answer your question?
Q. I think it does, Dr. Bradbury.
I think it does. Would you say that there was active thought and active
exploration of this field continuously at Los Alamos both before and after the
fall of 1949?
A. Tes.
Q. Was the fall of 1949 some sort of a crossroads in that?
A. The fall of 1949 was really a crossroads in the atomic energy business. As
I said in my earlier remarks, at that time it became clear that a step had been
accomplished by Russia. Naturally we explored our own activities to make sure
that our own technical progress was devoted as well as we could see it to
maintaining the lead which we had thought we had.
Q. What would you say as to the cooperation or lack of cooperation that was
evidenced by specifically Dr. Oppenheimer and generally by the General Advisory
Committee with respect to the thermonuclear program?
A. Both the General Advisory Committee and Dr. Oppenheimer, I always
found from my personal knowledge extremely helpful and cooperative— I am
seeking an appropriate word— actively cooperative with the Los Alamos Lab-
oratory in this field. This was, of course, not. a unique thing in the thermo-
nuclear field. The GAG and Dr. Oppenheimer had always to my knowledge been
an active friend and been active friends of the laboratory, and had been helpful
and had worked closely with us in all our discussions relevant to Los Alamos, or
many discussions relative to Los Alamos. They invited the staff of the labora-
tory to meet with them. I met with them myself on many occasions.
Their comments were always helpful. Their advice was always helpful. I
never knew them or Dr. Oppenheimer to take a stand or a position or to give
advice which was other than useful and helpful to the laboratory.
Q. By the way, in general did you and the people at Los Alamos, perhaps, if
you can speak for them, agree or disagree with the position taken by the GAC
in October 1949?
A. I think that if we disagreed, we disagreed perhaps in flavor rather than
in a substantive way. We felt extremely strongly that the thermonuclear field
had to be explored, had to continue to be explored, that indeed it had grave
obstacles in its way at that time, but that no decisions as to the wisdom or
morality of making or stockpiling H bombs could be possibly undertaken by this
country unless there was a complete knowledge of all the facts.
It was equally important that this country know what the potentialities were
in this field from, let us say, a defensive point of view. In other words, we must
know, we had to know, what the Russians might be able to accomplish in this
field.
Accordingly, the philosophy of the laboratory was that we did not wish to
enter into the debate as to whether or not this course was wise or moral or
politically sound. We regarded ours the technical responsibility to know as
much as it was possible to know and as rapidly as it was possible to know it,
about what was broadly called the H-bomb.
This is not a very satisfactory terminology, but if it is read as relevant to the
thermonuclear field, I think this will correctly describe our position.
There was, as I have said, active interest in this field and had been. It
seemed to us unfortunate that the way the issue came out in the public was
that here was a crossroads, and that the country or the laboratory went this
way or that way. Frankly it would have been impossible to have stopped the
active consideration and exploration of this field by any fiat. You cannot stop
people from thinking. It was an exciting field. It apparently violated no laws
of nature and inventive and Ingenious scientists are bound to think about and do
the work which is relevant to this activity.
We, of course, agreed with the publicly announced decision that this work
should indeed go ahead and go ahead vigorously. Whether or not this was at
variance with the general flavor of the GAG'S thinking at that time, I would
not want to say.
Q. Do yon recall a meeting at Princeton in the spring or summer of 1951?
A. Yes, I do.
808318—54 81
480
Q. You were present at that meeting?
A. I was present
Q. Would you care to say something about the role played by Dr. Oppenheimer
there, particularly in connection with what it may indicate to the board as to
his cooperation in the thermonuclear program?
A. The meeting of the General Advisory Committee in June, I believe it was,
of 1951, was called following an Eniwetok operation. It was called following,
let me say, the discovery at Los Alamos of some extremely promising ideas in
this field, and at that time the exploitation of these ideas seemed to us at Los
Alamos and to others of our consultants and associated with us in the field
warrant some attention by the Commission to certain decisions, let me say, of
production, which were extremely important, and could well be quite expensive.
We as the laboratory made this proposal. We found the General Advisory
Committee and Dr. Oppenheimer extremely enthusiastic both about this idea
and about the general proposals which were needed to implement this idea, par-
ticularly insofar as they required Commission action. Indeed, I think it fair
to say that the General Advisory Committee and Dr. Oppenheimer were willing
to go further than the laboratory in support of this, let us say, new approach to
the problem, and that their recommendations to the Commission were at least
as enthusiastic as ours, and actually went somewhat beyond, in terms of sup-
port, what we had originally drafted.
I would regard this myself as very positive evidence of the interest and en-
thusiasm which the GAC was showing and showed in this field.
Q. You have read the portion of the Commission's letter of December 23,
1953, which referred to the circulation and distribution of the General Advisory
Committee report?
A. Yes.
Q. What was the practice at the laboratory with respect to information as
to the work recommendation and reports of the General Advisory Committee?
A. If I may go back to 1946 or 1947, 1 guess, when the General Advisory Com-
mittee was first set up, I believe it was widely recognized that the atomic weapons
field was that field in which the Commission had its greatest immediate concern
at that time. They were extremely anxious to support the Los Alamos Labora-
tory and to make sure its work was in the most fruitful directions, and had the
maximum amount of assistance from the Commission.
To this end they asked the GAC to pay particular attention to Los Alamos
and they requested of me that I loan to GAC as its recording secretary Dr.
John Manley, who was then my associate director for research. Manley was
an outstanding physicist and had long experience with many phases, in fact
almost all phases, of the atomic energy program since its inception in the early
1940's. His selection was motivated both by his qualities as an individual and
by the fact that he was intimately aware of the activities of the laboratory and
this intimate awareness was regarded as extremely useful to the GAC in their
deliberations.
In consequence of Manley's relation both to me and to the GAC, it was custo-
mary as I have indicated earlier both for me and members of my staff to meet
with GAO when problems of Los Alamos were being discussed.
It was also customary for me at least to see in draft form those portions of
the GAC minutes which were relevant to Los Alamos. I probably would hare
been unable to find any specific piece of paper which said this is indeed the
request of either the Commission or the GAO. However, I am quite personally
certain that it had the knowledge and at least the tacit consent of all concerned.
As I say, it was frequently the occasion when we met with the GAC and to see
the results of our remarks or deliberations in the draft form which were not
surprising.
Q. Did you also see them in final form?
A. Probably so, because Mr. Manley's drafts were generally as good as his
ftaalfoxm.
Q. Now, with respect to the GAC report of the meeting of October 1949, do
ton recall whether you saw that specifically, and if so, whether there was any-
hlng unusual about it, whether it was the normal practice, or what happened?
A. I presume I did. I cannot give any precise date that I remember seeing
his precise document. But I would regard it as most likely that I did see it
"Certainly we had met with the GAC in discussing some of these matters either
t that time or in the general vicinity of that time, and I was well aware of
he general concern of the GAC in these matters. It would have been quite!
atural for me to have seen these and discuss them with Manley and for members
t my senior staff to have seen them.
481
Q. So far as you observed was there anything that Dr. Oppenhelmer did to
cause, as far as you know or ever heard, any unusual distribution of this GAG
report?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Did he play any role in the distribution of the report?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Perhaps distribution is a word of art. I understand It means giving people
copies and so on. Did the circulation, the showing, the knowledge of the GAG
report, shall we say, so far as you know, cause anybody to change his opinion at
the Los Alamos Laboratory about working on the thermonuclear program?
A. Not to my knowledge. The laboratory scientists in general, and those who
contributed conspicuously to this field are strong-minded individuals and gen-
erally reach their own conclusions about matters of this nature. While I think
that we regretted what seemed to be in some degree — I won't say opposition*
but some degree of divergence from what might have been the flavor, let us say,
of the GAG approach to it, I know of no senior person directly concerned with
the weapons program at Los Alamos who left the laboratory. Indeed Dr. Manley
did leave the laboratory some time in, I think, the latter part of 1950, This
could be found from the record, of course— to accept the position of chairman of
the department at the University of Washington, Chairman of the Department
of Physics. Manley had not been directly connected with the weapon, program,
and the weapon development program in the laboratory. I frhitiir ids title was
associate director for research.
Another senior individual did leave the laboratory in 1951, that was Dr.
Edward Teller, but in view of Teller's connection with this whole matter, I think
you may guess it was not because of any feeling he may have had about the
position of the GAG.
Q. He certainly didn't leave because he didn't want to work on thermonuclear.
A. This, I believe, is correctly said.
Q. You have seen the portion of the Commission's letter in which the state-
ment is made, "It was further reported that you, Dr. Oppenheimer, were instru-
mental in persuading other outstanding scientists not to work on the hydrogen
project, and the opposition of the hydrogen bomb of which you are the most
experienced, most powerful and most effective member has definitely slowed down
its development."
What would you say about the statement that the program was slowed down
because of Dr. Oppenheimer's opinion or activities?
A. It is not my opinion that the program was slowed down, as I have said. Of
course, if he himself had been in a position or wished to work on it directly and
personally, this would undoubtedly have been a great help. However, it is my
opinion that the program went and has gone with amazing speed, particularly
in view of the predictions made regarding the difficulty of this program through-
out the years 1945 to 1949. I know of no case, if you wish me to pursue these
remarks, where Dr. Oppenheimer persuaded anyone not to work in this field
As I have remarked, scientists of this caliber generally make up their own
minds about wishing to work or not to work in this field. A number of out-
standing people whom we would like to have brought into this program felt that
their best contribution to the country was to remain in university circles and
contribute to the training of graduate students.
With this point of view, one can hardly differ. Of course, Los Alamos Labora-
tory had a selfish approach to it.
Q. Would you say that Dr. Oppenheimer's attitude, opinions, activities with
respect to the development of thermonuclear weapons in any way indicated that
there were some malevolent or sinister motives about it?
A. Absolutely not. As I have remarked, from 1946 on, I have never known him
to act in a way other than was a help to the laboratory. In one specific instance —
and doubtless others if I could recall them— outstanding young men, this was in
1949, incidentally, an outstanding young theoretical physicist by the name of
Conrad Longmire had been offered an appointment by Dr. Oppenheimer at the
institute. This of course is evidence itself of the outstanding caliber of this
individual. It turned out he was always willing to consider coming to Los
Alamos, and we were extremely anxious to have him. Dr. Oppenheimer very
graciously extended or postponed his appointment to the institute indefinitely
to permit him to come to Los Alamos. Indeed, Dr. Longmire never did return
to the institute, and even in the last year we have explored with Dr. Oppen-
heimer the possibility of Longmire taking a sabbatical at the institute, and Dr.
Oppenheimer has been willing to consider this.
482
He has ctfven us frequently prospects, outstanding young individuals, whom we
might be able to approach particularly in the field of theoretical physics to join
the laboratory.
With me personally he has never been other. From October 1945 on and during
the war years, other than encouraging, helpful, congratulatory, and generally
both a personal friend and a friend of the laboratory.
Q. How long have you known Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I knew him as an instructor when I was a graduate student at Berkeley
in 1932-81, probably, somewhere through there. I knew him as director of Los
Alamos Scientific Laboratory from June of 1M4 until October 1945. I knew
him thereafter as chairman of the General Advisory Committee and saw him
regularly, I would say, several times a year, in that capacity. He visited Los
Alamos, I would again say, at least once a year or perhaps twice, in connecton
with his responsibilities as chairman of the General Advisory Committee.
Q. How well do- you think you know him as a man, his character, and so on,
the kind of person he is?
A. I would think I would know him as well as one knows any individual with
whom one has had friendly and professional contact over quite a long number of
years, and perhaps better than the average having seen him in his capacity as
director of the laboratory, in which I then had an assisting subordinate position.
Q. Do you have an opinion as to Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty to the country, and
as to whether he would be a security risk?
A. I do have such an opinion and it is a very strong one.
Q. Would you state it, please?
A. I would regard him from my observation as completely loyal to this country.
In fact, I would make a statement of this sort, I think, that while loyalty is a very
difficult thing to demonstrate in an objective fashion, if a man could demonstrate
loyalty in an objective way, that Dr. Oppenheimer in his direction of Los
Alamos Laboratory during the war years did demonstrate such loyalty. I myself
feel that his devotion to that task, the nature of the decisions which he was called
upon to make, the manner in which he made them, were as objective a demon-
tration of personal loyalty to this country as I myself can imagine.
Q. As to this business of a security risk, which I take it is perhaps a little
different from loyalty, do you have an opinion on that?
A. I do not regard him as a security risk.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I have no further questions.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Robb.
CBOSS-BXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Doctor, Dr. Oppenheimer in his answer at page 25, "I resigned as director
of Los Alamos on October 16, 1945, after having secured the consent of Com-
mander Bradbury and of General Groves that Bradbury should act as my
successor."
Would you tell us about what happened in that connection? I assume that
is true, is not not?
A. This statement is true. I had been assigned to the Los Alamos Laboratory
as a commander in the United States Naval Reserve in June of 1944. I had
been on active duty since 1941 on leave of absence as professor of physics at
Stanford University. Frankly to my great surprise and equally frankly still
to my surprise, some time in September — I don't remember the precise date —
Dr. Oppenheimer called me in and asked if I would be willing to undertake the
direction of the Los Alamos Laboratory, that he himself intended to leave and
return to academic work and asked me, as I have said, to undertake this task.
The only specific reason for this, as far as I can see, was that in the course of
my duties there from 1944 to 1945, 1 had had contact with a number of activities
in the laboratory. My background was in physics, at least, and partly in
nuclear physics. I did not agree to do this at that particular moment when
he asked me. I asked time to think about it. I wanted to speak further with
General Groves. I wished to consult with some of the senior members of the
laboratory, Fermi, Bethe, and others, and ask them their opinion of my com-
petence of this task, and* what they foresaw of the problem.
I was personally extremely concerned— this is purely a personal opinion—
that the laboratory continue its task. Its task in the war years had been out-
standingly accomplished, but there were a number of avenues that remained to
be explored. There was certainly my personal conviction that in the exploration
of these avenues still further avenues would be found that it would be necessary
to go into. I regarded it as inevitable that with the disclosure to the world
483
that such bombs could be made, that other countries would undertake this ac-
tivity, and that the -United States would have to be the leader in this field in
so far as it could make itself sure of this.
So I had a deep personal conviction that the laboratory should continue. I
ultimately agreed to undertake the task for a period of 6 months or until some
more logical successor could be found. Apparently no more logical successor
could be induced to take the task, and I also became then convinced that it
\\as impossible for a short-time man, a man on a short-time basis, with the
announced intention of leaving, to build a permanent and enthusiastic labora-
tory. Whereupon I agreed to remain on an essentially indefinite basis.
Q. Doctor, you will forgive me. I am not a physicist so I don't know too
much about such matters, but we have heard a number of times here reference
to work on a thermonuclear device or work on a fission device. I wonder if you
can tell us without getting into classified detail Just what does a physicist, when
he works on such a device? Does he just lock himself up in a darkroom and
think, or what does he do?
A. No. I am afraid to answer your question directly would require a detailed
discussion of how a laboratory works.
Q. I don't want that. I am wondering what you do when you work on these
things.
A. No one man, I think it is fair to say, works on a fission bomb. Let me give
you just a broad example here. One group of people, theoreticians, mathema-
ticians, computers, will be exploring the behavior of a number of, let us say,
possible systems.
Mr. GARRISON. Just for clarity, you ask about thermonuclear. He used the
word fission just now.
Mr. BOBB. I said thermonuclear or fission.
titr. GRAY. Did you intend to say fission?
Mr. BOBB. Yes.
The WITNESS. My words will be essentially applicable to both. Let us use
fission and fusion indistinguishably here, because I think my remarks would be
applicable to both. Working on designs for possible systems and computing,
as far as the techniques of the time permit their behavior.
Another group of people, experimentalists, technicians, mechanics, shop people,
will be making relevant experiments on quantities which have to go into these
calculations.
Still another group of people will be working on the techniques of making
the actual parts which will be required and obtaining them in the proper physical
form or the proper purity, or whatever Is required. All these activities follow
along and periodically come to pyramids of accomplishment.
Another group of people will be doing actual, let me say, nuclear weapon engi-
neering. That is, making out of a theoretician's schematic drawing a practical
operable system. So when you speak of a person working on an atom bomb,
whether it be fission or fusion, you can hardly be speaking of a person doing this.
It is a group of persons whose activties have to be correlated, some at the broad
base of research looking toward problems in the future ; others which are Involved
in activities leading to a specific weapon accomplishment.
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. That helps me very much, Doctor. In other words, the development of a
fission device or a fusion device requires a lot more than just thinking about It.
A. This is absolutely true.
Q. Doctor, between 1946 and 1950, how many people at Los Alamos were work-
ing on the thermonuclear as distinguished from just thinking about it?
Mr. SILVERMAN. I am not sure that the witness Indicated that thinking was
not a part of working.
Mr. BOBB. I think we can define our terms here.
Mr. GRAY. This is a very intelligent witness, and I am sure he is not easily
confused.
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. I am not trying to confuse you, Doctor.
A. I am sure you are not.
Q. I am trying to find out, because it has always been foggy to me.
A. I understand the import of your question, but it will be necessary to
answer it In a somewhat ambiguous fashion for this reason.
Let me take an example which will certainly be obvious, and certainly unclassi-
fied. The hydrogen bomb is widely known to potentially utilize one or more
484
isotopes of hydrogen. The nuclear cross sections of these isotopes have to be
known in the various energy spectrums with great accuracy for the computations.
Accordingly, during the war and even after we had active groups, actively
engaged in exploring the nuclear properties of the light elements, the elements
which might possibly be effective or utilizable in the fusion of thermonuclear
field. Those people were doing physics. They were also engaged in research
which was relevant to the thermonuclear weapon.
Another example which will be difficult for me again to give because of
security reasons, but I will try to guard my words— certain aspects of the
so-called fission field are directly relevant, intimately related to the fusion field.
If you wish to have an unclassified example of this, again it is widely known
in the comic strips, that apparently some sort of primary bomb, trigger mechanism
as it is called, is apparently required. How then does one distinguish developing
very unique and specialized skills in primary bombs as an example?
Is this directly related to the fission field where it is immediately applicable
or directly related to the thermonuclear field where it becomes applicable as
soon as the techniques become sufficiently skilled?
I cannot answer your question as to what group was engaged in thermonuclear
work and what people were engaged in fission work. The fields intermingle to
such an extent that while we have been asked this question for a period of years
by a variety of bodies, no definite answer is possible without going into detail ;
this man was doing this and it had that applicability and it had that applicability.
Q. Had you finished?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there any particular group at Los Alamos during that period from
194$ until 1950, or team that was working on the thermonuclear particularly?
A. There were a number of people in our theoretical division supported by
computers and computing machinery that were particularly concerned with the
exploration of various phenomena that would be relevant to the behavior of
thermonuclear systems.
Q. Am I right in your explanation that the fission bomb is one step toward
the thermonuclear; is that right?
A. I am quoting commonly accepted -
Q. Yes, sir. Were Dr. Richtmyer and Dr. Nordheim and Dr. Teller on that
team that was working definitely on the thermonuclear at Los Alamos?
A. Dr. Richtmyer devoted a good portion of his time to this matter, but also
a good portion of his time to the fission field. At one time Dr. Richtmyer served
as alternate division leader, so he had other interests. One of his major inter-
ests was a certain type of system which may be described properly as thermo-
nuclear, although this should not be construed to be a specific definition of it.
****** *
Q. And Dr. Teller?
A. Dr. Tfeller the same thing. Dr. Teller had been interested in this field
very much, and probably a major portion of his time during the war was devoted
to the exploration of this type of system. It was not uniquely so, and was not
during his contact with Los Alamos after the war. But it was always one of
his enthusiasms.
Q. Was anybody else, if I may use the expression, during the period of 1946
to 1950 at Los Alamos specializing on the thermonuclear?
A. How should I describe the position of people who were measuring the
cross sections of deuterium?
Q. I don't know, Doctor.
A. I don't know either. You ask me were they specializing in thermonuclear
Q. Yes, sir.
A. There were those people, if I wish to do so, that could be described as
particularly interested in the thermonuclear field. I would not so describe
them. They were doing fundamental research in physics, which was relevant
to the thermonuclear field. Another group of experimentalists I prefer not to
describe in detail who were doing work which might have been undertaken
by the laboratory as general research, but was undertaken undoubtedly by the
laboratory because of its probable relevance at that time to the technology
of thermonuclear devices. Were they doing work in the thermonuclear field
specifically, or were they not, and I cannot answer your question directly.
*1 tilto " tt dear that the thermonuclear field had active support
relevant
devoted to
485
A. You mean the percentage of his personal time?
Q. Yes.
A. I suppose roughly 50 percent so distributed.
Q. How long was he down there, sir?
A. He has been there since the war up until last year. He is still on our pay-
roll. He is currently assigned by us to the computing center at New York
University. He is shortly going to assume the directorship of that group, it Is
my information. He has become extremely interested in the techniques of
computation.
Q. Is Dr. Nordheim still there?
A. Dr. Nordheim was and is a consultant to us. He spent roughly a year
with us on leave of absence from Duke University.
Q. 1 believe he was down there one summer.
A. He has spent summers with us. He has spent 1 year and a good part
of another on leave of absence with us.
Q. Was it during the summer that he was actively interested in the thermo-
nuclear?
A. Certainly during the summers and during the year he spent with us. He
•was engaged in the computations, let us say, and trying to formulate a design
for a specific type of thermonuclear system.
Q. Did you have some computers who were working on the thermonuclear
problem?
A. Computers are an essential part of any thermonuclear computation.
They have a very great task to play because the computations in this field are
not things you make with a slide rule or a small pad of paper. As I believe
I remarked earlier, one of the stumbling blocks in the years 1943 or 1048 or
1949 was the absence of computing machinery, the so-called electronic brains
of sufficient capacity and magnitude to handle the type of computations which
were involved. Only recently, with the development of machines such as the
Maniac, the computer at Princeton, IBM computers, have we had machines
which even begin to attack the problem which was confronting us during the
1944-49 era.
Dr. EVANS. They are differential equations that have no integral?
The WETNESS. They are only attackable by essentially calculation methods,
by approximation methods.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Doctor, you mentioned in 1949 Dr. Longmire had an appointment at
Princeton, but came down to Los Alamos and stayed. Did that take place
before or after the Russian explosion?
A. His arrival at Los Alamos was in August or September of 1949. This is
clearly almost coincidental with the Russian explosion. So his decision to
come there I think must have preceded the actual knowledge of the Russian
explosion.
Q. Doctor, what was your position after the Russian explosion on the ques-
tion of whether or not we should develop the thermonuclear bomb? Were you
for it or against it?
A. I was under the impression I had made some remarks on that subject
When you say develop the thermonuclear bomb, may I qualify my remarks
to this extent. I felt, as I believe I said earlier, extremely strongly that the
laboratory must undertake all possible attacks upon the thermonuclear sys-
tem to see what there was of utility in this field. Now, it seems easy now to
say thermonuclear bomb has been developed by public announcement; it seems
obvious that there must always have been such a device in the obvious cards.
This was not the case. The state of knowledge of thermonuclear systems dur-
ing the war, and thereafter, and really up until the spring of 1951, was such
as to make the practical utility or even the workability in any useful sense of
what was then imagined as a thermonuclear weapon extremely questionable.
This does not mean that in fact, it meant very much to us that one must
find out what is there in this field. Only by work in it will one find out It is
possible that we would have explored the field and out it was not, that we
could not find a useful military system in it But without this exploration,
it is clear you wouldn't know.
We felt very strongly that we had to know the fact In 1949-60 the state
of knowledge at that time would certainly permit one to be very pessimistic
about the practical utility of what was called a hydrogen bomb.
Q. Did you think that the Russians would certainly try to find out?
486
A. I was personally certain that no group of people knowing the energy which
was available in the so-called fusion type of reaction would fail to explore
this field.
Q. Therefore you thought we ought to also?
A. I certainly feel this way, yes, felt and feel.
Mr. ROBB. Thank you, Doctor. That is all I care to ask the Doctor.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Bradbury, you referred to regaining a lead which we had had.
I believe this was your expression with respect to this kind of thing we are
talking about today.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. I suppose if in that context one refers to the thermonuclear
weapons. It is a question of size. Is that a fair statement?
The WITNESS. You mean size of bang?
Mr. GRAY. That is right, yes.
The WITNESS. I am afraid it Is more complicated than that.
Mr. GRAY. What I am trying to get at, Doctor, did your approach to this
problem involve any kind of moral consideration or was this purely technical
on the ground of practicability and usability?
The WITNESS. You are inquiring as to my personal opinions in this matter?
Mr. GRAY. That is correct. During this period that we are talking about
from 1946 when you became director of the laboratory up until the present
time. I may be making an effort at distinction which cant be as clearly made
as I am trying to do it. But let us take a very simple matter. I suppose any
ordinary conventional weapon, with respect to that, the question of making
it more efficient is not a moral question at all. If you assume the weapon you
have already swallowed the moral implications, I suppose.
What I am trying to get at is what you meant by regaining the lead.
The WITNESS, I meant by this only the fact that in, I think, the general guesses
that people made that the Russians in the development of both the actual fact
of atomic weapons and the related production enterprises had been expected to
be something of the order of 5 or more years behind us. The appearance of a
Russian atomic explosion in September 1949 was generally regarded, I believe,
as a year or 2 or 3 earlier than one might have reasonably expected the Russians
to reach this accomplishment. They were clearly therefore working at a high
rate of speed, even granting what I think became evident later, the treachery
of Puchs.
At the time of course, we were not aware, as I recall, that Fuchs had indeed
passed information on. Perhaps this made it seem a little more plausihle that
they had made such rapid progress. But at any rate it was clear at that time
that— I am now only quoting my own thinking and opinion in this matter— it
seemed to me that we were in the position of 2 runners in the race where it
was quite clear that your opponent was running and running quite fast It was
probably you were ahead of him in actual distance. It was not obvious that he
was not running faster than you were. Our own objectives at that time had to
be as far as we could make them to be sure we were running as fast as he was
Mr. GRAY. And successful work on thermonuclear weapons might have been
considered one of our legs.
The WITNESS. This I would definitely so consider. As you are aware, the
f^°nUel1ar,fiellSas^vo obvions military characteristics. One, apparently
that in a single shrike the destructive effort to deliver would be presumably
\ery great; two, that if the materials that went into this system were indeed
^ S^16; lhatJ*e cost of such systems "* tteSSSttS nSmbtr
? 1VS?5? to ? e Same "^ of restrictions that so-called fissionTare
to. Both these characteristics are of obvious military interest
£*£*?* c£aract^stics of thermonuclear systems or any weapons
matte/ wWch have to do *"* essentially deliverability. In
J8 n° g°°d '? tt f S Of such a <*aractei that it can't be £
weapons system must be looked at in terms of its net
of its «* its *•* and its relation to *
^trl^^"0*8**1*11 £espect to fusion ^sterns had to be explored.
were not known at any time in 1949, certainly and it was possible i
in this field ™Id ^ to sTmethi^Wcf wild
like to **&***** tha* this was at
487
Mr. GRAY. But on this matter of lead, thermonuclear weapons certainly
were a part of that picture.
The WITNESS. Very definitely so. There were also leads that had to be estab-
lished in the fission field or were being established in the fission field. This
was another part of the military strength of the country.
Mr. GBAT. As a matter of hindsight, suppose there had been a Presidential
directive in 1945 or at some later date, perhaps, but earlier than January 1950;
is It possible that we might have had the invention or discoveries earlier?
The WITNESS. My personal opinion in answer to that question is in the
negative. I would like to say as much as I can within the bounds of security
as to why.
Gould I consult just a moment on the question, Mr. Rolander?
(Consultation.)
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, I will leave it to the board if the board wonltl
like to, after hearing what Dr. Bradbury has to say, explore it in classified terms.
We would withdraw.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you. I hope that won't be necessary.
The WITNESS. I believe I can make my remarks in a fashion which will be
acceptable. The only line of attack which had occurred to us on this problem
throughout the years 1942 onwards seemed to be a line of attack during 1945-49
which would be fraught with enormous technical difficulties, that is, practical
technological difficulties.
There was also a grave question as to whether or not the systems then
thought of would have any behavior that would be at all, let us say, effective
in terms of their probable complexity, probable size and probable cost. Had we
endeavored to explore those fields in that state of knowledge, we would have had
in my opinion two extremely undesirable courses, one of which would have been,
I believe, almost fatal. We would have spent time lashing about in a field in
which we were not equipped to do adequate computational work. We would
have spent time exploring with inadequate methods a system which was far
from certain to be successful, * * *. I am getting here on thin ice, but if you
will let me stick by my earlier remarks that skill and ingenuity in the fission
field is an essential prerequisite to the success in the thermonuclear field, the
progress of the laboratory during the years following the war in the under-
standing and development, and indeed, some systems of very close relevance to
the thermonuclear system as we know them today, were an essential part of the
ultimate actual ability to make an effective thermonuclear weapon.
Hindsight is a difficult thing. Perhaps the statement I am making is self-
serving. But my own personal opinion is that the course of action pursued by
the laboratory is right. I regret to make this statement in this fashion, perhaps
because it was partly I presume my decision. But in retrospect I cannot see
how we could have reached our present objectives in a more rapid fashion
by any other mechanism except the mechanism by which we went.
Mr. GRAY. You think there has not been delay in any event. You reject the
notion that there has been delay in the development of this weapon?
The WITNESS. I reject this notion. I also think that it is perhaps correct to
say that at any time, particularly in 1945, 1946, and 1947, there were certain
fundamental objectives at the laboratory that simply had to be met. If we had,
let us say, retained our 1945 technology in weapons through the next 3 or 4
years, with or without thermonuclear systems, this country would have been
enormously deficient in strength compared to what it was actually at that time
because of the efforts of the laboratory in the fission field. These efforts also
made possible subsequent developments in the thermonuclear field.
Mr. GRAY. In your conversations with Dr, Oppenheimer in 1945 with respect
to the possibility of your becoming director, did you discuss what policy of the
laboratory might be with respect to this matter we have been talking about,
do yon recall?
The WITNESS. With respect to the development of thermonuclear systems?
Mr. GBAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. No, we did not discuss this. Let ine say I have no recollection
of discussing this. I would like to make one additional comment in that con-
nection. Shortly after I assumed the directorship of the laboratory* I had a
meeting of all the staff members then present and one to which I was essentially
talking — let me say the senior staff members, the corodinating council of the
laboratory, at that time I discussed my own philosophy of tfce laboratory and
included in that philosophy was the continuation of the exploration which we
had been doing in the thermonuclear field.
488
Mr GRAY. Do you recall any change of attitude on Dr. Oppenheimer's part
towards the development of thermonuclear systems at any time during your
aSThe TOTNESS. I mentioned earlier the developments, the ideas in this field
which occurred during the spring of 1951, prior to the meeting at Princeton
in June of 1051. I think I would be correct in saying that these ideas seemed
technically sound to Dr. Oppenheimer and that he upon hearing of them,
regarded the prospect of success in the field as extraordinarily more likely. I
think his opinions expressed at the meeting in Princeton reflected this opinion,
if you wish, that here was a technique or an idea which cast a new light on
the practicality of such systems.
Mr GRAY. But you don't recall anything at the time, for example, of the use
of the atomic weapon in the late months of the war that reflected any changed
attitude toward thermonuclear weapons?
The WITNESS. I don't believe I ever discussed the use of any atomic weapon
in war with Dr. Oppenheimer. Certainly not at that time. It would not have
been my position in the laboratory to do so. We probably had discussed the
GAG meetings later on of how such weapons might be employed, what vehicles
might be used for them, the problems of vehicles, questions of that sort.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Bradbury, you mentioned Dr. Teller's departure from the lab-
oratory. I am not familiar with the circumstances of that. Could you very
briefly indicate what the circumstances were?
The WITNESS. If I could do so in what I might regard as administrative con-
fidence. This is not restricted data, but on the other hand, it has to do with per-
sonal relationships between Teller and myself.
Mr. GKAY. I don't know important it is to have that.
The WITNESS. Perhaps I can answer this without any serious difficulty, but
again I would like to say that this is essentially— could I make it off the record,
if you wish?
Dr. EVANS. I think Dr. Bradbury doesn't have to answer.
Mr. GRAY. Let us go off the record.
The WITNESS. I don't care whether it is in the record or not All I would like
to say is that Teller and I disagreed as to the most effective method of the admin-
istration of the thermonuclear program at Los Alamos for its most rapid accom-
plishment, and ultimately we disagreed on essentially a matter of trivality, that
is to say, the projection in point of time in advance, a date for a definitive test op-
eration. I foiTtir for some time prior to that, Dr. Teller and I had had some dif-
ferences of personal opinion not regarding the importance of the program or the
general way in which it should be going, but we had differences of opinion re-
garding the best way to administer it. These were differences of a rather funda-
mental nature in the administration of a laboratory, and since the administration
of the laboratory was essentially my responsibility, I- had to do it in a way that
seemed best to me.
Ultimately Teller left. Our relations are personally friendly. He was a con-
sultant to the laboratory thereafter. He still spends occasional time with us, al-
though his primary interests are now with another group.
Mr. GSAY. At the time of the close of the war, there were varying views as to
what should be done with the laboratory, I believe. There were some who wished
to close it up, some who wished to continue full speed, some who favored its re-
moval to some other place. Is that a correct statement of the varying views
among the staff?
The WITNESS. I am afraid that I probably would not have a complete cross
section of all the views. My own opinion was obviously strong, and my own;
that the laboratory should not be closed up. It is unlikely that very many people
came to argue with me that it should be closed up.
Mr. GRAY. Did you ever hear Dr. Oppenheimer express the view that it should
be closed?
The WITNESS. I never did. In fact, I would probably be the last person to
nave heard him make such a statement inasmuch as he was instrumental in me
taking it over. It would be unlikely that he would say at the same time to close
it up. I was aware, and this was the proper question at the time, was Los Alamos,
New Mexico, the best place to operate this laboratory. This question was ac-
tively explored by the Manhattan District in the year following the war, and the
ultimate decision was that it was probably the best place to operate it.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Bradbury, I don't want you or anyone else to misunderstand the
next question I am going to ask. It points to no conclusion certainly in my
mind about anything at all. It has to do with perhaps the most serious underly-
489
ing Implication involved in these proceedings. That has to do with lovalty to
country.
I think your statement in response to a question from counsel was that you
had no question about Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty, and you based it at least in part
on his very remarkable accomplishments during the war years as Director of
the Laboratory. I think there are those perhaps who questioned Dr. Oppen-
heimers loyalty and who might argue that an individual who was sympathetic
to tne UbSR could very consistently have gone far beyond the call of normal
duty in his war work, which was beneficial to the interests of the United States,
and still have felt that sympathetic interests for the Soviet Union were also being
served. That is at least an argument can be made, and I am sure you are fa-
miliar with it.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. In your testimony about Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty, are you pre-
pared to give your judgment to the war years? In other words, do you think
that his actions since the war are of the same character and nature as to lead
you to a conclusion about his loyalty?
The WITNESS. I do, and I have the same opinion. I think it can be supported
by the same sort— perhaps not quite the same sort of objective evidence. I am
well aware that it is possible to attribute ulterior motives to almost any human
action. It is possible to argue these questions in perpetuity along those lines
Referring to my statement about his behavior as Director of Los Alamos Lab-
oratory, in my own opinion, this to me constitutes as strong objective evidence
as one can hope for, of loyalty. I have to base this not only upon the technical
accomplishments of the laboratory, but upon the way in which these accom-
plishments were done, upon the manner in which he sought and made use of ad-
vice from his senior staff, essentially upon a sort of subjective impression which
you can only get by seeing a man look worried, that indeed the success of this
laboratory and its role in the war that was then going on were objectives which
were uppermost and suprpassed all others in his mind. I was not looking in his
mind, and I cannot say this of course from definite knowledge. You can never
say anything about a man's loyalty by looking at him except what you feel. I
would feel from everything that I could see of his operation at Los Alamos dur-
ing the war years that here is a man who is completely and unequivocally loyal
to the best interests of this country.
I would make the same remark about the associations I had with him after
the war years. I suppose it is true, although he can say this better than I,
that he had deep personal concerns about the actual role of atomic weapons in
the national security. I think anyone is entitled and should have this same
sort of concern. What personal decisions one makes in the long run is of
course a personal matter. But certainly his chairmanship of the GAG after
ihe war years never questioned the fact or never questioned the assertion that
the Los Alamos Laboratory should continue, should be strengthened, should
proceed along lines of endeavor which were of military effectiveness. Every
decision that I can recall that the GAG made with respect to the laboratory, with
the possible exception of what may have been their opinion regarding thermo-
nuclear development, seemed to me to be the right decision. In other words,
there was never to my knowledge any degree of difference of opinion between
myself, my senior staff, and the positions taken by the GAG.
This was particularly the case that the laboratory felt extremely strongly that
actual test of nuclear weapons were a fundamental part of the progress in this
field. We still feel that way extremely strongly. The GAG supported us in this.
Had they not done so, our progress would have been enormously slower or almost
zero. This could have been a point where one might have taken a contrary
position perhaps. The GAG did not do so.
I believe the question which I tend to believe was exaggerated at the time in
the public press and got into erroneous importance at the time through the efforts
of a number of people— it assumed an erroneous stature in public debate— was on
a case where we might have found ourselves in a difference of opinion with the
GAG. Whether this difference was real or not, I am not prepared to say. But
I have stated what the opinion of the laboratory was as strongly as I can.
I do not personally believe that if there was this difference of opinion, and I
presume there was some difference of opinion here, that it was based on malevo-
lent motives.
I believe and still believe that the apparent position of the GAG was based
upon a defendable argument although one with which I might not personally
agree. I might not have personally agreed with one of the conclusions of foe
490
question of policy that some members of the GAG arrived at. Nevertheless, I
do not regard them as opinions which are either malevolent or subversive. I
positively regard them as opinions which can be held and which were held as
matters relating to the safety of the United States.
The safety of the United States I am convinced was uppermost in the minds of
all members, including the chairman, of the GAG. We may have differed as to
the best methods of obtaining the safety. I think such differences are an
essential part of any democratic system. I never had then nor do I now have the
slightest feeling that these differences were motivated by any other than a direct
deep and sincere concern for the welfare of the country.
That was only substantiated by the actions of the GAG after the President's
decision, which again were in strong support of this whole field which we char-
acterize as thermonuclear. Basically the GAG supported the laboratory as a
weapons laboratory in all fields. If there was a difference of opinion in 1949-50,
it had to do with perhaps the technical question of emphasis on one or another
line of attack in the weapons field in general.
Does that answer your question?
Mr. GRAY. I think probably it does. I think your answer is in the affirmative.
I think my question was that you feel that the character and nature and intensity
of Dr. Oppenheimer' loyalty has been as great in postwar years as you saw it in
the war years.
The WITNESS. That is my feeling.
Mr. GRAY. Are there .any questions?
Dr. EVANS. Yes. Dr. Bradbury, where did you have your undergraduate and
graduate education?
The WITNESS. I received the bachelor of arts degree from Pomona College in
Clairmont, Calif., in 1929. I received the Ph. D. from the University of Cali-
fornia in 1932. Then for 2 years I was research fellow at MIT. Thereafter
I was on the academic staff at Stanford University, first as assistant professor,
associate, and then full professor.
Dr. EVANS. Are you a Communist?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Hav.e you ever been?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Have you ever been a fellow traveler?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Dr. EVANS. There were a lot of organizations that the Attorney General listed
as under communistic control, Doctor ; do you know that Ust?
The WITNESS. I have seen that list
Dr. EVANS. Are you a member of any of those organizations?
The WITNESS. I am not. I think it would be an awful time to find out if I
were.
Dr. EVANS. Were you surprised when the Russians fired the bomb?
The WITNESS. In 1949?
Dr. EVANS. Yes.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Dr. EVANS. You were surprised?
The WITNESS, I was surprised.
Dr. EVANS. Do you -think the knowledge that Fuchs might have given them
helped them in that?
The WITNESS. I now think so. I was surprised at the time that it came so
early. It is now my personal impression although I have no evidence to support
this, of course, that probably they were assisted along these lines by the infor-
mation Fuchs appears to have given them. «*!«««,
Dr. EVANS. You do think that scientific men should be required to keep their
discoveries secret when they might affect the country and not publish them?
The WITNESS. That is a very difficult question to answer, sir. It is very diffi-
cultf or a scientist doing basic research to be sure that in the course of time this
particular technical report, paper, invention or discovery may affect the security.
May I give you an example of this? It would have been a perfectly normal
thingfora scientist to do, although somewhat difficult, tomeasurl^te^neuteon
**£ w"*™ *1932, 1934, 1936, and 1938, and so on^S
nd I**1*®* *ood nuclear s(*ence at that time. At the
Se?lon ^^^te a**, of course, carefully guarded
HowtQl934or
« J °JJLavikn(>TO that these c*088 sections are going to be something
that WOBM affect national security? I can't give yon an anlwef to y onrquStio£
491
I think if an individual knows or believes that his discovery is immediately
relevant to national security, he has definite responsibility to the country in
that connection.
Dr. EVANS. Do you think that scientific men as a rule are rather peculiar
individuals?
The WITNESS. When did I stop beating my wife?
Mr. GRAY. Especially chemistry professors?
Dr. EVANS. No, physics professors.
The WITNESS. Scientists are human beings. I think as a class, because their
basic task is concerned with the exploration of the facts of nature, understand-
ing, this is a quality of mind philosophy — a scientist wants to know. He wants
to know correctly and truthfully and precisely. By this token it seems to me
he is more likely than not to be interested in a number of fields, but to be in-
terested in them from the point of view of exploration. What is in them? What
do they have to offer. What is their truth. I think this degree of flexibility
of approach, of interest, of curiosity about facts, about systems, about life,
is an essential ingredient to a man who is going to be a successful research
scientist. If he does not have this underlying curiosity, willingness to look into
things, wish and desire to look into things, I do not think he will be either a
good or not certainly a great scientist.
Therefore, I think you are likely to find among people who have imaginative
minds in the scientific field, individuals who are also willing, eager to look at a
number of other fields with the same type of interest, willingness to examine,
to be convinced and without a priori convictions as to tightness or wrongness,
that this constant or this or that curve or this or that function is fatal.
I think the same sort of willingness to explore other areas of human activity
is probably characteristic. If this makes them peculiar, I think it is probably a
desirable peculiarity.
Dr. EVANS. You didn't do that, did you?
The WITNESS. Well
Dr. EVANS. Tou didn't investigate these subversive organizations, did you?
The WITNESS. No. Perhaps my interest lay along other lines. I don't think
one has to investigate all these political systems.
Dr. EVANS. Do you go fishing and things like that?
The WITNESS. Yes, I have done a number of things. Some people, and per-
haps myself among them, I was an experimental physicist during those days,
and I was very much preoccupied by the results of my own investigations.
Dr. EVANS. But that didn't make you peculiar, did it?
The WITNESS. This I would have to leave to others to say.
Dr. EVANS. Younger people sometimes make mistakes, don't they?
The WITNESS. I think this is part of people's growing up.
Dr. EVANS. We all do.
The WITNESS. That is, take actions which turn out to be wrong later on.
Whether they were mistakes at the time may be a debatable question.
Dr. EVANS. Do you think Dr. Oppenheimer made any mistakes?
The WITNESS. My personal feeling here with regard to the situation specifi-
cally to the question of organizations is that these are actions which in the light
of history, in the light of subsequent developments, turn out to have been un-
desirable. I would not like to say that I regard them as either right or wrong.
I say that simply they turn out to have been bad for him to have done at this
time. At the time they were done, I regard them as potentially at least without
significance. They reflected a certain area of interest, an interest which as
yon recall was held by a number of people at that time. The Spanish war was
of concern to a number of people.
Dr. EfrANS. That is potentially they should have been of no interest to this
Board?
The WITNESS. No, I cannot say that I don't wish to make a speech. It is
unfortunate that the number of objective examples which one has of, let us
say, people who are disloyal is extremely small. Tou can count them on the
fingers of one hand. In every case these people seem to have been drawn from
a certain type of background in which at least some degree of interest in liberal,
leftwing or Communist activities was a part. Therefore, I have to agree that
where this background of interest in these affairs occurs, that a query at least
is indicated.
It is a fact of life, but I think it perhaps regrettable that because a few people
out of thousands have been discovered in this particular area, that thousands
or tens of thousands are automatically thereby put potentially in the same
492
category. I think the question has to be raised because of the things which
Fuchs, Alan Nunn May, Greenglass have done. Perhaps it is one of the most
serious things they have done, to cast a shadow of suspicion on those who
were interested in these activities for completely humanitarian or intellectual
motives.
I think therefore this question has to be raised. I myself do not regard the
matter of membership in such societies or interest in them as particularly
significant in the light of the times— let me say necessarily significant in the
light of the times. I think it is a question which must be raised, must be
explored. It may turn out to have meaning. It might be in this case it does not
have meaning.
Dr. EVANS. You spoke of loyalty. Would you put loyalty to your country
above loyalty to your friends?
The WITNESS. I would.
Dr. EVANS. That is all I have.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILYEEMAN:
Q. Dr. Bradbury, from your knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer, today, do you
think he would put loyalty to his country above loyalty to a friend?
A. I believe he would.
Mr. SILVEBMAN, That is all.
BE- CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. Boss:
Q. Doctor, I have one question suggested by your discussion with the Chair-
man about what might be the result had there been a Presidential directive in
1945 or 1946 to undertake all out work on the H-bomb.
It has been testified here, Doctor, that something happened in the spring of
1951, and that accelerated the successful development of the thermonuclear so
Ihat work came to a successful conclusion maybe 18 months thereafter.
My question is, Supposing that something had happened in 1945 or 1946,
what would have been the result? How soon do you think you would have had
the thermonuclear weapon perfected?
A. We had this idea
Q. Is that an Intelligent question?
A. This is a question that I would answer this way. Had this idea occurred
in 1945, 1946, 1947 or 1948 or almost any time before it did occur, we would not
have known how to use it in an effective military fashion. We were already
pursuing in the years following the war those techniques, specifically in the
fission field, which made the implementation of this idea a practical thing. We
had already conducted experiments. I can't describe them for security reasons.
They were in the fission field, and bore directly upon this field. Frankly, if I
may go back to one of your other potential questions, had there been a Presi-
dential directive to proceed along thermonuclear lines in 1945, I would almost
doubt in retrospect that we would have done or could have done anything much
different than we did. In other words, the active exploration of the fission field
was a necessary and essential prerequisite known all along to the fusion field.
Had there been such a hypothetical decision, it is impossible to answer. Had
there been, we would have done exactly as we did. We might have been
persuaded otherwise, and I think if we had we would have found ourselves
farther behind in 1954 than we are.
Q. I am not sure your answer— and that is my fault and not yours.
A. It is my fault
Q. Your answer about not knowing how to use this discovery in 1946 or
1947, could you explain that a bit further?
A. I would have great difficulty in doing so without going into restricted
data. Let me think for a moment to see if I can find some way around this.
There would be two possibilities. We would not have been able to make the
relevant calculations for mechanical reasons. We would not have been able
to make them for let us say technological reasons, because only in the course
of those years did we begin to get some understanding of how to compute
atomic or fission bombs. * * *
Q. Doctor, in the years between 1946 and 1950, did you have the staff and
the equipment then to do what you did subsequent to this discovery in 1951?
A. Between when did you say, 1945 and 1950?
493
Q. Yes, sir. In other words, assuming this discovery in 1945, 1946, or 1947, did
you then have the staff to do what you did with the discovery in 1951 and 1952?
A. As you are doubtless aware, in 1945 the laboratory of course was partly
civilian and partly military. We had a couple of thousand SED, special engi-
neering detachment of the military personnel. We had a number of officers. In
1945 and early 1946, a great part of our civilian personnel left to return to school,
to their industrial and academic jobs. The size of the laboratory reached its
minimum roughly in September of 1946, at which time its size was roughly half,
perhaps a little less than half of its size at the present time. From that time
on it has grown steadily up to about the present time.
There were admittedly difficulties in taking the laboratory through the transi-
tion period prior to the Atomic Energy Act, while personnel straightened them-
selves out in their own desires. In 1946, throughout the entire year, or at least
until the adoption of the Atomic Energy Act, perhaps we were lucky to keep
ourselves alive. We had the Crossroads Operation to carry out, and life was
far from easy. I don't say it has ever been easy, but in those days certainly
our task was not simple. We were devoting, as I have said earlier, our major
directed effort, the efforts which come to the peaks of these pyramids of
development, two things which would make the production capacity of the
United States as effective in a military way as it possibly could be right then
and there. We were also devoting our efforts to making atomic weapons as they
then existed more effective as part of a weapons system for the country; in
other words, an effort to maximize the immediate potential of the country*
As I have said earlier this was not to the exclusion of thermonuclear work
but it was the focus of achievement which was in the fission field. We would
have had a hard time and unprofitable time and I think in the light of subsequent
events, and it would have been an error and mistake to try to hash about in a
field for which none of the basic technologies then existed, and at a time when
there were very clear things to be done in the fission field.
Q. Beginning with the Presidential directive in January 1950, did you there-
after receive additional personnel and additional funds and additional assistance
in your work?
A. The laboratory has never lacked for funds. The actual request for funds
has always been supported by the Commission and the Congress. The growth
of the laboratory has been as rapid as we could make it subject to housing and
the ability to draw personnel into our isolated area, and into the classified field.
There was no immediate change in either dollars or personnel before or after
the President's recommendation. It was a matter of growth. We did at that
time carry out an active campaign to enlist the services of a number of the
senior scientists of the country who had been with the project during the war,
to see if they could come back on a year's leave of absence, and we were success-
ful in a number of these cases, and in a number we were not because they felt
their task was more urgent in the instruction of graduate students.
Q. Whether it was immediate or not, as a result of the Presidential directive,
was there an expansion in your facilities and personnel and funds?
A. As a result of the Presidential directive, I can't say there was. I would
say there has been an expansion and an increase of our funds continuously in
the years from 1945 on onward. I would have to look at a graph of the actual
dollars per year spent. I don't have it with me. I would doubt if such a graph
of dollars spent would show any significant fluctuation in the period we were
talking about, except as a result of a test activity occurring in this year or not in
this year. By this I do not mean that we lack support. We have always
received from the Commission and the Commission from the Congress as much
support as we could see our way clear to use in a justifiable fashion,
Mr. ROBB. Thank you, sir.
Mr. GRAY. I am sorry, Dr. Bradbury, that I am not through with my questions.
When did you go to Los Alamos?
The WITNESS. I arrived July 4 or just about July 4 of 1944. I first visited
there some time in June 1944 when I was about to be transferred there. Prior
to that I was at the United States Proving Ground at Dahlgren, Va.
Mr. GRA.Y. I have forgotten at what time some of these people whom we
discussed in earlier proceedings, such as Lomanitz, left. I guess he left before
you arrived?
Mr. ROBB. He was not at Los Alamos.
Mr. BEOKEBLEY. He was at Berkeley. Did you know that man?
The WETNESS. No.
Mr. GRAY. Did you know David Hawkins?
494
The WITNESS. Yes.
Dr. EVANS. Weinberg?
The WITNESS. Weinberg, no.
Mr. GRAY. What were some of the other names?
Mr. SILVERMAN, I don't believe Weinberg was at Los Alamos.
Dr. EVANS. Xo, he wasn't.
Mr. GRAY. You knew Hawkins?
The WITNESS. I knew David Hawkins, yes.
Mr. GRAY. Did you know anything about his sympathies?
The WITNESS. At that time, no. I was unaware of his background until it
was about to appear in the public notice.
Dr. EVANS. That is, it is perfectly possible to be about a man quite a long time
and not know anything about his background?
The WITNESS. It is perfectly possible. I knew David Hawkins in a friendly
fashion. I presume I have had cocktails with him. I presume I have been to
dinner with him. I never discussed politics with him and found him a very loyal
supporter of our activities there.
Mr. GRAY. Were you surprised when you read or heard that he had been a
member of the Communist Party?
The WITNESS. I would say I was surprised, yes. I don't wish to have this
interpreted that I was shocked. I have no idea of this. I had no reason to
have any idea.
Mr. GRAY. Did you know Philip Morrison?
The WiTNEsa Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Do you know anything about his sympathies?
The WITNESS. I would say my personal contact with him was the same as
with David Hawkins. I had more technical contact with him because he was
very active in the design of one of our research tools, the so-called fast reactor.
We valued his professional advice extremely highly. I never recall discussing
with him political problems. I was, I think, indirectly aware that he was not
entirely sympathetic to the development of the atomic bombs. But I don't
think he was unique in this feeling among people who were about to leave
Los Alamos.
Mr. GRAY. This would indicate that you could know an individual and see him
frequently, as Dr. Evans said, in complete ignorance of membership in the
Communist Party?
The WITNESS. I am sure this is certainly true. I knew Fuchs well
Dr. EVANS. You did know him?
The WITNESS. I wouldn't say well. I am sure Fuchs has been a guest at my
house, and has had cocktails at my house or perhaps even eaten dinner at mv
house.
Mr. GARRISON. In Los Alamos?
The WITNESS. Yes. I must say in that case I was deeply shocked by what
appeared to have been Fuch's activities at the time. This was a great shock to
all of us at Los Alamos.
Dr. EVANS. It was a great shock to everybody.
Mr. GRAY. There seems to be no question that he had a commitment to a
foreign power, does there?
The WITNESS. I perhaps might have a slightly different interpretation of it
I think it must be said in fairness to Fuchs that he worked extremely hard and
effectively for Los Alamos and this country. He appears to have a divided or
double loyalty. I think his accomplishments at Los Alamos it must be said were
very effective.
Mr. GRAY. This was the point I was trying to make in the question I asked
you earlier, and when I asked you not to misunderstand the Import of the
question, that here is an example, Fuchs, himself, who at the same time could
want Los Alamos to be a marvelously successful laboratory, and still have
loyalty to another country.
The- WITNESS. I never saw in Fuchs anything other than to indicate a hard-
working, effective, skilled physicist. I think it is agreed that his accomplish-
(Witness excused)
Mr. GRAY. We will take a little recess.
<Brief recess,)
495
Mr. GRAY. Let us resume. Dr. Evans is out for a moment but will be back.
Dr. Whitman, do you wish to testify unde oath? You are not required to do so.
Dr. WHITMAN. I am perfectly willing to.
Mr. GRAY. All the witnesses have so testified.
(Dr. Evans entered the hearing room.)
Dr. WHITMAN. Yes, I will be glad to.
Mr. GRAY. Would you be good enough to stand and raise your right hand,
please. What is your full name?
Dr. WHITMAN. Walter G. Whitman; Walter Gordon Whitman.
Mr. GRAY. Walter Gordon Whitman, do you swear that the testimony you are
to give the board shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Dr. WHITMAN. I do.
Mr. GEAY. Will you be seated, please, sir.
It is my duty to remind you of the existence of the so-called perjury statutes,
Dr. Whitman. May we assume that you are familiar with their existence and
penalties?
Dr. WHITMAN. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. I should like to ask that in the course of your testimony if it
becomes necessary for you to disclose or refer to restricted data that you notify
me in advance so we may take necessary and appropriate steps.
Finally, Dr. Whitman, we treat these proceedings as a confidential matter be-
tween the Atomic Energy Commission and its officials and Dr. Oppenheimer, his
witnesses, and representatives. The Commission will initiate no public releases
with respect to these proceedings. It is my custom to express on behalf of the
board a hope that witnesses will have the same view.
Mr. Silverman, will you proceed.
Thereupon, Walter Gordon Whitman was called as a witness, and having been
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Dr. Whitman, will you state what your profession is, please?
A. I am a chemical engineer and the head of the chemical department of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Q. Do you hold any governmental position?
A. I am a member of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy
Commission.
Q. How long have you been such a member?
A. Since the summer of 1950.
Q. I understand that you were formerly chairman of the Research and Devel-
opment Board of the Department of Defense?
A. Yes, sir. I came down under General Marshall in the summer of 1951, served
under him, Mr. Lovett and Mr. Wilson for 2 years.
Q. Will you tell us something about your association with Dr. Oppenheimer.
A. My first meeting with Dr. Oppenheimer came in 1948 at a time when I was
the director of the so-called Lexington project which MIT ran for the Atomic
Energy Commission to determine or pass upon the feasibility of nuclear powered
flight
In connection with that project I met Dr. Oppenheimer in June of 1948 at the
time we were getting background information. The contact was not important.
My real contact began in September 1950 at the first meeting of the General
Advisory Committee after my appointment
I knew him in General Advisory Committee work quite intimately for the next
2 years until the termination of his 6-year term on the General Advisory Com-
mittee. He was, of course, the chairman of the committee, as yon know.
I had very close association with him also when I accepted the position as chair-
man of the Research and Development Board because he was then a consultant
to me and a member of my committee on atomic energy, a committee composed
of high ranking military officers from the three services concerned with atomic*
energy and certain civilians, Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr. Bacher, and a few others.
Q. Dr. Bacher was chairman?
A. Dr. Bacher was chairman of that committee. That association was very
close from August 1, 1951, for the next 2 years while I was in the Pentagon. I
also served on a special panel headed by Dr. Oppenheimer in December 1950.
This was in the Pentagon under the Research and Development Board before I
30381S— 54 82
496
became chairman and the purpose of this special committee was to review the
status of atomic energy and military applications and try to point out the lines
of research and development which should be followed in a wider exploitation of
atomic energy for military purposes. It was a look into the future.
I also had one special connection with Dr. Oppenheimer in December 1951 on a
trip to visit SHAPE headquarters and General Eisenhower to discuss with him
the findings of the so-called VISTA report. The VISTA report carried out at the
California Institute of Technology for the military was headed by Dr. Lee Du-
Bridge. Dr. DuBridge, Prof. Charles Lauritsen and Dr. Oppenheimer went over
to discuss this report with General Eisenhower and others— General Gruenther,
General Norstad, under the general sponsorship of the research and development
board, of which I was chairman. So I accompanied them on this 1-week trip
with the approval of Mr. Lovett, the Secretary of Defense.
I would say that my other contact official connection which is of less impor-
tance was as a fellow member of the Science Advisory Committee from about the
fall of 1951 until December of 1953.
Mr. GRAY. Science Advisory Committee of what?
The WITNESS. Of the Office of Defense Management
Of these various contacts my close association on the General Advisory Com-
mittee, the trip to Europe in connection with the VISTA report and the close as-
sociation as my consultant in the research and development board and a commit-
tee member are the significant ones.
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Would you tell us something about how Dr. Oppenheimer ran, if that is the
correct word to use, the meetings of the GAC so far as bringing out or permitting
expressions of views of the members and so on is concerned?
A. In the first place Dr. Oppenheimer worked very hard in advance of the meet-
ing in order to prepare a most worth while agenda for consideration by the com-
mittee. Some of the items were suggested by the Commission itself and others
were brought up by study by other members of the committee, particularly by
Dr. Oppenheimer. He was very careful to outline the problem and to see to it
that we had authoritative presentations of the situation on which we were to give
advice. I may say that he made it quite a point to assure the participation and
the expression of views by all members of the committee, not to initially state his
own views and try to coerce others to those views.
I think we were all, at least I was, remarkably impressed by his ability to sum-
marize the conclusions and the thinking of the committee in the presentation be-
fore the Commissioners themselves at the end of the 3-day meeting.
Perhaps I should say that initially we would meet with the Commissioners
and discuss the subjects that would be brought up. They would point out par-
ticular things on which they would like our views and advice.
Q. This was an oral discussion?
A. This was an oral discussion. The last item of the 3-day meeting was a
meeting with the Commissioners themselves at which was presented the conclu-
sions and thinking of the committee.
During the progress of the meeting very frequently individual Commissioners
would come in to participate in the discussions which we were holding.
In Ms final summarization of the committee advice, Dr. Oppenheimer had a
remarkable ability to pull it together and he would also make quite a point of
asking individual committee members to explain more at length theirviews,
which might be entirely in accord with his summary, or might represent a dif-
ferent position. So I always had a feeling that as the chairman of the meettag
he was most anxious that the Commission get the benefit not only of the sum-
mSTf tht US*1!?** vf ?*e commlttee «»>W give, but also the views which
might represent differing shades of opinion or even disagreement
n°«a aMm5tt of fl» G&UXB.I Advisory Committee at
meeting on the hydrogen bomb?
A. No, I had nothing to do with that, knew nothing of it and didn't enter the
™onths hid *" ^ President'S decision **« been announced and
Duri?? toe period from the time you became a member of the General
^mber 1950 until Dr. Oppenheimer's term Xed
would you care to say anything about Dr. Oppenheimer's
* -* tOWard ** W°rk °f ** GAO ^ connection
lAkS?1? ***?* came Dp a*11111 and a«ain a* our meetings. Frankly I was
shocked to read any comment that there was an attempt to obKtpr^I
497
after the decision was made, because all the way through I had the feeling that
he not only was not obstructing but that he was working hard toward helping
toward the early success of the hydrogen program.
Q. Do you recall a meeting at Princeton in the late spring or early summer
of 1951 on the hydrogen bomb?
A. I do.
Q. Can you tell us anything about that and particularly Dr. Oppenheimer's
roll there?
A. Dr. Oppenheimer was the moderator of that meeting, which consisted of
him, if not all of us on the General Advisory Committee, some of the Com-
missioners, people like Dr. Teller, Dr. Bradbury, and at that time there was a
very thorough consideration of what the status was today, what the hopes and
prospects were and at the conclusion of it, a program was discussed with which
the meeting was in pretty general agreement on pushing ahead the lines that
should be pushed hardest.
I should say frankly that I, not being a nuclear physicist, found that when
Dr. Teller, Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr. Bethe, and Dr. Fermi got talking about some
of the technical problems, it was a bit over my head. I, however, was in a posi-
tion, I believe, to sense the significance of what was being discussed and to
concur wholeheartedly in the conclusions which were reached.
Q. Was Dr. Oppenheimer's position at that meeting one of actively being in
favor of going ahead with whatever line of development was there agreed upon?
A. Yes. He very much took the position of being the moderator of the meet-
ing to be sure that all of the facts were brought out, that the discussion was
active between some of these very brightest minds of the country, and to see
to it that the thing was pulled together in the way of a conclusion as to future
action.
Q. Have you from time to time discussed with Dr. Oppenheimer and worked
with Dr. Oppenheimer on the matters involving the proper use of atomic
weapons?
A. Oh, yes. This was a very important part of his function as advisor to me
in the Department of Defense.
Q. Would you care to say something about Dr. Oppenheimer's work or con-
tributions in developing the concept of tactical use of atomic weapons?
A. Yes. Dr. Oppenheimer fully realized that atomic materials — the raw
materials for 'nuclear explosions — would become increasingly abundant and in-
creasingly cheaper. There had been in the early days of scarcity a very strongly
held belief that the bomb was useful in strategic bombing and there had been
very little thought given to the expansion of the use of the bomb for other
military purposes.
I should say that always Dr. Oppenheimer was trying to point out the wide
variety of military uses for the bomb, the small bomb as well as the large bomb.
He was doing it in a climate where many folks felt that only strategic bombing
was a field for the atomic weapon.
Q. Strategic bombing is a large bomb somewhere where the Army is not?
A. * * * I should say that he more than any other man served to educate
the military to the potentialities of the atomic weapon for other than strategic
bombing purposes ; its use possibly in tactical situations or in bombing 500 miles
back. He was constantly emphasizing that the bomb would* be more available
and that one of the greatest problems was going to be its deliverability, meaning
that the smaller you could make your bomb in size perhaps you would not have
to have a great big strategic bomber to carry it, you could carry it in a medium
bomber or you could carry it even in a fighter plane.
In my judgment his advice and his arguments for a gamut of atomic weapons,
extending even over to the use of the atomic weapon in air defense of the
United States has been more productive than any other one individual. You
see, he had the opportunity to not only advise in the Atomic Energy Commission,
but advise in the military services in the Department of Defense.
The idea of a range of weapons suitable for a multiplicity of military purposes
was a key to the campaign which he felt should be pressed and with which I
agreed.
I think it rather significant to realize that in the days of scarcity there was
such a strong—
Q. Scarcity of what, sir?
A. Scarcity of fissionable material. In the early days there was such a
strong feeling that the bomb was the peculiar and sole property of the Strategic
Air Command. It was very necessary to open up to the minds of the military
498
the other potential uses of this material which was going to become more avail-
able and cheaper all the time, and that deliverability was going to be a vital
Q On what occasion did Dr. Oppenheimer express and urge these views?
T The first time I ran into them was on the special panel over in BDB in
September of 1950 on the forward look to the atomic weapon in the Department
of Defense At that time I didn't have enough background, frankly, to contribute
very much to it Subsequently when I became chairman of BDB this was
rather a key point in my own determination of emphasis in research and develop-
Q. *Was Dr. Oppenheimer opposed to the use of atomic weapons for strategic
purposes?
A That is a hard thing to say. He was certainly not opposed to the develop-
ment of atomic weapons useful for strategic purposes. This is what I would
like to say specifically. I saw no evidence of obstruction in the development.
I think many of us felt that if and when the atomic weapon is really loosed in
a strategic campaign, which would be on both sides, it is the end of civilization
as we know it, and that the efforts must be predominantly to prevent any such
thing from happening. But the necessity for being strongly armed for strategic
air I have never questioned Dr. Oppenheimer's realization.
Q. Perhaps I have not expressed it too clearly, but what I would like is for
you to comment on Dr. Oppenheimer's views as to emphasis on one branch or
another of the use of atomic weapons, or as to a feeling that it is a matter of
balance or what have you?
A. Yes. I think very definitely he felt that great emphasis should be put on
having a spectrum in the arsenal of atomic weapons ; that there were so many
potentialities to this new material He recognized as practically everybody has
that the strategic use was being pushed with utmost speed.
He felt it quite incumbent— I am interpreting, this is my feeling of how he
felt — to emphasize the many other potentialities of the atomic weapon, and since
that was not being talked about by others- he was peculiarly conscious of his
responsibility.
Q. Did that cause some trouble for him in the Department of Defense?
A. The Strategic Air Command had thought of the atomic weapon as solely
restricted to its own use. I think that there was some definite resentment at
the implication that this was not Just the Strategic Air Command's weapon.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer urge this view of balanced defense and the gamut of
atomic weapons on this trip to SHAPE that you mentioned also?
A. Yes. In the talks which were held with them, General Eisenhower, General
Gruenther, General Norstad. General Eisenhower, of course, at that time with
the defense of Europe was particularly interested in the views as to what the
developments might be and how they could be employed in his mission.
Q. How well do you feel you know Dr. Oppenheimer as a man, with respect
to his loyalty and character and so on?
A. I feel I know him quite well
Q. Do you have an opinion as to Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty to the United States
and as to whether he is a security risk?
A. I have a very strong opinion.
Q. Would you state that opinion, please?
A. I have an opinion that he is completely loyal and that he is not any more
of a security risk than I am. Perhaps I should explain.
I feel that anyone who has secret information is to a degree a security risk,
which would be illustrated by the fact that If I were unfortunately in Com-
munist hands and they elected to torture me, I have no confidence in my ability
to refrain from disclosure. Under those circumstances I thinfr almost any of us
would be security risks and the more information we have the greater the risk.
But with the exception of this, which is common to all of us, I do not regard
Dr. Oppenheimer as any more of a security risk than I regard myself.
Q. And even that is not an exception, I take it I will withdraw that
A* At least I have some confidence in myself.
Q. Have you read the letter of the commission dated December 23, 195S?
A. I have.
Q. Referring to the one suspending Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance and your
answer is that yon have?
A. I have.
Q. That contains certain items of derogatory information.
499
A.4Yes; it does.
Q.'Does that letter change your views as to Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty or his
being a security risk?
A. It does not.
Q. Were you familiar with those items of derogatory information, except for
the hydrogen bomb as to which you said you were rather shocked, prior to the
Commission's letter?
A. I was.
Q. Will you tell us the circumstances under which you became familiar with
that?
A. In my position in the Pentagon, Dr. Oppenheimer's case was brought to my
personal attention through the security officers. This was close to the com-
pletion of my term in the Pentagon. I said that I would personally review the
whole case and leave for my successor my recommendation in terms of whether
or not Dr. Oppenheimer should be reappointed for another year as a consultant
in the Department of Defense.
Mr. ROBB. Could we have the date on this?
The WITNESS. That was early July 1953.
By Mr. SIXVERMAN :
Q. Dr. Whitman, that was pursuant to the President's Executive order re-
quiring a review of all such cases?
A. That was in line with the President's order which required a review of
cases which had significant derogatory information.
Q. What was your position at that time?
A. I had been Chairman of the Research and Development Board until the
reorganization plan went into effect on the 20th of June 1953. My successor,
who was to be appointed as Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and De-
velopment, was not going to take office until the latter part of the summer.
Mr. GEAT. What was his name, for the record?
The WITNESS. Donald Quarles. He subsequently took office on the first of
September. In the meantime I continued operating with the same functions
which I had, but under the official designation of Special Assistant to the Secre-
tary of Defense for Research and Development. I took a Saturday when no
one else was around to study the file very thoroughly. As I understand it, it
was a summary by the FBI of the material in Robert's folder. It was a file
that may have had 50 or 60 pages in it
By Mr. SILVERMAIT:
Q. How long did it take you to read it?
A. It took me at least 2 hours, and I think more, because I was reading it
very carefully and re-reading to f eel that I had the significance of the file.
At the conclusion I wrote longhand a memorandum pointing out that I had
been -
Q. Do you have a copy of that memorandum?
A. I have a copy of the memorandum.
Q. Perhaps it would be simpler to read the memorandum than for you to tell
A, Regarding Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. I have known for some time of
the general nature and salient features of the information contained in this
file. It discloses nothing which would cause me to modify my previous confi-
dence in h<R loyalty.
"Based on extensive associations with Dr. Oppenhefaner over the past 3 years
in the General Advisory Committee of the AEC and in the Office of Defense
Management Science Advisory Committee, and in the Research and Developm<mt
Board, I am convinced that he can be of great service as a consultant to the
research and development work of the Department of Defense.
"I unqualifiedly recommend his reappointment as a consultant.
Q. I take it nothing has happened between the date of that memordandum and
today that would cause you to change your opinion as to Dr. Oppenhetoerfl
loyalty or being a security risk?
A. No, sir ; I would make the same recommendation today,
Mr. GBAT. Wliat was the date?
The WITNESS, The 4ate Qf tfeat w*§ July 10, 19§3t
500
By Mr. SILVEBMAS :
Q. So far as you can now recall, are there any items of derogatory informa-
tion in the Commission's letter of December 23, 1953, other than the hydrogen
bomb, that was not included in the file that you then examined?
A. To the best of my recollection everything except the references to the hy-
drogen bomb was in the file which I examined.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I think I have no further questions to ask Dr. Whitman.
Mr. GBAY. All right
CBOSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, do you know whether he was reappointed?
A. I do not know for certain. I left at the end of July. This is hearsay. I
think that the case was really brought up to the attention of Mr. Wilson some
some time in the fall after the new Assistant Secretary, Mr. Quarles, had taken
office on the first of September.
Q. Who would have made the appointment — Mr. Wilson?
A. It had been previous practice for me to make the reappointments. The
practice was in process, I think, of change during the summer of 1953, follow-
ing the President's Executive order, and I frankly do not know what the present
procedure is, whether Mr. Quarles makes the appointment or whether Mr.
Wilson does.
Q. Or maybe Mr. Quarles recommends and Mr. Wilson makes the appoint-
ment
A. I just don't know.
Q. I seem to recall seeing a statement in the press the other day from Mr. Wil-
son to the effect that he will not have Dr. Oppenheimer over there. Did you see
that?
A. I saw Mr. Wilson's press statement. In fact, I have a copy of the whole
thing.
Q. If that were accurately reported, it would indicate that lie was not re-
appointed.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, I didn't think Dr. Oppenheimer's name was
mentioned.
Mr. ROBB, Apparently the witness understood it as I did.
Mr. GBAY. I think the chairman would make this observation. Perhaps
Mr. Garrison is technically correct, but I believe there seems to be no question
in the minds of any of us that Mr. Wilson in every likelihood was referring to
Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. ROBB. I have forgotten what the pending question was.
Mr. EVANS. Do we have a copy of that?
Mr. ROBB. Dr. Whitman says he has a copy of it Do yon have a copy?
One WITNESS. I have a copy of his statement which was sent to me, or at
least of the press conference. I think I have. This is entitled, "Excerpts From
Department of Defense, Office of Public Information, Minutes of Press Confer-
ence Held by the Honorable Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, Wednesday,
April 14, 1954."
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Do you want to read the pertinent portion to us, or do yon want me to
read it?
A. It is rather extensive. I would Just as soon give it to you for the com-
mittee if you care to have it
Q. Thank yon.
A. It is not significantly different from the report that came out in the New
York Times.
Mr. ROBB. It is quite long, as the witness says. It is five pages. So I will not
attempt to read it now.
Mr. GBAT. The state of the record now would indicate that Mr. Wilson would
not have accepted your recommendation in all probability, at least that is the
Impression. If counsel want to straighten it out
T ^?v SlLVBBMAN- * *ave no information on the subject The only comment
I wish to make is that it is perfectly possible that Mr. Wilson reviewed the file.
I have no idea what Mr. Wilson did. I do think there is a difference in the
weight to be given to a determination and a recommendation made by a man
wh° J^te tfcrongh a file with the duty of trying to make a recommendation,
*** 21;? ^f*16 respect to Cabinet officers and even ex-Cabinet officers, the state-
ments that they make in a press conference.
501
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, I think since the matter has been brought up,
I would request that the press conference be read into the record.
Dr. EVANS. I think that is very wise.
Mr. GBAT. As Dr. Whitman indicated, this is entitled, "Excerpts From De-
partment of Defense, Office of Public- Information, Minutes of Press Conference
Held by the Honorable Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, Wednesday,
April 14, 1954, 3 p. m., Room 3E-869, the Pentagon, Washington, IX C."
There are some dots. I am not clear what that indicates, but following the
j ^j.f. .
dots:
all?
>ts:
**The PBESS. Mr. Wilson, can you discuss the Dr. Oppenheimer situation at
f A
aii r
"Secretary WILSON. No. I'd class this in the same category. That is ap-
parently going to be reviewed by a board. I shouldn't comment on that either.
"I would like to comment, without referring to people or any particular inci-
dents. On this question of security risks and loyalty, they are distinctly dif-
ferent things. If a man is accused by being disloyal or subversive, that is some
kind of an act against the coipatry. The security risk business is simply trying
to eliminate the people that are more than average security risks, so that you don't
get them in the wrong place where they might do some damage. In other words,
we are trying to prevent the trouble instead of getting into trouble and then ac-
cusing somebody of disloyalty or subversive activities and trying them or court
martialing them like we would in the Army. That is a distinct difference and
it should be understood.
"I might explain it. It is a little bit like selecting a teller in a bank. The
president of a bank selects a teller* If the man frequents gambling joints and
has contacts with the underworld, you ordinarily don't hire him. Or if you
found out after you did hire him that at one time he had been convicted of theft
or something like that, maybe he is reformed and all, but you still don't expose
him again. You don't wait until he has stolen money from the bank and then
try to do something about it. You try to get people that are qualified and are
not financial risks in that sense.
"Now, the American people, I am sure, would like to get the people that are
security risks out of their armed services. It is too important a matter. So,
if you men could clarify this business for the benefit of the public, the difference
between accusing a man of being disloyal to his country and of subversion, in
which case he could go to jail or have all kinds of things done to him for the
crimes that he had committed, the other thing is that just on account of his
association and his train of thought and his previous activities he is a bad risk,
so yon don't expose him to a place where he might do the wrong thing."
Then there are some more dots. , ,. ^ ,
•The PBESS. This hypothetical question concerns, say, some specialist in a
field that the military services might require. He is one of the 3 or 4 men In
the country who is qualified to handle a certain problem that concerns weapons
that the Defense Department is interested in, and the project is a very important
one, a top priority project This man as a young man may have had some
Communist connections or sympathies and at the present time he indicates that
he no longer has them. His services are important to the Defense Department.
What would you do about bringing him in to work on that project?
"Secretary WILSON. I'd look at the other 2 or 3 if he is 1 out of 3 or 4.
[Laughter.]
"The PRESS. Let's add another point. Suppose that he is the key man in
that situation and without him you could not get any success in the project.
"Secretary WILSON. This is an awfully big country and I doubt if there are
^"The PRESS! Mr. Secretary, I'll ask you a specific question on the same lines.
I believe it is correct that the Army and possibly the Air Force brought to this
country a great number of German scientists to work on guided missiles develop-
ment, men with a record of recent past association with the Nazis. How does
that r have reach* the sta*e J
SXSOSJSt S
or applications engineering problem?
"Secretary WILSON. No; I wouldn't say that.
502
"The PRESS. In other words, we still need the type of scientist that I was
referring to earlier?
"Secretary WILSON. That's right."
More dots.
"The PRESS. Mr. Secretary, have you expressed yourself about the various
reports that the H-bomb development might have been unduly delayed?
"Secretary WILSON. No. I have never made any comment on it.
"The PRESS. Do you have one?
"Secretary WILSON. No.
"The PRESS. Do you know of any such delays?
"Secretary WILSON. See, I wasn't even here in my present position, and that
one also comes under this category of something that is being reviewed. So,
I shouldn't try to get into the play from the sidelines.
"The PRESS. Sir, has the Defense Department brought down a blank wall
between any other scientists and its atomic weapons research besides Dr.
Oppenheimer?
"Secretary WILSON. Well, we are carefully going over everything in connec-
tion with our present security regulations for civilians and military people as
well. The directive I put out last Thursday clarified the thing somewhat in
the military establishment and was an effort to have the uniform procedures
and step them up and handle the thing more promptly than we had.
"The PRESS. But nothing has been done in the case of any individual?
"Secretary WILSON. Well, of course they are being worked on all the time.
"The PRESS. Has there been any attention -
"The PBESS. Any more top attention, someone, say, as of great prominence
as Dr. Oppenheimer? Do you know of anyone else?
"Secretary WELSON. No; I don't.
"The PRESS. Mr. Wilson, there has been a suggestion -
"Secretary WILSON. See, actually we are not trying to hurt anybody or smear
anybody. We are just trying to do a good job for the country as quietly as we
can and quite frankly, I have great sympathy for people that have made a
mistake and have reformed, but we don't think we ought to reform them in the
military establishment They ought to have a chance somewhere else.
"The PRESS. Does that mean that Dr. Oppenheimer will no longer be admitted
to military bases -
"Secretary WILSON. Well -
"The PRESS, —or military secrets?
"Secretary WILSON. His case is being reviewed by a proper board that has
been appointed for the purpose, I understand."
More dots.
"The PRESS. Mr. Secretary, is Dr. Oppenheimer on any advisory boards or
committees in connection with special weapons or research and development in
the armed forces? .
"Secretary WILSON. No, he was a consultant to the Research and Develoo-
ment Board until that was abolished last July after we got the Reorganization
Plan No. 6 in effect for the Department of Defense.
"The PRESS. WJiy was he dropped then?
"Secretory WILSON. We dropped the whole board. That was a real smooth
way of doing that one as far as the Defense Department was concerned.
[Laughter.]'
More dots.
"The PRESS. Mr. Secretary, if the Defense Department needed a scientisfc-r
this Is a hypothetical question— who had questionable association in his Dast
and where the Defense Department thought that the services they could get
one I might put up to Moses. [Laughter.] Any of you remember
tag how Moses' fetter-in-law told him how to organize the children of lawelf or
irectiYG operation?
"The PBESS. Well, how about Saint Paul -
[Laughter.]
' WlLSON* I donft know w*etiier you would refer that one to Moses
More dots.
503
"The PBESS. Mr. Secretary, another Moses question. During the time that
this has been up, this current problem we have with the AEC and so on, has
anybody figured out how to keep secrets from men who probably put the secrets
in In the first place?
"Secretary WILSON. Well, maybe I should tell you a story on that one."
That is the end of the document which I have.
By Mr. KOBE:
Q. Doctor, do you agree with Mr. Wilson's philosophy or theory respecting
security risks as expressed in that press conference?
A. I would find it quite difficult to say what Mr. Wilson's philosophy is from
this press conference.
Q. May I ask you another question along those same lines? You said that
you reviewed this file. From that am I to take it that some question had arisen
which you were asked to answer?
A. Yes. The Presidents Executive order had come out This file was referred
to my attention because it obviously fell under the President's security order.
It was obvious to the security officers of ODM. They felt that this was a case
to be reviewed.
Q. That is what I am getting at. You did not read the President's order and
automatically get the file. Somebody brought it to you because of the President's
order?
A. That is correct; yes.
Q. Am I to gather that whoever it was that brought it to you expressed the
view that this file on its face raised some question about Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Yes.
Q. Doctor, you spoke of the Vista project and your trip to see General Eisen-
hower. Had you participated in the writing of that report?
A. I had not
Q. Was that the report that was prepared In Pasadena in the fall of 1951?
A. Yes.
Q. Had Dr. Oppenheimer taken any part in that as far as you know?
A. I am quite sure that Dr. Oppenheimer had worked with the Vista Project
to some degree, particularly in the section dealing with atomic energy.
Q. Do you know what part he had played in connection with that section?
A. I am not too clear on that but I believe he had quite a significant part in
helping in the drafting of that chapter.
Q. Did you ever discuss it with him?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you tell us from your discussion with him what his views were on
that subject?
A. I know that he felt that the atomic weapon had a potentially very im-
portant part in the problem of ground operations, particularly in the defense of
Western Europe. He felt that there were many opportunities to exploit the
atomic weapon which should be aggressively developed.
Q. I assume that these questions relate to the fall of 1951. Did he give you
his views at that time in connection with this report, about how he thought the
available stockpile of atomic weapons should be divided?
A. Yes. With the growing stockpile he very definitely felt that a range of
the smaller weapons which would be useful for tactical purposes should be
increased in numbers * * *.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer express the opinion that the proportion of atomic
weapons to be assigned to the Strategic Air Command should be kept the same,
increased, or decreased?
A. Frankly I don't recall.
Q. Did he express any opinion to you as to whether there should be any
announcement by the United States with respect to the possibility of a strategic
atomic attack on Russia?
A. I am going to try to answer this as carefully as I can.
Q. Yes, sir.
A. In the course of our trip over to SHAPE— We Sew over and we had dis-
cussions and we met with General Eisenhower as I say, and we had other dis-
cussions—many facets of the atomic weapon utilization were discussed among
the four of us who were there. As is customary in such disctissions, almost
every shade of opinion was expressed in exploring the future of the atomic
weapon.
For -example, I would probably present the arguments one way and then turn
and try to present them the other way. Dr. Oppenheimer certainly er-
504
pressed many views about the most effective utilization of the atomic weapon
in the problems of our military strength. * * *
Q. Ton and Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Dr. DuBridge and Dr. Lauritsen.
Q. You used the word "retaliate," Doctor. Was there any discussion about
whether or not the United States should announce that it would not initiate
a strategic bombing of Russia?
A. Frankly I don't remember. It could have been discussed. I say probably
it was because we were exploring all of the facets of it
Q. Can you tell us what Dr. Oppenheimer's view was on that question?
A, No.
*******
Q. Yes, sir. What I am attempting to direct my question to now, sir, Is a
question not of retaliation, but of using the atomic weapon first
A. I don't believe that any of us really discussed that To me In my own
view it doesn't seem like the right way to go at It, and I don't believe we discussed
that
Q. Did you have any discussion about the value of the thermonuclear weapon?
A. No. We were concerned at this stage with the Vista Report dealing with
the ground forces and the defense of Western Europe and the concept of the
thermonuclear weapon being involved In the immediate defense of Western
Europe didn't seem pertinent We knew at that time, of course, that thermo-
nuclear weapons of great magnitude— well, we felt they would find their useful-
ness in the strategic campaign, rather than the tactical.
Q. Did you have a copy of this Vista Report with you when you went over
there?
A. Yes; a draft of it
Q. A draft of it?
A. Not the final Vista Report In fact, might I interject one of the main
reasons for going on this trip was so that General Eisenhower and others over
there could be apprised of the Vista findings and tentative conclusions and
could express their judgment before the report was quite finalized.
Q. Did the draft that you had with you include the section to which yon
referred on atomic weapons?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that section later changed?
A. I think it was. I think practically everything in that draft— I mean many
of the salient features of that draft — were changed. That was the purpose
of the visit
Q. Can you tell us anything about what led up to the change in the section
of that report having to do with atomic weapons?
A. I think that the discussions at that time were an Important part of the
process of bringing the report into final form. May I emphasize the main
purpose of this was to go over with a rough draft and see what the final report
should say.
Q. What was the date when you went over? I don't mean the exact date.
A. It was early December of 19KL
Q. Before you went over, do you recall talking to Mr. William Burden and
Mr. Garrison Norton about the report?
A. Yes.
Q. They came to see you In your office, did they?
A. They did.
Q. And they discussed the section of the report having to do with atomic
weapons, didn't they?
A. Yes.
Q. Did they tell you that they were disturbed about it?
A. Yes.
Q. Did they tell you why?
A. Yes.
Q. What did they say?
A. They were very much concerned
Q. May I interrupt before you start that? Will you tell who those gentlemen
were?
A. Mr. Burden was the special assistant to Tom Blnletter who was the
Secretary of the Air Force. Mr. Garrison Norton, I believe, was assistant to
Mr. Burden.
505
Q. Did you have a copy of the draft before yon when you talked with them?
A. No, I think not.
Q. Did they tell you who had prepared the particular section to which they
took exception?
A. They said that chapter had heen written primarily by Dr. Oppenheiiner.
Q. Did you tell them you were disturbed too about it?
A. I said I was disturbed because they were disturbed and that I would have
an opportunity to discuss this with Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr. DuBridge.
Q. Did you express the view that efforts should be made to have this section
modified?
A. I certainly said that if it contained the implications which they were
worried about, there should probably be some modification. You must realize
that I was not familiar at that time with what the chapter said.
Mr. ROBB. That is all I care to ask, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. I have a couple of questions.
I would like to continue now, because I think we are so nearly through we
won't have to call you back after lunch.
For the record under whose auspices was the Vista contract made?
The WITNESS. The Vista contract was administered under one of the branches
of the Army. It may have been the Signal Corps. I am not sure.
Mr. GRAY. But not under the Research and Development Board?
The WITNESS. No.
Mr. GRAY. So you had no responsibility for the Vista report?
The WITNESS. I had only this responsibility, that the general problem of
coordinating the research and development was a responsibility of my office and
this was a project which, administered by the Army, nevertheless had great
Air Force and a little Navy interest in it. It was so full of suggestions on
research and development that there was a distinct interest and responsibility
on my part in terms of the nature of the report and the subsequent implementa-
tion of the research and development features.
Mr. GRAY. I didn't mean to imply by that that you were dealing with some-
thing which was not your concern. But it was not your direct responsibility.
The WITNESS. That is correct, although Mr. Lovett and I, talking over the
question of the visit to SHAPE agreed that this Vista report was of such
significance in research and development that the particular visit should be
arranged as a Research and Development Board visit with me in attendance as
the chairman of the RDB. So we really went over under the sponsorship of
the BDB rather than of the Army.
Mr. GRAY. In your testimony, Dr. Whitman, you said that Dr. Oppenheimer
more than any other man had educated the military as to the true potentiality
of atomic weapons or something to that effect
The WITNESS. That is my belief. From my observation I would so say.
Mr. GRAY. I don't question it I am interested to know how was this educa-
tional process carried out? What were the mechanics? Wno were the people?
Who was it that needed to be educated?
The WITNESS. Practically all of the officers. After all, this was really a very
new field. Dr. Oppenheimer was able to carry out that education considerably
by virtue of his connection with the Research and Development Board as a
member of the Committee on Atomic Energy, which contained such people as
Admiral Parsons, who subsequently has died. As Captain Parsons he dropped
the bomb over Hiroshima. General Nichols, now the manager of the AEC,
General Bunker of the Air Force, men of that ilk.
Mr. GRAY. Military people.
The WITNESS. I might say also General McCormack who at that time was in
the AEC in charge of the Military Division, but who subsequently went back into
the Air Force. Men of that ilk who were leaders in the field and lots of others
who were coming along. There has been a tremendous problem of education in
this entirely new weapon.
Mr. GRAY. But it was in Dr. Oppenheimer's relationship to the Research and
Development Board that these educational processes took place?
The WITNESS. I would say that was an important part of it He, of course,
has had many contacts with the military in other ways. This is the one I had
the best opportunity to observe.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Whitman, I don't suggest anything sinister about this, but I
think you are the third witness who has said that he felt that the use of hydrogen
weapons in an all-out war would mean "the end of civilization as we know it."
This is I think the precise language. This language appears in a report some
506
place in which you participated. I don't want to pursue this too far, but I was
just struck by the fact
The WITNESS. I don't recall it in any report. But in my conversations when
Mr. Lovett was Secretary of Defense, in our circle, I reiterated this point and
brought it up again and again as indicating the relative emphasis which we must
follow in the Defense Department, particularly in research and development,
but in other ways. In other words, what things come first. I have had occasion
to appraise this and * * * and lots of other things, and these are rather testing
appraisals over a period of 2 years when I was responsible there, * * * I do feel
that the future of civilization
Mr. GRAY. I don't question your feeling. I don't want to pursue it.
I have two questions now, and I am through.
In your testimony earlier you said that the reading of the Nichols letter of
December 23 does not change your mind at all or would not change your position
which you took in July of 1953, with respect to clearance of Dr. Oppenheimer,
for classified information. I would just like to have it clear, is that on the
assumption that the derogatory information contained therein is true, or that it
is not true, or do you make any assumption about that?
The WITNESS. Might I explain why I say this?
Mr. GRAY. Yes, I would like for you to.
The WITNESS. General Nichols1 letter contains for the most part material
which I had already reviewed and had rather prayerfully reached my own
conclusion. It contains in addition what I regard as a very serious charge, that
Bobert Oppenheimer obstructed and tried to delay progress on the hydrogen
bomb. Because my own association with him started in 1950, and had been
quite intimate since that, when he would have put in the obstructions after the
President's decision if he were obstructing it, my own personal experience with
him convinces me that is false. So the only additional information above the
file is something on which I have a right to a strong personal opinion by
association.
Mr. GRAY. I think that is a clear statement.
My question now is, did you come to your conclusion with respect to the other
derogatory information, other than the hydrogen bomb obstruction, on the as-
sumption that all of that might have been true, and nevertheless you felt there
was no security problem?
The WITNESS. Yes. I realized of course that it could not all be true, because
some of it is contradictory. I was willing to assume that the damaging state-
ments in there could have been true and still reached the conclusion.
Mr. GRAY. Or today you would say assuming it is true, you would still reach
this conclusion?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Did the security officers in the Military Establishment make any
recommendations to you with respect to your position, which is reflected in the
memorandum you wrote?
The WITNESS. I think they made the recommendation that this is a case which
I must review under the President's order. I don't know. In fact I don't recall
ever having had them say that "We think"— I mean express the judgment— that
he should not be reappointed. They may well, but I don't recall it. I wouldn't
be advised if they had, because security officers are notably careful as policemen
to take the negative point of view.
Mr. GRAY. Aren't Government officials generally careful?
The WITNESS. I am afraid they are too much. This is why I said I rather
prayerfully thought this whole thing over before I came out with the unqualified
recommendation that he be reappointed.
Mr. GRAY. Yes. Your recommendation is very clear.
Do you have any questions?
Dr. BSvANs. Are you a Communist?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Dr. EVANS. You have never been, have you?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Are yon a fellow traveler?
The Wmrass. No, sir.
Dr. EVANS. You never have been?
. The Wrrwttse. No, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Have yon belonged to those subversive organizations mentioned
by the Attorney General?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Dr. BVANS. Hare you met any Communists?
507
The WITNESS. I have met Russians during the war when I was with the
War Production Board where I had to deal with them on issues of supplies for
Russia.
Dr. EVANS. Have you met any Americans that turned out to be Communists?
The WITNESS. I don't recall that I ever have, Dr. Evans.
Dr. EVANS. I have no more questions.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I have, I think, two questions.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVEBMAN:
***** * *
Q. Did you feel that Dr. Oppenheimer's views as to relative division of
fissionable materials between strategic bombing uses and other uses were
motivated by anything other than considerations for the security and defense
of the United States?
A. Not at all.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I have no further questions.
Mr. ROBB. No further questions.
Mr. GBAY. Thank you very much.
The WITNESS. Thank you.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Mr. Chairman, there is one question I overlooked. May I
ask it?
Mr. GBAY. Counsel has another question for you.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I am sorry.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. Dr. Whitman, did you have an informal or formal security board that
looked into the question or looked at your recommendation afterwards with
respect to Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I had a security board setufc under me to give me advice. This particular
board did not look at Dr. Oppenheimer's case prior to my receiving it. Now, by
hearsay I understand that that board was continued by my successor, and did
review the case and iny recommendation, but that is purely hearsay.
Q. Do you know whether they agreed with your recommendation?
A. Hearsay, they did.
Q. Who were the members of the board?
A. Dr. Robert W. Cairns, who at the time was my vice chairman. Dr. L. T. B.
Thompson, who at the time was my vice chairman, and General John Bines,
who was my senior Army officer.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. That is alL
RE-OBOSS-EX AMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. You mean you already decided the case before they reviewed it?
A. No, I think I explained that because my term was going to be over at
the end of the month, and I realized that this case would not be finally decided
until the new Assistant Secretary came in, what I did was reviewed the case
and gave my recommendation which by hearsay subsequently Mr. Quarles
referred to this same informal committee that I had appointed.
Mr. ROBB. That is all. Thank you,
Mr. GBAY. Thank you very much.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GBAY. We will reconvene at 2 : 15.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, could we have a little bit longer, because we
Uave a problem with witnesses. Could we make it 2 : 30?
Mr. GBAY. We will make it 2 : 30.
(Thereupon at 1 : 15 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 : 30 p. m., the same day.)
AFTEBNOON SESSION
Mr, GRAY. Mr. Rowe, do you wish to testify under oath? You are not re-
quired to do so. I should tell you that all the witnesses to this point nave.
Mr. ROWE. I would prefer to.
Mr. GBAY. Would you be good enough to stand and raise your right hand?
What is your full name?
Mr. Rows, Hartley Rowe,
508
Mr. GRAY. Hartley Rowe, do you swear that the testimony you are to give the
board shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
Mr. ROWE. I do.
Whereupon, Hartley Rowe was called as a witness, and having been first
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
Mr. GBAY. Would you be seated, please, sir.
It is my duty to remind you of the existence of the perjury statutes. I trust
we need not discuss those here. You are familiar with them? .
The WITNESS. I have read them several times, yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. In the event, sir, that in the course of your testimony it becomes
necessary to disclose restricted data, I should like to ask that you notify me in
advance, so that we might take appropriate steps.
Finally, I point out to you that we consider these proceedings a confidential
matter between the Atomic Energy Commission, its officials on the one hand,
and Dr. Oppenheimer, his representatives and witnesses on the other hand.
The Commission will take no initiative in releasing material to the press about
these proceedings, and on behalf of the board, I express the hope to each witness
that he will take the same view.
DIBECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. MARKS:
Q. Mr. Rowe, will you please identify yourself for the record?
A. In just what manner?
Q. Your present position.
A. I am vice president and director of the United Fruit Co.
Q. What is your profession?
A. I am an engineer.
Q. Will you describe very briefly your professional career in Just a few
sentences?
A. I started after graduation from college as an engineer with the Isthmian
Canal Commission, which was later termed the Panama Canal Commission, and
served there 15 years.
I came back to the United States at the end of that time and entered in con-
sulting service with a firm by the name of Lockwood, Green & Co., first in
Detroit and then in Boston. I was with them about 7 years, and then went to
the United Fruit Co. as their chief engineer, and I have been with them ever
since.
Q. When did you become a vice president of United Fruit?
A. 1928.
Q. Will you also describe briefly your original connection with war work, that
is, World War II, and what it consisted of?
A. In 1940 I was connected with the National Defense Research Committee;
headed up by Dr. Vannevar Bush, Dr. Karl Compton, and Dr. Conant That
was later made into the Office of Research and Development.
I was chief of Division 12, which handled mobile equipment and naval
architecture from 1940 until the conclusion of the war, and the conclusion of
our reports in 1946. I was also a consultant to the Secretary of War I was a
consultant on the Rubber Division of the War Production Board and several
other short time jobs that I don't recall at the moment
wJStJ?^ <*evel°Pments did you have a share in while you were with the
NDRC and its successor?
A. The one that gained the most notoriety was the Duck, from that the WeaseL
which was a very slight snow vehicle traveling over snow and over marshy
ground. ^^
Q. In your capacity as a consultant for the Secretary of War, did you have
any overseas assignments? *
* J4 M*y 194* l was assigned to General Eisenhower's staff as a
technical adviser primarily for the purpose of bringing to the attention of the
fie£ ¥*%£?£?* and the troops ***** tte military things that had been devel-
°^ S* °Sa£,1J? P aat tt™- * served ^^ "a forTbout 7 months^
Q. Served with him?
A. With SHAEF for about 7 months.
9* 2?** were the conditioils under which you took that assignment?
A. There were two. (fee ordinary condition is that I requested I be intro-
*** his staff by a general officerr
effective operatin* out of Chann*s
509
Q. Why were you interested in that latter?
A. Principally because I don't know how to operate through military chan-
nels. Secondly, that I felt I could be more effective and save a great deal of
time — time was of the essence — and be much more effective to the field com-
manders.
Q. What were some of the things with respect to which you had any influence
in that assignment?
A. Radar and radar controlled guns, the proximity fuse, and its introduction
to combat the buzz bomb, the infrared instruments that were used by the para-
troopers to collect together after a drop.
Q. You have any difficulties persuading them to adopt these measures?
A. None whatever.
Q. After your assignment with SHABF, what was your next connection with
war work?
A. As soon as I returned to the United States from that work, I was notified
that they wanted me to go to the Pacific and do the same kind of work for
General MacArhtur. It had all been arranged with his consent under the same
conditions. Before I could get away, Dr. Conant and Major General Leslie
Groves came to me and said they had a job they wanted done and I told them
I was afraid I couldn't do it, because I had already signed up, and they said
this takes priority over everything you have been assigned to, so you better do
what we want you to do.
The only question I asked was whether or not the assignment would be in
the continental United States or whether it would still be abroad.
Q. What was that assignment?
A. I was assigned as a consultant to General Groves and Dr. Oppenheimer in
the procurement of materials in the development of the A-bomb, trying to be
of what assistance I could to bring it to a conclusion on a predetermined date.
Q. Where did you do that work?
A. In Los Alamos.
Q. How much time did you spend on it?
A. I spent a greater portion of my time commuting between Los Alamos and
my office in Boston. I usually spent the weekends in Boston and spent from
Monday to Friday in Los Alamos, or in some other city in connection with the
work.
Q. During that period how well did you come to know Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I was reporting more to him than I was to anyone else. I became very
well acquainted with him.
Q. I take it during all of this period you continued your connection with the
United Fruit Co.?
A. Yes, sir. The only time I had a leave of absence was when I was in
Europe.
Q. After the war what connections did yon have in any role with the Gov-
ernment?
A. I was made a member of the first General Advisory Committee in 1946,
I believe, and served for the 4-year term to which I was appointed, from 1946
to 1950. I think the initial date was August or September and it ended in
August or September.
Q. That is the initial date of the term was August 1946?
A. Yes.
Q. But you actually began your service early in 1947?
A. No. As soon as I was appointed, I think we met within the next month.
I am quoting entirely from memory, because I kept no papers of any kind
covering any of this confidential or secret work that I did.
Q. In connection with your work on the General Advisory Committee in those
first 4 years of its existence, did you again work closely with Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. After the conclusion?
Q. No, in that 4-year period.
A. We met once a month for 2 or 3 day sand 2 or 3 nights,
Q. Do you recall the meeting of the General Advisory Committee at the end
of October 1949?
A. Yes, sir. •
Q. That would have been not long after the announcement of the Russian
explosion of the atomic weapon?
A. I don't know whether they had their first atomic explosion or not, but
your records must show.
Q. To refresh your recollection, the announcement of the Russian explosion
was at the end of September 1949. In all events, do you recall the session of
510
the GAG at which the subject of a crash program for the hydrogen bomb
was the subject of debate?
Q! Do you recall how the question came to you, how the question came to the
General Advisory Committee? ^ ^ a
A. My recollection is that it was brought up by the then chairman of the
committee, and asked for
Q. The then chairman of the committee?
A Of the Commission, asking for the advice of the General Advisory Com-
mittee on whether or not we should enter into a crash program looking toward
the development of the H-bomb.
Q. Do you have any recollection whether that would have been an oral or a
written request from the chairman of the Commission?
A I couldn't say. I never saw the written request that I know of.
Q Would you give an account, as far as you can on the basis of your memory,
and' without getting into classified materials, of that meeting of the GAG, of
its discussions and of your own views on the subject of the crash program for
an H-bomb?
A. My recollection is that it was a pretty soul searching time, and I had
rather definite views of my own that the general public had considered the
A-bomb as the end of all wars, or that we had something that would discourage
wars, that would be a deterrent to wars. I was rather loath to enter into a
crash program on the H-bomb until we had more nearly perfected the military
potentialities of the A-bomb, thinking that it would divert too large a portion
of the scientific world and too large a portion of the money that would be
involved to something that might be good and it might be bad.
Q. As far as you yourself were concerned, did you have any qualms about
the development of an H-bomb or the use of it if it could be developed?
A. My position was always against the development of the H-bomb.
Q. Could you explain that a little?
A. There are several reasons. I may be an idealist but I can't see why any
people can go from one engine of destruction to another, each of them a thousand
times greater in potential destruction, and still retain any normal perspective
in regard to their relationships with other countries and also in relationship
with peace. I had always felt that if a commensurate effort had been made to
come to some understanding with the nations of the world, we might have
avoided the development of the H-bomb.
Q. Did you oppose the actions that the Atomic Energy Commission was taking
and with respect to which the General Advisory Committee was advising during
the period between 1947 and 1950 to realize the full potential of the A-bomb?
A. Will you state the question again?
Q. Did you oppose the efforts that were made to realize the full potential
of the A-bomb during the period 1947 onward?
A. Not knowingly, no. We were in that, and my earnest opinion was that
we should make the best of it
Q. If you can, would you explain why on the one hand you supported the
development of A-bombs to their full potential, but at the same time held views
that were in opposition to the H-bomb?
A. I thought the A-bomb might be used somewhat as a military weapon in the
same order as a cannon or a new device of that sort, and that we perhaps could
use it as a deterrent to war, and if war came, if we had all the potentialities of
it developed, we would be in a stronger position than if we only had the bomb
itself without any of the other characteristic military weapons that were devel-
oped later.
Q. Why did you distinguish between that and the H-bomb?
A. Purely as a matter of the order of destruction. The H-bomb, according to
the papers, this is not classified, is a thousand times more destructive than the
A bomb, and you haven't yet reached the potentiality of it.
<J. I am not clear whether you are saying that y6u felt that the H-bomb was big
enough for our needs.
A. I think the A-bomb was exploited to its full capacity, yes. I don't like to
step up destructiveness hi the order of 1,000 times.
Q. There has been talk that the H-bomb had unlimited capacity for stepping up
destructiveness. * * *
Q. Could you describe, if you have any recollection, what influence other mem-
bers of the GAC had on your thinking about the H-bomb?
A. Very little, if any.
Q. Did any of them have any particular influence?
511
A. I think I arrived at my conclusions even before the discussion came before
the committee.
Q. After the President announced his decision in January 1950, to proceed with
an all-out program to develop an H-bomb, you served on the General Advisory
Committee for some months?
A. Yes.
Q. During that period can you state what your attitude was and what the
GAC's attitude was about cooperating in this program which the President had
announced?
A. I can only state definitely what my attitude was, and that was that we had
received a directive and we had to go ahead. From my observations of the other
members of the committee, I don't think there was any lag anywhere in either
thought or deed. There were great scientific discussions which must necessarily
take place before you can organize a procedure and ask for funds for the develop-
ment of something that was as obscure at the moment as that was.
Q. Did you ever notice anything that Dr. Oppenheimer did that was contrary
to the course you have just described?
A. No, sir.
Q. I would like to turn now, Mr. Bowe, to a quite different subject. Have you
had any experience with communism?
A, You may be getting me into trouble, because I don't think so. I have had
for many years, and recently renewed, was my Q clearance. One of the ques-
tions I was asked at that time was whether I ever knew or associated with
Communists. My answer was that I knew Communists in Central America, but I
had not associated with them. I didn't either know or associate knowingly with
any Communists in the United States. Knowing that, I can answer your
question.
Q. Let us confine the question to Central America. What experience have you
had in Central America? How often have you been down there?
A. I went to Central America first in 1904 and served 15 years in those coun-
tries, and then came back and later went with the United Fruit Co. in 1926, and
I have made an annual trip to the tropics, with the exception of 2 war years —
1 of them was 1944 and the other was 1946.
Q. When you make this anual trip, how much time do you spend in the
various Central American countries?
A. I have to cover 7 or 8 countries, and it is usually 2 or 3 weeks in each
country.
Q. Don't answer this question if there is any reason from your own standpoint
why yon should not Let me ask yon: Is it a matter of business interest to you
to know what is going on in these Central American countries politically?
A. No, absolutely.
Q. Would you say that you are familiar with the situation in Guatemala?
A. I Pm familiar with all of the principal things that have taken place there.
I don't know of the every day detail in the country. I do know their pattern and
that is, it fbllows a very distinct pattern. In my experience in other countries
it always follows the same pattern. They start out by wanting to do something
for the common people, and they usually pass what they call an agrarian law,
which allows the Government to take up any lands that are not being used for
other purposes for distribution among the population. * * *
By Mr. MAKES:
Q. Mr. Rowe, I think it fair to say that the problem before this board is one
of formulating advice to the Atomic Energy Commission on the question of
whether it would endanger the common defense and security if Dr. Oppenheimer
were permitted to continue to have access to restricted data. In formulating
that advice, the board has to take account of the provisions of the Atomic
Energy Act, which stated that the determination should be made on the basis of a
man's character, loyally and associations. Do you have an opinion on this
subject?
A. Yes; I do.
Q. Would you state what your opinion of Dr. Oppenheimer is In the back-
ground of the question I have asked?
A. I can only speak from my acquaintance with Dr. Oppenheimer during these
years that I have outlined to you. So far as I am personally concerned, and so
far as my own observations go, Dr. Oppenheimer is no greater risk than any
other American citizen except for one thing, and that is he has a greater
knowledge of atomic fission than anyone else that I know of in the country*
808818—54 88>
512
If you are put in a position of knowing secret and top secret information, the
more you know, the greater risk you become, if you are ever in circumstances
where you, as our boys have been in Korea — I don't know how I would react,
and I don't know how Dr. Oppenheimer would react to brutal treatment. But
in the course of his associations in the United States, I would have no reservation
whatever.
Q. Are you saying that you have no question as to the loyalty, character or
associations?
A. None whatever, based on my association with him.
Q. Have you taken into account in expressing this personal opinion the fact
that at least up to some time in the early forties there is what is described
technically as derogatory information, which means that there is an extensive
record of associations with leftwing and with Communist personalties and
affairs?
A. I haven't reviewed that testimony thoroughly. I have only read what is
in the papers. I have never discussed it with Dr. Oppenheimer at all. Until
I knew some more of the surrounding facts and reasons and the climate of public
opinion at those times, I would not modify my statement.
Q. Would it surprise you if he had such associations and engaged in such
activities as I have indicated in that period that the man you know, Dr. Oppen-
heimer, is a changed man?
Mr. ROBE. How is that again?
(Question read.)
The WITNESS. There are really two questions there.
Mr. MASKS. I think it is not a good question. Would you strike it out
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I am not objecting and don't intend to, but a thought
does occur to me that sometimes the questions are a little bit leading.
Mr. MABKS. I think I have asked enough questions, Mr. Robb.
Mr. GRAY. You are not making any objection?
Mr. ROBB. I am not making any objection. I am Just calling attention to that
fact for whatever it may be worth.
I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Rowe, I was very much interested in your description of your
feelings in late 1949 about the development of the H-bomb. I I-MTITT you made
it very clear how you felt about it.
I would like to ask you whether you ever, in thinking about our problem and
what we should do in this country, whether it was a source of concern to you
that the Soviet Union might be working and perhaps successfully, towards the
development of this kind of weapon. Perhaps my question is does that make
any difference to you at all?
The WITNESS. It makes some difference, yes ; but I would place more reliance
on the proper use of the A-bomb without the H-bomb unless it developed as It did
later that we had to go into it as a deterrent. I don't think it will ever be used
against our enemies. I am quite concerned as to whether we would ever use
the A-bomb or the A-bomb artillery or other military weapons.
Mr. GBAT. Some witnesses who have come before this board have testified that
the news of the Soviet success in early fall, whenever it was, September
announced in September -
The WITNESS. You mean last year?
Mr. GBAT. No ; I mean in 1949, the A-bomb of the Soviet
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. Some witnesses have testified that at that point they felt that we
should do something to regain our lead, is the way it has been expressed, I
believe; that we had a margin of advantage we thought over a possible enemy
and the one with whom we would most likely be engaged in conflict if we became
so engaged, that with the announcement of the Soviet explosion it appeared that
the lead we had might dwindle and perhaps not continue to be a lead, and
therefore something should be done to regain it Do I understand your testimony
* ** proper agitation of 1*e w£££ we
** had would have enabled m to
The Wrnrass. I wasn't thinking so much of the lead, but I thought It would
' a?? ^ WOTfldJ»ave a better balanced military arm, the Army,
FoR?,: ™»>**ve:r yon take away from any one of those
A tra<ie of tte
thr» , ,
SAS £ ^f^f ttf5f- A tra<ie of tte effort bein* »ut on <*« H "on*
would detract from the things that needed to be done to get new weapons so that
In the next world war we would not be fighting tte war with the weapons of
513
the previous war, as we have in the last two. It seemed to me we had a much
better chance militarywise in perfecting our A bomb weapons. You understand
what I mean by the different kind of weapons?
Mr. GRAY. Yes, sir.
The WITNESS. Than it would be to devote that effort to producing something
that was a thousand times worse in explosive power at least, and can only be
used in my opinion in retaliation. I donft think it has any place in a military
campaign at all. Then if you used it in retaliation, you are using it against
civilization, and not against the military.
I have that distinction very clearly in my mind. I don't like to see women
and children killed wholesale because the male element of the human race are
so stupid that they can't get out of war and keep out of war.
Mr. GRAY. I would like to turn to something else for a moment. You have
read General Nichols' letter and Dr. Oppenheimer's reply?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Do you feel that your present conviction about Dr. Oppenheimer's
character, loyalty and associations, would be the same if you knew that the
information contained in the Nichols letter by early associations was true?
Would your reply still be the same?
Let me repeat, Mr. Rowe, I am not saying that it is or is not true. Can you
assume that derogatory information and still arrive at the answer you gave
to Mr. Marks' question?
The WITNESS. I think my answer to that would be I would make it just that
much stronger because people make mistakes and people in the climate of public
opinion in those days which was quite different than it is now— we know a great
deal more than we did then — I think a man of Dr. Oppenheimer's character is
not going to make the same mistake twice. I would say he was all the more
trustworthy for the mistakes he made.
Mr. GRAY. Let us not use Dr. Oppenheimer's name in the next question or
in reply to it. Do you feel that a man might have been in the late thirties or
early forties a member of the Communist Party and in 1954 not be a security
risk with respect to the most highly classified information?
The WITNESS. That is rather hard to answer categorically, but a great many
men would be a better risk. I would not say that they would all be a better
risk.
Mr. GRAY. What you are saying is that it is possible for a man to have been
a Communist and to have so completely renounced that that he would not be a
security risk in later years?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir ; that is what I am trying to say. Remember we all
had an opinion during the depression days that our Government was lacking in
some respects. It was discussed in almost every meeting of men that got
together. We did not seem to know how to cope and cope quickly with a condi-
tion that was facing us. There were all sorts of opinions, that we should follow
the British Constitution, that we should do this, that we should do that, we should
do the other. One characteristic solution that I heard was that you should
arm every other man with a pistol and let him go out and shoot one man, and
that would cure the unemployment in every short order. Those points don't
come from the heart or from the mind. They are just discussion.
Mr. GRAY. I believe you indicated that you felt that a man who had had no
Communist associations might logically be expected generally speaking to be a
better security risk than one who might have had such connections. I don't
want to make a statement that does not represent your view at all.
The WITNESS. I can't answer that for everybody.
Mr. GRAY. I think you were careful to say that it would be important to
know who the individual was.
The WITNESS. And how he reacted to a mistake.
Mr. GRAY. I think I can ask my next question which will cover what I am
driving at. You would urge that the Government would take whatever chance
there was in a situation with an individual who might have had these associa-
tions and who apparently had renounced them. You would say if there is any
chance the Government ought to take it?
Excuse me, Mr. Rowe; I am really trying to get what your view is. This
obviously is the kind of question that this board must ask itself.
The WITNESS. I understand your predicament
Mr. GRAY. I am doing a very poor job of putting my questions. I am not
experienced in this kind of procedure.
514
The WITNESS. In a great many instances the man would be a better risk
knowing more about the Communistic Party. I think if I had known more about
it in 1930 and 1940. I would have acted quite differently in my business in
connection with my company and in treatment of Government officials * * *.
1 would have a better understanding of what the thing was all about.
Mr. GBAY, Again, without asking you to consider that this refers to Dr.
Oppenheirner, would your reaction as a citizen of the United States be necessarily
unfavorable if you knew that the United States Government had given access
to classified material to a former Communist if you were satisfied with the
individual?
The WITNESS. No, sir ; that wouldn't worry me a bit.
Mr. GRAY. I think you have answered the question which I have had quite a
time putting to you. Dr. Evans.
Dr. EVAXS. I have just one question. You understand the position that this
committee is in, don't you?
The WITNESS. Tes, sir ; I believe I do.
Dr. EVANS. I hope you do. You are a man that has had experience, and
you know what you are talking about. I have just one question to ask you.
It is not quite the same as the Chairman was asking you.
If you had a lot of secret information in your mind, and you had some
friends that were Communists, would you be in a more dangerous position than
if you didn*t have those Communist friends?
The WITNESS. You probably would ; yes, sir.
Dr. EVANS. That is all I have to ask.
Mr. GBAY. Mr. Marks, do you have any other questions?
By Mr. MABKS :
Q. You used the expression, Mr. Howe, in answer to some questions that
were asked by the Chairman "better security risk."
I am not sure I understood what you meant by the term "better security risk."
Let me put it this way. What is the difference between a man who is not a
security risk in your opinion and a man who is a better security risk?
A. His character.
Q. Which of those two men would you trust most?
A. The man I thought had the best character.
Q. What I am trying to get at is — it is just that I don't quite understand the
sense in which you are using the term — would you trust most the man that
you regard as a better security risk or the man whom you simply regarded as
not a security risk?
A. What I was trying to bring out Is that there are different degrees of security
risks. The more secret information a man has, the more likely he is to get in
difficulties if then it came to a point where he was subject to torture. That is
what I was trying to distinguish between a small amount of secret information
and a large amount of secret information.
Mr. GRAY. A man with the greater amount would involve a greater security
risk, that is what you said?
The WITNESS. That would be his personal risk.
By Mr. MASKS :
Q. Do you think based on your experience with Dr. Oppenheimer he would
have any difficulty, as you know him today, in exercising discretion not to reveal
secret information or information he ought not to reveal to unauthorized indi-
viduals?
A. I certainly do. I trust him implicitly.
Mr. ROBB. I have no questions.
Mr. GBAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Rowe.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GARRISON. May we have a short recess?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GRAY. Do you wish to testify under oath?
Dr. DtrBsiDGE. As you wish ; whichever you prefer.
Mr. GRAY. You are not required to, but every witness who has come has done so
Dr. DirBRiDOE. Yes, I will be glad to.
Mr. GRAY. What is your fun name?
Dr. DuBBiDOE. Lee Alvin DnBridge.
515
Mr. GRAY. Lee AMn DuBridge, do you swear tbat the testimony yon are to
give the board shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Dr. DUBMDGE. I do.
Whereupon, Lee Alvin DuBridge was called as a witness, and having been
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Would you sit down, please, sir.
I must mention to you the existence of the perjury statutes. I assume you
are familiar with them and it is not necessary to review them.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. I should like to ask that if at any time during your testimony it
becomes, necessary to refer to or disclose restricted data that you will notify
me in advance so that we might take certain appropriate and necessary steps.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir. You wish the answer even if it does include re-
stricted data.
Mr. GRAY. Yes, that is correct. If you cannot accept a question without
referring to something of that sort, let us know and then we will find out
whether to put the question or not to put it. I should point out to you that
we consider this proceeding a confidential matter between the Atomic Energy
Commission and its officials on the one hand, and Dr. Oppenhelmer and his
representatives and witnesses on the other. The Commission will undertake
no initiative in release of information about these proceedings. On behalf of
the board, I express the hope to each witness that he will follow the same
course.
Mr. Garrison.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Dr. DuBridge, will you state your present position?
A. I am the president of the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena,
Calif.
Q. Would you tell the board what Government positions you have held and
now hold?
A. The list that I have held is somewhat long.
Q. Just the main ones.
A. I don't have the complete list before me, but among them, the ones I
would consider pertinent are the following: I was appointed by the President in
1946 as a member of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy
Commission for a 6-year term which expired in 1952. This term was coinci-
dental with the term of Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr. Conant.
I am now Chairman of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense
Mobilization, a committee which was established under the chairmanship of Dr.
Oliver Buckley, some 2 or 3 years ago, and I succeeded Dr. Buckley as chairman
c little over a year ago. Dr. Oppenheimer has been a member of this com*
mittee also.
I was for a term a member of the Naval Research Advisory Committee of the
Department of the Navy and a member of the Advisory Panel of the United
States Army.
For a term I was also a member of the Science Advisory Board to the United
States Air Force.
Those I think are the principal advisory positions I have held since the war
in the Government
Q. What has been the general nature of your acquaintance with Dr. Oppen-
heimer? About when did you first meet him?
A. I met him first some time in the thirties as a physicist at Physical Society
meetings and seminars. My first clear recollection is hearing him talk at a
seminar at the University of Minnesota. I saw him occasionally during the
thirties at Physical Society meetings, but was not intimately acquainted with
him.
In 1939 I spent the summer doing research at the Radiation Laboratory at
the University of California, just as a summer period of relaxation and refresh-
ment, and -work and became a little bit better acquainted with him personally
at that time. At least on one occasion I was invited to his home.
During the war I was at MIT in the Radiation Laboratory there which had
nothing to do with the Radiation Laboratory of the University of California.
We were working on radar. I did not see Dr. Oppenheimer during that period
very much, since he was at Berkeley and later Los Alamos.
516
The beginning of what I would call our close friendship, however, occurred
in May 1945, when he requested that I come to Los Alamos with one of the
members of our Radiation Laboratory to consult with the Los Alamos staff on
some of the electronic and production problems which were being faced by the
Los Alamos group, and particularly to discuss which members of the elec-
tronics group at MIT might be transferred to Los Alamos to assist in their
work. I spent a week at Los Alamos at that time.
Following the war when we both became members of the General Advisory
Committee, we also became what I consider to be good friends, and our friend-
ship has continued since that time.
During the last years since 1946, I have frequently been a guest in his home
and have seen him in Washington, of course, at many meetings where we have
spent long hours together in the meeting room and outside. He has visited
Pasadena. He was incidentally a member of the faculty of the California Insti-
tute of Technology when I arrived there as president in the summer of 1946.
However, shortly thereafter he left to assume his present position at the Insti-
tute for Advance Study. So for a short time we were associated in Pasadena-
Does that cover the situation?
Q. Yes. Of course, he has been with you on the Science Advisory Committee,
I think you said?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. I want to ask you a little about the work of the General Advisory Com-
mittee from its inception up to the October 1949 meeting. I want to ask you
a few questions about that meeting and then a few questions about what
happened in the GAC after President Truman gave the go-ahead on the all-out
program for the H-bomb.
We have a good deal of testimony already on these subjects. I don't expect
an exhaustive discussion from you, but I would like you to tell the board a few
of the things that stand out in your memory during the period from the beginning
of the GAC up to October 1949 in the way of recommendations made by the GAC
to the Commission and what part Dr. Oppenheimer played in that effort.
A. As you are aware, this is a very large subject, and I can only repeat a few
things that come to mind that would seem to me to be pertinent. If I may say
so, Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that the object of this hearing is to
secure information that casts light on Dr. Oppenheimer as a loyal citizen of the
United States, and as a good security risk.
Some of the things that might have happened in GAC arguments back and
forth, I think are irrelevant to that question.
Mr, GRAY. Did you say irrelevant?
The WITNESS. Irrelevant to the question of security risk and loyalty. But
I will start back with the beginning and hit a few points that occur to me.
When the General Advisory Committee first was assembled, at its first meeting
early in 1947, it was apparent to us largely from the reports which Dr. Oppen-
heimer presented to the General Advisory Committee, but also reports we received
directly from the Director of Los Alamos, that the Los Alamos Laboratory was in
a state of very considerable disruption. The end of the war had brought about
the desire on the part of the scientists there, a large number of them, to return to
their universities or their industrial positions, and to resume their normal scien-
tific careers and a very large number of course did that.
This left the top level positions of Los Alamos, many of them vacant. They
were quickly filled by bringing up younger men, but these were men with lesser
experience and less maturity. The departure of many key scientists of course
left the laboratory in a state of demoralization.
There had been a year's lag between the end of the war and the passage of the
Atomic Energy Act, a year in which uncertainty about the future of Los Alamos
and the atomic energy project was current The members of the Los Alamos
Laboratory did not know what their future was to be as individuals or their
function IB atomic energy work. This was true of other laboratories, too.
Therefore, the General Advisory Committee considered this as an important func-
tion in getting started and this came in a question asked by the Atomic Energy
Commission : How can we restore, reestablish, strengthen the Los Alamos Lab-
oratory as an effective weapon development laboratory.
It was evident at that time the most important thing that the Atomic Energy
Commission faced was how to bring the atomic weapons work back to full
strength. It was evident to us that peacetime applications of atomic energy
were somewhat remote, would be somewhat difficult to proceed with at that
time and that in view of the shortage of raw materials, the shortage of scientists,
517
it was clear that the weapons program was the most important program to push
forward, and the major job was how to strengthen Los Alamos, get better men
there, and give the men who were there the maximum amount of scientific help.
Bepeatedly this question came before the General Advisory Committee in
session after session during those 2 years. It was always evident that the
Chairman of the General Advisory Committee was among the most insistent,
that this was our job, to help Los Alamos and strengthen the weapons program
at Los Alamos.
A special weapons committee was appointed, a subcommittee of GAC, wmcn
I was not a member of, which paid visits to Los Alamos following the weapon
program. Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr. Rabi and Dr. Conant were on the com-
mittee, and have or will tell you more about the work of that committee.
The objective of all members of the General Advisory Committee, especially
under the leadership of our Chairman, was the strengthening of the United States
military position in the field of atomic weapons, and doing this by using our
scientific experience and technological work in process in Commission labora-
tories bearing on the weapons program especially at Los Alamos.
It was also evident to us that a critical bottleneck in the production of more
and better atomic weapons was the availability of raw materials, plutonium
particularly. So we discussed and made recommendations to the Commission
at various times at various meetings for the expansion and improvement of the
production facilities at Hanf ord. We felt it was quite important to increase the
rate of production of plutonium and to expand the neutron yield of the Hanford
reactors, and to increase the plutonium production there.
At various times we made recommendations, some of which eventually were
adopted ; others were not.
These matters of improving our weapons position and our fissionable materials
position engaged a very large section of the attention of the General Advisory
Committee during those days. We discussed also how the general scientific
picture of the country would be strengthened especially in the nuclear physics
and nuclear science areas through the Atomic Energy Commission support of
scientific activities, through a fellowship program and so on. But never far
beneath the surface of our discussions was the question of military strength
of the United States in the atomic weapons field.
I may say that throughout the discussion on the General Advisory Committee
we had many long and earnest discussions. We usually met for 3 days at a
time and often went through the evenings, always informally in the evenings
if not formally, and it was a very hardworking Committee. Always was the
feeling of urgency and of concern that we should advise the Commission properly
in ways that would strengthen the United States.
There were disagreements at times, of course, among members of the Com.
mittee. That is the reason you have a Committee rather than one person, so
that different points of view can be represented. These points of view were
brought forward frankly and given full discussion in all cases. But in the
end almost invariably the recommendations of our Committee were unanimous.
There were occasional minority reports. These were never suppressed* But
they were also written up when they seemed important and wished by the
minority members and sent to the Commission along with- the majority report
of the members of the Committee.
This is the general tone and tenor of the discussions of our Committee.
Q. Do you have any comment on Dr. Oppenneimer's part in all this?
A. Even if Dr. Oppenheimer had not been officially elected Chairman each
year, and if I may say so, he resigned or attempted to resign each year, feeling
that a new Chairman should be elected, the Committee unanimously rejected
his recommendation every year, and asked him to continue to serve as Chairman.
He was so naturally a leader of our group that it was impossible to imagine
that he should not be in the chair. He was the leader of our group first because
his knowledge of the atomic energy work was far more intimate than that of
any other member of the Committee. He had obviously been more intimately
involved in the actual scientific work of the Manhattan project than any other
person on our Committee. He was a natural leader because we respected his
intelligence, his judgment, his personal attitude toward the work of the Com-
mission, and the Committee. Of course, without saying we had not the faintest
doubt of his loyalty. More than that, we felt, and I feel that there is no one
who has exhibited his loyalty to this country more spectacularly than Dr.
Oppenheimer. He was a natural and respected and at all times a loved leader
of that group.
518
At the same time I should emphasize that at no time did he dominate the
group or did he suppress opinions that did not agree with his own. In fact,
he encouraged a full and free and frank exchange of ideas throughout the full
history of the Committee. That is the reason we liked him as a leader, be-
cause'though he did lead and stimulate and inform us and help us in our
decisions, he never dominated nor suppressed contrary or different opinions.
There was a free, full, frank exchange, and It was one of the finest Committees
that I ever had the privilege to serve on for that reason.
Q. Coming now to the October 29, 1949 meeting at which the question of the
crash program for the H-bomb was discussed at great length, do you recall
how the topic of the so-called crash program for the H-bomb came up to the
GAC?
A. This is a matter of recollection of a particular thing that happened. I
will have to tell it in rather general terms though I am sure the records of the
Committee must be available to yon.
It is my recollection that as the Committee assembled for this meeting, we
were informed by the Chairman that a question which was before us for
consideration was whether a large undertaking should be initiated by the United
States.
Q. You say the Chairman?
A. The Chairman stated to the Committee.
Q. The Chairman of
A. The Chairman of our Committee, Dr. Oppenheimer, stated to the Advisory
Committee that a matter we should consider was the question of whether the
United States should embark upon a large production program aimed at the
production of hydrogen weapons, and the particular version of the hydrogen
weapon which was then called the Super. This production program involved
first
Q. May I go back a minute to ask you whether the members of the AEG met
with the GAC before you went into your meeting? Let me ask you the ques-
tion, are you talking now about the meeting of the GAC members themselves,
or are you talking about the beginning of the session which, as I understand it,
the practice was that the members of the AEC met with the GAO.
A. I am sorry I don't recall that particular meeting. Sometimes we met with
the members of the Atomic Energy Commission at the beginning of our session
sometimes in the middle or at the end, or sometimes several times. I just
simply do not recall whether in this particular session we met with the Com-
missioners first I am sorry I do not recollect that. I do have a vivid recol-
lection of Dr. Oppenheimer presenting to us the question, when the Commis-
sioners were not present, only the Committee was assembled. Dr. Oppenheimer
presented to the Committee this question : Shall we advise the Commission to
embark upon this program? This proposal involved the construction of large
reactors designed for the production of tritium.
At this point, Mr. Chairman, I am not sure whether what I want to say contains
restricted material or not
Q. I think I could perhaps Just ask you a few questions that will avoid that
because we have had quite a little testimony about what happened, and I want
to bring out Just a few points.
I would like to ask you a few questions about the report itself. I understand
about the report, but what I want to ask you about is the 2 annexes, one signed
by yourself and Dr. Conant and Dr. Oppenheimer and Mr Bowe as
and the other by Dr. Rabi and Dr. T^Tp^O^^MS
** you recaU who drafted tlie so-called majority
6nt STif ^X* J?6 ttllL ^r r «° back 1™* a moment? After
was posed by Dr. Oppenheimer to the Committee for its considera-
tion—and I will not attempt to state the full technical content of that question
at the moment-Dr. Oppenheimer asked the members of the Committee Ttf t£ey
T^SR™^™^ *% teble ?»*• *** Tiews on ttis question^ne wly
£ -*8d at *e "^ * «• -«~ «• ™
^S?^^-^?^?61111617' did not €xP*ess his point of view on this
until after aU of the rest of the members of the CommitteThad^
It was clear, however, as the individual members did ex-
ar(mnd the teu* *»* wwte there weredSering
519
Q. These discussions I take it ranged over several days.
A. This particular phase was in one session in one half day. Later after
we had gone around the table and expressed our opinion, we then elaborated
and explored, wrote up drafts, argued about them, redrafted and so on, for
at least 2 days. But to get the problem before us, the Chairman simply asked
each member of the Committee to make a brief statement, and I suppose each
person took 5 to 10 minutes or thereabouts to express his views.
After they were all on the table, the Chairman said he also shared the views
of the Committee. We then discussed the question of how to state our views
and our recommendations most effectively to the Commission.
It was on this subject of how our general conclusions could be most effec-
tively and clearly stated that a very substantial discussion went forward for
the next day or two.
It is my recollection that Dr. Conant and myself and possibly at least one
other were on one Committee to make a draft, and that Dr. Rabi and Dr. Fermi
were asked to make another draft. These 2 groups retired and prepared their
respective drafts, and came back to the Committee meeting and read them.
We criticized each other's draft, made suggested changes and discussed the
question at greater length and eventually came out with these 2 versions.
Q. There has been testimony here as to the views of different members of the
GAC. I don't want to ask you to attempt to reconstruct in detail the majority
annex which is not in the record, but I would like to have you state to the board
as simply as you can your recollection of the position which you held at the time
on this subject, how you felt about it, and why.
A. Becalling as nearly as I can, projecting my thoughts back 5 years or four
and a half, it went something like this: First, though I was not intimately
familiar with the technique of the atomic and hydrogen bomb design, it was my
impression that the super design, which was then being considered, was * * *
in too early a stage to embark on a large and expensive program. In other
words, there were technical reasons why a crash program at that time seemed
unwise.
Secondly, it was clear in my mind that the fission weapon program was
progressing quite well, that better designs of fission weapons had been developed
over the 2 or 3 years Immediately preceding that time, that both larger in point
of view of energy and smaller fission weapons had been evolved, and were de-
signed and still further progress was rapidly being made. That we were, in
other words, rapidly attaining a position of great strength in the fission weapon
field. That some of these fission weapons were very much larger in their
energy release than the original fission weapons exploded over Japan. That
very much more efficient ways of using our fissionable material had been found
so that our stockpile with a given number of pounds of fissionable material had
greatly multiplied, and was in the process of being further multiplied.
Therefore, it was to the best interest of the United States to proceed as rapidly
as possible to continue this development and improvement of our fission weapons
so that our stockpile would be more effectively used, and our weapon strength
would be further increased for a variety of military purposes. Small weapons
for tactical purposes, and very large weapons for strategic purposes.
Mr. BOBB. Is this the majority report?
The WITNESS. This is my view as I recall it at the time.
Mr. BOBB. This is the separate opinion of Dr. DuBridge, and the other gentle-
men who Joined with him?
Mr. GABBISON. I am not asking him to recollect in detail the precise order
of language and so forth in the majority report.
Mr. BOBB. I understand. I want to have it clear in the record if we can
which particular report he was talking about
The WITNESS. As I understood the question, it was to give my own views as
to the hydrogen weapon at the time. To some extent these were reflected in the
report, to some extent they were not.
Mr. BOBB. I see.
The WITNESS. If we made any mistake in our reports, the mistake was In
not amplifying and giving our views. I think we made our reports too brief,
and therefore they were not understood. Therefore, much of what I am saying
is opinion I held as I recall it, and I am not sure just how much was written
down. Only a small part of that actually. Therefore, there were technical
reasons for not thinking that the super was ready for production. There were
important reasons for thinking that there were more fruitful: things at Los
Alamos, and the other laboratories could proceed on the fission program.
520
The fission weapon program was that such that a very large destructive power
was in our hands, and it was not clear to me that the thermonuclear weapons
would add in significant ways to that destructive power.
Finally, there was a question of whether the United States could not find a
better way of strengthening, rather than deteriorating its moral position with
the rest of the world. It seemed to me and to some other members — I think all
of the members of the Committee — that if the United States, instead of making
a unilateral announcement that it was proceeding with this new and terribly
destructive weapon, should instead say to the world that such a weapon may
be possible, but we would like to discuss methods of reaching agreements where
no nation would proceed with the design and construction of such a weapon.
It seemed to me at the time that the moral position of the United States in the
face of the rest of the world would be better if we took that kind of a stand
rather than making a unilateral announcement that we were proceeding with
this new weapon of mass destruction. That as I recollect it was the background
of my thinking at that time.
I must say that I cannot claim credit for originality in these thoughts. These
thoughts evolved from my discussions with the other members of the Committee.
But as nearly as I can reconstruct my thoughts at that time, that is it.
By Mr. GAEEISON :
Q. After this October meeting you had another meeting in the first week in
December and resumed the discussions, did you not?
A. Yes,
Q. After President Truman's direction to proceed with the program, did the
QAC under Dr. Oppenheimer's chairmanship cooperate and try to carry out the
President's directive, and if so, in general what did it do?
A. During the October meeting and during all the time immediately following
that before our next meeting, I should make it clear that the only objective of
the committee — and I am confident, of its chairman — was to increase the strength
of the United States. All of the arguments and recommendations were aimed
at that end. There was not the slightest question about that in any 6f our
minds. If there were differences of opinion, these were honest differences of
opinion as scientists and had nothing to do with our objectives in improving
tfie position of the United States morally and physically. Though our recom-
mendations as transmitted to the Commission were not accepted by the President
of the United States, when we next met the announcement of the President of
the United States was made, as I recall, during our meeting, and it was then
clear to us that the decision of the United States had been made, that it was our
job then to collaborate and cooperate fully in carrying forward this decision.
From that time forward I recall of no argument within the committee but
that we had only one duty, and that was to implement the decision of the Govern-
ment in proceeding with this project.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer agree with that?
A. Fully and completely.
Q. Do you want to say anything more about what the committee itself actually
did to help implement the program?
A. This was a matter mostly of technical assistance to the Los Alamos Labora-
tory in which I personally was not competent to participate. By discussing the
program with the members of the Los Alamos Laboratory and others like Dr.
Hans Bethe, I think substantial assistance was rendered by members of our
committee individually and collectively to the program. I think a conspicuous
piece of assistance to the thermonuclear program was a conference which Dr
Oppenheimer called at Princeton, I believe in June of 1951, at which time the
purpose of this conference was to review the entire technical status of the
thermonuclear program.
The members of the General Advisory Committee were all invited to this
conference, and the members of the Commission. In addition, a number of the
key staff members of Los Alamos including Dr. Bradbury, consultants of Los
Alamos, including Dr. Bethe and Dr. Teller. This conference lasted 2 or 3 days,
I have forgotten which, and was a long and extensive and intensive examination
of the technical problem of the thermonuclear program.
There were many technical ideas which had been considered which were
tnen being considered and being examined, and these were all laid out, and
discussed in great detail, with an attempt to find out where is the best and
most promising line of procedure with what was known at that time.
I believe that this conference was held at a critical time and was a critical
and important assistance to clarifying ideas of the technical problems Involved,
521
and illustrating the next steps in the theoretical and experimental program of
the laboratory. At various times during the months and years that followed,
we were asked to give technical opinions on various aspects of the thermo-
nuclear program and we did this as earnestly and carefully as we could.
Our objective was always to help the Commission in its work and since its
job was to carry forward this program we considered it our job to help. In
this, as in every other matter, the Chairman was our leader in this effort.
Q. Mr. Walter Whitman testified this morning about visiting SHABF in
connection with the Vista report. I believe you were the head of the Vista
project?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you accompanied Mr. Whitman and Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr. Laurit-
sen on this trip to Europe?
A. That is correct.
Q. I don't want to go into the details because there was a good deal of testi-
mony about it. I would just ask you in a general way whether Dr. Oppenheimer
contributed in any respect to the usefulness of this project?
A. I think if I may, I would like to say a word about the Vista project
This was a project which the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy asked the
California Institute of Technology to undertake, to examine some of the prob-
lems being faced by the Air Force and the Army, * * *.
A substantial group was assembled at the California Institute of Technology
during the summer of 1951 to examine these problems. We made extensive
trips to Army, Air Force, and Navy installations, had a very large number of
Army, Navy, and Air Force officers visit the institute to discuss and give us
information and background on these problems. As the late summer came along,
the group which had been assigned under the chairmanship of Dr. Robert
Baeher, then a member of the California Institute staff, * * *.
Dr. Baeher and Dr. Christie and the others on this group suggested to me
that it would be useful to them if Dr. Oppenheimer could be invited to come
out and spend a little time with the Vista group to consult further on this sub-
ject At our invitation Dr. Oppenheimer did come to Pasadena, and we discussed
this subject at great length. He was of assistance in taking the draft of the
chapter which had already been prepared and discussing the best method of
presenting it, and threshing out further ideas and assisting the group in clarify-
ing this idea and preparing a final draft.
During the cause of the Vista discussions, many problems came up in regard
to the battle of Western Europe where we did not have the information about
organization, forces, the NATO structure and the NATO problems, and we
thought it would be helpful, after assembling our own ideas, if we could go
over to Europe and consult the leaders, General Eisenhower and the other
leaders, of the United States forces in Europe, to get the information which
they had available and to discuss with them their thoughts about the battle of
Western Europe, if it should occur.
I think it was during a discussion at which Dr. Oppenheimer was present,
at which we were exploring ideas with John McCone, who either at that time
still was or had just retired as Assistant Secretary of Air Force under Mr.
Finletter, John McCone urged this trip and offered to assist us in arranging
it, and it was finally arranged through the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Lovett,
that a group of the Vista project people headed by myself and after some dis-
cussion the other members of the group to include Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr.
Lauritsen, to go to Europe, and Dr. Lovett offered the facilities of the Depart-
ment of Defense to make this trip possible, appointed Mr. Whitman, who was
then Chairman of the Research and Development Board, to make all the ad-
ministrative arrangements and to accompany us on behalf of the Secretary of
Defense.
The four of us then went to Paris in the fall of 1951, 1 think November. We
went to Paris. We saw General Eisenhower on two occasions and we went
up to Weissbaden and met with General Norstadt and Air Force officials. We
went to Heidelberg and met with United States Army commanders, returned—
I am sorry, General Norstadt has headquarters not at Weissbaden, but at
Fontainebleau, south of Paris, where General Norstadt was located, and we
discussed things with him there.
Through all these discussions with the Army as to their problems * * * th*
problems which the Air Force faced in having enough airplanes, the right kind
of airplanes cooperating with the Army and so on, in all these discussions alt
four of us took an active part I felt these discussions were very illuminating.
They helped us form our own ideas that went into the final vista report
522
General Eisenhower's thoughts were particularly helpful. We had lunch with
him and a Ions discussion with him on the general problem of the defense of
Western Europe. It was obvious that the group was well picked, I felt. Dr.
Lauritsen and Dr. Oppenheiiner and Mr. Whitman were all important contribu-
tors to the effectiveness of our discussions. * * *
Q. "Sou have read General Nichols* letter of December 23, 1953. You have
read the items of derogatory information in it. Assuming that those items of
derogatory information were true and without saying whether they are or not,
what would your opinion be as to the loyalty of Dr. Oppenheimer, except for
the hydrogen bomb allegation which I left out for purposes of this question.
A. You prefer to leave them out.
Q. Yes. I think that is of a different character.
A. It has always been, ever since reading this letter of General Nichols, diffi-
cult for me to see how any of the allegations therein had any significant rele-
vance to the question of the loyalty and integrity of Dr. Oppenheimer. Some
of the statements made in that letter having to do with acquaintances and asso-
ciations and friends Dr. Oppenheimer has said were, of course, true.
Q. May I just for a moment remind you that the Atomic Energy Act requires
the board to consider character, associations, and loyalty. Having this frame
of reference that the board here must consider, the character, associations and
loyalty of Dr. Oppenheimer, in determining whether or not his continuance of
his clearance would endanger the national safety, having in mind the past asso-
ciations set forth in the letter, having in mind what you know about Dr.
Oppenheimer's character, having in mind what you say that the continuance of
his clearance would to any degree endanger the national safety?
A. In no degree whatsoever.
Q. On -what do you fcase this judgment?
A. In the first place, these associations that are mentioned were those of many,
many years ago. As I understand it, they have largely long since been termi-
nated, in at least one. case by death. In the second place, these were rather
natural associations of a person who had strong human interests, interests in
human rights and human liberties and human welfare, who had strong revul-
sions against the growth of dictatorship in Germany, Spain, and Italy, and who
wanted to express his opposition to such violations of human liberty as he
regarded these dictatorships. He therefore found himself among others of like
minds, some of whom it turned out were possible members of the Communist
Party. But this was only a natural exhibition of his deep interest in human
beings and in human liberty and had nothing to do with his devotion to this
country, or nothing adverse to do with this country.
In the second place, it seems to me that to question the integrity and loyalty
of a person who has worked hard and devotedly for his country as Dr. Oppen-
heimer has on such trivial grounds is against all principles of human justice.
It seems to me whatever his ideas and associations were in 1935, is quite irrele-
vant in view of the last years since 1941-42, during which he has shown such a
devoted interest to the welfare, security and strength of the United States.
Whatever mistakes, if they were mistakes, and I do not suggest that they were,
that were made in the thirties have well been washed out and the value of a
man like Dr. Oppenheimer to his country has been adequately and repeatedly
proved.
It would be in my opinion against all principles of justice to now not recognize
the way in which his loyalty has been proved in a positive way through positive
contributions. Furthermore, this country needs men of that kind, and should
not deprive itself of their services.
Q. I think I should put this question to you because it is something that I
want you to bear in mind when I ask you to give me your final judgment.
You are familiar with the Chevalier incident as recited in the Commission's
letter.
A* That is my only familiarity, what I read in the letter.
Q. Supposing that it had been shown here that after Dr. Oppenheimer had
had the conversation with Chevalier that for several months he did not report
the Incident to security officers, that after he had heard from the security officers
at Los Alamos that they were concerned about espionage at Berkeley that on
his next trip to Berkeley he told the security officers about Bltenton, did not
r^real tbe i name of Chevalier and declined to do so. Supposing it was further
established .that he told the security officers that his friend whose name he would
not reveal had contact with the Russian consulate and that there were microfilm
facilities tor transmitting information, and that the friend had approached
523
3 different persons, 2 or 3, 3 I think, and suppose tnat these were untrue state-
ments about the consulate, the microfilm and the 3 persons, suppose that he was
again urged after having been urged by the security officers at Berkeley to
reveal the name of his friend, he was again urged by Colonel Lansdale and again
declined, he was again urged by General Groves and said he would not do so
unless ordered ; General Groves said he didn't want to order him to do it, asked
him to think it over ; General Groves saw him again and said he would have
to order him if he would not reveal the name, and at that point Dr. Oppenheimer
revealed the name of Chevalier.
I am not trying to ask you now to do anything more than to assume that
you had that set of facts before you. Would your conclusion still be the same
as you have expressed it here to the board?
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I don't object to the question, but I wish it to be
recorded that my failure to object does not imply or import that I endorse the
complete accuracy or fullness of the hypothesis stated by Mr. Garrison.
Mr. GARRISON. I quite understand that. To carry it further I would have to
read the whole testimony.
Mr. ROBB. I understand. I don't want to debate it.
Mr. GARRISON. I want to give Dr. DuBridge the nature and character of the
problem.
The WITNESS. May I ask one question on your assumption? In what year
was this supposed to have taken place?
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. 1943. You would regard that seriously, I take it?
A. I would want to examine this situation very seriously and what you said
about the assumption obviously does not include all the facts. I assume there-
fore you wish me to answer this from the point of view of iny knowledge of I>r.
Oppenheimer's character and integrity, and my statement would be without
hesitation that I would say that these acts which he is supposed to have com-
mitted in no case stem from any disloyalty to the United States, but possibly a
mistaken but nevertheless a sincere and honest belief that this was the best
thing to do at the time. I just know that Dr. Oppenheimer is loyal to his friend
and loyal to his country, that he is honest, but has a humane feeling, that if he
did these things it was with a sense that a loyalty to a friend was important
but was not in conflict with any loyalty to the country at that time.
Q. Do you think that today if he were asked by security officers to reveal
information which they believe to be important for the security of the country,
that he would decline to do so even if a friend were involved?
A. I am sure that at any time if he had felt a loyalty to his country was in-
volved, he would have done what seemed to be the proper thing to reinforce that
loyalty.
Q. I am asking you today, leaving aside whether he thought that his friend
was innocent or not, if he were told by security officers that in their judgment
the interests of the country required knowledge which he had about a friend,
would he put the interests of his country ahead of the friendship?
A. I am confident that he would. We have all learned a great deal about
security problems hi the last 10 years.
Mr. GARRISON : That is all.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, do you think that loyalty to a friend justifies the giving of false
information to a security officer?
A. I would not wish to do that myself.
Q. You would not do it, would you?
A. I don't think so.
Q. In fact, you can't conceive of any circumstances under which you would
not?
A. I wouldn't say that.
Q. It is hard to think of any?
A* First, it is hard to project ourselves back 10 years as to what the situation
was like then. None of us had any very keen appreciation of the problems of
security and secrecy at that time or what was involved. I cannot say under no
circumstances would I be reluctant to give away or give information about a
friend if I were personally convinced that this information had nothing to do
with the country's welfare. I would try to cooperate with security officers
524
under all conditions but I cannot say that under no conditions would I be
reluctant to give such information.
Q That was not quite my question. My question was whether or not you
would feel that loyalty to your friend justified you in lying to a security officer.
A. No, I would not feel so. ,.,«,.««.
Q. The standards of honesty were the same in 1943 as they are now, weren't
they?
A. Presumably,
Q. Doctor, I was interested in your discussion of the Vista matter. As I
understand it, what was it called— a committee?
A. It was called a project
Q. That project took place in the summer of 1951.
A. That is correct. Our report was completed in early 1952.
Q. You said Dr. Oppenheimer was not there when the project commenced, is
that it?
A. That is right. He was a member of the staff of the project only for a
relatively short period.
Q. I believe he came out in about November?
A. I believe it was before that, but I do not remember the dates.
Q. I don't know exactly either.
A. I think it was the latter part of the summer, September.
Q. Do you recall it was chapter 5 of the report that dealt with atomic bomb
matters? •
A. That is correct.
Q. Did Dr, Oppenheimer prepare an Introduction to that chapter?
A. Dr. Oppenheimer collaborated with the other members of the committee
that were responsible for chapter 5 in developing chapter 5. He did not write
either the first or the last draft of that chapter. He assisted in the preparation
of 1 or 2 intermediate drafts.
Q. Was there a time in November when the group was reviewing the report
as a whole with you presiding?
A. Immediately after our return from Europe?
Q. No, sir, I am talking about before you went to Europe.
A. We had weekly meetings reviewing various chapters and various parts
of the report. I don't know which one you are referring to.
Q. I realize it is hard to project yourself back.
A. We had many meetings and I was chairman of most of them.
Q. Perhaps I can refresh your memory. I am informed that on November 13,
1951, when the group was reviewing a draft of the report that you announced
that Dr. Oppenheimer had prepared a portion of the introduction to the report.
Do you remember that?
A. I don't recall the exact incident but it is quite possible I did, because he did
prepare a draft of a part of chapter 5 at that time. It was not the final draft,
but it was an intermediate one.
Q. I am informed that you stated that you considered that to be a great
document, and you felt confident it would be accepted without amendment. Do
you remember that?
A. No, I don't.
Q. I am not trying to lead you into something, but trying to find out whether
that coincides with your memory.
A. I don't remember that meeting or the statement. At the time I certainly
did have the opinion that the draft that Dr. Oppenheimer helped prepare of the
Introductory portion of the chapter was a fine contribution to the Vista work.
I believed that and I still believe It
Q. Was that draft which Dr. Oppenheimer helped to prepare incorporated
in the draft which you took to Europe?
A. It certainly was incorporated in it, but I am sure there were probably
changes in the wording between that time and the time we went to Europe. In
other words, there were continuous changes in the wording of all parts of the
report
Q. By the way, at those meetings in November, was General Quesada present?
A. General Qnesada participated in some meetings. «"»«»• present
Q. Did General Quesada undertake to make available to your group his
report on the so^aHed Greenhouse test?
A. I dont recall.
!Lm °I!P^eimer WWl to Prepare, the introduction to the
report, was any reference to thermonuclear weapons made?
525
A. In the introduction to chapter 5?
Q. Yes, sir.
Q. This is a matter of record whether there was or was not I don't recall.
Certainly in some drafts, and I believe in the final report there was a reference
to thermonuclear weapons.
Mr. ROBB. I might say, Mr. Chairman, I am undertaking to do this on an
unclassified basis for the benefit of counsel. I suppose ultimately I will have to
ask the Doctor some questions on a classified basis and read some extracts I have
here, but I don't want to do it if I can help it. because I want Mr. Garrison to
hear it.
The WITNESS. Do you have notes on it?
Mr. ROBB. Yes, I have.
Mr. GARRISON. I don't want anything withheld from the board.
Mr. ROBB. No, but I am trying to keep out of the classified area.
Mr. GRAY. Let us see if you can do it unclassified.
The WITNESS. Did I make clear in my answer to that question? I don't recall
at what stage or what draft reference to the thermonuclear weapons came in,
but there was a reference and only a passing one, as I recall.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Do you recall that subsequent to the November meeting, that draft of
chapter 5 or the introduction to it was amended?
A. It was amended many times.
Q. Was it amended subsequent to that meeting in November?
A. Since I don't recall the particular meeting, I can't answer that specifically.
I cannot even recall at the moment the date on which we departed on our trip to
Europe. May I ask if that date is available? I don't have that date.
Mr. GBAY. Mr. Robb, do you have it?
Mr. ROBB. I am looking now to see if I can find it.
The WITNESS. These were matters of continuous study and drafting and
redrafting and changing and finally we got a version which we took to Europe.
We redrafted pieces of it on various chapters while we were in Europe as a
result of our discussions. We came back and redrafted many parts again in the
light of what we had learned, and finally got a report which we all agreed was
the best we could do, which was submitted then to the Defense Department.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. I have a note here, Doctor, which may assist you that you returned from
your visit to Paris and reported to the Vista group on the 18th of December, 1951.
That might help you fix the date when you went to Paris. At your meetings in
California in the summer and fall of 1951, did you confer with General Quesada?
A. Yes, we asked General Quesada to come and discuss these various matters
with us and at our invitation he did come.
Q. Did you have any report from General Quesada on the Greenhouse test?
A. As I say, I just don't remember. We certainly talked with General Quesada
about atomic tests. Whether the Greenhouse test was specifically reported on as
such, I don't recall.
Q. Was the Greenhouse test exclusively atomic or wasn't that thermonuclear
in part?
A. I don't know.
Mr. BECKEBLEY. The public record is that it included experiments in ther-
monuclear.
Mr. ROBB. The answer was that he didn't know.
(Record read by the reporter.)
The WITNESS. One reason for not recalling is that I never can remember the
code words for these various tests.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. I can't either.
A. Whether General Quesada reported or not, we certainly knew through
various channels because I was still a member of the General Advisory Com-
mittee at the time about the Greenhouse test
Q. Doctor, do you remember— I don't expect you to remember the oate, out
I will give it to you to assist you— on April 80, 1952, having lunch with Dr. Eabi,
Mr. David Griggs, Mr. Garrison Norton, and Mr. William Burden at Mr. Burden's
house here in Washington?
A. Yes. I can't confirm the date, but I remember approximately that tnne
and I have only had lunch there once with that group.
526
Q. Do you recall that you and Dr. Rabi on that occasion expressed some
opinions concerning H-bomb development?
A. We had a very visorous discussion of this question, yes.
Q. Would you undertake, please, sir, to give us the opinions that you and
Dr. Rabi expressed?
A. It is a little difficult to try to recall a conversation of 2 years ago. If I do
recall, they were not substantially different from the ones I have already
expressed here previously in regard to whether or not the thermonuclear weapons
were important additions or were not to the military potential of the United
States, and questions, if so, under what conditions they could be used. If you
have any specific questions about the statements I made
Q. I can understand how hard it is to remember. Do you recall you and
Dr. Rabi saying in substance that you thought that there were two things
that were more important than H-bomb development, the first being a concerted
effort of the best minds in this country toward peace with Soviet Russia. Do
you recall something like that?
A. That is quite consistent with what I might have said.
Q. Do you recall Dr. Rabi saying together with Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr.
Lauritsen that he, Dr. Rabi, would press for action in accordance with plans
that they were preparing, and that they were already in touch with the State
Department, on the subject
A. I don't recall that.
Q. Do you recall anything like that?
A. I have a faint recollection at this time that there was a committee at work
in the State Department on exploring new approaches to an agreement with
Russia. I had nothing to do with that committee. Though it is quite possible
that Dr. Rabi said something about it, I am inclined to feel that I probably did
not express any opinion about it since I did not have personal knowledge about it.
Q. I was not suggesting that you did. I was asking if you recall Dr. Rabi
saying something about going to the State Department on the subject
A. It is not impossible that he made such a remark.
Q. Do you recall that was Dr. Rabi's feeling at the time?
A. I think it probably was, namely, that because of the terrtfring implica-
tions of A bombs and thermonuclear weapons, it was desirable to make another
attempt to find a way to avoid using them.
Q. Do you recall either you or Dr. Rabi or both of you expressing an opinion
that the second thing which was more important than H-bomb development was
more emphasis on having a good air defense?
A. We certainly emphasized the importance of an air defense, yes.
Q. I believe at that luncheon meeting you said you had quite a go-around
with these gentlemen.
A. We had a very vigorous discussion with Mr. Griggs.
Q. Yes, you put it more delicately than I did.
A. I didn't mean it that way. Our discussion was primarily with Dr. Griggs,
who disagreed with Dr. Rabi and myself very violently on some points.
Q. Dr. Griggs contended that Dr. Oppenheimer had got the GAO to soft pedal
the thermonuclear development, didn't he, and you said that was not so?
A. That is correct
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, could I Just ask what is the general nature of
the document that Mr. Robb is reading from?
Mr. ROBB. I am sorry, it has top secret stamped all over it, Mr. Garrison.
Mr. GRAY. Do you wish to make any point of this?
Mr. GABBISON. No.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. That was the bone of contention between you in general, that Dr Griggs
said Oppenheimer and the GAO had not fully supported work on the thermo-
nuclear and you and Dr. Rabi contended that the GAO had consistently sup-
ported it and emphasized it?
A, Essentially that is correct. Griggs made what we considered to be false
statements, that the GAC had impeded thermonuclear development. We both
emphasized strongly that neither Dr. Oppenheimer nor the GAO had impeded the
iteTOlojweat of thermonuclear weapons. On the contrary, from almost the
opening day of the GAG'S existence, its chairman and its members had recom-
inended to the Commission that thermonuclear research proceed and the im-
gfcwenfeed and strengthened at Los Alamos. We did not feel at the time that the
time 1950 was ripe lor tbe production effort, but we always advocated the
527
research and development effort. Our difference of point of view with Dr.
Griggs, as I recall, was that he felt that the thermonuclear weapon development
and production was No. 1 priority for the country. We felt that improving our
fission weapon program and improving our defense were just as important, if
not more important at that time.
Q. This was 1952?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that the view of Dr. Oppenheimer at that time, too?
A. It is a little hard to speak as to what his opinions were at any particular
moment. I think in general we have agreed with each other. These were tech-
nical matters of priority and I must insist that at all times Dr. Oppenheimer,
myself, Dr. Rabi and the others had only one objective in mind; that was
strengthening the moral and physical and military position of this country. We
had no other thought.
Mr. GBAY. Excuse me. At one point I am going to ask for a recess, but I
don't want to cut you off in the middle of one thing you want to pursue.
Mr. ROBB. I have one question and then I think we might take a recess.
By Mr. ROBE :
Q. Doctor, you testified that the recommendations of the Vista Report were
carried out and are still being carred out, is that right?
A. In so far as the use of atomic weapons is concerned. There are some
other recommendations which were not. There are others that had nothing to
do with atomic weapons which are being carried out.
Q. Were those recommendations to which you referred the same as the recom-
mendations in the draft which Dr. Oppenheimer helped prepare in the fail of
1951 at Pasadena?
A. I believe so.
Mr. ROBB. This is a good time to stop.
Mr. GRAY. Let us take a few minutes recess.
(Brief recess.)
(The following portion of testimony, numbered pages 1747 through 1758, is
classified, and appears in a separate volume.)
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, I want to ask you a couple of questions and I want to assure you
that when I ask you, I have not the slightest intention of being offensive or
suggesting the slightest impropriety on your part. Did you volunteer to be
a witness here? , „ L
A. I am trying to recall how it came about. I would have been glad to
volunteer. I think I probably said to Dr. Oppenheimer or his counsel that if
there is anything I could do to help, I would be glad to do so.
Q. Did you in that connection with helping undertake to raise a fund to assist
Dr. Oppenheimer in this matter?
A. The newspaper reports in that connection are mistaken. As near as I can
telL the origin of that statement was that at the Cosmos Club here in Washington
one day a few weeks ago, several friends said, "Would it not be nice if Oppen-
heimer's friends chipped in $100 each to raise a fund to assist him in the
expenses of his hearing?" We agreed that this would be nice, and maybe some-
body should see the best way of doing it. The matter dropped there, and that
is the last I heard of it until I saw the statement in the paper. I do not know
where they got that information that I was organizing a fund. I did not and
was not and am not After the thing appeared in the paper I received many
letters, however, with checks from individuals who read it in the paper and
sent in their contributions.
Q. I was sure you wanted to have the record clear on it
A. I returned all these checks to the donors.
Q. Were the friends you were talking to any of the other witnesses who ap-
peared here?
A. Some were and some were not
Q. Who were the ones who were witnesses?
A. I do not know who else have been witnesses, as a matter of fact.
Q. Gould you teU us who the friends were?
A. Dr. Rabi, I believe, was present at the time the discussion went under
want, and Dr. Bacher.
Q. Dr. Fermi?
A. Dr. Fermi was not present. Mr. Trevor Gardner.
Q. Who is he, sir?
ftftfiftlft — S4 84
528
A. He is the Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force for Research and
Development. I believe that is his title. He is a civilian engineer who was for-
merly associated with the General Tire and Rubber Co.
Q. Was that the group?
A. Dr. J. R. Zacharias of MIT was another member. I think it was actually
Dr. Zacharias who raised the question.
Q. Was that luncheon for the purpose of discussing this case, if we can call
it such?
A. Xo. This was just an informal grouping at the Cosmos Club. The oc-
casion was the last meeting of the Advisory Committee, ODM, of which I am
chairman. These others that I have mentioned, except Mr. Gardner, are mem-
bers of that committee and we happened to be in town together. Gardner had
at our request appeared before the committee that day to discuss some matters
so he joined some of us at the Cosmos Club for dinner, I believe. This was a
friendly discussion, wouldn't it be nice if we could help our friend.
Q. Yes, certainly. About when was that, Doctor, in March?
A. May I refer to my diary?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I think I can give you the exact date of that last meeting. I believe it
was the 12th or 13th of March.
Q. Did you see or talk to Dr. Oppenheimer about that time?
A. Did I see or talk to him?
Q. Yes.
A. I believe I called him on the telephone just to ask how things are *oin*
and to wish him well.
Q. Was he in Washington?
A. He was in Princeton. I am sorry, no, I called him at Princeton but they
found him somewhere in Washington and I talked to him on the phone
Q. Did you see him?
A. I did not see him.
Q. What was the substance of your conversation?
A. I Just said "Robert, how are things going?" It was only a friendly con-
versation, attempting to express confidence In him and cheer him UP if possible
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer tell you how things were going?
A. He only said it was not a very pleasant experience that he was going
through. a
Q. Anything more?
A. Nothing more relating to the substance of this case.
Q. That is what I mean. Substance?
A. That is right
Q. What was said about the case in addition?
A. Just what I said, as I recall. It was not a very pleasant experience for
him to be going through.
Q. Would it be on that occasion that you suggested to him that you testifv
or had you previously? J w»uxjr
time * had already Previously discussed testimony with his counsel before that
Denh taVVCia SinCe discussed yoTir testimony with counsel and with Dr. Op-
A, I have discussed the testimony?
Q. Yes.
A. I have not seen Dr. Oppeuheimer just before I came here today I have
discussed of course the testimony with his counsel.
Q. You understand I am not trying to pry into your affairs but I thiTiir th**,*
are matters which the Board ought to have on the re£>r<L
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you discuss the case after that with Mr. Gardner?
A. Did I discuss the Oppenheimer case?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. After that time?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I have not seen Mr. Gardner— I think he did come to Pasadena shm*iv
Q. Has he been active in assisting Dr. Oppenheimer, do yon know?
A. Has Mr. Gardner been active in assisting?
529
Q. Yes, sir, in any way.
A. I do not know whether he has seen Dr. Oppenheimer or not, or his counsel.
I just don't know.
Q. Has he ever told you that he was doing some work for Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. No, he never has.
Mr. EOBB. That is all I care to ask.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. DuBridge, I am going back now briefly to October 29, 1049.
Would you consider the two annexes to the GAG report in conflict with one
another?
The WITNESS. Certainly not. Their conclusions were the same. They were
slightly different approaches to these conclusions. Dr. Rabi and Dr. Fermi em-
phasized one aspect of the argument, and the rest of us emphasized another as-
pect. It was my feeling that these were definitely not in conflict, but only bring-
ing out different points of view, which led essentially to the same conclusion and
recommendation.
Mr. GRAY. There is something in your testimony that led me to ask whether we
could make this kind of distinction with respect to what we have been calling the
crash program. You know what I mean when I say that.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. I think this kind of distinction has only perhaps just come clear to
me. Gould there be a distinction between a crash program for the development
of a thermonuclear weapon as distinguished from a crash program for the pro-
duction of same?
The WITNESS. Of course, yes.
Mr. GRAY. Your position was that there should be no crash program for the
production?
The WITNESS. That is correct
Mr. GRAY. Did you favor a crash program for development?
The WITNESS. We favored the continuation of the research and development
program at Los Alamos. We felt that it was going along pretty well. We rec-
ommended against at that time a crash program for production. In this case
research and development I use together because both aspects are involved. But
the research and development programs were in progress at Los Alamos.
Mr. GRAY. That was going as fast as it possibly could?
The WITNESS. We thought it was going along reasonably.
Mr. GRAY. There was nothing that could be done to speed up that to get into a
crash-production program? I am trying to get it clear in my mind because I am
still a little confused by the different points of view that are expressed about this
thing. I can understand it better if this is a valid distinction.
The WITNESS. In my opinion it is. The research program began away back —
there was some talk about thermonuclear programs during the war, as you know.
I am informed though I was not present at the first discussion of thermonuclear
programs was at a session in 1942 of which Dr. Oppenheimer was in charge in
which the ideas of thermonuclear reaction were discussed. When I was in Los
Alamos in 1945, the idea of thermonuclear explosions was then described to me
in the general nature of the kind of reaction one might have. At various times
we received reports from Los Alamos in the General Advisory Committee meet-
ings as to the progress on research on thermonuclear reactions. It was my im-
pression that this research was going forward, that there were some very difficult
technical obstacles, but that the research and development was moving forward.
It was not my intention at least in making this recommendation and signing it
that thtg research and development effort should in any way be slowed down, but
should be continued
Mr. GRAY. At the same pace?
The WITNESS. At the same pace, and if possible, expanded if additional people
could be found. We did not at any time recommend stopping the effort at Los
Alamos.
Mr. GRAY. That is clear to me that you didn't stop it
The WITNESS. Or slowing it down.
Mr. GRAY. Or slowing it up. I am wondering whether it was a matter of dis-
cussion in the GAG as to whether something more might be done in research and
development short of production than was being done.
The WITNESS. Again, it is a little difficult to project the opinions back to that
time, but as I recollect my own views on it they were that the thermonuclear pro-
gram was proceeding satisfactorily, that it was a difficult decision of priority as
to whether additional effort— that means men— should be transferred into the
thermonuclear program as compared to the fission program, which was also pro-
530
ceeding beautifully, and was resulting in substantial improvements in our stock-
pile position on fission weapons.
There was a delicate balance there as to whether more good people — it took
very good people at that time to make any good contribution to the thermonuclear
program— should be asked to transfer from the fission to the thermonuclear pro-
gram. I think it should also be made clear that these two programs are by no
means independent ; * * *. The thermonuclear and fission programs were very
closely related, and going forward hand in hand as they must necessarily do.
In our opinion it was not a matter of real conflict but there was a matter of
balance. We felt that very important fission programs were under way that
should not be slowed down.
By Mr. GRA.Y :
Q. And they might have been slowed down by more emphasis on research
and development with respect to the other weapons?
A. They could have been.
Q. I want to discuss a little bit with you, if I may, your views with respect
to loyalty. This follows some direct questions put to you.
It is my recollection that you stated at one time in the day that you felt that
former associations were irrelevant. If that is not a fair summary, I wish you
would correct me. In any event, you felt that in this particular situation they
are not relevant
A. I was confining my remarks to the particular associations mentioned in
the allegation in this case and to the individual in this case.
Q. Dr. DuBridge, Cal. Tech. has a lot of Government-sponsored research.
A. Yes.
Q. Is some of it classified?
A. There are two parts to our research, if I may explain. One large project
which is operating off the campus about 5 miles at the Government-owned in-
stallation. CaL Tech. operates it. That is a classified project on rockets.
On the campus where our students are, we have essentially no classified work
in progress. We avoid it on the campus. There are one or two pieces of equip-
ment, wind tunnels, to which classified models are occasionally brought for test
and so for a while a classification screen has to be set up around. But by and
large, we do not have classified research going on on the campus.
Q. At the off-campus center, which does have classified work, you must have
certain employment policies with respect to people there. I assume you don't
knowingly employ a person who is currently a member of the Communist
Party?
A. Obviously not.
Q. That would be pretty clear, I think. Are the prospective employees or
personnel on that project asked if they have ever been members of the Com-
munist Party?
A. I am not sure I can answer that. I don't know what questions the per-
sonnel officer asks. No one Is employed on that project, however, until we have
received from the Army a clearance saying that this mfm is cleared for con-
fidential work. This is a project under the sponsorship largely of the Army
Ordnance Corps. There is a local ordnance office in Pasadena. An prospective
employees are referred to them for screening and clearance. I am sure that
they would not clear anybody who was a member of the Communist Party.
Q. Currently.
A. Yes.
Q. Would they clear anybody who had been a member of the Communist
Party?
A. We had one case a few years ago where they did dear a person who had
been a member of the Communist Party. When they found it out, however, they
withdrew his clearance.
Q. Would you make a distinction between the type of clearance needed for
someone who is going to join the faculty on the campus where there is not classi-
fied information and someone who would join the other project where there is
classified?
A. Yes.
Q. You would apply a more rigid test on the off-campus center?
A. Yes. Partner, on the off-campus center, we say as a university we are not
competent to judge the security risk of prospective employees. We therefore
refer these questions to the Army.
Q. So, as president you don't take responsibility securitywise for the people
employed on that project?
531
A. That is right. We naturally are careful in our employment policies to not
get prospective employees referred to the Army that are obvious security risks
even to us. We would not employ anyone until we were sure first he was an
honest man, second he was an able scientist or engineer, and third, that his
former employees and associates felt that he was a good man to work in such a
group. We would give this kind of general screening of ability and integrity first.
But we would not attempt an FBI investigation.
Q. I understand. You get applications for employment at that center, and if
you think the individual is a good prospect for employment, you ask the Army to
clear him?
A. That is right.
Q. If you knew that a man was a member of the Communist Party, would you
even send his name over?
A. I would not consider it at all.
Q. If you knew he had been a member of the Communist Party, would you
send his name over?
A. If he was an applicant for a job at the classified research laboratory, that
is a little difficult, because it would depend a little on the circumstances as to
what the man had done in the meantime. Whether he had told us honestly he
had been a member and had resigned, or whether he had hidden it and we had
found it out in some other way.
Q. In the latter case, there would not be much question?
A. Yes.
Q. But you are not sure about in a case
A. If a man came to us and said, "I was a member of the Communist Party
20 years ago, I resigned for the following reasons," we would probably say,
"Well, everything else being acceptable, we will not put you at work, bnt we will
put your name in for clearance, and we will see what the Army thinks of your
connection."
Q. In testifying about associations earlier today, you indicated an under-
standing that in a particular case the associations ceased. I believe at least
that was true.
Let me say that this board has reached no conclusion, and I want to make clear
that I am trying to establish your philosophy, and not to ask you to pass judg-
ment on any set of facts.
Suppose some of these associations continued, would that change the answers
you gave?
A. If they had continued in an active way, and if the associations, the in-
dividuals involved had continued themselves an active association with the Com-
munist Party, I would think this was a proper matter to be further investigated.
Q. So in that case associations would be very relevant?
A. That is correct. If they were continuing, and if the individuals involved
were continuing their association with the party.
Q. I have just one final question which relates to your discussion of the
atmosphere and times in the late thirties and early forties when people were
concerned with what was happening in Germany and Spain. You indicated
that at least part of this deep concern was a reaction to dictatorship and there-
fore some people turned to the Communist Party in reaction to revulsion against
dictatorship. Wasn't it pretty well understood in this country at that time that
the Soviet Union was a dictatorship?
A. It is a rather curious situation that the most active verbally opposition
to. Hitler at that time came from members of the Communist Party. It is now
obvious to all of us that this was a piece of hypocracy, since their own regime
was a dictatorship all the time. I think, however, in the early 1930's it was
not so clear as it is now that the Communist Party in the United States was
really a part of the Soviet Government apparatus, nor was it so clear that
the type of dictatorship was the same. I think those who thought that were
wrong and mistaken, but it was nevertheless true. Wasn't it half a million
people voted for the Communist candidate for President in the thirties, appar-
ently under the illusion that the Communist Party had a solution to the de-
pression problems, or something and we were not aware of the nature of the
world conspiracy which was developing at that time. But it is certainly true
that I believe many people joined the Communist Party, or became associated
with those who were members because the members did express an active
opposition to Hitlerism, to Nazism, to Fascism generally and a support of the
Spanish Loyalists.
Q. I don't pose as an expert. You asked me a question. I think yon will
not find that we ever had a time in the political history of this country where
532
a half million people voted for the Communist Party candidate. I believe that
you would find that in the depression years, to use the words of the Democratic
candidate last year, almost a million people voted against capitalism. Again
just to make sure I don't accept that statement of the situation, the vast
majority of those were votes for Norman Thomas, the Socialist candidate, and
I am guessing— I don't know whether I am sworn here— I am guessing that very
considerably less than half a million ever voted for the Communist Party. I
think we are engaged in an excursion.
A. Yes, I think so. I hope my figures there will not be taken seriously. But
there was a substantial vote for the Communist Party.
Q. Yes, certainly more than would be true today, I think.
A. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Evans, do you have any questions.
Dr. EVANS. Dr. DuBridge, let us go back again to that Chevalier incident.
You remember about it. I want to ask you this question. Was it Dr. Oppen-
heimer's job to decide whether the security of his country was involved, rather
than to report the incident?
The WITNESS. Would you repeat that?
Dr. EVANS. Yes. Was it Dr. Oppenheimer's job to decide for himself whether
the security of the country was involved rather than report the incident im-
mediately?
The WITNESS. I think possibly Dr. Oppenheimer was mistaken in his judg-
ment at that time. I am sure it is a mistake he will not repeat.
Dr. EVANS. You would not have done it the way Dr. Oppenheimer did?
The WITNESS. Knowing what I do now, today, I would not. What I would
have done in 1940, 1 cannot say.
Dr. EVANS. That is alL
Mr. GBAY. Mr. Garrison.
REDHEECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GABMSON :
Q. I have just one question to clear up what may or may not be a misunder-
standing.
When you were being asked about the luncheon, I think at Mr. Burden's in
Washington, and the discussion with Mr. Griggs, and so on, I think the question
was put to you whether you said anything at that luncheon to the effect that you
regarded the development of continental defense and of atomic weapons, fission
weapons, as more important at that time than the H-bomb. I wanted to ask
you whether you meant to convey to the board— if you did, you should say so—
that you had in mind at that time or indeed at any time that there should be
any lessening of the effort to produce the H-bomb, or any lessening of coopera-
tion with the letter and spirit of President Truman's "go-ahead."
A. It was not my understanding then or now that President Truman's decision
meant that no other military program should go forward other than the H-
bomb program, or that even that the H-bomb program would have overriding
priority over all others. It seems to me then that of more immediate concern
to the strength of the country was the continued development of our fission
stockpile and the methods for delivering it, plus the continued development of a
method of defending this country against a fission bomb attack which then
was as now certainly possible on the part of the Russians. It was not our
tnonsht that giving attention and effort to the fission program or especially
to the continental defense program need in any way detract from "the essential
part of the effort on the H-bomb program.
I think what we were trying to get across at that time there were many people,
it seemed to us, who were of the opinion that the only thing that could save
this country was to get an H-bomb right now, and that all other things would sink
into insignificance by comparison. I felt that was not a fair evaluation of this
ITSfL* "^F Cation. That it was important that the fission program
go ahead and the continental defense go ahead. The continental defense is
now going ahead on a large scale, and it is recognized that it is an important
enterprise, and indeed its importance has increased by virtue of the H-JboImb
effort on the part of the enemy
533
A. I meant the H-bomb because it is my understanding that the Atomic Energy
Commission has detected evidence of a thermonuclear explosion in Russia.
Dr. EVANS. Thank you.
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Is it unclassified to say when?
Mr. BECKERLEY. It was announced.
The WITNESS. It was announced.
Mr. GARRISON. When was it announced?
Mr. BECKERLEY. August 1953.
The WITNESS. That is, of course, the time this was being discussed. What I
was referring to was also after. I was saying that the continental defense now
that is going ahead was even more important because of the thermonuclear ex-
plosion by Russia in 1953.
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. I think when I was asking you about your opinions regarding Dr. Oppen-
heimer's loyalty, when I put to you a very long question about the Chevalier
incident, I also asked you to assume that all the derogatory information in the
December 23 letter of the Commission was true, leaving aside the items about
the H-bomb, and you answered the question leaving aside the items about the
H-bomb.
I just wanted to make sure— and I think it is probably sure by now, but perhaps
not— that with respect to the items of information about the H-bomb in the
Commission's letter, do you have any opinion with regard to those particular
items?
A. Yes. In the first place, I think
Q. Let me refer to it a little more explicitly. What I have reference to are
the suggestions that Dr. Oppenheimer
A. May I refer to a copy of that letter?
Mr. ROBB. Surely.
By Mr. GARRISON:
Q. He caused to be distributed and so forth, copies of the report, that he dis-
couraged people from working on the project, and that he delayed the production
of the work on the bomb. I am paraphrasing it. You have the exact language
there.
A. In the first part of this paragraph, which is on page 6 of the original
letter, the paragraph starting, "It was reported that in 1945, you expressed the
view" and so on, certain statements are made about Dr. Oppenheimer's opinion
on the feasibility and desirability of an H-bomb program.
Q. What I have reference to are the reports at the top of page 7.
A. I would like to make a report about the first part.
First, it seems to me that those statements about his opinions, even insofar
as they are true, could perfectly possibly and indeed I believe were the opinions
of a perfectly loyal American seeking to increase and not decrease the military
establishment of his country.
"Further reported that even after it was determined as a matter of national
policy to proceed with the development of a hydrogen bomb, you continued to
oppose the project and not cooperate fully in the project."
To the best of my knowledge that statement was false. "It was reported that
you departed from your proper role in the distribution of the reports of the
General Advisory Committee for the purpose of trying to turn such top personnel
against the development of the hydrogen bomb." To the best of my knowledge
that is false.
I Wnfc it is quite probable that copies of GAC reports did reach the top people
of Los Alamos as all our reports did by normal channels, but that the chairman
of the committee departed from his proper role or did this with the purpose of
trying to turn personnel against the hydrogen bomb is in my opinion false.
"It was further reported that you were instrumental in persuading other out-
standing scientists not to work on the hydrogen project, and your opposition to
the hydrogen bomb of which you are the most experienced and most powerful
has definitely slowed down its development," that is also false. Quite the con-
trary, I believe Dr. Oppenheimer's efforts and the efforts of the GAC were in-
tended solely to improve the position of this country, with no other objective,
purpose or result.
Mr. GARRISON. That is all.
534
RE-CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Just to have the record clear, what you have done is to give your opinions
without knowing definitely the facts?
A. I said to the best of my knowledge in each case.
Mr. ROBB. Thank you.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Dr. DuBridge.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GRAY. We are in recess until 9 : 30 tomorrow morning.
(Thereupon at 6: 10 p. m., a recess was taken until Friday, April 23, 1954, at
9:30 a. m.)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER or J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
BUILDING T-3, ROOM 2022,
Washington D. tf., Friday ', April £3, 1
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to recess,
before the board, at 9 : 30 a. m.
Personnel Security Board : Mr. Gordon Gray, chairman; Dr. Ward
V. Evans, member; and Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Roger Robb and C. A. Rolander, Jr., counsel for the
board; J. Robert Oppenheimer, Lloyd K Garrison, Samuel J. Silver-
man, and Allan B. Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer; Herbert
S. Marks, cocounsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
(535)
PKOCEEDINGS
Mr. GRAY. The proceeding will begin.
I suggest we open the proceedings with your request or statement, Mr. Gar-
rison.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, I was informed by you yesterday afternoon
that some witnesses would be called this coming week by the board. I had
assumed from prior discussions that we would be informed of the names of
these witnesses, but whether or not that assumption was correct I asked you
at the close of the session yesterday for the names of the respective witnesses
in order that we might have time to prepare for cross examination, if cross
examination seemed to be indicated with respect to one or more of them.
I would like to state very briefly the reasons why it seemed to me this request
is a proper one to make on behalf of Dr. Oppenheimer.
The purpose of this inquiry which is not a trial is to arrive at the truth as
nearly as truth can be arrived at. I don't think it takes any argument to point
out that cross examination is one of the ways of bringing out the truth. I
appreciate fully that there is no question here of denying the right of cross
examination, but there is, as I am sure the board knows, oftentimes a need
of preparation in cases where there may be an element of surprise in the calling
of a witness, or in cases where a witness who one might perhaps think it possible
the board might call we would know in advance would require a great deal of
preparation, and in the press of other work, we would not want to undertake that
uselessly if the person were not to be called. But in the main it is to have an
opportunity to consider who is going to be called and to inform ourselves as to
what we need to do. a ^ ^
With respect to ou,r own witnesses, we have I think from the very first day,
and from time to time gladly' supplied the board with a list of people whom we
expected to call. There have been changes in the schedule. Some inevitable
additions and some who could not make it because of conflict of things and
so forth, but in general I have tried to keep the board as accurately informed
as I could.
It is quite clear that in the case of at least some of these witnesses substan-
tial preparation for cross examination was made ahead of time and in the case
of several others opportunity was had for the representatives of the board
to discuss matters with these witnesses themselves, a process to which we had
not the slightest objection at all. ^ mj_
Now, it seems to me that the same kind of notice and the same opportunity
for preparaition both in fairness to Dr. Oppenheimer and in the interest of
developing the true state of affairs be accorded to Dr. Oppenheimer.
Therefore, on his behalf I request that we be informed of the witnesses whom
the board proposes to calL
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, unless ordered to do so by the board, we shall not
disclose to Mr. Garrison in advance the names of the witnesses we contemplate
calling.
I should like briefly to state the reasons which compel me to this conclusion
in the very best of spirit, and I am sure Mr. Garrison will take it that wafr.
In the first place, I might say, Mr. Chairman, that from the very inception
of this proceeding, I think Dr. Oppenheimer has had every possible consideration.
Going back to December, subsequent to the receipt by him of the letter from
General Nichols, the time for his answer to be sent in was extended several
times at his request, and without any objection whatever, because it was thought
that was a reasonable request.
At the proceedings before this board, I am sure the record will show that the
board has extended every courtesy and consideration to Dr. Qppenheimer and
his witnesses. The board has permitted the testimony of several witnesses to
be interrupted in order that others might be called to suit their convenience.
The board has sat long hours for that purpose. One evening, as I recall, we
sat until 7:45, and I cross examined the witness for the last 2 hours of that
(537)
538
session. On one occasion we adjourned early so that Mr. Garrison might confer
with his client with a view to putting him on for redirect examination.
Counsel has made no objection to any questions, although I say frankly that
some questions might have been objectionable, but witnesses have been permitted
to argue from the witness stand without objection, and tell the board in rather
forceful terms about what the board ought to do about the problem, without
objection.
Mr. Rolander has worked late at night and on Saturday and Sunday in order
to get the record in shape so that it might be taken by Mr. Garrison and his
associates.
I mention all these things, Mr. Chairman, only to illustrate what I think the
record abundantly shows, which is every effort has been made to make this a
full and a fair hearing, and to accord Dr. Oppenheimer every right, and I am
sure that has been done.
Mr. Chairman, the public has an interest in this proceeding also, and of
course the public has rights which must be looked out for. In my opinion, and
it is a very firm opinion, the public interest requires that these witnesses be not
identified in advance. I will say frankly that I apprehend, and I think reason-
ably apprehend, that should that be done, the names of these witnesses would
leak, and the result then would be the embarrassment and the pressure of
publicity.
I think furthermore, and I will be frank about it, that in the event that any
witnesses from the scientific world should be called, they would be subject to
pressure. They would be told within 24 hours by some friends or colleagues
what they should or should not say. I say specifically and emphatically I am
not suggesting that would be done by Dr. Oppenheimer, his counsel or anybody
representing him. But I think the record abundantly shows here the intense
feeling which this matter has generated in the scientific world. I think it per-
fectly reasonable to believe that should there appear here today that Scientist
Y was to testify, inside of 24 hours that man would be subject to all sorts of
pressure.
Now, Mr. Garrison has said there would be no leak. Perhaps so, Mr. Chair-
man, but the New York Times of the day after this hearing began, and the
column which appeared in the Washington Post this morning do not lead me to
rely with any great assurance upon any such statements. I think it would be a
serious danger that the orderly presentation of testimony, the truthful presenta-
tion of testimony would be impeded were these witnesses to be identified.
Mr. Garrison speaks of the preparation for cross examination. In the first
place, I didn't ask Mr. Garrison for the names of his witnesses in advance. It
was entirely immaterial to me whether he gave them to me or not. We talked,
of course, to General Groves, Mr. Lansdale— I think that is all of the witnesses—-
because both of them wanted to look at the files to refresh their recollection.
Most of the witnesses who were called here I never saw before in my life.
I will let Mr. Garrison in on a little trade secret In the case of almost all of
the witnesses, my only advance preparation for cross examination was a thorough
knowledge of this case. I am sure that Mr. Garrison has an equally thorough
knowledge of the case. He has been working on it, I am sure, as long as I have.
He has the assistance of Dr. Oppenheimer. Dr. Oppenheimer is the one man
in the world who knows the most about Dr. Oppenheimer, his life, and his works.
He also knows as much, I think, as anybody else about the subject of nuclear
physics, which has been under discussion.
Mr. Garrison also has the assistance of three able counsel in this room, and I
believe one other lawyer who is reading the transcript and making a digest of it
for him.
As for surprise, I am sure any witness who testifies here within the scope of
the issues of this case will not be unfamiliar to Mr. Garrison, nor will the subject
matter of his testimony be unfamiliar to Mr. Garrison.
I am sure Mr. Garrison can do just as well as I did, however well that may
have been. Maybe he wants to do-better, if he can, fine.
Mr. Chairman, to sum up, my position is simply dictated by the public interest
which I think would not be served by a disclosure in advance of the names of
these witnesses for the reasons I have stated. I think that fairness to Dr.
Oppenheimer does not require such a disclosure.
Mr. GBA.T. Do you care to respond to any of that?
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to make an argument. I just
want to make one or two observations.
539
First, with regard to the procedure of the board, the only thing that I have
objected to that I still regard with all due respect as not in keeping with the
spirit of the regulations is the questioning of witnesses, particularly Dr. Oppen-
heimer, as to their recollection of things past when the Government had in its
possession papers, some of them taken in Dr. Oppenheimer's case from his own
file as classified, and then declassified and read to him after the questions had
been put in a way that could be calculated to make the witness appear in as poor
a light as possible. The sort of thing I can make no objection to on orthodox
legal rules of trial behavior in a court room, but which seem to me not appropriate
here. I simply have to say that lest by silence I seem to acquiesce.
I also might say that in a court room that state of affairs can scarcely arise
because of the nature of the documents and the source from which they came
in this case. So it is perhaps an altogether novel situation and all the more I
think not in keeping in the spirit of inquiry as distinct from a trial.
Now, with respect to leaks, I think all of us have done what we can to prevent
them. I know we have. I have not seen the column in the Washington Post
this morning. I have not read it. I have heard of it. I understand it is
something to do with General Osborne's testimony and stated in quite an
erroneous fashion, in a way that certainly could not have been nut out by any-
body connected with Dr. Oppenheimer in any way.
It was also stated in that column that Dr. Oppenheimer's representatives are
not available to the press, which is certainly the case as far as giving out of
information is concerned. I think the only actual leak that is difficult to explain
about these proceedings since we began was Jerry Green's column about the
Condon letters published actually the night before they were produced in evi-
dence here, a statement about which on information which only could come from
somewhere within the Government
If it be the conclusion of the chair that in the light of this discussion the
names of witnesses should still be withheld, I would then— perhaps I should ask
the chair to first rule on that, and then make another request if I need to.
Mr. ROBB. I have nothing more to say, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. I can respond on behalf of the board, because we have had some
discussion of it this morning. I am going to advert to several things that
counsel said here, so my statement may be in the nature of random observations
in part.
I think that since the column in the Washington Post it has become a matter
of this record in fairness to the chief counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer, it should
be said that he has been hard to get hold of, specifically by name, and I am
sure that is correct
With respect to a reference to the Condon letters, it was my recollection
that we had a Condon letter in this record. I didn't know there was more than
one letter that appeared in this record. I suppose, however, that is not too
material because I am quite convinced in my mind that nobody connected with
this proceeding released those communications to anybody.
I might say the reason I am confident is that if for example the counsel for
the Government and the board were interested in releasing information to the
press which would be detrimental to Dr. Oppenheimer, I would not guess that
the Condon letters referred to would be perhaps the most significant material
for that purpose.
Now, it is true, Mr. Garrison, that you have at all times attempted to keep
the board and Mr. Robb informed as to your general course of action with
respect to witnesses. It is a courtesy which has been appreciated. It was
not something that was required by the board.
I would like to say a little bit about this matter of calling witnesses. In our
earlier discussion, I think I have loosely used the phrase witnesses to be called
by the board. Actually I don't think at this moment that the board intends
to call any witnesses, I do not consider that we have called those who have
testified to this point, and the witnesses whom Mr. Robb will examine in direct
examination will be called by him. For that purpose, this board considers
you the attorney for Dr. Oppenheimer, Mr. Robb the attorney for the Atomic
Energy Commission. He was appointed by the Atomic Energy Commission, as
I understand it
The board would be very much concerned if Dr. Oppenheimer's interests were
in any way adversely affected by anything in the nature of surprise. I would
guess from what Mr. Robb has told me that there probably will not be an element
of surprise in the sense that we have in mind in this discussion. If, however,
there is, the board will wish to he informed hy counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer,
540
and can give you assurance on behalf of the board that we will so conduct the
proceeding that any disadvantage to Dr. Oppenheimer by reason of surprise aa
may be related to cross examination may not continue.
The board is interested in developing the facts, and if you are unable under the
circumstances to perform your functions — very important functions — as counsel
for Dr. Oppenheimer, we want to hear about it, and take the necessary steps.
The proceedings under which we operate, which are familiar to you, I know,
require that the boasd conduct the proceedings in a way which will protect the
interests of the individual and of the Government The representettve of the
Government in this case feels with some conviction 'that the interests of the
Government could possibly be prejudiced by furnishing a list of witnesses at
this time.
My ruling after consultation with the board is that Mr. Kobb will not be
ordered by the board to furnish these names. I couple to that ruling .however,
a repeated assurance that we wish to hear you at any time that you think you
are at a disadvantage by not having had the names of the witnesses.
I would make one further observation, and that is in preparation for any cross
examination* no attorney— or it is a very rare thing if an attorney knows what
the testimony on direct examination is going to be. I suspect we have had so
•much of a record in this case that there is hardly anything that might be in any
way related to it that has not been in some way discussed in this hearing.
I have one other observation. You have expressed unhappiness with the
cross examination of witnesses, particularly of Dr. Oppenheimer. I hope that it
will be unnecessary to say to you, Mr. Garrison, that the members of this board,
with the exception of a very brief period one afternoon when Mr. Morgan was
unavoidably absent, have heard all of the testimony, the circumstances under
which it has been given, the board will have available to it therefore not only
the transcript, but a very vivid recollection of the circumstances under which
the testimony was given. Without in any way making any observation about
the merits of this suggestion you have made about the manner of examination,
certainly the board will consider what has been adduced here, and not be
particularly impressed, for example, with the fact that a witness failed to
recollect a meeting or writing a letter or something of that sort. I think we
will try to consider these things in balance and perspective.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, may I say one further thing?
Mr. GRAY. Yes, sir.
Mr. ROBB. Lest my silence be misinterpreted, I wish to say that nobody con-
nected with the Commission, as far as I know, had the- slightest thing to do
with the release of the so-called Condon letter. I think it is quite apparent
on the face of the news story that it came from some other department of
the Government.
Mr. GRAY. Or perhaps some other branch.
Mr. ROBB. Some other branch of the Government is what I meant; yes, sir.
Mr. GARRISON. I think on that counsel on that occasion referred to Mr. Green
as perhaps clairvoyant
Mr. CHAIRMAN. May I make a final observation?
Mr. GRAY. Yes, you may.
Mr. GARRISON. I want to thank you for the courtesy with which this pro-
ceeding has been uniformly conductd. I know the spirit of fairness which
animates the members of the board. What you have said about considering
any request we might make for time to prepare for cross-examination if we
were disadvantaged by the calling of some particular witness meets what I
was going to say after the chairman had made his ruling.
I just feel I must make one comment, not in criticism of the board, but with
respect to the procedure. The notion that counsel for the Commission is to
call his own witnesses in a proceeding which therefore takes on the appearance
of an adversary proceeding with the board sitting as judges, and counsel for
the Government on the one hand, and counsel for the employee on the other,
is not quite a true picture of the actual shape of affairs. Unlike in an ordinary
adversary proceeding before a judge in a courtroom, counsel here is possessed
of documents taken from Dr. Oppenhetmer's files in some cases which we have
no opportunity to see in advance of their reading, and all the rest of which
we have no opportunity ever to see.
It differs further in that the board Itself is in possession of all these docu-
ments which It has had a week's opportunity to examine before the hearing
began. This, then is not like an ordinary adversary proceeding. This is
what we have to bear, Mr, Chairman. I am sure the board is aware of the
541
problem that this presents to a person whose whole career and In a way his
whole life is at stake.
I think I have no more to say.
Mr. GRAY. Let me make one further comment. I am sure all members of
the board are aware of the difficulties involved for Dr. Oppenheimer. The board
is certainly aware of the agonized character of these proceedings as far as
Dr. Oppenheimer is concerned. This is not for any of us involved a pleasant
kind of task. We are sympathetic to the difficulties. Some of these are inherent
difficulties. I am sure we would all agree as to that.
I should explain further the view, so far as I know now, that witnesses will
be called by counsel. First of all, I think it would be unreasonable to suppose
that you would call witnesses for Dr. Oppenheimer who would do other than
support his position and him as an individual. There obviously is division of
opinion with respect to this matter or it would not be before us. Certainly
the board must hear from people who may be in disagreement, perhaps, or who
can shed further light beyond that thrown on the matter by representatives
of Dr. Oppenheimer.
I am very anxious that it not appear that this board has called any witness
as a board witness who had come here in a sense on behalf of prosecution. This
is why I am making this distinction.
I think I should further say that if you read the regulations, the board does
have power to call witnesses. We interpret that this way. It is conceivable
that a witness who might normally be expected to testify for Dr. Oppenheimer
would not be called by you. I am sure this is not the situation but my illustra-
tion could well be Mrs. Oppenheimer. I take it under these proceedings the
board would have the power to call Mrs. Oppenheimer.
On the other hand, it is conceivable that there might be someone identified
with the Atomic Energy Commission in an official capacity who would not be
called by Mr. Bobb, or whom the Atomic Energy Commission might not wish
to be called. In that event, I take it that this board has the power to say
we must hear from that witness.
I know of no such situation and that is why I have said at this point that
the board would not call any witnesses and that is why I distinguish the matter
of the development of opposed views in these matters.
I invite any further comment from counsel.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, we welcome the calling of witnesses either by
the board or Mr. Robb or both to the extent that they can throw light upon
the problem before the board. We feel rather relieved in fact that this is to
be done, because I think it will bring out what we are confident will be the
true situation, which we believe to be one which would lead to a sound con-
clusion here regarding Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance.
With respect to Mrs. Oppenheimer, we, of course, expected to call her as a
witness and are expecting to put her on Monday morning — put her on is not the
phrase— invite her to testify on Monday. She came as the board will recall on
the first day on crutches as a result of a broken ankle, and she subsequently has
had what appears to have been a case of German measles. But she is now all
right and will testify, barring accidents, on Monday.
Mr. GRAY. Of course, we should be glad to hear from her. I knew it had
been your intention to bring Mrs. Oppenheimer before the board, and that is
why I used this as an illustration, because I am sure it would not develop into
the kind of situation I described.
Mr. GARRISON. I would like to put one question to Mr. Robb. In the New
York Journal American of last week— I am sorry I don't have the clipping, and
this is Just by hearsay — I am informed in Howard Rushmore's column last
week Mr. and Mrs. Crouch were quoted as saying that they had been told that
they would be called here as witnesses. I wonder of counsel could give me
any information pertaining to that
Mr. ROBB. I didn't see the column and don't know anything about it, Mr.
Garrison, so I don't think I should comment on it. I am not responsible for
what somebody writes in New York. I don't know anything about it
Mr. GARRISON. I understand that. Could you say within the keeping of the
chairman's ruling whether or not you expect to call them, because there is a
great labor of preparation there.
Mr. ROBB. It is rather difficult to say at this time, because I don't know what
is going to develop here from here on, Mr. Garrison. I would just rather not
comment at this time.
Mr, GARRISON. There is not any notion that physicists would pressure on the
Crouches?
542
Mr. ROBB. Not a bit, no, sir.
Mr. GARRISON. Is there any reason why we should not be informed if they
are to be called?
Mr. ROBB. If they are or if they are not.
Mr. GARRISON. Either way. If they are not, it will relieve us of a considerable
amount of unnecessary work. If they are, we should have time to prepare
for it.
Mr. GBAT. I would like to make an observation about that particular request
The board felt that Mr. Hobb's point about some of these witnesses was well
taken and that is why we gave the ruling we did. I don't see, Mr. Robb, why
in this case you can't.
Mr. ROBB. I don't either. I will say that is a reasonable request. No, I
have no intention at this time of calling Mr. or Mrs. Crouch. I will tell you
that frankly. But as you realize, I can't project myself into the middle of
next week. I don't know what will develop.
Mr. GARRISON. I assume if you change your intention you will notify us?
Mr. ROBB, I will do so, yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Garrison, do you have a witness?
Mr. GARRISON. Tes.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Winne, do you care to testify under oath? You are not re-
quired to do so.
Mr. WINNE. I would be glad to testify under oath, Mr. Gray.
Mr. GRAY. Would you stand and raise your right hand, please?
Mr. WINNE. Harry Alonzo Winne.
Mr. GRAY. Harry Alonzo Winne, do you swear that the testimony you are
to give the board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth
so help you God ? '
Mr. WINNE. I do.
Whereupon, Harry Alonzo Winne was called as a witness, and having been
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Would you be seated, please, sir, and indulge me while I remind
you of the existence of the perjury statutes. I should be glad to discuss them
with you, but may I assume you know about them?
te?16 WlTNESS- I know th€re are sucl1 tkfcss- I don't know the details, but
Mr. GRAY. I should like to request, Mr, Winne, that if in the course of your
testimony it becomes necessary to refer to or disclose restricted data, you notify
me in advance so that we may take certain steps which are appropriate and
necessary ?
The WITNESS. Tes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Finally, I should like to say to you that the board treats these
proceedings as confidential matter between the Commission and its oflK
?£>^£ne *£!* nnd Df * OppenMnw and his representatives and witnessed on
the other. The Commission will make no release of matter with resDect to
fcr^^' * ?D **?* of *» Boapd " is ^ custom to
to each witness that he or she will take the same view.
The WITNESS. I so understand and I agree, Mr. Gray
J*™,?*^1 ***? say we had some tocu*sion before you came in on pro-
cedural matters, and somehow there crept into the record a conversation &bmTt
trt^^JKE^ *J*e Was*»*t<* Port o£ ftiSSKSS I
and which said that the board is demanding secrecy The board desire T
* rmind you
TheWrrKEss. Surely.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Marks.
By Mr. MARKS: DlBECT
9" Jk- TOaae, what is your present position?
Te-tfmical Advteory Panel on Atomic Energy, inWthe Officl
Secretary of Defense for Research and Development.
543
Q. What was your professional career with the General Electric Company?
A. I started with General Electric as soon as I left college in 1910, and was with
General Electric until December 31, 1953, filling various positions on the way
up to becoming in 1941 vice president in charge of apparatus engineer, and then
in 1945 vice president in charge of engineering policy so-called, which was essen-
tially a coordinating and policy directing position for the engineering effort of
the company as a whole, which position I held under a slightly different title,
vice president, engineering, until November 1, 1953, when I was assigned to a
certain special problem, which I worked on until the end of the year.
I might mention also because I think it is pertinent here that during the war
years, starting with either the end of 1942 or early 1943, I devoted a good deal
of time to coordinating and directing in a general way the efforts of General
Electric Company in connection with the atomic energy program. The General
Electric Company produced a lot of equipment, particularly for the magnetic
separation process at Oak Ridge, and also the gaseous diffusion process at
Oak Ridge, with both of which I was quite familiar, spending a few days at
different times at Berkeley and some time at Oak Ridge.
Then in 1946, when General Electric took over the operation of the Hanford
Works, I was appointed chairman of the so-called nucleonics committee of the
company, which from that time for several years directed the general policy
and the operation of the company in the atomic energy field, that is, the opera-
tion of the Hanford Works, the construction and operation of what was called
the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory at Schenectady, and other activities in the
atomic energy field.
Q. I recall that last fall, I believe it was, you received some industrial award.
Can you remember what that was?
A. That was last summer. It was the so-called McGraw Award for men in
the electrical manufacturing industry, as distinguished from a similar award
for men in the utility industry, and so forth. I received the award for the
manufacturing man in the electrical industry last summer.
Q. When did you first know Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. To titie best of my knowledge, I first met him in Mr. Acheson's office, I think
in late January or early February of 1946, when I was asked to serve as one
member of the five-man board of consultants to the Assistant Secretary of
State's Committee on Atomic Energy in endeavoring to propose some plan for
international control of atomic energy.
Q. How well did you get to know him as a result of that, or other work?
A. I feel quite well, Mr. Marks, because during the period of discussion and
final drawing up of this plan for international control of atomic energy, that
board of consultants met almost continuously for about 8 weeks, I think it was,
except for weekends and even sometimes on weekends.
Q. How many hours a day did you work together on that?
A. Very often it was a matter of all day and dinner and evening, starting
at 8 : 30 or 9 o'clock in the morning. So I felt that during that experience I
got to know him, I feel, very welL
Since that time I have had— I can't state definitely Just how many contacts.
He and I were both members of the Committee on Atomic Energy of the Research
and Development Board, as I recall, starting in early with my membership in
early 1952, or possibly late in 1951.
Q. Research and Development Board of what agency?
A. I think it was called the Department of Defense at that time. Even prior
to that in connection with the activities of the MLC, the Military liaison Oom-
mittee — I was not a member of that committee — I was invited to make at least two
trips to the West Coast visiting various installations with that committee. It
started at the time that Donald Carpenter was chairman of the committee. My
contacts continued with it while Bill Webster was also chairman.
I remember one of the trips Karl Compton was along. On those trips— I don't
recall whether on every one— at least one I recall meeting Dr. Oppenheimer
at Berkeley and serving on a subcommittee of which he was chairman, which I
think was set up by Mr. Carpenter, although I am not absolutely sure of that,
to consider the matter of radiological warfare.
I visited Princeton once at least since his taking over the direction of the in-
stitute there It was a more or less social session of the members of the hoard
of consultants at the institute I suppose I have seen him 15 or 20 times, pos-
sibly more, since the days of the board of consultants.
I have visited at his home in Berkeley, I think, twice as a part of one of these
groups which were making these trips to the west coast, not privately, I mean,
S03S1S— 54 85
544
but as a group of several at a cocktail party or something of that nature at
his home in Berkeley. So as I say, I feel I know him quite well.
Q. The 15 or 20 times that you are speaking of, are those including the work
on the State Department board in 1946?
A. No, since that time.
Q. Have most of these occasions been social or have they been working re-
lations?
A. Xo, most of them have been in connection with work of the Committee on
Atomic Energy or as I say, the trips with the MLC, and so forth.
Q. Speaking in a very general way, with what subject has the work of this
Committee of the Research and Development Board been concerned?
A. Primarily with the use of atomic energy in military preparedness of the
country, both in the form of weapons and also of propulsion equipment of naval
vessels and aircraft.
Q. During the war, when you were working on aspects of the atomic energy
project in the Manhattan District, who were your contacts there?
A. During the war?
Q. Yes, at the time, who were your contacts with?
A From the Manhattan District General Groves, at that time Colonel
Nichols, Colonel Walter Williams, a few contacts with General Groves' prede-
cessor whose name I cannot recall at the moment, and then with the Kellex
Corp. people, Dobie Keith, Al Baker and others in connection with the gaseous
diffusion plant, and with Stone & Webster, A. C. Klein and others of that
organization, and the Carbide & Carbon people operating Oak Ridge — too
numerous to mention.
Q. If you happen to know, can you say who suggested your name for member-
ship on the Board of Consultants to the State Department on international con-
trol of atomic energy in 1946?
A. I do not know. I have always suspected that General Groves is the one
who suggested it, because I did not know Mr. Acheson or Mr. Byrnes, nor the
other members of the State Department's Committee on Atomic Energy at that
time. So I have always suspected General Groves did, but I do not know that.
Q. In your work on that committee, concerned with the problem of interna-
tional control of atomic energy, what was your major worry about or what coun-
try or what countries?
A. Our major consideration, of course, was the protection of the United States,
that is, of devising a scheme of control of atomic energy which would ultimately,
we hoped, prevent the use of atomic bombs and might lead to — this may have
been wishful thinking—abolition of warfare entirely, but always without sacrific-
ing the protection of the United States.
Q. In those deliberations and in that work, what was your attitude, and if
you can say, what was the attitude of your colleagues about Russia?
A. I think I can say we looked upon Russia as the most probable enemy of the
United States. We looked upon her as the country which would be working
hardest on trying to produce atomic weapons. I think none of us foresaw that
she would produce these as early as ultimately turned out to be the case. We
had hopes— again this as it turned out was probably wishful thinking— that
Russia might be willing to go along with tne plan which we ultimately evolved
and succeeded.
Q. What did you think of the efficacy of that plan as a measure of protec-
tion for the United States?
A. We thought it was the best we could devise. We recognized that the de-
tection of possible operations in the production of atomic weapons would at best
be difficult, but we thought that the plan which we finally evolved could suc-
cessfully do that
Q. What part did the respective members of that board play, you and your
four colleagues, in the development of the plan that you ultimately recom-
mended?
A. That is a difficult question to answer, because there was so much back
and forth discussion and give and take. I think that the germ of the idea—
the first suggestion of the idea of the international development authority came
from Dr. Charles Thomas, who is now president of Monsanto Chemical Company.
We were all searching for some method which would not forestall the peaceful
development of atomic energy and of the use of atomic energy which I felt was so
rery important. You may remember that in the early stages of the discussion,
someone suggested that perhaps the only thing to do was to stop all work en-
tirely. That the only hope for preventing the use of atomic weapons in war-
fare— r
545
Q. Did Dr. Oppenlieimer suggest that?
A. No, I think that was Mr. Lilienthal. I said if that was tne aim or tne
board of consultants, this was no place for me, because I thought that the de-
velopment had to go forward. We had to devise, if possible, some moans for con-
trolling the development in such a way as to prevent the use of atomic energy for
weapons.
Mr. GRAY. I am sorry. May I ask you to repeat that suggestion that Mr.
Ldlienthai made? My attention wandered for a moment, Mr. Winne.
The WITNESS. As I recall it, this was in the first 1 or 2 days of our discussion,
and we were all of us somewhat appalled by the immensity of the problem which
we faced in trying to arrive at some solution to this question. Mr. Lilienthal
suggested — I am not sure that it was 100 percent serious, but perhaps in partly
a joking tone— maybe the only recommendation we could come up with would
be to outlaw all development in atomic energy. The only way we couhl hope to
prevent the use of it in warfare was that. I recall I spoke up and said if that was
to be our objective this was no place for me, because I wanted to see atomic
energy developed for peacetime industrial use, primarily.
By Mr. MAEKS :
Q. What view ultimately prevailed in the formulation of the report after
the 2 months or whatever it was of deliberations and discussion °i
A. The view that peacetime development should go forward and that we
should set up, as you will recall from the report, this atomic development au-
thority, which could exercise enough supervision to prevent the use of atomic
energy in weapons, or at least to give forewarning to ail nations in case any
nation undertook the development or the manufacture of atomic weapons.
Q. When you say forewarning, what do you mean by that?
A. I mean we felt that the conversion from peacetime development to the
production of actual weapons would take a certain amount of time measured
in months, at least, and that the authority could be aware of this reasonably
soon after it was undertaken by any nation, and could thereby warn the other
nations of the United Nations community that such and such a nation was in
effect abrogating the pact, and going ahead with the development of weapons
so that the other nations could, if they desired, do likewise.
Q. What gave you any hope that under the plan you devised, the international
authority of which you speak, would have had early enough warning of sin-
ister developments in Russia or other countries?
A. We felt that it was absolutely necessary that all countries be open to in-
spection by this international authority, inspection which would be broad enough
to permit the detection of supposedly clandestine operations in the production
of atomic weapons.
Q. In the later deliberations in which you participated with Dr. Oppenheimer
on the Atomic Energy Subcommittee of EBB, to what, if any, extent did prob-
lems concerned with the potential menace of Russia enter into your consid-
erations?
A. I would say to a great extent. Always in the backs of our minds and fre-
quently in the discussion was the question as to what Russia was doing, what
her atomic stockpile might amount to, and as to when she might start a war in
which atomic weapons would probably be used. That was always one of the
main considerations which guided our discussion, and thinking. It may be well
to state that on this committee there were not only civilian members, such as
Dr. Bacher, who was chairman, Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr. Bethe, Mr. William
Hosf ord, formerly vice president of Western Electric— I don't remember if there
were other civilians— but there were also representatives of each of the armed
services. General Yates of the Air Force, Admiral Withington and later Ad-
miral Wright of the Navy, and General— I can't think of his name, from the Army,
but usually two representatives from each of the services. So military con-
siderations were the prime matters which we were discussing of course.
Q. In the course of these working relations and other relations you had with
Dr. Oppenheimer, did you form any opinion about his loyalty to the United
States, and his character?
A. Yes; very definitely. I have no question at all as to his loyalty to the
United States. I think lie is a man of high character. I have great respect
and admiration for him.
Q. What led you to this opinion?
A. I can't cite specific instances, but his discussion, Ms remarks during the
deliberations of first the board of consultants in 1946, and at later meetings of
the Committee on Atomic Energy. As I say, I can't specify remarla, specify
546
comments, but there just developed within me a conviction as to his great concern
for our country and his loyalty to it, his great concern for the safety of our
country,
Q. What, if any, attitude did you observe with respect to Russia?
A. The feeling that Russia is the country which we have to guard against,
a country maybe certainly our enemy and maybe the one to start a war against
us, and one against which we must be on our guard at all times.
Q. When did you first form this impression?
A. I can't cite any particular date or time. It gradually developed.
Q. 1946, 1947?
A. It developed in the days of our board of consultants meetings in 1946, Mr.
Marks, and, has, if anything, been strengthening since that time.
Q. Mr. Winne, have you read the letter of December 23, 1953, from General
Nichols to Dr. Oppenheimer, which is the genesis of these proceedings?
A. As it appeared in the New York Times, yes; and then I again glanced
through it this morning, or rather the copy which you have, and which you left
with me as you came in here.
Q. Placing to one side the statements in that letter relating to the subject of
the so-called hydrogen bomb and assuming that the derogatory information other-
wise— and I am asking you only to assume not to consider whether it has been
established in this proceeding that it is true or not — assuming that it is essen-
tially true, the derogatory information other than that concerning the hydrogen
bomb, what effect does that have on the conviction you have expressed with
respect to Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty and character?
A. I am still convinced of his loyalty to the United States and of his char-
acter. I am glad you said placing to one side the statements with reference
to the hydrogen bomb. I have no objection to the first part of the statement
with reference to the hydrogen bomb, but if it should be true that he really
worked against the development of the hydrogen bomb, which I do not believe,
after the President had decided to go ahead with it, that I could not understand.
If that proved to be true, it would bother me a great deal.
The statements to the effect that he was opposed to the development before
the President decided to go ahead with it do not bother me particularly, and it
may be well that I state here that in the early days in the talk about the
hydrogen bomb I personally had grave misgivings as to whether it was wise at
that time to go ahead with that development. Those misgivings were based on
two factors. One, that the development of the hydrogen bomb at 'that time,
it seemed to me, would detract from what we might term our atomic capability
because the development of one important ingredient would reduce
Q. What do you mean by ingredient, if you can describe it in unclassified
terms?
A. I don't know whether this is classified or unclassified.
Q. Did yon mean a material?
A. A material, yes ; because the production of that one required material would
decrease the production of plutonium for the atomic bombs. Of course, as I say,
this was several years ago and presumably our stockpile of atomic bombs at that
time was not nearly so great as it is now. I knew from our operations at
Hanford that the production of this material would make serious inroads on
the production of plutonium.
So that raised the question as to whether it was desirable to go ahead with
It at that time. It would also require the time and attention of a great many
physicists and engineers.
Then I also had this question as to its military usefulness as compared to the
atomic bombs ; that is, whether a sufficient number of targets which would Justify
the use of so powerful a weapon as the hydrogen bomb. Two, even if there were
it seemed to me that there was a good possibility that it might be better to attack
with, sa/» 25 Planes, each carrying^and I use 25 to pull a number out of the hat,
l«S££ £* £?' i°S.'^.v^r€ach carryinS * °r possibly 2 atomic bombs, or to
attempt to attack it with 1 or 2 planes each carrying a hydrogen bomb.
It seemed to me that the chances that a considerable number of the atomic bomb
carrying planes would get through were so much greater than the chance that
iSiS^S^ h5fl«*«ft *>om|>s would get through, that the effectiveness of the
bombs might be considerably *-**
547
A. I don't know. It was probably somewhere around 19oO or 1031. I don't
know the exact date, Mr. Marks, but in discussing it with Ernest Lawrence, I
mentioned these misgivings. When I first said that I had some misgivings as to
whether it was wise to go ahead with the hydrogen bomb development, he ex-
pressed surprise. Then when I explained why, he said, "Oh, you mean that." He
said, "I thought perhaps you mi^ht have the ethical or moral misgivings that some
people have." I said, no, I did not, that it was entirely on a practical basis.
As I say, I had those same misgivings. Developments have, I think, shown
that those misgivings were pretty largely unfounded, because at Hanford we
have been able, as has been told publicly, to so greatly increase the production
of plutonium from the piles which when we took over were supposed to be about
ready to quit, that the production of the material for the hydrogen bomb has
not seriously interfered with the production of sufficient plutonium. The costs
in the equivalent of atom bombs have proven to be much lower. So that the
program on the hydrogen bomb is working out much better than I had expected
it would. I think that is true of many people. Many people thought at that
time that it was going to make serious inroads in the production of atomic
bombs, and that the hydrogen bombs would be extremely expensive. Of course,
they are expensive in any ordinary terms.
Q. At the time you speak of, whether it was in 1950 or 1951
A. It could have been in 1949. I don't remember, Mr. Marks. But I recall
distinctly the conversation. I have seen Ernest Lawrence many times, and I
can't tell you which time it was.
Q. At the time you speak of, what if any responsibility did you personally
have for the operation at Hanford?
A. I was at that time still chairman of the nucleonics committee of the Gen-
eral Electric Co., which was the policy setting committee for all of our operations
In the atomic energy field. As such I held a very real responsibility for the
Hanford Works. In fact, at the particular time that the hydrogen bomb or
that we began to produce at Hanford material for the hydrogen bomb, our
organization had been changed somewhat so that the Hanford Works operation
reported through a vice president located there directly to me, whereas pre-
viously it had been a part of the chemical division of the General Electric Co.'s
operation, simply guided by the nucleonics committee. So I was pretty well
aware of what was going on at Hanford and what the changes in production
might be.
Q. In describing your misgivings that you held and you expressed you say to
Dr. Lawrence about proceeding with the hydrogen bomb program, misgivings
relating to the possible inroads that such a program might make on production
of materials needed for A bombs, I think you said you were thinking particularly
about production at Hanford.
A. Production at Hanford and the military usefulness of the hydrogen bomb.
Q. I think you said it turned out that production at Hanford for atomic
bombs did not in fact suffer?
A. To say that it did not suffer is probably a correct statement, because had
we not produced some material for hydrogen bombs, we would have produced
more plutonium. But even with producing the material for the hydrogen bombs,
we had increased the production of plutonium to such a great extent that the
atomic bomb production was maintained at a very high rate.
Q. Hod did you bring that about to the extent that you can say in unclassified
terms?
A. Of course, there are a tremendous amount of technical details, most of
which are classified, covering the changes in operations which we made there
which enabled us to step up the production of the existing piles very materially,
and also to reduce the cost of the operation.
Q. Why didn't you foresee that at the time you talked to Dr. Lawrence?
A. Those changes came along rather gradually, and it is not always possible
to foresee Just what can be done. As a matter of fact, as I say at the time when
we took over in 1946, it was thought that the piles would be out of commission
in a very few- years, and have to be completely replaced, whereas today they are
still running and producing at a very much higher rate.
Q. In general who had responsibility for bringing about the changes or im-
provements, whatever they were, at Hanford that enabled you to keep up your
production for A bombs in a manner that you had thought impossible or improb-
able if the H bomb program were adopted?
A. It was the General Electric Co. organization at Hanford primarily.
Q. You Just didn't foresee that would be possible?
A. That is right.
548
Q. Did the General Electric people who were responsible to you at Hanford
foresee it?
A. They may have foreseen more of it than I did, because they were closer
to the job, but they were certainly not willing to go out on a limb and say that
the things which were accomplished would be accomplished. As I say, there
were gradual developments in the operation and whole technology of the pile
operation which permitted us to do that.
Q. I think you said that reading this letter from General Nichols and assum-
ing that the derogatory information, except for that part of it which you spe-
cifically excluded relating to the hydrogen bomb, relating to part of the informa-
tion, you said I think that would not alter the conviction you expressed with
respect to Dr. Oppenheimer's character and loyalty to the country?
A. That is true.
Q. General Nichols1 letter also speaks of a variety of associations which Dr.
Oppenheimer is said to have had with Communists, with left wing organizations,
with causes which have been identified with Communist objectives. How do
you reconcile your expression of confidence in Dr. Oppenheimer with this array
of associations?
A. I think Dr. Oppenheimer's reply explains those associations. It explains
how they developed and how he ultimately cast them off as he became more
acquainted with the aims and objectives of those associations, of the Com-
munist Party, of Russia. I think his subsequent efforts on behalf of the
country, his thinking and the discussions he participated in in the meetings
of the board of consultants of the Committee on Atomic Energy of the Research
and Development Board, indicate to me that he is completely free of perhaps
what you might call illusions or lack of understanding which he had in those
earlier days. I think they do not affect his basic loyalty to the country.
Q. Suppose it appeared in these proceedings that at least some of the associa-
tions referred in in the Nichols letter— or that some of the people referred to
about whom questions have arisen — were people that he still on occasion saw.
I think it appears in evidence here, or perhaps in the answer, I have forgotten
which, that as recently as last November in Paris, when Dr. Oppenheimer was
abroad, he saw at the request of his old friend Chevalier, he saw Chevalier.
Does that worry you?
A. No.
Q. Why?
A. I know nothing about the association between Dr. Oppenheimer and
Chevalier, excapt through what I read in these 2 letters, 1 from General
Nichols and 1 from Dr. Oppenheimer. But it appears that Chevalier was a
close friend of his in the early days at Berkeley, and even though Chevalier may
have been proved to be a Communist, and to have had the wrong kind of ideas,
shall we say, I would not hold it against Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty to the coun-
try at all, if he should, on Chevalier's request, see him to discuss whatever
Chevalier wished to discuss with him. I feel sure he would not have divulged
to Chevalier anything which would be inimical to the interests of this country.
Q. Do you think in making that determination of what would or would not
be inimical to the United States, Dr. Oppenheimer would make the decision on
the basis of his judgment or on the basis of the rules of the Government?
A. I think he would make it on the basis of the rules of the Government
insofar as the rules cover the situation. Beyond that he would use his own
judgment in which I would have confidence.
Q. Doesn't it worry you that a man who has as much classified information as
Dr. Oppenheimer would even see a person like Chevalier?
A. No, Mr. Marks, that does not worry me, because, as I say, I have confi-
dence in the loyalty and in his Judgment. His judgment in his younger days it
may be claimed, was faulty. Instead of Judgment, it may have been a lack of
understanding of these organizations and so forth. But from the period of
my knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer and my acquaintance with him, I have no
cause whatsoever to doubt his loyalty or his good judgment in political as well
as technical matters.
tJ*'^* ™ teke another case- I aave forgotten if there are more in either
the letter or the proceedings here, but one I remember is Dr. Morrison. Do
you know who he is?
£* ^ * faw* **o be Is because in connection with the board of con-
sultante in the early days of 1946, we visited several of the installations and I
remember meeting Dr. Morrison. I can't remember where, whether it -was at
Los Alamos or where, but I remember meeting him at that time.
549
Q, I think it has come out In congressional hearings that Dr. Morrison was
once a Communist. Would it bother you in the connection in which we have
been speaking if Dr. Oppenhein^er had seen Dr. Morrison in recent years?
A, No, it would not.
Q. I don't think his name has been mentioned in the Nichols letter, but I
think another name that has cropped out in these proceedings is that of a
Dr. Seber, at Columbia.
A. As far as I know, I don't know him at all.
Q. I would like to make sure that you have in mind the full imi»ort of some
of what appears to be the more important derogatory information in the Nichols
letter. I would like to read to you, in order to be sure that yon have it
vividly in mind, one paragraph of ihis letter, and then I would like to ask you
to make a comment.
In the letter that General Nichols sent to Dr. Oppenheimer, the following
appears :
"It was reported that prior to March 1, 1043, possibly 3 months prior, Peter
Ivanov, secretary of the Soviet Consulate, San Francisco, approached George
Charles Eltenton for the purpose of obtaining information regarding work
being done at the radiation laboratory for the use of Soviet scientists; that
George Charles Eltenton subsequently requested Haakon Chevalier to approach
you concerning this matter; that Haakon Chevalier thereupon approached
you, either directly or through your brother, Frank Friedman Oppenheimer,
in connection with this matter; and tht Haakon Chevalier finally advised
George Charles Eltenton that there was no chance whatsoever of obtaining
the information. It was further reported that you did not report this episode
to the appropriate authorities until several months after its occurrence; that
when you initially discussed this matter with the appropriate authorities on
August 26, 1943, you did not identify yourself as the person who had been
approached, and you refused to identify Haakon Chevalier as the individual
who had made the approach on behalf of George Charles Eltenton ; and that it
was not until several months later, when you were ordered by a superior to
do so, that you so identified Haakon Chevalier. It was further reported that
upon your return to Berkeley following your separation from the Los Alamos
project, you were visited by the Chevaliers on several occasions ; and that your
wife was in contact with Haakon and Barbara Chevalier in 1946 and 1947."
I would also like to read Dr. Oppenheimer's reference to this episode in his
answer on page 22 of the answer :
"I knew of no attempt to obtain secret information at Los Alamos. Prior to
my going there my friend Haakon Chevalier with his wife visited us on Eagle
Hill, probably in early 1943. During the visit, he came into the kitchen and told
me that George Eltenton had spoken to him of the possibility of transmitting
technical information to Soviet scientists. I made some strong remark to the
effect that this sounded terribly wrong to me. The discussion ended there.
Nothing in our long-standing friendship would have led me to believe that
Chevalier was actually seeking information ; and I was certain that he had no
idea of the work on which I was engaged.
"It has long been clear to me that I should have reported the incident at once.
The events that led me to report it— which I doubt ever would have become
known without my report— were unconnected with it. During the summer of
1943, Colonel Lansdale, the intelligence officer of the Manhattan District, came
to Los Alamos and told me that he was worried about the security situation
in Berkeley because of the activities of the Federation of Architects, Engineers,
Chemists, and Technicians. This recalled to my mind that Eltenton was a
member and probably a promoter of the FAECT. Shortly thereafter, I was in
Berkeley and I told the security officer that Eltenton would bear watching.
When asked why, I said that Eltenton had attempted, through intermediaries, to
approach people on the subject, though I mentioned neither myself nor Chevalier.
Later, when General Groves urged me to give the details, I told him of my
conversation with Chevalier. I still think of Chevalier as a friend."
Refreshing your mind about that incident, what effect does that have on your
opinion aftout Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. It does not change my opinion as to his basic loyalty to the country. I
think that had I been in his place, I would have reported the incident immediately
with the name, although one cannot at this date put himself back in the frame
of the situation as it existed in 1943, and say definitely what he would have done.
It seems to me that I would have reported it at that time.
550
As I say, it still does not affect my belief and my conviction in Dr. Oppen-
heimer's strong loyalty to our country. I think it was an error on his part not to
report it immediately with the full details, but all of us make mistakes at
some times.
Q. How does it affect your opinion about his character?
A. It does not affect that either. I still think his character is very high.
Q. As I recall, you said, Mr. Winne, that you are at present chairman of a
committee on atomic energy.
Q. It is a technical advisory panel on atomic energy in the Department of
Defense, reporting to Assistant Secretary Quarles. It, together with a so-called
coordinating committee made up — this is a civilian committee — there is also a
coordinating committee on atomic energy which is made up entirely of military
personnel which reports to Secretary Quarles. The panel of which I am chairman
Is purely advisory. We have no power whatsoever other than the power of facts
as we may develop them. It, together with that military committee, in effect
replaces the old Committee on Atomic Energy of the Research and Development
Hoard, of which Dr. Oppenheimer was a member at the time I became a member.
Incidentally, I would be very glad to have Dr. Oppenheimer as a member of
the panel today if he is cleared by this Board. I have that faith in his
loyalty to the country and his outstanding ability as a scientist, which needs
no testimony. We need that kind of people on such a panel.
Q. As chairman of that committee, do you feel any personal and official
responsibility?
A. Very, very definitely, responsibility to do everything we can to assist the
military organization of the country in developing the most effective use of
atomic energy for military purposes. Of course, incidentally, protecting the
interests of this country very fully from the standpoint of classified information
and so forth.
Q. Do you feel any responsibility in that capacity for the security of the
sensitive information that flows to you?
A. Very, very definitely. I feel a very high sense of responsibility.
Mr. MABKS. That is all, Mr. Robb.
Mr. GBAT. I am going to ask that we recess very briefly.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GBAY. Mr. Robb.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Mr. Winne, Mr. Marks read you two paragraphs from Dr. Oppenheimer's
answer and in particular one sentence which I will reread for clarity: "When
asked why, I said that Eltenton had attempted through intermediaries to
approach people on the project, though I mentioned neither myself nor
Chevalier."
Dr. Oppenheimer has testified before this board, sir, that what he said on
that occasion was in certain respects untrue; specifically, that he said that
there were three people who were approached whereas in fact there was only
one; that he reported that there had been conversation about microfilm with
Chevalier, whereas in fact there had not; that he reported that Chevalier
had spoken of making a contact through someone in the Russian consulate,
although in fact that was not true.
Does that disturb you, sir?
Mr. MABKS. Mr. Robb, would you mind if I ask you to identify the time at which
these statements that you described were made and to whom?
Mr. ROBB. I am talking about the occasion referred to in this letter when
Dr. Oppenheimer reported to the security officer about this episode with
Chevalier. In that interview he has testified before this board he made certain
misstatements of fact knowingly.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Does that disturb yon, sir.
A. It disturbs me to some extent that he should have done that at that time.
As I say, as I look at that incident I would have reported the whole thing
immediately and in the true aspects of it. I don't know why he did not He
has since in his letter admitted that he should have or thinks he should have.
It Is a rather disturbing incident, there is no question of that
But on the other hand from my almost living with him and the other members
of the panel for 8 weeks and quite a lot of contacts since in deliberations on
551
weapons and that sort of thing, I still have no question about his loyalty to
the country.
Q. Yes, sir; you speak of loyalty. Would the fact that he deliberately Hetl
to the security officer about this matter in certain respects in your opinion have
a very material bearing upon his character?
A. Obviously if a man deliberately lies it does have some bearing on his
character. Of course, in connection with that the full situation at the time
should be known. It is impossible for me to look back 10 years and to visualize
just what the situation was in his respect at that time, although I can see no
reason why he should have lied about it if that is what he did at that time.
Q. Suppose Mr. Winne you had an employee at GE who undertook to report
some such incident to you and you subsequently found out that he lied to you
abut certain material parts of it, would you be disturbed about it?
A. Yes, I would be disturbed and I would endeavor to find out just why and
what all the circumstances were. But it would by no means necessarily be
reason for firing him and his subsequent conduct* would have much greater
bearing on my feelings toward him than would that particular incident.
Q. Is It a fair statement that unless he could give you a pretty satisfactory
explanation of why he lied to you you would fire him?
A. It would depend on what the situation was, what he was lying about and
that sort of thing.
Q. Assume it was a very important matter.
A. If it was a very important matter and he could not give a convincing
reason as to why he felt it was necessary at that time, it is quite probable that
disciplinary action would be taken.
Q. Assume that the matter arose that you were looking into— you wanted to
find out all you could about it for the good of GE — and you talked to an
employee about it and he lied to you about it, and those lies impeded you in
finding out about it and made it more difficult for you to run the matter down,
wouldn't that disturb you very greatly?
A. It would disturb me, yes.
Q. And it would be very likely that when you found out about it under those
circumstances you would fire him, wouldn't you?
A. Again it would depend on what the matter was ; it would depend on his
value to the company, his ability and several factors like that. Certainly the
act of lying about an important matter would be considered as a black mark,
you might say, against him.
Q. It would be something that you would require some explanation for,
wouldn't yon?
A. Yes.
Q. How well do you know Dr. Morrison, Mr. Winne?
A. I just met him, as I say, either on a trip or maybe he appeared before the
board of consultants in some capacity to explain. You see, many of us on that
board of consultants
Q. Pardon me. I don't mean to cut you off but perhaps I can save a little
time by coming to the point
Do you know anything about his background?
A. No ; other than what has appeared in the newspapers.
Q. You mean about his Communist connections?
A. I understand he has at least been accused. I don't recall I have ever
seen that it was proved that he had Communist leanings or was a member of
the Communist Party.
Q. He has admitted that he was.
A. I didn't know that unless it was brought out in the questioning by Mr.
Marks. I forget. I knew he was at least under suspicion. I didn't know it
at the time that I met him.
Q. I understand that.
A. I can't say I know him well at all because I have seen him once or twice.
Q. Knowing what yon do about Dr. Morrison, do you think you would employ
him on a GE confidential project?
A. On a matter like that I would have to know more about him and more
about his subsequent actions and more about— I would have to know him much
better than I do now to say whether or not I would be willing to employ him.
Q. You would want to look into it?
A. Very definitely.
Q. Just the way this board is looking into Dr. Oppenheimer.
552
A. I suppose so.
Q. Thoroughly, in other words.
A. Yes.
Q. In other words, you think that his background would raise some question
which ought to be resolved.
Q! One' further question on this subject about Dr. Oppenheimer. Suppose it
should appear that Dr. Oppenheimer in some respects has not told the whole
truth to this board in his testimony or in his answer, would that disturb you
greatly?
A. Yes, it would.
Q. That would have a very material bearing on your judgment of him, of
course, would it not?
A. I think it would. Again when you say "told the truth", it is a matter of if
he has given incorrect information through mistake.
Q. No.
A. You mean if he deliberately lied about some important matter.
Q. Yes.
A. That would have a very definite bearing in my opinion.
Q. Doctor, G. E. has had many confidential war projects which have come
under your supervision.
A. It has had a great many war projects, some more or less directly under my
supervision and many more about which I have known in general and have had
advisory contact with and that sort of thing.
Q. If you found that the man in charge of one of those projects had a number
of Communist friends or friends who were either Communists or fellow travelers,
would that trouble you somewhat?
A. If I had any doubts about the man himself, yes, it would. On the other
hand, there are many of our scientists and some of our top engineers who are
of the turn of mind as so many of the scientists—^ very inquiring type of mind,
very curious about everything — and I would not be at all surprised to find that
some of them may have attended Communist meetings, may have had discussions
with Communists just to find out what line the Communists are using and what
their aproach is to world conditions and so forth. That would not necessarily be
disturbing.
Q. Has anyone suggested to you that is what Dr. Oppenheimer did in this case?
A. No.
Q. Taking our hypothetical superintendent again, suppose you found that that
man had brought a number of his Communist or f ellow traveler friends along to
work with him on your project, how would you feel about that?
A. That would bother me, but I would have to give consideration to the
question of whether or not he could get people of ability to do the project, whether
he was making a judgment as between getting the project done at all or getting
it done with some degree of risk by bringing in such people.
Q. Do I understand that the security officers on any project that you are
familiar with would have permitted on the project people that they knew to be
either Communists or fellow travelers?
A. No, I don't think they would have. I don't recall any case where that kind
of a situation has arisen. But one does have to some times, if a job Just has
to be done, make some compromises in the way that he gets the Job done.
Q. Of course, you would assume our hypothetical superintendent would have
told the security officers all about these fellows?
A. Yes.
Q. That would be his duty, wouldn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. And that would not be an unreasonable duty to impose on him?
A. No, it would not
Q. Even though they happened to be his friends?
A. No, that would not be an unreasonable duty to impose upon him even
though they happen to be his friends.
Q. Mr. Winne, you mentioned the meeting in 1946 in Secretary Acheson's
hei ? y°U reCa11 Wh° Was present at tnat ^^ting when you met Dr. Oppen-
A. As I recall it, all of the people who were to be ultimately members of this
™ard of consultants W€re Present, which included Dr. Oppenheimer, David
Hlienthal, Chester Barnard, Charles Thomas and myself vv^^**' vim*
J^0™lrT^r ****** **?»* meet!n* Mr. M*3*8 *and ^ Carroll Wilson
were present. I do not remember whether they were. They were then, or we
553
met them soon afterwards, I don't remember which, because they acted as secre-
taries and so forth for the hoard of consultants.
Q. Which Mr. Marks is thatV
A. Herbert Marks.
Q. This Mr. Marks who is here?
A. Yes.
Q. What was his connection with the Committee?
A. He was in the Department of State at that time and he and Carroll Wilson
were assigned to the Committee to help us with writing up the ultimate report
and getting information as we might ask for it and that sort of thing.
Q. Is that the Mr. Carroll Wilson who was later secretary of the AEC?
A. He was later General Manager of the AEC.
Q, That is when you first got to know Mr. Marks?
A. Yes, that is right. I think I had met Mr. Marks once or twice, perhaps,
prior to that when he was in, I think it was called, the power section of the
War Production Board, or something of that order. I believe he visited
Schenectady with a group and I met him at that time.
Mr. ROBB. That is all I care to ask, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GBAY. Mr. Winne, your convictions are pretty deep about this matter.
That is apparent
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. I know you are here to be helpful to this board in the discharge
of a really very difficult task. There has been some discussion about the
Nichols letter and Dr. Oppenheimer's reply which quite apart from the record
of this proceeding establish certain facts. There are certain things reported
and adverted to In General Nichols* letter and which are said to be true in
Dr. Oppenheimer's reply.
Mr. Winne, against the background of the exchange of letters, I would like
to read you certain pertinent excerpts from the personnel security clearance
criteria for determining eligibility which was issued by the Commission and
which we are required, as I understand it, to consider in the course of these
deliberations.
I would be glad if counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer would watch me closely in
this because I don't want to leave out anything that might be pertinent and
therefore mislead Mr. Winne.
This Is a very serious question I am addressing to you. This document
establishes the fact, or rather, recites the fact that the Commission in Sep-
tember 1950, issued its procedure for administrative review— that is the reason
for which we are convened— and points out also that this procedure places
considerable responsibility on the managers of operations, and it is to provide
uniform standards for their use that the Commission has adopted the criteria
described herein.
I might interrupt to say that I am sure it is true that managers of operations
here would be in this case the General Manager of the Commission, General
Nichols.
Mr. ROBB. That is correct
Mr. GRAY. Then reading from the document:
"Under the Atomic Energy Act of 19i6, it is the responsibility of the Atomic
Energy Commission to determine whether the common defense or security
will be endangered by granting security clearance to individuals either em-
Bloyed by the Commission or permitted access to restricted data."
Then omitting some language : "Cases must be carefully weighed in the light
of all the information and a determination must be reached which gives due
recognition to the favorable as well as to the unfavorable information con-
cerning the individual and which balances the cost of the program of not having
his services against any possible risks involved."
I believe you, in your testimony, put some emphasis on the point of great
services and values that Dr. Oppenheimer has been to the program.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GKAY. Then it says, "To assist in making these determinations on the
basis of all the information in a particular case, there are set forth below a
number of specific types of derogatory information. The list is not exhaustive,
but it contains the principal types of derogatory information which indicate a
security risk." Then it says that they are divided into two categories.
Category (A) includes certain things. I am going to read paragraph No. 1
and parts of paragraph No. a
554
"Category (A) includes those cases in which there are grounds sufficient to
establish a reasonable belief that the individual or his spouse has :
"1. Committed or attempted to commit, or aided or abetted another who com-
mitted or attempted to commit, any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or
sedition.
*******
"3. Held membership in or Joined any organization which has been declared
by the Attorney General to be totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, subversive * * *
or, prior to the declaration by the Attorney General, participated in the activities
of such an organization in a capacity where he should reasonably have had
knowledge as to the subversive aims or purposes of the organization;".
*******
"6. Violated or disregarded security regulations to a degree which would
endanger the common defense or security ;".
There are a lot of other types of derogatory information which I am not
reading. I hope it does not distort it to take those out of context. Then I
would go to the last two or three paragraphs of this document :
"The categories outlined hereinabove contain the criteria which will be ap-
plied in determining whether information disclosed in investigation reports
shall be regarded as substantially derogatory. Determination that there is
such information in the case of an individual establishes doubt as to his eligi-
bility for security clearance.
"The criteria outlined hereinabove are intended to serve as aids to the Man-
ager of Operations in discharging his responsibility in the determination of an
individual's eligibility for security clearance. While there must necessarily
be an adherence to such criteria, the Manager of Operations is not limited
thereto, nor precluded in exercising his judgment that information or facts in
a case under his cognizance are derogatory although at variance with, or out-
side the scope of the stated categories. The Manager of Operations upon whom
the responsibility rests for the granting of security clearance, and for recom-
mendation in cases referred to the Director of Security, should bear In mind
at all times, that his action must be consistent with the common defense or
security."
I suppose it is true that the Executive order of the President, which I fo^k
has somewhat more restrictive criteria, must also be taken into account in these
proceedings. I will not take the time now to take you through all of those.
I have indicated this is a serious inquiry and I am asking for your help to
this board.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. It seems to me pretty clear that some of these criteria have, been
met, if you will, by the exchange of letters that I read. Would you agree with
that?
The WITNESS. It seems to me that the exchange of letters Indicates that in
the earlier years under consideration — I think it is 1942 and earlier — that Dr.
Oppenheimer — I forget the exact wording there — did support to some extent
some of the organizations which have since been declared subversive or perhaps
were at that time. I do not know.
Mr. GRAY. This is quite a serious question. One of our difficulties is that it
does not say "is a member."
The WITNESS. I recognize that.
Mr. GRAY. It says 'The individual or his spouse," and then "done these things."
The WITNESS. Of course, Dr. Oppenheimer does admit that his wife had been
a member of the Communist Party.
Mr. MARKS. That is correct
The WITNESS. That is in the letter. So taking the strictly legal interpretation
perhaps you have no alternative there.
Mr. MARKS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to interrupt
Mr. GRAY. Surely.
Mr. MAKES. Because I feel that there is a really very important technical
question of interpretation that is involved in the question.
Mr. GRAY. I would be glad if you would state it
Mr. MASKS. I do not think that the criteria which you read mean or are
intended to mean that the establishment
Mr. BOBB. Mr. Chairman, might I interrupt? Would it not be well to have
the witness step out while this is going on?
Mr. MASKS. We would be glad to have that done.
Mr. BOBB. I don't know whether the witness is going to be confused or not
555
Mr. GRAY. I really think actually the argument should not be given in answer
to a question by the witness. I will rephrase my question and see if I can take
care of your difficulty.
We have had witnesses before the board, Mr. Winne — men of great stature
and eminence — who have been inclined to treat very lightly these matters which
we have been discussing here, I think with sincerity and conviction, on the
ground of what they think they know of Dr. Oppenheimer all this washes out
anything that happened in the past.
I will now ask this question : Has anything here said since your direct testi-
mony made you wish to alter your direct testimony as a result of hearing
what I read?
Is that a fair question?
The WITNESS. I feel it does not change my opinion, Dr. Gray. As I was about
to say, and this is an entirely gratuitous remark and perhaps I should not make
it, but it seems to me that it may be possible that you have no alternative but to
make a certain finding here. But even if you make a finding adverse to Dr.
Oppenheimer, my personal feeling still is that he is loyal to the country, that he
would be an asset to the whole atomic and hydrogen weapons project for the
country.
You may, because of the wording of the law, be forced to make a decision
adverse. I hope you will not, but you may be forced to.
Mr. GBAY. Just for the sake of the record now, and perhaps to ease Mr.
Marks'
Mr. MASKS. No ; this is perfectly all right
Mr. GRAY. I am making no assumption of any kind.
The Wmnsss. No; I recognize that.
Mr. GRAY. The board has reached no conclusions and I certainly would say
that we cannot say that any alternatives or set of courses of action are neces-
sarily inevitable in this thing. I don't want to have any misunderstanding on
that point
There is substantial and widespread ignorance about the procedures and the
requirements of the law in these cases, I believe. I don't mind saying that I am
deeply troubled by these things that are before us. However, I don't want to
pursue it with you further because I think you have made it absolutely plain
that you would go as far as the law would allow you to go to grant Dr. Oppen-
heimer security clearance. That is the sum of it, isn't it?
The WITNESS. Yes, that really is the sum of it, Dr. Gray. To express my
own belief, I think it is not necessary to assume that because a man several
years ago — I am not referring to Dr. Oppenheimer now, but anyone— was sup-
porting the Communist Party, particularly if he was a youngster in college at
the time, that should disqualify him for security clearance today. I hope most
of us have changed our ideas about many subjects as we have gone along through
life. I think in many cases it would be found that if the true facts could be
gotten at, especially the youngsters in college who have supported the Com-
munist Party to some extent or joined it or something like that, really did not
realize that they were acting inimical to the interests of the country. I think
all of those things should be taken into consideration.
I know it is an almost insuperable job for a board such as yours with the
law as it exists. You, of course, have to abide by the law.
Mr. GRAY. I had one other question which is entirely unrelated to what we
have just been discussing and I guess it Is more for my information than any-
thing else. It is an uninformed question.
Are there developments which are useful for the welfare of mankind as
opposed to wars of destruction which may come out of the hydrogen bomb dis-
coveries and inventions and development, in your judgment?
The WITNESS. I do not know that, Dr. Gray. Based on the long history of
science I would bet that there will be rather than that there will not. But I do
not know of any in the immediate future.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Evans, have you any questions?
Dr. EVANS- Yes. Mr. Winne, you feel that in these atomic developments
with the fission and the fusion bomb we are just scratching the surface of
what we will know years from now.
The WITNESS. Certainly we will know a tremendous amount more than we
know now if we keep on with our developments. Whether you mean by that
that we will develop much more powerful bombs and weapons and so forth,
I do not know that But we will certainly know much more about them and
be able to produce them at lower cost and much less effort and so forth.
556
Dr EVANS I merely mean this: Do you remember Faraday's experiment
with the coil of wire before the Royal Society?
The WITNESS. I remember it rather vaguely.
Dr EVANS Let me refresh your memory. He put a coll of wire between two
magnets and the coil of wire was carrying an electric current and the wire
turned like this [indicating]. Gladstone said to him, "But of what possible
use can it be?" Paraday said, "Mr. Gladstone, you may be able to tax it"
Rather interesting, isn't it?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Dr. EVANS. Someday we very likely will be able to tax this. Tou also feel
that we should be smart enough to have international agreement on these things
rather than to allow them to destroy us, don't you?
The WITNESS. I feel we must exert every effort to prevent weapons of any
kind from destroying us — every reasonable effort — without sacrificing anything
as material as a Nation. Whether that should be by international control or
whether simply the fear which I think is gradually being generated in all people,
the fear of the use of these weapons, is going to prevent their actual use.
Dr. EVANS. You don't feel that threatening the use of these weapons is going
to do the thing. It has to be done by some other way.
The WITNESS. No. I think it is possible that the mere threat of the results
from the use of these weapons may prevent their actual use, Dr. Evans. I
would feel still safer if we had some really workable system of providing for
international disarmament, but it has to be a workable system and one which
will really protect all the countries if it is really to work.
Dr. EVANS. You realize when we begin to deal with this sort of thing with
these enormous temperatures an$ pressures, we are beginning to deal with the
kind of things that make and destroy worlds, isn't that true?
The WITNESS. I am not enough of a scientist to say whether or not that is
true, Dr. Evans, but it seems as though we may be approaching that point
Dr. EVANS. Do you have any ethical or moral scruples when you think
about these terrible things today?
The WITNESS. I would hope that we will not have to use the atomic and
hydrogen bombs in war for the destruction of other peoples. On the other hand,
unless and until some reasonable system of control for actual prevention of
their use is in effect, I think our country has no course but to go ahead with
their development and try to develop the very best weapons than can be made.
Dr, EVANS. I quite agree with you. You will admit, Mr. Winne, and I think
you did, that Dr. Oppenheimer was indiscreet on occasion.
The WITNESS. Yes, on the basis of the information particularly with reference
to his not disclosing this instance when he was approached.
Dr. EVANS. I want to ask, you are not a Communist?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Have you ever been a fellow traveler?
The WITNESS. No.
Dr. EVANS. Have you any Communist friends?
The WITNESS. No. Well, I don't know, but not that I know of.
Dr. EVANS. Would you, if you were on a security committee, go to see a
Communist friend?
The WITNESS. If I were on a security committee?
Dr. EVANS. Yes.
The WETNESS. Would I go to see a Communist friend?
Dr. EVANS. Yes.
The WITNESS. That is a question that is very difficult to answer.
Dr. EVANS. You don't have to answer.
The WITNESS. Without having all the circumstances, that is.
Dr. EVANS. You don't have to answer it. Perhaps it is a bad question.
Strike it
The WITNESS. If I had a friend who had committed a serious crime and was in
prison, I might go to see him if he was a close friend, to try to find out from him
just why he did it and what the circumstances were and to be of some moral
support to him in trying to rehabilitate himself and that sort of thing. One can't
answer a general question like that yes or no.
Dr. EVANS. You would not have done this thing in regard to this Chevalier
incident in just the way Dr. Oppenheimer did.
The WITNESS. I think not, Dr. Evans, to the best of my knowledge and belief.
I think I would not have done it
Dr. EVANS. That is alL
Mr. GEAY. Mr. Marks.
557
REDIRECT EXAXIXATIOX
By Mr. MASKS :
Q. I think you have probably answered this, Mr. Winne, but just to be sure
that we are clear as to your own thoughts I would like to go over some ground.
Mr. Robb was inquiring of you as to what you would do as one of the responsible
chief officials of the General Electric Co. in various contingencies relating to
conduct of an employee. I need to ask you whether, if it came to your attention
that an Important employee and a trusted employee had many years ago in
different times and circumstances committed acts of the kind that Mr. Robb
described in relation to the Chevalier incident or some other incident that you
can imagine involving the truth and refusal to cooperate in an investigation, that
it happened many years ago and there had been a long intervening period of
faithful service to the General Electric Co., what consideration would you give
or how would you seek to weigh considerations that you would have to judge in
determining his future with the General Electric Co.? That is his future, if any.
A. That again is a question the answer to which would vary under different
circumstances. First I would endeavor, as it seems to me this Board is doing,
to find out all I could about the circumstances in the early years, to see just
what caused the employee to do whatever he had done. Then I would investigate
very carefully all of his actions with the company since that time, talk with him,
and if this were an important employee, talk with the higher officers of the
company and then come to a decision as to what we should do about it. I don't
think one can say right offhand whether we would fire him or keep him. It
would depend on a lot of circumstances.
Q. Just one other question, and I just have no idea whether or not you know
the answer to it
I ask you whether at the time which you have referred to that you had some
contact with Dr. Morrison, while you were a member of the Board of Consultants
of the State Department, did you know of the capacity in which he was then
connected with the Manhattan District?
A. I think I probably did, Mr. Marks, but I can't recall definitely that I did,
nor do I recall now just what capacity he was employed in the Manhattan Dis-
trict, if he was employed.
Mr. MASKS, Mr. Robb, will you permit me to ask a question that I am afraid
is leading but is Intended to refresh -
Mr. ROBB. I am afraid of most anything you ask, Mr. Marks, but go ahead*
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Robb is glad for you to ask a leading question.
Mr. ROBB. I don't think this witness will be led, Mr. Marks. I think the
witness will answer the question in his own way.
Mr. MAinrfl. i am sure of that.
By Mr. MASKS:
Q. Do you know, Mr. Winne, whether or not at the time Dr. Morrison had his
contacts with your board of consultants he was then serving under a designa-
tion or appointment from General Groves as a member of General Groves' Com-
mittee on International Control of Atomic Energy?
A. I cannot recall, Mr. Marks, whether that was the case or not. I cannot
recall
Mr. MASKS. That is alL
Mr, ROBB. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. .GRAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Winne. I am sorry we kept you so long.
The WITNESS. Thank you. That is perfectly aU right
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GAEEISON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a couple of statements for
the record. I have also one or two affidavits to read into the record.
I would suggest that since it is now quarter past twelve, or approximately
that, and Dr. Bush has agreed to testify at 2 o'clock this afternoon, I don't think
there is any use in starting with Dr. Bacher who is ready to testify because he
can wait over until Monday. We will have to go into next week anyway.
My thought would be, Mr. Chairman, to adjourn very shortly so tnat we might
have Dr. Bush promptly at 2 and then, I think, the arrangement we made
yesterday, which would enable the board to adjourn at a reasonable hour.
Mr. GRAY. If you have some affidavits, can we read those into the record now
and that will save a little time?
Mr. GABSISON. Yes. If I might just make a statement for the record on one
or two things that have come up and I flhfafc are worth saying.
558
First just one word about this Drew Pearson column which I have seen now
It is entitled "Veil Over Oppenheimer Case", and the first paragraph describes
Low nobody can find out where Dr. Oppenheimer is living. I may say that was
arranged deliberately, Mr. Chairman, by all of us for the very purpose of
avoiding statements to the press.
"Lloyd Garrison, attorney for the atomic scientist is just as mysterious as his
client"
If there was left any implication that I am the only one of the attorneys
associated in this case who is as mysterious as the client, I want most em-
phatically to reject that implication. As a matter of fact, Mr. Marks, who has
cut himself off completely from his office— he has not even received a telephone
call since last week—and I have been living together except to separate to so to
bed at night
Mr. Ecker has been with us almost continuously except when he has been down
here working on transcripts. Mr. Topkis is going back to New York after a
couple of days of help. Dr. Oppenheimer has been almost continuously with us
I just say to you, sir, that there is not a one of us who has had contacts with
the press in this time and since the early calls bombarded us, in which we said
that we cannot give information and returned the calls as a matter of courtesy
How this came to be is a mystery to all of us. I want to say this most em-*
phaticaUy for cocounsel and my associates in this matter as well as for myself
Mr. GRAY. Thank you. May I address a question to you. Do you want to
leave the record in such a state that all counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer are
mysterious? That is a facetious observation.
Mr. MARKS. I would like to say that when calls from the press come to me and
I am available, I take them. I try to be civil and courteous and I refuse to make
any comments of any kind about this proceeding, even as to whether the
proceedings are in progress.
Mr. MORGAN. The only question I had was whether you believe what Mr
Pearson writes or not ? It may not be pertinent to this hearing.
Mr. GRAY. I doubt if it is worthwhile pursuing that Would you proceed, Mr
Garrison. '
Mr. GARRISON. Of course, we don't believe this stuff. I don't believe any of it
Mr. Chairman, just a word about these criteria which I am so glad that you
raised. It has been on my own mind to say something about it, but I didn't
want to interrupt the flow of the testimony. f »««• * umu i
I would like to read Into the record and just for a moment brine to the
attention of the board rather forcibly the two paragraphs that follow the
Description of the general nature of the Atomic Energy Act. These are taken
wvVS? \ T1C Energy Commission criteria for determining eligibility from
which the chairman read particular excerpts from category (A)
'tmder the act the Federal Bureau of Investigation has the responsibility for
data. In determining any individual's eligibility for security dear-
*•
559
I think that last sentence, of course, is particularly pertinent to the general
manager's consideration, but I am sure that this board is expected to provide
the general manager with all of this kind of information that is here set forth.
This would include, for example, responsible judgment of a man like Dr.
Bradbury who is a Commission staff member.
I would like to stress in summary that it seems to me that quite pertinent to
this proceeding is Dr. Oppenheimer's past association with the atomic energy
program, the nature of his job as a consultant, the judgment of responsible
persons who have appeared here and will appear here as to his integrity and the
responsible mature viewpoint and responsible judgment of Commission staff
members who have testified — only one of them actually — and chat the case must
be carefully weighed in the light of all of the information.
There is one other thing I would like to point out. That is, if category (A)
is considered, as, of course, it must be, it is said to include those classes of
derogatory information which establish a presumption of security risk.
I take it that it is quite clear from this that if the board should find a deroga-
tory item which it felt had been established under category (A), which I Hope
the board will not and believe it should not on the evidence— but if it should—
that would establish a presumption which, I take it under this overall judgment
that is referred to here, would be rebuttable by other evidence such as what Dr.
Oppenheimer has actually done for his country and the opinion of responsible
people who know him and the like. In other words, it is not a final and con-
clusive matter but a rebuttable presumption.
Mr. GRAY. I assume, Mr. Garrison, that at the conclusion of the testimony
you possibly may wish to address yourself to some of these matters. I would
not at this time respond to any request for an interpretation of the criteria
either in this document or in the President's order.
I frankly have received this statement of yours at this time in the record
because I initiated all this by bringing it up with Mr. Winne. I think I would
like to say why I did that.
I believe it is true and I say this now not in the presence of any witness that
we have had some witnesses who have come before the board and in effect have
said, "I know this man to be loyal; clear him.'* That is the sum of some of the
testimony we have had.
There has been an inclination to be impatient with procedures and regulations
and things of that sort. I just wanted to make clear that everybody understands
that the board must take into account all rules, regulations, and procedures in
the course of its proceedings and I would not wish you to draw any conclusion
now from anything I might have said in talking to Mr. Winne.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, speaking for Dr. Oppenheimer, we agree that
any light waving aside of what are serious matters or what may be requirements
of the regulations we are not in sympathy with. We take this just as seriously
as does the board. That goes for all of us.
I think apart from that, the mere testimony from a witness that having known
Dr. Oppenheimer closely for many years he has a conviction about his loyalty,
I would say that in itself is pertinent.
Mr. GRAY. I quite agree it is pertinent. Speaking at least for one member of
the board, these deep convictions held by responsible people are important in
these deliberations. They are important to me and I am sure to the other
members of the board.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, might I interpose since we are talking about these
criteria. We might at this point refer to section 4.16 of the procedures, which
also refers to them : "Recommendations of the board. The board shall carefully
consider all material before it, including reports of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, the testimony of all witnesses, the evidence presented by the indi-
vidual, and the standards set forth in ABC Personnel Security Clearance Criteria
for Determining Eligibility. In considering the material before the board, the
members of the board, as practical men of affairs, should be guided by the same
consideration that would guide them in making a sound decision in the admini-
stration of their own lives. In reaching its determination, the Board shall con-
sider the manner in which the witnesses have testified before the board, their
demeanor on the witness stand, the probability or likelihood of their testimony,
their credibility, the authenticity of documentary evidence, or the lack of evi-
dence upon some material points at issue."
Mr. GABBISON. That is all I have to say.
Mr. GRAY. Do you have some affidavits at this time, Mr. Garrison?
303313—84 36
560
Mr. GABBISON. Tes. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if we might adjourn for lunch.
It is almost 12 : SO. I will proceed, however, if you wish.
Mr. GRAY. How long are they?
Mr. GABBISON. I would say it would probably take 10 or 15 minutes.
Mr. GBAT. I think we should recess for lunch, then, and be here at 2 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 12: 25 p. m. a recess was taken, to reconvene at 2 o'clock this
day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. GBAT. Do you wish to testify under oath?
Dr. BUSH. Whatever is customary.
Mr. GBAT. All the witnesses have.
Would you stand and raise your right hand, please. What is your full name?
Dr. BUSH. Vannevar Bush,
Mr. GBAT. Vannevar Bush, do you swear that the testimony you are to give
the board shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help
. you God?
Dr. BUSH. I do.
Whereupon, Vannevar Bush was called as a witness, and having been first
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GBAT. It is my duty to remind you of the existence of the so-called perjury
statutes. I assume we don't need to discuss those in any detail.
The WITNESS. No, I think I know about them.
Mr. GBAT. I should like to request that if in the course of your testimony
it becomes necessary for you to refer to or disclose restricted data, let me know
in advance so we may take certain necessary and appropriate steps.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAT. Finally, I would like to say to you that we consider these proceed-
ings a confidential matter between the Atomic Energy Commission and its officials
on the one hand, and Dr. Oppenheimer and his counsel and witnesses on the
other.
The WITNESS. I have already said to the press several times that I would
not discuss this subject while it was before this Board.
Mr. GBAT. We just express the hope that it will be your position.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
My Mr. GABBISON:
Q. Dr. Bush, would you state for the record your present position, and after
that, the principal Government offices which you have held and now hold?
A. I am president of the Carnegie Institution in Washington. At the present
time I hold no Government post except membership on one or two committees
I don't think you need to have them.
I was chairman of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics for sev-
eral years, about 1939.
I was chairman 'of the National Defense Eesearch Committee when it was
formed in June of 1940.
I was a Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development when it
was formed in June of 1941, through the war, and until after it was closed out
after the war.
the war I was chairman of the New Weapons Committee of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
After the war I was chairman of the Joint Research and Development Board
of the Army and Navy, and then when that board was made permanent by
statute, I was chairman of the Research and Development Board until 1949
I think those are the principal appointments, sir.
Q. About how long have you known Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I have toown him well since the early days of the war. I undoubtedly
**
Q. What was your connection with his appointment to the Manhattan Dis-
trict?
A. There were appointments before then. At that time General Groves who
was in charge of the Manhattan District, reported to a body of iSSfcl wa2
chairman, and which I omitted to list. It iTrather hard to get an of thSS
to. It was the Mi^ryPoUcy Committee, of which I was chairmm Dr.Conant
was my deputy. General Groves took up all of his programs and policies with
tuat group.
561
At the time General Groves made the appointment of Dr. Oppenheimer at Los
Alamos, he took that matter up with us. In my memory he took it up informally,
not in a formal meeting, and discussed it with Dr. Conant and with me.
Q. What recommendation did you make?
A. General Groves said he had in mind appointing Dr. Oppenheimer. He re-
view for us orally what he knew of Dr. Oppenheimer's prewar record. I don't
remember that we looked at any file or any written records. He recited some of
the previous history. Then he asked the opinion of me and Dr. Conant in regard
to the appointment, and I told him I thought it was a good appointment.
Q. Did you have any discussion about any prior left-wing associations that
he had?
A. Yes, we did. He recited previous associations.
Q. When you say "he," you mean whom?
A. General Groves.
Q. About when was this?
A. I noted down a few dates. I can't say, gentlemen, that my memory for
dates and the like is good. In fact, it is a little bad. I have that date here
somewhere. Oppenheimer was chosen in November of 1942.
Q. Did you have opportunity to observe his work at Los Alamos?
A. In a sense which I was responsible for it. The structure at that time, you
remember, was this : OSID started this work and continued it for a considerable
period. It continued parts of it in fact after that date. I originally carried
the full responsibility for it, reporting to the President. On my recommenda-
tion when the matter came to the construction of large facilities, the matter was
transferred to the War Department. Secretary Stimson and I conferred, and the
Manhattan District was set up. Groves was made head of it.
After that the Military Policy Committee reviewed Ms recommendations on
which I was chairman, and there was also a policy committee appointed by
the President which consisted of the Vice President, Secretary Stimson, General
Marshall, Dr. Conant and myself, I believe. That was appointed by Mr. Roose-
velt at my request. When I was carrying the full responsibility, I told him I
would prefer to have some group of that sort, and that committee was appointed.
It never was formally dissolved.
Q. Would you say a word as to your view of his achievement at Los Alamos?
A. He did a magnificent piece of work. More than any other scientist that
I know of he was responsible for our having: an atomic bomb on time.
Q. When was your next governmental connection with him, do you recall?
A. There have been so many I am not sure which one.
Q. Let me go back a minute and ask you another question about the Los
Alamos work.
What significance would you attach to the delivery of the A-bomb on time,
or was it delivered on time?
A. That bomb was delivered on time, and that means it saved hundreds of
thousands of casualties on the beaches of Japan. It was also delivered on time
so that there was no necessity for any concessions to Russia at the end of the
war. It was on time in the sense that after the war we had the principal
deterrent that prevented Russia from sweeping over Europe after we demobilized.
It is one of the most magnificent performances of history in any development
to have that thing on time
Q. You were connected with the effort of this country to control international
atomic energy before the United Nations?
A. Yes. After the war, very soon after the war, you remember that there was
a so-called Attee Conference, when Mr. Atlee came over and the Prime Minister
of Canada came down. At that conference was prepared a declaration. I man-
aged that affair for Secretary Byrnes and John Anderson, and I wrote that
declaration. That is where it was decided to take this matter to the United
Nations.
The next step was the Secretary of State's committee of which I was a member.
That committee appointed a panel of which Dr. Oppenheimer was a member.
That panel prepared what later became known as the Baruch Plan. After it
was prepared, it was approved by the Secretary of State's committee, and it was
presented to the United Nations by Mr. Baruch at the President's request
Q. Did you see something of Dr. Oppenheimer during that period?
A. Certainly. We had a number of discussions between the main committee
that was drafting the agreement.
Q Did you form any opinion as to his contribution at that time?
A. His contribution was substantial in the thinking that went Into ttat very
difficult matter.
562
Q When you became chairman, I think, of the Joint Research and Develop-
ment Board in 1947, did you set up an Atomic Energy Committee?
A. That is right I appointed Dr. Oppenheimer as chairman of it, as I
remember.
Q What would you say as to his services in that connection?
A I think I can save time by saying that I have worked with him on this
general subject in many capacities. Two have been mentioned. He was also
on the panel which reviewed the evidence before Mr. Truman made the announce-
ment of the Russian atomic explosion. He and I were both members of a panel
set up by the Secretary of State which worked a year ago last summer, I believe,
on general disarmament matters. I think there were probably one or two other
occasions. I worked with him on many occasions on this general subject
Q. In connection with the Secretary of State's panel, did you have occasion
to visit the Secretary of State in the summer of 1952?
A. I will not try to be exact on dates on that But when the panel had gotten
to a point where it was about to draft a report, we met with the full panel and
the Secretary of State, and went over some of our conclusions orally, as I
remember.
Q. Before that time did you have occasion to talk with the Secretary of State
about the question of postponing the test of the H-bomb?
A. I did. That had nothing to do with that panel, however. That was a
personal move that was made, as a matter of fact, before the panel was in
operation. The clearances on the panel were delayed. In that interim I visited
the Secretary of State and gave my personal opinion in regard to that test
Before so doing I talked with a number of my friends.
Q. Who did you talk to among others?
A. Mr. Elihu Root I also talked with three or four members that were wait-
ing to go to work on the panel. John Dickey, Joseph Johnson, Allan Dulles,
Robert Oppenheimer. I undoubtedly discussed it with one or two others. In
every case it was discussing the matter in generalities, without going into
confidential matters. It was not necessary in order to do that.
I then visited the Secretary of State and gave him my personal opinion on
that matter.
Q. Without revealing any matters that you consider confidential, could you
state what your position at the time was with respect to that test?
A. Wait a minute. I gave the Secretary of State a memorandum wMch gave
him my personal views. I made no copy of that memorandum. Nobody knows
the exact content of that memorandum as far as I know except the Secretary
of State and anyone he may have told about it It has never been made public.
It seems to me that it would be quite improper for me to give you the content
I will lean on the judgment of the chairman. My inclination is that I should
not reveal this before this board.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Bush, I think you should not discuss the contents of the memo-
randum, but I see no reason why if you expressed your views to a number of
people at that time, why you can't
The WITNESS. Quite right I can readily say what moved me to go at all,
and what the general tenor of my thinking was, much as I discussed it then.
There were two primary reasons why I took action at that time, and went
directly to the Secretary of State. There was scheduled a test which was
evidently going to occur early in November. I felt that it was utterly improper—
and I still think so— for that test to be put off just before election, to confront
an incoming President with an accomplished test for which he would carry
the full responsibility thereafter. For that test marked our entry into a very
disagreeable type of world.
In the second place, I felt strongly that that test ended the possibility of the
only type of agreement that I thought was possible with Russia at that time,
namely, an agreement to make no more tests. For that kind of an agreement
would have been self-policing in the sense that if it was violated, the violation
would be immediately known. I still think that we made a grave error in
conducting that test at that time, and not attempting to make that type of
simple agreement with Russia. I think history will show that was a turning
point that when we entered into the grim world that we are entering right now,
that those who poshed that thing through to a conclusion without making that
attempt have a great deal to answer for.
That is what moved me, sir. I was very much moved at the time.
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Turning now to the matter of the controversy in the fall of 1&49 over
whether or not to proceed with an all-out program for the development of the
H-bomb, did you have any official participation in the actions that were taken
at that time?
A. No. I did not. I had no official connection with the matter. I would like
to make one thing clear. There have been statements in the paper that at
that time I expressed opinions on that matter. I did not do so. In fact, I
very carefully refrained from doing so. There was some talk in the press of a
review body on that matter. I was named as a possible chairman. I said to
one or two men on Capitol Hill that I felt that would be a mistake, to establish
such an affair. In the first place, the General Advisory Committee had been
set up by law for the explicit purpose of reviewing such matters, and second,
a review panel would constitute new men, and it would take months of work
before it could understand the technical matters Involved and pass reasonable
Judgment. Hence I declined to give any personal estimate of the matter at the
time.
Q. Would you care to express a judgment about it now?
A. I have never reviewed in detail all of the considerations. No, I am not going
to express an opinion on that today. Let me say with all due respect that I
don't think this board could arrive at the question of whether reasonable judg-
ment was shown at that time. There are some exceedingly difficult things that
come into such a question. I can certainly recite things that would need to
be considered.
For one thing I think it is fully evident that the hydrogen bomb was of
great value to Russia — much greater value to Russia than to us. I think I
can also be sure that a test by us of a hydrogen bomb would be of advantage to
Russia in the prosecution of their program. There are two considerations that
might weight very heavily indeed in such a consideration. The other one, of
course, is feasibility.
Q. Turning to another topic, at the time of the establishment of the Atomic
Energy Commission and the General Advisory Committee, or several months after
the establishment of them both, did the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission consult you about Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance?
A. Tes, I remember that he did. Mr. Lilienthal consulted me, and I wrote
him a letter about it
Q. Do you have a copy of that with you?
A. What I have is this. I have no record in my flies of these matters.
All of my records in the Office of Scientific Research and Development were of
course turned over to the Defense Department. All of my records in the
Research and Development Board remain there. I have not gone back to those
files.
From stenographic notebooks I have a transcript of the body of that letter.
Q. Isn't that the one we have already read in the record?
A. Quite likely. I could not find a copy, sir. Would you want to look at It
to see if it is?
Mr. GABBISON. Would there be any objection to reading it again?
Mr. GRAY. No, there would be no objection.
Mr. ROBB. No, of course not.
The WITNESSS I could not find a copy anywhere, but my stenographer had
his old notebooks and that is where I got it from. Isn't is quicker for me to
read it?
Mr. GRAY. Why don't yon read it?
The WITNESS. "At our conference yesterday you asked me to comment con-
cerning Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, and I am very glad to do so. Dr. Oppen-
heimer is one of the great physicists of this country or of the world for that
matter. Prior to the war he was on the staff of the University of California, and
was regarded as the leader of theoretical aspects of atomisttcs and similar sub-
jects of physics. Shortly after the Army entered into the development of atomic
energy he was given a very important appointment by General Groves. This
appointment made him director of the laboratory at Los Alamos, which was in
all probability the most important post held by any civilian scientist in connec-
tion with the entire effort General Groves undoubtedly made this appointment
after a very careful study of the entire affair from all angles, as this was his
custom on important appointments. Subsequent developments made It very clear
that no error na<[ been made in this connection, for Dr. Oppenheimer proved him-
self to be not only a great physicist, but also a man of excellent judgment and a
564
real leader in the entire effort. In fact, it was due to the extraordinary accom-
plishments of Oppenheimer and his asociates that the job was completed on
time. Subsequent to the end of the war Dr. Oppenheimer has had a number of
important appointments. He was invited by Secretary Stimson as one of the
scientists consulted by the Secretaries of War and Navy in connection with the
work of the Interim Committee. He was appointed by the State Department
as a member of the board which drew up the plan on which Mr. Baruch based
his program. He has recently been appointed by the President as a member of
the General Advisory Committee of your organization. I have appointed him
a member of the Committee on Atomic Energy of the Joint Research, and De-
velopment Board. All of this has followed from his extraordinary war record
in which he made a unique and exceedingly important contribution to the success
of the war effort of this country.
"I know him very well indeed and I have personally great confidence in his
judgment and integrity."
Mr. ROBB. I have the original now.
By Mr. GAEEISON :
Q. At the time you wrote that letter, had you been through Dr. Oppenheimer's
personnel file, the FBI reports?
A. I don't think I ever went through Dr. Oppenheimer's FBI file. If I did, I
certainly do not remember.
Q. Did you understand at the time that you wrote that letter that he had left
wing associations?
A. I understood that at the time of his first appointment was made at Los
Alamos. I had an exposition of the entire affair from General Groves.
Q. Ton read the letter of General Nichols dated December 23, 1953, to Dr.
Oppenheimer, containing the items of derogatory information?
A. Yes, I read that as it appeared in the press.
Q. Is there anything in that letter which would cause you to want to qualify
the letter which you wrote to Mr. Lilienthal that you have just read?
A. Now, let me answer that in two parts. I had at the time of the Los Alamos
appointment complete confidence in the loyalty, judgment, and integrity of Dr.
Oppenheimer. I have certainly no reason to change that opinion in the mean-
time. I have had plenty of reason to confirm it, for I worked with him on many
occasions on very difficult matters. I know that his motivation was exactly the
same as mine, namely, first, to make this country strong, to resist attack, and
second, if possible, to fend off from the world the kind of mess we are now
getting Into.
On the second part of that, would I on the basis of that document, if those
allegations were proved, change my Judgment. That is what I understand this
board is to decide. I don't think I ought to try to prejudge what they might
find out.
Q. I would not want to ask yon to do that, and my question is not designed
to do that.
A. My faith has not in the slightest degree been shaken by that letter or any-
thing else.
Mr. GABBISON. I think that is all, Doctor.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Robb?
Mr. ROBB. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GBAY. I have one question which relates to the development of the hydro-
gen bomb in general, and it is prompted by something you said in answer to a
question put to yon by Mr. Garrison, I think.
I believe you said that you felt that that test in the fall of 1952 was of value
to the Russians in their own program. Did I understand that correctly?
The Wmncss. I am sure it was.
Mr. GRAY. And this is for technical reasons?
The WITNESS. I am sure of it for one reason because when we reviewed the
evidence of the first Russian atomic explosion, we didn't find out merely that
they had made a bomb. We obtained a considerable amount of evidence as to
the type of bomb, and the way in which it was made. If they had no other
evidence than that from their own test and the like, they would have derived
information. * * *
Mr. GRAY Would it have been your guess that the Soviets would have at-
tempted to develop this kind of weapon?
The WITNESS. Why, certainly, because it is very valuable indeed to them. To
us, with 600 KT fission bombs we have very little need for a 10 megaton
565
hydrogen bomb. The Russians, on the other hand, have the great targets of
New York and Chicago, and what have you. It is of enormous advantage to
them.
Mr. GRAY. So they probably would have sought to develop this in any event
unless some international control machinery had been in effect.
The WITNESS. That is right.
Mr. GRAY. And our not proceeding, as some people thought we should not,
probably didn't have any relation to what the Russians might do about it.
The WITNESS. I think it has relation tu what the Russians might do about it
because whether we proceeded or not determined tu some extent the speed with
which they could proceed. Let me interpose a word there, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. Yes, sir.
The WITNESS. It was not a question, as I understand it, of whether we should
proceed or not. It was a question of whether we should proceed in a certain
manner and on a certain program. I have never expressed opinions on that
But certainly there was a great deal of opinion which seemed to me sound that
the program as then presented was a somewhat fantastic one. So it was not a
question of do we proceed or do we not. I think there was no disagreement of
opinion as to whether we ought to be energetic in our research, whether we
should be assiduously looking for ways in which such a thing could be done
without unduly interfering with our regular program. The question of whether
we proceeded along a certain path — may I say one more word on that, Mr.
Chairman, quite frankly, and I hope you won't misunderstand me, because I
have the greatest respect for this board. Yet I think it is only right that I
should give you my opinion.
I feel that this board has made a mistake and that it is a serious one. I feel
that the letter of General Nichols which I read, this bill of particulars, is quite
capable of being interpreted as placing a man on trial because he held opinions,
which is quite contrary to the American system, which is a terrible thing. And
as I move about I find that discussed today very energetically, that here is a
man who is being pilloried because he had strong opinions, and had the temerity
to express them. If this country ever gets to the point where we come that near
to the Russian system, we are certainly not in any condition to attempt to lead
the free world toward the benefits of democracy.
Now, if I had been on this board, I most certainly would have refused to
entertain a set of charges that could possibly be thus interpreted. As things
now stand, I am just simply glad I am not in the position of the board.
Mr. GRAY. What is the mistake the board has made?
The WITNESS. I think you should have immediately said before we will enter
into this matter, we want a bill of particulars which makes it very clear that this
man is not being tried because he expressed opinions.
Mr. GRAY. Are you aware, Dr. Bush, how this got in the press and was spread
throughout the world?
The WITNESS. Yes, I know how it was released.
Mr. GRAY. Do you know who released it?
The WITNESS. I believe this gentleman on my right released it.
Mr. GRAY. I don't think you can blame the board. We had quite a discussion
about that
The WITNESS. It was bound to be released sometime when you made your
Mr. GRAY. It might have leaked. I don't think it was bound to be released.
I assure you, and I am sure that we are all sure that whatever the outcome,
tfris board is going to be very severely criticized.
The WITNESS. I am sure of that, and I regret it sincerely, sir, because I fear
that this thing, when your report is released, will be misinterpreted on that very
basis whatever you may do.
Dr. EVANS. Dr. Bush, you don't think we sought this Job, do you?
The WITNESS. I am sure you didn't, and you have my profound sympathy
and respect. I think the fact that a group of men of this sort are willing to do
as tough arid as difficult a job as this augurs well for the country. It is in
stark contrast with some of the things that we have seen going on about us in
similar circumstances. Orderly procedure and all of that is good. I merely
regret that the thing can be misinterpreted as it stands on the record, and mis-
interpreted in a way that can do great damage. I know, of course, that the
executive branch of the United States Government had no intention whatever of
pillorying a man for his opinions. But the situation has not been helped, gentle-
men, recently by statements of the Secretary of Defense. I can assure you that
the scientific community is deeply stirred today.
566
The National Academy of Science meets this next week, and the American
Physical Society meets, and I hope sincerely that they will do nothing foolish.
But they are deeply stirred. The reason they are stirred is because they feel
that a professional man who rendered great service to his country, rendered
service beyond almost any other man, is now being pilloried and put through
an ordeal because he had the temerity to express his honest opinions.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Bush, are you familiar with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 at
all?
The WITNESS. I have read it.
Mr. GRAY. Are you familiar with the fact that the Commission has a pub-
lished set of procedures which for these purposes have the effect of law?
The WITNESS. Yes. I am not quarreling with the procedure, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. As I understand it, and I can be corrected by counsel, the writing
of a letter to Dr. Oppenheimer with specifications is required under these
procedures.
The WITNESS. I have been a friend of General Nichols for many years. He
wrote the letter. I quite frankly think it was a poorly written letter and should
have been written in such a way that it made it absolutely clear that what was
being examined here was not the question of whether a man held opinions and
whether those were right or wrong, whether history has shown it to be good
Judgment or poor Judgment I think that should have been made very clear.
Mr. GRAY. I would also point out Just in the interest of having a record here,
and I don't consider myself in any argumentation with you, for whom I have
a very high regard, personally and professionally, that there were items of
so-called derogatory information — and that is a term of art — in this letter,
setting aside the allegations about the hydrogen bomb. There were items in
this letter which did not relate to the expression and holding of opinions.
The WITNESS. Quite right, and the case should have tried on those.
Mr. GRAY. This is not a trial.
The WITNESS. If it were a trial, I would not be saying these things to the
Judge, you can well imagine that I feel a very serious situation has been
created, and I think that in all fairness I ought to tell you my frank feeling that
this has gotten into a very bad mess. I wish I could suggest a procedure that
would resolve it
Mr. GRAY. The proceeding, of course, is taking place in accordance with
procedures, and I was glad to hear you say a few moments ago that you felt
that this was a fair kind of proceeding. I am not sure I am quoting you
correctly.
The WITNESS. You can quote me to that effect I think some of the things
we have seen have been scandalous affairs. I think in fact the Republic is in
danger today because we have been slipping backward in our maintenance of
the BUI of Bights.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Evans.
Dr. EVANS. Dr. Bush, I wish you would make dear Just what mistake you
think the board made. I did not want this job when I was asked to take it I
thought I was performing a service to my country.
The WITNESS. I think the moment you were confronted with that letter, you
should have returned the letter, and asked that it be redrafted so that you
would have before you a clearcut issue which would not by implication put you
in the position of trying a man for his opinions.
Dr. EVANS. I was not confronted with that letter, and I don't think it would
have made any difference if I had been. I was simply asked if I would serve on
the board. What mistake did I make when I did that?
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, might I make a remark for myself here, speaking
for Dr. Oppenheimer? I have the deepest respect for Dr. Bush's forthright
character, for his lifelong habit of calling a spade a spade as he sees it I simply
want to leave no misunderstanding on the record here that we share the view
that this board should not have served when asked to serve under the leftter
as written,
The WITNESS. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the opinions being
expressed are my own. They usually are.
Mr. GRAY. I have never heard it suggested that you didn't express your own
opinion, Dr. Bush.
Dr. EVANS. Dr. Bush, then your idea is that suppose I was asked to serve
on this board, and I didn't know anything about it— I had not seen any of this
xoaterial^-after I had agreed to serve, and saw this material, I should fcave
resigned?
567
The WITNESS. No, I think you simply should have asked for a revision of the
bill of particulars.
Dr. EVANS. I am Just anxious to know what you think my procedure should
have been.
The WITNESS. That is what I think. Now, I don't see how you can get out
of this mess.
Mr. MORGAN. Doctor, on what ground would you ask for a bill of particulars if
you didn't know the record?
The WITNESS. I think that bill of particulars was obviously poorly drawn
on the face of it, because it was most certainly open to the interpretation that
this man is being tried because he expressed strong opinions. The fact that he
expressed strong opinions stands in a single paragraph by itself. It is not
directly connected. It does have in that paragraph, through improper motiva-
tions he expressed these opinions. It merely says he stated opinions, and I think
that is defective drafting and should have been corrected.
Mr. MORGAN. In other words, we want to prejudge the case before we know
anything about it
The WITNESS. Not at all. But I think this board or no board should ever sit on
a question in this country of whether a man should serve his country or not be-
cause he expressed strong opinions. If you want to try that case, you can try me.
I have expressed strong opinions many times, and I intend to do so. They have
been unpopular opinions at times. When a man is pilloried for doing that, this
country is in a severe state.
Mr. MORGAN. I have no more questions.
Mr. GARRISON. I should like to ask one more question.
The WITNESS. I hope it is a gentle one. Excuse me, gentlemen, if I become
stirred, but I am.
By Mr. GARRISON:
Q. Dr. Bush, have you had some experience in handling security questions in
the past?
A. Throughout the war, I was responsible for security in the Office of Scientific
Research and Development. The formal situation was this. All the appoint-
ments I was responsible for clearance in the organization. On appointment on
the staff of contractors, the contractor himself was responsible. Of course, you
realize that to a contractor was given only the information within his field. No
question was raised in connection with contractors unless either the Army or the
Navy cautioned about them. On appointments to OSRD, I had advice from both
the Army and the Navy, but the responsibility was mine.
I might say in passing that there were a good many appointments, and I know
of no case in which an appointment on OSRD was made in which disloyalty has
since been proved. I am proud of that record. I think our procedure in clear-
ance at that time was a sane and reasonable one and effective one.
Mr. GARRISON. That is alL
Mr. ROBB. May I ask one question,
GROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. I am going to ask you a question which I am sure you will describe as a
gentle one. Let me tell you I never saw this letter in question until 2 months
after it was written. I am not asking this for personal reasons.
A. I am sure you didn't write it
Q. I am sure you didn't mean to imply that Would you make a distinction
between the question of whether a man's opinions were right and wrong, and the
question of whether a man's opinions were expressed in good faith or bad faith?
A. Yes ; a very great difference. If this paragraph that I referred to had said
by improper motivation because this man had allegiance to another system than
that of his own country, he expressed these opinions in an attempt to block the
program, then I would not have objected.
Q. If the paragraph was interpreted to question the good faith of the opinion,
then you would have no objection to it
A. No, if it was done explicitly enough, certainly not
Q. Thank you.
A. The trouble is of course that the public will not read and will not interpret
gently or sympathetically. The public is going to read this in the worst possible
interpretation.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Dr. Bush.
568
The WITNESS. Thank you, sir.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. ROBB. That is all we have to do today.
Mr. GRAY. Do you have some affidavits?
Mr. GARBISON. I think they could go over until Monday. It won't take very
long.
Mr. GHAT. We will recess for the weekend and meet again Monday mornin*
at 9: 30.
(Thereupon at 2 : 50 p. m., a recess was taken until Monday, April 26, 1954, at
9:30 a. m.)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION.
BUILDING T-3, ROOM 2022,
Washington^ D. C., Monday. April 26.
The above entitled matter came on for hearing pursuant to recess
before the board, at 9 :30 a. m.
Personnel Security Board : Mr. Gordon Gray, chairman; Dr. Ward
T. Evans, member ; and Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Roger Robb, and C. A. Rolander, Jr., counsel for the
board; J. Robert Oppenheimer ; Lloyd K. Garrison; Samuel J. Silver-
man ; and Allan B. Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer ; Her-
bert S. Marks, cocounsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
(569)
PROCEEDINGS
Mr. GRAY. Before we start, Mr. Garrison, Dr. Evans has a statement he would
like to make for the record. With your consent, I should like this to appear in
the record at this point.
Dr. EVANS. Mr. Chairman, for the record, I would like to state that I think
Dr. Bush was in error when he stated that the members of the board made a
mistake when they agreed to serve on this board unless the letter from General
Nichols was rewritten. Personally I knew very little about this case when I
agreed to serve on it at considerable inconvenience to myself, and I did so because
I thought it was my duty to serve.
Mr. GRAY. Mrs. Oppenheimer do you wish to testify under oath?
Mrs. OFPENHEIMER. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Would you be good enough to stand and raise your right hand.
Your name is Catherine Oppenheimer?
Mrs. OPPENHEIMER. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Katherine Oppenheimer, do you swear that the testimony you are to
give the board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you God?
Mrs. OPPENHEIMER. I do.
Whereupon Katherine Oppenheimer was called as a witness, and having been
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Will you be seated, please.
Mrs. Oppenheimer, it is my duty to remind you of the existence of the perjury
statutes. We will assume that you are familiar with them.
I should also like to say to you what I have said to the other witnesses, and
that is that we consider these proceedings a confidential matter between the
Atomic Energy Commission and its officials on the one hand, and Dr. Oppen-
heimer and his witnesses and representatives on the other. The Commission
will issue no public releases, and we express the hope that witnesses will take the
same view.
The WITNESS. Bight*
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Garrison, will you proceed?
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILTCBMAN:
Q. Mrs. Oppenheimer, you are the wife of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer?
A. I am.
Q. What were yon doing in the autumn of 1933?
A. I was attending the University of Wisconsin.
Q. You were attending the University of Wisconsin?
A. That is right.
Q. As an undergraduate student?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you do during the Christmas holidays of 1933?
A. I went to stay with friends of my parents in Pittsburgh.
Q. Will you tell us the circumstances of your meeting Joe Dallet?
A. Yes. I have an old friend in Pittsburgh, a girl called Selma Baker. I saw
quite a bit of her at that time. It was Selma who said she knew a Communist,
and would we like to meet Mm. Everybody agreed that would be interesting.
There was a New Year's party. Selma brought Joe Dallet.
Q. Did you and he fall in love during that holiday period?
A. We did.
Q. Did you decide you would be married?
A. We did.
Q. Did you fix a date for that?
A. Yes. I decided to go back and finish my semester at Wisconsin and then
join Joe In Youngstown and get married there.
Q. Is that what you did?
A. Yes.
(571)
572
Q. The semester ended at the end of January, I suppose, of 1934, and you
went to Youngstown?
A. Early February. I don't know.
Q. Joe Dallet was a member of the Communist Party?
A. He was.
Q. And you knew that he was?
A. Yes.
Q. During your life with him, did you join the party?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Will you tell us why you Joined the party?
A. Joe very much wanted me to, and I didn't mind. I don't know when I
joined the party. I think it was in 1934, but I am not sure when.
Q. Did you do work for the party?
A. Yes.
Q. What kind of work?
A. I mimeographed leaflets and letters. I typed. I did generally office work,
mostly for the steel union that was then in existence.
Q. What were most of your activities related to?
A. Mostly to the union at first, and later anything that came up, I was sort
of general office boy.
Q. Did you pay dues to the party?
A. Yes,
Q. How much were the dues?
A. I believe mine were 10 cents a week.
Q. Would you describe the conditions under which you lived with Joe Dallet as
those of poverty?
A. Yes.
Q. How much rent did you pay?
A. Five dollars a month.
Q. As time went on, did you find that you became devoted to the party or more
devoted or less devoted or more attached or less attached?
A. I don't think I could ever describe it as a devotion or even attachment
What interest I had in it decreased.
Q. Did Joe's interest decrease?
A. No, not at alL
Q. Was that a cause of disagreement between Joe and yourself?
A. I am afraid so.
Q. Did you and Joe ultimately separate?
A. We did.
Q. When was that?
A. About June of 1936.
Q. Would you say that your disagreement with Joe about your lack of en-
thusiasm, shall we say, for the party, had something to do with the separation?
A. I think it was mostly the cause of the separation. I felt I didn't want to
attend party meetings or do the kind of work that I was doing in the office.
That made him unhappy. We agreed that we couldn't go on that way.
Q. Did you remain in love with him?
A. Yes.
Q. Where did you go when you separated?
A. I Joined my parents in England.
Q. That was about June of 1936?
A. I think it was June.
Q. Did a time come when you wrote Joe that you were willing to rejoin him?
A. Yes. I wrote him probably very early in 1937, saying that I would like
to rejoin mm.
Q. Did he answer you?
that W(rald ^ S°od» but he was on **» TOy to Spain
A. I met him at Cherbourg aboard the Queen Mary as it docked.
Q. That was in 1937?
A. Yes. I think it was March. I am not sure.
Q. Did you go with him then to Paris?
A. We took the boat train and went to Paris.
Q. How long did you stay in Paris with him.
ha^e been a we* It
573
Q. Do I understand that he had a furlough or some time off or something
because of the reunion?
A. That is right.
Q. What did you do during that 10 days or so in Paris?
A. We walked around and looked at Paris, went to restaurants, the sort of
thing one does in Paris. We went to the museums and picture galleries. We
went to one large political meeting, a mass meeting, where thye were advocating
arms for Spain.
Q. Who was the speaker?
A. Thorez.
Q. He was a Communist?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall any other political activities if that might be called one
during that period or that 10 days or so?
A. I think one should describe as a political activity that one place I saw where
people who were going to Spain were being checked in and told how to do it.
I went there once.
Q. As a spectator?
A. I had nothing to do.
Q. Then Joe went off to Spain.
A. Yes.
Q. During that period did you meet Steve Kelson?
A. Yes. I met him in Paris. I saw him several times. I think Joe and I
had meals with him occasionally.
Q, What did you talk about with him?
A. I don't know; all kinds of things. I think among other things the only
thing that interests this board is the fact that we talked of various ways of
getting to Spain, which was not easy.
Q. Then Joe went to Spain at the end of that 10 days os so?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you do?
A. I went back to England.
Q. Did you try to do anything about joining Joe?
A. Yes, I wanted to very much.
Q. What was your plan as to how you would join Joe?
A. I was told that they would try to see if it were possible, and if it were, I
would hear from someone in Paris and then go to Paris, and be told how to get
there.
Q. Was there talk of your getting a job somewhere in Spain?
A. Yes. I don't know what, though.
Q. Were you ultimately told that it was possible?
A. I got a letter from Joe saying that he found me a job in Albacrete.
Q. Did you then go to Paris?
A. First I stayed in England and waited quite a while, until October.
Q. What year was this?
A. 1937. I then got a wire saying I should come to Paris, and I went Do
you want me to go on?
Q. What happened when you got to Paris?
A. When I got to Paris, I was shown a telegram saying that Joe had been
killed in action.
Q. What did you do then?
A. I was also told that Steve Nelson was coming back from Spain in a day
or two, and I might want to wait and see what Steve had to say. He had a lot
to tell me about Joe.
Q. Did Steve come?
A. Yes,
Q. And met you in Paris?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you talk with Steve? ^
A. Yes, I spent at least a week there. I saw Steve most of the time.
Q. What did you talk about with him.
A. Joe, MprcqpM, myself.
Q. Would you say that Steve was kind to you and sort of took care of you
during that period?
A. He certainly was, very.
Q. Did you discuss with Steve what you would do now?
A. I did.
574
Q. Will you tell ns what that discussion was?
A. For a little wliile I had some notion of going on to Spain anyway.
Q. Why?
A, I was emotionally involved in the Spanish cause.
Q. Did Joe's death have something to do with your wanting to go on anyhow?
A. Yes, as well as if alive he would have.
Q. Did you discuss this with Steve?
A. I did, but Steve discouraged me. He thought I would be out of place and
in the way. I then decided that probably I would go back to the United States
and resume my university career.
Q. Is that what you did?
A. Yes.
Q. After you returned to the United States, did you continue to see any of the
friends that you had with the Communists?
A. When I first got back I saw some friends of Joe's in New York who wanted
to know about him and to whom I wanted to talk. I saw some other members
of the Communist Party in New York. I went to Florida with three girls. I
know one was a Communist. I think another one was, and the third one I don't
remember.
Q. Did that relationship with Communist friends continue?
A. No, it did not.
Q. What happened?
A. I visited a friend of mine in Philadelphia. I had planned to go to the
University of Chicago, and got back to the United States to go back to their
second trimester. I don't know whether they still have that system, I- knew
no one there. I met a lot of people in Philadelphia, and they said, "You know
all of us, why don't you stay here?" I stayed in Philadelphia and entered the
University of Pennsylvania, the spring semester of the year 1937-88.
Q. What kind of work did you do at the university?
A. Chemistry, math, biology.
Q. Was biology your major?
A. It became my major interest.
Q. Did you continue to do professional work as a biologist?
A. I did graduate work later and some research.
Q. Ultimately you had a research fellowship or assistantship?
A. Both.
Q. Where?
A. University of California.
Q. Did you remarry?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you give us the date of your remarriage and the man whom you
married?
A. I married Richard Stewart Harrison, an English physician, in 1938, in
December or November.
Q. Was he a Communist?
A, No.
Q. He was a practicing physician?
A. He had been, I think, in England. He had to take all his examinations in
this country and do an internship and a residency before he could practice
here.
Q. Did he go to California?
A. Yes.
Q. And you went with him?
A. No. He went to California much earlier than I to take up his internship
Q. Did you go out there to join him?
A. Yes.
Q. After graduation in June of 1939? When did yon meet Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Somewhere in 1939.
Q. When were you divorced from Dr. Harrison?
A. In the first of November 1940.
Q. You then married Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Yes.
Q. Did there come a time after you married Dr. Oppenheimer when you again
saw Steven Nelson?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you tell us the circumstances of that?
A. I will as best I can remember. I remember being at a party and meeting
a girl called Merriman, I knew of her. She was in Albacrete, and her husband
575
also got killed in action there. The reason I remembered her name is that I
had been asked to bring her some sox when I came. When I met her at this*
party, she said did I know that Steve Nelson was in that part »>f the LI mm 17.
I said no, and then expressed some interest in his welfare. Some time thereafter
Steve Nelson telephoned me, and I invited him and his wife and their small
child up to our house.
Q. What did you talk about?
A. We had a picnic lunch. The Nelsons were very pleased that they finally
had a child, because they tried for a long time to have one without success.
We talked about the old days, family matters.
Q. Did you see him again?
A. I think that they came out to our house two times
Q. Was it all just social?
A. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. What was the date of this period, approximately? If you have
said, I have forgotten.
The WITNESS. I didn't say, Mr. Gray, because I am a bit vague.
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Can you give it as closely as you can?
A. Yes. I would guess it was late 1941 or perhaps in 1942. I don't know.
Q. Are you fairly clear it was not later than 1942?
A. Fairly clear.
Q. Have you seen Steve Nelson since 1942?
A. Since whenever it was?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. You are no longer a member of the Communist Party?
A. No.
Q. When would you say that you ceased to be a member?
A. When I left Youngstown in June 1936.
Q. Have you ever paid any dues to the party since then?
A. No.
Q. Will you describe your views on communism as pro, anti, neutral?
A. You mean now?
Q. Now.
A. Very strongly against.
Q. And about how far back would you date that?
A. Quite a long time. 1 had nothing to do with communism since 1936. I
have seen some people, the ones that I have already described.
Mr. SILVERMAN. That is all.
Mr. KOBE. No questions.
Mr. GRAY. Mrs. Oppenheimer, how did you leave the Communist Party?
The WITNESS. By walking away.
Mr. GRAY. Did you have a card?
The WITNESS. While I was in Youngstown ; yes.
Mr. GRAY. Did you turn this In or did you tear it up?
The WITNESS. I have no idea.
Mr. GRAY. And the act of joining was making some sort of payment and
receiving a card?
The WITNESS. I remember getting a card and signing my name.
Mr. GBAY. Generally speaking, as one who knows something about commu-
nism as it existed at that time in this country and the workings of the Com-
munist Party, and therefore a probable understanding of this thing, what do
you think is the kind of thing that is an act of renunciation? That is not a very
good question. In your case you Just ceased to have any relationships with the
party?
The WITNESS. I believe that is quite a usual way of leaving the party.
Mr. GRAY. When you were in the party in Youngstown, or when you were in
the party at any time, did you have a party name?
The WITNESS. No. I had my own name, Kitty Dallet.
Mr. GRAY. Was that the usual thing for people to use their own name?
The WITNESS. I knew of no one with an assumed name. I believe that there
must have been such people, but I knew of none.
Mr. GRAY. I think the record shows that in some cases there were people
who had some other name,
sossas— 54 87
576
The WITNESS. I think there were people who lived under an assumed name
and had that name in the party, but then that was the only name I would have
known.
Mr. GRAY. When you saw Steve Nelson socially in whatever year this was,
1940, 1941 or 1942, did you discuss the Communist Party with him? Did he
know that you were no longer a member of the Communist Party?
The WITNESS. Yes, that was perfectly clear to him.
Mr. GRAY. Did he chide you for this or in any way seek to reenlist your
sympathy?
The WITNESS. No.
Mr. GEAY. He accepted the fact that you had rejected communism?
The WITNESS. Yes. I would like to make it clear that I always felt very
friendly to Steve Nelson after he returned from Spain and spent a week with
me in Paris. He helped me a great deal and the much later meeting with him
was something- that was still simply friendship and nothing else.
Mr. GRAY. The people you dealt with in Paris or that you saw there were
members of the Communist Party. I have in mind any discussions you had
about going to Spain, both before and after your husband's death?
The WITNESS. I wouldn't know who was or wasn't then. Many people were
going to Spain who were not members of the Communist Party. I think, how-
ever, that probably most of the people I saw were Communists.
Mr. GRAY. But at that time you were not?
The WITNESS. No.
Mr. GRAY. This was following your leaving the party in Youngstown?
The WITNESS. That is right.
Mr. GRAY. Do you suppose they were aware of the fact that you had left the
Communist Party?
The WITNESS. I am sure they were. I mean such as knew me.
Mr. GRAY. This is a question not directly related to your testimony, but we
have had a witness before the board recently— I might say I am sorry I didn't
ask him this question— and this witness referred to Soviet communism in a
general discussion here before the board. In your mind as a former member
of the Communist Party in this country, can a distinction be made between the
Soviet communism and communism?
The WITNESS. There are two anwsers to that as far as I am concerned. In
the days that I was a member of the Communist Party, I thought they were
definitely two things. The Soviet Union had its Communist Party and our
country had its Communist Party. I thought that the Communist Party of the
United States was concerned with problems internal. I now no longer believe
this. I believe the whole thing is linked together and spread all over the world.
Mr. GRAY. Would you think that any knowledgeable person should also have
that view today?
The WITNESS. About communism today?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. Yes, I do.
Mr. GRAY. I was puzzled by this reference to Soviet communism in April 1954.
But in any event, you would not make a distinction.
The WITNESS. Today, no ; not for quite a while.
Mr. GRAY. But in those days you in your own mind made the distinction?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. At that time the American Communist Party was not known to
yon to be taking its instructions from Russia?
The WITNESS. No.
Mr. GRAY. You testified that today you are opposed to the Communist Party
and what it stands for.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. I am getting back now to whatever action of renunciation is Do
you think these days that a person can make a satisfactory demonstration of
renunciation simply by saying that there has been renunciation?
The WITNESS. I think that is too vague for me, Mr. Gray.
Mr. GRAY. All right I am afraid it is a little vague for me, too. I won't
pursue it
Do you have any questions?
Dr. EVANS. Just one. Mrs. Oppenheimer, I have heard from people that there
are two kinds of Communists, what we call an intellectual Communist and Just
a gain ordinary Commie. Is there such a distinction, do yon know?
The WITNESS. I couldn't answer that one.
577
Dr. EVASS. I couldn't either. Thank you. I have no more questions.
Mr. GRAY. Thank yon very much, Mrs. Oppenheimer.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GARRISON. May we take a 5 minute recess?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GRAY. Do you wish to testify under oath, Dr. Lauritsen?
Dr. LAURITSEN. I would like to.
Mr. GRAY. Will you raise your right hand, please, sir. What is your full
name?
Dr. LAURTTSEN. Charles Christian Lauritsen.
Mr. GRAY. Charles Christian Lauritsen, do you swear that the testimony you
are to give the board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?
Dr. LATTRITSEK. I do.
Whereupon, Charles Christian Lauritsen was called as a witness, and having
been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Will you be seated ; please, sir.
Dr. Lauritsen, it is my duty to remind you of the existence of the so-called
perjury statutes with respect to giving false information, and so forth. Is it
necessary for me to review those provisions with you, or may we assume you
are familiar with them?
The WITNESS. I would be very glad to hear the essentials.
Mr. GRAY. The provisions of section 1621 of title 18 of the United States Code,
known as the perjury statute, make it a crime punishable by a fine of up to
$2,000 and/or imprisonment of up to 5 years for any person to state under oath
any material matter which he does not believe to be true.
It also is an offense under section 1001 of title 18 of the United States Code,
punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more
than 5 years, or both, for any person to make any false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or misrepresentation in any manner within the jurisdiction of any
agency of the United States.
If, Dr. Lauritsen, in the course of your testimony it should become necessary
for you to refer to or disclose restricted data, I would ask you to notify me
in advance so that we might take certain necessary and appropriate steps.
Finally, I should say to you that we consider these proceedings a confidential
matter between the Atomic Energy Commission and its officials on the one
hand, and Dr. Oppenheimer, his representatives and witnesses on the other.
The Commission will make no release about this proceeding and this testimony,
and we express the hope that witnesses will take the same view.
Mr. Marks.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. MARKS:
Q. Dr. Lauritsen, what is your present position, and where?
A. I am professor of physics at the California Institute of Technology.
Q. How long have you held that post?
A. I believe as full professor since 1936. I have been at the California Insti-
tute since 1926, first as a graduate student, later as assistant professor, and
subsequently associate professor, and full professor.
Q. Are you an experimental or theoretical physicist?
A. Experimental.
Q. Dr. Lauritsen, will you describe briefly the nature of the more important
war work that you did during World War II? Let me suggest that you leave
out the preliminaries and just describe as what you regard the most important
A. All right Starting in July 1940, I came to Washington and joined the
National Research Defense Committee which had just been formed in June.
The organization consisted of four divisions, and I was appointed by Dr. Bush
as vice chairman of division A on armor and ordnance. More important things
that we worked on in that division initially were proximity fuse sand rockets.
Q. Will you tell the board about your work on rockets during the war?
A. Yes, I will be glad to. In the early summer of 1940-^1 am sorry, 1951 —
Dr. Haf stad and I were sent to England,
Q. Who is Dr. Hafstad?
A. Dr. Hafstad at the present time is head of the Reactor Division of the
AEC. Dr. Harry Hafstad. He and I were sent by the NDKC to England to
discuss proximity fuses with them. We brought over the first samples of the
proximity fuses we made in this country.
578
Mr. ROBB. I can't hear the witness. Will you speak louder?
The WITNESS. Shall I repeat? Dr. Hafstad and I were sent by the National
Defense Research Committee to England on proximity fuses. I had also been
intersted in the development of rockets in this country and the program was in
my opinion not very satisfactory at that time, although I was responsible for it.
I knew nothing about the subject at that time. So while we were in England
in the early summer of 1941, I obtained all the information that I could on
rockets in England and on the British rocket program. At the same time I also
obtained all the information I could about the British atomic energy program.
When I came back I reported to Dr. Vannevar Bush on these two subjects.
You wanted particularly to hear about the rocket program?
By Mr. MASKS :
Q. Yes.
A. As a result of my report to Vannevar Bush, he asked me to organize an
expanded effort on producing of rockets for the armed services. This I tried
to do first here in the East without very much success, and in the fall of 1941,
I went back to Pasadena and started a program at the California Institute
for the development of rockets.
A number of my colleagues had been here in Washington up to that time
working on proximity fuses. They went back to Pasadena with me and started
this rocket program.
The result of this was that ultimately we produced all the rockets that were
used in World War II by the Navy and the Marines and tlie Air Force.
Q. When you say "we produced," who do you mean by "we"?
A. I mean this rocket project at the California Institute of Technology.
Q. Who was the head of that?
A. I was the technical director of that program and responsible for the
technical program.
Q. You mean you produced at the project in Pasadena?
A. At the project we developed the first type of rockets that we thought were
necessary and that we could get Interest in that the military thought they needed,
particularly the Navy. I worked personally very closely with the Bureau of
Ordnance. We then developed these and tested them, and when they were
approved, we produced them until such time as large companies could get into
production.
A typical example was the 5-inch rocket, which you read so much about
that was used in Korea. This one we developed and we manufactured in
Pasadena something considerably over 100,000, which were used in the European
theater, and later on in the Pacific war. * * *
Q. Did I understand you to say, however, that your project in Pasadena pro-
duced all the rockets that were used in World War II.
A. All the rocket types, not the individual rockets that were fired. We pro-
duced them only until large companies could take over production, which was
usually something like a year. We made all the rockets used in the African
landings, In the Sicilian landings, and in a number of the landings in the Pacific,
like Iwo Jima, and many of the others. Altogether several hundred thousand
rockets. Our total project added up to about $80 million spent at the project
Q. How many people did you have under you in that production work?
A. I am not quite certain, but I believe the number was something like 3,500
at the maximum. This, of course, did not include contractors and subcontractors.
These were the people employed by the California Institute for this purpose.
Q. Can you tell what importance you attached to the rocket program and why?
A. Personally I like to think that the most important thing was the landings
in the Pacific which ultimately became a matter of walking ashore. There were
very few casualties due to the heavy bombardment of the shore defenses just
before landings were made. A number of landings were made in the Pacific with
almost no losses. Of course, the same thing was true at Inchon. The coast line
Q. Inchon when?
A. During the Korean war. The coast line was heavily bombarded and there
was no opposition .when we landed. This Is of course not entirely due to rockets,
but until they started using the rockets in large numbers, the losses on landing
operations were very heavy. ^^
Q. I don't quite understand what part the rockets played.
A. The advantage of the rocket is that you can unload almost a whole ship's
cargo of rockets in a very short time and no shore installations can withstand
such bombardment. Rockets can be fired in huge numbers at one time.
579
Another application was the application of the 5-inch rocket that I Just men-
tioned to airplanes. This made a very powerful weapon out of the carrier based
airplanes as well as the small support aircraft used by the Air Force for sup-
porting ground troops. They are tor all practical purposes equivalent to a 5-inch
naval gun.
Q. Did the use of rockets represent any change in the nature of firepower?
A. It is an enormous increase in firepower at the moment you need it, in a
very short time. You can fire thousands of them in 1 minute. It would not be
possible to provide enough guns to deliver that fire at one time in a short
period. * * *
Q. Apart from the work that you did on development and production of these
new weapons, did you have anything to do with the introduction of their use
into military operations?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you describe that?
A. Whenever a weapon was accepted for service use, and we produced the
ammunition, we usually sent a man along with the equipment to the various the-
aters to be sure that it was received with some understanding and used in a
reasonable way and that the equipment was kept in operation, and that the crews
were trained. It was usualy necessary to spend some time training crews.
As an example, I might mention that I was together with one or two of my
colleagues to Normandy in 1944 to introduce these rockets to the Air Force.
We equipped some squadrons and trained them in their spare time, usually at
night after they had been carrying out their daytime missions and operations.
They were enthusiastic enough about it to work on learning how to use them
during the evenings. They would go back from Normandy, sometimes, over to
England to practice on a field that we had borrowed from the British. It was
necessary to stay with an operation like this long enough until the weapon was
properly used.
Q. How much experience have you had in this kind of field work in the intro-
duction of the use of new weapons that you have been concerned with?
A. Usually I did not personally go out with all the equipment. I did per-
sonally go out with some of the first submarine weapons that we developed,
and I took part in many of the training exercises on the shore bombardment
rockets and on the aircraft rocket I was frequently involved. But often other
members of our organization were the ones that went out in the field to help
with these things.
Mr. GRAY. Do you mind if I interrupt for a minute, Mr. Marks?
Mr. MASKS. Surely.
Mr. GRAY. Are you going to relate this to the present inquiry?
Mr. MARKS. Yes.
The WITNESS. I think I have not said anything that is classified.
Mr. MARKS. If the chairman prefers, I would be glad to get directly to the
issue on the present inquiry and then go back?
Mr. GRAY. I don't want to restrict you at all, but we are in a little different
field than we have been discussing in these hearings.
Mr. MARKS. I don't want the testimony to be unintelligible through any point
of mine.
Mr. GRAY. Let us proceed.
By Mr. MARKS :
Q. Let us leave this subject and let me ask you what later work did you do in
World War II apart from the rocket work?
A. During 1944 it became apparent to us that the war was coming to an end,
and that there would probably not be time to dream up any very important new
rocket weapons that could be produced in quantity to have much effect on the
war. The Navy agreed with us. At that time they decided that they wented to
take over the operation of the facilities that had been developed for our purpose,
namely, the large test and development station at Inyokern, Calif. We had been
operating that station during the war. In 1944, the Navy decided that they
would take that over gradually and also to take over the future development
of rocket weapons.
Q. What did you do then?
A. At the request of Dr. Bush and Dr. Oppenheimer and General Groves, I
went to Los Alamos to help with the final stages of the atomic bomb.
Q. What did you do in that capacity?
A. Most of what I did was talking, I am afraid. I attended numerous meet-
ings of the various divisions when they had meetings trying to make decisions. I
580
would usually attend these meetings. I attended meetings of the various steering
committees and in general tried to assist Dr. Oppenheimer in any way that I
could on making decisions, particularly on hardware.
Q. What do you mean by hardware?
A. Hardware is all the things that are required to produce a weapon and all
the components that are necessary for the weapon itself. They may be elec-
tronic gadgets or castings or machine parts or production tools. We had a con-
siderable part of the responsibility for producing the explosive components,
that is, the conventional explosive components, and the various tools necessary
and installations necessary for producing these.
Q. Bid you have a title at Los Alamos? Where did you work?
A. I had no title. I worked directly in Dr. Oppenheimer's office.
Q. How long was that?
A. Just about 1 year. I agreed to stay 1 year, and at the end of 1 year the
war was over.
Q. When you say you worked in his office, you mean in the office which he
occupied?
A. Yes.
Q. You and he occupied an office together?
A. That is right
Q. How long had you known Dr. Oppenheimer before that?
A. I have known Dr. Oppenheimer since he came back from Europe, from
Qoettingen, which I believe was in 192S or 1929. I am not certain about the
date. In 1928 or 1929, when he came to Pasadena.
Q. In the years since that date, how well have you known him?
A. I have known him as well as I have known any member of our faculty.
Q. Commencing when?
A. Very soon. In fact, I probably saw him the date he arrived because it
happened accidentally that we had been interested in the same problem, he
in the theory of it, and I in the experimental aspects of it. So he looked me
up very soon after he came there, I believe.
Q. What date was that approximately?
A. Either in 1928 or 1929. I could certainly get that date, but I could not be
very certain at the moment
Q. Did you become dose friends?
A. I would say so, yes.
Q. Has that friendship continued?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you observe Dr. Oppenheimer during the thirties and the forties, and
can you say anything about his political views and activities during that- time?
A* I cannot say very much about it. I knew very little about it until, I think,
about the time of the Spanish war. This was the first time that I knew that
he had any political interest. Up to that time I have no recollection that we
ever discussed political questions of any in interest or serious nature.
Q. What impression did you come to have of his political interests?
A. It is a little difficult to say because I think they changed a great deal with
time. I would say that at one stage he was very deeply interested in the Spanish
Loyalist cause, and took the attitude that was taken at that time by many lib-
erals, the hope that they could do something about it, and that they would like to
help the Spanish Loyalist cause.
You spoke of his changing views. What do you mean by that?
A. I think it was probably a gradual increase in interest in social causes, a
compassion for the underdog, if you like. The attitude that many liberals took
at that time.
Q. Did you observe in him an identification with views that were regarded as
Communist views or with which the Communists were associated?
A, I think at that time very few of us and perhaps very few Americans had
very little idea about what communism was. I think most of us that were
concerned about political things and international things were considerably
more concerned about fascism at that time than we were about communism.
Fascism seemed the Immediate threat, rather than communism. Also, I *Mnir
perhaps my own views were colored by the fact that I was born and raised in
Denmark, where Germany was the natural enemy, rather than Russia. I think
for that reason we did not pay as much attention to the evils of communism as
we should have done.
Q. Were you mixed up in any communistic activity?
A. No.
581
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I don't think the witness quite answered the question
Mr. Marks propounded to him. I wonder if we might have it read back so the
witness could have it in mind.
(Question read by the reporter.)
The WITNESS. I frankly did not know, Just what characterized the Communist
view at that time. When they talked about improving the lot of the working
people, I believe Oppenheimer and probably many other people thought this
was a good beginning. But that this was not the whole story of the Communist
ideology I think was not realized by very many people at that time. Does that
answer the question?
Mr. ROBB. Yes.
The WITNESS. It did not occur to me at that time or at any other time that he
was a Communist Party member. In fact, at the date we are talking about,
namely, the early part of the Spanish-American War, I didn't know there was
such a thing ;
By Mr. MASKS:
Early part of what war?
A. The Spanish War. Did I say Spanish-American?
Q. Were you in the Spanish- American War?
A. No. These are words that have just been associated so long. I was not
aware that there was such a thing as a secret membership of the Communist
Party. I don't know if other people were but I was not.
Q. I asked you, I think at the time Mr. Robb reminded me that you had not
answered an earlier question, whether you were mixed up in Communist activities
yourself.
A. I was not
Q. Was there a difference between yourself in that respect and what you
observed of Oppenheimer at that time?
A. I think I was more pessimistic about what liberals could accomplish, even
if they were trying to accomplish good things. I was less optimistic about what
you could do about these activities. Therefore, I took no part in them.
Q. As time went on, did you notice any change in Dr. Oppenheimer's attitude
about these matters which you have indicated as being more optimistic than
yours?
A. How far along are we now? Are we still hi the thirties?
Q. Let us take the period, Dr. Lauritsen, from the late thirties to the early
forties.
A. In the late thirties, the event that I remember best, the discussion that I
remember best, is the discussion we had, I believe it was on the day that Russia
signed the agreement with Germany. This was an event that shocked me very
deeply and we discussed it at considerable lengths.
Q. When you say ''we," who do you mean?
A. I was thinking about conversations Dr. Oppenheimer and I had on that day,
I believe, or at least very shortly after. I was very convinced that this was the
beginning of a war and during our conversation I am quite certain that Dr.
Oppenheimer agreed with this point of view, and was as concerned about it as
I was.
Q. Concerned in what way?
A. Afraid that this would lead to war, realizing what a bad situation, what a
dangerous situation for the rest of the world, this combination of Russia and
Germany could be.
Q. Did anything else happen as time went on of that nature?
A. This was 1933, was it not? Shortly after that the war started. The war
was a reality. That is Germany went into Poland.
Q. What if anything did you observe about Dr. Oppenheimer's attitude as
these events of the late thirties and early forties progressed?
A. Yon must realize that our most intimate contacts at this time during the
late thirties were limited to the spring term, because Dr. Oppenheimer spent
most of the year in Berkeley, and only the spring term, part of May and June,
in Pasadena. So there were considerable intervals when we did not spend a
great deal of time together.
The next thing that I recall was in 1940, and it was in the spring of 1940 that
we at the California Institute realized that we would have to change our way of
life and that sooner or later we would have to get into war work. As I have
already related, in June 1940, NDRC, the National Research Council, was organ-
ized and in July I joined. So there were long periods after that when I did not
get back to California and when I did not see Dr. Oppenheimer.
582
Q. Do you have anything to say— if you don't, of course, just don't say it—
about your observation of his views during the period 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943?
A. I can only say that at that time in 1940-41, I saw Dr. Oppenheimer only
rarely, probably only 2 or 3 times. I do remember at one time — I think it was
in 1941— he did not tell me what he was working on, I did not tell him what I
was working on, but he did ask me if I thought that there would be an oppor-
tunity possibly later of his contributing to the work that we were working on.
When I say "we," I meant in 1941, division A, Professor Tolman, who was a
very good friend of both of us, who was the chairman, and I was the vice
chairman. Dr. Oppenheimer expressed the desire perhaps to join us, because
of our old associations.
Q. Could you date that time?
A. I could not be sure but I think it was 1941.
Q. Was it the early or latter part of 1941?
A. It was almost certainly either during the spring term, namely, June and
July, early summer, or else Christmas, because those were the two times when
we were most likely to be in Pasadena at the same time. As I say, the rest of the
year he was as far as I know in Berkeley.
Q. So that the next intimate, if you can call it that, contact you had with
Dr. Oppenheimer is when you came to Los Alamos into his office?
A. That is right.
Q. Did you observe anything about his political attitude then?
A. At that time politics didn't seem very important. The job was to win the
war.
Q. What did you do after the war?
A. After the war I went back to teach school at California Institute of Tech-
nology.
Q. And how long did you do that without extensive outside interests?
A. This continued without too much interference from the outside until the
start of the Korean war.
Q. What change occurred in your own work after the commencement of the
Korean war?
A. Actually some of these activities started before the Korean war. I may
have a little difficulty in getting the actual date, but I will at least get the
sequence.
The first so-called study project that I was asked to join was called the Hart-
well project * * *
After this study, which was according to the Navy people that I know quite
satisfactory and quite useful to them, these studies became a habit.
Q. Became a habit with whom?
A. With the military, and a number of such studies were originated by the
military.
Q. How many did you engage in?
A. Hartwell, as I say, was the first one. The next one was called
Charles. * * * I believe it was In the summer of 1951, which resulted in the
setting up of the Lincoln laboratory. * * * Perhaps this was before. It was
already in the summer of 1950 that we undertook at the California Institute of
Technology a study that was called the Vista study. * * *
Q. From whom did you get that assignment?
A. From all three services. It was originally suggested in somewhat modified
form by the Air Force, but before we undertook the program the Army and the
Navy joined, and it was done jointly for all 3 services and under the direction
the 3 services.
Q. What other connections have you had with military work since 1950?
A. In fact, ever since the war I have spent a little time in an advisory capacity
at the naval ordnance station at Inyokern. In the beginning it was merely
because of personal and friendly relations with the technical director up there.
Frequently I visited at his request. Somewhere around 1949, he requested from
the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance an advisory board which was set up on a
formal basis. It was setting up this thing for the same purpose, but on a formal
basis. This board was organized, I believed, in 1949. I was the first chairman
of that board. The board still meets about three times a year and I am a mem-
ber of that board, but no longer chairman. We rotate the chairmanship.
This was the only direct connection I had with military affairs, as I say,
until 1950.
The next thing I was requested to do was to go to Korea for the Secretary of
Defense's office, the Weapons System Evaluation Group. I went there in October
583
and November of 1950. The Korean war started, I believe, In June 1950. As-
suming this is correct, then it was in October or November of 1950.
Q. What else have you done along these lines?
A. I am still on two panels of the Scientific Advisory Board of the United
States Air Force, one panel on explosives and ordnance, the other panel on
nuclear weapons. I am a member of an advisory board to the R3search and
Development Command of the Air Force in Baltimore. I am a member of a
panel on armament.
Q. Since 1950, how much of your time has been devoted to this work con-
nected with military affairs?
A. Including homework and travel, it is probably about half my time.
Q. Since 1950?
A. Yes.
Q. In these connections, did you have anything to do with much top secret
material?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have what is called a Q clearance in all of these matters?
A. Yes.
Q. In this work commencing with the Korean war, what associates have you
had with Dr. Oppenheimer and to what extent has his work and yours over-
lapped or coincided?
A. I believe the first contact on these problems was in connection with an ad
hoc committee in the Research and Development Board. It was an ad hoc
committee of the Committee on Atomic Energy in the Research and Development
Board. We had meetings around Christmastime or I guess January 1951 —
probably December 1951 and January 1952— the purpose of this was to make
recommendations to the Research and Development Board and the Military
JLOaison Committee on long range planning and production of atomic weapons.
I think this was the first contact.
I was, as far as I know, still am, a consultant to this permanent committee
of the Research and Development Board.
Q. What other connections did you have with Dr. Oppenheimer in this work?
By "this work" I mean the general activities of yourself in the military field
since the Korean war.
A. I believe the next connection or perhaps this was even before was on the
Vista project, where we asked Dr. Oppenheimer to help us on a particular chapter
on which he was better informed than most of the rest of us.
Q. In connection with the work at MIT on continental defense, did you have
any association with Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Yes, I do not recall whether Dr. Oppenheimer was present or took part in
the first study, the one I referred to as the Charles study, but after the Lincoln
Laboratory got under way, there was a subsequent study the following summer
at which Dr. Oppenheimer and I were both present part of the time. The main
purpose of this study was to see if the Lincoln Laboratory could somehow be
improved, whether they were doing the right things, and whether we were
covering all the important aspects of continental defense.
Q. In your observations, do you care to make any comment about the nature
of his contributions to these various endeavors that you have described?
A. I think they were very important. It is always hard in a large group like
that to know who contributes most. It is a joint effort
Q. What was your own purpose in all of the military work that you have
been doing since Korea, speaking generally?
A. My own purpose is to contribute to avoiding a war if we possibly can.
To be somewhat more specific, I think my general thinking was very much in-
fluenced by the detailed objectives of the Vista study, * * *
Q. Again speaking generally, how did you give expression to this purpose
in the work you did and the policies you advocated?
A. We did that by getting a great deal of help from the military, especially
from the people that had fought over there in World War II. * * *
Q. What part did consideration of atomic weapons play in this work?
A. We felt that if atomic weapons
Mr. ROBB. Excuse me. The witness said "We." Could he identify who he is
talking about for clarity?
The WITNESS. I am talking about the Vista project
Mr. ROBB. I mean the individuals, in the interest of clarity.
584
By Mr. MASKS:
Q. Would you try to do that?
A. I will be very glad to try to do that. The way the Vista project was
operated was that a group of us would be together usually for a couple of hours
every morning, and discuss what we were trying to do— trying to formulate
what our understanding of the problem was. This group consisted of Dr. Du-
Bridge, the director of the project, Dr. Fowler, and a number of the senior
members of the institute faculty, like Dr. Bacher and myself, and also the heads
of the various subdivisions of the project. With us would usually be visiting
people or people that we could somehow persuade to spend time with us. As
an example, I might mention that Dr. Wedemyer spent several weeks with us,
and General Quesada spent a good deal of time with us. We kept notes during
these discussions and tried to write up what we thought was a sensible program
as a result of these discussions.
Q. What about Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I doubt if he was ever present at any of the dally strategy sessions. If he
was, it was only one or two occasions.
Q. What part did he play in the ultimate formulation of the Vista report?
A. He played an important part in expressing our ideas on * * * one par-
ticular chapter, called chapter 5. On that chapter he was very helpfuL
Q. Who were the other who worked on that chapter?
A. Most of the preliminary planning and writing was done — the discussion was
usually between Dr. Bacher, Dr. Christie, and myself, and I think most of the
preliminary writing was done partly by Dr. Bacher and part by Dr. Christie.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer help on that?
A. Not in the preliminary stages, but later on in arranging the material and
presenting it in the final form, he helped. He made a very important contribu-
tion.
Q. If you can put it briefly, what was the essential point of this chapter 5 on
atomic weapons that you have been talking about?
A. The essential point was that we felt that without the use of atomic weapons
to support ground operation, to destroy mass attacks like we have seen in
World War II so often on the Russian front, and like we have seen in Korea. To
hold it was necessary to have atomic weapons that could be delivered on short
notice, and with high accuracy in all kinds of weather. We felt that with the
growing stockpile, it was wise and besides, that it was necessary in order to
solve our problem. But in any case, we felt that it was wise to use part of our
stockpile or to divide part of the stockpile so that it could be used for this purpose
if it was necessary. We believe it was necessary in order to resist aggression.
Q. Did this mean that you were opposing strategic air use of atomic weapons?
A. Not at alL It meant that we felt that * * * it would not be wise to
devote all of our stockpile to strategic weapons.
Q. There has already been testimony in these proceedings about a trip to
SHAPE which was made by yourself and a number of others in connection with
the Vista report in the latter part of 1951. Could you describe the circumstances
of that trip, why it was made and what you did?
A. This was at the time when the Vista report was nearing completion. It was
in what we considered very close to its final form. Some of the people on the
project, especially Dr. DuBridge, felt that it would be very important to discuss
the proposals, especially the more radical proposals in tactical change in airport
with the staff of the supreme headquarters. Some of the Secretaries, I believe
especially Secretary Lovett, thought this was sound before the report went in
officially. So the arrangements were made and Dr. DuBridge. Dr. Oppenheimer,
and Dr, Whitman and I went over to discuss the Vista report with the planning
staff at supreme headquarters.
Q. Why did you, take Dr. Oppenheimer along?
A. Because we felt that people would be more likely to believe what he said
about what we could do about atomic weapons than what any of the rest of us
saw. Also, be learns very fast, and we thought we might learn something
while we were over there.
Q. Was there any difference between your views and his about the use of
atomic weapons?
A. Not that I know ot
^S** ^ a result o* your visit to supreme headquarters toward the end of 1951,
did you make any essential changes in your report?
A. There were no essential changes. There were changes in wording, in ex-
pression, and the way the material was presented perhaps in some places, but
there was no change In the essential idea. * * * p«"-«», uut
585
Q. When you speak of using atomic weapons in support of ground troops, are
you speaking simply of a different kind of use of atomic weapons, or are you
speaking of different kinds of atomic weapons than those which would be used
in strategic?
A. They would in general be quite different
Q. Had they been developed?
A. They had not been developed and tactics for delivering them had not
been developed at that time.
Q. What were you advocating then?
A. We were advocating the development and use of weapons that would be
suitable for precise delivery at close range from our troops and in all kinds of
weather. * * * We felt that by increasing the accuracy you could economize
on material. You see if accuracy is poor, you must have a very large explosive
to destroy a target. If the accuracy is high you can get along with a much
smaller weapon.
Q. I think there has been a suggestion in these proceedings that in the course
of going through various drafting stages, the Vista report changed substantially
from time to time in respect of chapter 5. Would you comment on that?
A. I hope it improved due to discussions with very many people. The purpose
was still the same. There was nothing changed that made it less useful for our
purpose. There was no significant change in the methods proposed, as far as I
know. I can say I was still happy with the final version of the report I think
it would accomplish our purpose.
Q. How about some of the intervening drafts?
A. There were a number of those. There were not nearly as many as there
would have been if I had been writing it. Most people need more than one draft.
As a result of discussions some wording was changed, or perhaps some emphasis
was changed, but the general purpose and important ideas in that chapter were
not changed as far as I know.
Q. Just so that we can be clear, Dr. Lauritsen, will you say again what that
essential purpose was?
A. That essential purpose was to try to develop weapons — In particular In
chapter 5, of atomic weapons— for supporting ground operations. * * *
Q. In any of these drafts did the essential attitude that you have described
with respect to strategic use of atomic weapons as contrasted with the new
tactical uses change?
A. I think not. Certainly not to the extent that this was lost sight of because
this is what made the Vista proposals as a whole possible.
Q. When you speak of this, I am not sure I know what you mean.
A. I mean the tactical use * * *.
Q. Did you at all times think that was consistent with the maintenance of a
strong strategic air force?
A. Yes. I think this is even more true now * * *. But even at that time I
think it was sound to start on this development.
Q. Again by this development, you mean tactical use?
A. Weapons that could be delivered with high accuracy in any kind of
weather * * *.
Q. Will you turn your mind now, Dr. Lauritsen, to the studies that you
referred to having to do with continental defense at MIT. What was the
relation in your mind between the efforts that were being made in those studies,
what was the relation in your mind between those studies and those efforts and
the policies that you advocated with respect to tactical and strategic use of
atomic weapons or any kind of weapons?
A. I am not sure I understand your question. I am not sure there is any
relation except as far as our overall military effort is concerned. May I say
why I was interested in Lincoln? Is that what you are trying to get at?
Q. That is correct
A. We knew by that time, by the time of the first study on Lincoln, namely,
the Charles study, that the Russians had, or very soon would have, a very
considerable capability of striking us * * *. We knew they had an air force
that was capable of coming over here and delivering those weapons. We felt it
was important first of all to get as early warning as we could of a possible attack.
Second, that it was Important to be able to shoot down as many of these bombers
before they reached our strategic airfields and our principal cities. * * *
Mr. ROBB. Could we have a date on this, Mr. Marks, approximately?
The WITNESS. The Charles study? I can certainly find that It was either
1960 or 1951. * * *
586
By Mr. MARKS.
Dr. Lauritsen, let me see if I can get at the question that I put to you rather
badly a moment ago. Do you believe that we need a strong strategic air?
A. I do.
Q. Do you believe that we need strong developments and strong capabilities in
respect of tactical use of atomic weapons?
A. I do.
Q. Do you believe that we need a strong continental defense?
A. Yes.
Q. Taking into account what you know of the relation between scientific
development and military affairs, and taking into account what you know of our
capabilities and potential, do you regard these three views that you have
expressed as consistent or inconsistent?
A. I think they are consistent.
Q. To what extent can you say of your own knowledge that the views you have
just described are similar to or different from the views that you know Dr.
Oppenheimer to hold?
A. I believe he agrees with me. He has worked hard on all of these three
things. I think his purpose has been the same as mine. He may have sometimes
thought of it differently in different details. The aims have been the same, I am
convinced, and we have agreed in general.
Q. Dr. Lauritsen, what opinion do you have about Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty
and character? By loyalty I mean loyalty to title United States.
A. I have never had any reason to doubt it.
Q. Do you think you could be mistaken about this ?
A. I suppose one can always be mistaken, but I have less doubt than any other
case I know of.
Q. Less doubt than in any other case?
A. Than in any other person that I know as well.
Q. Do you know many people better?
A. Not many. I suppose I know my own son better, but I don't trust him
any more.
Q. To what extent would you trust Dr. Oppenheimer's discretion in the han-
dling of classified information, restricted data ?
A. You are referring now to recent years when he understood these problems,
I hope. In that case I think I would trust his discretion completely. I think in
the early thirties very few of us knew anything about discretion and were not
very conscious of security. Whether he had been indiscreet at that time, I
don't know. It is possible. It is possible I have been indiscreet. But I am sure
after he understood what security meant, and what was involved, that he has
been as discreet as he knew how.
Q. What do you mean' by as discreet as he knew how?
A. As discreet as it is possible to be and try to get some work done.
Q. Do you have any idea about whether your views about the needs for and
the possibilities of being discreet are any different than his?
A. I think they are no different now, certainly.
Q. Let us take the period commencing in 1944, when you went to Los Alamos.
Is that the span of years you are talking about ?
A. During that period this would apply. At that time he knew the importance
of the information we had.
Mr. MASKS. That is all, Mr. Bobb.
Mr. GRAY. I think it would be well to break for a few minutes at this point
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Bobb, will you proceed.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Doctor, do I understand that you have known Dr. Oppenheimer both pro-
fessionally and socially?
A. That is correct
Q. Have you visited him from time to time at his ranch in New Mexico ?
A. I liave visited him I think twice.
Q. When was that, sir?
A. About the middle thirties— 1935 or 1936, 1 believe.
Q. Do you also kotow Dr. Oppenheimer's brother Frank ?
A, I do.
Q. When did you meet fr*™, sir?
587
A. I believe I met him for the first time at the ranch in 19JJ5 or 103G. I mav
have seen him once before, but I am not quite sure
Q. Was he on the faculty at Cal. Tech.?
A. He was a graduate student.
Q. Under you?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you get to know him pretty well, too?
A. I got to know him quite well in the laboratory.
Q. And you saw him on the ranch, also, I take if?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you know him at Los Alamos?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Have you seen him since then very frequently?
A. Not frequently. I have seen him. Most recently last year at a meeting
of the physical society in Albuquerque, X.Mex.
Q. Up until the end of it, did you have any reason to bel'eve that Frank was
a Communist or had been a Communist?
A. No, I had no reason to believe that until he made that statement himself.
Q. What would you say about Frank's loyalty?
A. I have no reason to doubt his loyalty.
Q. And his character?
A. His character is very good.
Q. You would make about the same answer about him that you do about Dr
Oppenheimer?
A. Yes, I would think so. His judgment was perhaps not as good as Dr.
Oppenheimer's.
Q. Yes, sir. I notice that you made some little distinction between Dr. Op-
penheimer's present appreciation of security and his appreciation in the past of
security.
A. I think that applies to all of us.
Q. Yes, sir. You suggested that there might have been some change in Dr,
Oppenheimers' attitude on those matters.
A. On how important you think it is, how seriously you take it.
Q. Would you care to tell us, Doctor, when you think that change took place?
A. I think we all learned about it during the war.
Q. You think Dr. Oppenheimer learned about it during that period?
A. That would be my judgment. I think this was true of most of us that
had had little to do with military things until that time.
Q. I see. Did you know many of Dr. Oppenheimer's friends ?
A. I knew of his friends in Pasadena and some of his friends in Berkeley.
Q. That is up until the war years, is that right ?
A. That is right.
Q. Did you know a man named Frank K. Malina at Pasadena?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Who was he, Doctor?
A. He was first, I believe, a graduate student and later a research fellow in
the aeronautics department on a special project that had to do with rocket
developments.
Q. Was he working under you?
A. No, he was not. When I first went to Pasadena I knew of his work. I
did not know of him personally. I hoped to get him to undertake the rocket work
at Pasadena. However, we did not agree on what should be done, so I dropped
the subject and went to Pasadena myself to do the work. We had no connection
with their development, which incidentally resulted in the so-called assisted
takeoff system which is not a weapon for a method for getting aircraft with
overload or from too short trips.
Q. What they called JATO?
A. That is right.
Q. Did you suspect at any time that Frank Malina had any Communist
connections?
A. I had no way of knowing. I did not know him personally.
Q. You did not suspect that?
A. I had no way of knowing. I did not know him socially. I never have
associated with him. I have only talked with him a few times when I tried
to get him interested in this project.
Q. At least you knew him well enough to suggest that he come help you on
the project?
A. That is right, I knew of his work.
Q. Did you suspect that he had any Communist connections?
A. I had no idea, no.
Q. Did you know a man at Pasadena named Martin Summerfield?
A. I had a student at one time in a class, not in my laboratory, by that name.
I believe he later worked at the jet propulsion laboratory but I have had no
connection with him since he was a student.
Q. That Jet propulsion laboratory was a part of Gal. Tech.?
A. It is a contract with the Army Ordnance Corps that is administered by CaL
Tech., but it has no other connection with Cal. Tech. It has the same relation
as Los Alamos has with the University of California.
Q. You never had any suspicion, of course, that Martin Summerfield had any
Communist connections?
A. I had no way of knowing.
Q. Did you know Dr. Thomas Addis at Berkeley?
A. No.
Q. Did you know a David Adelson at Berkeley?
A. No.
Q. Did you know a couple named Henry Barnett and Shirley Barnett?
A. At Los Alamos?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. Who were they?
A. He was a doctor, I believe.
Q, Who was she?
A. I think she was a secretary.
Q. To whom?
A. To Dr. Oppenheimer, I believe, or assistant secretary.
Q. Did you ever have any reason to suspect that they had any Communist
connections?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever suspect that?
A. No. I would have no way of knowing.
Q. Did you know a man named David Bohm at Berkeley?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you ever meet a woman named Louise Bransten?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Did you ever know a man called Haakon Chevalier?
A. No, sir.
Q. You never met him?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you know a man named Robert Raymond Davis at Los Alamos?
A. I can't recall. I can't be sure. Davis — the name sounds familiar. Was
he a physicist at Los* Alamos?
Q. I believe so. In all events, you didn't know him well if you knew him?
A. I certainly did not know him well. I have no recollection of knowing him.
Q. Did you ever know a man up at San Francisco named Isaac Folkoff?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you know a man at Berkeley named Max Friedman?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you know David and Francis Hawkins at Los Alamos?
A. I knew David Hawkins, not Francis Hawkins.
Q. Who was David Hawkins?
A. David Hawkins was, I guess you would call him a historian. When I
knew him he was writing the history of the project
Q. Did yon know him before he began to write the history of the project
Doctor?
A. I knew him probably from the time I Joined Los Alamos, that is, from
September 1944*
Q. You didn't Join until September 1944?
A. That is right
Q. Do you recall what Hawkins was doing then?
A. No, I don't I think he was already then thinking about this history, but
I am not quite sure what he was doing.
?' 5*d Jou ever sus*>ect Ifcat he ever had any Communist connections?
A. No, sir, I did not know Mm personally.
Q. Did yon know a man at Berkeley named Alexander S. Kaun?
A* No, sir*
589
Q. Did you know a man at San Francisco named Rudy Lambert?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you know a man at San Francisco named Lloyd Lehmann?
A. No, sir. If any of these people are physicists it is quite possible I have met
them at one time or another, but I have no recollection of knowing them.
Q. When I say San Francisco, I mean the area of San Francisco to include
Berkeley.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you know a man named Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz up there?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you know a man in San Francisco named Kenneth May?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you know a man named Philip Morrison at Los Alamos?
A. Yes.
Q. What was he?
A. He was a theoretical physicist.
Q. Did you come in contact with him frequently?
A. I saw him quite frequently. In fact, I knew him before I went to Los
Alamos. He was a student of Dr. Oppenheimer who occasionally while he was
a graduate student came during the spring term to Pasadena with Professor
Oppenheimer.
Q. Did you ever suspect he had any Communist connections?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you know a man at Los Alamos named Eldred Nelson?
A. I knew Nelson, but I do not recall him at Los Alamos. I recall him the
year after. He was in Pasadena the year — in late 1945 and 1946.
Q. Did you know anything about his background and associations?
A. Not any.
Q. Did you know a man at Los Alamos named Bernard Peters, and his
wife, Hannah Peters?
A. Is he the physicist who later was at Rochester?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I did not know him at Rochester, but I met him since the war. I mean I
didn't know him at Los Alamos.
Q. Did you know him at Berkeley?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever suspected that he has ever had any Communist connections?
A. I heard that after the war.
Q. After the war?
A. Yes ; I did not know him before.
Q. How did you happen to hear that?
A. The way I heard about it was that 2 years ago the physical society had a
meeting in Mexico City, and I was president— no, I was elected— I was vice
president of the physical society. Dr. Rabi was the president of the physical
society. He was at that time in Italy at UNESCO meeting, so I was requested
to represent the physical society in Mexico City. There was an invited paper
on the program to be given by a physicist who had worked with Peters. It was
joint work that was to be presented. This invited speaker died in the mean-
time or was killed in an accident, I believe, and some of Peters' colleagues re-
quested that the physical society should appoint him the invited speaker to give
this paper. They referred to me as the highest official in the country at the time.
Q. The senior officer present.
A. That is right. However, I referred it back to the secretary of the society,
who habitually handled all of those things. So I avoided the decision. But
this was the first time as far as I remember that I had met Dr. Peters.
Q. How did the Communist business come into it?
A. It came in because someone told me to be careful about this, because he
might not be able to get permission to go into Mexico. So that is the reason
I did not want to invite him.
Q. Did he appear?
A. He did, but be appeared without official invitation from the society.
Q. That was 2 years ago?
A. I think so, 2 or 3.
Q. Did you ever know a man up in the San Francisco area, named Paul
Pinsky?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you ever hear of him?
590
A. I think I have heard the name, but it doesn't mean anything to me, and I
certainly do not known him personally.
Q. Did you ever know a man in the San Francisco area named William
Schneiderman?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you ever hear of him?
A. I have heard the name.
Q. It doesn't mean anything to you?
Q. Dld'you'know Robert and Charlotte Serber at Los Alamos.
A Vgg gir.
Q' Do you know anything about their political background?
A No. There again I had known them long before the war. Dr. Serber was
again one of the students that came down during the spring term with Dr.
Oppenheimer. So I got to know them long before the war, and saw quite a bit
of them at Los Alamos.
Q. Did you ever suspect that Mrs. Serber had any Communist connections?
A! No ; I did not suspect that she had Communist connections, I would say
that I thought she was again what I would call an optimistic liberal.
Q. That is as far as your suspicion, if you can call it such, went?
A. That is right
Q. Did you ever know a man named Joseph Weinberg?
A. In Pasadena or in Berkeley?
Q. In Berkeley or Pasadena.
A. No. I know only of what I read in the papers. He is Scientist X, is that
not correct? I do not know him. As far as I know, I have never met him.
Q. You don't know anything about him?
A. No.
Q. Do you know anything about the organizations to which Dr. Oppenheimer
may have belonged in the late thirties and early forties?
A. No; I do not I assume you do not refer to the physical society or the
National Academy?
Q. No, sir. I mean the other organizations.
A. No.
Q. Doctor, you said that Dr. Oppenheimer played an important part in
expressing the ideas of your group in chapter 5 of the Vista report Would you
tell us just what that part was that Dr. Oppenheimer played?
A. I think you know that Dr. Oppenheimer is very articulate.
Q. Yes, sir.
A. He is very good at expressing ideas clearly and understandably.
Q. Yes.
A. This is primarily what I had reference to.
Q. You mean he drafted that part of the report?
A. There were several drafts before he came out the first time, and then
there were many discussions afterward. The wording was modified more or
less continuously until the final version was accepted.
Q. Dr. Oppeuheimer's part was in preparing that final draft?
A. The final draft and possibly some intermediate drafts where the wording
was somewhat different, perhaps the emphasis somewhat different, but as far
as I know, the main theme was the same.
Q. Was that final draft presented at a meeting out in Pasadena?
A. Yes. In fact, even earlier drafts were presented to the whole group that
was working in the field.
Q. There certainly came a time when the finished product was presented to
the meeting, is that right?
A. That is right
Q. Do you recall who it was who presented it, Doctor?
A. I believe Dr. DuBridge presented it
Q. Referring to that draft as it was prepared by Dr. DuBridge, do you re-
member if that said anything about thermonuclear weapons?
A. They may have been mentioned, but they were not part of our proposal
for close support, for Army support.
Q. Would you explain that a bit to me, Doctor? Why weren't they?
A. In the first place, at that time the feasibility of hydrogen weapons had not
yet been established, and we did not feel that this could be part of our proposal.
Pevelopment work was still going on and the investigation of the technical
feasibility of a hydrogen bomb was still going on*
591
Q. This was in May 1952?
A. No ; this was in November 1950, 1 believe, was it not?
Q. We were both wrong. It was November 1951.
A. November 1951, that is correct. That is the time that we discussed the
version that we took to Europe with us. That was November 18, 1051, 1 believe.
*******
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, do you remember in the spring of 1932, specifically in May, when
there was discussion about so-called Ivy Shot?
A. I remember the Ivy Shot ; yes.
Q. The Ivy Shot was supposed to be a test of some thermonuclear device.
A. That is right.
Q. Did you take any position on whether or not that should be postponed or
canceled?
A. I thought it was an Important time to see if some agreement could be reached
for avoiding future tests, or if there was some way of reaching agreements on
control of weapons of that character. I thought a study should be made, and
consideration should be given to the possibility of making use of this important
event to accomplish this purpose.
Q. Was it your position that the Ivy test
Mr. MAEKS. Mr. Robb, what was the date of the Ivy test?
Mr. ROBB. It was in the fall of 1952, wasn't it, Doctor?
The WITNESS. That is my belief and recollection.
Mr. ROBB. We are talking now about the spring of 1952.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Was it your position in the spring of 1952 that the Ivy test should not take
place?
A. It was my position that some effort should be devoted that summer to
studying the question of whether we could take advantage of this possibility of
trying to reach some sort of agreement on the limitation of the use of thermo-
nuclear weapons.
Q. Agreement with -whom?
A. With the Russians.
Q. Did you oppose the Ivy test in the absence of such an effort to make an
agreement?
A, I did not oppose it in any official capacity. I thought It was very
unfortunate.
Q, Were you opposed to the development of the so-called H-bomb?
A. Yes.
Q. Had you finished?
A. I have finished. I think I have said all I can say unless we go Into
classified material.
Q. Were you opposed to the development of the H-bomb as of the spring
of 1952?
A. You refer to a hydrogren bomb, is that correct?
A! I thought it would be very unfortunate to devote an effort to that that
would be so large that it would interfere with the weapons that we have discussed
earlier, namely, the weapons that the Vista study indicated were needed for
ground support and for resisting aggression in Western Europe.
Q. Doctor, I don't want to be unfair with you, but am I to conclude from your
answer that you were opposed to the development of the H-bomb?
A. I was not opposed to a study of the technical feasibility of an H-bomb,
That was the question that was being considered at that time, I believe.
Q In May 1952?
A." I think so. I believe this was the President's directive, that a study of the
technical feasibility should he made. This I was in favor of.
Q. Doctor, when was the President's directive?
A. I believe there were two directives, one on the 30th of January, and the
second, an official newspaper announcement, on the 31st of January, 1950.
Q. That was 2 years before May 1952.
A. That is right.
Mr. ROBB. I think that is all I care to ask, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GBAT. Dr. Lauritsen, do you feel as of today a member of the Communist
Party, that is, a man who is currently a member of the Communist Party, is
automatically a security risk?
803313—54 38
592
The WITNESS. I think so.
Mr. GRAY. Yon don't have any question in your mind about that, do you?
The WITNESS. No ; not if I can believe what I have been told about the Com-
munist Party, and I do believe it.
Mr. GBAY. In testifying earlier, I think you said you considered Dr. Irank
Oppenheimer loyal in every respect, and with no reservations about this charac-
ter or trustworthiness?
The WITNESS. That is right.
Mr. GRAY. Are you aware that Dr. Frank Oppenheimer has stated at an
earlier period in his life he was a member of the Communist Party?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir I am aware of that now.
Mr. GBAY. But still you say you have no reservations about his loyalty or
character?
The WITNESS. No, I have not.
Mr. GBAY. Would you explain to the Board why you conclude that yon would
trust him with any secret, which I believe is the effect or import of what yon say,
today, although you believe that a member of the Communist Party is auto-
matically a security risk? Would you explain that?
The WITNESS. I believe he has resigned from the Communist Party, and he la
no longer under the discipline of the Communist Party. I believe he was
cleared for work on war projects during the war and including nuclear weapons
work.
Mr. GRAY. This was not after it was known he was a member of the Communist
Party?
The WITNESS. This I have no way of knowing. I do not know what turned np
in his investigation.
Mr. GBAY. Would you feel that if it had been known at the time that he was
a member of the Communist Party he should have been cleared for war work?
The WITNESS. If he had not resigned previously, I would certainly not rec-
ommend his clearance. If he had resigned previously because he no longer
wanted to be a member of the Communist Party because he had found out that
the Communist Party was not what it appeared to be, then I would still be
inclined to say that he would be reliable.
Mr. GBAY. Today on classified projects for which you have some responsibility,
including a security responsibility, if a man comes to the project seeking em-
ployment, who is known to you to have been a former member of the Communist
Party, would you employ him simply on his statement that he no longer was
a member of the Communist Party?
The WITNESS. No ; not without appropriate clearance through official channels.
Mr. GBAY. What would your recommendation be?
The WITNESS, If he had resigned from the Communist Party when he found
out what the purpose of the Communist Party really was, and had been a
member only as long as he had been under misconceptions about these things,
then I would not hold that against him.
Mr. GBAY. You would accept as evidence of that his own statement?
The WITNESS. Not necessarily. I think some people you can trust, and
others you can't trust. I think it depends on what other activities he has
been involved in and what he has been doing. In Frank's case, I think he demon-
strated that he wanted to work for this country. Other people perhaps have not
demonstrated that. I think there is a great deal of difference between being a
Communist in 1985 and being a Communist in 1954. I don't think very much
of us knew, I certainly did not know what the Communist Party was up to and
how it operated.
Mr. GBAY. Let me ask this question : Would it be a rather accurate summary
of at least parts of your testimony to say that you never really understood very
much about the Communist Party or its workings?
The WITNESS. That I did not?
Mr. GBAY. That is right.
The WITNESS. At that time.
Mr. GBAY. Because each of these people that Mr. Eobb asked you about, who
I think were later identified as having been in the party or close to it, you
testified that this was something you had no knowledge or suspicion about.
The WITNESS. That is right.
Mr. GBAY. Have yon ever known anybody that you thought was a Com-
munist?
The WITNESS, Not personally, no.
Mr. GBAY. So membership in the Communist Party is something you really
have not concerned yourself with in any way?
593
The WITNESS. That Is right
Mr. GRAY. Did you know Mr. Fuchs?
The WITNESS. I knew him at Los Alamos.
Mr. GRAY. You didn't suspect he was a Communist?
The WITNESS. No. I did not know him well. My contacts with him were
limited to our having lunch together in the same dining room occasionally.
Apart from that, I did not know him.
Mr. GRAY. But you had no more suspicion of him than you did of the others
whose names have been mentioned here?
The WITNESS, No.
Mr. GRAY. If asked at the time would you hare said that he was loyal to
the war effort?
The WITNESS. I would not have said it. I did not know him well enough to
have an opinion. I had nothing to do with his work.
Mr. GRAY. If he worked very hard at Los Alamos and contributed effectively,
that is in a sense a demonstration of his loyalty?
The WITNESS. I would say it would be one in his favor, but perhaps not
conclusive.
Mr. GRAY. In the light of developing facts.
The WITNESS. That is right. I could not have testified against him if I had
been asked to because I did not have the information.
Mr. GRAY. Ton would not consider yourself an expert on communism in any
sense of the word?
The WITNESS. No.
Mr. GRAY. Have you any questions, Dr. Evans?
Dr. EVANS. Yes. Doctor, you said you were born and raised in Denmark.
The WITNESS. That is correct
Dr. EVANS. Would you tell us just where you were educated?
The WITNESS. I studied in a technical school called Odense. I graduated from
there in 1911. Then I studied at the Royal Academy of Arts in Copenhagen
subsequently.
Dr. EVANS. You got a degree from there?
The WITNESS. I got a degree from this technical school, what probably here
would be called structural engineering. I think that would be the nearest
approach to it I was at that time planning to be an architect
Dr. EVANS. You are not a Communist?
The WITNESS. I am not a Communist, no.
Dr. EVANS. Have you ever been what is called a fellow traveler?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Have you belonged to any of these subversive organizations that
appear on the Attorney General's list?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Doctor, do you believe that a man can be perfectly loyal to his
country and still be a security risk?
The WITNESS. I suppose so, yes.
Dr. EVANS. You have faith in Dr. Oppenheimer's discretion, you say?
The WITNESS. I do.
Dr. EVANS. Have you ever been approached for security information?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Dr. EVANS. Men have approached you?
The WITNESS. BBI, yes,
Mr. GRAY. I want to make sure the witness understands this question.
Dr. EVANS. I don't mean the FBL
The WITNESS. I am sorry.
Dr. EVANS. I mean somebody that might be a Soviet agent
The WITNESS. No.
Dr. EVANS. You have never been approached?
The WITNESS. Not to my knowledge, no.
Dr. EVANS. You are not always able, I>octor, to tell these Communists when you
meet them, are yon?
The WITNESS. That is right
Dr. EVANS. It apparently is not easy to recognize them.
The WITNESS. That is right
Dr. EVANS. It is particularly apparent for a professor not to know whether peo-
ple are Communists, is that true?
The WITNESS. I think it is true of anybody. I don't think professors are any
better or any worse than any other people.
594
Dr. EVANS. I don't know, Doctor, since I have been on this board. That is all.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Marks.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. MARES:
Q. Dr. Lauritsen, looking back over the span of the last 25 years, do yon know
Robert Oppenheimer or Frank Oppenheimer better?
A. Robert much better.
Q. Would you explain that?
A. We had more professional things in common and were if not of the same age,
at least more nearly the same age. It was only reasonable both being members
of the faculty that I should know him better. Also, I have known him a longer
time and a greater fraction of the time.
Q. You said you don't consider yourself an expert on communism.
A. No; I don't
Q. Do you consider yourself an expert on Dr. Oppenheimer's trustworthiness?
A. No, I don't know what an expert on that is, or how you get to be an expert
on that. I only know what my own feelings and belief are, and it is very deep.
Q. There was a long list of names read to you. Some of them you said you
didn't know.
A. As far as I know, as far as I remember.
Q. Some of them you described, such acquaintance as you had with them. Are
there any people on that list that was read to you by Mr. Robb with respect to
whom your knowledge was as great as that of Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. No; I think not.
Q. Considering the fact, Dr. Lauritsen, that you extensively engaged in military
work of a top secret nature, would you consider it a departure from discretion
if you were to visit with Dr. Morrison today?
A. No,
Q. Would you consider it a departure from discretion if you visited with the
Serbers?
A. No.
Q. Would you visit with them?
A. I would like to very much.
Q. Would you say the same of Dr. Morrison?
A. I know him very little. I know the Berbers fairly well. I have no knowl-
edge that they are Communists.
Mr. GRAY. I don't know whether you had completed your Questioning
Mr. MARKS. I think so.
RE-CROSS-EXAMINATION
Q. How about Peters? Would you visit him?
A. I don't know him personally, but I feel that it would be very wrong for the
Physical Society to throw him out of the society. It is not a political society.
Q. No, but from what you have heard about Peters, would you feel that vou
were being discreet to associate with him?
A. I really don't know enough about him to be sure about that
Q. You couldn't be sure either way?
A. I don't have enough information.
Q. One question that I overlooked, Mr. Chairman. Do you recall Doctor, any-
thing in the Vista report, either in the draft as it was read in final form at Pasa-
dena or later, about an announcement by the United States that no strategic
atomic attack would be made against Russia unless such an attack were first
started by Russia, either against the Zone of Interior or against our European
Allies, or something of that sort? *^
* * * * * ' « »,
rt^TT^fV^?! ^^^ ?bout any ana°uncement to that effect being made by
the United States? Was there any recommendation?
A. Was a recommendation in the Vista report?
Q. I am asking you to search your recollection for it
A. I think it is possible that we pointed out that we felt that the tactical sup-
S?J^SS2 ** a^SKe tt •** a statement was m*de, that we would not use
the strategic capability except in retaliation.
Q. Was that your view?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it Dr. Oppenheimer's?
595
A. I believe so.
Q. Did your views and Dr. Oppenheimer's pretty generally coincide during
this period?
A. I think so.
Q. Was that true in May of 1952, also?
A. In May of 1952?
Q. When you were talking about the Ivy test.
A. I think so, yes.
Q. Did you discuss that with him?
A. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. I think that is all.
Mr. GRAY. I have Just one other question. Dr. Lauritsen. Would it be fair
for me to assume that your view with respect to a Communist, former Commu-
nist, and so forth, is that you really prefer not to have to make these determina-
tions, and you would rely on the security people for it?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. In fairness, isn't that your statement, that you would just prefer
not to have to go into it?
The WITNESS. That is right.
Mr. GRAY. I don't want to put my statement in your month.
The WITNESS. No, I agree this is the point of view. We have machinery for
handling these cases, and I think it would be quite wrong for me to make the
decisions.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. MASKS:
Q. Dr. Lauritsen, accepting the view that you have just described, that we
have machinery for deciding the kind of issues that the Chairman has men-
tioned about the Communists, I would like to have you distinguish between the
operation of that machinery in the large, the operation of that machinery in
general, and the opinion that you hold with respect to Dr. Oppenheimer, and I
would like to ask you whether you have any hesitation in making the judgment
on this matter with respect to Dr. Oppenheimer — personal judgment — that is, a
personal judgment with respect to his character, loyalty, discretion.
A. Would you say what the question is?
Q. My question, is, bearing in mind your view that it is appropriate for the
machinery of government to determine questions of who is and who is not a
Communist, who is and who is not a security risk, I would like now to ask you
whether in view of that opinion you have any hesitation in expressing what your
own convictions are about Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I think I have already done so. I take it we are in the middle of the
operation of this machinery, and I have made statements that I would have no
hesitation to recommend complete clearance.
Q. I was not asking you that.
A. I thought that is what yon asked.
Q. I think you answered the question.
Mr. GRAY. I think his earlier testimony pretty adequately answered that. I
don't want to keep him from saying it again, but I think it is perfectly clear.
Mr. MARKS. No, I just wanted to be sure that there was a distinction. Just
one more question.
By Mr. MARKS :
Q. The testimony that has already been given by others here suggests to me
that it is not inappropriate for me to ask the question that I am about to ask. If,
however, the answer to it in any way involves classified information, you will
have to say so.
*******
A. May I state it a little differently? It is a little hard to answer directly.
Q. Answer it as best you can, if you can without getting into classified material.
A. The best I can say is that from what I know about the discussions that
have appeared in the newspapers, the discussion has been on the basis of whether
yon are for or against a crash program on hydrogen bombs. This expression
was not used as far as I know in any directive by the President. The President's
directive did not mention crash program. It did not mention hydrogen bomb.
I believe it mentioned the order of investigation of the technical feasibility of
thermonuclear weapons.
*******
596
Does that answer the question? I was never opposed to carrying out what I
understood to be the President's directive but it has been discussed in very
different terms, it seems to me.
Mr. MARKS. I think that is all.
Mr. ROBB. That is all.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Dr. Lauritsen.
The WITNESS. Thank you.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GRAY. Who is your next witness?
Mr. GARRISON. I told Mr. Buckley that I arranged for him to testify at 2
o'clock.
Mr. GBAY. Do you have anybody here now?
Mr. GARRISON. We have Dr. Zacharias here.
Mr. GRAY. Is he likely to be a long witness?
Mr. MAEKS. I hope not.
Mr. GRAY. Could we get started with Dr. Zacharias?
Mr. GARRISON. The problem you will recall about Mr. Buckley
Mr. GRAY. Yes, I would say in this case because of Mr. Buckley's health and
circumstances of his being here, if we don't finish with Dr. Zacharias, we will
interrupt his testimony. But I would like to get ahead with it if we can unless
you object to that.
Mr. ROBB. No, indeed.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Zacharias, do you wish to testify under oath? You are not
required to do so. However, I think I should point out to you that every witness
who has appeared to this point has chosen to do so.
Dr. ZAOHARTAR. Yes, I do.
Mr. GRAY. Would you be good enough to stand and raise your right hand.
What is your full name?
Dr. ZAOHARIAS. Jerrold R. Zacharias.
Mr. GRAY, Jerrold R. Zacharias, do you swear that the testimony yon are to
give the board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Dr. ZAOHARIAS. I do.
Whereupon, Jerrold B. Zacharias was called as a witness, and having been
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Will you be seated, please, sir?
It is my duty to remind you of the existence of the perjury statutes, and the
fact that there are penalties with respect to violation of those statutes. Do I
need to review those with you, Doctor?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Mr. GRAY. I should like to reguest that if in the course of your testimony it
becomes necessary for you to refer to or disclose restricted data, yon notify me in
advance so that we may take certain appropriate steps in the interest of security
Unally, I should say to you, as I say on behalf of the board to all witnesses,
wa«.b WG ^UUOAU^J. uuio 1/j.ircccuuug a uujLuiueuuaj. matter Between me Atomic Junerffy
Commission and its officials on the one hand, and Dr. Oppenheimer, his repre-
sentatives and witnesses on the other. The Commission is making no releases
with respect to these proceedings, and we express the hope that the witnesses
will take the same view.
Mr. MARKS. May we pause just a minute. I am not sure yon expressed the
hope to Dr. Lauritsen.
Mr. GRAY. Yes, I did.
Mr. MARKS. I am quite sure he understands that
Mr. GRAY. No, I am not sure that I did.
Mr. MARKS J[ think he understands in any case but I just wanted to be sure.
Mr. GRAY. Will yon proceed.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. MARKS:
Q, What is your present position?
A. I am professor of physics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and
director of the laboratory of unclear science there.
™™ T ^orked[ Curing World War n primarily in the radiation laboratory at
^ Jmtt™ W ^ring P* ^ at *» Bdl Telephone iffi ffl£
tory at Whippany, N. X I spent about 4 months at the end of the war, Just
597
overlapping VJ-day, at Los Alamos. Then I spent a fair amount of time on a
number of study projects for the military and for things associated with the
military.
Q. What are those projects?
A. The first one was a study of nuclear powered Ilight sponsored by the Atomic
Energy Commission, a project headed by Walter Whitman, and known as Project
Lexington. I think it was probably the first of the things that we call summer
studies.
The second one was Project Hartwell, which I directed, * * * .
Then Project Charles, which was a study at MIT, headed by F. W. Loomis.
I was the associate director of that study.
*******
Then out of that study there grew a laboratory at MIT called the Lincoln
Laboratory, * * *.
I was for a time associate director of the Lincoln Laboratory in its first
year or so.
Q. When was that?
A. The laboratory started in about June, July or so of 1951. I was involved
for a short time—not very long— in Project Vista, which I am sure has entered
into these discussions before. Then as a member of Project Lincoln, I was in
charge of a study on defense of the North American Continent, a project that
had no name. We were trying not to let it be a project, but it got to be known
as the summer study of Project Lincoln. That was in the summer of 1952. I
think that is about it.
Q. In connection with this last project that you have described, did you
personally make any special contribution to it that you can describe without
getting into classified material?
A. I was director of the project, and therefore involved in almost all phases
of it. I think without getting into rather involved technical discussion which
might turn out to be classified, that is, a frank discussion of which might go
off into classified channels, I think it would be best not to be too specific about
personal contributions.
I would be glad to if necessary.
Q. How long have you known Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. As I remember it, I met him when he was a student abroad. It was in
the summer of 1926 or 1925. It was the summer of 1926 at a meeting in the
University of Leyden in Holland, and talked to him a bit
Q. What is your association with him since that time?
A. Since that time I would say it has been very scanty up until my working
at Los Alamos. However, I did meet him again in 1940— the summer of 1940—
Norman Ramsey and I met him at Seattle, and together we drove south to San
Francisco and Dr. Oppenheimer joined us.
Q. Putting .to one side such casual associations, what is the period during
which you have had close associations with him?
A. The close association, I would say, substantially started at Los Alamos
in July of 1945.
Q. Since that time have you had frequent occasion to work with him?
A. Yes, and mostly on tilings that involve the military. To some extent on
general policies, regarding the support of science.
Q. Regarding the support of science where?
A. Support of science in this country generally. Let us call it financial support
of science and the trends that physics takes.
Q. Just to be sure I understand you, you are speaking now, I take it, about
two different aspects of your postwar association with Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Yes.
Q. One is military.
A. One is you might say military in matters of national policy and that sort
of thing, and the other has to do with support of — let us be specific — of nuclear
physics. It being fairly expensive, there has been a fair amount of discussion
about how such an expensive thing can be properly supported, and the direc-
tions on which It ough to go. On those subjects we have had considerable
discussion.
Q. Did you have much contact with Dr. Oppenheimer in connection with Vista?
A. Not really. I saw him there. I was at that project only about 2 or 3 weeks.
He was there at the time that we were working on substantially different things,
and although I saw him there, I wasri't very close to the particular thing he was
working on.
Q. How about Project Lincoln?
598
A. On Project Lincoln, I think the most important thing to mention would
be the study during the summer of 1952. Could 1 go into a little detail on that?
Q. Yes, bearing in mind the Chairman's caution about classified information.
A, I think the story of that summer study is probably worth putting into
the record, and I will try to do it as quickly as I can, because it has been to a
certain extent a moderately controversial thing.
****** *
Q. Let me interrupt you there to ask you if you can say, was there any
policy with respect to continental defense before the summer study of which
you are speaking?
A. Surely. The Air Force had then and has considerable interest in conti-
nental defense, and was going along certain technical lines, and with the buildup
of a certain amount of counter force for the protection of the continent. In fact,
the Lincoln Laboratory itself, which was by then a year and a half to 2 years old,
is a laboratory that is under contract to the Air Force. It is a joint Army, Navy,
Air Force laboratory, but the Air Force holds the contract and is the major
contributor.
Q. I interrupted you when you were about to tell the story of what happened
as a result of the summer study.
A. The Lincoln Laboratory set up to work on technological and technical aspects
of continental defense. In fact, air defense of any sort. Just prior to the sum-
mer of 1952, Dr. Lauritsen and I had a long discussion about the trend in
continental defense, whether the buildup was great enough, * * *.
Dr. Lauritsen and I decided that it might be a very good thing if we looked
into these technical, military, and economic questions again during that summer.
We decided that we should talk this over with certain others whom we knew
very well. First of all, Dr. Hill, who was then the Director and is now the
director of Lincoln Laboratory. We decided we would talk it over with Dr.
Oppenheimer and Dr. Babi.
Q. Why did you talk to Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. In my experience it is always profitable to talk to Dr. Oppenheimer. His
head Is so clear on questions of this sort that when you flounder for months to
try to formulate your ideas, you get to him and he can listen and help state clearly
what you and he and others have decided is the germ of what you are thinking.
This is true in all of my contacts with Dr. Oppenheimer on this kind of question'
We decided, then, that it would be a good idea to start such a study, that Dr*
Oppenheimer, Dr. Rabi, and Dr. Lauritsen agree to work on this study in part
The reason is that it is very difficult to recruit men of stature, men of ability
into any kind of study. They are doing what they think is adequate and they
have some sense of urgency but they also have the feeling, why don't we let
somebody else do the work.
Dr. Hill, who is the director of the Lincoln Lab, and I felt that if Dr Opoen-
heimer, Dr. Babi, and Dr. Lauritsen agreed to work on this in part, that it would
be easier for us to recruit a number of very brilliant people and some of the
more experienced people to do the job. Indeed, that turned out to be true So
that directly within the Lincoln Laboratory and sponsored by the Air Force as
I say, we set up a study. '
We came out with three recommendations, one of which I would like to say
something about. And the other two I will just mention and not go into more
deeply because of security classification.
*******
Q. Let us not go into those matters, Dr. Zaeharias. You spoke of resistance to
these ideas in some quarters in the military and civilian circles. Has this
resistance persisted?
A. I am not rare that I said there was resistance. However, I am sure in the
newspapers it is dear that continental defense is a subject that has a lot of
«S±?±>!K !,! , 1?°*? ^nt to bring to tte confusion of post hoc ergo
?i? F£ ^ be£ore tte time of ** stu(Jy and before tte dis-
foUowed **• ***** was not a stoas P°licy, and there now is a
rJ^™6™^ ld? y't want ^ ST16* to be ««ted with change of national
policy no matter what I happen to tMnfr when I am by myself.
I**? *2? yOU conce^ve *^e recommendations of this summer study that you have
with respect to what is described as strategic air policy? n Cy
599
A. The only conflict is of a funny sort. Let me begin it this way. Certainly
part of any defensive system in this country is what we call our offensive plan.
One doesn't think of prote«-tinj? the continent hy cnnvf urioiml defensive means.
That is, destruction of enemy bases is JIM as important and overy bit as impor-
tant as local defense. It was the feelintr of a number of us who worked «»n this
summer study that the amount of money ami the amount of effort that the Gov-
ernment would have to put into overall defense was larger or is larger than was
being put in then. Many people interpreted our strong recommendations for
defense as an unfortunate method of cutting into appropriations for Strategic
Air Command. -This was not the case in our recommendations and we believed
then and I still believe that the money is going to have to come from other
sources, and not from cuts from the military except in the matter of pruning
certain military things that are not terribly fruitful.
Objections to try to build up continental defense from the point of view of
people who are trying to build up offensive power alone, simply that if you work
with a limited number of dollars and a limited amount of effort, naturally if you
build one thing up, you would have to build the other down. Whereas, I am
firmly of the opinion that we are going to build the whole thing up, and our
economy will have to stand it, and I am assured that it will. Does that answer
your question?
Q. You mean that you had both strategic air and also continental defense?
A. Yes, sir ; and other military things, too, as events of the present show.
Q. In this work that you have been describing
Mr. GRAY. Are you still on the continental defense, or are you about to leave?
Mr. MARKS. I was about to get to a final couple of questions.
Mr. GRAY. Please proceed if you are that close to finishing. My question was
related to whether we should stop now for lunch.
Mr. MASKS. I think I could finish in just a few minutes.
Mr. GRAY. Let us go ahead.
By Mr. MAKES :
Q. The work which you described in which Dr. Oppenheimer participated on
continental defense and other military and scientific affairs, who did you con-
ceive to be the enemy that we needed to be worried about?
A. There is no question in anybody's mind, and there was no question in the
mind of anyone who participated or was closely associated with any of these
discussions, Soviet Union, and the word "enemy," or "Russia" and the word
"enemy" are sort of interchanged freely. It Is that deeply imbedded in every-
body's thinking, including that of Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. What was your general purpose in devoting yourself to this work?
A. That is a simple question. This is the only country we have, and these
are tough times, and we want to help it.
Q. As a result of your association with Dr. Oppenheimer have you formed an
opinion or conviction as to his character and his loyalty to the United States?
A. I am completely convinced of his loyalty to the United States. Can I add a
little way of saying it?
When you are gathered in a group of men who are discussing the details on
how to combat the Russians, how to contain the Russians, how to keep them from
overrunning the rest of the world, and so on, the loyalties come out very, very
clearly. There just is not any question in my mind that Dr. Opi)enheimer's
loyalty is for this country and in no way or shape by anything other than hos-
tility toward the U. S. S. R.
Q. What about his character?
A. His character? Ethical, moral is first rate.
Q. Do you have any views as to his capacity to exercise discretion in dealing
with classified and restricted data and military secrets?
A. In my opinion, he is always discreet and careful and has regarded the
handling of secret documents and secret ideas and so on with discretion and
understanding. You might thnk it is not the easiest thing in the world to carry
around a head full of secrets and go about in public, too, and talk about burning
questions of the day. It is difficult. I believe that Dr. Oppenheimer has showed
in every instance to my knowledge that he can do tbis kind of thing.
Mr. MARKS. That is all
Mr. ROBB. I can finish in 2 minutes, I think.
Mr. GRAY, If we can, let us go ahead.
600
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Doctor, are you in the group that is called ZORC?
A. Yes, except let me say that this name was never heard of by the members
of that group, by any one of those four until it appeared in the national magazine.
Q. I was going to ask yon if you could tell us what you know about the origin
of that nomenclature.
A. I have no knowledge of the origin of that nomenclature. I do know one
friend of mine went around to a meeting of the Physical Society and hunted
for people who had heard of it. Found one and I would rather not mention
the name because it has nothing to do with this thing. He may have heard it or
it may have been the invention of the man who wrote the article.
Q I think for our purpose, the name is not popular. Was there a group con-
sisting of yourself, Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr. Rabi, and Dr. Lauritsen?
A. No, no more than there would be a group of any four people who respect
each other despite the fact that they hold slightly different ways of looking
at things— a community of interests and a slight disparity of approach. These
four people, I think, are very different.
Q. Were you four people the nucleus of that Lincoln summer study?
A. No, sir. The four were not. I would say the nucleus, as I tried to clarify
before, were Dr. Hill and myself. That is, the director of the Lincoln Labora-
tory. The first discussions were with Dr. Lauritsen. Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr.
Rabi agreed that it would be a good thing to go ahead with it and they were
willing to lend their prestige to help pull in some people into it, but this is far
from being the nucleus of the thing.
Q. That is what I am trying to find out because it has been rather fuzzy in
my mind. Were you four people — Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr. Lauritsen, Dr. Rabi,
and you— peculiarly active in that summer study? Were you the leaders of it?
A. Let me say this. I ran it. I was the director of it. So, I was in it There
are no two ways about that. Dr. Rabi, Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr. Lauritsen
spent a small fraction of their time. However, let me say this. We had for
the first week of that study a briefing for 4 days, as I remember it, that was
packed with as much meat as you can get into any 4 days of technical briefing.
I 'wanted a summary of that technical briefing, and there were about 65 people
there, all very fully informed, and the only man I could turn to give a summary,
who could pull the thing together, was Dr. Oppenheimer. He did a masterful
job. It was perfectly clear to everybody in that group how Oppenheimer felt
about all of the issues, so that if you questioned any one of those you could find
a statement of what he believed.
Q. Was there any discussion, Dr. Zacharias, about the comparative morality
of a so-called fortress concept, on the one hand, and a strategic air force to
wage aggressive war on the other?
A. Not in that summer study. I am afraid that wars are evil. I do not
think there is anyone in the room who would take exception to that. It is not
a very meaningful statement. But the question of morality, one way or the
other, you do not have time for when you are trying to think how you fight.
Q. Was there any conclusion reached as to the relative importance of a
strategic air force on the one hand and an impregnable air defense on the other
hand and, if so, what was it?
A. I know of no one who really knows the inside of the military who believes
that it is possible to have either an impregnable and all overwhelming and
completely decisive strategic air command, and I know of no one in the know
who thinks you can have a completely impregnable defense. What the country
needs is a little of both and one has to supplement the other. That was clearly
stated in the conclusion of this report.
Mr. ROBB. That is all I care to ask.
Mr. QBAY. I have a couple of questions. I am going to reverse my procedure
and call on Dr. Evans.
Dr. EVANS. I have no questions.
Mr. MORGAN. I have no questions.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Zacharias, have your own associations been in question? Have
you, for example, been identified with any groups which the Attorney General
has listed in these various publications?
The WITNESS. No, sir. Let me make one statement about this, which I have
written on all security questionnaires so you will know.
In the late thirties, sometime, there grew up something called the American
League Against War and Fascism. I may have been a member. I would now,
601
thinking back on it, believe that I should have been. It is an organization
which became Communist-dominated. What I have bad to say in any security
questionnaire is this: that if their rolls say I was, I wa*. If their rolls say
I wasn't, I wasn't. It was not something that I 1 ad inurh time for or much
traffic with. Tbis is the only thing of any sort remotely associated with this
kind of thing. Mind you, it was not a Communist-dominated organization when
I was looking into it and thinking tbat it might be a good thins to back.
Mr. GRAY. I think that is a very fair statement.
May I just ask this one further question. At one time, did you begin to be
conscious that association with the Communist Party hud elements of danger'*
Is that a clear question?
The WITNESS. Yes, but like the question that is not completely clear, the
answer will take a couple of minutes. Yes or no will not quite do.
Mr. GRAY. I understand.
The WITNESS. I went to college in New York, at Columbia, having come from
the South. I learned about that, that there was such a thing as Communism,
as a college student naturally. I lived in New York as a graduate student at
Columbia and as a member of the teaching staff of one of the municipal col-
leges, Hunter College* There was Communist argument all around. I could
never really understand any of the Communist arguments and always fought
bitterly, intellectually with all of the people who tried to hand out the Com-
munist line, so I would say that at no time since even my first discovery of
Communism did I ever think there was anything very sensible about it.
I remember even what I thought as a freshman in college. At no time did I
ever think there was anything sensible about it, so there was never any sudden
becoming aware. However, the buildup of the Communist talk was something
that a number of us in New York would always fight off and I can remember
some bitter battles with the pinks of the 1930's.
Mr. GRAY. As of the time the fighting started in Europe, would it have been
clear to you that communism might have involved some security problems?
I am not sure that is a fair question. What I am trying to get at is whether
you as a scientist were conscious at all of communism either in relationships
or its threats or dangers, or whether it was something that really did not cross
your path at all.
The WITNESS. I do not think one could have claimed that he was awake and
live in New York City in the thirties and not know that there was communism.
I think a lot of people did not regard is as the threat that it turned out to be.
Russia was small, it was experimental, it was backward, and so on. I do not
think any people who were backing it then knew that it would capture half
of the globe by 1954. Does that answer your question?
Mr. GRAY. Yes. I think perhaps I will put one other to you.
Is there any question in your mind that employing a Communist today on
matters involving security would be a mistake, one who is now a member of
the Communist Party?
The WITNESS. Let me get this straight.
Mr. GRAY. Let me put the question this way: In your mind, would party
membership be an automatic bar to a man who was being considered for work
of a classified nature?
The WITNESS. Certainly.
Mr. GRAY. Would this have been true in your mind in the war years of World
War II?
The WITNESS. A then member of the Communist Party, I would have thought
the same, because I had such a low opinion of their attitudes. In the case of
some whom you might call American Communists, there was a fanaticism that
left little doubt about whether you would want to have them on a secret project
There are many who saw the light and when they did — the Russo-German Pact
certainly cut a lot of those— and the less fanatical ones were probably hlreable.
Mr. GRAY. It follows, I suppose, from what you have already said that you
feel that today a man who might have been a member of the Communist Party
can be in 1954 a perfectly safe person securitywise. That Is possible?
The WITNESS. Yes, I think so. I think also that in giving a security clearance
one should look at the depth of his involvement and what sort of involvement
there was.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Evans.
Dr. EVANS. There was quite a number of Communists around Hunter College
at that time,
602
The WITNESS. I do not know how many. I knew that Bella Dodd, who was
the head of the Teachers Union there was likely to be a Communist. Remember,
it is hard to know who is a Communist if you are not in it, but I was never
surprised when Bella Dodd confessed that she was a Communist.
Dr. EVANS. You can meet a lot of people and talk to them and know them
in a certain way and not know they are Communists. •
The WITNESS. It depends on how you define it. Some people want to be very
specific and try to say a dues-paying member. You might not know whether
a man was a dues-paying member unless you happened to have some mechanism
for knowing it. A man is not likely to show you a red card and say, "Look,
I am a member of the Communist Party." But you can certainly tell the flavor
of a man's opinions by what he says. There are many people that I would call
Bussophilic American Communists— lovers of Russia. You could tell this by
talking to them, I am sure.
Dr. EVANS. You have never been approached by anyone trying to get classified
information from you, have you?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Dr. EVANS. I have no further questions.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. MARKS :
Q. Just three questions.
Dr. Zacharias, in response to a question of the chairman, as to whether you
would consider someone who once had been a Communist or perhaps he said
close to Communists, but who no longer was, considering his present hirability
for secret work, you said you would have to take account of the extent of his
involvement in the Communist movement. Would you also take into account his
record since then? .„.,_,
A. Certainly. Whenever you sign a petition saying, "I give this man clearance
to work on such-and-such secret project," this is a positive statement, and I
think should be backed up with good, full knowledge and appreciation, pro and
con.
Q. In response to a question by Mr. Robb about continental defense and stra-
tegic offensive, I think you said that what you were advocating and what your
group in the summer study was advocating was a little of both.
A. Maybe I should have said a lot of both.
Q. Just one other question. Do you have any connection with the Science
Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization?
A. Yes, sir. I am either a consultant or a member depending on whether
the "names have been changed in the last month or two. There are so many
people who are members of the Science Advisory Committee and so many people
called consultants and it was decided to switch the titles of the groups.
Q. Do you attend those meetings regularly?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Could you make any comment on the value of Dr. Oppenheimer's contri-
butions in that organization.
A. There are very few people who have Dr. Oppenheimer's ability to synthesize
the additions of others along with the ideas of himself. He has that wonderful
ability. Meetings that have gone on without Dr. Oppenheimer, in my opinion,
have suffered somewhat from this lack. Mind you, there are people on that
Committee who have a real gift for summary, but they are not the equal of
Robert Oppenheimer. In particular, DuBridge and Killian, two college presi-
dents. Maybe that is part of the equipment of a college president, but neither
one of them will focus the ideas quite as well as Robert Oppenheimer.
Dr. EVANS. I did not get what you said about the equipment of college
presidents.
The WITNESS. The ability to bring ideas into a clear focus. I am afraid it
sounded
Dr. EVANS. You say that is the ability or is not the ability?
The WITNESS. It is the ability.
Dr. GRAT. He said it may be.
Mr. MARKS. That is all.
Mr. ROBB. I have nothing further.
Mr. GRAT. Thank you very much, Dr. Zacharias.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GRAY. We will recess until 2 : 15 p. m.
(Thereupon, at 1:10 p. m., a recess was taken to reconvene at 2:15 p. m.
this day.)
603
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Buckley, do you care to testify under oath? You are not
required to do so.
Mr. BUCKLEY. I am quite willing to do so.
Mr. GRAY. All the earlier witnesses have done so. If you do wish to, would
you raise your right hand and stand please? May I have your full name?
Mr. BUCKLEY. Olliver B. Buckley. If you wish the middle name, it is Ells-
worth— Olliver Ellsworth Buckley.
Mr. GRAY. Olliver Ellsworth Buckley, do you swear that the testimony you
are to give the board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Mr. BUCKLEY. I do.
Mr. GRAY. Will you be seated, please, sir.
I am required to remind you of the existence of the so-called perjury statutes.
May I assume you are familiar with those? I am prepared to review with you
the penalties for falsification or fabrication under oath.
Mr. BUCKLEY. I realize they are severe. I could not state them.
Mr. GRAY. I think that is adequate.
Mr. BUCKLEY. I should like to ask, sir, if the course of your testimony should
indicate to you that it is necessary to advert to or disclose restricted data you
let me know in advance so that we may take certain necessary and appropriate
steps.
Finally I should say to you what I have been saying on behalf of the board to
each of the witnesses, and that is, that we considered these proceedings a con-
fidential matter between the Atomic Energy Commission and its officials on one
hand and Dr. Oppenheimer, his representatives and witnesses on the other, and
that the Commission is making no releases with respect to these proceedings
and we express the hope that the witnesses will take the same view of the
situation.
Would you proceed, Mr. Garrison.
Whereupon, Olliver E. Buckley was called as a witness, and having been
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GARBISON :
Q. Mr. Buckley, would yon state your present position?
A. I am retired. I was formerly chairman of the board of Bell Telephone
Laboratories.
(Mr. Morgan left the hearing room.)
A. Before that, I was president of Bell Telephone Laboratories— president for
a period of 10 years and chairman for a period of 1. I am still a member of the
board of directors of Bell Telephone Laboratories.
Q. Your training has been that of what?
A. I hold a doctor's degree in physics, and after obtaining that at Cornell
University, went to the Bell System — really with the Western Electric Co.
engineering department which later was merged into Bell Telephone Labora-
tories— and spent my whole professional career in that organization in one way
or another, except for a period of 1 year in the Signal Corps in the First World
War.
Q. During the Second World War, did yon hold a defense position?
A. I was a member of the Guided Missile Section or Division— I forget just
how they labeled it — of the National Defense Research Committee and Chairman
of the particular branch of that that had to do with applications of television to
guided missiles. I was also for a time a member of the Communications Division
of NDRC.
(Mr. Morgan reentered the hearing room.)
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Then after your service in World War II, would you state the govern-
mental committees on which you served in connection with our defense work?
A. There was another committee— an ad hoc committee— that I served on for
a short time during the war that perhaps deserves mention. That was the
National Academy of Science Review Committee on Atomic Energy, which was,
I think, for a short period in 1941. After the war, I served on the Industrial
Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission from October 1947 to
August 2, 1948, when I was appointed to the General Advisory Committee and
dropped off the Industrial Advisory Committee.
604
Q. And you served on the General Advisory Committee for 8 years?
A. It will be 6 years the first of August I am nearing the end of my statutory
term.
In April of 1951 1 was appointed Chairman of the Science Advisory Committee
of the Office of Defense Mobilization, which office I held until May 15, 1952
when I resigned because of illness, though remained at the request of the Presi-
dent in my position as a member of that committee. I am still a member of
that committee.
Q. When did you first meet Dr. Oppenheimer, in what year and what
connection?
A. I am not certain. I recall Dr. Oppenheimer as a younger man in presenting
papers to the American Physical Society which I attended. The first definite
memory I have of meeting him was while I was on the Industrial Advisory Com-
mittee of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Q. In 1947?
A. That would be 1947, when the GAC met with the Industrial Advisory
Committee on one occasion.
Q. Were you closely associated with him— I know you were on the GAC— in
the work of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization?
A. I was, quite, because I sought his advice at the time I was considering
acceptance of that appointment. The Committee, as it was originally proposed
by some people working in the Government, was not one I thought I could accept,
but with some modifications I came to the conclusion that I ought to accept it if it
could be cut to fit my ideas a bit better. I consulted Dr. Oppenheimer in this
connection and he was very helpful in working out some of my problems in this
connection.
Q. You remember, of course, the October 1949 meeting of the General Advisory
Committee that had to do with the H-bomb program.
A. I have refreshed my memory on that occasion by looking up some notes in
the AEC and recall some things about it
Q. Did you join in the so-called majority report at the October meeting?
A. I did.
Q. Did you later at the next meeting in December or before then submit an
additional statement of your own?
A. Yes. That was the meeting early in December— December 3. I wrote up
a separate attachment that did not in my opinion reverse the position I had
taken, but elaborated on It from my point of view. There was no attempt in ,
that statement to express the views of other members of the committee, but
rather my own interpretation of what the committee statement signified.
Q. Would you care to summarize as briefly as you can for the board what your
position in the matter was?
A. I shall have to refer to my notes to do that I haven't a transcript of that
thing.
Mr. ROBB, Excuse me, Doctor, is that your letter of December 3, 1949?
The WITNESS. That is right
Mr. ROBB. Would you like to see that?
The WITNESS. I have seen it I saw It the other day over at the AEC. I don't
know whether there is anything in there that is regarded as classified material
at the present time.
Mr. ROLANDER. I will have to consult the classification officer.
Mr. GABBISON. I didn't intend to ask Mr. Buckley to go into much detail but
just state the essence of his position without reading from the text
Mr. ROBB. He could certainly have it before him if he wishes to have it while
he is testifring. It is marked "Top Secret"
The WITNESS. This Is the difficulty with its label. I felt at liberty to make a
few cryptic notes about it
Mr. ROBB. Yes, indeed.
Mr. GABBISON. Do you wish to have the text before you?
The Wrrriross. No, I don't have to have the text before me.
Mr. GABBISON. I didn't ask for anything very elaborate.
lite WITNESS. Is there a security officer present?
Mr. ROIANDER. I am the security officer. I have asked for the classification
officer. But I think if you talk in general terms you won't have any difficulty
here.
The WITNESS. Wffl you (iheck me if I do go beyond bounds?
Mr. ROUNDER. I will try to be of service.
605
The WITNESS. I see no clanger in discussing it, but I don't wish to violate any
security regulation.
Mr. GARRISON. Perhaps while we are waiting for him I could ask you one or
two preliminary questions.
By Mr. GARRISON:
Q. How did you come to write a statement of your own?
A. As I recall it—my memory is not entirely clear on this point — I thought that
our statement of October had been misinterpreted and I thought that what I
meant at any rate in signing the statement needed more explanation than the
mere statement itself gave.
Shall I proceed.
Mr. ROLANDER. The classification man is here now, Dr. Buckley, so if you would
like to proceed you can check with him any question that might arise.
The WITNESS. This memorandum was based on the question of an immediate
all out effort on what was called the super, which was a hypothetical kind of
a weapon at that time, as I recall. I was at the time still opposed, as I had been
something a month earlier to a crash program to produce something that we
didn't understand and the consequences of which we did not understand. I
based my opinion on certain assumptions which I enumerated : (1) our ignorance
of how to build the super or whether it could in fact be built at all ; (2) the great
cost in money which it represented and the diversion of effort from the A-bomb
program which it must mean ; (3) the small, if any, adidtion to military effec-
tiveness as I then viewed this hypothetical weapon ; (4) if we can do it, the
Russians can also do it, but they cannot do it so quickly.
I assumed those things were so. I noted that others might not agree with
those assumptions. It was the way it looked to me. I endeavored to appraise
what I would call the good versus the harm of this development. It was, I
thought, a possible retaliatory weapon, one of doubtful value. It represented
the diversion of effort from the area of practical military weapons to the end
only of extensive genecide and ruthless destruction. It might have an adverse
effect on the acceleration of Russian development. It might lead to a false sense
of security and it represented some loss of moral and political value in limiting
defense activity to instruments of military effectiveness. Those, as I recall, with
the aid of my notes, were questions in my mind based on the assumptions which
I had made.
Weighing the pros and cons as best I could, I favored very careful systems
analysis of the "super" program, and an active program of research — doing
everything that we could see needed to be done to establish whether this thing
could be done and how — so that we could know what we were making policy
about This was one of the things that troubled me: That we were advising
on policy about a thing that we didn't understand and see our way through on.
I thought that we ought to see our way through and not be hysterical about an
all-out development and production of a weapon of which we knew so little and
without compromising our position and restricting production to weapons of
predominantly military value. My notes are not too clear on this point. I am
rather cryptic and I would refer you to the document itself.
I favored strongly building a large stock of A-bombs at the same time that
we pursued this super idea further in the laboratory and by test shots of various
sorts that would lay a sound engineering foundation for doing the Job.
That Is what I scratched in an obscure way out of my notes and the document
may not be entirely consistent with those words, but the general idea that I had
was that I thought we ought to proceed with research and development parts of
these things rather than an all out production immediately of something we
didn't understand either physically or with regard to its probable consequences.
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. After President Truman directed in January, 1950, that work in connec-
tion— I am not trying to state exactly what his directive was, but I think you
know what I mean— that work on the thermonuclear weapon should move for-
ward actively, what would you say as to the cooperation or lack of cooperation
of the members of the GAG, particularly Dr. Oppenheimer, with the national
policy?
A. I think all members of the GAG accepted the President's decision as a
definite determination of policy to which we were bound and all of us, along with
Dr. Oppenheimer, conducted ourselves accordingly from thence on. There was no
argument about it That was the policy. However, we did persist in our opinion
ouo
tbat the A-bomb stockpile should be enlarged and that development should pro-
ceed in that field as well, which I think was consistent with the President's order.
Q. Do you feel that your associations with Dr. Oppenheimer in the years that
you served with him on GAG and your service with him on the Science Advisory
Committee were sufficiently close to enable you to form a judgment as to his
character and loyalty to the United States?
A. The question never arose in my mind as to whether lie was loyal to the
United States. I believed and believe that he was loyal to the United States.
I just don't recall any event that even raised that issue in my mind.
Q. Would you have any comment as to the quality of his service in those years
to the country?
A. This is in the postwar years you are speaking of?
Q. Yes.
A. I think it was extraordinary service to the country. The Job of being
chairman of the GAG is a very heavy and time consuming job. He was our
unaminous chairman during the period that my service overlapped his and he
was so outstandingly good in that position that if you give value to the services
of the GAC you must also give great value to the service of its chairman who
was an excellent chairman.
Q. What would you say as to his discretion or lack of discretion, particularly
with reference to his knowledge of classified material of a very secret character?
A. I assumed and believed him to be discreet with reference to such material.
Q. You read the Commission's letter of December 23, 1953, to Dr. Oppen-
heimer which initiated these proceedings.
A. I read it in the newspaper.
Q. Do you have the same confidence in him today that you had when you
served with him in the postwar years?
A. Yes.
Mr. GAEBISON. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Bobb.
CBOSS-EXAMINAMON
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Doctor, are you a nuclear physicist?
A. I am not, sir.
Q. So in respect of the question of the feasibility of a superbomb, I suppose
you had to rely on the opinions of others, didn't you?
A. That is right
Q. Whose opinion did you rely on, Doctor?
A. I gave great weight to Dr. Oppenheimer's opinion. I subsequently to the
letter of which I just spoke visited Los Alamos and heard a discussion of it by
Dr. Teller and got a briefing on it, you might say. I could not analyze that or
criticize it as a physicist, of course.
Let me say that so far as I could understand it, it was consistent with the
opinion that I had formed after hearing from Dr. Opepnneimer and others that
it was one of these things that had a speculative chance. It was a hypothetical
kind of thing and not the kind of a thing that was developed later.
Q. Doctor, you said that you felt that your subscription to the majority reoort
of the GAC of the October 1949 meeting had been misinterpreted, I believe you
A. I think that is stated in the document that I wrote and, I think,
Q. Would you explain that to us a little bit, Doctor?
A. Yes. As I look back on it, that statement doesn't fully reflect our discus-
sion at ttiat meeting because I believe that it was the general opinion that
research in the direction of thermonuclear weapons should be nearly pushed!
I can't prove teat but I think that was the position. I believe that I thought
it was the position at the time I wrote this memorandum. But further than
that, I can't recall That was not brought out in the October statement, you see!
(q{« x see.
A. As a matter of feet, there was work going on already and work planned
ahead at fbe time of this thing being set up. It was down the thermonuclear
alley. The question at Issue was a crash program to build a hypothetical super
as I recall It. My memory may not be accurate but that is the best I can recall
I think that memorandum which I endeavored to sum up is consistent witli
that point of view because in the memorandum I did not take exception to "the
prior statement I was in my mind elaborating on it I did not attampt af I
OUY
said, to reflect the opinion of all the others. But I believe on that point it was
consistent with the position that the GAC took at that time and had taken
previously.
Q. Doctor, do you recall in your later memorandum making some reference to
a public commitment not to develop the thermonuclear weapon?
Mr. GABRISON. "Would you make that a little more clear?
The WITNESS. I don't recall offhand.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Let me show it to you.
A. That is a statement, I think, of my opinion at that time.
Q. Having looked at this do you now remember that you did make some
reference as to whether there should or should not be a public commitment not
to develop the weapon?
Mr. GABRISON. Could you read the sentence?
Mr. ROBB. May I read this, Mr. Classification Officer?
Mr. MABSHALL. May I see it, please?
Mr. ROBB. Yes [handling].
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. I want you to explain this and what caused to put that in. The two
sentences I have in mind are these : "Whatever course of action is adopted In
the development of superbombs I do not wish at this time to recommend for or
against a public commitment not to develop the weapon, nor have I any spe-
cific recommendation as to declassification. Some public announcement of
policy may be necessary or desirable but I do not feel able to advise wisely."
Would you mind explaining what you had in mind?
A. It seems to me it hardly needs explaining. I think that is a clear state-
ment
Q. I just wondered if there had been some discussion in the GAO as to
whether there should be a puWic commitment or not.
A. I don't recall any. There may have been, but I don't recall it
Q. Had there been any discussion as to declassification?
A. I dont't recall that there was any at all.
Mr. ROBB. That is all I care to ask, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAT. Mr. Buckley, you have made a distinction, I think, in your testi-
mony between research and development or partial development on the one
hand, and an all-out production effort on the other. This is a distinction I
believe you made and I believe you have stated that you were opposed to what
has been called the crash or all-out effort on the super. At least this was your
position and was the majority position of the GAC in the October 1949 meeting.
I think you also testified that you felt, however, that we should have an
active program of research. I believe those were your words.
Did you later feel that the interpretation of the written report of the October
1949 meeting lead people to believe that you had been opposed as a committee
to active research? Is that one of the reasons you felt that you wanted to
make a clarifying statement later?
The WITNESS. I now believe, or, as I recall, that was my position on the
thing. I wasn't aware that there was any great difference in the committee
on this thing. I wanted to state it more explicitly. Perhaps in that committee
I had been rather often making the point that we ought to do what I called
systems analysis to see as far as we could where we are going before we
embark on a heavy development program.
Mr. GRAY. I am a layman. Would systems development be the same thing
as active research?
The WITNESS. No. Systems development would be a paper study, generally
speaking— those supported by experiments— to determine systematically ends
and possible means of achieving those ends in the nature of a technical survey
and enlarging the technical grounds for planning a program with these ends
in view.
I thought we ought to see our way through just as far as we could and build
up as good a technical background for a program as we possibly could and that
this would be the economical and speedy way to do the Job, whatever job
^S^GBAY. Would you forgive me Just a moment while I glance at your letter.
Your feeling is that your participation as a member of that October meeting
did not in any way commit you against the development of this weapon although
you did oppose all-out production?
808818—64 89
608
The WITNESS. You could say an all-out development and production program.
I through that a more careful study of the problem based on further experi-
menting than had been done and based on our military objectives might lead
to some major modification of the program, but it was not to my mind a determi-
nation advice on our part not to pursue the study of thermonuclear weapons.
Is that clear?
Mr. GRAY. Yes, I think you have answered the question.
The WITNESS. That is the way I now recall my position which I think is fairly
set forth in that letter which I wrote.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Garrison, do you have any further questions?
Mr. GABBISON. No.
Mr. ROBB. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GBAY. Thank you very much, Doctor ; we appreciate you being here.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GBAY. Who is the next witness, Mr. Garrison?
Mr. GARRISON. Dr. Bacher, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GBAY. Dr. Bacher, do you wish to testify under oath?
Dr. BACHES. I would be very glad to, if you so wish.
Mr. GBAY. You are not required to, but all other witnesses have done so.
Dr. BACHER. I should be glad to do so.
Mr. GRAY. Would you stand and raise your right hand, please, and also give
me your full name?
Dr. BACHEB. Robert Fox Bacher.
Mr. GBAY. Robert Fox Bacher, do you swear that the testimony you are to
give the board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you God?
Dr. BACHEB. I do.
Mr. GBAY. Would you be seated, please, sir?
I am required to call your attention to the existence of the so-called perjury
statutes. May I assume you are familiar with them and their penalties and it.
is unnecessary to review them?
Dr. BACHEB. I tMnfr I am.
Mr. GBAY. I should like to ask, Dr. Bacher, if in the course of your testimony
you find it necessary to refer to or disclose restricted data that you notify me
in advance so that we might take certain appropriate and necessary steps.
I should also make the same observation to you that I have tried to remember
to make to all the witnesses, that we consider these proceedings a confidential
matter between the Atomic Energy Commission and its officials on the one
hand and Dr. Oppenheimer and his representatives and witnesses on the other.
The Commission is making no releases to the press and on behalf of the board
I express the hope that the witnesses will take the same course of action.
Mr. Garrison, will you proceed.
Mr. GABBISON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. Dr. Bacher, would you state your present position?
A. I am Chairman of the Division of Physics, Mathematics, and Astronomy
and professor of physics at Cal Tech.
Q. Where did you receive your academic training?
A. I went as an undergraduate to the University of Michigan, took a bachelor's
degree, and later a doctor's degree in physics in 1930.
Q. How long have you known Dr. Oppenheimer, approximately?
A. Approximately since 1929 or 1930 when he visited the University of Michi-
gan during the summer to give some lectures there in the summer symposium
In theoretical physics.
Q. When did you first get to know him very well?
A. That was somewhat later. I know him through the thirties. If I recall
correctly, he lectured in Ann Arbor once or twice more in the early thirties and
I think I was present at that time. During the fall of 1930 I was national re-
search fellow at the California Institute of Technology and he was lecturing
there during the fall term. I saw him quite frequently during that period.
Later than that I saw nim only occasionally at meetings or at other, times. I
remember at one time seeing him in the winter of 1934 in New York when I was
an instructor at Columbia and he was visiting his father there. Between then
and the war period I think I saw him only occasionally at scientific meetings.
My close association with him began Just prior to the establishment of the Los
Alamos Laboratory.
609
Q. Suppose you just state what your Government service has been beginning
with your work at Los Alamos.
A. I came to Los Alamos from the radiation laboratory at MIT where I
had been for 2 years and a half and on the occasion of the starting of the lab-
oratory at Los Alamos. There was a conference when that laboratory was
started. I attended the conference. It was decided during the conference that
I would Join the laboratory and I did, in charge of the Division of Experimental
Physics.
In the summer of 1944 the laboratory was reorganized and I became the head
of the Bomb Physics Division, which was a position I held until the end of the
war. This involved in both capacities very close contact with Dr. Oppenheimer
and this contact was, I would say, daily and very close.
Q. What was your next Government service?
A. My next Government service, if I recall correctly, was on a committee hav-
ing to do with declassification which was set up by the Manhattan District at
the end of the war. I think I served on one other committee for the Manhattan
District and I don't recall exactly what the title of that committee was. Then
during the summer of 1946 I served as a scientific adviser to the United States
delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.
Q. In that connection you had an opportunity to see Dr. Oppenheimer some
more?
A. Yes.
Q. What next after that?
A. After that in October of that year, or it was the first of November, I be-
came a member of the Atomic Energy Commission and was a member of the
Atomic Energy Commission until I left in mid-May 1949.
Q. Have you had Government service since then?
A. Since then I have been an adviser to the Atomic Energy Commission and
am still an adviser to the Atomic Energy Commission.
I have been first a member of a panel on long-range objectives, I thing it was
called— this may not be quite the right title for it— of the Committee on Atomic
Energy of the Research and Development Board from spring 1951 until its
dissolution in 1953. I was Chairman of the Committee on Atomic Energy of the
Research and Development Board.
Q. Was Dr. Oppenheimer a member of that Committee?
A. Dr. Oppenheimer was a member of that committee. I am presently a
member of the Technical Panel on Atomic Energy of the Office of Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense for Research and Development. There may be some others
which I have forgotten for the moment.
Q. Going back to the Los Alamos period, how much did you see of Dr.
Oppenheimer in those years from April 1943 to the dose?
A. A very great deal. Much of the work for which I was responsible was
very close to the heart of our problem of making an atomic weapon. The demand
was for much information from other parts of the laboratory and in particular
needed a great deal of guidance from the theoretical people.
As a consequence of this, in particular, I saw a great deal of Dr. Oppenheimer.
It would be hard for me to .estimate how much I saw him but it seems to me
looking back on it that there was scarcely a day going past that I did not spend
an hour or more with him.
Q. When he went away did you from time to time act as acting director of
the project?
A. I think not in any official capacity, but I believe sometimes when he left
the laboratory he did leave me in charge.
Q. Did you yourself go on any official missions with him?
A, On a number of occasions I went on official missions with Dr. Oppenheimer,
trips to the east and in some cases to the west coast, where we needed to get
information for the project.
Q. Do you have any recollection of his political views in those years as he may
have expressed them to you in talks that you may have had?
A. We were pretty busy trying to make an atomic bomb and we didn't talk
about many other things. I was aware of the fact that Dr. Oppenheimer seemed
to be a Democrat and views that one would associate with his being a Democrat
I was an upstate New York Republican, and we used to joke about this from
time to time. But we didn't have much political discussion.
Q. Coming to the period of your service on the Atomic Energy Commission, I
would like to ask you to recall what you can of the actions that were taken with
respect to Dr. Oppenheimer Js clearance in 1947.
610
A. I might say in this respect that I did refresh my memory on this point hy
consulting some of the minutes of the Commission, because when I started to
think about it, I found I didn't have all of it so clear in my mind.
The consideration of the appointment of the General Advisory Committee to
the Commission was taken up at one of the early meetings of the Commission.
In fact, if my memory serves me now on this refreshing of this morning, it was at
the second meeting at which this was discussed.
This had to do with who were to be the members of the General Advisory
Committee.
Q. This is about what time?
A. This was about the 20th of November, I think.
Q. Of what year?
A. Of 1946. Then a little later
Q. Before the appointment of the GAC?
A. Yes. Then a little later there was some discussion of the question of
making some announcement about this, of the appointments which had been made
by the President I have forgotten exactly when that was, but I presume in the
interim period recommendations had been made to the President, and he had
approved these and actually appointed the members of the Committee.
Q. Let me Just make sure I understand. The Atomic Energy Commission
recommended some names to the President for appointment to the GAC?
A. That is right. It was a Presidential appointment.
Q. Were the people appointed by the President the same as those who had
been recommended?
A. If I remember correctly, that is so.
Q. In any event was Dr. Oppenheimer among those recommended?
A. It was, yes.
Q. This was a recommendation of the Commission as a whole?
A. This was a recommendation of the Commission as a whole.
Q. Now, coming to the clearance and the actions that had to do with his
clearance, would you say what you can remember of that?
A. If I recall correctly, clearance at the start of the Commission activities
was for the most part Just carrying over clearance that had been given under
the Manhattan District. Also, if I recall correctly, all members of the General
Advisory Committee had during the war some access to activities in the Man-
hattan District, and some of them had been employees for an extensive period
and continued to hold Manhattan District clearance up to that time. It I remem-
ber correctly, this clearance was then Just continued, because it took some time
to get clearance procedures, and so on, under the Atomic Energy Act into full
operation. So this was the first basis of clearance. For new employees, there
had to be from the time the Atomic Energy Commission took over investigation
under the act.
Q. What do you next remember about Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance.
A. I recall that during the spring of 1947 this questiion was discussed. I
am not precisely sure in response to what, but I think in response to a query
to the Commission. I remember that we looked at various times through that
period, first a summary of information from the FBI, and later a quite voluminous
file. Exactly when that is done, I am afraid I don't remember.
Q. Do you have a recollection of having examined then both the summary
and some kind of a file?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have any recollection at all as to the approximate dimensions
of these documents?
A. I am afraid I don't, except that the file, I remember, was a fairly thick
document I don't know, something like this [indicating].
Mr. GABEISON. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the examination of Mr.
LUienthal, there was put into the record at page 1409 of the transcript a memo-
randum from Mr. Jones, the security officer, to Mr. Bellesly, which contained a
reference of which I would Just read one sentence. This is a note by Mr. Yolne
in longhand on the file, and it says— this is dated July 18- "My impression is
that the Cconmission saw no need for formal action following the meeting they
had with Mr. Hoover, referred to Jn Idlienthal's letter of April 3, to the FBI
Director.
We asked for the documents pertaining to this matter when we were in
the course of examining Mr. Lilienthal.
Mr. ROBB. What was that?
611
Mr. GARRISON. This is a letter of Mr. Lilienthal of April 3 to Mr. Hoover,
referred to in Mr. Volpe's longhand note on the Jones memorandum to Bellesly
of July 18.
Mr. ROBB. I am sorry. I fell off on the first turn of that, Mr. Garrison. What
was the question?
Mr. GARRISOX. What I was going to ask the chairman was to have the letter
of April 3 in the record so that we might see what it was that Mr. Lilienthal
wrote to Mr. Hoover because I think it might help to clarify the matter under
discussion.
Mr. ROBB. I have it before me. Shall I read it? This is a copy. I assume
it is the one of April 3, 1947 :
"TOJ/D," in the upper right-hand corner.
"Hon. J. EDOAB HOOVES,
"Federal Bureau of Investigation,
"United States Department of Justice, Washington, JD. C.
"DEAD MB. HOOVES : As agreed at our recent meeting I am forwarding for your
information copies of letters in the possession of the Atomic Energy Commission
concerning Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, as well as papers relating to the award
of the Medal of Merit to Dr. Oppenheimer.
"Sincerely yours,
"DAVID E. LILIENTHAL, Chairman."
("Enclosures: cc Mr. Lilienthal. File 2.")
Then some longhand notes: "Enclosures, papers on Medal of Merit, letters
from Conant, Patterson, Groves, Bush." That is in longhand.
"Distribution : One and two, to Mr. Hoover. Three and four, to Mr. Lilienthal.
Five, reading file. Six, records section file,"
Mr. GKAT. That is the longhand note?
Mr. ROBB. The one Mr. Garrison read, "My impression is that the £ommis-
sion saw no need for formal action following the meeting that they had with
Mr. Hoover, referred to in Lilienthal's letter of April 3, to the FBI Director."
That apparently was sending the Medal of Merit award we had here, and the
letters from Patterson, Groves, Conant and the others.
Mr. GABBISON. This seems to refer to a meeting with Mr. Hoover.
Mr. ROBB. That was a meeting on which there was a memorandum written
by Mr. Jones, which was read into evidence, on March 27, 1947. That is in
the record some place.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I have some more requests for information that
I think the Commission can give us about the history of these events that I
would like to submit to the board, but I don't want to take the time now while
Dr. Bacher is on the stand. I thought possibly the particular letter might
throw a little more light.
Mr. ROBB. Maybe I can throw some light on it, if I might
Mr. GRAY. If you are going to pursue questioning of Dr. Bacher about those
events, or if you are, Mr. Robb, I think it might be helpful to Dr. Bacher to
have his recollection refreshed because people seem not to remember this period
very clearly.
The WITNESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GARRISON. What is there, Mr. Robb?
Mr. ROBB. I don't know whether I am at liberty under the rules to tell you,
but apparently a number of people were interviewed concerning Dr. Oppenheimer.
I think Dr. Bacher was interviewed. I think that material was in the file
before the board. ^ ^
Mr. GRAY. One thing it seems to me that Mr. Garrison is perhaps groping for
is the possibility that there may have been a meeting of the full Commission
with Mr. Hoover. Mr. Lilienthal testified, did he not, about a conversation?
Mr. ROBB. That is right.
Mr GRAY That is, with Mr. Hoover at a time when he was accompanied by
the deputy counsel of the Commission. It would be my guess on the basis of
anything I have heard, Mr. Garrison, that there was not a full meeting of the
Commission with Mr. Hoover, but this I am not sure about
Mr ROBB. If there was, I find no reflection of it in this file.
Mr" ROLANDBR. The only record in the file of such a meeting was the one
discussed and introduced in the record when Mr. Lilienthal testified.
Mr. GRAY. And this involved a visit to Mr. Hoover's office of Mr. Lilienthal
and Mr. Volpe.
Mr. RQLANDER. That is right
612
Mr. GRAT. I would guess the Commissioners would remember if they went
in a body to Mr. Hoover.
Mr. ROLAKDEB, The memorandum in discussing the meeting, it refers to meet-
ing between representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Whether that includes all members of the Commission,
1 just don't know.
Mr. GABRISON. Could we have read into the record the portion of the minutes
qf August 6, 10-47, relating to the matter of Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance?
Mr. ROBB. I thought this thing that had Mr. Volpe's note on it was all there
was on it.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Volpe's note was before that.
Mr. ROBB. Here is a paper here, August 11, 1947, from T. 0. Jones to William
Uaana, "Subject: J. Robert Oppenheimer,"
Mr. GABBISOJT. This refers to the meeting and I think that was read into the
record.
Mr. ROBB. "Authorization for granting final Q type clearance, August 6 "
Mr. GABBISON. What I would like to have is the actual August 6 meeting
Mr. ROLANDER. I think we had in the record a stipulation as to what the
minutes reflected. Isn't that satisfactory?
Mr. GABBISON. It did not seem to me to be a quotation from the minutes
but rather a stipulation by the Commission that clearance be recorded, or
something of that matter. At least it did not on its face appear to be a Quota-
tion from the minutes. *
Mr. ROBB. I don't know. Frankly I did not concern myself with it in view
of the stipulation. I have never looked at the minutes.
Mr. ROLANDER, I dont think we can state the actual Commission minutes.
The Commission minutes as such, I don't believe it proper for us to quote them
Therefore, at that time the Commission did, early in the proceedings, agree to*
a stipulation as to what took place. That is what we had hoped tomake a part
of this record, and has already been made a part of the record;
Mr. GABRISON. Mr. Chirman, I am not asking for any portion of the minutes
whiQh might have to do with extraneous matters, but only that portion which
relates to Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance, and it seems to me that is a piece of
information very relevant to this proceeding, and certainly can evolve no
matter of improper information to be read into a record like this
Mr. GRAY. I am not informed about the minutes or about the procedures of
the Commission not making its minutes available. I think in this c£e Iwffl
have to rely on the representative of the Commission, Mr. Rolander who says
tte record?0 ** ^ ** ^^Qt ***"* °f ** ^n^Tan be 3d into
Mr. ROLANDEE. That is my understanding, yes,
MR
Mr. GRAY. If you wish, Mr. Garrison, now to make a request of that
d n>t
*?* maie a fomal ""West °* that sort,
, ^«ra asa'
™'* *e baTC "•*• ae
Mr
•ASSSSiJ!*14 "^ *° proceed *** Dr- Bacher
By Mr. GAEBISON :
Q. In addition to that, a thicker ffle?
613
A. At a later date, if my memory serves me correctly, I believe we went over
a very much thicker file, and I believe it was reviewed by the other Commis-
sioners, too.
Q. Do you remember discussing this with other Commissioners?
A. Yes.
Q. What do you remember?
A- J don't remember very much about the discussion with the other Com-
missioners, except that I remember either before or during the Commission
meeting referring to various parts of it which seemed to be relevant to hap-
penings in the past that we thought we ought to know about I can't remember
very much at the moment just what was said about that But we did review
that and discuss it in the Commission meeting.
Q. Do you recollect any decision on the matter or any conclusion?
A. My memory is that when a query was addressed to the Commission, it
seemed appropriate to us to consult with some of the people with whom Dr.
Oppenheimer had worked during the war other than ourselves. I can't remem-
ber exactly who was consulted, but I am relatively sure that Dr. Bush and Dr.
Conant were consulted. I don't remember who else was consulted. After
consultation with these people and a review of the file, the question was dis-
cussed by the Commission and I think the conclusion was arrived at that the
Commission saw no reason in view of the information which had been brought
up to take any different action on the clearance of Dr. Oppenheimer than that
which had already been taken.
Q. Do you know Mr. Serber?
A. I do.
Mr. ROBB. Did you say Mr. or Mrs.?
Mr. GABBISOK. I will ask about both.
By Mr. GAKEISON :
Q. Do you know Mr. and Mrs. Serber?
A. Yes.
Q. Where did you first know them?
A. I can't remember when I first met them. I presume that I knew them
before the war, but if so, only very slightly. The first I knew them really at all
well was at Los Alamos. Dr. Serber was a member of that laboratory and was
there when I arrived.
Q. Did you know anything of their political background at the time?
A. I would say "No."
Q. Did the question of Dr. Berber's clearance come up wnen you were a
member of the Atomic Energy Commission?
A. It did.
Q. What was done about it?
A. If I recall correctly, Mr. Berber's clearance came up as part of the reinvesti-
gation of all contractors' employees. There was a certain amount of derogatory
information in the file that appeared. I have forgotten exactly what happened
in the local office out there, but it was concluded that there ought to be a hearing
board set up on this.
Q. The local office where?
A. The local office on the Pacific coast A hearing board was set up on the
Pacific coast, I believe out of the San Francisco office, and I can't remember the
members of that hearing board, but I if remember correctly, Admiral Nimitz was
the ehqfrrniin of it. The hearing board made a report which I believe was trans-
mitted to the Commission, and the Commission acted favorably on clearance
after the hearing.
Q. Did the panel recommend clearance?
A. If my memory serves me correctly, they did.
Mr. QAEBISON. Mr. Chairman, our information is> I feel quite certain, that
the Atomic Energy Commission records will bear this out I would simply like
to state for the record subject to verification, which I am sure can be made
by Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Bolander, that the panel in addition to Admiral Nimitz
as chairman, consisted of Mr. John Francis Neyland, regent of the University of
California, and a lawyer, well known. I think he was counsel to the Hearst
interests in San Francisco. And Major General Joyce, of the Marines* If I
could just state that in the record and ask if that could be checked,
Mr. ROBB. I believe that is correct, Mr. Garrison.
614
By Mr. GAKKTSOTT :
Q. What was the date of that?
Mr. ROBB. I don't have It.
By Mr. GABEISON :
Q. Do you recall about when this was after the start of the Commission?
Would you, date it from there?
A. I would think this was 1947 or perhaps the beginning of 1948. I am not
clear on the date.
Q. Do you have occasion to see Dr. Serber now from time to time?
A. Yes. He is professor of physics at Columbia University, and I see him
from time to time when I go to New York.
Q. Do you see Mrs. Serber from time to time?
A. Occasionally.
Q. When you say when you go to New York, in connection with what would
this normally be?
A. In connection with Physical Society meetings or other scientific meetings
in Xew York. Professor Serber is now spending, I believe, one day a week out
at Brookhaven Laboratory, in particular in the interpretation of some of the
work they are doing with their high energy accelerator out there, their cos-
motron. This is related to work that I am closely interested in, so I see him
from time to time because he has the most interesting information on what
is going on there.
Q. Do you know whether a Q clearance is called for by that sort of work?
A. I don't know. I presume he must have some sort of clearance to be a
regular consultant to the Brookhaven Laboratory, but what sort of clearance
he has, I don't know. I never have any questions concerned with classified
information to discuss with him.
Q. What was the character of the clearance which the ABC granted in 1947
or 1948, whenever it was?
A. I believe this was a Q clearance that he was granted at that time.
Q. Have you ever heard of any action changing that?
A. No.
Mr. ROBB. This is Dr. Serber, and not Mrs. Serber.
Mr. GABBISON. Yes. I don't believe she is a physicist or works on Govern-
ment projects.
Mr. ROBB. No.
By Mr. GARBISOK:
Q. Isn't that correct?
A. No, she is not physicist
Q. As a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, did you have occasion to
observe closely the work of the GAG?
A. Yes, I think that during the period I was in Washington I probably followed
the work of the General Advisory Committee more closely than any other mem-
ber of the Commission. This was natural because I was the only one with a
scientific and technical background, and tfte work of the General Advisory Com-
mittee was mostly scientific and technical. I frequently attended much of their
meeting and read their reports very carefully. They were very valuable to us
in getting the atomic energy enterprise back on its feet and getting some of the
work established that we thought ought to get established.
Q. Would you make a comment on Dr. Oppenheimer's work as chairman of
that committee?
A. It was outstanding. He was appointed a member of the General Advisory
Committee. The members of the General Advisory Committee themselves
elected him chairman of that committee. Until he left, the committee, I believe,
he continued to be chairman, He had had the closest connection with the weapons
development work of any of the members of the General Advisory Committee.
In that period in early 1947 when the General Advisory Committee was set
up, our greatest problem was to try to get the Los Alamos Laboratory in the
development of weapons into a sound shape. The General Advisory Committee,
I might add, was vigorous on this point, and very helpful in getting the labora-
tory into shape both by reason of the recommendations which they made, and
also the direct help that they gave us in connection with personnel for the
laboratory.
Q. What about Dr. Oppenheimer's individual contribution in this effort?
A. I would say In this effort Dr. Oppenheimer's individual contribution was
the greatest of any member of the General Advisory Committee. He took his
615
work on the General Advisory Committee very serionsly. He usually came to
Washington before the meetings to get material ready for the agenda and
usually stayed afterward to write a report of the meeting.
During the course of the meeting prolonging discussion at great length so
everybody would express his views, nevertheless after the views had been ex-
pressed, he had a very great clarity in focusing these views of what would
be a report of the committee.
Q. What was your normal routine when the General Advisory Committee
would meet in Washington? When I say your routine, I mean the routine of
the Atomic Energy Commission. Did you meet with the GAC or how did that
work?
A. If I recall correctly, usually the members of the Commission came in at
the start after the meeting at least for a little while and then usually before
the end of a meeting there was a session of the General Advisory Committee
with the Commission. Sometimes this might occur on a Sunday afternoon, but
usually there was a session at the end of the General Advisory Committee so
that there could be discussion of what appeared to be their recommendations.
At such time it was usual that Dr. Oppenheimer would give a verbal summary in
the presence of all the members of the General Advisory Committee, and of the
Commission of their findings, and then these would be discussed.
Q. What was the character of the initial meeting between the members of
the Atomic Energy Commission and the GAC? At the start of the meeting,
in other words?
A. I think this initial meeting was apt to be somewhat less regular. Usually
most of the members of the Commission went down ; if I remember correctly,
the Chairman, Mr. Lilienthal, would generally convey to the committee ques-
tions which had come up either within the Commission or from members of the
staff to be proposed to the committee.
Q. There was verbal discussion?
A. There was verbal discussion.
Q. You left the Atomic Energy Commission in May of 1949?
A. Mid-May 1949.
Q. So you were not present at the October meeting.
A. No.
Q. Did you remain as a consultant after yon left the Commission?
A. Yes. I have been an adviser to the Commission since I left in 1949 and
still am.
Q. At the time of the Russian explosion, did you have to do with assessing
the information about that?
A. Yes.
Who else had to do with that?
A. If I recall correctly, Dr. Bush was chairman of a group called together in
mid-September 1949 to assess the information which was relevant to the deter-
mination of whether the Russians exploded an atomic bomb. The other mem-
bers of the group, if I recall correctly, were Admiral Parsons, Dr. Oppenheimer,
and myself, and I believe Dr. Arthur Compton was supposed to be there, as a
member of the group, but could not come. If I recall correctly there were Just
four members of the panel that were set up to assess this information.
I can't give you the exact date on this, but it must have been about the 15th of
September.
Q. After President Truman's declaration in January 1950 about the thermo-
nuclear program, did you make a speech on the subject of the program?
A. I made a speech called, "The Hydrogen Bomb," in the end of March 1950.
This is open and available for the record and I am sure that looking this over will
be much better than any memory I have of what is in that speech.
Q. I Just want to ask you two general questions about it Were you, in that
speech, critical of President Truman's declaration?
A. No.
Q. What was the principal point you made in that speech?
A. I would say there were two points, but here I would like any remarks that
I make to be subject to referral to the speech itself for anyone to judge what
the speech says. I would say there were two principal points. One, I had mis-
givings about over-reliance in a weapon which seemed to me to not add much
beyond large fission weapons to our national arsenal, and second, I was very
much concerned that there was not more information available to the public
on which sensible opinions could be formed.
616
Q. You said, I think, that yon served on the Committee on Atomic Energy of
the Research and Development Board?
A Yes
Q. And that you became chairman of it and served as chairman from 1951 to
1953?
A. Yes.
Q. Did that committee convene a panel in late 1950 or early 1951 to consider
°UA.WL?Ireca^l that is about the time that a panel was convened for that purpose.
Q. And you were a member of it?
A. I was a member of a panel that was convened about that time for studying
our weapons program.
Q. And Dr. Oppenheimer was a member of it?
A. Yes.
Q. And members of the military?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. If I recall correctly, Mr. Oppenheimer was chairman of that panel and
other members were General Nichols and Admiral Parsons, and I think General
Wilson from the Air Force, Dr. Alvarez, Dr. Lauritsen, and myself. Some of
these may not be correct, but I think they are.
Q. Do you have any particular commitment on Dr. Oppenheimer's service on
both the committee and on the panel.
A. If I recall correctly, the panel met for 2 or 3 days to discuss what might be
the important areas for progress. We then divided up the various areas to.
study somewhat further to find out a bit more about it and came back at a sub-
sequent day to write a report, and incorporate the views of the various days'
smaller groups at that time. With his unusually great clarity Dr. Oppenheimer
succeeded in turning out a report that stated very accurately what the panel
thought in draft form. This was then discussed essentially word by word by
the panel, and a report finally appeared which presumably is available some-
where.
Q. From your vantage point, if I may call it that, of the chairman of the
Committee on Atomic Energy in the years 1951 to 1953, have you any Judgment
which you could express to the board regarding any alleged or possible delays
in the production of thermonuclear weapons.
A. I am. My impression is that this went ahead pretty fast. At least as
far as the research and development work went, all of the effort that could be
put on this was put on it After a Job is done, it is always easier to look back
and say if we had not done this, we would have saved some time. I believe
that almost everything that was done either in fission weapons or in thermo-
nuclear weapons was very relevant to the job of making a thermonuclear weapon.
Q. You are still a consultant to the Department of Defense?
A. Yes.
Q. You had to do with the Vista program?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you chairman of the Vista project?
A. No. Dr. DuBridge was chairman of the Vista project.
Q. What was your share of it?
A. I was responsible for one section of the project which had to do with atomic
weapons.
Q. You were in charge of that section?
A. Yes.
Q. There has been a good deal of testimony about this project and I don't
want to duplicate the record about Dr. Oppenheimer's participation in it, and so
forth. I would Just like to ask one or two questions about it. Was there a
question of allocations as between the Strategic Air Command and tactical air
group with respect to the materials that would go into tactical weapons?
A. Yes ; but I believe it would take a little further discussion to make clear
Just what was meant by that. I am not exactly sure on this point whether one
does not get into classified information. I think it could be answered without
getting into classified informatipn but if there is someone here whom I could
consult on that point
Q. I am not going to ask you any questions of that character. I would like to
have your Judgment as fairly as you can express it without going into classified
materials as to whether the recommendations of this chapter on atomic energy
would have affected the hydrogen bomb program then under way, whatever its
nature may have been.
617
A. I know of no way in which it would have affected that.
Q. Was there any purpose to affect that program in any way?
A. I am not even sure I understand the question.
Q. I am not sure I do either. What I am trying to bring out is was this ques-
tion of allocation related in any way to the thermonuclear work that was going
forward?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. It was a question of the allocation of then existing fission materials?
A. Could I say a word about what the purpose of this section of the report was,
because otherwise I think it is not even clear what you would like me to answer.
Q. I don't want you to answer anything except what you know.
A. I won't * * *
Mr. ROLANDEE. I think that is all right.
By Mr. GABRISON :
Q. Would you say a word about Dr. Oppenheimer's contribution to the results
of this report?
A. The Vista project was started in April 1951, if I recall correctly. Is that
correct?
Q. I think that is right
A. Is that a correct date?
Mr. ROBB. I think so.
The WITNESS. I believe it is correct It continued through the summer.
Mr. ROBB. That is right
The WITNESS. It was started in April 1951. It continued through the sum-
mer, * * *. The other people who worked with this group were Dr. Lauritsen
and Dr. Christie. Dr. Thorndyke from the Brookhaven Laboratory was there
during most months of the summer. Dr. Hayworth from the Brookhaven Lab-
oratory was there for a period of a week or so, and a few other people helped
us from time to time during that period. During the summer we got a good many
of our ideas in line and during the fall started to formulate these so that we
could write a report
I think that by fall much of the background information was beginning to be
clear, and many of our ideas were beginning to be a little clearer. It was very
difficult to formulate these ideas because all of the points we wished to recom-
mend were interrelated and we found ourselves in difficulty.
I think it was about this time, I don't remember the date, October or Novem-
ber, that we were fortunate to get Dr. Oppenheimer to come and spend a week
or 10 days with us. He was very helpful to us in formulating these ideas. I
think that we had a first draft of the report actually written down at that time,
but it was not in very good form. After 2 more days of discussion with htm,
he had some ideas of how these things could be better formulated, and helped
very much in bringing them to a focus.
Subsequently this draft then went through several revisions. I don't even re-
member how many. It was finally revised in late December of that year and the
final report, I think, appeared or was proposed shortly after Christmas.
Q. Dr. Bacher, you are familiar with the Commission's letter of December 23,
1953, to Dr. Oppenheimer initiating these proceedings?
A. I have read it
Q. Apart from the allegation or the reports about the H-bomb, did the rest of
it come to you as a surprise?
To put it another way, how much, if any, of the matters in this letter apart
from the H-bomb would you say you had been over previously at the time of the
1947 clearance?
A. It is, of course, hard to give a categorical answer to a question like that,
but I didn't find any parts of it that seemed surprising to me in view of the things
I had read before.
Q. How well do you feel that you know Dr. Oppenheimer ?
A. I feel I know him very well. I have worked very closely with him during
the war, have seen fr*™ frequently since the war, and feel I know him really
very welL I Just don't think it would be possible to work with a man as closely
as I worked with Dr. Oppenheimer during the war without knowing him very
well.
Q. What is your opinion as to his loyalty to the United States?
A. I have no question a tall of his loyalty.
Q. On what do you base that? Is that purely a subjective judgment?
A. I fotTife opinions of that sort are always subjective judgments. In this
case I put great credence in my own judgment, naturally, because I know him very
618
well. But this is essentially an assessment on my part based on knowing him
for a great many years. I have the greatest confidence in his loyalty.
Q. What would you say as to his sense of discretion in the use that he would
make of the knowledge that has come to him and will continue to come to him
assuming that he continues in Government work?
A. I found Dr. Oppenheimer to very discreet. I can remember during the
war once when we had to go out on a trip together and it was essential that he
carry a memorandum, that even in note form was classified, and he was so
careful and he pinned it in his hip pocket. I thought here is a man who really
is very careful about these things. But to say more generally as to his dis-
cretion, I have always found Dr. Oppenheimer to be very discreet in his handling
of classified information.
Q. Is there anything else you care to say to this board about his character
as a man and as a citizen?
A. I have the highest confidence in Dr. Oppenheimer. I consider him to be
a person of high character. I consider him to be a man of discretion, a good
security risk and a person of full loyalty to the country.
Mr. GABBISON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
CBOSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Dr. Bacher, you were asked by Mr. Garrison what you knew about Dr.
Oppenheimer's political views at the time you were in Los Alamos, and you
answered, I believe, that you knew him to be a Democrat
Did you know anything about his interest in other political philosophies?
A. As I think I answered Mr. Garrison, too, we didn't have very much time
to discuss politics at Los Alamos.
Q. Whether you discussed it or not, did you know?
A. Not much. I had been aware of the fact that he had leftist sympathies
before the war, but I didn't really know very much about it, and I didn't discuss
it with him.
Q. Did you ever state to anyone that you knew that between 1984 and 1942,
Dr. Oppenheimer became interested in various political philosophies and was
interested as many others were at the time in the experiment being conducted
by the Soviet Government in Russia?
A. I don't know, but it sounds as if I might have.
Q. Did you know that?
A. That is a difficult question to answer, because I am not exactly sure what
it would take to know that. I was aware that this was commonly discussed.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, there is in the file before the board a memorandum
to the files, dated March 14, 1947, the subject is stated to be a study of a refcort
on J. Robert Oppenheimer, or an analysis of a report on J. Robert Oppenheimer.
Much of this analysis has to do with FBI reports which I am not allowed to
discuss or disclose here.
Mr. GABBISON. This is an analysis by whom?
Mr. ROBB. It is not signed, Mr. Garrison, strangely enough. But it is in the
ABC files under that date.
Mr. GABBISON. Is that a document used in connection with the clearance dis-
cussions?
Mr. ROBB. I assume it was. I don't know. It is March 14, 1947.
Mr. GABBISON. An unsigned document?
Mr. ROBB. That is correct.
Mr. GRAY. It is on AEO stationery?
Mr. GABBISON. Are you going to read portions of that to Dr. Bacher?
Mr. ROBB. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, as I say, I am not permitted to read those
portions which reflect FBI reports. I would like, however, to read a certain
portion which does not necessarily involve such reports, and wherein some
minor Instances there are some references
Mr. GABBISON. I am sorry. I did not hear that
Mr. ROBB. I would like to read certain portions which do not involve reference
to FBI reports. In some instances where there is reference to FBI reports I
would like to delete or paraphrase, so as not to get into FBI reports. I wish
the board would follow me so I am not distorting.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, is there anything to show that this may not be
simply a kind of memorandum exchanged between security officers?
Mr. ROBB. I don't know what it is. It is a memorandum to file.
619
Mr. GRAY. There is not anything to show the authorship of this report.
Mr. GARRISON. I am a little troubled about reading into the record matter fnnn
a document whose purpose, nature, origin, authenticity ; we have no knowledge
at all.
Mr. ROBB. Could you want the board to consider it without your hearing it?
Mr. GARRISON. I would like to hear everything that the board considers. I
know that to be beyond the possibilities, greatly as I regret it.
Mr. ROBB. May I proceed, Mr. Chairman. I am reading from page 4 of this
memorandum, starting at the bottom — "It is known"
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, could we have this read first off the record to
see what we can make of it, and then see if it belongs in a part of the record
which conceivably one day may become public? I am not saying that there is any
plan to make it public, but this is a record of some historic character, and I
think
Mr* GRAY. I would like to ask Mr. Robb whether this is going to be the basis
of a question to Dr. Bacher?
Mr. ROBB. I think it relates to Dr. Bacher's testimony, and I want to put some
questions to him about this.
Mr. GARRISON. Does it relate to him personally?
Mr. ROBB. Not at alL
Mr. GARRISON. Why can't you put your question without reading it from an
unknown document?
Mr. ROBB. Because I am conducting this questioning and I would like to do
It in my own way.
Mr. GAEEISOK. I am conducting my question to the Chair.
Mr. ROBB. You asked me and I answered it.
Mr. GRAY. Where is that?
Mr. ROBB. Starting at page 4 of the report, at the bottom of the page, the
next to the last paragraph.
Mr. GRAY. And how much?
Mr. ROBB. Reading from there through the first full paragraph on page 6.
Mr. GRAY. I am going to allow counsel to read these portions he has indicated.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that there are certain minor references
in here to FBI reports which we are not permitted to disclose which is why I
was going to undertake to read it to give counsel the benefit of it with those
references deleted.
This board, as I understand it, is to base its decision in this matter upon the
whole file before it. If counsel does not want to hear this, and wants the board
to go ahead and consider it without him hearing it, that is all right with me.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, what I object to is reading into the record what
I take to be allegations about Dr. Oppenheimer's past which are unsupported
by anything approaching a signature, without any knowledge of the use to
which. tM« was put, or the source of it, without any possible means of our
knowing what it is going to say. It seems to me to read an anonymous allegation
of that kind about Dr. Oppenheimer into the record
Mr. GRAY. I don't believe that the portion that Mr. Robb proposes to read makes
allegations with respect to Dr. Oppenheimer. Am I correct?
Mr. ROBB. It concerns certain individuals employed on the project. I appre-
hend that this report was before Dr. Bacher at one time or another.
Mr. GBAY. This report clearly came out of the Atomic Energy Commission
files. As Mr. Robb said,* I tfriTifr it is safe to assume that even though Dr.
Bacher may not remember seeing this particular document, that at one time he
certainly had seen it in connection with the clearance procedures involved.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, if this was a part of the material which Dr.
Bacher went over, why can't it be shown to him now, and then questions put
to him about individuals, rather than reading this into the record. There cer-
tainly can be no objection to a former member of the Commission reading some-
thing from the Commission's files, as I understand it, particularly if he has
already read them in the past
Mr. ROBB. I certainly would not expect Dr. Bacher to remember this offhand.
Mr. GARRISON. Why cant you show it? Mr. Chairman, wouldn't that be
the appropriate procedure to let Dr. Bacher look at this, and then if counsel
wants to ask him questions about particular individuals, he can.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask Dr. Bacher questions about this
memorandum. I think the record ought to reflect what it is before I start to
ask him questions about it.
Mr. GRAY. I tf»*nir I shall have to talk with my colleagues on the board. I
understand you are objecting to the reading.
620
Mr. GARRISON. Yes, sir. I don't object if it is shown to Dr. Bacher so he may
read it, and then questions put to him about particular individuals, whatever
questions that counsel wants to ask. I just have this feeling that to read into
the record these anonymous passages about particular people is not sound
procedure.
Mr. ROBB. Of course, Mr. Chairman, I can't quite follow my friend because
this report is before the board in its entirety. I can't see why putting a portion
in the record seems to be such a horrible step to take. The only thing that will
happen if I read this is that counsel will get to hear it.
Mr. GARRISON. It also will become a part of the transcipt, which may become
a permanent record.
Mr. ROBB. I assume these files are a public record.
Mr. GARRISON. It may become public.
Mr. ROBB. It won't become public through us.
Mr. GRAY. I think it is not unreasonable to assume that some time this trans-
cript may become a public record. I would hope not, but I think we can make
no guarantees. I would like to have a consultation with my colleagues on the
board. I think we will just move into the other room briefly so we won't have
to send all of you out of the room.
(The board withdrew.)
(The board reentered the room.)
Mr. GRAY. After conferring with my colleagues on the board, I am going to
suggest that Mr. Robb show this document to Dr, Bacher, and if he wishes to
point out particularly the paragraphs which he is now concerned with and
then to ask him to question Dr. Bacher on the basis of these paragraphs without
reading them into the record.
Mr. Robb. Mr. Rolander, is it all right for Dr. Bacher to make references to
Mr. ROLAWDEB. Yes, but Dr. Bacher should not refer to references in discus-
sion.
Mr. ROBB. May we take time out while he reads it?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. May we proceed?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Dr. Bacher, you have read the paragraphs in that analysis to which I
referred you?
A. Yes.
Q. Doctor, if the statements made in this analysis about Charlotte Berber
are fact, would you have had her on the project at Los Alamos?
A. Could I see this thing again to refer to?
Q. Yes, sir. [Handing.]
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to note for the record that Dr
Baeher's answer to that question, whether he answers yes or no, scarcely seems
to me to be relevant to the subject of this inquiry for it has absolutely no .bearing
on the question of whether Dr. Oppenheimer knew those facts to be true or not
whatever these facts may be. This is a question in the cark about the witness1
opinion about something not in the record about some member of the project
Ifear that the inference which the question may wish to have drawn is that if the
witness answers the question in the negative somehow that will be taken as
directed to Dr. Oppenheimer. It just seems not to belong in the record, but
I don't want to seem to be argumentative about this, but I do put It to the
Chairman very seriously. y
K Mr^ 2?£Y; WOT? observation about It is in the record, and I am certain the
board will take into account all of the circumstances, Including the nature of
^ r dlscussion' and *** retate<i ^tors you pointed oit
The WITNESS. Would you repeat the question?
(Question read by the reporter.)
answer that question, Mr. Robb, I think it is neces-
of a statement about what ** ** f or securlty
oP *t Los Aalmos did not put ourselves in the position
/ 3ta*E5lt £2° whether >«tonttflc people should oishould
SllSJ? member of the project This was a question which was left up to the
security officers. For example, to take the case of Philip Morrison^J^ppen ^o
621
remember this, and it is referred to in the same document which you have just
asked me to look at— in his case he was a member of the metallurgical laboratory
at the University of Chicago. Some time in the summer of 1944 I was on a
recruiting trip for the Los Alamos laboratory. We were desperately trying to
get people from other sections of the project to help us in the work out there. I
went to the metallurical laboratory, I went to the SAM laboratories in New
York, and if I recall correctly, I went also to Oak Ridge. At each of these places
I talked to people and approached them with reference to coming to Los Alamos.
Finally after finding that some of the people whom I had initially approached
were unavailable for security reasons at Los Alamos, I took the precaution of
not talking to people until I cleared it with the security officer. In other words,
it was clear from this that the responsibility for as to who came to Los Alamos
was held with the security office and not with the scientific director or any
member of the scientific staff.
In the case of Philip Morrison I interviewed him in Chicago. Subsequently,
if I recall correctly, a question was raised as to whether it was advisable for
frim to come to Los Alamos. We pointed out that he was a very able man, would
help us more in our work out there than most of the other people that we might
get, and after review somewhere, it was decided that he would come to Los
Alamos and he did, and made a number of valuable contributions to the project
I think this is only to indicate that judgment as to what had to be taken for
fact in these matters and the decision as to what ought to be done on that was
something which was in the hands of the security officer at Los Alamos.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. May I interpose, since we digressed a little bit, you have here, have you
not, given a judgment on Dr. Oppenheimer as a security matter?
A. I have given my personal opinion.
Q. Yes, sir. Would you give that same personal opinion in respect of Charlotte
Serber, assuming that the statements you have read about her in this memo-
randum are true?
A. I will say this. I don't think Dr. Oppenheimer would not have had her at
Los Alamos if he did not think she was reliable.
Q. Would you please answer the question? I am asking for your opinion.
A. I believe I would have relied on the security officer to make a decision on
this.
Q. Suppose the security officer told you the facts set out in this memorandum,
and asked you for your opinion as to whether she should be there or whether she
should not, what would you have done?
A. In any security case, there are lots of acts and these may only be a part of
the facts. A security judgment, as I understand it, is as a matter of balancing
one thing against another. . . M
Q. In other words, you don't think you are qualified to give an opinion?
A. I do think I am qualified to give an opinion.
Q. Would you give one on Charlotte Serber?
A. In answer to that question, I think you need all the facts and not Just
what you have given me.
Q. Assuming that these facts were given to you, do you thing that taxing tnose
facts as data that she had any business on that project?
A. It seems to me that these are not necessarily facts. They are stated in tne
form of it as an opinion.
Q. I am asking you to assume that they are facts.
A. Could I read them again, please?
Q Yes.
Mr GRAY. I would say that the witness does not have to assume they are
facts, but for the purpose of a question only yon may. This is not to get you
Mr. ROBB. No, I am not asking you to say they are facts. I am merely trying
to explore the witness' criteria of security standards.
The WITNESS. Mr. Chairman, as you can see from my answers, I am a little
reluctant to answer hypothetical questions. „<„,«„„ *„
Mr GABBISON. I think, Mr. Chairman, that when counsel put the question to
Dr. Bacher, I thought he was making a comparison or parallel between that
question to Dr. Bacher about Mrs. Serber, and the question I put to Dr. Bacher
abort his opinion of Dr. Qppenheimer. Quite clearly Ws opinion about Dr.
Oppenheimer is based on many long years of intimate association in Government
woSTand 1 1^"*" to analogize that to an opinion about Mrs. Serber based on a
hypothetical set of facts is quite misleading.
622
Mr. BOBB. I don't think the Doctor is misled. Have you now read that again,
Doctor?
The WITNESS. I have now read it again.
I think, Mr. Robb, that there is a great difference between assuming that is a
fact, and proceeding on the basis. I think the real question comes up as to
whether that is a fact or not.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Assume that you knew that these statements were the truth about Mrs.
Berber, would you then be of the opinion that she should be cleared for service
on a secret war project such as Los Alamos?
A. In the case that all those facts are correct as stated, and were current at
the time, I would say no.
Q. Yes, sir. What was Mrs. Berber's Job down there?
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, please believe me, I am not trying to delay
or obstruct. I think since we now have had put to the witness questions about
these facts, those facts now ought to go in the record. I hoped when counsel
had shown this document to Mr. Bacher that the course of questioning would have
followed a different line. But the record as it now reads is absolutely blind and
incapable of evaluation by us. While I had hoped to avoid this kind of reading
of this raw undigested anonymous material into the record I now see no recourse
but to have it done, because otherwise the transcript is left in a meaningless state
of affairs. I think it better go in. I am sorry it has taken this turn. But I
didn't suppose that the questions would bring about that result.
Mr. BOBB. I am perfectly satisfied with the record as it stands, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Garrison didn't want it read. I wanted to read it I foresaw exactly what
would happen. Nbw he wants it read.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I really think it should go in. I have thought
from the argument that the question of counsel would put would be of an
entirely different category than to say assuming these facts to be true, what
would your opinion have been. I think we now ought to have the facts in the
record. I would like to have them read into the record so we know what we
are talking about.
Mr. GRAY. The Chair proposes to suggest that these paragraphs be read into
the record, but first I would like to know whether either of my colleagues feel
that is not a proper procedure.
Dr. EVANS. It is all right If Mr. Garrison wishes to have it read, it is all
right with me.
Mr. GARRISON. I do think the end result is an objectionable one, but it is less
objectionable now to have it in than to leave it blank.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I am a little bit confused. Am I to read Just the
section dealing with the Berbers, or all the paragraphs I have in mind?
Mr. GABBISON. I would Just do the Serber one.
Mr. ROBB. All right. I will have to leave out certain portions.
Mr. GARBISON. Would you indicate where the portions are left out
Mr. ROBB. "It is known" — I am leaving out something— "that subject was
responsible for the employment on the project at Los Alamos of a number of
persons"— I left out a word — "known to be either Communists or active Com-
munist sympathizers"— omissions— "Robert and Charlotte Serber. With respect
to the persons mentioned above, it is known that Charlotte Berber's family Is
prominent in Communist Party ranks in Philadelphia, Pa.; that she herself
was probably a party member and possibly a member of the Comintern, and
that she has always been active in radical activities and front organizations
wherever she has lived. Her husband, Robert Serber, perhaps under her
influence, has been active in the same circles since he married her, although
there is no conclusive evidence that he is a party member. Robert Serber" —
blank, blank— "were graduate students of the University of California under
subject."— blank, omissions. "It is known that all of them"— referring to
certain other persons and the Serbers— "perhaps influenced by subject were
extremely active in Communist activities on the campus at Berkeley during this
time. After finishing their studies all"— blank— "of the men went to the Uni-
versity of Illinois where they are also known to have associated with known
Communists, and to have taken part in Communist activities. When the Man-
hattan Project came into being, the Serbers were employed at Los Alamos by
subject"— omissions— "all of these people were very close personally to subject
and there is little room to doubt that he was aware of their sympathies and
activities. In evaluating this information, it must be kept in mind that both" —
.623
««* **
I think that is all on Serber.
Aftep a Mank' "Serber' t00' ls
Mr. ROBB. Yes, "Serber, too, Is highly regarded."
r« LS^'rJ £ ™th£reCOr,d Sh°uld show that this» without omissions that
S to t ^ discussion, represents excerpts from a memorandum in
Energy Commission files on Atomic Energy Commission stationerr
^ to flies, subject : Analysis of Report on J. Robert Oppe£
uthor h H> 194?' and Wlth no identiflcat^n as to
Mr. GARRISON Mr. Chairman, may I now point out what seems to be the vice
in this matter of using as a hypothetical case to Dr. Bacher-I have no objection
to putting hypothetical cases to him to see how his mind works on these things—
but here are some people called Serber. All we know on the record is that
Dr. Serber was cleared by a distinguished panel of which Admiral Nimitz was
chairman, and cleared by the Atomic Energy Commission itself for top secret
Q clearance. Presumably this material was taken into account It Is certainly
clear from the Commission's criteria that in evaluating Professor Berber's
qualifications, his wife's background must also have been taken into account
Here now are two people that I don't know from Adam, but it seems to me most
unfair to use them as a framework for a hypothetical question. A document
of this kind, anonymous and full of blanks, in the case of people who have
been cleared by Admiral Nimitz and Mr. Neyland and General Joyce, and by the
Commission itself. To me It serves no purpose in proceeding and is most unfair
to all concerned. It leaves the inference in the record that in spite of the
subsequent clearance of the Berbers that -
Mr. ROBB. Of the who?
Mr. GABBISON. If Dr. Oppenheimer ever sees them at all it is something very
wrong. This is a backhanded accusation against the Berbers in this record —
I am not defending them at all — but I am questioning the validity of this
procedure. I would specifically request the chairman that hypothetical cases
to Dr. Bacher be put in the form of X or what have you, and not names of people
to be used for material of this character.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Garrison keeps arguing about the clearance
of the Berbers. So far as I know, Mrs. Serber has never been cleared by the
Atomic Energy Commission but she was employed at Los Alamos as a librarian.
She had access to all the classified information that was there. My questions
to Dr. Bacher were directed at his opinion of Mrs. Serber. I read the matter
about Mr. Serber just because I felt sure if I didn't read it all, Mr. Garrison
would say I should have read it all. I have not asked him anything about
Mr. Serber yet May I proceed, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. I think the witness has already answered the question.
Mr. ROBB. Yes.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, do you know what evidence might have been presented to the
board which cleared Dr. Serber?
A. No, I was not present
Q. May I ask you, Doctor, do you recall whether or not in 1947 the Commis-
sion had its security officer prepare some analysis of the FBI reports in the
file for you?
Mr. GABBISON. Which file is this, Dr. Oppenheimer's file?
Mr. ROBB. Yes.
The WITNESS. Mr. Robb, I remember reading a summary but I don't believe
I remember anything that would allow me to answer your question either In
the affirmative or negative.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. I notice here In Mr. Jones* memorandum to the file which refers to entries
which is March 10, 1947, the last page of that contains this notation, "The
results of the discussion with Mr. Clifford were reported to the Commission at
a meeting at 5 p. m. this afternoon." That would be March 11.
Mr. GABBISON. Is this the document read into the record before?
Mr. ROBB. Yes, sir. "At that meeting the general manager reported that a
detailed analysis of the FBI summary was in process of preparation by the
Commission's security staff, as an aid to evaluation,"
aom&— 54 - *o
624
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Assuming such summary was made, no doubt you had it before you?
A. It sounds so, but I don't remember it, Mr. Robb.
Q. I was not there, but my thought is that probably this paper that I showed
you which purports to be an analysis of the report on Dr. Oppenheimer was
the analysis referred to in that note of March 11.
A. I am afraid I can't help you on that
Mr. Chairman, could I make an observation on this last discussion?
Mr. GRAY. You certainly may.
The WITNESS. In view of the fact now that this has been read into the record,
I tried in my answer to you about Mrs. Serber on the hypothetical question, to
make it clear that if that information was (a) fact, and (&) current, that the
answer I gave then applied. I think the question that I had in my mind, and the
reason I found it so difficult to answer the hypothetical question which you
posed, was that I would assume that the board and also the Commission in re-
viewing a case dig not believe that was either (a) fact, or (6) current I think
these are the pertinent questions in making a decision.
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Are you talking about the Commission or the board considering Dr. Oppen-
heimer's case?
A. No, I am talking about the Serber case, which is the question you asked
me about
Q. Of course, Mr. Berber's case was distinct from that of Mrs. Serber. My
question related to Mrs. Serber, and perhaps to make it perfectly clear whether
I am getting at it, I will ask you this : If you had that data before you in 1942 and
1943, and had to make a decision as to whether Mrs. Serber would come to Los
Alamos, would you have decided that she should come or that she should not
come?
A. Once again my answer to you would be that I would leave that to a full
investigation by security officers under those circumstances, because this does
not constitute a full record.
Q. But assume that the investigation disclosed that those statements were
true, and you then had to make the decision, what would it have been?
A. I said if they were true facts and were current, that is, applied as of that
day, which is not clear, I might add, from the record you have read, then I
would say no.
Mr. BOBB. I think that answers my question. Thank you. That is all I have
to ask.
Mr. GBAY. Dr. Evans.
Dr. EVANS. Dr. Bacher, did you have a graduate student at your school by
the name of Sheehan in the last 2 years?
The WITNESS. It could be, but I don't recall him in physics.
Dr. EVANS. He was a chemistry student, but he took a lot of physics. He was
one of my students, and I just wondered if you knew **™
The WITNESS. I did not know him.
Dr. EVANS. Dr. Bacher, you have never been a Communist?
The WITNESS. No.
Dr. EVANS. Never been a fellow traveler?
The WITNESS. No.
Dr. EVANS. Have you belonged to any of those subversive organizations that
the Attorney General listed?
The WITNESS. As fas as I know I have never belonged to any organization that
Is on the Attorney General's list
Dr. EVANS. Do you think that a man can be completely loyal to his country
and still be a security risk?
The WITNESS. Yes. If he is a drunkard, he might be a security risk and be
completely loyaL
Dr. EVANS. Just suppose because of his associates.
The WITNESS. It seems to me that on this question of association that is a
different question. If you have full confidence in a man's character and his
integrity and his discretion, I don't believe that one can rule him out as a
security risk on the basis of his knowing people who have in the past had connec-
tion with the Communist Party, mostly because I don't believe there would be
many people left in the United States that would satisfy that criterion.
Dr. EVANS. Then you are answering the question this way. You think a man
can be completely loyal, and if he Is completely loyal, he is not a security risk?
Is that what you are saying?
625
The WITNESS. I believe I specified a little more than that, Dr. Brans. I said,
If I recall correctly, that if he is a person of high character, a person of integrity,
and a person who is discreet, and is at the same time a person who is clearly
loyal, then he is not a security risk, assuming of course that other criteria such
as he is not a drunk or things of that sort are included.
Dr. EVANS. You think Dr. Oppenheimer is always discreet?
The WITNESS. I do.
Dr. EVANS. Do you think he was discreet when he refused to give the name
of somebody that talked to him? Do you remember that Chevalier incident?
The WITNESS. I don't remember the point you refer to, I am afraid.
Dr. EVANS. Someone approached Dr. Oppenheimer about getting security in-
formation, and Dr. Oppenheimer refused to give the name of the man that
approached him.
The WITNESS. I thought he did give the name, Dr. Evans.
Dr. EVANS. He refused twice I tMnfr, and for quite a long time he didn't give it.
Am I right on that?
Mr. BOBB. I believe that is correct
Mr. GARRISON. That is right.
Dr. EVANS. Was that discreet?
The WITNESS. Could you ask the question again, Mr. Evans?
Dr. EVANS. Yes. If you were on a project, and you had access to a lot of
secret information, and I came to you and told you that there was somebody
that knew that I could give information to if you would give it to me, would
you have gone and told somebody that I had approached you?
The WITNESS. I think that should have been reported.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman.
Dr. EVANS. Maybe I put the question very badly.
Mr. GARRISON. All right. I accept it as a hypothetical question.
Dr. EVANS. You have never been approached by people?
The WITNESS. No, never.
Dr. EVANS. Do you believe a man should place loyalty to his country before
loyalty to a friend?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Dr. EVANS. That is all I want to ask.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Bacher, did you know— I am not sure whether this was covered
In earlier testimony— David Hawkins?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Did you know him well?
The WITNESS. I met him first at Los Alamos, Mr. Chairman, when he was a
member of that laboratory. I cannot remember exactly when he came to Los
Alamos. I would guess some time in the last part of 1943 or early 1944. I met
him there, knew him fairly well at Los Alamos, and have known him a bit since
the war. He lived in Washington for a time and did some work, I think, at the
end of the war in finishing up a history that he had been preparing of the Los
Alamos project. I knew him a bit while he was here in Washington. I have
not seen him now for some time. I believe he is in Colorado.
Mr. GRAY. At the time you knew him at Los Alamos or later, did you have any
information about his what I believe are sometimes referred to as political
affiliations? Did you know anything about his connections?
The WITNESS. I did not discuss politics with him. I believe I read some
testimony since that he has had and I must say I was very surprised at what
came out in that testimony, because I believed Hawkins and believe him today
to be a person of character, and I don't believe one who could today subject
himself to the rigid control that would be required if he were to have the
affiliations of which I believe he has testified since then.
Mr. GRAY. I don't believe he has testified to any current affiliation.
The WITNESS. No, I meant in the past
Mr. GRAY. You testified that you interviewed Philip Morrison.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. With respect to his' employment
The WITNESS. Yes, that is right.
Mr. GRAY. Did you know anything about his political affiliations?
The WITNESS. I didn't at that time, no.
Mr. GRAY. Would it surprise you if he had had Communist associations or
connections as a personal matter?
The WITNESS. Today?
626
Mr. GRAY. Perhaps I am not making my question clear. My question is
whether it would surprise you today to know that he then at the time you
interviewed him had political connections which you would feel would not
make him a good security risk today?
The WITNESS. After all, Mr. Chairman, in the meantime I have read some of
these things so I could not easily be surprised by it.
Mr. GRAY. Were you surprised when you read them?
The WITNESS. I was surprised when I found out in that particular case.
Mr. GRAY. When you interviewed people for the laboratory this kind of
question was not asked?
The WITNESS. No, I had no relation to that. Any interview by a scientific
person was concerned entirely with the question of whether that man would
be an appropriate addition to the laboratory on scientific and technical ground.
The question of whether he came to the laboratory or not was left to the
security officer to pass on.
Mr. GRAY. That was the system you used; that probably is not the system
today, is it? Everybody concerned with the project is expected to take some
interest in security?
The WITNESS. Yes, I would say also at the time I interviewed Morrison, I
didn't know anything at all about his background.
Mr. GRAY. On the question of identification of people and with no conclusions
to be drawn from the question, did you know Fuchs well?
The WITNESS. I knew him reasonably well at Los Alamos, because he was
a member of the Theoretical Division and did a certain amount of work for the
Division for which I was responsible there. I didn't know him well outside
work, but within the laboratory there I saw him fairly frequently. I probably
knew 8 or 10 members of the Theoretical Division better than I knew Fuchs, and
my knowledge of him was entirely through the work of the project
Mr. GRAY. He was considered to be doing a good job?
The WITNESS. He did a good job, I believe.
Dr. EVANS. You were very surprised when that came out?
The WITNESS. I was certainly surprised.
Dr. EVANS. You might have lost a little faith in your own judgment of people?
The WITNESS. I didn't know him very well personally, that is, I didn't spend
many hours with him. I saw him mostly in a scientific and technical capacity.
So I didn't have an opportunity to form a personal judgment of Fuchs very much.
He was a very quiet, very retiring person.
Mr. GRAY. Would you say, Dr. Bacher, that aside from the security aspect,
you were responsible for the employment of Philip Morrison as a member of
the project? I asked that badly. You have already testified that you didn't
concern yourself with the security angle.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Did Dr. Oppenheimer suggest Morrison as a prospect?
The WITNESS. I don't recall that he did. I think as a matter of fact that I
interviewed him at the metallurgical laboratory and how I got the list of people
that I interviewed at the metallurgical laboratory, I Just don't remember. I
think it was presented by the metallurgical laboratory of people on the project
whom they thought would be helpful in the work at Los Alamos, and who in the
emergency they could manage to get along without or were willing to get along
without.
Mr. GRAY. In any event, you were exercising your own best judgment in inter-
viewing Morrison for possible employment?
The WITNESS. Yes, I think a question was raised about Morrison. If I recall
correctly, we from Los Alamos said he was one of the people that would be most
useful to us from the scientific and technical end. The question was reviewed,
I don't know, whether by local security people or whether in Washington; and
Morrison then came to Los Alamos. I think this was along about in the early
Mr. GRAY. Do you have any more questions?
Mr. GARRISON. May I ask one more question about Morrison?
^ BEDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GARRISON:
Q. Did you interview a group of young men at the metallurgical laboratory?
A. JL€S.
Q. And he was one of a group?
A. Yes.
627
Q. And In interviewing them what did you seek to find out?
A. I sought most to find out what their work had been at the metallurgical
lab, and whether they would fit into the work that we had to do at Los Alamos
and in part to find out whether they would be willing to pick up their belongings
and their families and move out to New Mexico to undertake work on that
project
Most of the people wanted to know quite a little bit about what the circum-
stances were, because they didn't have very good information on this point, and
they were unwilling to make a decision in the matter until they learned a little
more about the physical surroundings, and so on.
Q. And had all of these young men been cleared for work on the metallurgical
project?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you ever been fooled in your Judgment of the loyalty of anybody whom
you have known as long and as intimately as Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. No.
Q. Do you think you could be?
A. I doubt it
Mr. GRAY. Do you have any more questions?
Mr. GABRISON. Since Dr. Evans put a hypothetical question about the Chevalier
case, I think I would like to read from the Commission's letter and put a question
myself.
By Mr. GAEEISON:
Q. I am reading, Dr. Bacher, from the Commission's letter of December 28,
1954, on page 6 which you testified you had read, but I want to refresh yonr
memory of it
"It was reported that prior to March 1, 1943, possibly 3 months prior, Peter
Ivanov, Secretary at the Soviet Consulate, San Francisco, approached George
Charles Eltenton for the purpose of obtaining information regarding work being
done at the Radiation Laboratory for the use of Soviet scientists; that George
Charles Eltenton subsequently requested Haakon Chevalier to approach you
concerning this matter; that Haakon Chevalier thereupon approached you,
either directly or through yonr brother, Frank Friedman Oppenheimer, in con-
nection with this matter ; and Haakon Chevalier finally advised George Charles
Eltenton that there was no chance whatsoever of obtaining the information.
It was further reported that you did not report this episode to the appropriate
authorities until several months after its occurrence; that when you initially
discussed this matter with the appropriate authorities on August 26, 1943, you
did not identify yourself as the person who had been approached, and you
refused to identify Haakon Chevalier as the individual who had made the ap-
proach on behalf of George Charles Eltenton ; and that it was not until several
months later, when you were ordered by a superior to do so, that yon so identified
Haakon Chevalier. It was further reported that upon your return to Berkeley
following your separation from the Los Alamos project* you were visited by the
Chevaliers on several occasions ; and that yonr wife was in contact with Haakon
and Barbara Chevalier in 1946 and 1947."
In Dr. Oppenheimer's answer at page 22, he said as follows :
"1 knew of no attempt to obtain secret information at Los Alamos. Prior to
my going there my friend Haakon Chevalier with his wife visited us on Eagle
Hill, probably in early 1943. During the visit, he came into the kitchen and told
me that George Eltenton had spoken to him of the possibility of transmitting
technical information to Soviet scientists. I made some strong remark to the
effect that this sounded terribly wrong to me. The discussion ended there.
Nothing in our long-standing friendship would have led me to believe that Che-
valier wa9 actually seeking information; and I was certain that he had no idea
of the work on which I was engaged.
"It has long been clear to me that I should have reported the incident at once.
The events that led me to report it— which I doubt ever would have become
known without my report— were unconnected with it. During the summer of
1943, Colonel Lansdale, the intelligence officer of the Manhattan District, came
to Los Alamos and told me that he was worried about the security situation in
Berkeley because of the activities of the Federation of Architects, Engineers,
Chemists and Technicians. This recalled to my mind that Eltenton was a mem-
ber and probably a promoter of the FAECT. Shortly thereafter, I was in Berke-
ley and I told the security officer that Eltenton would bear watching. When
asked why, I said that Eltenton had attempted, through intermediaries, to ap-
proach people on the project, though I mentioned neither myself nor Chevalier.
Later, when General Groves urged me to give the details, I told him of my
conversation with Chevalier. I still think of Chevalier as a friend."
Supposing that the evidence here showed that Dr. Oppenheimerfs statement
about the approach by Chevalier included a statement bv him to the security
officers to whom he initiated the mention of the name of Eltenton the fact that
Chevalier, whom he did not name, had approached three people; that actually
Chevalier, according to Dr. Oppenheimer's testimony, approached him only;
that he invented the fact that there were three people and not one; that in
his discussions with the security officers he said that Eltenton had a contact
with the Russian consulate and that there was somebody that had microfilm or
some other method of getting secret information to Russia and that those details
were also inventions.
Taking al that now into account, and taking further into account the fact that
General Groves pressed Dr. Oppenheimer for the name of the intermediary,
namely, Chevalier, that Dr. Oppenheimer said he would tell him if ordered
and General Groves said that he did not want to order him and asked him to
think it over and that later General Groves said he must have the name and
that If it were not told to him he would have to order it, that Dr. Oppenheimer
revealed the name of his friend Chevalier to General Groves. Taking all of that
Into account and assuming for the purpose of this question that this is the record
before you, would your previous answer about your confidence in Dr. Oppen-
heimer's loyalty be altered in any way in your mind?
Mr. ROBB. May I Just enter my usual caveat to the record as to the accuracies
of the hypothesis, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GARRISON. Quite right
Mr. GRAY. That means, Dr. Bacher, that Mr. Robb does not necessarily
accept—-
The WITNESS. I fully understand that
Mr. GRAY. It puzzled Dr. Bacher.
The WITNESS. Thank you.
Mr. GRAY. This is Mr. Robb's statement for the record and now you can
proceed with the answer.
By Mr. GARRISON:
Q. I say that is my version of the hypothesis.
A. Would you restate the question, not the whole hypothesis.
Q. Having all of this before you now, you previously testified that on the
basis of your experiences with Dr. Oppenheimer, you were confident of his
loyalty to the United States and also that you considered him to be a good
security risk.
I ask you now, accepting what I told you to be the case for the purpose of the
discussion, would your conviction about the matters that you expressed about
his loyalty and his security be the same.
A. No. I think he made a mistake in not reporting it Immediately, but this
does not change my Judgement of Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. When you say no, yon mean by that -
Mr. ROBB. I think he meant yes, if there is any question.
The WITNESS. The question was, Did It change my opinion?
Mr. GARRISON. That Is correct
The WITNESS. The answer is "No." I believe Dr. Oppenheimer made a mistake
In not reporting that incident Immediately, but what you have told me and read
into the record does not change my Judgment given previously.
By Mr. GARRISON:
in &f?f«MSU ?££ thatDr Oppenhelmep would today do what he did In 1943
In this incident if the fects I have told you are the case?
A-Idonot I think he realizes he made a mistake on that by your statement
tnere*
Q. I do not want you to accept my statement
statemettt to tte record and I telieve the same thing of my own
Dr. EVANS. That is, he was not particularly discreet at that time.
I think this Is more a question of Judgment rather than dis-
Dr, BVANS, He did not have good Judgment at that time. How Is that?
629
The WITNESS. It seems to me this is more a question of judgment than dis-
cretion.
Dr. EVANS. I do not know the difference.
By Mr. GABBISON :
Q. Was there involved in this case, Dr. Bacher, as I put it to you any leakage
of information by Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. No, not that I know of. The word discretion is usually used in security
matters with reference to someone saying something that might conceivably be
classified where someone can hear it who is not authorized to receive the infor-
mation. That is why I made that difference.
Q. Would you say it was the fact here that quite contrary to the leaking of
information, Dr. Oppenheimer declined to have anything to do with even a notion
of leaking information and after much delay revealed finally the names of the
people above?
A. He seems to have reported the incident fully, judging from what you read
me. The only question seems to be one of time.
Mr. GABEISON. That is all.
Mr. BOBB. That is all. I have no further questions.
Mr. GRAY. I have one question and this won't take long.
There are those in the scientific community today, Dr. Bacher, who think that
the fact of this proceeding is an outrage. There are some, I say, would feel that
way,. You have heard the view expressed?
The WITNESS. I have heard that it has been expressed.
Mr. GRAY. I do not say that it a universally held view but there are those
who hold it
As a former member of the Commission, I would like to ask you whether you.
feel that this matter is of such serious consequences that this kind of hearing is a
good thing. I am not talking about the publicity angles and the rest of it
I mean in the interest of the Government and of the individual himself.
I will put it this way : If such a hearing had been had in 1947, it would not
have been an outrage, would it?
The WITNESS. I find it very difficult to answer that question, Mr. Chairman,
In the first place, it is hard to know what one means by an outrage.
Mr. GBAY. That is my characterization and I agree that it is bad to have it
in the record. I should not perharps express it this way, but to say that there
are those in the scientific community who see absolutely no justification for this
hearing, is that an exaggeration of a point of view which exists?
The WITNESS. It may exist I have tried rather hard not to talk to too many
people before testifying here and I do not have a good view of what people think,
so I cannot answer your question really very well on that
With respect to the procedures that ABC has for handling security cases, these,
of course, were worked up rather carefully by the Commission over a long period
of time. Our generatl counsel pointed out to us that the essence of a proper
system for handling security cases was the procedure and, therefore, the Com-
mission in setting up the present procedure tried hard to follow as nearly as
possible those procedures which over the years have come to be recognized
in courts of law. This can't be f ollowed fully where questions touching on classi-
fied information and involving classified information must appear. This poses
very grave difficulties.
I can think of no way, for example, in which hearings of the present sort could
be held in public as some people have requested. I just do not know how a
thine like that could be done. I am not sure that I get the flavor of your question.
]2r. GBAY. That wasn't directly responsive, but do you feel that having estab-
lished the procedures, I suppose while you were a member of the Commission
Mr GRAY The Commission having established them and I assume your hav-
ing felt at the time that they were fair, do you as a former Commissioner and
as a scientist and as a former associate and a friend of Dr. Oppenheimer feel that
the Commission should not have instituted this proceeding?
The WITNESS That, Mr. Chairman, would depend on my assessment of
whether there has been substantial new derogatory information brought to bear
about Dr. Oppenheimer. I have not seen such in reading the set of charges
that have been brought up and listed by the general manager that were not
known before. There may be information which I do not have. But on the list
of charges that were there, I did not see any substantial amount of new derogatory
information.
630
Mr. GRAY. Without in any way endorsing or rejecting the information about
the hydrogen bomb, that certainly is new since 1947. I am speaking now of the
material in the general manager's letter.
Th^* WITNESS Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Also, I think that it is true that there are files which are in existence
which were not available to the Commission in 1947.
The WITNESS. You see, I am not aware of that, Mr. Chairman.
Mr GRAY. Again, I am not suggesting that there is anything that should or
should not be concluded from those files, but that is the fact
Finally, I suppose the question of formal action of clearance of Dr. Oppen-
heimer in 1947 remains to be a matter surrounded by some mystery. Would
counsel accept that in view of the fact that the reference to this action which
apparently finally was written down in August referred to action which took
place in February, although in fact any clearance which may have been passed
upon by the Commission must have been done by it in March and there is some
confusion. I do not cite this as having a bearing on the ultimate question of
Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance as much as having a bearing on the propriety of
these proceedings.
If I seem to be making an argument, it is not my intention, but I was interested
actually in having your view because, in a sense, you have been on both sides of
this kind of thing.
The WITNESS. Let me see if I can answer your question this way : If what I
read in the papers has been correct and most of my information on this does
come from reading newspapers, there seems to be two possible ways in which
the case could be handled. Either the Commission could have, on the occasion
of the case being raised, again recommended to the President that there be an
administrative clearance, either by the Commission or directly by the President,
or as the second alternative a hearing could be set up.
I presume from what I have read in the papers that the President made the
decision that there should be a hearing. These, I think, are the only two alterna-
tives as far as I know that exist There may be others with which I am not
familiar. With that decision, I think a hearing is being held under all of the
regulations that have been set up and the procedures of the ABO.
I find it very difficult to answer hypothetical questions without all of the in-
formation that went into this decision.
Mr. GBAY. I think I should, as chairman, make an observation for the record,
that an assumption about the participation of the President of the United States
in this matter is the assumption of the witness.
The WITNESS. It was only what I read in the paper, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. We will allow the witness certainly to report anything of his recol-
lection of what he has read in the press, but I do not want to involve the Presi-
dent of the United States in this proceeding, because I have no information in
that regard myself.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I think a little while back you put a question to
counsel on this side which remained unanswered, when you said wouldn't
counsel agree that there was confusion as to whether Dr. Oppenheimer had been
cleared
Mr. GRAY. Whether it was formal action.
Mr. GARRISON. If I might be permitted to respond
Mr. GRAY. You certainly may.
Mr. GARRISON. I would say at this point we simply do not know. I do know
precisely what the course of action was that was taken. I made a request a little
earlier today for a copy of the minutes of the August meeting relating to it which
has been taken under advisement. I have some other questions having to do with
the record which I would like to put to the board in the morning. I do not want
to take your time this afternoon.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, as I advised the chairman, I have to leave. I would
like to leave as soon as I may. Does Mr. Garrison have any more questions?
Mr. GARRISON. No, sir.
(At this point, Mr. Bobb departed from the hearing.)
Dr. EVANS. If you had been a free agent and not connected with these projects,
just an ordinary of the country, and you had been asked to serve OB this panel
as we have been, would you have thought it your duty to do so?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Dr. Bacher. We appreciate your coming
here.
We are recessed now until 9 :80 in the morning.
(Thereupon, the hearing was recessed at 5 :80 p. m., to reconvene at 9 :80 a. m.,
Tuesday, April 27, 1954.)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER OP J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
BUILDING T-3, ROOM 2022,
Washington^ D. <7., Tuesday ', April £7 \
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to recess,
before the board, at 9 : 30 a. m.
Personnel Security Board : Dr. Gordon Gray, chairman; Dr. Ward
T. Evans, member; and Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Roger Robb, and C. A. Rolander, Jr., counsel for the
board; J. Robert Oppenheimer, Lloyd K. Garrison, Samuel J. Silver-
man and Allan B. Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer; Her-
bert S. Marks, cocounsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
C681)
PROCEEDINGS
Mr. GRAY. The chairman wishes the record to show that following Dr. Backer's
appearance as a witness, the chairman conferred with Mr. Garrison and Mr.
Robb. The chairman suggested to counsel that the board was willing to strike
that portion of Dr. Backer's testimony which related to the memorandum in the
ABO files, dated March 14, largely on the ground that the memorandum in
question was unsigned and unidentified.
The chairman stated that his suggestion was also related to Mr. Garrison's
objection that the memorandum in question introduced into the record statements
about the Berbers which were unidentified in origin. The chairman made it
clear to counsel that the board does not feel there is any question of impropriety,
but wished to take into account fully every possible consideration of fairness
as far as the record is concerned.
Mr. Robb indicated that he had no objection to this procedure. Mr. Garrison
felt that it would be a mistake, once the record was formed, to strike this
portion of the record.
Is that correct, or is any of that incorrect? I would like help on this, because
I am simply trying to reflect what the facts are.
Mr. ROBB. It is entirely correct as far as I am concerned.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I think I would just say that while I objected
to the introduction of the document and the questions based on it, I still hold the
views that I then expressed. The matter in fact having come before the board
and testimony having been had before us, I think that it should stand in the
record.
Mr. GRAY. Under the circumstances, the record will stand.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, before we begin with the witness, I would just
like to ask if the minutes of that August 6, 1947, meeting that I asked; for
yesterday are available?
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I am informed by Mr. Mitchell, the General Counsel,
that he has taken the matter up with the Commission. Both he and I have
recommended that they be made available, but they will not meet until this
afternoon, at which time they will make the decision.
Mr. GBAY. I think the record ought to clearly show that only the Commission
can make this decision.
Mr. ROBB. That is correct.
Mr. GABBISON. The board can, however, Mr. Chairman, I take it join in the
request to the Commission and make it available.
Mr. GRAY. I think it is understood that the board did join in that request
Mr. ROBB. I think there is no question about that
Mr. GRAY. General, I would like to ask whether you wish to testify under oath.
You are not required to do so. I think in fairness I should say that all witnesses
have so testified.
General MCCOBMIOK. I am perfectly willing.
Mr. GRAY. Would you be good enough to raise your right hand, General?
What is your full name?
General MOCOBMAOK. James McCormack, Jr.
Mr. GRAY. James McCormack, Jr., do you swear that the testimony you are to
give the board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you God?
General MCCORMAOX. I do, sir.
Whereupon .Tames McCormack, Jr., was called as a witness, and having been
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Will you be seated, please.
I am required to remind you of the existence of the so-called perjury statutes.
May we assume that you are familiar generally that there are perjury statutes?
The WITNESS. I am familiar ; yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. I am prepared to review the penalties, if yon wish.
The WITNESS. It won't be necessary.
634
Mr. GRAY. May I ask, General McCormack, if in the course of your testimony
it becomes necessary for you to refer to or disclose restricted data, you notify me
in advance so that we might take the necessary and appropriate steps In the
interest of security?
The WITNESS. All right, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Finally, I should say to you what I try to remember to say to all
witnesses, that we consider these proceedings a confidential matter between the
Commission and its officials on the one hand, and Dr. Oppenheimer and his repre-
sentatives and witnesses on the other. The Commission is making no releases
about these proceedings. On behalf of the board, I express the hope that wit-
nesses will take the same view of the matter.
The WITNESS. If I may ask, this is as regards public statements.
Mr. GRAY. That is correct
The WITNESS. Thank you.
Mr. GRAY. I should say further that in your case, there is no military require-
ment involved about participating in these proceedings and what you might say
about them. I think I covered it as well as I could by saying that the board
considers these proceedings a confidential matter between the Commission and
Dr. Oppenheimer, and their various representatives.
The WITNESS. I had not meant to confuse, sir, but before coming, I told my
immediate commander where I was going and the purpose. I wanted you to
know that.
Mr. GRAY. That is essential, I tMnfr. You have to tell him when you return
where you have been and what you have been doing, perhaps?
The WETNESS. Your experience would indicate that
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVERMAN:
Q. General McCormack, for the record will you state your rank and branch of
service, and your present post, please?
A. I am a major general in the United States Air Force. My present position
is vice commander of the Air Research and Development Command, stationed
at Baltimore, Md.
Q. You are appearing as a witness at the request of the attorneys for Dr
Oppenheimer?
A. That is right
Q. Could you tell us a little bit about your present command, what the Air
Research and Development Command is?
A. The Air Force, unlike the Army or Navy, has consolidated all of its research
and development creative engineering activities in a single command, and all of
its procurement, production, supply, and service activities in another. The first is
the Air Research and Development Command, and the second is the Air Materiel
Command. These two functions are put together in separate packages in the
Navy, in the Bureau of Ordnance, Bureau of Aeronautics, and so forth.
The Air Force as the field operating organization and not as Washington policy
staff, we have purview over all research and development activities directly sup-
ported and sponsored by the Air Force, and are responsible for liaison with cor-
responding corollary comprementary activities of interest to us in other services
and indeed in science and industry and throughout the Government
Q. Does this command include such portions of research and development as
have to do with development and use of atomic weapons?
-nT JRtS"? the Mf F?rce resP°aslNltty in that field, although the major re-
sponsibility of course rests with the Atomic Energy OomWssion?
Q. About how large is the personnel of this command?
o JrvAPPr?5i?atel£ 4%°°° total on tne Government rolls, roughly half military
and half civilian, of whom some 25,000 could be said to be engaged in research;
development, and testing activities. The rest are supporting |-oups. re8earcn'
°f *e DiVi8i0n 0± ****** ««*« * ttt
A. From February 1947 to August 1951.
taier? WaS tt ^ that connection tnat y°n *»d your contacts with Dr. Oppen-
hetaier?
, you were ector of the Division of Military Ap-
tta « of «£ flSMSP °°™n!B^ dld you have occasion to ob^
SJJ^T £ e Gen?al Advisory Committee insofar as that affected matters
with which you were fcuniliar, and particularly the work ofDr.^^heSer?^
635
A. I would say I got a rather good view of it. It was the usual practice— I
don't know how many departures there were — to invite me or my staff in when
the General Advisory Committee was discussing in preliminary fashion matters
affecting my operating responsibility.
Q. Would you care to comment on the contribution of the General Advisory
Committee, and particularly of Dr. Oppenheimer toward helping the atomic
energy program, and in particular as far as you could observe it.
A. I have worked with a number of advisory committees in my business. I
think the General Advisory Committee was the outstanding one of my experience
in terms of its qualifications, its interest in the work, and its consistent effort to
be helpful in broadening the base of weapons development, of pushing out into
other areas of military interest, generally to the full extent
I speak in terms of my own responsibility which was below the policy level as
regards the Commission. Just generally I would say the committee was con-
tinuously interested in doing the very best they could by the weapons program.
A committee, of course, is limited in the impact it can have as opposed to the
administrative organization.
Q. Did you work fairly closely with the committee and Dr. Oppenheimer dur-
ing this 4 years or so that you were Director of the Division of Military
Application?
A. I saw the committee very frequently. The record would indicate how
many meetings they held during that period but I have it in mind it must have
been 4 to 6 a year. In addition to that, I saw members of the committee passing
through Los Alamos, through the Commission building in Washington.
Q. And that included Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Yes ; I saw a great deal of Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. Were you familiar with Dr. Oppenheimer's views on the relative division
of atomic weapons between strategic air use and use for tactical purposes and
continental defense, or is that a very mixed up question? If you understand, will
you answer the question I should have put?
A. I take your question to relate to the division of weapons in the stockpile or
the division of effort for developing new weapons.
Q. Perhaps you will answer both.
A. I don't think the General Advisory Committee or Dr. Oppenheimer were
concerned with the division of actual weapons in stockpile. That is much the
question of the design of the weapon for the purpose for which it was created
which was one in accordance with military requirements and the program laid
out on that basis.
With regard to contemplating future uses of fissionable material when weapons
might be developed and fabricated, my recollection is that the General Advisory
Committee and of course Dr. Oppenheimer as its leader and spokesman, were
very strongly in favor of developing new types which would open new uses for
tactical applications, particularly. My recollection may be faulty on this point
but I thin* up to the time I left the Commission, the use of atomic weapons in
air defense was not a clear enough picture for any strong views one way or
another.
Q. Was it your impression that Dr. Oppenheimer was in favor of limiting the
use of atomic weapons for strategic air purposes or strategic air bombing?
A. Setting up a limit which would be effective in a campaign? Not to my
knowledge.
Q. Was he in favor of cutting down the proportion of fissionable materials
that went into strategic air bombing?
A. As best I can remember this arose only once during the period of my as-
sociation with Dr. Oppenheimer, and it had more to do with contemplated
future uses, if I can make this clear. I recall Dr. Oppenheimer's being a pro-
ponent of the school that if you are to get the full military developmental and
operational interest in atomic weapons for tactical use, you had to give them
something realistic to put in their thinking, such as an understanding that as
these uses are developed, material will be available.
This is my statement of the thesis, not Dr. Oppenheimer's. My recollection is
that this was a line of his thinking as I understood it.
Q. Did that involve cutting down the amount of material available for
strategic air bombing or did he think there would be enough for both?
A. I had not recalled the thesis as being an arbitrary reduction as against
some future date, but rather as a factor for planning. War plans are different.
Q. I am not talking about war plans.
A. What you use weapons for when you actually start using them Is what the
situation requires. I don't recall Dr. Qppenheimer ever denying that
636
Q. Did he indicate that this use of atomic weapons was an ever-expanding
business, and you have enough materials both for tactical uses and strategic?
A. That I think is a fair statement.
Q. By the way, your present command covers both so-called continental
defense and tactical and strategic use of atomic weapons insofar as the Air Force
is concerned?
A That is right
Q. In the course of your meeting and acquaintanceship with Dr. Oppenheimer,
did you feel you came to know him quite well?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Do you have an opinion as to Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty to the United
States?
A. I never had a question as to it. _,,,,. ^ **
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether he is a security risk, as to his discre-
tion in the use of classified materials, whether it is safe to trust him with such?
A. Nothing in my associations with him would raise the question with me.
Mr. SILVEBMAW. That is alL
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. Boss :
Q. General, you spoke of the role of the GAG towards helping the atomic
energy weapons program. I assume that you followed the debate in the GAG
in October 1048 with respect to the development of the thermonuclear weapon?
A. Yes; although I was not specifically present at the time. Perhaps I was
not entirely clear in my previous answer, although I think I was. That debate
was a debate at the Commission's policy level. I was speaking of my relations
with the General Advisory Committee in carrying out the policies that were
decided upon.
Q. Were you supposed to represent the views of the military at that time in
respect to the thermonuclear weapon?
A. No. The Military Liaison Committee is the normal organization tinder
the law. I was an operating staff officer of the Commission. I did my best to
carry military thinking into the Commission, yes, but the formal responsibility
rested with the Military Liaison Committee.
Q. What was the military thinking in October 1949 with respect to the devel-
opment of the thermonuclear weapon?
A. In my understanding the military interest was a very definite interest in
going forward with it if indeed it proved to be technically feasible, although
questions of scale and rate of effort and what you cut off your programs to
encompass new efforts, these were questions. But on the broad question of
going ahead, I think the military interest was solid.
Q. In other words, it was a weapon the military wanted?
A. If it could be made ; yea.
Q. After the meeting of the GAG of October 29, 1949, and the report which
they made on that meeting, did you read the report of the GAO?
A. I must have, although I don't recall any of its particulars. The only thing
that is sharp in my memory is that there was a dissent, but even the details
of the dissent, I would not be a very competent witness on.
Q. In all events, you were familiar in general with the decision of the GAO?
A. I was generally familiar with it, yes, although I should definitely stipu-
late that it was not entirely clear to me at the time, nor would it be now,
because I have not been in the business for some time, precisely what the
question was that the GAG had before it. Whether it was a yes or no decision,
shall we or shall we not, or crash versus no increase in the program. I imagine
it was a rather complex question.
Q. Was the position of the GAG on the thermonuclear pleasing to the military
and to you as a member of the military?
A. I beg your pardon. I didn't hear it
(Question read by the reporter.)
The Wrwnres. I was in disagreement with It
ByMr.RoBB:
Q. Would you mind telling us why you were in disagreement with it?
A. I think my thought was just about as simple as this. If the weapon is there,
if it can be had, how can we afford not to try for it
Q. Have you remarked, General, in substance that the position of the GAO
in that matter was either silly or sinister?
637
A. I thought as a sort of a professional staff officer that the quick action on
a problem which obviously loomed so large, if I had to choose between the words,
I would say silly. I drew no sinister implications. Indeed, I could not have
stayed with the Commission had I done so, because some of my bosses
Q. I am not suggesting that you did draw such implications, but have you
not remarked that either one of two alternatives was offered; either it was
silly or it was sinister?
A. I think that is about it, yes, sir.
Q. So in respect of that action by the GAG, it could not be said that the
GAG was in your opinion doing Its best by the military weapons program, could it?
A. I had not thought that was necessarily a part of the package. I speak
of the General Advisory Committee, and the help they tried to give me in the
programs for which I was responsible as being consistent throughout. There
was a very large policy question up for discussion. The General Advisory Com-
mittee talked It out among themselves, and with the Commission, and initially
recommended against a full blast ahead program, anyway. Once the decision
was over, I suppose those who had reservations continued to hold them, and
certainly enthusiasm for the program fluctuated as the prospects of early
technical success fluctuated. But I was not aware of any member of the General
Advisory Committee trying to hold back the program.
So far as my efforts to push the program forward, I would always have
liked to have had more help from everybody, budget and everything else. I was
not aware of anyone trying my feet
Q. I was talking to you about the decision. I think you have answered the
question.
General, you were asked your opinion with respect to Dr. Oppenheimer's
trustworthiness and whether you trust him, and you said you would, is that
right?
A. From any facts known to me, I would, sir.
Q. Beg pardon?
A. From all the facts known to me, I would ; yes, sir.
Q. Have you heard anything about the episode which occurred in 1943 when
Dr. Oppenheimer had a conversation with a man named Chevalier in which the
possibility of passing information to the Russians was mentioned?
A. I know what I have heard about it since this board WAS established; that
is all.
Q. What have you heard, General?
A. I have heard that Chevalier, who was a friend of Dr. Oppenheimer's in
some rather obscure way suggested that there was a channel through which
information on the project which Dr. Oppenheimer was by then in charge of, I
believe, at Los Alamos, although I think it had not grown up, there was a
channel for passing information from this project to the Communist apparatus.
I have heard that Dr. Oppenheimer told him that was a horrid idea, but that he
waited until some time later before he reported it then to the security organiza-
tion of the Manhattan project, and having reported it, then, tried for a while
anyway to shield his friend, Chevalier, whom he thought was not really involved
in it until General Groves asked him a direct question at which time he told
the whole story. I am repeating my recollection of reading newspapers and
hearing conversations on the matter.
Q. Of course, you are not familiar with what Dr. Oppenheimer may have
testified about that incident here in these hearings, are you?
A. Not in specific detail ; no.
Q. I would like to read you a portion of Dr. Oppenheimer's testimony and get
your views on that I might tell you so that this will be intelligible to you that
Dr. Oppenheimer was interviewed by Colonel Pash of the security organization
about this matter, and then by Colonel Lansdale.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, I think this raises the same question that I
raised earlier. I have no objection— we all have been putting hypothetical ques-
tions to witnesses— but it seems to me to extract a piece of the testimony and
only one piece, and then to ask opinions upon that without having the whole
testimony. That is an unfair method of procedure. I think I made this objec-
tion at the outset, and it was after that that the questions began to be put in a
different form. I do very much object to just a piece of the transcript being
read from the evidence without the context of the whole.
Mr. ROHB. I am going to read a rather substantial piece. Of course, Mr.
Chairman, Mr. Garrison framed his hypothetical questions, and that has been
all right with me. I think I have a light to ask this witness on the basis of
638
questions and answers right in this record whether his answer would he the
same.
Mr. GABRISON. This is not a hypothetical question.
Mr. ROBB. No ; this is a definite question.
Mr. GARRISON. This is a slice out of the transcript.
Mr. GRAY. I would like to ask Mr. Garrison whether his point is that the
witness is not hearing everything that Dr. Oppenheimer testified before this
board, or whether the witness is not hearing everything he said with respect to
this particular incident?
Mr. GARRISON. Everything he said before the hoard with respect to this
incident. It seems to me to lift a part of it out, and ask the witness* opinion
about that is to present him onl.v a fraction of the total in what could be a
misleading light I don't know what fraction it is. I think it is quite different
from putting a question if it has been established here that such and such took
place before the board. I think that is different. It is quite clearly put as not the
evidence itself. I never attempted to say to a witness what the evidence here
had been.
Mr. ROBB. I think my method is more accurate. I am going to read him the
actual questions and answers.
Mr. GABRISON. In my questions I tried to summarize the best I could the way
it looked to me. I appreciate that on each occasion Mr. Robb quite properly
reserved his own feeling or position that the story as he might relate it would
be a little different.
Mr. GRAY. I am going to ask Mr. Robb if he can put his question in hypothetical
terms as he would see the question and not be confined to any hypothetical
questions which counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer would.
Mr. ROBB. Very well. I will attempt to summarize the testimony which I
have in mind.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. General, I will ask you, sir, to assume that when questioned before this
board about that episode and his interview with Colonel Pash, he was asked
whether he told Colonel Pash the truth about the episode and he said no. He
was asked if he lied to Colonel Pash and he said yes. When asked why he did
that he said "Because I was an id<ot" He said "I was also reluctant to mention
Chevalier" and somewhat reluctant to mention himself.
Assume further that he was asked whether or not if the story he told to
Colonel Pash had been true, it would have shown that both Chevalier and
Dr. Oppenheimer were deeply involved in an espionage conspiracy. He agreed
that was so.
A. May I ask yon to repeat this last statement of yours?
Q. He was asked whether or not if the story which he told to Pash had
been true, instead of as he said false, that story would have shown that both
Dr. Oppenheimer and Chevalier were deeply involved in an espionage conspiracy.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I certainly don't recall that.
Mr. ROBB. Since my friend objects
Mr. GRAY. I would say to Mr. Garrison that he certainly has the privilege
of making a statement that Mr. Robb has made in each case with respect to a
hypothetical question.
Mr. GARRISON. Yes, but this is so obviously a paraphrase of the transcript
It is not an attempt at a summary. It seems to me it doesn't event attempt
to give the witness a picture of what took place.
Mr. ROBB. I can see, Mr. Chairman, I should have inerrupted Mr. Garrison's
question and raised technical questions about it, too, but I didn't do it
Mr. GRAY. Proceed, Mr. Robb.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Did you have the last in mind, General?
A. If I have heard you correctly in answer to a question whether had he
told the truth it would have shown him, Dr. Oppenheimer, and Mr. Chevalier
to be deeply in espionage.
Q. Tes.
A. And he answered yes, he would have.
Q. Tes.
Mr. SlLVEBMAN. No.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman
Mr. ROBB. Wait a minute, Mr. Garrison.
Mr. SILVERHAN. You misunderstood.
639
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. I am going to explain it. Assume that the story he actually told Colouel
Pash was true, then would that not have shown that he was deeply involved in
an espionage conspiracy? Do I make myself plain?
BIr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I don't think it is plain, and I don't think it is
in the record.
Mr. ROBB. Very well. I will read this to you : "In other words, if X [meaning
Chevalier] had gone to three people, that would have shown, would it not —
"OPPENHEIMER. That he was deeply involved.
"That he was deeply involved. That is, was not Just a casual conversation.
"OPPBNHEIMEE. Right."
Now, am I justified?
Mr. GABRISON. No, because you indicated that Dr. Oppenheimer would then
be involved. That is what I very deeply object to.
Mr. ROBB. Page 488 :
"Q. You will agree, would you not, sir, that if the story you told to Colonel
Pash was true, it made things very bad for Mr. Chevalier?
"A. For everyone involved In it.
"Q. Including you.
"A. Right"
Now, may I proceed?
Mr. GAERISON. Mr. Chairman, he said that the story was an invention and
the implication here to the witness is that he lied about something which
would have implicated himself in espionage. I don't think that implication
ought to be in this record at all.
Mr. ROBB. That is exactly what he said.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. General, will you further assume
Mr. GRAY. Well
Mr. ROBB. Pardon me.
Mr. GRAY. Could you state the last assumption that you made?
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Would you assume that the testimony was to that effect?
A. I am clear on what this point is now.
Q. Fine. Would you further assume, sir, that Dr. Oppenheimer knew that
by refusing to name the man we referred to as "X", who afterwards turned
out to be Chevalier, Dr. Oppenheimer knew by refusing to name him, he was
impeding the investigation by the security officers into this espionage con-
spiracy?
Assuming those things, General, would you care to amend your answer
with respect to the trustworthiness of Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I spoke of my opinion in the period in which I was associated with him,
and knowledge from my associations. From that time, 1943, I would have
said this was a very foolish action. I could not have — I could not now believe
that Dr. Oppenheimer would have acted that way at the later time when I was
associated with him. I think probably he had learned a great deal about the
mechanics of security in the intervening years.
Q. Does it come as a shock to you to hear that occurred?
A. When I first read it in the newspaper
Q. No, sir, I am talking about what I have just told you about it Does it
come to you as a shock to hear that happened?
A. It is not a comfortable thought that one should have been, to use Dr.
Oppenheimer's word, such an idiot at that time. It would certainly come as a
shock to me if there were evidence that he still operated that way in 1947 and
afterward when I knew him.
Q. As a military man, General, and a professional soldier, suppose you found
out that someone in your command had conducted himself in that way in an
Interview with a security officer ; what would you do?
A. As of now in the context of the past, I would want to get all the facts
bearing on it before I spoke. Years have passed.
Q. Suppose you found out today that someone in your command had con-
ducted himself in that way last week in an interview with one of your security
officers; what would you do?
. A. I would take immediate action.
1 Q. You would court-martial him, wouldn't you.
640
A. The formalities are that I would suspend him and turn his case over to the
OSI.
Q. For an investigation?
A. Yes.
Q. Looking to a court-martial, would you not?
A. Depending on the facts.
Q. Because you would take a very serious view about it?
A. I would, indeed.
Q. To a military man, General, lying is never justified. I mean to one of
your own security officers. You could not justify that, could you?
A. False official statements are not condoned ; no.
Mr. ROBB. That is all. Thank you.
Mr. GRAY. General McCormack, your recent experience has been a very great
deal of research and development, is that correct? That has been your primary
concern in recent years?
The WITNESS. From the administrative side. I am not a technical person.
Mr. GBAY. I understand. This is one of your responsibilities insofar as you
have ultimate responsibility. One of them is in the general field of research
and development. I am going to ask you a question now which reflects some
confusion on my part about the well known October 1949 meeting of the General
Advisory Committee, and the circumstances surrounding it — the events leading
up to it, and subsequent events.
It is clear, I believe, that the recommendation of the General Advisory
Committee was not to proceed with an all out program for the production of
this weapon. Is that a fair statement as you understood it?
The WITNESS. That was surely a part of the decision, yes, sir. The other
things that went around, I would have to go and read the record.
Mr. GRAY. But that was clear. Another alternative, I suppose, which would
have been at any time before the GAG was the alternative of not proceeding at all
with research, development or production, leading to the weapon under dis-
cussion.
The WITNESS. In theory that was an alternative, yes, sir. In practical fact,
science goes on, of course.
Mr. GRAY. Is there in your opinion anything that the General Advisory Com-
mittee might have done in October 1949 which would have represented a middle
ground between these two extreme positions?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Do you mean by that, that perhaps they could have emphasized
more strongly and recommended more enthusiastically research and development
perhaps short of the all-out production program which was at least one issue
with respect to which they took a position?
The WITNESS. Oh, yes, sir. There is a vast amount of middle ground between
the two alternates as you stated them at the end of the spectrum.
Mr. GRAY. Did you feel at the time that perhaps the GAG might consistent
with the technical uncertainties, wnich clearly existed, have recommended more of
an effort that this action of October 1949 seemed to you to suggest?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir, I do. In fact, the program as it proceeded was a
question of picking up steam as you could do it. Greater expenditures of effort
as useful places to expend that effort appeared in the course of the research.
Mr. GRAY. In your judgment could the GAC have at that time recommended
actions involving this greater effort without serious impairment or without
impairment of the on-going fission program at the time?
The WITNESS. The question of scale and rate of effort, yes, sir. Anything
that we did immediately that we had not been doing before required either new
resources to do it with, or it had to displace something. So the phasing out
of the old programs and the phasing in of expanded effort in the thermonuclear
field was more or less a normal process, although it proceeded at very high
priority, as high as we could put on it
Mr. GBAY. I am now going to ask a question with respect to which you have
not testified this morning, that is, do you feel that the military at that time was
well informed about the possible and appropriate and sensible use of atomic
weapons?
The WITNESS. Knowledge was far less complete than it is today, and probably
less complete today than it will be at some time in the future.
Mr. GRAY. Do you feel that the lack of knowledge on the part of the military
was a factor in whatever delay there might have been in the development of
this weapon?
641
The WITNESS. Lack of knowledge on the part of the military services as to
just what the technical prospects were, I would say, yes, sir. I would give the
same reply, I think, with regard to the more advanced fission weapons that
have come out since that time. So much of this was
Dr. EVANS. You mean the fusion weapon or the fission?
The WITNESS. I said fission, then sir. It is all a part of it
Dr. EVANS. Yes, I understand.
The WITNESS. Of a single problem. The atomic weapon field has gone for*
ward very rapidly compared in contrast with our experience in the development
of the other machines of war that the foreseeing uses, the techniques of their
use, their application to given battle situations, had to be developed as the
weapons developed. It was my constant experience as long as I was with the
Commission that the invention had to precede in part a clear and detailed plan
for its use.
Take the use of the weapon carried under a fighter aircraft, for example:
you had to have some idea of what you had in the way of energy release in
the weapon before you could develop the fighter tactices and before the fighter
tactics are clear in mind, the Air Force is in a poor position to say to the infantry
on what you can do in putting atomic explosions down on the battle line.
Mr. GRAY. What was the function of the Military Liaison Committee?
The WITNESS. Under the original law, it was appointed by the Secretary of
War and Navy and in the revision of the law that happened after the unification
of the Armed Forces, the Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee was made
an appointment for confirmation by the Senate, and he represents the Secretary
of Defense.
Mr. GRAY. Was it one of the functions of that Committee to keep the military
advised in these respects with respect to the matters about which you said they
might have known more than they did?
The WITNESS. Theirs was the formal responsibility. There were many of us
working on it, of course. It was in large part a process of mutual education.
Mr. GRAY. In your opinion and recollection, General McCormack, is it possible
that we would ever have found ourselves in a period or at a position in thia
Government in which the military might have been stating no military require-
ments because they believed there was no technical feasibility and the Commis-
sion and its agencies might have been not pressing for development on the ground
that there was no military demand?
The WITNESS. I think in the practical working of the organization as it
then existed, sir, that insofar as we were wise, insofar as we knew what to do,
this gap could not have existed. I, for instance, could not have sat in my office
in the Commission knowing that there was a prospect in any field that might
be of some military interest without seeking out the military service, or that
segment of one of the military services that might be most interested in and
make sure they got as clear a look at it as they could have had at that time.
This was on the informal basis. Our formal dealings through the Military
Liaison Committee will reflect the big issues. They will not reflect the myriad
of contacts and interchange, the stationing of military officers at Los Alamos,
the loaning of Los Alamos personnel to the target planners in the Pentagon, the
interchanges of visits and so on. This was a very broad thing. By these means
we tried to grow up with the situation as fast as the situation was growing.
Mr. GRAY. As a practical matter, you think the answer to my question would
be no?
The WITNESS. To the limit of our wisdom and ability to do it,
Mr. GRAY. I am making the assumption that those concerned with the program
were of course doing their duty as they saw it best under the circumstances. I
mean by that it is unreasonable to suppose that many in the military could
understand some of the technical implications, especially those who were not
themselves scientists. You do not feel that there was delay because of any
possible misunderstandings by the military about scientific feasibility and at
the same time misunderstanding by the scientific advisers as to military
requirement?
The WITNESS. I think an honest answer in the light of history, sir, is that
there must have been delays. I would not know how to put my finger on them.
Had we known where they existed at the time, we would have cured them. But
in fact, they must have existed in a sense not entirely different from the normal
business where I am now, where there are delays getting a new aircraft in
operation because its operating characteristics exceed the experience of the
642
pilots until they have had a chance to work on it Therefore, you go down to the
production line with things that you have to re-do, and this introduces delays.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you, sir.
REDIEECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. SiLVEBifAX :
Q. With respect to the question Dr. Gray was asking you about delays, and
your answer, would you say that the delays in the development of the thermo-
nuclear weapon, so far as you knew about them, were greater than just the
normal delays that one would expect, because one is venturing into a new field?
A. First, other than counting off the period of the debate as a delay, if you
wish, I am not aware of any delays in the thermonuclear program that occurred
for any reason other than just not knowing how to do tie next step. I know
the resources that were available to us to put in the program were freely avail-
able at all times. Los Alamos competence built up, and we drew in others to
work on it. With that stipulation, I don't have any delay to put my finger on.
I would have to say that the thermonuclear program went well indeed, even with
shifts in the lines of technical attack. It still kept apace which I thought was
admirable at the time and met the expectations that were at least apparent to
us at the beginning.
Q. I think Dr. Gray asked you about whether you felt the military was well
informed with respect to the development of thermonuclear weapons and the
possibility of developing thermonuclear weapons— something of that order —
and as I got your answer, it was that we are better informed today and we
will be better informed at some future date.
A. I was merely trying to indicate that being informed and not being in-
formed Is a very relative term if you are going back to the beginning of a
program of inventions which had not yet been invented.
Q. With respect to the period of October 1949, did you feel that the military
was well informed as to- the feasibility and the possibilities of use of atomic
and thermonuclear weapons in the light of what was then known with respect
to the feasibility of such weapons?
A. If there was anything known in the Commission organization or its labora-
tories of importance about the prospects of thermonuclear weapons feasibility
that was not known to the military services, I was certainly unaware of it
But little was known as a fact We were dealing with very large conjectures.
Q. With respect to the chairman's question of a possible middle ground between
the two ends of the spectrum, was it your feeling that the GAG was in favor
of a program of research on the feasibility of thermonuclear weapons?
A. There was a research program in thermonuclear weapons and had been
since I first reported in to the Commission. It had not picked up much headway
until the whole situation was catalyzed by the news of the Russian fission
explosion. I have no specific memory at this time of the reaction of the General
Advisory Committee, or any of its individuals, as to the degree to which this
program might be expanded, yet falling short of the program which they recom-
mended against.
Is this responsive? It is to me a very complicated question.
Q. I think it Is probably as responsive as you can make it to me. With re-
spect to the remark about the GAG report or recommendation being sUlv or
sinister
Mr. ROBB. Did you say "and" or "or"?
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I said "or."
Mr. ROBB. That is what I said. That is what he said.
By Mr. SILVEEMAN :
Q. What did yon think it was?
A. Perfectly frankly, I thought the rush action was silly.
Q. Did you think it was sinister?
A. I did not As I stated earlier with several of my immediate superiors
to the Commission holding a view which I understood to be similar to the
General Advisory Committee. I would have moved out immediately had I
though there was a sinister implication in the opposition,
Q. With respect to how well informed the military was on the prospects of
the thermonuclear weapon, do you recall a panel report to the War Department
jurepared late in 1945 describing the prospects of the super?
A- I do not recall a report under that name. There were papers in the
Commission which had been prepared some time back when I Joined it at the
643
beginning of 1947, and this was a new paper prepared at the beginning of 1947
for the use of the new Commission which rounded them up as they then
appeared and all of these papers in my memory anyway read about the same
as the state of knowledge, as far as I understood it certainly as far as I recall
it, had not advanced substantially from 1945 to 1947. Nor indeed was there
any big breakthrough from the research program between 1947 and the time
after the program had been accelerated, although there were new ideas coming
along.
Mr. SILVERMAN. I have no further questions.
HE-CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. General, when you spoke a minute ago of the rush action, did you refer
to the action by the committee?
A. It all happened very quickly.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes, as I recall the committee and the Commission acted Jointly, and
went to the President with their combined opinion or separate opinions. They
were not unanimous, of course.
Q. General, I take it you are not a nuclear physicist?
A. I am not, sir.
Q. You said I think in response to a question by Mr. Silverman that the
thermonuclear program went very well indeed.
A. In terms of timing and eventually meeting our expectations. It had its
ups and downs, of course.
Q. What time were you referring to when you said that?
A. From the beginning of 1950 until what I regarded as a successful mile-
stone just before I left the Commission in 1951.
Q. Yes. That is what I thought.
Was there a considerable stepping up in the efforts to develop the thermo-
nuclear subsequent to the President's statement in January 1950?
A. Indeed there was, sir. We stepped it up in all ways of which we were
capable.
Q. Would you care to give us an opinion, recognizing of course that you are
not a nuclear physicist, as to what might have been the result had that
stepped-up program been started in 1945 or 1946? Might you have gotten the
end result sooner?
A. Putting the same effort into it that we were able to put into it in 1950?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Speaking nonexpertty from the scientific point of view in any event, I
think it could not have helped speeding the time when there would have been
a thermonuclear weapon, looking back on it I can easily see why General
Groves and the Commission later with all of the other urgent work to do in
rebuilding Los Alamos and getting the fission weapon program straightened
out, did not feel up to making a gamble certainly as early as 1945.
Mr. ROBB. I am not debating that. I merely want to get your opinion as to
the time element
Thank you very much, General.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, General McConnack.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GRAY. We will take a recess.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GRAY. Dr. von Neumann, do you wish to testify under oath?
Dr. VON NEUMANN. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. You are not required to do so. The other witnesses have.
Dr. VON NEUMANN. I am quite prepared-
Mr. GRAY. Would you be good enough to stand and raise your right hand, and
give me your full name?
Dr. VON NEUMANN. John von Neumann.
Mr. GRAY. John von Neumann, do you swear that the testimony you are about
to give the board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you God?
Dr. VON NEUMANN. I do.
Whereupon John von Neumann was called as a witness, and having been first
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Will you be seated, please.
I am required to remind you of the existence of the so-called perjury statutes.
I shall be glad to review them with you if necessary.
.644
The WITNESS. I think I am aware of them.
Mr GBAY Mav I ask if in the course of your testimony it becomes necessary
for you to refer %to or disclose restricted data, you notify me in advance, so we
can take appropriate and necessary steps in the interest of security.
Finally, Doctor, I would say to you, as I say to each of the witnesses on behalf
of the board, that we consider these proceedings a confidential matter between
the Atomic Energy Commission and its officials on the one hand, and Dr. Oppen-
heimer his representatives and witnesses on the other hand. The Commission
is making no releases with respect to these proceedings, and we express the
hope that the witnesses will take the same view.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
DIKECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q Dr von Neumann, what is your present nongovernmental position?
A*. I am professor of mathematics at the Institute for Advanced Study at
Princeton.
Q. How long have you been that?
A. Since 1933.
Q. That was before Dr. Oppenheimer came there?
A. Yes.
Q. I understand you were for 2 years president of the American Mathematical
Society.
A. That is correct.
Q. You have been a member of the National Academy of Science, I understand,
ince 1937?
A. Yes, since 1937.
Q. Will you state your present governmental position?
A. I am a member of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy
Commission. I have been that since 1952. I have been a consultant to the
Los Alamos Laboratory since 1943. Outside the Commission, I am a member of
the Scientific Advisory Board of the Air Forces. I have also a few other gov-
ernmental advisory positions.
Q. Would you tell us the story of when you first knew Dr. Oppenheimer and
what contacts you have had with him since?
A. I think that Dr. Oppenheimer and I first met in Germany in 1926. It was
in Goettingen, to be precise. We were both I think immediately after our re-
spective Ph. D.'s and we were both there. There was a great center of theoreti-
cal physics in Goettingen, and we were both there at the time.
Then between 1926 and 1940, we may or may not have met. I think we did
not, although I knew about Dr. Oppenheimer and I knew about his work.
In 1940 we met in Los Angeles, and we had several conversations. We also
met at that time in Seattle. We met again in early 1943, at which time Dr.
Oppenheimer told me that he wanted me to Join a project which he could not
describe at that moment
Then I went to England and came back in the fall, and then I was asked
officially to go to Los Alamos. After that, our contacts have been practically
continuous, with a slight interruption between 1945 and 1947, when we both had
left Los Alamos and Dr. Oppenheimer had not yet come to Princeton.
Q. Since 1947 you have both been?
A. I would say our association has been practically continuous since 1943.
Q. You referred to meeting Dr. Oppenheimer in 1940 in Los Angeles, and did
you say at Seattle, also?
A. Yes, it was outside of Seattle.
Q. Was that after the fall of France, or about the time of the fall of France?
A. This was in May or June of 1940. It was in the period during which
France was collapsing, and the conversation I had mentioned we then had and
which I assume is relevant in this context, it was one we had about the political
situation then. What I do recall very clearly is that Dr. Oppenheimer was for
intervention on the side of the western allies: This was of course a very acute
question at the moment, and I asked practically everybody I met how he felt so
this I remember quite clearly.
Q. There has been, I guess, a fair amount of testimony that would be an un-
derstatement—about the GAC report of October 1949, with respect to the hy-
drogen bomb and the thermonuclear program. Dr. von Neumann, did you agree
with the GAC report and recommendations?
A» No. I was in favor of a very accelerated program. The GAC at that
point recommended that the acceleration should not occur.
645
Q. Very accelerated hydrogen bomb or thermonuclear program?
A. Yes, it is all the same thing.
Q. Would it be fair to say one might say in the opposite camp on the question?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Did you consider that the recommendations of the GAG and In particular
Dr. Oppenheimer were made in good faith?
A. Yes, I had no doubt about that.
Q. Do you have any doubt now?
A. No.
Q. You knew, of course, that Dr. Oppenheimer was not the only person who
was opposed to the program?
A. No, the whole group of scientists and military who were keenly in this
matter — of course, there had been a lot of discussion and practically everyone
of us knew very soon fairly precisely where everybody stood. So we know each
other's opinions, and very many of us had discussed the matter with each other.
Dr. Oppenheimer and I had discussed it with each other, and so we knew each
other's views very precisely.
My impression of this matter was, like everybody else, I would have been
happy if everybody had agreed with me. However, it was evidently a mat-
ter of great importance. It was evidently a matter which would have con-
sequences for the rest of our lives and beyond. So there was a very animated
controversy about it It lasted for months.
That it lasted for months was not particularly surprising to my mind. I think
it was perfectly normal that there should be a controversy about it. It was per-
fectly normal that emotions should run rather high.
Q. Have you yourself participated in the program of the development of
thermonuclear weapons and the hydrogen bombv
A. Yes.
Q. After the President's decision in January of 1950, is it your impression
that the GAC and particularly Dr. Oppenheimer was holding back in the effort
to develop the bomb?
A. My impression was that all the people I knew, and this includes Dr. Oppen-
heimer, first of all took this decision with very good grace and cooperated. The
specific things I know were various actions which were necessary in 1951. At
that time there were a number of technical decisions that had to be made about
the tehcnical program. I know in considerable detail what Dr. Oppenheimer did
then, and it was certainly very constructive.
Q. Can you tell us any of that in unclassified terms?
Mr. BOBB. Excuse me. Could I ask what date he is referring to ?
The WITNESS. I am referring particularly ot a meeting in Princeton in June
1951.
Mr. BOBB. Thank you.
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. I don't know whether you can expand on this in unclassified terms or not.
A. I think the details of why there was a need for technical decisions at that
moment and exactly how far they went and so on, I assume is classified, unless
I am otherwise instructed. But it is a fact. You must expect in any program
of such -proportions that there will be as you go along serious technical decisions
that have to be made. This was one. There was a meeting at Princeton which
was attended I think by part of the GAC. I think it was the weapons sub-
committee of the GAC which is in fact about two-thirds of the group, plus several
Commissioners, plus several experts which included Dr. Bethe, Dr. Teller, my-
self, Dr. Bradbury— I am not sure whether Dr. York was there— Dr. Nordheim
and possibly others. This meeting was called by Dr. Oppenheimer and he cer-
tainly to the extent which anybody was directing it, he was directing it This
was certainly a very necessary and constructive operation.
Q. At that meeting did he express himself as being in favor of going ahead?
A. In all the discussions at that point there was no question of being or not
being in favor. In other words, it was a decided technical policy. I didn't hear
any discussions after 1950 whether it ought to be done. There certainly were
no such discussions at this meeting. The question was whether one should make
certain technical changes in the program or not
AH I am trying to say is that at that point there was a need for technical
changes. If anybody wanted to misdirect tie program by very subtle means, this
would have been an occasion.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer cooperate in making it easier for you and others to
work at Los Alamos for Los Alamos on the hydrogen bomb program?
,644
The Wrnress. I think I am aware of them.
Mr. GRAY. May I ask if in the course of your testimony it becomes necessary
for you to refer to or disclose restricted data, you notify me in advance, so we
can take appropriate and necessary steps in the interest of security.
Finally, Doctor, I would say to you, as I say to each of the witnesses on behalf
of the board, that we consider these proceedings a confidential matter between
the Atomic Energy Commission and its officials on the one hand, and Dr. Oppen-
heirner, his representatives and witnesses on the other hand. The Commission
is making no releases with respect to these proceedings, and we express the
hope that the witnesses will take the same view.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVEBITAN :
Q. Dr. von Neumann, what is your present nongovernmental position?
A. I am professor of mathematics at the Institute for Advanced Study at
Princeton.
Q. How long have you been that?
A. Since 1933.
Q. That was before Dr. Oppenheimer came there?
A. Yes.
Q. I understand you were for 2 years president of the American Mathematical
Society.
A. That is correct.
Q. You have been a member of the National Academy of Science, I understand
ince 1937? '
A. Yes, since 1937.
Q. Will you state your present governmental position?
A. I am a member of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy
Commission. I have been that since 1952. I have been a consultant to the
Los Alamos Laboratory since 1943. Outside the Commission, I am a member of
the Scientific Advisory Board of the Air Forces. I have also a few other gov-
ernmental advisory positions.
Q. Would you tell us the story of when you first knew Dr. Oppenheimer and
what contacts you have had with him since?
A, I think that Dr. Oppenheimer and I first met in Germany in 1926 It was
in Goettingen, to be precise. We were both I think immediately after our re-
spective Ph. D.'s and we were both there. There was a great center of theoreti-
cal physics in Goettingen, and we were both there at the time.
Then between 1926 and 1940, we may or may not have met. I think we did
not, although I knew about Dr. Oppenheimer and I knew about his work
In 1940 we met in Los Angeles, and we had several conversations. We also
met at that tame In Seattle. We met again in early 1943, at which time Dr
Oppenheimer told me that he wanted me to Join a project which he could not
describe at that moment.
Then I went to England and came back in the f all, and then I was asked
officially to go to Los Alamos. After that, our contacts have been practically
continuous, with a slight interruption between 1945 and 1947, when we both had
left Los Alamos and Dr. Oppenheimer had not yet come to Princeton
Q. Since 1947 you have both been?
A. I would say our association has been practically continuous since 1943
yo2' Jy atlS,^?66^ ^ Oppenheimer to 194° to ^ *«** ^d did
A. Yes, it was outside of Seattle.
Q. Was that after the fall of France, or about the time of the fall of France?
A. This was m May or June of 1940. It was in the period during which
Ftance was collapsing, and the conversation I had mentioned we thenhad and
which I assume is relevant in this context, it was one we had about the political
situation then. What I do recall very clearly is that Dr. Oppenheimer was for
intervention on the side of the western allies? This was of Bourse a very acute
1 ^^ PraCtiCaU ^ T
.
5** S^i^8^ fair amount o* testimony that would be an un-
f"^? £e °AC ^P0rt of October 1949' ^ resPect to the by-
2«m £ A n nd thJl fr^awaaa* Program. Dr. von NeumannVdid you agree
with the GAG report and recommendations? «**«*?
A. No. I was in favor of a very accelerated program. The GAG at that
point recommended that the acceleration should not occur
645
Q. Very accelerated hydrogen bomb or thermonuclear program?
A. Yes, It is all the same thing.
Q. Would it be fair to say one might say In the opposite camp on the question?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Did you consider that the recommendations of the GAG and in particular
Dr. Oppenheimer were made in good faith?
A. Yes, I had no doubt about that.
Q. Do you have any doubt now?
A. No.
Q. You knew, of course, that Dr. Oppenheimer was not the only person who
was opposed to the program?
A. No, the whole group of scientists and military who were keenly in this
matter— of course, there liad been a lot of discussion and practically everyone
of us knew very soon fairly precisely where everybody stood. So we know each
other's opinions, and very many of us had discussed the matter with each other.
Dr. Oppenheimer and I had discussed it with each other, and so we knew each
other's views very precisely.
•My impression of this matter was, like everybody else. I would have been
happy if everybody had agreed with me. However, it was evidently a mat-
ter of great importance. It was evidently a matter which would have con-
sequences for the rest of our lives and beyond. So there was a very animated
controversy about it It lasted for months.
That it lasted for months was not particularly surprising to my mind. I think
it was perfectly normal that there should be a controversy about it. It was per-
fectly normal that emotions should run rather high.
Q. Have you yourself participated in the program of the development of
thermonuclear weapons and the hydrogen bonibv
A. Yes.
Q. After the President's decision in January of 1950, is it your impression
that the GAC and particularly Dr. Oppenheimer was holding back in the effort
to develop the bomb?
A. My impression was that all the people I knew, and this includes Dr. Oppen-
heimer, first of all took this decision with very good grace and cooperated. The
specific things I know were various actions which were necessary in 1951. At
that time there were a number of technical decisions that had to be made about
the tehcnical program. I know in considerable detail what Dr. Oppenheimer did
then, and it was certainly very constructive.
Q. Can you tell us any of that in unclassified terms?
Mr. ROBB. Excuse me. Could I ask what date he is referring to ?
The WITNESS. I am referring particularly ot a meeting in Princeton in June
1951.
Mr. ROBB. Thank you.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN:
Q. I don't know whether you can expand on this in unclassified terms or not.
A. I think the details of why there was a need for technical decisions at that
moment and exactly how far they went and so on, I assume is classified, unless
I am otherwise instructed. But it is a fact. You must expect in any program
of such -proportions that there will be as you go along serious technical decisions
that have to be made. This was one. There was a meeting at Princeton which
was attended I flMTiir by part of the GAC. I think it was the weapons sub-
committee of the GAC which is in fact about two-thirds of the group, plus several
Commissioners, plus several experts which included Dr. Bethe, Dr. Teller, my-
self, Dr. Bradbury — I am not sure whether Dr. York was there — Dr. Nordheim
and possibly others. This meeting was called by Dr. Oppenheimer and he cer-
tainly to the extent which anybody was directing it, he was directing it. This
was certainly a very necessary and constructive operation.
Q. At that meeting did he express himself as being in favor of going ahead?
A. In all the discussions at that point there was no question of being or not
being in favor. In other words, it was a decided technical policy. I didn't hear
any discussions after 1950 whether it ought to be done. There certainly were
no such discussions at this meeting. The question was whether one should make
certain technical changes in the program or not
AH I am trying to say is that at that point there was a need for technical
changes. If anybody wanted to misdirect the program by very subtle means, this
would have been an occasion.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer cooperate in making it easier for yon and others to
work at Los Alamos for Los Alamos on the hydrogen bomb program?
646
A. I certainly never had the slightest difficulty. One thing is that I think
if Dr. Oppenheimer had wanted to create difficulties of this kind, as far as I am
concerned, it would have been possible. Also, our relations would probably
have deteriorated. There was absolutely nothing of that. Our personal rela-
tions stayed very good throughout. I never experienced any difficulty in go-
ing as much to Los Alamos as necessary.
Q. There was no suggestion by Dr. Oppenheimer that this was interfering
with your work at the institute?
A. None whatsoever, absolutely none.
Q. And did you spend a good deal of time at Los Alamos?
Mr. ROBB. Could we have the times fixed on these? I am sorry to keep
interrupting.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. After 1949?
A. Yes. It may have averaged 2 months a year. Not all in one, but say in
two pieces of 3 weeks and various shorter visits. I must say this was uniform
from 1945 to almost now. I have been somewhat less in Los Alamos lately
because I have other commitments.
Q. And I take it there was no objection to your doing any work that might
be helpful to Los Alamos at Princeton?
A. Absolutely none whatsoever.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer attempt to dissuade you from working on the
hydrogen-bomb program?
A, No. We had a discussion. Of course, he attempted to persuade me to
accept his views. I equally attempted to persuade him to accept my views, and
this was done by two people who met during this period. I would say apart from
the absolutely normal discussion on a question on which you happen to disagree,
there was absolutely nothing else. The idea that this might be pressure I must
say did not occur to me ever.
Q. Do you now think that it was pressure?
A. No. I think it was the perfectly normal desire to convince somebody else.
Q. During what period was this discussion?
A. This was in 1949, December 1949. I remember quite clearly two discussions,
one which was about half an hour at which time I saw the GAG opinion and we
discussed it.
Q. You had a Q clearance at that time?
A. Yes. We discussed the same subject again about a week later, again
for about 20 minutes or half an hour, I don't know. We probably also talked
about the subject on other occasions, but I don't recall.
Q. Wasn't the discussion about whether you personally should work on the
hydrogen-bomb program?
A. Absolutely not. The only question was whether it was or was not wise
to undertake that program.
Q. You have known Dr. Oppenheimer, I think you said, substantially continu-
ously since 1943 to the present date?
A. Yes.
Q. With the exception of the period from 1945, the end of the Los Alamos days,
until 1947, when Dr. Oppenheimer came to the institute as director.
A. That is correct.
Q. During that period yon have really lived in the same small town?
A. Yes.
Q. And been friends and known each other quite well during all that time?
A. Yes.
Q. Both professionally and socially?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Do you have an opinion about Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty to the United
States, his integrity?
A* I have no doubts about it whatever.
Q. Your opinion I take it is quite clear and firm?
A- Yes, yes,
Q. Do yon have an opinion as to Dr. Oppenheimer's discretion in the handling
of classified materials and classified information?
A. Absolutely. I have personally every confidence. Furthermore I am not
aware that anybody has questioned that.
Q. There seems to be some question among my associates whether I asked
this. Do you have an opinion about Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty?
A. Yes.
647
Q. What is that?
A. I would say he is loyal.
Q. Do you have any doubt on that subject at all?
A. No.
Mr. SEDVBBMAN. I have no further questions.
CBOSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Dr. von Neumann, you stated that Dr. Oppenheimer attempted to persuade
you to accept his views, and you attempted to persuade him to accept your views
in December 1949?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you tell us briefly what his views were as you understood them?
A. Well, that it would be a mistake to undertake an acceleration of the hydro-
gen bomb, the thermonuclear program for the following reasons : Because it
would disorganize the program of the AEC because instead of developing fission
weapons further, which one knew how to do and where one could predict good
results fairly reliably, one getting back on a crash program which would super-
sede and damage everything else, and the results of the crash program would be
dubious. That furthermore, from the military point of view, making bigger
explosions was not necessarily an advantage In proportion to the size of the
explosion. Furthermore, that we practically had the lead in whatever we did, and
the Eussians would follow, and that we were probably more vulnerable than they
were for a variety of reasons, one of which is that we can probably saturate
them right now— I meant right then— whereas they could not at that moment
Therefore, a large increment on both sides would merely mean that both sides
can saturate the other. Also, that since there was now this possibility of a large
increment in destructive power, this was now for the second time, and possibly
for the last time an opportunity to try to negotiate control and disarmament
I think this was by and large the argument There are a few other angles
which are classified which I think are not very decisive.
Q. Doctor, was there anything in his argument about the immorality of devel-
oping the thermonuclear?
A. I took it for granted that it was his view. It did not appear very much in
our arguments, but we knew each other quite well. My view on that is quite
hard boiled, and that was known.
Q. What was Dr. Oppenheimer's view, soft boiled?
A. I assume, but look, now, I am going by hearsay. I have not discussed it
with him.
Q. I understand.
A. I assume that one ought to consider it very carefully whether one develops
anything of this order of destruction just per se.
Q. Yes, sir. Doctor, in response to a question from Mr. Silverman, you said
you had no question about Dr. Oppenheimer's integrity, did you not?
A. Yes.
Q. By that you meant his honesty, did you not?
A. Yes.
Q. Doctor, do you recall having heard anything about an incident which oc-
curred between Dr. Oppenheimer and a man named Chevalier?
A. Yes, but that was lately. I do not know for absolutely sure when I first
heard it I saw the letter of charges and there it occurs. When I read it,
I had the vague impression that I had heard this before, but I think that this
was in the last few years.
Q. You saw the letter" of General Nichols and Dr. Oppenheimer's response?
A. Yes. I am not absolutely certain whether I saw the complete original or
whether I saw somebody's excerpts of relevant parts.
Q. What is your present understanding about that incident that I referred
to— the Chevalier incident? What do you have in mind about -what happened?
A. What I understand happened was— and pleace correct me.if my recollection
is inexact— my impression is that Chevalier was a man who had been Dr. Oppen-
heimer's friend in earlier years, who in 1942, I think, or early 1943, when Dr.
Oppenheimer was already associated with the atomic energy project which was
not yet the Manhattan district, made an approach and suggested to him that
somebody else, whose name I have forgotten, was working for Russia and would
be able to transmit scientific and technical information to Russia,
648
I understood that Dr. Oppenheiiner essentially told him to go to hell, but did
not report this incident immediately, and that when he later reported it, he
did not report it completely for some time, until, I think, ordered by General
Groves to do so.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Your memory is pretty good, Doctor, Do you recall the name of the other
person was Eltenton?
A. Yes, Eltenton.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the witness a hypothetical ques-
tion. I assume, Mr. Garrison would file a caveat to it but I venture to suggest
in the interest of entirety to assist the board and the witness, it would be most
helpful if Mr. Garrison allowed me to state my question before he made his
objections.
By Mr. ROBB:
O. I want you to assume now, Dr. von Neumann, that Dr. Oppenheimer reported
and discussed this incident with two security officers, one named Colonel Pash
and one named Colonel Lansdale, and will you please assume that Dr. Oppen-
heimer has testified before this board that the story of the Chevalier incident
which he told to Colonel Pash on August 26, 1943, and affirmed to Colonel
Lansdale on September 12, 1943, was false in certain material respects.
Assume that he has testified here that the story he told to Pash and Lansdale
was a cock and bull story, that the whole thing was pure fabrication, except for
the one name Eltenton; that he told a story in great detail that was fabricated,
that he told not one lie but a whole fabrication and tissue of lies in great cir-
cumstantial detail.
Assume that he has further testified here that his only explanation for lying
was that he was an idiot, and he was reluctant to name Dr. Chevalier and no
doubt somewhat reluctant to name himself.
Assume he has further testified here that if the story he told to Colonel Pash
had been true, that it showed that Dr. Chevalier was deeply involved in a
conspiracy; that the conversation or the remarks of Dr. Chevalier were not
just a casual conversation and it was not just an innocent contact, but that it
was a criminal conspiracy on the part of Dr. Chevalier.
Assume that he testified further that if the story that Dr. Oppenheimer
told to Colonel Pash was true — if it was true— then it made things look very
bad for both Dr. Chevalier and Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, I wish the record to show that I do not accept
this assumed version of the testimony as being an accurate summary of the
testimony.
Mr. GBAT. The record will show that counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer does not
accept the question as put. The witness will consider this a hypothetical
question.
The WITNESS. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, I have not quite understood the
meaning of this exchange. Does this mean that the question ought to be
answered?
Mr. GBAT. Let me state it this way, Dr. von Neumann. You must not assume
that this board has reached any conclusions with respect to any matter before
it. Therefore, in statements to you by counsel, either Mr. Garrison or Mr. Robb,
and questions put to you by either Mr. Garrison or Mr. Robb which are said
to you to be hypothetical, you are asked to reply to that question on an assump-
tion that the facts are true for the purpose of this question, and not to assume
that this is a conclusion of the board.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GAKBISON. May I ask if the question might be reread at this point?
The WITNESS. I would also like to ask a few elucidations about the question.
For one thing, Mr. Robb, you have described a hypothetical situation, but if
I did not get mixed up, you did not ask the question.
Mr. ROBB. I have not asked the question. I wanted to give Mr. Garrison a
chance to object Would you like the question read back to you?
The WITNESS. No. I will ask you a few things about the hypothetical ques-
tion, because it is pretty complicated.
Mr. GABBIBON. Before we go further, I want to emphasize my point that I
want it clearly understood that the question that was put involved asking the
witness if the false story which he had told had been true, there would have
been a criminal conspiracy and make it clear that even if the false story that
649
was true there was no suggestion by Dr. Oppenheimer that he was involved in
espionage.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Garrison, I will ask the witness.
Mr. GRAY. I would suggest you proceed with your question.
Mr. ROBB. Thank you.
By Mr. ROBB:
Dr. von Neumann, my question is, assuming that Dr. Oppenheimer testified
before this board as I have indicated to you, would that shake your confidence
in his honesty?
A. May I ask you again, if I understood correctly
Q. Yes.
A. If I understood correctly, the hypothetical representation to the board
would have been something like this : That a false statement was made because
Dr. Oppenheimer wanted to avoid naming Mr. Chevalier and himself. I under-
stood your description first as saying that he said that he is supposed to have
said that he made these statements to security officers because he did not want
to mention Chevalier's name and did not want to mention his own name. Is
this correct?
Mr. ROBB. I wonder if we might have the question read back to the witness?
The WITNESS. Please read it back.
(Question read by the reporter.)
The WITNESS. In other words, the hypothetical testimony is that his conduct
was first of all due to a desire to make things easier for Chevalier and possibly
for himself, but on the other hand, it actually made it much worse. Is this the
idea?
Mr. ROBB. I hesitate to instruct the witness, Mr. Chairman, beyond the state-
ment of the hypothesis.
Mr. GARRISON. I think that is right.
Mr. SILVERMAN. You asked the witness a hypothetical question. If the wit-
ness is not entirely clear as to the hypothetical question, if the witness* under-
standing of it is at all different from that of the hearers, it make his answer
not very competent, and therefore it is important to have it clear.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. I think it is clear to say that part of the assumption is that Dr. Oppen-
heimer testified that one of his explanations for this conduct was that he was
reluctant to mention Dr. Chevalier and somewhat reluctant to mention himself.
A. But at the same time, he now realized that his statements if true would
actually be much worse for Chevalier.
Q. I think that is a fair statement, yes, sir.
A. So this was an attempt to achieve something of which it actually achieved
the opposite, is that the idea?
Q. That might be inferred, yes.
A. Look, you have to view the performance and the character of a man as
a whole. This episode, if true, would make me thiTifr that the course of the
year 1943 or in 1942 and 1948, he was not emotionally and intellectually prepared
to handle this kind of a job; that he subsequently learned how to handle it, and
handled it very well, I know. I would say that all of us in the war years, and
by all of us, I mean all people in scientific technical occupations got suddenly
in contact with a universe we had not known before. I mean this peculiar
problem of security, the fact that people who looked all right might be con-
spirators and might be spies. They are all things which do not enter one's
normal experience in ordinary times. While we are now most of us quite
prepared to discover such things in our entourage, we were not prepared to
discover these things in 1943. So I must say that this had on anyone a shock
effect, and any one of us may have behaved foolishly and ineffectively- and
untruthfully, so this condition is something ten years later, I would not consider
too serious. This would affect me the same way as if I would suddenly hear
about somebody that he has had some extraordinary escapade in his adolescence.
I know that neither of us were adolescents at that time, but of course we were
all little children with respect to the situation which had developed, namely,
that we suddenly were dealing with something with which one could blow up
the world. Furthermore, we were involved in a triangular war with two of our
enemies had done suddenly the nice thing of fighting each other. But after all,
they were still enemies. This was a very peculiar situation. None of us had
been educated or conditioned to exist in this situation, and we had to make our
rationalization and our cofle of conduct as we went along.
650
For some people it took 2 months, for some 2 years, and for some 1 year. I am
quite sure that all of us by now have developed the necessary code of ethics and
the necessary resistance.
So if this story is true, that would just give me a piece of information on how
long it took Dr. Oppenheimer to get adjusted to this Buck Rogers universe, but
no more. I have no slightest doubt that he was not adjusted to it in 1944 or 1945.
Q. Had you completed your answer?
A. Yes.
Q. In 1943, Dr. Oppenheimer was the director of the Los Alamos Laboratory,
wasn't he?
A. Yes.
Q. I believe at that time he was 39 years old?
A. Yes.
Q. You wouldn't say he was at that time an adolescent, would you?
A. No. I was trying to make this clearer. There are certain experiences
which are new for an adolescent, and where an adolescent will behave in a
silly way. I would say these experiences were now for a man of 39, if he
happened to be 39 at that moment in history.
Q. Do you think, Doctor, that honesty, the ability and the desire to ten the
truth, depends upon the international situation?
A. It depends on the strain under which you are.
Q. The strain?
A. Yes.
Q. You mean a man may lie under certain strains when he would not under
ordinary circumstances?
A. Yes, practically everybody will lie under anesthesia.
Q. Do you think, Doctor, if you had been placed in the same situation that
Dr. Oppenheimer was in 1943, in respect of this matter, that you would have
lied to the security officers?
•Sj?£f * don)t know h°w t(> answer this question. Of course, I hope I
wouldn t. But—you are telling me now to hypothesize that somebody else
acted badly, and you ask me would I have acted the same way. Isn't this a
question of when did you stop beating your wife?
Q. I don't think so, Doctor, since you asked me. You do feel that Dr Oppen-
heimer as you put it acted badly in the matter?
A. The hypothetical action, I take it, is a bad action.
Q. Quite serious, isn't it?
A. That depends on the consequences, yes.
Mr. KOBB. I think that is all I care to ask, Mr. Chairman
Neumann' you went to *** Alamos in the fall of 1943?
Mr. GBAT. Did you stay there throughout the war years?
* but l •""* *•* abont
Ohmmf c°nsider 0»t People who were identified with the
to tteSrtM fuSon? "* <*«ainitment to a foreign power, specifically
* ^^ that ** 80mebody was a P"1^ member and under party
' bnt what yon would
WITNESS. I so then believed. M somebody was under party discipline,
T°£.were V"" m 194S o£ the treats to the security of the
to
M ^J^nly «• a security risk, yes. I certainly felt that as
a
the Demies had to all advanta^ got into
K Tas ****& Proper to exploit this. That alfar as
bomb wa^ "««»»«, what aU of us had In mind in 1048
^J&l"* science •»* technology was enormous!
651
get, if it is possible, an atomic bomb before anybody else does. We certainly all
had the feeling that this was paramount, and that it was quite proper to take
calculated risks in this regard.
1 must say that I considered Russia an enemy from the beginning to the end,
and to now, and the alliance with Russia is a fortunate accident that two ene-
mies had quarreled. However, I think it also was perfectly fair to take
advantage of this, that the military commander could perfectly well decide that
one should take calculated risks on this, and employing a Communist might at
that moment accelerate getting an atomic weapon ahead of Germany.
Of course, it would later be a bad problem from the security point of view. But
then the German danger was there, and the other thing was remote, and military
information obsolesces rapidly anyhow. So I think it was not unreasonable to
take such a step.
Mr. GRAY. You might have applied a different test with respect to the calculated
risk in 1943 than you would apply today?
The WITNESS. Entirely.
Mr. GRAY. Were you acquainted during your service at Los Alamos with
Dr. Hawkins?
The WITNESS. Yes, I knew him.
Mr. GRAY. With your awareness of the existence of the Communist Party,
did you in any way have reason to believe that he was a member of the Com-
munist Party at that time?
The WITNESS. You see, it is a little difficult to be quite sure in 1945 whether
you think you learned around 1944, you learned 6 months earlier or later. I am
fairly sure I had no idea if his Communist affiliations when I came to Los Alamos
and first met him. He was not a particularly well known man and not to me.
I tfrittk I learned that he had some kind of Communist connection before I left
Los Alamos. Exactly how he had that connection I did not learn at that time.
Mr. GRAY. And if someone had asked you at that time, this would be one of
the calculated risks?
The WITNESS. I would say this was a calculated risk, yes.
Mr. GRAY. From what you knew of Dr. Hawkins at the time, was he pretty
well an indispensible member of the team out there?
The WiTNEsa If I am not mistaken he was a project historian.
Mr. GRAY. I think that was in part
The WITNESS. He was not indispensible in the sense in which a man who is
primarily interested in a technical sense. He was not a physicist. He was
not a chemist or an applied mathematician. I think he was a philosopher.
Mr. GRAY. And a mathematician.
The WITNESS. And some experience in sciences. He was a perfectly suitable
person for being a project historian. Exactly how hard or easy it was to get a
man who Is qualified to do this thing I did not know at that time. I would say
it is a job which requires a special kind of talent, and is not quite easy to fill.
Mr. GRAY. Did you know Philip Morrison?
The WITNESS. Yes, I know Philip Morrison.
Mr. GRAY. Did you then know anything about his political affiliations?
The WITNESS. I am fairly sure that I learned the fact that he had close
Communist ties later.
Mr. GRAY. And not at the time?
The WITNESS. This must have been in mid-1945 that I learned this.
Mr. GRAY. Were you acquainted with Fuchs?
The WITNESS. Yes, I knew Fuchs quite well.
Mr. GRAY. Did you have any reason to suspect his Integrity or dependability
or whatever was involved in the subsequent disclosures?
The WITNESS. Not particularly. He was a rather queer person, but then
under these conditions queer persons occur. I did not suspect Mm particularly.
He was clearly not an ordinary person.
Mr. GRAY. What I am getting at is whether you had reason to believe he was
a Communist
The WITNESS. I think I did not know about him, no. I did not know about
him, that he was a Communist practically until the whole affair broke.
Dr. EVANS. Practically what?
The WITNESS. Until it became known, until he confessed, or rather until he
was shown.
Mr. GRAY. At the time you learned about it, were you surprised?
The WITNESS. Look, I was not surprised in this sense, that he clearly was a
peculiar person. So If it turns out about an ordinary run of the mill person that
652
he is a conspirator and spy, you are shocked and surprised. He was a very
peculiar person with respect to whom I didn't have much experience. Of course,
I was surprised by the fact that there had been such a thing, that a spy had been
so well placed.
Mr. GRAY. When you said a few moments ago that you didn't know about it
until practically at the time the disclosures were made public, does that mean
that there was information available to people at Los Alamos about him, about
his Communist connections, before the story was known here in Washington?
The WITNESS. I don't think so.
Mr. GRAY. I didn't think you intended to say that
The WITNESS. No.
Mr. GRAY. I want to make clear that the record did not reflect it until you
intended to say it.
The WITNESS. No, no ; absolutely not.
Mr. GRAY. You think in that case if people in charge had known that
Fuchs was a member of the Communist Party or had a Communist commitment,
that this is the kind of calculated risk that you felt was desirable to take in
those days? Was the calculated risk worth it in the case of Fuchs?
The WITNESS. Clearly not. I don't quite get the question. In the light of
hindsight, clearly not.
May I say this was of course a highly empirical subject. Fuchs made a contri-
bution. Of course, the damage he made outweighs the contribution by f ars prob-
ably. Exactly what concentration of spies one would find among the people
with Communist backgrounds nobody knew ahead of time, and quite particularly
the technical people didn't know. So I would say this was a decision for security
and for whatever branch of the Government was involved, which deals with
counterespionage to make.
Mr. GRAY. Today you would not recommend employment on a sensitive project
of someone known now to be a member of the Communist Party.
The WITNESS. No.
Mr. GRAY. Suppose there was recommended to you an individual for employ-
ment who some years ago had what you believed to be close Communist afflu^
tions ; what would your response be today?
The WITNESS. I would certainly not employ him in a sensitive job.
Mr. GRAY. A person who had had close Communist affiliations in an earlier
period of his life?
The WITNESS. How early? I thought you said a few years ago. I mean how
early. I would say if somebody had close affiliations with the Comnaunist Party
after 1945 or later, then I would certainly not employ him in a sensitive Job.
If he had close affiliations with the Communist Party in the late 1930*s, then I
would say if he was never a party member, then I would view the entire situation
and I think if there is prima facie evidense of a probability that he had changed
his views, I certainly would. If he was an actual member of the party, I would
say that the burden of proof that he is no longer a member is on Mm. in other
words, on his general conduct since then. I think you must consider the total
personality and the total life and the probable motivation and interests of the
person after 1940.
Mr. GRAY. Do you pick 1940 as a particular year?
The WITNESS. No. It is a vague thing. It is somewhere between 1940 and
1944, 1 would say.
Mr. GRAY. That close affiliations as late as 1944
The WITNESS. I would begin to get worried, in fact, seriously worried. The
great watershed is evidently the Second World War. There are all sorts of
things happening there. For instance, the possibility for error is greater in
1943 and 1944 when the Russians were allies, than in 1940, when they were co-
operating with the enemy. So I think dating between 1940 and 1944 is very
difficult. But I would say definitely that I would take a lenient view of things
before 1940, and a very hard view of things after 1944.
Mr. GRAY. Suppose at Los Alamos someone had come to you— this is purely
hypothetical-— and said, although the British are our allies and the official policy
of the United States Government is to share military information of the highest
degree of secrecy with the British, this policy is being frustrated in Washington,
now I have a way of getting to the British scientists information about what
we are doing here in Los Alamos, and don't you think it is up to us to make sure
that official policy is not frustrated, and you knew that this person was in-
terested in the British, what would your position have been at that time, Dr. von
653
The WITNESS. For one thing, I would certainly not have given him information,
but I asume that the main question is would I have reported him right away.
Mr. GRAY. Yes; let me ask that question. The British were allies, it was
official policy, this man frankly said that then if the information were made
available, it could be transmitted through channels which were not official
channels.
The WITNESS. I would probably have reported him. I realize, however, that
this can lead to a bad conflict. If I am convinced that the man is honest in his
own benighted way, that is an unpleasant conflict situation, I would probably
have reported him anyway.
Mr. GRAY. The reason I asked the question is not to get an answer from you
on the basis of a hypothetical question, but to really ask next whether you would
have made a distinction at that time between an approach on behalf of the
Russians and an approach on behalf of the British.
The WITNESS. Yes. I think the probability of being at war with Russia in the
next 10 years was high, and the probability of being at war with England in the
next 10 years was low.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you, Dr. Evans.
Dr. EVANS. Dr. von Neumann, where were you born?
The WITNESS, Budapest, Hungary.
Dr. EVANS. I think you did tell us, but I want to know again, just where were
you educated?
The WITNESS. I studied chemistry in Berlin and Zurich and graduated as an
engineer of chemistry in Zurich.
Dr. EVANS. Zurich?
The WITNESS. Yes ; in Switzerland. After that I got a Ph. D. in mathematics
in Budapest, Hungary. This was in 1926.
Dr. EVANS. When did you come to this country?
The WITNESS. 1930.
Dr. EVANS. Are you a citizen of the United States?
The WITNESS. Since 1937.
Dr. EVANS. And were you professor here at any time in any institute?
The WITNESS. Yes ; I was professor of mathematical physics at Princeton Uni-
versity until 1933. At that time the Institute for Advanced Study began to
operate in Princeton and I was then appointed to the Institute for Advanced
Study.
Dr. EVANS, You first met Dr. Oppenheimer in Goettingen?
The WITNESS. It was either Zurich or Goettingen in 1926.
Dr. EVANS. Doctor, do you think a man can be loyal to his country and still, due
to his associates, be a security risk?
The WITNESS. That is possible; yes.
Dr. EVANS. Do you think a scientific man— A man trained in mathematics, like
yourself— after any country had exploded an atomic bomb, a scientist like
yourself in Russia, could guess a good bit about it?
The WITNESS. That depends when. I think in 1913, hardly. Pardon me.
Just from the fact of the explosion?
Dr. EVANS. You knew it was an atomic bomb explosion, and you knew the
room to the atom had been unlocked, and we knew the structure in there, and
the quantum mechanics connected with it, you would be able to guess a good bit?
The WITNESS. Surely. Knowing about nuclear fission and knowing that
somebody else had been able to make a detonation, one could go ahead on that
basis, but it takes a large organization.
Dr. EVANS. Yes ; it does. Do yon believe scientific men should be required
not to publish this discovery?
The WITNESS. In which era?
Dr. EVANS. Any time.
The WITNESS. Forgive me, sir, I have not understood. You mean that no
discovery should be published?
Dr. EVANS. Yes; a scientific man makes a discovery; should we keep it secret
or should we publish?
The WITNESS. No ; it ought to publish. There are military areas, there are
areas of classification and I think apart from this, one ought to publish.
Dr. EVANS. Apart from that?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Dr. EVANS. You do think there are some that should be kept secret?
The WITNESS. Oh, yes.
654
Dr. EVANS. If someone had approached you and told you he had a way to
transport secret information to Russia, would you have been very much sur-
prised if that man approached you?
The WITNESS. It depends who the man is.
Dr. EVANS. Suppose he is a friend of yours.
The WITNESS. Well ; yes.
Dr. EVANS. Would you be surprised?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Dr. EVANS. Would you have reported it immediately?
The WITNESS. This depends on the period. I mean before I got conditioned
to security, possibly not. After I got conditioned to security, certainly yes.
Dr. EVANS. You would.
The WITNESS. I mean after quite an experience with security matters and
realizing what was involved ; yes.
Dr. EVANS. I am sure you would now, Dr. von Neumann.
The WITNESS. There is no doubt now.
Dr. EVANS. You don't know some years ago whether you would have or not?
The WITNESS. What I am trying to say is this, that before 1941, 1 didn't even
know what the word "classified" meant. So God only knows how intelligently
I would have behaved in situations involving this. I am quite sure that I learned
it reasonably fast. But there was a period of learning during which I may have
made mistakes or might have made mistakes. I think I didn't.
Dr. EVANS. Would you put loyalty to a friend above loyalty to your country at
any time?
The WITNESS. No.
Dr. EVANS. Have you met any Communists?
The WITNESS. Oh ; yes.
Dr. EVANS. That you knew were Communists?
The WITNESS. Oh ; yes.
Dr. EVANS. Have you any friends that are Communists?
The WITNESS. At this moment ; no.
Dr. EVANS. Do you always know a Communist when you meet him?
The WITNESS. No.
Dr. EVANS. I guess that is all.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Perhaps particularly In view of Dr. Evans' question about whether you
ever met any Communists, I hope you will forgive me if I ask you 1 or 2 personal
questions.
Was your family in Hungary at or about the time of the -Soviet state there?
A. Yes.
Q. And did they leave in part because they didn't like it?
A. We left Hungary very soon after the Communists seized power. The
Communist regime in Hungary lasted 130 days. This was in 1919. We left
essentially as soon as it was feasible, which was about 30 or 40 days later, and
we returned about 2 months after the Communists had been put down. I left
Hungary later than this, to be exact 2 years later in order to go to college
I first intended to become a chemical engineer, and if I had become a chemical
engineer I might have returned to Hungary. Since I decided to become a
mathematician and then the academic outlook in Hungary was not at all prom-
ising whereas in Germany at that time it was very promising indeed, I then
decided to go to Germany. '
em ^tH 8reW UPl did y°U and y°Ur famUy re£ard Rtissia as a sort of natural
A. Russia was traditionally an enemy of Hungary. There was a seed of war
betweeen Hungary and Russia in 1948 which according to the Hungarian version
which is what I know, the Hungarians put down the Russian army. After this
they were not friendly. This trauma lasted after the First World War. After
reason to worry about "• Btlt
™Snnf £^0° g° 1*° an?thfr «**<*. Would you say that the development of
computers was an important or essential part of the hydrogen-bomb program?
655
A. The way the thing went, it was very important. Whether one could have
done without it is a different question. I have been a very strong proponent of
computers and their use so I don't want to overevaluate it, but I think it made
an important difference, let us say.
Q. Could you elaborate on that? Perhaps the view to indicating to what
extent the development of computers at the particular time the hydrogen bomb
was being developed contributed to it.
A. You mean what the role of very fast computers was or who developed them
and why?
Q. Was it a fact that there were developments, important developments in
computers during the period.
A. Very high speed computing came into reasonably general use just about
during those years. I would say
Q. When you say "those years," what do you mean?
A. When the hydrogen bomb was developed. I would say about two-thirds of
the development took place under conditions like this, that the heavy use of
computers was made, that they were not yet generally available, and that it was
necessary to scrounge around and find a computer here and find a computer there
which was running half the time and try to use it, and this was the operation
I was considerably interested in. I would say the last third of the development,
computers were freely available and industrially produced, and by now this is not
a scarce commodity. It was very scarce during more than the first half of the
hydrogen-bomb project.
Q. Was there also a question of some kind of computers not perhaps devel-
oped yet?
A. The art is better now than it was then. I would say by now what passes for
a fast computer is 3 or 4 times as fast as 3 or 4 years ago. There were few of
them and there were fewer people who knew what to do with them, and they were
less reliable.
Dr. EVANS. Did you know my friend Mr. Flanders?
The WITNESS. Yes, I know him well.
Dr. EVANS. Did you know a chemical engineer named Adelaneau?
The WITNESS. No.
Dr. EVANS. He was connected with gas. Was there such a thing as the
Roumanian-English Oil Co. over there, do you know?
The WITNESS. Probably. I know there was a lot of oil in Rumania, and I
know the English companies were the ones exploiting it.
Dr. EVANS. I wondered if you knew him as I knew him personally very well.
The WITNESS. No.
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Would you say anything about the role done at the Institute with respect
to the development of computers?
A. We did plan and develop and build and get in operation and subsequently
operate a very fast computer which during the period of its development was in
the very fast class.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer have anything to do with that?
A. Yes. The decision to build it was made 1 year before Dr. Oppenheimer
came, but the operation of building it and getting it into running took approxi-
mately 6 years. During 5 of these 6 years, Dr. Oppenheimer was the Director
of the Institute.
Q. When was it finally built?
A. It was built between 1946 and 1952.
Q. When it was complete and ready for use?
A. It was complete in 1951, and it was in a condition where yon could really
get production out of it in 1952.
Q. And was it used in the hydrogen bomb program?
A. Yes. As far as the Institute is concerned, and the people who were there
are concerned, this computer came into operation in 1962, after which the first
large problem that was done on it, and which was quite large and took even
under these conditions half a year, was for the thermonuclear program. Previous
to that I had spent a lot of time on calculations on other computers for the
thermonuclear program.
Q. You were asked if there were an incident that looked like an approach to
espionage to you, you indicated you would report it, and now you indicated you
certainly would and at other times you hoped so.
soasia— 54 12
656
A. I would. It is possible to define a transitional period in everybody's life
where he is not fully aware of the problem being present. How well anybody
behaves in the period is in part a question of fortitude and in part a question
of luck. There is always a relation of these things
Q. If such an approach were made to Dr. Oppenheimer today, what do you
think his reaction would be?
A. I have no doubt that he would report it.
Q. Immediately?
A. I think so, yes. May I say I can summarize my views on this. I think
after about a year's experience with military security and implications of secu-
rity and the things which make it necessary, I think every one of us and I am
convinced of Dr. Oppenheimer, and I, and everybody who I take seriously, would
act the same way, namely, follow the rules which exist
Q. Do you think that Dr. Oppenheimer would place loyalty to a friend above
loyalty to his country?
A. I would not think so.
Q. Dr. Evans asked you about whether it is possible for a man to be loyal to
his country, and yet be a security risk because of fcis associations.
A. Yes.
Q. I think you answered "Yes." Do you feel you know Dr. Oppenheimer's
associations reasonably well?
A. I rather think so.
Q. Do you think that Dr. Oppenheimer is a security risk because of his present
associations?
A. No, I don't think so.
Mr. SILVERMAW. That is alL
Mr. ROBB. One further question.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Doctor, you have never had any training as a psychiatrist, have you?
A. No.
Mr. ROBB. That is all.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Dr. von Neumann.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GBAY. We will recess until 2 o'clock.
(Thereupon at 12 : 35 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. GRAY. Do you wish to testify under oath?
Dr. LATIMER. I am willing.
Mr. GRAY. You are not required to do so, but all the witnesses have.
Dr. LATIMER. I am willing.
Mr. GRAY. Would you hold up your right hand, and give me your full name?
Dr. LATIMER. Wendell Mitchell Latimer.
Mr. GRAY. Wendell Mitchell Latimer, do you swear that the testimony you
are to give the board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?
Dr. LATIMER. I do.
Whereupon, Wendell Mitchell Latimer was called as a witness, and having
been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Would you be seated, please, sir.
Dr. Latimer, it is my duty to remind you of the existence of the so-called
perjury statutes. I should be glad to review them with you if necessary, but
may we assume you are familiar with them.
The WITNESS. I think I am in general familiar.
Mr. GRAY. All right, sir. I should like to request that if in the course of
your testimony it becomes necessary for you to refer to or disclose restricted
data, you notify me in advance so we may take necessary and appropriate steps
in the interest of security.
The WITNESS. I hope if I step over at any time that somebody would check
me, because I am not always sure as to what is restricted, and what is not
Mr. GRAY. We have, Dr. Latimer, a security officer of the Commission present,
and I suppose available a classification officer, if we need to call him in So
If there is some question in your mind, we will try to answer tfce question.
657
Finally, I should like to say to you that we consider these proceedings a
confidential matter between the Atomic Energy Commission, its officials and
witnesses on the one hand, and Dr. Oppenheimer and his representatives on the
other. The Commission is making no release with respect to these proceedings,
and we express the hope to every witness that he will take the same view.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. Dr. La timer, would you tell the board what your present position is, sir?
A. At present I am professor of chemistry at the University of California, and
associate director of the Radiation Laboratory.
Q. Located where, sir?
A. At Berkeley, Calif.
Q. And you live in Berkeley, Calif.?
A. I live in Berkeley.
Q. Could you give the board some account of your education and background?
A. I have an A. B. from the University of Kansas. I have a Ph. D. from the
University of California. I have been at the University of California on the
staff since 1919. I was dean of the College of Chemistry for 8 years. Is there
anything else that you want?
Q. What is your specialty in science, Doctor?
A. My specialty is thermodynamics and inorganic chemistry.
Q. Have you held any positions or offices in the National Academy of Science?
A. I am a member of the National Academy and I was chairman of the
chemistry section for one term.
Q. Are you the author of any books?
A. Yes, I have several textbooks. I also edited a series of books for the
Prentiss Hall Publishing Co.
Q. On what?
A. Chemistry in general.
Q. Do you know Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. How long have you known him, sir?
A. Oh, a great many years ; ever since he came to the University of California.
Q. Beg pardon?
A. Ever since he came to the University of California I think we have been
acquainted.
Q. Did you know him when he was on the faculty there?
A. Yes, I did, both before and after the war.
Q. Has your acquaintance been both social and official?
A. Not very highly social. I believe I was at his house for cocktails at one
time. Officially, early in the Los Alamos program my group made a few hundred
milograms of plutonium for their project. I think it was the first plutonium
that they had. During that period I saw him several times.
Q. Doctor, you somewhat anticipated my next question, which was whether
or not there came a time when you and your group at Berkeley did some work
on the A-bomb.
Mix SILVEBMAN. Would you mind, I don't quite understand this reference to
Dr. Latimer's group.
Mr. ROBB. I was going to ask him to explain that, too.
The WITNESS. Plutonium was discovered in our laboratory by Professor
Seaborg and his group, and after Seaborg went to Chicago to work in the metal-
lurgical laboratory there, I continued to direct a group on the chemistry of
plutonium, and In the early days our principal source of plutonium was from our
cyclotrons. So we worked up as large samples as we could of plutonium in
order to study its chemistry*
The group I was directing did a lot of the early work on the chemistr<y of
plutonium.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. When you say your group, Doctor, to what do you- refer?
A. I guess we had about 25 men working on the chemistry of plutonium.
Q. You mean working under you in your department?
A. Yes.
Q. When you refer to the cyclotron, where was that located?
A. There were two cyclotrons at Berkeley. The one that was used largely
was the 60-inch cyclotron on the campus.
Q. At Berkeley?
658
A. At Berkeley.
Q. That is what was called the radlab.
A. Yes ; it is called the radlab.
Q. The Radiation laboratory?
A. Radiation laboratory.
Q, When did this work on plutonium go on, Doctor?
A. I started Dr. Libby working on radioactive problems about 1933. Between
that and 1940, we had built up quite a group, Seaborg and Kennedy, and at the
time the war broke out, we had probably the best group of young nuclear chemists
all over the country, so it was just a gradual transition from our research pro-
gram that we had underway to applications for the Manhattan District.
Q. Doctor, I would like to ask you a question for the record. What is the
connection between plutonium and the atom bomb?
A. Plutonium was one of the elements which were fissioned with slow neutrons,
and therefore it is a material which can be used to sustain chain reactions, and
was one of the materials used in the B-bombs.
Q. In connection with your work on plutonium and your production of pin-
tonium, did you come in contact with Dr. Oppenheimer during the war?
A. As I mentioned, we did make the first sample of plutonium for the Los
Alamos Laboratory. I believe I am correct in that. We did other work for
them. We made various ceramic materials for them in which to melt plutonium.
We tried to be as helpful as we could although we were working closer with the
Chicago laboratory. Still we did jobs for Los Alamos as best we could when
they requested it.
Q. How frequently did you have occasion to see or meet Dr. .Oppenheimer
during the war period?
A. Not very frequently. As you know, after they went to Los Alamos, they
were pretty well tied down there. We didn't see many of the men after that.
Q. Did you follow the work that was being done at Los Alamos?
A. Not very closely. We were interested in the production of plutonium, and
they were fabricating it into bombs. We didn't follow that side of it.
Q. Doctor, did there come a time when you began thinking about a weapon
which is called the H-bomb?
A. Yes.
Q. When was that?
A. I suspected I started worrying about the H-bomb before most people. Just
as soon as it became evident to me that the Russians were not going to be
cooperative and were distinctly unfriendly.
Q. Would you keep your voice up just a bit, Doctor?
A. I felt that it was only a question of time that the Russians got the A-bomb.
I haven't much confidence in secrecy keeping these things under control very
long. It seemed to me obvious that they would get the A-bomb. It also seemed
to me obvious that the logical thing for them to do was to shoot immediately
for the super weapon, that they knew they were behind us in the production
of a bomb. It seemed to me that they must conclude shooting ahead immediately
in making the super weapons. So I suspect it was around 1947 that I started
worrying about the fact that we seemed to be twiddling our thumbs and doing
nothing.
As time passed, I got more and more anxious over this situation that we were
not prepared to meet, it seemed to me, a crash program of the Russians. I
talked to a good many people about it, members of the General Advisory
Committee.
Q. Do yon recall who yon talked to about it?
A. I talked to Glenn Seaborg for one. I didn't get much satisfaction out of
the answers. They seemed to me most of them on the phony side.
Q. Doctor, may I interpose right here before we go on to ask you a couple
of questions, first, why did it seem obvious to you that the Russians would
proceed from the A-bomb to the H-bomb?
A, They knew they were behind us on the A-bomb, and if they could cut
across and beat us- to the H-bomb or the super weapons, they must do it I
could not escape from the conclusion that they must take that course of action.
It was the course of action that we certainly would have taken if we were
behind. I could not escape from that conclusion.
Q. The second question is, yon said that we seemed to be twiddling oar thumbs
in the matter. What was the basis for that feeling on your part?
A. In the period between 1945 and 1949 we didn't get anywhere in our atomic
energy program in any direction. We didn't expand our production of uranium
659
much. We didn't really get going on any reactor program. We didn't expand
to an appreciable extent our production of fissionable material. We Just seemed
to be sitting by and doing nothing.
I felt so certain that the Russians would get the A-bomb and shoot for the
H-bomb that all during that period I probably was overanxious, at least com-
pared to most of the scientists in the country. But it seemed to me that such
an obvious thing would happen.
Q. Reverting again to your narrative, you said you talked to Dr. Seaborg and
others about going ahead with the H-bomb, and their answers, you said, seemed
to be phoney. What did you mean by that ?
A. I can't recall all the details during that period. When the Russians
exploded their first A-bomb, then I really got concerned.
Q. What did you do?
A. In the first place, I got hold of Ernest Lawrence and I said, "Listen, we
have to do something about it." I think it was after I saw Ernest Lawrence
in the Faculty Club on the campus, the same afternoon he went up on the Hill
and Dr. Alvarez got hold of him and told him the same thing. I guess the
two of us working on him at once with different impulses got him excited, and
the three of us went to Washington that weekend to attend another meeting,
and we started talking the best we could, trying to present our point of view to
various men in Washington.
On that first visit the reception was, I would say, on the whole favorable.
Most people agreed with us, it seemed to us, that it should be done.
Q. Could you fix the approximate date of this?
A. I would say within 2 or 3 weeks after the explosion of the Russian bomb.
I don't remember the date of that.
Q. That was in September 1949.
A. Shortly after that.
Q. And you said your reception seemed to be on the whole favorable. Do
you recall whom you saw on that occasion?
A. Around the Commission I think Dean was the only Commissioner there.
I talked largely to the chemistry group there, to Dr. Pitzer, and Dr. Lauritsen,
and Dr. Lawrence and Dr. Alvarez talked to a good many other men. They
talked to, as I recall, members of the joint congressional committee, and to
various men in the Air Force and Army.
Q. Do you recall whether you talked to any other scientists who were not
with the Commission?
A. Yes. I talked to Dr. Libby and Dr. Urey in Chicago. I talked to every-
body I could, but I don't remember now. I tried to build up pressure for it.
I definitely tried to build up pressure for it.
Q. What was the reception of your suggestions received at that period of time?
I am speaking of the time 2 or 3 weeks after the Russian explosion.
A. It was favorable, I would say. We met practically no opposition as
I recall
Q. Will you tell us whether or not that situation changed?
A. It definitely changed.
Q. When?
A. Within a few weeks. There had been a lot of back pressure built up, I
think primarily from the Advisory Committee.
Q. Would you explain that to us a bit?
A. I don't remember now all the sources of information I had on It, but we
very quickly were aware of the fact that the General Advisory Committee was
opposed.
Q. What was the effect of that opposition by the Committee upon fellow
scientists, if you know?
A. There were not many scientists who knew the story. I frankly was very
mystified at the opposition.
Q. Why?
A. Granted at that time the odds of making a super weapon were not known,
they talked about 50-50, 10 to 1, 100 to 1, but when the very existence of the
Nation was involved, I didn't care what the odds were. One hundred to one
was too big an odd for this country to take, It seemed to me, even if it was
unfavorable. The answers that we kept getting were that we should not do
it on moral grounds. If we did it, the world would hate us. If we didn't do it,
the Russians wouldn't do it. It was too expensive. We didn't have the man-
power. These were the types of argument that we got and they disturbed me.
Q. Did you ascertain the source of any of this opposition?
A, I Juflge the source of it was Dr. Oppenheimer-
660
Q. Why?
A. You know, he is one of the most amazing men that the country has ever
produced in his ability to influence people. It is Just astounding the influence
that he has upon a group. It is an amazing thing. His domination of the
General Advisory Committee was so complete that he always carried the majority
with him, and I don't think any views came out of that Committee that weren't
essentially his views.
Q. Did you have any opinion in 1949 on the question of the feasibility of
thermonuclear weapons?
A. Various calculations seemed to show that it might go if you could just
get the right conditions or the right mechanical approach to it. The odds didn't
look good, but as I say, I didn't care what the odds were, if there was a pos-
sibility of it going, I thought we must explore it, that we could not afford to
take a chance not to. The stakes were too big. The very existence of the
country was involved and you can't take odds on such things.
Q. Was there any way that you knew of to get the answer without experiment
and tests?
A. No, I am sure all the calculations showed that the only way it could ever
be settled was by trying it
Q. Have you followed the progress of the thermonuclear program since 1949?
A. In a rough way, yes. In the past 2 years, we have been working on some
of the problems at the Radiation Laboratory.
Q. At Berkeley?
A. At Berkeley.
Q. Dr. Latimer, this board is required within the framework of the statute
to determine upon its recommendation to the general manager as to whether
or not the security clearance of Dr. Oppenheimer should be continued and the
standards set up by the statute for the board are the character, the associations
and the loyalty of Dr. Oppenheimer. Would you care to give the board, sir,
any comments you have upon the basis of your knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer
as to his character, his loyalty and his associations in that context?
A. That is a rather large order.
Q. I know it is, Doctor.
A. His associations at Berkeley were well known. The fact that he did have
Communist friends. I never questioned his loyalty. There were elements of
the mystic in his apparent philosophy of life that were very difficult to under-
stand. He is a man of tremendous sincerity and his ability to convince people
depends so much upon this sincerity. But what was back of his philosophy I
found very difficult to understand.
A whole series of events involved the things that started happening immedi-
ately after he left Los Alamos. Many of our boys came back from it pacifists.
I judged that was due very largely to his influence, this tremendous influence
he had over those young men. Various other things started coming into the
picture.
For example, his opposition to the security clause in the atomic energy con-
tracts, opposition on the floor of the National Academy which was very intense
and showed great feeling here. These various arguments which were used for
not working on the H-bomb, the fact that he wanted to disband Los Alamos.
The fact of the things that weren't done the 4 years that we twiddled our
thumbs. All these things seemed to fit together to give a certain pattern to his
philosophy. A man's motives are just something that yon can't discuss, but all
his reactions were such as to give me considerable worry about his Judgment as
a security risk.
Q. I will put it in very simple terms, Doctor. Having in mind all that you
have said, and you know, would you trust him?
A. You mean in matters of security?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I would find— trust, you know, involves a reasonable doubt, I would say.
Q. That is right.
A. On that basis I would find it difficult to do so.
Q. Doctor, it has been suggested here that Dr. Oppenheimer is so valuable
to this country's weapons program that he should _be continued in his present
status. What can you say about that?
A. He could be of tremendous value to this country. His leadership of the
scientists of the country has been extremely valuable. As far as his value in
continuing the atomic energy program, I would say it is largely in the influence
he has upon other scientists. One of the things that annoys a great many
661
scientists more than anything else is this statement that he alone could have
built the A-bomb, or that lie alone could have carried on the program. One
very prominent engineer said to me yesterday that statement just gets me
down. Sure, I can pick out a half-dozen young men that could do the Job.
Whenever you do anything new the first time it seems awfully hard, but later
you discover that all you have done is taken a long roundabout road to get there.
Actually there is a shortcut and you get there in a hurry. So one always tends
to magnify the difficulties the first time you do a thing. If you have enough
good men working on it, you are almost sure to find a shortcut.
I think the developments in the super weapon that have occurred recently
show that this went along without very much — at least the key ideas were not
supplied by him.
Q. What?
A. The key ideas were not supplied by him.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. By Dr. Oppenheimer.
The WITNESS. That is right.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. But you would not say that he was indispensible?
A. No, I couldn't say that.
Mr. ROBB. That is all I care to ask, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. May we take about 5 minutes recess to consult with my col-
Mr. GRAY. Was there anything said you didn't hear, Mr. Silverman?
Mr. SILVEBMAN. No, sir.
Mr. GRAY. I think we might as well proceed.
Let me say this. My commitment on behalf of the board with respect to cross-
examination of witnesses whose direct examination has been conducted by Mr.
Robb is that if there are instances in which Mr. Garrison felt that he was dis-
advantaged by surprise, we would consider any reasonable request But it
doesn't seem to me necessary to take a recess for purposes of cross-examination
unless there is something that you
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Mr. Chairman, I don't press the point particularly. There
are 1 or 2 places when I was talking to Dr. Oppenheimer when Mr. Marks
heard something and I asked what was said, and he says he has it down. It is
that sort of thing.
Mr. GBAY. If you feel at any point you cannot properly represent Dr. Oppen-
heimer's interest, I would want you to inform the board.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I will do my best to represent Dr. Oppenheimer's interest.
We will just take a minute here if that is all right
Mr. GRAY. Go ahead.
CBOSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. Dr. Latimer, Dr. Oppenheimer left Berkeley in 1947, didn't he, to go to the
Institute for Advanced Study?
A. I don't remember the date.
Q. How often would you say you have seen Dr. Oppenheimer since 1947?
A. Not very frequently. I have seen him at the academy meetings. He has
been back to Berkeley on visits, but it has been infrequent
Q. Woud you say you have seen him 10 times, 5 times?
A. Let us say five times.
Q. Were those in fairly large groups?
A. I would certainly at least meet him and shake hands with him and maybe
pass a few words.
Q. Just social?
A. These were casual meetings.
Q. You met him a few times casually since 19479
A. That is right
Q. And before, that, did you meet him frequently?
A. We never had an intimate relationship. We saw each other on the
campus.
Q. You were members of the same faculty.
A. We were members of the same facility and had the normal contacts as
between faculty members.
Q. Did he ever visit your home?
A. No.
662
Q. And the only time you have a recollection of visiting his home is that one
time you went to a cocktail party?
A. I believe that is all I recollect.
Q. You say you started worrying, I think was the phrase you used, about
the hydrogen program and about the fact that we seemed to be twiddling our
thumbs about 1047, when your worries began?
A. I can't date it, but at the end of the war I was not content for us to stop
going ahead. I did not trust the Russians and I immediately started worrying
about keeping ahead. I can't date it, but let us say I suggested it even before it
became obvious to everybody that the Russians were not going to be friendly.
I started worrying about it.
Q. Did you know whether there was work being done on thermonuclear
research, and research on thermonuclear weapons at Los Alamos during the war?
A. Yes, I knew that the program, that a start had been made on it
Mr. ROBB. Have you finished the answer?
The WITNESS. I knew a start had been made on it. I knew they had not gotten
very far, but that calculation had been made and various possible approaches
were being investigated.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. Did you know that research continued?
A. Yes, it continued without much pressure on it
Q. How did you know what was being done?
A. I saw Teller occasionally. I don't suppose I had a very clear idea at that
time except that it is not hard to form an impression of the magnitude of a pro-
gram from many different sources.
Q. What I am concerned about is to what extent these sources were matters
of which you had some fairly direct personal knowledge.
A. I don't know what you mean quite by direct personal knowledge, I was
not down to Los Alamos during that period, and I didn't talk to the men working
on the program during that period. But our general impressions around the
radiation laboratory, the general impressions I got from talking to men in Wash-
ington, was that things were not moving ahead.
Q. Did you have some sort of responsibility for any part of the atomic weapons
program?
A. During those years?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. Did you have any official connection with it?
A. I was still associate director of the radiation laboratory, and the men to*
gether in this laboratory talked over between them many problems. There is a
pretty general amount of information on these programs.
Q. What I am concerned about is, was what you knew pretty much what you
picked up in a sort of general way, or was it something that it was your business
to know something about, and that you made fairly direct efforts to find out?
A. It was not directly my business to know about it except as a citizen of this
country who had a certain amount of information on that subject, and was
greatly concerned about what was being done. I would ask questions as high up
as I could to find out what was being done. Maybe the answers were often vague,
but still anyone can form a pretty definite impression by such methods.
Q. Quite so. I would not for a moment question your right to form an opinion.
Indeed a very natural interest would lead to it What I am trying to arrive at
was the opinion or impression you had formed the impression of an interested
citizen without very direct access or responsibility to the problem, or was it that
of a man whose job it was to be working on the problem?
A. It was not my job to be working on it, but I had a lot of information about
the nuclear program. I had a lot of sources of classified Information. I think
I might say that my suspicions over that period had been verified by evidence
that has come out later.
Q. What you had was suspicions?
A. It was obvious during those years we were not doing anything of any
significance.
Q. Did the radiation laboratory do any substantial work on atomic weapons
during the years 1945 to 1949?
A. No.
Q. Did you know what General Groves* views were as to whether It was de-
sirable In the years 1947 on— in the early years there— as to whether it was
desirable to concentrate on fission weapons rather than on thermonuclear?
663
A. I suppose I heard his views. They seemed to coincide with that of the
General Advisory Committee pretty much. I suspect again under the influence
of Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. You don't of course question General Groves' patriotism or his good faith?
A. I don't question the patriotism of any of the members on that committee.
Of course, he was not on the committee. Not only General Groves, hut the other
members on the committee, Conant and the other members, they were under the
influence of Dr. Oppenheimer, and that is some influence, I assure you.
Q. Were you under Dr. Oppenheimer's influence?
A. No, I don't believe I was close enough contact to be. I might have been
if I had been in closer contact.
Q. You think that General Groves was under Dr. Oppenheimer's influence?
A. Oh, very definitely.
Q. Have you ever spoken to General Groves?
A. About this problem?
Q. At all.
A. Oh, yes ; I saw him frequently during the war.
Q. On what do you base your Judgment that General Groves was under Dr.
Oppenheimer's influence?
A. I wouldn't go too far in answering that question, because I don't know
how much General Groves' opinions have changed in recent years. The state-
ments that I have heard attributed to h*m seemed to follow the same — at least
for a while, I have not seen his statements very recently — but during part of this
period hej seemed to be following the Oppenheimer line.
Q. What I am curious about is how do you know that Dr. Oppenheimer was not
following the Groves line?
A. That is ridiculous.
Q. Pardon?
A. Knowing the two men, I would say that is ridiculous. Oppenheimer was
the leader in science. Groves was simply an administrator. He was not doing
the thinking for the program.
Q. I' am trying to arrive upon what it is that you base your— I think you said
it was a suspicion, but perhaps I am wrong, that General Groves was under
Dr. Oppenheimer's influence. Is it simply the fact of your knowledge of Dr.
Oppenheimer and the fact that he is a leading scientist and a man of great gifts.
A. I know these things were overwhelming to General Groves. He was so
dependent upon his Judgment that I think it is reasonable to conclude that most of
his ideas were coming from Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. How do you know he was so dependent?
A. I don't I don't know, but I have seen the thing operate.
Q. There were other scientists at Los Alamos, weren't there?
A. Yes, there were.
Q. And General Groves has had contact with other scientists.
A. Yes, but there were no other scientists there with the influence that Dr.
Robert Oppenheimer had and moreover this close association with Groves
certainly one would normally conclude that he still had tremendous influence
over him. It may be an unreasonable conclusion, but it doesn't seem so to me.
Q. Forgive me, but no man considers his own view unreasonable.
A. That is right You must accept these as my personal opinions and nothing
more than that.
Q. I am trying to arrive on what you base these personal opinions.
A. Various things that go into a man's Judgment are sometimes difficult to
analyze.
Q. I am trying to find out to what extent objective facts
A. I had studied this influence that Dr. Oppenheimer had over men. It was
a tremendous thing.
Q. When did you study this influence?
A. All during the war and after the war. He is such an amazing man that
one couldn't help but try to put together some picture.
Q. Tell us about these studies that you made about Dr. Oppenheimer's influ-
ence. You said after the war.
A. He has been a most interesting study for years. Unconsciously, I think
one tries to put together title elements in a man that make him tick. Where
this influence comes from, what factors in his personality that give him this
tremendous influence. I am not a psychoanalyst. I can't give you how my
picture of this thing was developed, but to me it was an amazing study, just
thinking about these factors.
664
Q. For a long time you have been thinking abont Dr. Oppenheimer's influence
on people.
A. Yes, particularly during this period when he was able to sway so many
people, so many of his intimate
Q. What is the period here?
Mr. ROBB. Wait a minute. He has not finished.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Sorry.
The WITNESS. During this period of discussion as to whether one should
work on the H-bomb and the super weapons. I was amazed at the decision that
the committee was making, and I kept turning over in my mind how they
could possibly come to these conclusions, and what was in Oppenheimer that
gave him such tremendous power over these men.
By Mr. SILVEEMAN :
Q. Did you talk to any of these men over whom Dr. Oppenheimer had this
tremendous power?
A. Occasionally, yes.
Q. Would you tell us whom you talked to, please?
A. The man on the Commission I was most intimately associated with was
Dr. Seaborg, since he was a member of my department. I talked to him very
frequently about the problem.
Q. Did Dr. Seaborg say he just couldn't stand up to Dr. Oppenheimer's
influence.
A. He didn't stand up to him very welL
Q. What did he say?
A. That is years ago. I can't remember.
Q. I am trying to distinguish between your judgment and what you were
told.
A. These were my judgments, I would say. I have seen him sway audiences.
It was just marvelous, the phraseology and the influence is just tremendous.
I can't analyze it for yon, but I think all of you know the man and recognize
what I am talking about.
Q. I think you said that you judged that the source of the opposition to the
hydrogen bomb, the back pressure, I think you referred to it as, was Dr.
Oppenheimer.
A. That is right.
Q. Would you tell us on what you based that judgment?
A. As chairman of the Committee he wrote all the Committee reports and
the decisions became pretty apparent I don't remember how the decisions
leaked out but the fact that they recommended to the President that no work
be done. Surely nobody could conclude it wasn't largely Dr. Oppenheimer's
opinion which was being presented.
Q. Have you ever met Dr. Conant?
A. Yes, I know Dr. Conant.
Q. Would you say that he is a man of fairly firm character?
A. I have known him a long time. He is a man of force, but in matters per-
taining to theoretical physics, I think he trusted Dr. Oppenheimer completely.
Q. And on what do you base that?
A. The fact that he followed along so consistently.
Q. Do you know whether Dr. Conant's judgment in connection with the hydro-
gen bomb was based on a technical evaluation— I don't mean a technical evalu-
ation—a judgment as to the nuclear aspects of the problem, the scientific nuc'ear
aspect of the problem?
A. Those were the reasons which were given in the report. They were
expressed in technical terms. I was by no means convinced that those were
the real reasons behind the decision.
Q. Have you read that report?
A. I don't know as I ever have. I may have in recent years seen in the
atomic energy office copies which would confirm my opinions, but certainly
the essence of the report was known, that they were opposed to the thermo-
nuclear weapons. We didn't have the manpower for it. It would detract from
our A-bomb work — a number of reasons like that I don't know. Technical
reasons were given.
Q. You consider those technical reasons relating to nuclear physics?
A. They sounded pretty phony to me.
Q. That was not my question, precisely. My question was whether you con-
sidered those reasons related to nuclear physics, and on which therefore Dr.
Conant might be relying on Dr. Oppenheimer?
665
A. Yes, those were the obvious reasons given, I believe.
Q. Did you consider that those were reasons related to nuciear physics on
which Dr. Conant would therefore be relying on Dr. Oppenheimer ?
A. Those would have been legitimate reasons if he had been exercising his
free judgment and not overwhelmed by his great confidence in Dr. Oppenheimer's
judgment. I doubt if it was a free judgment on his part.
Q. My question, sir, is not whether it was free judgment or whether it was
legitimate reasons or anything like that. My question is whether you consider
manpower a problem of nuclear physics.
A. It was in this case. In this case if it was true we didn't have the man-
power Jto do it, it was a legitimate reason. But I believe we did have the
manpower to do it as subsequent events showed.
Q. Is that the problem that Dr. Conant was relying on Dr. Oppenheimer, as
to whether we had the manpower?
A. I judge he offered that as one of the reasons.
Q. You don't know now whether you have ever read the GAG 1949 report, or
do you?
A. I don't recall. I have talked to a good many men who have seen it.
I have talked to Dr. Pitzer and Dr. Seaborg and probably a half dozen others
who have seen it. Whether I read it or not, I don't recall, but the essence of
it was obvious.
Q. Do you know whether these reasons you have given were stated in the
1949 report of the GAG?
A. I can't at this moment say definitely, but they were, as I recall, approxi-
mately the arguments given.
Q. You say as you recall. As you recall it from what?
A. As I recall it from the discussion which was occurring at that time. That
has been a number of years ago.
Q. Discussion with whom, sir?
A. With everybody concerned in the program and that was concerned in this
decision. There was general discussion among the scientists on the atomic
energy program whether the thing should go. These arguments were tossed
back and forth very freely among hundreds of men on the program.
Q. What I am concerned about, sir, is the reasons given in the GAG report
A Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what the reasons that were given in the GAG report were?
A I can't at the moment quote the reasons given, but the intent of the report
was obvious. Four or five years ago I could have given you many of the details,
but today all I can recall in detail is the intent of the report.
Q. And you think that the report did contain this argument about diversion
A You see, there were so many arguments being given by members of the
General Advisory Committee, many of them verbally, and what was actually
written down in that report at this moment, confusing all these arguments
that are given, I could not definitely state.
Q. You came to Washington in an effort, I think you put it, to build up
pressure for the hydrogen bomb. ,_,.,_«» -u^ ^ T ***
A. I came to Washington on another mission, but while I was here, I oia
everything I could to build up pressure for the work.
Q. Did you know that the General Advisory Committee would be consulted
on this problem?
Q! How* many 'members of the General Advisory Committee do you know
now. Many of them I did not know intimately. Rabi, I knew
fairly well. Fermi I had a speaking acquaintance with. Seaborg, I donl
remember the exact composition of that Committee at that time.
Q. Did you attempt to communicate your views to any member of the Gen-
eral Advisory Commitee?
A. I certainly worked hard on Seaborg.
Q. Didn't Dr. Seaborg tell you that he was not going to be at the meeting?
A. He wrote a letter, I believe.
Q. Didn't he tell you he was not going to be at the meeting?
A. Yes, but he still had influence.
Q. Did you speak to anyone else who was going to be at the meeting?
A. I have not directly.
Q. I don't understand what you mean by not directly.
A. I worked on a good many of my friends around the Commission, such as
Ken Pitzer. I told Mm my point of view.
Q. Dr. Pitzer did not hare to be convinced of your point of view, did he?
A. It didn't take very long to.
Q. Did you try to speak to Dr. Oppenheimer about it?
A. I did not.
Q. Did you then hold the view that Dr. Oppenheimer was a very influential
member of the GAC?
A. Oh, that was obvious.
Q. Did you then hold the view that whatever Dr. Oppenheimer's view was
would ultimately be the GAG view?
A. The majority, I believe. I believe there was occasionally a dissent, but
certainly the majority followed his opinion.
Q. Didn't it occur to you that it might be useful to call up Dr. Oppenheimer
and try to present your point of view in the hope that GAC would be influenced?
A. I didn't think my opinion would have much influence upon him.
Q. In matters as important as this, did it really matter what the chances
were of your being able to influence Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. It was merely a matter of procedure. I was trying to accomplish my
objectives, but one makes judgment as to how is the best way to accomplish these
objectives. I talked to Admiral Strauss and gave him detailed statements of
what I thought he could use with the President to make the decision.
Q. Did you think that Admiral Strauss' influence was greater than that of
Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. When he got the Army and Navy and others behind him it turned out
it was.
Q. Did you then think that Admiral Strauss' influence would be greater?
A. I did.
Q. Didn't you think it would be a good idea if you could get the GAC to go
along?
A. I hoped they would.
Q. Did you do any more?
Mr. ROBB. Wait a minute. He has not finished his answer.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I am sorry I keep interrupting.
The WITNESS. Let it go at that. I hoped he would. But I didn't feel with
very many members of the GAC I didn't have much influence. After all, a
chemist does not have much influence with theoretical physicists.
Mr. SILVBBMAN, I believe there is one chemist in this room that has a certain
amount of influence.
The WITNESS. Not directly.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. Wasn't there a chemist on the GAC?
A. Seaborg.
Q. How about a fellow named Conant?
A. He was a college president.
to Dr- Conant aere wouid *• any rapport
A. No. In fact— well, I guess It doesn't matter.
intoritiJ!!?? ^ °f 5taT?°^Lctll¥ back f rom Los Alamos P^sts. and you
that JudXenM Oppenheimer's influence. On what did you base
°n to him. They were capable of independent Judgment,
^ »«?*•* "W"* <* indoctrination ^ad takenplace:
mnCl1 W6U!llt On> bQt tt VM 3ust ** obserT*tton
Dr' Latimer< ™s te a terribfr seriooa matter, this whole
A. I realize it. I feel terrible about it
te<* LriM?*!!* ^A?*' Ia* tt ^^ «»••*"« Judgment that boys came
bact Pacifists from Los Alamos due to Dr. Oppenheimer's influence?
conduston WaS ** con<flusl<m I came *°- I "MT to wrong, but that was my
Q. And you gave that conclusion in your direct testimony.
•&» xes.
Q. On what did you base that conclusion?
667
A. It is difficult to analyze it. I talked to them. This was years ago, though.
I can't recall all the details of it That was the conclusion I came to. I don't
remember now what went into my judgment at the time.
Q. Dr. Latimer, let me put it to you as frankly as I can, and I would like you
honestly, and I know you will, to consider this point of view. Would you say
that your Judgment that these boys were influenced to become pacifists by Dr.
Oppenheimer is based essentially on your judgment that Dr. Oppenheimer is a
very persuasive person, and that very few people come in contact with Dr.
Oppenheimer without being influenced by him?
A. That is certainly an important factor in my decision.
Q. And that therefore if someone comes back after having a contact with Dr.
Oppenheimer with a view which to you appears to be Dr. Oppenheimer's view,
it is in your judgment reasonable to suppose that Dr. Oppenheimer influenced
them?
A. I would conclude from the devotion of these boys to him that would not be
contrary to his own opinions and probably expressed.
Q. Did you know what his opinions were on the question of pacifism?
A. Let me phrase this a little differently. Let us not put the general pacifism,
but an unwillingness to build weapons or to work on any research involving
weapons. I believe that was a more careful statement of the opinions they
voiced.
Q. Dr. Latimer, that is a very different thing from being pacifists, is it not!
A. It amounts to the same thing, I would say. We have to have weapons to
fight. If we don't have weapons, we don't fight.
Q. Wasn't it true that many scientists after the explosion at Hiroshima and
perhaps even before that— many scientists after the explosion at Hiroshima
were terribly troubled by this weapon?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Weren't you, sir?
A. I was more troubled by what the Russians might do along the same line.
Q. I would like to ask you whether you were troubled by this weapon.
A. No.
Q. Were you troubled by the fact that 70,000 people were killed at Hiroshima?
A. I felt that you might even have saved lives. I had been in the Pacific and
I had seen something of the difilculty of getting the Japanese out of caves. I
went over there on a special mission that involved that problem. I felt that If
we had to land our boys on the coast of Japan, and knowing what I knew about
the difficulty of getting Japanese out of underground positions, that the loss of
life might be very much greater.
Q. I think we all understand that consideration, Dr. Latimer, and I think we
all share it What I would like to know is whether you were troubled by the
fact that 70,000 people were killed at Hiroshima.
A. I suppose I was troubled to the same extent that I was troubled by1 the
great loss of life which occurred in our fire bombs over Tokyo. The two tilings
were comparable in my mind. I am troubled by war in general.
Q. Don't you think that perhaps boys who had worked on the atom bomb and
who perhaps felt some responsibility for the bomb might have felt that trouble
in perhaps even more acute form?
A. I grant that is correct ; they might have.
Q. Now, I think you said that you referred to Dr. Oppenheimer's opposition to
the security clause.
A. Beg pardon?
Q. I think you referred to Dr. Oppenheimer's opposition to the security clause.
A. This was just part of the pattern that seemed to be developing. There was
quite a group in the academy who fought the security clause in the AEG con-
tracts, and I think many of them were sincere in it I Just said this was a part
of the picture. Dr. Oppenheimer being more eloquent and speaking more force-
fully before the academy, seemed to be carrying the lead in the attack. This is
not in itself important, because he was joined by many others, especially an
eminent astronomer from Harvard.
Dr. EVANS. Harold Shapeley?
The WITNESS. Yes.
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Was also a member of the United States Senate one who joined him?
A. Yes.
Q. Senator McMahon?
668
A. I suppose so. I didn't approve of it. But I thought he was a little
vociferous.
Q. You say Dr. Oppenheimer opposed a security clause. You mean he opposed
a security clause for the building of works?
A. No ; these were fellowships. I think he probably had the right position.
But I said this simply fits into a pattern. He was in good company in making
his objections. I think he was probably right in this particular case.
Mr. GRAY. What was the date of this, roughly?
The WITNESS. I can't give the date. In itself I would not attach any great
significance to it. I simply said this fits into a pattern.
By Mr. SILVEKMAN :
Q. This is something you mentioned on direct examination as a reason why I
think you had some trouble about it.
A. I think this is part of the picture. I can expand the picture a little more
if you would want me to.
Q. I would like to concentrate for a moment on this particular item. So the
opposition to the security clause was an opposition to a security clause with
respect to AEG fellowships?
A. The fact that they had to take a loyalty oath. There was a division in the
academy. I just mention this as indicating the side that he was always on.
In itself I would not attach any intention except as part of a general picture.
Q. I think in view of the fact that you mentioned it and referred to it as a
security clause in an AEG contract, it is desirable that the record be clear now
as to what it is he was opposed to.
A. He was opposed to an oath which all holders of AEG contracts must take.
I believe that was a more direct statement
Q. All holders of AEG contracts?
A. No ; all holders of AEG fellowships. Let me get my phraseology correct
Q. I think it is important And these were fellowships in basic science?
A. They were.
Q. Were they fellowships in the building of weapons?
A. No ; they were just part of the pattern which had been set up by Congress.
The item is not highly significant in itself.
Q. You did consider that Dr. Oppenheimer's position was right on that,
wasn't it?
A. I felt that the act of Congress was unfortunate but in view of the act, I
didn't feel that one should offer this strenuous objection that he offered.
Q. So though you thought that he was right in his position, your objection
was that he stood up too strongly for his position?
A. I would say this, that I didn't approve of it, either, but since the act of
Congress set this up, I thought the strenuousness— it was the intensity of his
objections, rather than whether it was right or wrong.
Q. Now I don't understand. I thought at one point you said that Dr. Oppen-
heimer was right in his opposition.
A. I think the loyalty clause in the contract was wrong.
Q. Do you think that Dr. Oppenheimer was right in his opposition to that
clause?
A. I didn't oppose it on the floor of the academy. I think I voted against the
resolution.
Q. Did you think that Dr. Oppenheimer was right or wrong?
A. I thought he was within his rights in offering the objections.
Q. I thought you said in answer to an earlier question that he was probably
right in opposing it. That is not what you meant?
A. I thought I tried to make myself plain.
Q. Excuse me. It was not entirely clear to me, and I would like you to make
it clear.
A. I felt that the thing basically was not good, but I was somewhat struck by
the intensity of his opposition.
Q. What was basically not good? The thing that Dr. Oppenheimer opposed?
A. Correct
Q. Surely you don't draw any unfavorable inferences from the fact a man
intensely opposes that which he believes to be wrong?
Mr. Rom Mr. Chairman, I think the witness has explained 4 or 5 times what
his view on that was.
Mr. SH.VERMAN. Perhaps that Is right
Mr. GBAY. Proceed.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. Let me ask just one more thing. Was it a loyalty clause that Dr. Oppen-
heimer opposed, or was it an FBI investigation in this connection, and was it
for classified fellowships or for unclassified?
A. For unclassified.
Q. For unclassified?
A. As I recall.
Q. Did he make a distinction between classified and unclassified?
A. I do not recall that.
Q. I think you said that Dr. Oppenheimer wanted to disband Los Alamos?
A. As I recall it it was essentially that. He wanted to move it to Chicago,
I believe. At least it would have appeared to have been a serious interruption
of the program.
Q. How do you know that he wanted to disband Los Alamos?
A. That impression was built quite a number of years ago, and I am not sure
that I remember all the details that went into mv knowledge, but it was correct,
wasn't it?
Q. One of the advantages of being a lawyer is that I don't have to anfcwer
A. I may have been misinformed, but I believe I wasn't.
Q. Was one of the details that went into your knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer's
decision a conversation with Dr. Oppenheimer on this point?
A. No.
Q. Don't you think that might have been the most reliable source of informa-
tion on that point?
A. I think my judgment was reliable.
Q. I think you referred to the fact that many scientists were annoyed at
the notion that Dr. Oppenheimer alone could have built the atom bomb. I take
it you were among those scientists, or weren't you?
A. I certainly appreciate his very great contributions. They were tremendous.
But I certainly think it would be erroneous to assume that it could not be done
by anybody else.
Q. My question, sir, was not that. My question is whether you were among
the scientists who have been annoyed at that notion?
A. I am annoyed at that statement which has been appearing in the news-
papers. Every time I pick up a newspaper and read that, I am definitely
annoyed. A great many other scientists I know, are equally annoyed.
Q. Do you know whether Dr. Oppenheimer has ever taken that position?
A. I do not He is a very modest man. I assume he would not take that
position.
Q. Have you read Dr. Oppenheimer's answer to the Commission's letter in
this proceeding?
A. I have read it.
Q. Do you know whether he said anything on that point?
A. I don't recall that lie did.
Q. I think you said that the key ideas with respect to the hydrogen bomb
were not supplied by Dr. Oppenheimer. That is what you said, wasn't it.
A. I believe I did put it that way. Maybe it could be better phrased than that.
Q. Perhaps you would phrase it better then because I think it would be
desirable to have your notion as clearly as possible on this record.
A. This gets on the verge of classified information, of coure, but I think one
can say without going into classified information that the idea which made It
work easily was not supplied by htm.
Q. The idea that what?
A. That made it much easier to build was not supplied by him.
Q. If it makes it easier there has, been testimony in this record that Dr. Teller
and Dr. Ulam made very great contributions.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you understand that Dr. Oppenheimer claimed that he had supplied
the key ideas?
A. No, I did not. I had not heard that he had.
Q. I was Just sort of wondering why you found it necessary or desirable to
refute a statement which apparently had not been made.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I don't think that is hardly a fair question inasmuch
as I asked M™ to make his comments with regard to Dx. Oppenheimer, and it
was in response to that question that he made that remark.
Mr. SILVHBMAN. I see.
670
By Mr. SILVEBMAN:
Q. I want to return for a moment to the GAG as constituted in 1949 to your
fear of not being able to influence them. I think you gave as one of your reasons
that chemists might not have much influence with nuclear physicists. Dr. Cyril
Smyth was on the GAG?
A. That is right, he was. I had forgotten he was on there. If I had gotten
hold of him, I would have certainly talked to him.
Q. This was a terribly important thing, wasn't it, the problem of influencing
the country's national policy on the building of the hydrogen bomb?
A. We got the right answer, too.
Q. Didn't you think it was worth your while to call Dr. Smyth?
A. I worked through other methods.
Q. You did not work through the GAG?
A. If I had failed I would have said it was certainly unfortunate, but as long
as we didn't lose the battle, I guess it was not so important
Q. What I am merely asking, sir, is do you think it is fair to say that the
GAC was influenced complete^ in its opposition to the hydrogen bomb by
Dr. Oppenheimer's domination without having talked to some of the members of
the GAC who participated in the discussion?
A. I think it is fair.
Q. I think you suggested that we made very little or no progress in atomic
armament from 1947 to 1950. That comes as something of a surprise to me. I
think there has been some testimony in the record that would seem to be the
other way. But perhaps I am wrong. How do you know that nothing had hap-
pened of value?
A. You keep asking me to go back and analyze my judgments. The reactor
program did not move forward, the development of our natural uranium supplies
did not move forward rapidly, the expansion of Hanford was slow, the expansion
of production of U-235 did not move much, this sort of thing.
Q. Which reactor program, did not move forward? The reactor program for
weapons?
A. No, the general reactor program which of course related to the program as
a whole. Weapons are not entirely independent of the reactor program.
Q. Wasn't it true there were expansions, large and important expansions in
the reactor program between 1947 and 1950 with respect to weapons?
, A. It was delayed at least a year by busting up the Los Alamos group and
arguing where it was going and a lot of scientists got discouraged and quit.
Q. Wondering what?
A. I forget the details of whether it was going to be moved out to Chicago
or Idaho. You broke up a competent group at Los Alamos and delayed the whole
program for a while.
Q. Don't you recall that there was a delay in over a year after the war before
an act was passed by Congress?
A. Yes, but still there was plenty of delay after that
Q. Wasn't it during that period until an act was passed by Congress that the
great deterioration occurred at Los Alamos?
A. I don't remember the exact date. A lot of deterioration occurred during that
period. But certainly the reactor program didn't move forward.
Q. Do you recall that Dr. Oppenheimer testified in favor of early legislation
in order to prevent the deterioration of Los Alamos?
A. No, I do not
Q. Do you know whether there was a sizable growth in the stockpile of fission-
able material and of atomic weapons in the period of 1947 to 1950?
A. Under existing facilities there should have been a sizable growth
Q. Do you know whether there was or wasn't?
A. Those figures are confidential and I don't have access to them, but knowing
in general about what the production capacities were, one could conclude that
the normal production went on, but there was no reasonable expansion of the
program,
Q. And on what do you base your conclusion that there was no reasonable ex-
pansion of the program?
A. None of my Mends disappeared to work on projects anywhere. If there
were any such projects set up, they were kept awfully secret to me.
Q. Can you tell us to what extent work on the atom bomb done after the war
** M a precondmoa to tte ****** * ^e dey*op-
671
A. I think Dr. Teller could answer that question much better than I. It is his
particular field. My impressions would be based very largely on what Dr. Teller
lias told me, and it would be second hand. I place considerable reliance on it
frot Sw!?19& y°U Ugbt there had been no progress to atomic weapons
f™1 M1 no"617 "ttl6 Progress> Y(m had a Program and you kept it going, but
Q. Would you tell us what Dr. Teller told you as to whether work on atomic-
bomb development was helpful as a precondition to the physics of the hy"™
bomb? *
A. I think he would say he got some encouragement, but he had a small groun
2 or 3 or 4 men working with him, something of the sort group,
Q. I am afraid you are not answering my Question
A. I thought I was.
Q. What I was asking was whether what Dr. Teller told you about the extent
to which postwar work on the atom bomb, not necessarily by ^im, was helpM £s
a precondition to the physics of the hydrogen bomb ^eipiui as
A. I can't give you more than the general feeling that he didn't get much en-
couragement during that period. fe e
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I have no further question,
Mr. GBAY. Dr. Evans.
kf many y^ars^^' * *** Say * reUed °n Latimer and Hi^brand for
The WITNESS. It is very kind of you to say so
DI; ?^S'*15?enJ;he fis!?01i bomb was fired' is Jt correct in saying you were
worried about the other end of the curve that Harkins wrote about Lny years
The WITNESS. Yes. It, of course, became obvious to everyone that energeticallv
such things were possible and being a student in themo^namicr^Kme^
thing is possible, it is probable that somebody can make it work
Dr. EVANS. Have you ever been approached for secret information?
The WITNESS. No.
Dr. EVANS. Have you known any Communists?
The WITNESS. No, I did not.
D£ EVANS. Dr Latinier, anyone that knows him and his work would not call
Dr. Conant a nuclear physicist by any stretch of the imagination?
The WITNESS. No, he is an organic chemist
Dr. EVANS. Thank you.
Mr. GRAY. I have a question Just in the interest of finding out what
""** ClaUSe With respect to
The WITNESS. Let's see. I forget the outcome of that I think the academv
am not sure now as to
BEDIBECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
eet SSMScJ r6 a yOUng man Mmed Kennedy Whom you *"* who
A. Yes.
Q. Is he now in your department?
A. No, he is not
Q. Did he return to you after he worked at Los Alamos?
A. No, he went to the University of Washington at St. Louis.
e worked at ^ Alamos?
he was one of
Q. Did that strike you as unusual?
pom't of vtewltSelf' J W°Uld Say J WaS a Uttle ^P118^' a Tex** taking that
808316—54 - 48
672
Q. He is a Texan?
A. I believe so.
Mr. ROBB. That is all. Thank yon.
RE-CBOSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVEKMAN:
Q. Did Dr. Kennedy say to you that he had talked to Dr. Oppenheimer about
the question of working on weapons?
A. I cannot recall that he did.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. That is all.
Mr. GEAY. Thank you very much, Dr. Latimer.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GBAY. I would like to ask Mr. Garrison if he wants to offer those affidavits
at this time?
* Mr. GAEBISON. Yes, I think it is a good time.
Mr. ROBB. Are you going to read them, Mr. Garrison?
Mr. GARRISON. I would like to. They are rather short I would like the
board to hear them.
I have a very short statement, Mr. Chairman, by Walter G. Whitman, dated
April 23, 1954, entitled, "Corrections to Testimony of Walter G. Whitman given
April 22, 1954." He sent this to me on his own initiative. I am sorry I don't
have copies of this.
Mr. ROBB. May I see it before you read it into the record?
Mr. GARRISON. Yes. I also have one from Dr. Tniu^ Mr. R0bb, of which
I regret to say I don't have copies.
Mr. ROBB. I don't think it is a matter of much substance, but on Dr. Killfan,
he has not testified before.
Mr. GARRISON. No. Mr. Whitman says :
"Dr. Evans asked me a question as to whether I had personally known any
Communists or persons who were subsequently shown to be Communists My
answer should be amended to include the following information. "
"I have known Professor W. T. Martin, who was a member of a faculty com-
mittee at MIT which I chairmanned in 1949-51. Professor Martin testified in
1958 before a congressional committee that he was a member of the Com-
munist Party about 1988 and that he left it in about 1946. My association with
him did not involve any consideration of political philosophy, or any matters of
security.
"I have known Professor I. I. Amdur very casually since about 1934 It is
my understanding that Professor Amdur testified at the same congressional hear-
ing that he had been a member of the Communist Party over somewhat the
same period of time as Professor Martin had. *"«<»> me
"I regret that I overlooked these two cases when I was testifying.
11 (Signed) WALTER G. WHITMAN."
r- Ohaima11' to adding ttat to *• record **
Mr. GRAY. The chairman sees no objection.
Mr. ROBB. I have none whatever.
, which I would like to read. I am sorry I don't have copies, Mr. Chairman.'
"Sworn to before me this 20th day of April 1954.
It begins : "RlDTH L* DAWSON' NotarV PMW
"COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
County of Middlesex, **;
^ James R. Killian, Jr., being duly sworn, deposes and says •
Mass.*? SS^ftffiM^
Mobilization, a committee in which both J. :
,
meetings of this committee at which Dr. Oppenheimer was
** *** meet^Toncf whS
°f ** "^tt** dined at Dr. Oppen-
673
"In the course of these meetings I have observed no action or suggestion on the
part of Dr. Oppenheimer that seemed to me to be against the interest of the
United States, or to give any support to the charges against him in General
Nicliols' letter. On the contrary, he impressed me in these meetings as a man
deeply devoted to strengthening the security of the Nation and fertile of ideas
for promoting the national welfare. Every aspect of his work on this committee
sustained my confidence in his loyalty and integrity.
"To my knowledge this committee never discussed the desirability of making
hydrogen bombs. Certainly I never heard any statement by Dr. Oppenheimer
that reflected opposition on his part to the decision that had been made by the
administraiton to go ahead on this development.
"I recall being with Dr. Oppenheimer on 1 or 2 occasions other than the
meetings described above, and these meetings were casual or social. He came
to MIT in 1947 to deliver the Arthur D. Little Memorial Lecture. He gave this
lecture before a large audience which seemed absorbed by his ideas and moved
by his sincerity.
"Dr. Oppenheimer was a participant in the summer study project of the MIT
Lincoln Laboratory in the summer of 1952. He was able to give the project
only a very slight amount of time, as I recall, and I was not present at any
of the meetings in which he participated. He did give a briefing to the group
undertaking the study on the meaning of atomic warfare. * * *
"An earlier project, known as Project Lexington, carried out by the Atomic
Energy Commission under contract with MIT sought information from Dr.
Oppenheimer which has been described elsewhere by the director of this pro-
ject, Prof. Walter Whitman. No information I have about Dr. Oppenheimer's
relationship to either of these projects has given cause to question his integrity
and loyalty.
" ( Signed) JAMES B. KTT.T.TAN, Jr."
Mr. GRAY. That affidavit becomes a part of the record.
Mr. GARRISON. I have copies of this supplemental affidavit of Dr. Manley.
This was to clear up a question that arose in his testimony. I think the chair-
man put the question.
Mr. GRAY. Yes. I might say with respect to that, or at least one portion of
that, which involved a round use of the words "instrumental in persuading"
rather than "attempts to persuade." Later on in reading General Nichols* letter
that was General Nichols' own language in the letter and if I had realized at the
time I probably would not have raised the question. There is no reason why
this amplification should not be made.
Mr. GARRISON. I think this relates to an additional question, Mr. Chairman.
It is an additional one, because it also covers "instrumental." This is a sup-
plemental statement signed by Dr. John H. Manley, "Sworn to before me this
16th day of April 1954. Mary E. Mossman, notary public.
"I have been requested to clarify portions of my statement of February 16, 1954.
This request reached me on April 15, 1954 by personal visit of Mr. Walters and
Mr. Chipman of the Seattle FBI office with a teletype inquiry originating with
the AEC and by a letter informing of Mr. Lloyd K. Garrison's offer to Mr. Gordon
Gray to ask me for clarification. All questions refer to statements on page
10 of the reference document I was informed that the AEC inquiry was for
clarification of the following excerpts :
"1. 'Indeed, I had no feeling that anyone was holding back on the work on
thermonuclear weapons once the President had decided the question by his
announcement in January 1950.'
"2. 'I never observed anything to suggest that Dr. Oppenheimer opposed the
thermonuclear weapons project after it was determined as a matter of na-
tional policy to proceed with development of thermonuclear weapons, or that
he failed to cooperate fully in the project to the extent that someone who is
not actively working could cooperate*.
"3. ^Neither have I heard from any scientists that Dr. Oppenheimer was
instrumental in persuading that scientist not to work on the thermonuclear
weapons project'.
"Mr. Garrison's inquiry related to the first excerpt.
"I do not now have a copy of the charges against Dr. Oppenheimer, but I
recall that one was the accusation of opposition to H-bomb development after
the Presidential decision of January 1950. My statements (1) and (2) above
were directed to this charge and therefore contain specific reference to the
President's decision. It is completely incorrect to asume that the converse
statement was true before January 1960.
674
"With respect to excerpt (1)1 call attention to the two preceding sentences
of my statement which have no time qualification and which, I hope, are un-
ambiguous. To say that no one held back at any time would be ambiguous
because, as I tried to show in preceding pages, the question was one of relative
effort and anyone fully occupied with A-bomb problems was in effect being held
back from H bomb work, not because of Dr. Oppenlieimer but because of labora-
tory program and AEG direction before January 1950. I know of no case of
an individual connected with the weapons program who could be accused of
'holding back' from improper, malicious or disloyal motives. This includes Dr.
Oppenheimer.
"With respect to excerpt (2), it is a matter of AEG record that Dr. Oppen-
heimer and others opposed a top-priority program to develop thermonuclear
weapons before January 1950. The reasons are also a matter of record. I
add that the approved programs of the Los Alamos Laboratory for a consider-
able period prior to this date included such work, that these programs were
normally reviewed by the General Advisory Committee, Dr. Oppenheimer,
Chairman, and that I can recall no instance of his opposition, formal or in-
formal, direct or indirect, to the themonuclear investigations proposed in these
programs and carried forward by the laboratory. On the contrary, I know of
specific assistance on his part in certain examinations of theoretical questions.
"With respect to excerpt (3) I can state that I never heard from any scientist
that Dr. Oppenheimer ever attempted to persuade or was instrumental in per-
suading that scientist not to work on the thermonuclear weapons project.
Neither did I ever hear Dr. Oppenheimer make such an attempt nor did I at any
time see any evidence that would lead me to believe that any scientist was so
approached or influenced either by Dr. Oppenheimer or by anyone else. My
position was such that I believe any such attempt would have come to my
attention.
"(Signed) JOHN H. MANLEY."
Mr. GRAY. Thank you, Mr. Garrison.
Mr. GARRISON. That is all we have, sir.
Mr. GRAY. We will now recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon at 3:47 p. m., a recess was taken until Wednesday, April 28,
1954, at 9: 80a.m.)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER or J.
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
BUILDING T-3, ROOM 2022,
Washington, D. G., Wednesday, April 28, 1954.
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to recess,
before the board, at 9 : 45 a. m.
Personnel Security Board: Mr. Gordon Gray, chairman; Dr. Ward
T. Evans, member; and Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Roger Robb, and C. A. Rolander, Jr., counsel for the
board; J. Robert Oppenheimer, Lloyd K. Garrison, Samuel J. Silver-
man, and Allan B. Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer; Herbert
S. Marks, cocounsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
(675)
PROCEEDINGS
Mr. GBAY. I should like to read into the record a communication to me from
the general manager with respect to the minutes of August 6, 1947, meeting of
the Commission:
"UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
"Washington 25, D. O.
"Memorandum for Mr. Gordon Gray, Chairman, Personnel Security Board.
"On February 19, 1954, Mr. Mitchell wrote Mr. Garrison referring to a meeting
of the Commission on August 6, 1947, at which the question of the continuance
of the clearance of Dr. Oppenheimer was considered. I understand Mr. Garrison,
as counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer, has now requested the precise text of these
minutes.
"The minutes show that at the meeting held on August 6, 1947, Commissioners
David E. Lilienthal, Sumner T. Pike, Lewis L. Strauss, and W. W. Weymack were
present. Following is the full text of that part of the minutes which reflect the
action taken regarding Dr. Oppenheimer :
" 'Mr. Bellsley called the Commission's attention to the fact that the Commis-
sion's decision to authorize the clearance of J. E. Oppenheimer, chairman of the
General Advisory Committee, made in February 1947, had not previously been
recorded. The Commission directed the secretary to record the Commission's
approval of security clearance in this case and to note that further reports con-
cerning Dr. Oppenheimer since that date had contained no information which
would warrant reconsideration of the Commission's decision.'
"(Signed) K. D. NICHOLS,
"General Manager."
Mr. GABEISON. Mr. Chairman, could I look at that again, or could you read
the last?
Mr. GRAY. There is no reason why you should not look at it Do you propose
to discuss this?
Mr. GAERISON. I would like to make a brief comment about it
Mr. GBAY. If it is in the nature of argument on the part of counsel, I don't
think this is the appropriate time. This was read into the record pursuant to
your request to be read in the record. It was not done earlier because the Com-
mission had to make the decision with respect to the request At a time when
the board is considering testimony with respect to the matters involved in this
memorandum, or at a time when you as counsel are addressing the board,
it would be perfectly appropriate to discuss it, but I don't want the record now
to involve a discussion of this particular meeting and the circumstances sur-
rounding it
Mr. GABEISON. Mr. Chairman, there is a statement in this memorandum about
myself to which I would like to respond at this point of time, and I can scarcely
respond to it without a little discussion. I believe this is the time to do it, and it
won't take long.
Mr. GBAY. I take it you are not now wishing to discuss the matter involved in
the memorandum, but some reference to you in the memorandum?
Mr. GABBISON. Yes, but they are intertwined. Perhaps I could tell you what
I have in my mind, and you can stop me if you wish me to go no further.
Mr. GBAY. All right
Mr. GABBISON. I will begin by saying this, that I am sure Mr. Mitchell will
remember a conference which Mr. Marks and I had with. Mr. Mitchell and
General Nichols, I think around the 12th of February, or the 13th, at which we
brought with us a list of documentary material— items of documentary material—
which we believed would be relevant to the proceeding here for the Commission
to make available to us and be helpful to the board.
Mr. Marks had a typewritten list which was left with counsel as I recall. I
had a handwritten short list of which I have the original with me, but in it was
explicitly contained a request for the minutes of the Atomic Energy Commis-
(677)
678
sion meetings relating to the clearance of Dr. Oppenheimer in 1947, and a request
for all pertinent documents having to do with that whole matter.
Mr. Mitchell and General Nichols said that they would take these matters
under advisement and would notify me how much of the documentary material
that we asked for could be made available.
The next thing that I heard of that was the letter from General Nichols of
February 19, which contained the stipulation — letter from Mr. Mitchell, addressed
to me, and saying, "This will confirm our telephone conversation of today. The
Commission will be prepared to stipulate as follows for purposes of the hearing :
"On August 6, 1947, the Commission recorded clearance of Dr. J. Robert Oppen-
heimer, which it noted had been authorized in February 1947.
"Furthermore, Dr. Oppenheimer will be given an opportunity to read the
minutes of the GAG meeting of October 1949."
We had asked that they be made available in some summarized form.
"by coming to the Commission's offices for his convenience. Arrangements for
this purpose may be made with Mr. Nichols.
"Sincerely yours."
I am sure also Mr. Mitchell will recall the telephone conversation referred to
in that letter in which he explained to me that our requests for documentary ma-
terials had all been declined— every one of them— and the only information of a
documentary character which we could have relating to documentary material
relating to the actions of the Commission in 1947 was this one stipulation.
I expressed a natural disappointment, but we didn't have any argument about
it. But that is the way it was left.
The situation then is that back in the middle of February, I did ask for these
minutes. They were denied. I was given a stipulation which I think the record
here will show was misleading because even yourself, Mr. Chairman, in these
proceedings a little while back quite doubted whether there had actually been any
clearance.
Mr. GKAY. I would say for the record that I still feel that there is very con-
siderable mystery about it I don't want to get into an argument about it now,
but I don't want to leave the Impression that what we have now read into the
record clears up my mind on it.
Let me say on this matter that the situation now is, and the record of this pro-
ceeding will show, that in the course of the conduct of these proceedings, and in
the context of matters before this board, you requested the inclusion of the full
minutes in the record. Counsel for the board and the board then asked the
Commission to consider whether they would depart from what I understand
to be policy in the Commission with respect to minutes, and would furnish the
actual transcript of the minutes of that meeting, and that has now been done
I don't want to interrupt whatever you are saying about it.
Mr. GARRISON. I appreciate the cooperation of the board in making this avail-
able. What disturbs me is that the very significant words "further reports
concerning - "
Mr. GRAY. Now you are getting into discussion of a material nature which I
don t want to appear in the record at this time. You will not be denied an oppor-
tunity to go into that F
Mr. GARRISON. May I make one other comment, then, Mr. Chairman. Seven
different documents relating to -
Mr. GRAY. Is this related to the minutes we have read into the record?
Mr. GARRISON. It is related to a request I would like to make to the board
J5i «?M i™**™* to say l *»t think that type of thing is before the
SSSi fL ? ^?e' *T£reall£ ar,e resP°ndinS t(> a request that the transcript
reflect the minutes of this particular meeting which has been the sublect of con-
siderable discussion in these proceedings and about which there possibly will be
further discussion. If you have any observations to make for the record or other-
wise about other documents, about your relationship with the Commission, or
SffiMB !azff &W3SST1 "* * *~ «• T * *>
Mr. GARMSOH. When may I go into that, Mr. Chairman?
.?***!' J woaWf't want to establish a precise time. I should think, Mr.
?*1 ^at " WO?I<3«5! satisfactory *<* the Chairman to assure yon that you
£M* a*ort™11»- We are H> the middle of testimony from witnesses
* 10DS dISCUSSion of a IBatttr *»' to not related
to hir
***** * WB"rt °f y°U te tagO>a ***»**»•
679
Mr. GRAY. I don't know that I have ever denied you the opportunity to make
a request at any time in these proceedings. I am unable to answer that. I want
to give you nay assurance that you will be given an opportunity to discuss any-
thing pertinent to this proceeding, and beyond that, I am unable or unwilling to
do it at this moment.
Mr. GARRISON. I will make this request without argument, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. Make your request If you are going to make a request
Mr. GARRISON. For further information.
Mr. GRAY. I would say this. I would suggest that any request for materials
which are not in the record and which are in the hands of any Government agency
to which you do not have access should be made to the agency itself, and I should
be glad to discuss this with you, Mr. Garrison, but I do not want to get into an
argument at this time in this proceeding about matters which are not pertinent
to the testimony that is being given to this board.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I will follow your instructions. I would like to
make the request for the cooperation of this board and the assistance of this
board in obtaining information. I understand that counsel for this board did,
on behalf of the board, ask the Commission for the minutes of the August meet-
ing. I think it appropriate indeed that this board should make a similar request
in connection with the further information which I have in mind. I will state
that request at any time you wish.
Mr. GRAY. I will now rule that we will not discuss this matter at this time, Mr.
Garrison. You will forgive me for becoming impatient. I have made it abun-
dantly clear that we are in the middle of testimony from witnesses, and I am not
going to have this reflect at this time discussions about your relationships with
Government agencies. I repeat my assurance that you will be given an oppor-
tunity to say anything that is pertinent to this proceeding, and I think the record
will show abundantly that the board has given every possible cooperation.
I would like now to proceed with the witnesses who will be before us this
morning.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, may I make one brief comment? We will, of course,
attempt to keep the firist coming to the mill. I am advised, however, of one
matter which I think I should tell the board about.
The Commission has been advised by Mr. Reynolds, who is the business man-
ager for the radiation laboratory at the University of California, that because of
illness and ill health, Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence, who is the director of the radiation
laboratory, and who had been expected to appear here, who I believe has gotten
as far as Oak Ridge, we have been advised, will not be able to appear, and he has
had to return to the west coast. I mention that now to explain why we may
perhaps have a gap. I hope we won't I hope we will be able to keep the board
running at full time. I expect we will.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you.
General Wilson, do you wish to testify under oath? You are not required to
do so.
General WILSON. I would prefer to do so.
Mr. GRAY. Would you give me your full name?
General WILSON. Roscoe Charles Wilson, major general, United States Air
Force.
Mr. GRAY. Would you raise your right hand? Roscoe Charles Wilson, do you
swear that the testimony you are to give the board shall be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
General WILSON. I do, sir.
Whereupon, Roscoe Charles Wilson was called as a witness, and having been
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Would you be seated, General.
Allow me to remind you of the existence of the so-called perjury statutes. May
we assume that you are familiar with them?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr, GRAY. I should like also to request, General Wilson, that if in the course
of your testimony it becomes necessary for you to disclose or refer to restricted
data, you notify me in advance so that we may take the necessary and appropriate
steps in the interest of security.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Finally, I should say to you that we consider these proceedings a
confidential matter between the Atomic Energy Commission and its officials and
witnesses on the one hand, and Dr. Oppenheimer and his representatives on the
other. The Commission is making no news releases. I express the hope on
behalf of the board that witnesses will take the same view of tiie situation.
680
The WITNESS. May I make a statement, please, sir?
Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that I am appearing here by
military orders, and not on my own volition.
DIBECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. General, would you tell the hoard what your present assignment is, sir?
A. I am in the process of change of station. I have just heen relieved as
commandant of the Air War College, and am in transit to my new command,
which is commander of the Third Air Force in England.
Q. Would you tell us what the Air War College is, sir?
A. The Air War College is an adult school to which the military sends selected
colonels or Navy captains, members of the State Department and CIA, and certain
foreign officers who have completed about 15 years of service. These people are
schooled In international relations, in military matters, particularly air matters,
and in grand strategy. The purpose is to prepare them for positions of high
responsibility in the military.
Q. How long did you serve as the commandant or president of that college, sir?
A. About 2% years, sir.
Q. Where is that located?
A. Montgomery, Ala.
Q. Would you tell the board, General, something of your previous military
background and history?
A. I was appointed to the Military Academy as a result of competitive exami-
nation by President Hoover. I graduated in 1928, and from the flying schools in
1929. I was sent to postgraduate engineering school from which I graduated —
a 1-year course — in 1933.
Q. Where was that, sir?
A. That was at Dayton, Ohio. I was an instructor in natural and experi-
mental philosophy at the Military Academy at West Point iu 1938 and 1939, and
was assistant professor of natural and experimental philosophy there in 1940. I
was chief of experimental aircraft design at Dayton and when the war started,
was brought into Washington as chief, bombardment engineering, and later
became chief of development engineering for the staff in Washington, that is the
air staff.
Q. How long have you held your present rank of major general, sir?
A. I was made a major general in 1951.
Q. General, during the war, what, if any, connection did you have with the
atomic-bomb program?
A. Sir, in 1943, I believe it was, I was directed by General Arnold to make
certain that the support of the Army Air Forces was given Gen. Leslie Groves.
I served General Groves as a liaison officer while still maintaining my position
as chief of development engineering in the Air Force. My duty was to assist
him in procuring materials, scarce items, especially electronic equipment, to
make certain that if a bomb were developed that there would be an aircraft to
carry it, and later on to make certain that an organization was assembled, trained,
and equipped to deliver the weapon.
My association with General Groves was not directly under his command,
but in his support
Q. What did you do in that connection? Where did you go and what did you
do after you got that assignment?
A. In Washington I principally with Captain Parsons of the Navy and with
Dr. Norman Ramsey and with General Groves, my duty largely was assembling
material and getting equipment together, and arranging later on for aircraft to
be modified.
In the spring of 1944 I was sent by General Groves to Los Alamos, and there I
talked again with Ramsey and Parsons and with Dr. Oppenheimer, and with
others who were concerned with the external configuration of the weapons. The
idea was to make certain that the aircraft had an equipment in which the bomb
would fit, and also to make such minor modifications to the exterior of the
weapon as might be necessary to make it fit.
Later on that year, General Groves sent me again to Los Alamos, this time to
see if an airdrome could be built on a plateau, and also to recommend to him If
I could an area in which some tests might be made. My impression was that
he had several people doing both of these, but I did it also as an independent
mission.
Q. Did you make such recommendations?
A. Yes, sir; I did.
681
Q. What site did you recommend?
A. I picked the bombing range at Alamagordo, N. Mex.
Q. In that connection did you have occasion to confer with Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I am quite certain I met Dr. Oppenheimer at that time.
Q. Following that, what duty did you perform?
A. Sir, I monitored the Air Force portion of the program until December. By
monitoring I mean I selected the commander of the organization, I made sure
that he had personnel, I followed the modification of the aircraft, the supply of
the aircraft, and helped where I could to supply the then Manhattan District with
the equipments and the military assistance that they desired.
In December, I was relieved and sent to a bombardment wing, and in the sum-
mer of 1945 was sent overseas. I remained at Okinawa until both bombs were
dropped on Japan, and when I was hurriedly brought home and sent out to
Japan again where I joined the party to look at the wreckage.
Q. Then there came a time when you returned to the United States?
A. Yes, sir. I came back in August or September of 1945, and was assigned as
the deputy to General LeMay, who was then Deputy Chief of Staff for Research
and Development.
Q. What did you do in that connection?
A. He had been brought in to revitalize research and development in the Air
Force, and I assisted him in programing where we could.
Q. How long did you carry on that work?
A. I was there, sir, as I recall until 1947, at which time I was assigned as the
deputy to General Groves, who was then Chief of the Armed Forces Special
Weapons Project.
Q. What were your duties in that connection?
A. They were to reflect in the activities of this Joint agency Air Force thinking
to the extent it was possible for me to do so. The Armed Forces Special Weapons
Project was and is unusual in that it is a service which is common to all of the
armed services, and the chief of it is the subordinate of each of the chiefs of
service, but not the subordinate of the Joint Chiefs.
Q. How long did you stay on that duty, General?
A. I stayed there until 1950.
Q. Did General Groves stay that long?
A. No, sir. He retired. My notes and my mind are a little hazy on this, but
he was succeeded by General Nichols in this period, and I served as General
Nichols* deputy.
Q. Is that General K. D. Nichols, who is presently general manager of the
AEC?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did there come a time when you served on the Research and Development
Board and the Military Liaison Committee?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When was that, General?
A. In the latter part of 1948 if my memory is firm. Certainly during 1949
and a part of 1950 I served as a member of the Committee on Atomic Energy
of the Research and Development Board. Throughout all this period up unto
the middle of 1951 1 was a member of the Military Liaison Committee.
Q. What was your duty in those two connections? What did you do in gen-
eral? I don't mean a daily diary.
A. Yes, I understand. The Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy
Commission is an agency which is charged with making certain that the military
interests of the Nation are properly reflected in the activities of the Commission.
It served also as a group — I am oversimplifying this, sir— which kept the De-
fense Department advised of the potentials of the developments of the Atomic
Energy Commission.
The Committee on Atomic Energy of the Research and Development Board
was a coordinating group designed to establish programs to prevent overlap and
unnecessary duplication in research and development In the Committee on
Atomic Energy, our duties were confined to the field of atomic energy.
Q. In connection with your work on those two groups, will you tell us whether
or not yon came in contact with Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What were your contacts with him?
A. Dr. Oppenheimer was a member of the Committee on Atomic Energy. I
think I saw him at almost all of the meetings during 1949. He also served as
the chairman of a long-range objective panel on which I had the ihonor to serve
in 1948, and chairman again of a similar panel or the same panel reconvened
682
in 1930. Of course, he was a member of the General Advisory Committee of the
Atomic Energy Commission, and occasionally we saw him in that capacity also.
Q. Were your contacts with him rather frequent?
A. I would not say frequent, but rather regular. Perhaps I saw Dr. Oppen-
heimer once every month or so. He was very kind to me, and when our panel
met out in California he invited me to his home ; this sort of an association.
Q. General, are you familiar with the history of the position of the military
and, in particular, the Air Force with respect to the thermonuclear weapon?
A. Sir, I would like to refer to my notes, if I may.
Q. Certainly. Have you recently refreshed your recollection about that
matter?
A. I did indeed. I struggled with this very problem yesterday.
Q. General, I tTiinTr it would be helpful to the board if you could give us in
your own way something of the history of the position of the military and the
Air Force on this matter. You may of course refer to notes to refresh your recol-
lection.
A. I find it a little difficult to pinpoint some of these things. For instance, I am
aware of a meeting at Los Alamos which had been requested by the scientists
to discuss matters of military interest. I remember at that meeting General
LeMay was asked what size bomb do you want. There had been a great deal of
discussion about smaller bombs.
* * * * * * *
I have a lot of this sort of information in my mind, and I am embarrassed
that I can't put dates to it. But I do have a few dates.
I have a statement that I found in a document marked top secret, sir, but
the statement itself is not top secret. This is a little confusing to me, but it
does indicate— I think it is safe to say it— that in 1948 both the Research and
Development Board, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had expressed an interest in
continuing research on the thermonuclear weapon. This is the first written
statement I can find in my own records — in 1948.
On September 23, 1949, we had the announcement of the Russian A-bomb, and
that I really think sparked off the military interest in this larger weapon.
In the early part of October, Drs. Bradbury and Lawrence visited the Armed
Forces Special Weapons project, where they talked to General Nichols and at
the same time Dr. Edward Teller visited the Air Force, where they talked to a
group at which I was present on the possibilities of a thermonuclear weapon.
They urged that the military express its interest in the development of this
weapon.
Mr. SH.VEBMAIT. Pardon the interruption. Would you mind giving the names
of the people who were present again?
The WITNESS. Drs. Bradbury and Lawrence visited the Armed Forces Special
Weapons project. This was early in October 1949. Perhaps I better clariftr
something. I am not sure whether Teller's visit to the Air Force was at the same
time or shortly thereafter. This is a little hazy in my mind. But in the same
general period of October 1949.
On October IS of 1949— and I am sure as a result of the urging of Dr. Brad-
bury and Dr. Lawrence—General Nichols, who was of course the subordinate
of General Vandenberg, went to General Vandenberg with General Everest of
the Air Force, and urged General Vandenberg as the No. 1 bomber man to
express again the military's interest in a large weapon.
General Vandenberg directed Nichols and Everest to express his point of view
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that afternoon, since Vandenberg was not going to
b€ present at that meeting. This they did.
On October 14, 1949, the Joint Chiefs met with the Joint congressional com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, where General Vandenberg, speaking for the Joint
Chiefs, strongly urged the development of this thermonuclear weapon. I have
a copy of the excerpts of the notes of the meeting covering General Vandenberg's
statement if the committee wishes it to be read.
Mr. BOBB. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that has been released by formal action
of the joint committee, confirmed to General Nichols by letter which we received
this morning.
Mr. GRAY. You may read it.
The WITNESS. "Page 1792. One of the things which the military is pre-
emtaentiy concerned with as the result of the eary acquisition of the bomb by
Russia is its great desire that the Commission reemphasize and even accentuate
tbej^elopraent work on the so-called super bomb. General Vandenberg dis-
cussed this subject briefly and stated that it was the military point of view
683
that the super bomb should be pushed to completion as soon as passible, and
that the General Staff had so recommended. In fact, his words were, 'We have
built a fire under the proper parties/ which immediately brought forth the
comment, who are the right parties? General Vandenberg replied that it was
being handled through the Military Liaison Committee. He further stated that
having the super weapon would place the United States in the superior position
that it had enjoyed up to the end of September 1949 by having exclusive pos-
session of the weapon. There followed a series of questions, somewhat of a
technical nature about the super weapon, which General Nichols answered for
the Chiefs of Staff. He stated that it was the opinion of the scientists that the
possibility of a successful super weapon is about the same as was the possibility
of developing the flrt atomic weapon at the 1941-42 stage of development He
stated that the military fears that now the Russians have a regular atomic
weapon, they may be pushing for the super weapon, and conceivably might
succeed prior to success in this country of the same project. * * *
This was on October 14, sir. On October 17, the JCC wrote a letter to the
Committee on Atomic Energy and this letter is on file in the Military Liaison
Committee, in which they requested further information on the big weapon and
expressed some concern that the committee had not asked for funds to prosecute
the project.
Mr. GRAY. Which committee?
The WITNESS. I beg your pardon. The Atomic Energy Commission. This was
a letter to the Commission and a copy of this letter came to the Military Liaison
Committee.
At that same meeting, the chairman of the Military Liaison Committee in-
formed that committee of his visit, together with General McCormack and Dr.
Manley to Dr. Oppenheimer at Princeton where they had discussed the super
and other problems to be taken up by the General Advisory Committee.
At that same meeting the Military Liaison Committee approved a directive
to reconvene the long-range objectives panel. This was the second panel on
which I had the honor of serving with Dr. Oppenheimer.
On October 27, there was a joint meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission
and the Military Liaison Committee, at which the Commission announced that
it had asked the General Advisory Committee to consider the super weapon in
the light of recent developments. Then of course on the 28th and 29th of
October was the meeting of the GAC.
On November 8, 1949, the MLC at its meeting heard a report from the Secre-
tary that in accordance with the directive to reconvene the long-range objec-
tives panel, he had been determining the availability of membership of the
panel, and that he had discussed the panel with Dr. Oppenheimer on the 29th
of October, and that Dr. Oppenheimer agreed that the panel should meet but
"felt strongly that this should not be done until a great deal more information
was available, probably not before February of 1950."
November 9, 1949, is the letter from the AEC to the President
November 19 was the letter from the President to Admiral Sowers of the
National Security Council, and during this period a military committee or sub-
committee was set up to advise Admiral Sowers in determining the position on
the thermonuclear development. This was a committee composed of General
Nichols, Admiral Hill, and General Nordstad of the Air Force.
On the 13th of January 1950 there is a letter to the Secretary of Defense from
General Bradley in which the military views are set out. I do not have that
document. I have a hazy recollection of what might have been in it, sir. I
do know that it expressed concern lest the Russians come up with this bomb
before the United States did, and the feeling that this situation would be intol-
erable, since it would reverse the advantage we had had in this country prior
to the Russian A-bomb explosion.
The rest of my notes are to the effect that in February the Air Force an-
nounced that it had undertaken the development of an aircraft to carry a
weapon of this sort, and a program which it was coordinating with the AEC.
On February 18— and I would like to say that my memory of this date is not
certain— I have noted February 18, 1950, to the best of my knowledge, the long-
range objectives panel was completed and submitted to the Committee on Atomic
By Mr. ROJBB:
Q. Can you tell us about that report, General?
A. This panel was composed of a group of military people, of which I was one,
and the chairman was Dr. Oppenheimer. Another member was Dr. Bacher, and
684
another Dr. Luis Alvarez. The panel contained some conservative statements
on the possibility or the feasibility of an early production of a thermonuclear
weapon. These reservations were made on technical grounds. They were sim-
ply not challengeable by the military. They did, however, cause some concern
in the military.
It is hard for me to explain this, except to say that most of us have an almost
extravagant admiration for Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr. Bacher as physicists,
and we simply would not challenge any technical judgment that they might
make. But I must confess, and I find this exceedingly embarrassing, sir, that
as a result of this panel and other actions that had taken place in the Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, that I felt compelled to go to the Director of Intelli-
gence to express my concern over what I felt was a pattern of action that was
simply not helpful to national defense.
Q. Action by whom?
A. By Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. Would you explain what that pattern was?
A. I would like first to say that I am not talking about loyalty. I want this
clearly understood. If I may, I would like to say that this is a matter of my
judgment versus Dr. Oppenheimer's judgment. This is a little embarrassing
to me, too. But Dr. Oppenheimer was dealing in technical fields and I was
dealing in other fields, and I am talking about an overall result of these actions.
First, I would like to say, sir, that I am a dedicated airman. I believe in a
concept which I am going to have to tell you or my testimony doesn't make
The U. S. S. R. in the airman's view is a land power. It is practically inde-
pendent of the rest of the world. I feel that it could exist for a long time
without sea communications. Therefore, it is really not vulnerable to attack
by sea. Furthermore, it has a tremendous store of manpower. If you can
imagine such a force, it could probably put 300 to 500 divisions in the field, cer-
tainly far more than this country could put into the field. It is bordered by
satellite countries upon whom would be expended the first fury of any land
assault that would be launched against Russia, and it has its historical distance
and climate. So my feeling is that it is relatively invulnerable to land attack.
Russia is the base of international communism. My feeling is that the mas-
ters in the Kremlin cannot risk the loss of their base. This base is vulnerable
only to attack by air power. I don't propose for a moment to say that only
air power should be employed in case of a war with Russia, but I say what
strategy is established should be centered around air power.
I further believe that whereas air power might be effective with ordinary
weapons, that the chances of success against Russia with atomic weapons or
nuclear weapons are far, far greater.
It is against this thinking that I have to judge Dr. Oppenheimer's judgments.
Once again, his Judgments were based upon technical matters. It is the pattern
I a up talking about.
I have jotted down from my own memory some of these things that worried
me.
First was my awareness of the fact that Dr. Oppenheimer was interested in
what I call the internationalizing of atomic energy, this at a time when the
United States had a monopoly, and in which many people, including myself,
believed that the A-bomb in the hands of the United States with an Air Force
capable of using it was probably the greatest deterrent to further Russian
aggression. This was a concern.
*******
To do this the Air Force felt that it required quite an elaborate system of
devices. Some were relatively simple to produce, some of them were exceedingly
difficult to produce, and some of them were very costly. Dr. Oppenheimer was
not enthusiastic about 2 out of 3 of these devices or systems. I do not challenge
his technical judgment in these matters, but the overall effect was to deny to the
Air Force the mechanism which we felt was essential to determine when this
bomb went off. In our judgment, this was one of the critical dates, or would be
at that time, for developing our national-defense policy.
Dr. Oppenheimer also opposed the nuclear-powered aircraft. His opposition
was based on technical judgment. I don't challenge his technical judgment, but
at the same time he felt less strongly opposed to the nuclear-powered ships. The
Air Force feeling was that at least the same energy should be devoted to both
projects.
685
The approach to the thermonuclear weapons also caused some concern. Dr.
Oppenheimer, as far as I know, had technical objections, or, let me say, ap-
proached this conservatism for technical reasons, more conservatism than the
Air Force would have liked.
The sum total of this, to my mind, was adding up that we were not exploiting
the full military potential in this field. Once again it was a matter of judgment.
I would like to say that the fact that I admire Dr. Oppenheimer so much, the
fact that he is such a brilliant man, the fact that he has such a command of the
English language, has such national prestige, and such power of persuasion, only
made me nervous, because I felt if this was so it would not be to the interest of
the United States, in my judgment. It was for that reason that I went to the
Director of Intelligence to say that I felt unhappy.
Mr. ROBB. That is all I care to ask. Thank you, General.
CBOSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. General, you said you are not raising a question of loyalty?
A. No, sir.
Q. You do not question Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty?
A. I have no knowledge in this area at all, sir.
Q. Do you
Mr. ROBB. Wait a minute. Let him finish his answer.
The WITNESS. I have no knowledge one way or another.
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
' Q. Have you any information to indicate that Dr. Oppenheimer has been less
than discreet in the handling of classified information?
A. No, sir ; I haven't Maybe I talk probably too much.
Q. Please.
A. I read an article OP the way up to Washington in the U. S. News & World
Report, and this was a considerable surprise to me
Q. Excuse me. If you are going to tell us something that you know about,
we are all interested to hear it
A. I beg your pardon?
Mr. ROBB. Wait a minute.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Let me finish, Mr. Chairman. If Mr. Robb or the chairman
thinks what I am saying is wrong
By Mr. SZLVEEMAN :
Q. I would think if all you would do is tell us about an article in U. S. News &
World Report, we would .do better reading the article.
Mr. KOBE. I think what the general refers to is the letter of General Nichols
and Dr. Oppenheimer's letter, which has been frequently referred to.
The WITNESS. Yes ; this is what I am speaking of. This was news to me. I
assume you are speaking of the period in which I served with Dr. Oppenheimer,
and my answer to your question is "No ; I do not."
Mr. GRAY. I did not understand that.
The WITNESS. I was not aware of any indiscretion on the part of Dr. Oppen-
heimer in the handling of classified material in the period in which I served
with him.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. I have some notes on some of the things you said, and I thinir I would like
to run through them and ask for elaboration where questions arose in my
mind, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I think you said you are appearing on military orders and not on your
own volition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I take it you didn't ask for these orders?
A. I certainly did not
Q. What was the first intimation that you had, sir?
A. I was telephoned about 3 or 4 days ago by General McGormack, of personnel
of the Air Force, saying that by verbal orders of the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force I was to report to this committee.
Q. And you then reported to
A. I then reported to Mr. Robb.
Mr. ROBB. That is the first time any major general ever reported to me.
By Mr. STLVEBMAN :
Q. You stated, I believe, you went through your notes and gave various dates
of expressions of military interest in the hydrogen bomb.
A. Yes.
Q. I think you said that the Russian explosion of September 23, 1949, really
sparked off the military interest in the hydrogen bomb or some such phrase?
A. Some such phrase. The interest was there, but this certainly in my opinion,
at least from where I saw it, the little piece in the Air Force, this certainly
at least gave impetus to the interest.
"Q. By that I take it you mean that the Air Force was much more actively
and intensely interested after September 23, 1949, than before?
A. Yes, that Is a fair statement.
Q. I think you said that the long range objectives panel was completed. I
take it unless my notes are wrong the report of the panel was completed and
submitted to the Committee on Atomic Energy on February 18, 1900, I thought
you said.
A. That is the best of my recollection, February 18, 1950.
Q. Could it be 1951?
A. I am very sorry. This is the one date on which I am really worried.
I regret that I had to do some rather hard research and I must say it could have
been 1951. Wait. February 1951?
Q. Is there some way you could find out rather readily? There is no desire
here by anybody to trap you on anything. I just want to get the facts.
A. I apologize, sir, this was a bad date. I could find out if I could make a
phone call, sir.
Mr. ROBB. I may be able to help you on that. Is that the one Dr. Kelly was on?
The WITNESS. Yes, he was on that paneL This was a panel of the Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy.
By Mr. SH»VEBMAN :
Q. I have here some references to a report of the panel in the testimony, part
of which was classified, and therefore I don't have it, but I think in the un-
classified portion a date was given of December 29, 1950. I think that is the
date you gave, Mr. Robb. Let me see if I can find the place? On page 196 of
the record, Mr. Robb, you referred to a report which of course I have not
seen, dated December 29, 1950, and I do not know whether that is the report the
General is talking about. I just don't know.
Mr. ROBB. The report entitled. "Military Objectives on the Use of Atomic
Energy, to the Atomic Energy Committee of the Research and Development
Board of the Department of Defense."
The WITNESS. This sounds right. Is there a cover sheet with the list of
members?
Mr. ROBB. I don't have that here. That was December 29, 1950. Then January
6, 1951, if I might give this, Mr. Silverman, to assist you, the General Advisory
Committee considered that report and commented that it stated the military
objectives with clarity and keen insight into the reality of the present situation.
Mr. Whitman and Dr. Oppenheimer participated in the report, abstaining from
taking action on the matter.
Mr. GRAY. I should like to ask counsel if he wants to establish this date
perhaps we could recess and let General Wilson make his telephone call.
Mr, SILVEBMAN. I think that would be the sensible thing to do. I think that
is the easiest way to do it
Mr. GRAY. We will recess for a few moments.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GRAY. Would you proceed.
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Have you now ascertained that date, General?
A. I have. The correct date is January 18, 1951, which is the date of the
approval by the Committee on Atomic Energy.
Q. General, I would like you to cast your mind back now to that period as well
as you can. Do you know whether that was the time at which the feasibility
of the ttiermonuclear weapon technically appeared to be at almost its low period?
Mr. ROBB. What period are we talking about now?
Mr, SILVERMAN. January 1951.
The WHTNESS. Of course, you realize I am guessing. It was pretty low in my
opinion. It was similar to most projects of this sort There is a certain
optimism, then there is a period of pessimism, and then the optimism grows
687
again. My feeling is that it became lower a little later, and it became lower
because of some doubt as to the amount of a very scarce and costly material.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. Was it lower then, do you recall, as to the prospects of feasibility than it
had appeared, say, a year earlier which was the time of the President's directive?
A. Sir, you are asking me to pass judgment on a technical matter.
Q. If you don't know, say so.
A. I don't know.
Q. And you don't recall discussions at that time?
A. Yes, sir ; I can remember discussions among the scientists.
Q. What did the discussions among the scientists indicate to you?
A. You see, my oracle in this matter was Dr. Oppenheimer and they indicated
that this was a difficult job. I speak of oracle as Chairman of this Board. He
was the expert
Q. Do you recall who the other members of that panel were?
A. I recall some of them. I didn't write down their names. Dr. Oppenheimer,
Dr. Bacher, Dr. Alvarez, Dr. Kelly, I was a member, Gen. James McCormack
was a member, General Nichols was a member, but I don't believe he attended
the meetings as a member. He was in the process of transfer about this time.
Q. I have here a list which might be helpful to you, sir. Dr. Lauritsen was
a member of the Committee?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I think you mentioned Dr. Whitman, did you not?
A. Dr. Whitman was ; yes.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. That is the list, Mr. Chairman. It is item 5 on Dr. Oppen-
heimer's biography in section 2, "Membership on Government Committees." It
is item 5 (b).
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. Did you mention Admiral Parsons?
A. And Admiral Parsons. I beg your pardon.
Q. Instead of our doing this the hard way depending on my recollection of
what you said, let me read the list as I have it, and see if that accords with
your recollection.
A. All right.
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer was Chairman ; Dr. Bacher, Dr. Alvarez, Dr. Lauritsen,
.Dr. Kelly, Dr. Whitman, General Nichols, Admiral Parsons, yourself, General
McCormack, with David Beckler as secretary.
A. That is correct I also recollect that Nichols did not act as a Committee
member. I do think he appeared on that, but he was not a member.
Q. Those people in addition to Dr. Oppenheimer's scientific knowledge, Dr.
Bacher is an eminent physicist, is he not, and a great man who had great knowl-
edge in this field?
A. That is correct.
Q. And he joined in the report, did he not?
A. That is correct.
Q. Did he question the statement about the feasibility of the hydrogen bomb
as it then appeared?
A. I am searching my memory pretty hard, but my recollection is that Dr.
Bacher supported Dr. Oppenheimer in this view.
Q. They all signed the report?
A. This is something else I don't recall. I don't recall signing a report I
recall that the report was prepared and it contained a statement that there was
no substantial difference in opinion or no important disagreement or something
of that sort. It was then submitted to the Committee on Atomic Energy which
voted to accept if or otherwise. I don't recall signing it.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Perhaps Mr. Robb, you could clarify that point, because I take
it you have the report?
Mr. ROBB. I don't have it.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I am sorry. I thought when yon questioned Dr. Kelly on the
basis of having signed the report
Mr. ROBB. No.
The WITNESS. It would be normal to sign the report, but I don't recall that
is an important point
8Q33I3-— 54 44
688
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Dr. Lauritsen was an eminent physicist, was he not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And a man very well informed on matters of nuclear weapons?
A. Each of these civilians really was in a similar class.
Q. Did he join in the technical judgment as to the feasibility of the hydrogen
bomb?
A, I don't recall the discussion.
Q. Did he disagree?
A. The statement in the report was to the effect that there was no substantial
disagreement in the report as finally drafted.
Q. Dr. Alvarez was an eminent physicist ; was he not?
A. Yes.
Q. And a man who is very familiar with matters of nuclear weapons?
A. Yes.
Q. He was a man who rather favored the development of the hydrogen bomb.
He took a different view from the members of the General Advisory Committee ;
did he not?
A. I am sorry, sir, I don't recall.
Q. In any event, he was very familiar with matters of nuclear weapons.
A. As far as I know; yes, sir.
Q. And you do not recall that he expressed a dissent on this point?
A. No one dissented. As I recall there was discussion in the meeting but when
the report finally was drafted, it was submitted with the statement that there
was no important difference of opinion in the report as submitted.
Q. You have no doubt that was a correct statement?
A. I thlTik that was a correct statement. But I would like to make this reser-
vation, sir.
Q. Yes.
A. Certainly I, as a military man, did not engage in the technical part of this
discussion. I don't think the military people were in a position to debate the
technical Judgment.
Q. We, of course, all realize that while your knowledge of these matters is
doubtless greater than you perhaps like to admit for reasons of modesty, your
knowledge is certainly not that of these scientists by a long shot.
A. That is correct.
Q. We don't for a moment question that fact What about Admiral Parsons,
was he quite familiar with these matters?
A. I would say Admiral Parsons was probably as close to a scientist as we
had in our group.
Q. And he had been at Los Alamos, too, had he not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Short of being one of these four nuclear physicists that I have mentioned,
he really was very familiar with the problems of nuclear weapons and the scien-
tific aspects of them?
A. I think among military men he was certainly as well informed as anyone.
Q. He, too, of course, Joined in the report They all Joined?
A, There was no important disagreement.
Q. General Nichols— you said that he did not really actively participate.
A. That is my recollection, sir.
Q. Yes. It occurs to me that this matter of the date of that panel has perhaps
another important bearing which I would like to suggest to you, and see whether
I am right January 1951— indeed I think December was the date of the report
itself, December 29, or something like that.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. We were already in the Korean war ; is that not correct, General?
A. Yes.
Q. And that started, I think, in June of 1950?
A. In* June.
Q. When did the Chinese intervention come?
A. Oh, my goodness, sir, I regret I Just don't remember.
Q. Wasn't it Just about that time, or Just a little before that?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Wasn't it in December, I think, of 1950?
A. I am sorry, I don't remember. I would have to refresh my memory.
Q. Let me suggest this to you. If this doesn't refresh your recollection, it
doesn't Had there not been alerts of possibility of enemy aircraft at about
that time, shortly after the Chinese intervention? Do you recall that?
Mr. &OBB. Mr. Silverman, I am not quite dear what the question taeand.
Maybe the general is. You mean alerts of enemy aircraft here or in Korea?
Mr. SILVERMAN. I think perhaps in the North American Continent
The WITNESS. I was not aware of any such thing.
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. "Was not the panel concerned, the Chinese intervention — I am merely
suggesting this to you.
A. I will accept this for lack of notes of my own.
Q. I regret to say I have not myself looked it up. That is my information.
Was not the panel concerned at that point about the possibility of an eruption
of a general war in the near future?
A. Yes ; that is fair. This is almost a constant state of mind. sir.
Q. well
Mr. ROBB. Let him finish.
The WITNESS. We are always worried in the Pentagon about an accident which
might start trouble. Surely this was a tense period.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. More so than an earlier year?
A. Yes.
Q. Was not the problem of the panel one of trying to make suggestions as to
the use of atomic weapons in the event of an emergency which might arise in the
very near future?
A. No, sir ; that would be a military judgment, and this panel was a technical
panel which was attempted to develop guidance for research and development
projects.
Q. Were suggestions made at that panel as to the possible use of atomic
weapons that might be feasible and usable in the Quite near future, much
nearer than it looked as if a hydrogen bomb could be developed?
A. I have no recollection, frankly, sir, but I would very much be surprised if
this group of people at that time didn't discuss those things.
Q. Do you recall discussions of the use of the atom in some versatile way
in an emergency which might occur very soon, at that panel discussion?
A. You mean as a radiological warfare type of operation? I am afraid I don't
understand.
Q. I am afraid I don't know myself. I am thinking of recommendation for the
use of smaller atomic weapons to be carried on a small airplane.
A. Yes.
Q. Was that discussed at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that recommended?
A. Yes ; this program was recommended. There has always been an interest in
this field.
Q. And that was a matter which looked a good deal more feasible in the quite
near future than the hydrogen bomb, did it not?
A. Yes ; I think that is a fair statement
Q. Do you recall you were rather enthusiastic about the prospect of that?
A. I am first of all a big-bomb man, but I do recognize the potential value of
the so-called tactical weapons. Here was an opportunity to increase the stock-
pile of weapons. This, of course, was something of importance to all of us.
This had more to do than simply developing weapons of smaller size. These were
still very potent weapons.
Q. I gather that even the smaller atomic weapons are very potent weapons.
A. I am not expressing myself well. These are still large weapons to be
carried by large aircraft There was a technical development which promises
to still increase the number of bombs. This was of great importance to us at
that time.
Q. And that was discussed at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that a development that looked as if it would be usable in the event
of an emergency in the near future but more likely to be usable than, say, a
hydrogen bomb?
A. Yes.
Q. I think you said that you are a big-bomb man, and at an earlier stage you
referred to yourself as a dedicated airman. I assume that the two are not quite
the same, but those are both parts of your views.
690
A. I mean that I believe in the theories of Douhet and Mitchell and Admiral
Mahan as modified to fit the present war. This is a belief that the objective of
war is not the defeat of the enemy's army, but the defeat of the enemy's will to
wage war. That this comes about only after failure to win the real victory,
which is the prevention of war.
Q. The views you have expressed I take it are your views as a dedicated airman
and a believer in big bombs.
A. That is correct.
Q. I don't mean for a moment that you get any pleasure out of the dropping
of big bombs. You understand that, of course.
A. That is correct.
Q. Are the views you expressed pretty much unanimous views among the
informed people of the Air Force?
A. There are a great number of people who belong to this school of thought.
They might not subscribe to my views precisely as I have expressed then to you.
I don't want to be coy or overcautious here, but I would not speak for the whole
Air Force. But there are members of this group.
Q. Are there people in the Air Force who don't agree with you?
A. Yes, there are.
Q. People of good faith?
A. That is correct
Q. You refer to yourself as a dedicated airman. I take it that a dedicated
naval officer might have somewhat different views?
A. I hope that we are all dedicated Americans. When I say this, I mean our
dedication is to the preservation of the United States. I don't want to sound
sentimental to you, but this is the idea. I have oversimplified my statement by
saying I am a dedicated airman. I believe that proper defense lies along the
line that the Air Force proposes, or that I suggest. I know that the other services
have other views.
Q. And you are not surprised that the civilians have perhaps still other views.
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you recall that just about the time of the GAC meeting, just a couple
of weeks before it, I think, there was some testimony before the Committee on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives. I think the newspapers may
have called it the Battle of the Admirals, or something. It was the discussion
of the B-37. Do you remember testimony of Admiral Ofstie?
A. Yes. Let me say I recall that he did testify. I don't recall just what it
was. I know I didn't like it at the time.
Q. Is this part of what you didn't like? I am reading from page 183 of the
hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
81st Congress. The dates of the hearings run October 6 to 21, 194& I don't
have here unfortunately the number of the document as such. It is page 183 _
it is somewhere in October. I can't tell without running through it which
precise day it was. Page 183, Admiral Ofstie was testifying :
"There is a widely held belief that the Navy is attempting to encroach on
strategic air warfare, and that this was the principal consideration in planning
the so-called supercarrier. This is a misconception which is quite at variance
with the facts. We consider the strategic air warfare as practiced in the past
and as proposed in the future is militarily unsound and of limited effect, morally
wrong and decidedly harmful to the stability of a possible world war "
I take it that is part of the statement with which you disagree?
A. I don't agree with any part of it from start to finish.
Q. You don't question Admiral Ofstie's good faith in making the statement?
A. I most seriously question his good judgment in making such a statement
ir, fhfo ™Y' * W°Ul£ ^e to ask U your WW** is Siting somebody else's views
in this record, or whether you are questioning the general about something that
ne can testify about. ^^
Mr. SILVEBMAN The general did not testify about this, sir. At least not that
°W °k 3S X am attempting to do, sir, is to see if the general will agree
good faittl for B80Dto whose patriotism ls
' ?***' f?e hat^te<i ^equivocally for the record that he does agree with
S?t t0 ^e mysel* <*ear * my question to you. We have allowed so
^*™' ?noit ********* latitude in what has been brought befbrethe
ffTO docuinents wnich at times seemed to the Chairman to be really
nSlES^*0*^ tagnll3& bnt tf you feel tbat te important to further establish
the fact tbat the general agrees with you, I would let you argue for your pofr£
691
but I believe he has stated clearly that it is possible for people of good faith to
be in disagreement on these matters. There is no question in your mind about it ?
The WITNESS. There is no question in ray mind, no, sir.
Mr. GRAY. If that is your point, I think it has been well made.
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. I think you questioned Dr. Oppenheimer's judgment on a number of matters.
You said that Dr. Oppenheimer was interested in the internationalizing of
atomic energy at a time the United States had a monopoly of it, and that was
the greatest deterrent to Russian aggression. I take it you concede — excuse me,
I am not meaning to be sarcastic at all — I am sure you do concede that Dr.
Oppenheimer did play a great role in the development of the atomic bomb which
did become this great deterrent to Russian aggression?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you hear at the time of this discussion of internationalizing of atomic
energy that it was the view of many scientists that Russia would have the
atomic bomb in time anyhow?
A. Yes ; I think I understood this to be the case.
Q. And therefore perhaps it might be better to internationalize it while there
was a chance to do so?
A. I had never heard that argument.
Q. You did not?
A. No.
Q. You did know that many people of good faith did urge that point?
A. I am not aware. I don't believe I have ever heard that argument.
Q. I did not make myself clear : You stated you had not heard that argument*
and I did not therefore make my next question clear. You did know that many
people of good faith, many informed people, were in favor of what came to be
known as the Acheson-Lilienthal and later the Baruch plan?
A. I don't think you are speaking of quite the same thing. The Baruch plan
had certain safeguards in it which change it from what I believed to be Dr.
Oppenheimer's earlier program. It was less general, let us say.
Q. Would it surprise you to learn that there are those who think that it was
more general?
A. That is possible.
Q. Do you know that Dr. Oppenheimer supported the Baruch plan?
A. Yes.
Q. And, of course, the Russians opposed it?
A. Yes.
Q. Had you heard that it was Dr. Oppenheimer's view that inspection is not
enough, that you could not be sure that the Russians would not evade inspec-
tion, and therefore it was necessary to have an international agency that would
itself be the only one that could?
A. I didn't know this as a fact, I am sorry.
Q. I think you said on technical grounds, Dr. Oppenheimer did not support
the full long-range detection program of the Air Force?
A. That is my recollection ; yes, sir.
Q. That he was not enthusiastic about 2 out of 3 of these devices.
A. Yes.
Q. I think you also said you do not challenge Dr. Oppenheimer's Judgment?
A. That is correct.
Q. As to the 2 out of 3 devices that Dr. Oppenheimer did not support, do you
recall that he was always in favor of continued research on them?
A. Oh, definitely. My recollection is that in most of these matters Dr. Oppen-
heimer always favored research. I have never heard him at any time say that
the field was closed and we needed no more study or research.
Q. Did you understand Dr. Oppenhemier's lack of enthusiasm for these two
devices was based on the then state of technical development of those devices?
A. Yes ; I believe that I understood that this was why he was not enthusiastic.
Q. Are these two devices that Dr. Oppenheimer was not enthusiastic about now
in effect?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were they bettered by research?
A. Of course.
Q. You said 2 of 3 devices. I would like to turn to the third device, the one
that he was enthusiastic for.
A. Well, yes; all right.
692
Q. I don't want to put words in your mouth.
A It is hard for ine to talk about these things. We are not naming names.
They were three. They were of relative degrees of development or lack of
development. The one that appeared to be most immediately promising, the one
that perhaps we had the most information on was the one that Dr. Oppenheimer
supported to the greater degree.
Q. Bo you recall the circumstances of the development of that method?
A. Only vaguely. That it was during the war. I was conscious that it was
being done, because I had been asked for aircraft to assist in some of the
experiments. This is the limit of my knowledge.
Q. Do you know that it was under Dr. Oppenheimer's direction at Los Alamos
that that first system for long-range detection of atomic explosions was
initiated?
A. I don't know that as a fact, but I am not surprised, sir.
Q. And that it was done substantially at the same time as we were developing
the atomic bomb?
A. I knew the activities were about the same time. Of this I was aware.
Q. Was it done at Los Alamos?
A. This I don't know, sir, because of the compartmentalization of that project.
I don't know who was doing it.
Q. Do you know whether Dr. Oppenheimer directed the first trial of that
method?
A. No, sir, I don't
Q. I thinTr you said Dr. Oppenheimer opposed nuclear powered aircraft and
was less strongly opposed to nuclear powered ships.
A. On technical grounds. My statement was that he was opposed to these
in this order. He had a time scale. As I recall it was the orderly development
of these in series appealed to him. I am trying to say why one was ahead of
the other. So far as I know it was only on technical grounds that he objected
or opposed these.
Q. And you do not question his technical judgment?
A. No, sir.
Q. Was he alone in this technical judgment?
A. No, sir.
Q. Were there other well informed scientists who Joined with him.
A. Yes; I am sure there must have been, because there was a great deal nf
controversy in this area.
Q. Was his opposition in committees or did he make public statements?
A. These were in committees. I don't recall any public statements on the
matter.
Q. And these committees did have other scientists on them?
A. Yes.
Q. With respect to Dr. Oppenheimer's opposition to nuclear-powered flight
and the apparent support of nuclear-powered ships
A. Perhaps opposition is not the word. I wish we could find a better word?
Q. T^k of enthusiasm?
A. Lack of confidence in the timely success, or something of that sort I
don't think I have ever heard Dr. Oppenheimer doubt that this would be accom-
plished, but it was always 15 to 20 years, so far away that there were many
other things that we could do more profitably now.
Q. Was there not a statement made, perhaps by the Chief of the Air Force,
in any event by a very important official of the Air Force — I don't happen to
know the name — within the last year or so in which he said that nuclear-powered
flight looked like something we might have in about 20 years?
A. I don't know what, sir, I am sorry.
Q. Do yon recall the Lexington study on nuclear-powered flight?
A. Yes; I do.
Q. What was their conclusion?
A. This was a study to make a statement, if possible, on the feasibility of
achieving nuclear-powered flight. The report was rendered by Dr. Whitman,
I believe, who was the chairman, and immediately there was a controversy
as to what the report meant. The Air Force maintained that the Whitman
report stated that nuclear-powered flight was feasible provided certain things
were done. The opponents to the project said that these things that had to be
done were of such a nature as to render the program infeasible. This is my
recollection of it.
I personally think that the Whitman report or Lexington report stated that
the project was feasible.
693
Q. Did the report say anything about the time scale in which one could hope
to have nuclear-powered flight?
A. I am sure it did, but I don't recall what it was. It was not tomorrow.
I don't want to give the impression that I feel that if we had poured all the
money we had available into this project we could have had a nuclear airplane
in a matter of months. We knew it was going to take time. But our argument
was that the sooner we got to it, the better off we would be.
Q. Do you remember what Dr. Oppenheimer's participation was in the Lex-
ington study?
A. I am sorry, I do not.
Q. Do you remember whether he did more than give a few briefings to the
committee?
A. I really do not know.
Q. It has been the consistent position of the Air Force that nuclear-powered
flight should be pushed?
A. Yes.
Q. In fact, however, have the Air Force come up with different programs for
nuclear-powered flight from time to time?
A. We have to iny knowledge come up with two. The first one failed to
gain the scientific support essential. It was then reorganized on a different
basis which promised greater support, especially from the Atomic Energy Com-
mission. These are the two that I know of.
Q. What are the dates of those?
A. I am very sorry.
Q. Did the second program substantially revise the first one?
A. Yes ; I think that it changed the time scale. I had left this business before
really I could see it get under way so I am not too competent to discuss it, but
it did revise the time scale, setting up a program somewhat longer than the Air
Force would have liked.
Q. Do you know what the time scale was, that is, the revised time scale?
A. No, sir; I do not
Q. Would it be fair to say that the revision of the program was to bring it
more into accord with what appeared to be the technical realities of the
situation?
A. I can only make an assumption here. I assume that it did.
Q. As to the difference between nuclear powered aircraft and nuclear powered
ships, do you doubt that the possibility and the time scale of nuclear powered
ships is very different indeed from that of nuclear powered flight ?
A. This is an area of debate. You can find a lot of answers to this. As far
as I am concerned, I recognize that the problem is more difficult in the airplane.
There were at that time and still are a large number of aeronautical engineers
who could have been put to work on this project. My own feeling is that it prob-
ably would have lagged behind the submarine but that if we had given it a real
push, it might have not lagged too far behind.
At any rate, such an airplane would be of such importance to this Nation
that my own feeling is that we should have prosecuted it vigorously from the
start
Q. Would you concede that it was possible for men of good faith, technically
informed on the subject, to feel that it made sense to proceed with the nuclear
powered ships at a somewhat faster pace than nuclear powered flight?
A. I have heard that discussion, yes, sir, and I will concede that.
Q. The fact is, is it not, that at least the scientists seem to feel that there are
fewer technical difficulties with respect to nuclear powered ships than with
nuclear powered flight?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I don't suggest either of them is easy. I think the newspapers indicate
that the submarine has been produced.
In any event, certainly Dr. Oppenheimer did press for continued research in
both areas and particularly in the area of nuclear powered flight.
A. I can't answer that in the affirmative. I think that Dr. Oppenheimer
pressed for continued research and experiment in reactors which in time might
have contributed to nuclear powered flight I won't say that Dr. Oppenheimer
pressed for nuclear powered flight
Q. I didn't mean that. I mean pressed for research.
A. Yes; that is correct.
Q. He did keep saying let us find out about as much of this as we can.
A. Yes.
694
Mr. ROBB. Wait a minute.
The WITNESS. In reactors.
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Didn't he say let us find out what we can about nuclear powered flight,
too?
A. My recollection is that he didn't. I am not even sure that he showed an
interest in flight. This is my recollection.
Q. These reactors, of course, were essential for nuclear powered flight?
A. Yes.
Mr. SILVERMAN. I hare no further questions. Thank you, General.
Mr. GRAY. General, I would like you not in any way to take offense at my
first question of you.
You stated for the record that you were here under orders.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. I think all of us understand what that means. But by that, do you
mean that your presence here is a result of military orders, and am I correct
in assuming that your testimony is your own, and not in any way involved with
military instructions?
The WITNESS. My testimony is my own, sir. By this I meant, and I expressed
myself very awkwardly, that I find this a very painful experience because of
my admiration for Dr. Oppenheimer. I am exceedingly sorry that this is
taking place, and I don't think I would have volunteered to come up here to
make statements of this sort.
Mr. GRAY. I think that the board is aware of the painful nature of the matter.
General Wilson, approximately when did you feel impelled to go to the Chief
of Air Force Intelligence?
The WITNESS. This was after this long-range objectives panel, the date of
which I had confused. It was in January of 1951. I went to Intelligence and
I remember going actually from one of these panel meetings, rather than to the
Provost, because my feeling was not one of making charges, but I was un-
comfortable. I was worried about something I could not put my hands on.
I saw somebody to consult with.
Mr. GBAY. I am a little confused by that last answer and your reference to
some officer other than the Chief of Air Force Intelligence.
The WITNESS. If I had thought that there had been an overt act or a delib-
erate move to obstruct the proper defense of the country, something of that
sort, I would probably have appealed to the Provost Marshal. This would have
been my duty to do so and make charges. But this is not a matter of charges.
This was a matter of really worry that a general pattern of activity coming
from a man of such stature seemed to me to be jeopardizing the national defense.
Once again this is bluntly understated, but it was a worry, a concern. I wanted
to discuss it with someone I thought was knowledgeable in this sort of an area.
Mr. GRAY. You felt that the security of the country might be somehow in-
volved?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. You stated, General Wilson, on the basis of your association—
I believe you stated— with Dr. Oppenheimer, you did not doubt his loyalty to
the United States?
The WITNESS. I have no knowledge of this at all, sir. I certainly have ob-
served nothing nor have I heard him say anything that I personally would
say was disloyal. In fact, sir, it seems to me that he has demonstrated his
loyalty, once again in a private opinion, in the tremendous job he has done for
this country. I have just no knowledge of this.
Mr. GRAY. I should like to ask you another question on this point It may
be a difficult one to answer. Is it possible, do you think, for an Individual to be
completely loyal to the United States, and yet engage in a course of conduct
which would be detrimental to the security interests of the United States?
The WITNESS. Yes ; I do.
Mr. GRAY. I would like to refer now to what you described as a pattern of con-
duct You mentioned several things. The internationalization of atomic energy
has not been accomplished. With respect now to the long-range detection system,
have these other two that have been under discussion here been developed,
and are they now in use?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir ; they have been developed and are in use. It was a
bitter wrangle to get them developed, but they are in use.
695
Mr. GRAY. With respect to nuclear powered aircraft— I don't know what
the security problem is in this next question— may I ask you whether this is a
promising field at the present time?
***** * *
Mr. GRAY. I suppose I should state frankly the purpose of this series of
questions. You have stated that you do not question Dr. Oppenheimer's tech-
nical Judgment and competence.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. You made that very clear. I am trying to find out really whether
in these several things that you referred to as constituting what might be a
pattern of conduct, whether events have shown technical Judgment in this case
to have been faulty. Let me say for the record this board is not asked to pass
upon the technical Judgment of anybody, and is not competent to pass upon it.
But it seems to me an answer to my question is pertinent to the part of the inquiry
that we are engaged in. So I ask whether in these areas subsequent events
have proved the validity or otherwise of these technical Judgments which you
accepted more or less without question, I believe you said, from Dr. Oppenheimer.
We know that internationalization of atomic energy has not been accomplished.
With respect to the others
The WITNESS. Of course, the long-range detection program has been accom-
plished. I don't recall that Dr. Oppenheimer ever said that this couldn't be done.
It was Just perhaps that we ought to concentrate on the portions that could be
done readily and quickly. I don't remember exactly the argument. It was
essentially that — do what we can and perhaps that is the best we can do, this
sort of thing, and for the rest let us experiment The Air Force was frantic
because it was charged with the Job of detecting this first explosion and it felt
all three methods had to be developed and put in place or it would fall down
on its job.
Mr. GRAY. I think I won't press you on the answer to the question as I asked
it, because it is not a good question.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir; I am sorry.
Mr. GRAY. General Wilson, with respect to what might be called the philosophy
of strategy in a conflict with the Soviet Union, is it your view, as a dedicated
airman today, knowing what you know about our capabilities in the field of
nuclear weapons, that these weapons are important?
The WITNESS. Vastly, yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. And as an airman, would you feel that even with improvements
in the atomic weapons, which may have taken place in these years we have been
discussing, these are still important weapons, that is, the thermonuclear?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. You feel as an airman, knowing air capabilities, that they have
direct useful application in the course of a conflict with the Soviet Union in
particular?
The WITNESS. I think that they are vital, sir, to deterring a war, and I
think that they are vital to winning a war should such a thing come. Further
than this, it would seem intolerable to me that the Russians have such a weapon
and the United States not. This is to get back to this area again. I would
have reversed essentially our position when we had a monopoly on the atomic
bomb— not entirely, but to a large degree. Involved as we are in a nonshooting
war, this could have been a tremendous defeat for the United States.
Mr. GRAY. We have had testimony given to this board by scientists who were
involved in some of these discussions to the effect that thermonuclear weapons
are more useful to the enemy than they are to us. By that I believe tbey meant
to say that we are more vulnerable, assuming that both powers have these
weapons, than are the Russians. Do you share that view?
The WITNESS. Of course, it depends on the perimeters of our problem. Stated
Just as you have stated it, I would share that view. But think what would
happen if we did not have the bomb and they did. The fact that we are
troubled does not mean we should have this weapon in my view.
Mr. GRAY. I may get you into a classified difficulty so let me know if I do.
Is a part of your conviction that these weapons are vital to our security based
on considerations of numbers of aircraft that might be involved in any use of
these weapons? Is that a clear question?
The WITNESS. Do you mean, sir, that by having these weapons fewer air-
planes might be required?
Mr. GRAY. That is part of it, yes. Is that an important military consideration?
696
The WITNESS. It is to a degree. In order to be effective an enemy's defenses
must be saturated. By this there must be a certain number of attacks made to
confuse and confound his defense. This establishes really the minimum number
of aircraft. This is sort of "get rich quick" air tactics. Added to that is
the matter of flexibility to take care of local situations. This also could require
a number of aircraft. What I am trying to say is that if you have a weapon
that is 10 times as great as your old weapon, you cannot reduce your number
of aircraft by 10 automatically. There are other considerations.
Mr. GRAY. I think I have only one more question. During the period with
respect to which you have testified— perhaps I should be more specific — during the
period 1947 to January 1950, did you have a serious question in your mind,
based on what information you had, that the Air Force might have difficulty
in developing a carrier which was capable of transporting and delivering the
weapon which was under debate?
The WITNESS. This is the atomic bomb in that period and the thermonuclear
bomb coming up?
Mr. GBAT. That is correct.
The WITNESS. Of course, there was no question about carrying the atomic bomb.
Mr. GBAT. Yes.
The WITNESS. There was no question among the combat bombardiers about
their ability to deliver it. There was a great deal of impassioned debate on this
subject, but I have never heard a bombardment commander say he could not
deliver the weapon.
Mr. GBAY. This is the atomic weapon?
The WITNESS. This is the atomic weapon. We didn't know what the size
and the weight and shape of this thermonuclear weapon would be, but as soon
as the President directed that we determine the feasibility of it, the Air Force
went immediately into a study of deliverability, and we were prepared with a
series of devices to carry it Some of them were not good, but they were a
start. * * *
Mr. GRAY. In October 1949, based on what you know— how much or how
little— about the technical difficulties in bringing about such a weapon which
the Air Force might use, was there any doubt in your mind about your ability to
design a plane, a carrier which would be effective?
The WITNESS. That a plane could be designed?
Mr. GBAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. No, sir; I don't think there was any such doubt. You can
design as big an airplane as you want, I am sure.
Mr. GBAY. I am asking you this question because you are an airman.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir. My answer is, No, there was no doubt of the ability
of the aircraft industry to design an airplane to carry almost anything. The
important thing is that we get to work on it, and that we work together with the
Atomic Energy Commission so that we can keep the size and shape together to
come up with a good device in a timely manner.
Mr. GBAY. Dr. Evans.
Dr. EVANS. General Wilson, it has been mentioned a number of times in this
meeting this morning that you were a dedicated airman. I wish to state for the
record that this board does not think there is any approbrium, and I don't think
anybody in this room thinks there is any approbrium connected with being a
dedicated airman.
The WITNESS - Thank you, sir. I invented the term.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. If there was any suggestion that I meant any such thing, I
certainly did not.
Mr. GBAY. I think Dr. Evans wishes everybody here to take Judicial notice
that there may have been people present who may have been interested in the
Army at one time.
The WPTNESS. I understand, sir.
Dr. EVANS. One of the possible reasons there may have been opposition to
this thermonuclear weapon was possibly that Russia had fewer targets for that
thing than we had. Was that ever mentioned? It would be like killing a
mosquito with a sledge hammer.
The WITNESS. I have heard this sort of debate, but not seriously in official
circles ; no, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Do you have an idea now that the thermonuclear weapon was
developed far more quickly than you would have had reason at one time to
think it might be?
The WITNESS. Yes. I was agreeably surprised. Yes, sir.
Dr. EVANS. That is all I have.
697
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. General, there are a couple of questions suggested by the chairman's
questions.
We have heard some discussion here by various witnesses about tactical
bombing versus strategic bombing. I wonder if you could give us a little infor-
mation about what the distinction is, what the two kinds of bombing are, so we
have it from somebody who knows what he is talking about?
A. There is no real distinction. It is an over-simplification of terms. I think
that what is meant by tactical bombing is bombing in immediate support of
ground troops, somethng of this sort. Actually my view and the view of my
school is that all bombing is directed toward a strategic goal, and that bombing
done on the battlefield should be timed with bombing done against the enemy's
will to resist, so that both will be mutually supporting. Short of a lecture, sir, I
hope that will suffice.
Q. Is the thermonuclear weapon considered to be a tactical weapon or a stra-
tegic weapon, or both?
A. If you will accept my definition, which is not an accurate one, that a tacti-
cal weapon is in support of ground troops on the battlefield, then you would
assume that a thermonuclear weapon would be a strategic weapon. We don't
like to use these terms. We prefer not to, because they are all directed to a
strategic end.
Q. Is the nuclear powered ship, using the term perhaps unprofessionally, a
strategic or tactical weapon?
A. For the same reason you can't differentiate. It would be a highly flexible
performing airplane.
Q. I am talking about a ship.
A. Oh, a ship. I beg your pardon. I don't think you can differentiate there
either. It depends on how they are employed.
***** * *
Mr. ROBB. That is all.
Mr. SILVERMAN. I think I have one question.
RE-CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr, SILVERMAN :
Q. I think the chairman asked you about whether you had any question in
October 1949 about the possibility of determining an aircraft large enough to
carry a thermonuclear weapon. I am not sure in my own thinking. We are
talking about a big hydrogen bomb?
A. I understand, sir.
Q. I think you said you didn't have any doubt that it could be done?
A. It could be designed, yes.
Q. Will you give us some idea about how long it takes from design of a plane
to production?
A. It varies of course. The cycle used to be about 3 years. When I left the
business it had crept up to about 5 and I don't know how long it is, but it is a
goodly period. That is from the drawing board to the production and rolling
them off, and not a modification.
Q. If it were a much bigger plane than anything that had been had before it
anight be presumably longer?
A. It might be longer if it is from the original concept of production. If it
is a modification, it Is different.
Q. And one couldn't tell what you needed until you saw the size and shape
of the thing you had to carry ?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Thank you.
Mr. ROBB. Thank you, General.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, General Wilson.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GRAY. We will recess until 2 o'clock.
(Thereupon at 12 :05 p. m.f a recess was taken until 2 p. m., the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Pitzer, do yon wish to testiry under oath? You are not re-
quired to do so.
Dr. PITZER. I would be very happy to do so if that is customary.
Mr. GRAY. All the other witnesses have.
698
Will you raise your right hand and give me your full name?
Dr. PITZEB. Kenneth Sanborn Pitzer.
Mr, GRAY. Kenneth Sanborn Pitzer, do you swear that the testimony you are
to give the board will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Dr. PITZEB. I do. ^ _ . .
Whereupon Kenneth Sanborn Pitzer was called as a witness and, having been
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Will you be seated, please.
It is my duty to remind you of the existence of the so-called perjury statutes.
May we assume that you are familiar with them?
I should also like to request, Dr. Pitzer, if in the course of your testimony
it becomes necessary for you to refer to or to disclose restricted data, you will
notify me in advance, so that we may take the necessary steps in the interests
° Finally, I should like to say to you that we consider this proceeding a con-
fidential matter between the Atomic Energy Commission, its officials, and wit-
nesses on the one hand, and Dr. Oppenheimer and his representatives on the
other. The Commission is making no releases to the press, and we express the
hope that witnesses will take the same view.
The WITNESS. Surely.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Robb, would you proceed?
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, would you tell us what your present post or position is?
A. My present post is professior of chemistry and dean of the college of
chemistry, University of California, at Berkeley.
Q. Would you tell us something of your academic training and background,
please, sir?
A. My undergraduate training was at the California Institute of Technology,
with a bachelor's degree and a Ph. D. at the Univeristy of California in Berkeley.
Q. In what?
A. Physics and chemistry; officially chemistry. My general work has been
what is sometimes described as a borderline area between physics and chemistry
for the most part, although my professional affiliation has been with the Chem-
ical Society pirmarily.
I am a member, indeed, a fellow, of the American Institute of Physics, as
well as affiliated with the Chemical Society.
Q. Would you say when you took your Ph. D.?
A. 1937.
Q. Do you know Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Certainly.
Q. How long have you known him, sir?
A. I at least knew of him when I was at Cal Tech in the period 1931 to 1935.
More personal acquaintanceship developed gradually during the period from
1835 on at Berkeley and in the later years I was, of course, a professional col-
league, and I was a member of the staff in chemistry and in physics.
Q. Have you ever been employed by the Atomic Energy Commission?
A. Yes. I was director of the Division of Research of the Atomic Energy
Commission from approximately the beginning of 1949 to the middle of 1951.
Q. You left your academic duties and came on to take that position ; is that
right?
A. Yes, I was asked to do this. The. only basis which seemed reasonable and
agreeable to me was on a leave of absence basis, because I wished to maintain
as a primary career actual direct scientific work and teaching at the university.
The Commission originally asked me to come for 2 years and leave was
arranged on that basis. As a later step it was extended for another 6 months.
Q. When your leave was up, you went back to California?
A. When my leave was up I went back to California. The only difference was
that they asked me to take over the deanship. At that time I had been Just
professor of chemistry previously.
Q. What connection have you now if any with the atomic energy program?
A. My principal connection now is as consultant and affiliate of the radiation
laboratory at the University of California, including the program at Livennore,
as well as the campus.
Q. Is the Livennore side Dr. Teller's laboratory?
699
A. It is commonly known as that. I have taken special pains to be sure that
the chemistry and chemical engineering program at the Livermore laboratory
was adequately staffed and in a healthy state, including the loaning of members
of our departmental staff to that program.
Q. I should have asked you in sequence, but I will ask you now, what were
your duties as director of research of the Atomic Energy Commission?
A. I am glad you came back to that. My line duties, as it were, concerned
responsibility for basic or fundamental research in the physical sciences, in-
cluding mathematics, chemistry, physics, metallurgy. In what might be de-
scribed as a staff capacity, I was, shall we say, scientific adviser to other divi-
sion directors, such as production, military applications, and in general
wherever scientific — let me say advice in the physical sciences was useful to
the Commission.
Q. And you undertook those duties, I believe you said, in 1950?
A. No, January 1949.
Q. I beg your pardon. Doctor, coming to September 1949, will you state
whether or not you had any knowledge of any questions arising or interest in
a socalled thermonuclear weapon about that time?
A. Yes, I think it was about that time that my colleagues from Berkeley,
Latimer, Lawrence, and Alvarez, came in in connection with some other meet-
ing, and drew my attention particularly to the importance of a more vigorous
program in this area.
Q. When you say came in, you mean came to Washington?
A. Yes. That is, they had come to Washington, two of them being members
of another panel in some other field, and arriving the day before the meeting,
came in to see me and talked about the potentialities in this area.
Q. And you said their thoughts were what about it?
A. Their thoughts were that this represented an important area in which
the defense of the United States could be improved by a vigorous program of
research and development leading to what has now become commonly termed
the hydrogen bomb.
Q. Was that before or after the Russian explosion?
A. It was after the Russian explosion.
Q Did you thereafter have occasion to see Dr. Oppenheimer?
A The event that I recall was on a weekend, some time in October— the exact
date could be developed if desired, but I do not remember it now— in which I
had been up in that area, particularly giving an address to the Chemical
Society meeting at Reading, Pa., and I dropped by and visited with Dr.
Oppenheimer.
A" At his "home in Princeton, or his office, too, and we discused this subject,
and also the subject of the Atomic Energy Commission fellowship program
which was having certain difficulties at that time. I would not say that either
one or the other was necessarily the principal reason for the visit.
Q What was said by Dr. Oppenheimer about the thermonuclear?
A. I was very much surprised to find that, he seemed not in favor of a vigorous
program in this area.
Q. Do you recall whether or not he gave a reason for that feeling?
A. I am a little vague in my memory as to the reasons and the details of the
discussion then. As nearly as I can recall the reasons were substantially the same
as are stated in the General Advisory Committee report of October 30, wasn t it?
Q. 29th, I believe it was.
A. And in particular in the appendix or substatement that was signed by Dr.
Oppenheimer with others. ^ _ ^ .
Q. Was this occasion on which you saw Dr. Oppenheimer before or after that
meeting of the GAC? . ,
A. This was before the GAC meeting. I am quite positive of that.
Q. Do you recall whether or not any mention was made by Dr. Oppenheimer of
the views of any other scientists?
A. I am quite sure there was mention at that time of discussion or communica-
tion between Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr. Conant, and an indication that Dr. Conant
was taking a view similar to that being expressed by Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. Before we go further in point of time, were you familiar at that time in the
fall of 1949 with the work which was going on, prior to the Russian explosion, at
Los Alamos in respect to the thermonuclear?
A. I would not say I had a detailed acquaintanceship with that I knew there
was a small study program of some sort and that Dr. Teller was the figure that
was regarded as the principal expert in the field. As I recall, he spent a portion
700
of the time from year to year in Los Alamos. I don't recall the details. I did visit
the Los Alamos laboratory in 1949 and reviewed its program in some detail, at
least in the areas of which I had particular cognizance or competence, and it
was apparant that there was no extensive program in the thermonuclear field.
Q. Would you say that the work that was going on was significant or otherwise
in point of magnitude and intensity of effort?
A. It was certainly not what you would call a vigorous program. It was a sort
of very subsidiary exploration of a few people— I don't know just how many.
Q. You saw, did you, the report of the GAG of the October 29-30 meeting?
A. Yes. I have forgotten just how long after it was issued.
Q. Were you here in Washington at the time of that meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you tell us whether or not you had prepared any material or any
presentation to make to the committee in respect of the thermonuclear problem?
A. No; I don't believe I had any particular presentation prepared at that time.
I don't recall any such.
Q. Were your views on the matter solicited by the GAC1?
A. I don't recall the detail, but I do not believe that they were, although I
am not sure about that point. I do recall having come down at one period and
then having had Carroll Wilson, then general manager, apologize and say that
the attendance at the forthcoming session was being more highly restricted
than he had anticipated. At least this particular session I did not attend. I
am not very clear as to the exact detail.
Q. Had your views been solicited or received by the committee on other
matters?
A. Oh, indeed.
Q. Prior to that time?
A. Yes.
Q. And were they solicited on other matters subsequent to that time?
A. Yes.
Q. You have stated or have told us about your conversation with Dr. Oppen-
heimer prior to the GAG meeting and you told us about seeing the report of the
GAC meeting. Were you aware subsequent to the GAC meeting of any significant
change in Dr. Oppenheimer's views as he had expressed them to you orally,
and as they were expressed in the report of the GAC meeting?
A. Over what period of time do you mean?
Q. Any time subsequent to that?
A. I am sure there was some change in detailed view, but I don't recall any
marked or major or sudden change.
Q. I am speaking particularly of his attitude with respect to the advisability
of going ahead with the thermonuclear program. Were you aware of any
significant change in that or any increase of enthusiasm?
A. Certainly not any very marked increase in enthusiasm. There was no
major or sudden change that I was aware of.
Q. Doctor, would you say that you are pretty familiar with the nuclear
scientists, physicists, and chemists in the country? Are you generally familiar
with them?
A. I have reasonably wide acquaintanceship, more of course on the chemical
side, but I am acquainted with many nuclear physicists.
Q. Given Dr. Oppenheimer's attitude and feelings as you have described them,
what can you tell us about what would be the effect in your opinion upon the
scientific world of such attitudes and feelings so far as either increasing or
decreasing enthusiasm for the thermonuclear program? That is a long question.
I hope it is clear. I am trying not to lead you.
A. I hope you will permit me to make a statement of my general impressions
of that time. After the President made the decision and announced it to the
papers, I was rather surprised to find that Dr. Oppenheimer did not in some
manner or another disqualify himself from a position of, shall we say, technical
leadership of the program. I had the feeling that if my advice on a major
subject of this sort had been so— if the decision had been so much in reverse
from my advice, let us put it that way— that I would not have wanted to be in
a position of responsibility with respect to the subsequent pursuit of the program.
As to just what course of action would have been most appropriate, there
are various alternatives. I think this would have led to a clearer and more
vigorous program had some other arrangement of this sort been had.
Q. Why do you think that, Doctor?
701
A. It would have been clear that the Commission was by this time thoroughly
behind the program and that the fullest support was going to be given to it
because special arrangements had been made to be sure that the leadership
would be vigorous.
Q. Do you think the fact that Dr. Oppenheimer stayed on entertaining the
views which you have told us about discouraged other physicists from going
ahead on the program with vigor?
A. I can only say to this that I am afraid it may have. I am not aware of
detailed negotiations or influences on particular individuals, but I do know
there was difficulty in that early period in obtaining the staff that would have
seemed desirable to me and as I believe Dr. Teller felt was desirable at that
time, particularly in the theoretical physics area. To have had other advisory
leadership that was known to be enthusiastic for the program would, I think,
have assisted.
Q. You suggested other advisory leadership. Did you have in mind a specific
step that might have been taken either by Dr. Oppenheimer or by the Commission
to get such leadership?
A. As I said before, it seemed to me that there were several alternatives there.
If the most extreme change had seemed desirable, there was a possibility of
full changes of membership in the Statutory Advisory Committee. Other possi-
bilities could have been the appointment of some special panel in this field, and
of course a marked and clearcut change in the viewpoints of certain individuals
would have assisted the program.
Q. In your opinion did Dr. Oppenheimer do everything he might have to
further the program after the President's decision?
A. Again in an Inferential sense, I am afraid I must say that he did not.
Q. Would you explain that to us a little bit?
A* As I indicated earlier, it seemed to me that had he enthusiastically urged
men in the theoretical physics field to go to Los Alamos or other points as indi-
cated for this program that the difficulties in staffing it would have not arisen.
I am sure he had great influence over individuals in that field.
On the other hand, as I say, this is simply an inference, and not something
that I know from day to day and man to man.
Q. I understand. What was Dr. Oppenheimer's influence in the physics field
during that period to your knowledge?
A. He was unquestionably a most influential individual in dealings with
other physicists, particularly theoretical physicists, but also experimental men.
Q. Doctor, did there come a time when Dr. Libby was appointed to the General
Advisory Committee?
A. Yes.
Q. Did yon have anything to do with that appointment?
A. I don't know how much I had to do with the appointment, but at that
time I discussed problems with the then Chairman, Gordon Dean.
Q. Could you give us the approximate date of that?
A. I am trying to fh*"fe when those appointments were made. This must have
been in the late spring or summer of 1950, 1 would infer.
Q. Would you go ahead? I am sorry I interrupted you.
A. At that time I pointed out to Mr. Dean, as I indeed had pointed out earlier,
that there was a considerable body of scientific opinion of the very distinguished
and able men that was more enthusiastic with respect to the thermonuclear
weapons program and had undoubtedly different views in a number of respects
than were represented on the Advisory Committee as of that time. I urged
him to appoint to that Committee at least one individual who had been from
the beginning enthusiastic for the thermonuclear program and who would
assure him of advice based on that point of view.
Q. Whom did you suggest, if anyone?
A. I suggested a number of names, including Dr. W. F. Libby, of the Uni-
versity of Chicago, and eventually Dr. Libby was appointed to the Committee.
Q. Was there a weapons subcommittee of the General Advisory Committee?
A. I believe there was ; yes.
Q. Who chose that weapons subcommittee?
A. I have never been a member of the Committee, and I cannot state as a
matter of knowledge what the Committee procedure was. I presume that the
selection was very likely on nomination by the Chairman and confirmation by
the Committee, although it may have been by the full Committee action in some
other mechanism.
Q. However, it was done, was Dr. Libby ever appointed to that weapons sub-
committee to your knowledge?
702
A. I don't know whether he was ever appointed to the Committee, but I am
substantially certain that he was not appointed to the Committee in the fall of
1950.
Q. There has been quite a bit of testimony here about a meeting held at Prince-
ton, I believe, in the spring of 1951. Are you familiar with that meeting in gen-
eral, and did you hear about it?
A. Yes, I heard about that meeting.
Q. Was Dr. Libby invited to that meeting as far as you know?
A. As far as I know, he was not.
Q. What can you tell us about the importance or the essentiality to the atomic
weapons and the thermonuclear weapons program today of Dr. Oppenheimer, in
your opinion?
A. Let me develop this in a number of facets.
Q. That is why I asked the broad question so you can answer it in your own
way.
A. I would like to discuss these briefly from three points of view . One is in
terms of immediate scientific work. That is the calculations, theoretical deriva-
tions and this sort of thing. This by and large is done by younger people, particu-
larly in the field of theoretical physics. I haven't the slightest doubt that Dr.
Oppenheimer would be valuable to such work but, by and large, from that tradi-
tion and experience hi theoretical physics, this sort of thing is done by people in
their twenties or thirties.
The second aspect is that of leadership among men in this field. I have no
doubt that Dr. Oppenheimer's influence and importance in the sense of leadership
among men is of the highest order. He would have a great deal of influence and
could be of a great deal of assistance in persuading able people to work at certain
places and at certain times and in selecting people for this.
The third phase that I would mention would be that on what might be called
policy advice. This is the sort of thing that the Commission and other nontech-
nical management people need. Personally, I would not rate Dr. Oppenheimer's
importance in this field very high for the rather personal reason, I suspect, that I
have disagreed with a good many of his important positions and I personally
would think that advisers in the policy field of greater wisdom and Judgment
could be readily obtained.
Q. You say very honestly that you personally disagree. Let me ask you whether
or not events have proved that you were right or Dr. Oppenheimer was right
A. That is a difficult question. I think personally that we were right in going
into a vigorous thermonuclear program at the time we did. I would not want
to question the possibility of a perfectly sincere and reasonable judgment to
the contrary at that time. I want to make it perfectly clear that I am empha-
sizing here essentially need, or in the extreme, indispensability of the advice
than some other feature. Possibly it would be just fair to say that in the policy
area I certainly do not regard Dr. Oppenheimer as having any indispensability
Q. One final question, Doctor. Yon are not here as a witness, are you, because
you wanted to be?
A. Certainly not. Thank you for asking that. I am here only at the very
specific and urgent request of the general manager and with a feeling that as one
of the senior scientific personnel of the Commission at a critical time that it was
only reasonable that I should accede to the general manager's request
Q. Doctor, I am asking this next question so that the record will be plain and
not intending to insuate anything.
Although you are here at the specific request of the general manager, your
views which you have expressed are your own independent views, aren't they?
A. Indeed. I am expressing only precisely my own views and I think anyone
that knows me would be pretty certain that I would not express anybody else's
views no matter how they were put
Q. In other words, the general manager's request brought you physically here
but did not give you the ideas which you expressed.
A. That is correct.
Mr. ROBB. That is all I care to ask, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Silverman.
Mr. SILVERMAN-. Yes, sir.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. SELVEBMAN:
Q. I think you said that at your visit to Dr. Oppenheimer in Princeton in Octo-
ber of 1949, 1 thought you. said you were rather vague as to Dr. Oppenheimer's
statement of his views but that as far as you can recall, they were about the same
as in what has come to be known as the majority appendix to the GAC report.
708
A. What I believe I said was that I was surprised that he was opposing a
vigorous program and that as nearly as I can recall for it were substantially those
in this majority appendix.
Q. Do you recall specifically that he then told you the reasons and what they
were? I am not trying to trap you into anything. Or do you think it possible
that you are now reading back the reasons stated in the GAG report, and they
did not surprise you very much when you heard them as Dr. Oppenheimer's
A. I am sure we did discuss the problem, not at great length, but at appreciable
length, and that the reasons must have been offered. I frankly can't be sure
exactly which argument came into the picture at which time.
Q. You were asked about the extent of the thermonuclear program work' that
was being done in that field up to September of 1949. I think you said that you
didn't think there was a very extensive program, or something of that kind?
A, Yes.
Q. If I am wrong, don't hesitate to correct me. It is all right. Would you
say that Dr. Bradbury, who was the director of the laboratory at Los Alamos,
was perhaps in a better position to give a statement of the extent of the thermo-
nuclear work that was befrg done than you were?
A. Oh, indeed. Dr. Bradbury had more detailed information concerning the
size of the program, as did Dr. Teller and others.
Q. Your position was director of research. Am I correct that weapons de-
velopment or research was not a part of your responsibility?
A. The situation with particular respect to weapons was as follows. The
line authority for the Los Alamos Laboratory and the remainder of the weapons
development, as well as production program, was in the Division of Military
Applications under the directorship then of General McCormack. My func-
tion in that area was strictly a staff function to be of whatever assistance and
advice I could be since General McCormack was not himself a scientist
Q. If and when you were asked for scientific advice, you would give it, and
find out what you could, and so on?
A. Yes. In fact, I would go further. I am not particularly bashful. I
would frequently make suggestions on my initiative, and I was invited to make
suggestions on my initiative.
Q. I am not suggestion that you were not, nor that your suggestions were
not entirely welcome. I am sure they were. I am just trying to establish
the lines of responsibility.
A. That is correct.
Q. And that, in facfc the development of weapons would be more a matter
that perhaps General McCormack would know more about, and perhaps Dr.
Bradbury would.
A. In terms of the details or in General McCormack's case, the administrative
side of the program, that statement would be appropriate.
Q. And in terms of what was actually done in the development of the
weapons.
A. I wouldn't argue that
Q. I am not trying to argue with you either. I think you said that you did
not think that your views were solicited by the General Advisory Committee
at the time of the October 1949 report. Do you recall whether there was a
subsequent time, fairly shortly after the General Advisory Committee report,
when they did solicit your views?
A. As I recall, there was a subsequent meeting, possibly in early December,
in which this subject was reviewed again. If I remember correctly, General
McCormack and I were both invited to that meeting and invited to essentially
speak our peace, since we were by that time believed to be in substantial dis-
agreement with the Committee. As I recall, General McCormack testified at
greater length and I supported the view contrary to the Committee's report
briefly.
Q. You said testified ; spoke, I take it you mean. It was a discussion.
A. Yes.
Q. I think you said you were rather surprised that Dr. Oppenheimer did not
disqualify himself from a position of technical leadership of a program with
which he apparently disagreed. Do you know whether Dr. Oppenheimer did
in fact offer to resign from the chairmanship of the General Advisory Committee
at that time?
A. I have no information on that »
303S1&— 54 — -45
704
Q. You have not heard that he offered to the Chairman, Mr. Dean, to resign?
A. I don't believe I heard that ; no.
Q. And you don't know what Mr. Dean's reaction was. You just never
heard of it?
A. I never heard about it
Q. I think there has been testimony here about it, so I think the record is
clear enough on it.
A. At least, if I heard of it, I do not recall at this time.
Q. I take it you would be less critical of Dr. Oppenheimer's attitude if that
were the fact, if he offered to resign and was urged to remain?
A. Certainly so. I think, however, that his position today would be better
if he had insisted on at least some degree of disqualification in this field at
that time.
Q. I wish you would elaborate on that.
A. Let me put it this way. i am extremely sorry to see this issue concerning
advice which on hindsight proved not too good brought up in connection with
a security clearance procedure. I feel very strongly that scientists should
feel free to advise the Government and not be held to account if their advice
proves not the best afterward. This should have no relevance to security
clearance procedure. If Dr. Oppenheimer had seen fit to insist upon stepping
out of the position of advising on the hydrogen program, this could not be
introduced into this argument at this time. I am very sorry to see that it
does have to come up at this time.
Q. I need hardly say that I entirely agree with you.
I think you said that you thought that Dr. Oppenheimer's attitude may have
discouraged people from working on the thermonuclear program, and you were
very frank in saying you didn't have details of that, and so on. I suppose your
greatest familiarity would be with the situation at Berkeley, would i,t not?
A. I certainly had some degree of familiarity with the situation at Berkeley
at the time I was in Washington, both because the radiation laboratory was
more immediately under the Research Division, and because all of my personal
contacts with the Berkeley staff.
On the other hand, I would assure you that I took a very definite interest in
this thermonuclear program and visited Los Alamos on occasion, and visited
with Professor Teller and others when he was in Washington in order to see
how it was going, and in order to offer my assistance at any time.
Q. I think you were asked whether you thought Dr. Oppenheimer did every-
thing he might have done to further the President's thermonuclear development
program after the President's decision, and I think you said you thought he
might not have. Everything that a man might have done is a relative thing.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I hate to interrupt but it seems to me that the wit-
ness ought to do the testifying and not Mr. Sllverman.
Mr. SILVERMAN. That is an introduction to the question.
Mr. GB^Y. I think it is true that you have been expressing your views quite
frequently, Mr. Silverman, in this cross-examination, and I have not stopped
you, again in the interest of not being too rigid in our procedures. But I thinfr
it well for me to make a request at this time that you confine your introductory
statements to the necessities of the question, because the record should primarily
reflect the views of witnesses, rather than counsel.
Mr. SILVERMAN. I have tried to do so, sir, and I will try to be more careful
of that
Mr. GBAY. Thank you.
By Mr. SELVERMAN :
Q. Would you say that doing everything that one might have done is a relative
matter?
A. It is a relative matter, and in my earlier answer to the question I was
not trying to slice close to the line. I felt that the events of that period were
sufficiently wide of a narrow borderline to Justify the critical statement
Q. In one sense, and I am not critcizing you, sir, you did not do everything
you might have to further the program.
A. No. There are things on hindsight one can always figure out one could
have done more. I suppose one could have done many things differently, but
I certainly carried it as a high priority among my duties, particularly consider-
ing that it was not a line, but rather a staff problem, and I regarded the pro-
gram since as something that demanded my attention whenever anything sub-
stantial could be contributed to it
705
Q. You didn't consider that it was necessary for you not to return to the
university, for instance?
A. No. But I delayed the return for 6 months very substantially on that
account.
Q. Believe me, I am not criticizing you, sir. I think you are entirely within
your rights. You have taken the position as a consultant which I take it is
a part time position.
A. Yes ; I think since you are pursuing this matter, I would like to say a little
further that I am not myself a nuclear physicist The chief contributions which
I can make to this program are to be sure that the chemical engineering com-
ponents that need to go into the various units are made to the exact specifica-
tions that are required, and so on. My position is the administrative position
in chemistry at the University of California at Berkeley, and I have thought my
best contribution would be to see that the proper people were working on the
proper jobs at the proper time, rather than I should necessarily go and do them
with my own hands.
Q. Don't you think, sir, that the decision as to how much of one's own efforts
and time one puts into some program is a matter for personal judgment of a
man?
A. Yes ; I was considering these judgments earlier in very appreciable degree
with respect to the adequacy of staffing of a given program and the ability of
a particular person to take steps to assure that the program was adequately
staffed. In my own position the sort of thing I could do was to essentially say,
"Look, Mr. So-and-so, we will get along without you in the department, half
time or full time, next semester. This is an extremely urgent job." Of someone
not associated with the university initially, but in my general field I can advise
him of the importance of the program and urge him strongly to serve if offered
an appropriate position. It is in this frame of reference that my earlier com-
ments were made.
Q. Don't you think that service on the General Advisory Committee is itself
quite an important contribution?
A. It is, indeed, an important position.
Q. Returning to your statement that you thought that you thought Dr. Oppen-
heimer's attitude may have discouraged people from working on the thermo-
nuclear program, there, of course, have been other factors in the difficulty of
getting staff, were there not?
A. There are always other factors. The question is the relative importance
of this task as compared to others, and the sense of urgency which is Imparted
to a man who is considering either going to this program or not going to the
program.
Q. I think you said that you saw no marked increase in Dr. Oppenheimer's
enthusiasm as to going ahead with the hydrogen bomb. Was that during the
period you were here?
A. Yes ; that was during the period I was in Washington. I have seen Dr.
Oppenheimer only most infrequently since I left Washington.
Q. When did you leave Washington?
A. This was the summer of 1951.
Q. Are you in a position to say as to whether his enthusiasm increased with
the later improved outlooks for the feasibility of the hydrogen bomb?
A. I am not in a position to say anything about that.
Q. You referred to the appointment of Dr. Libby to the General Advisory Com-
mittee. I think you said that Dr. Libby was one of a number of names that
you had suggested. Do you know that Dr. Libby was on a list that Dr. Oppen-
heimer submitted to Chairman Dean for membership on the General Advisory
Committee?
A. I have no knowledge of that
Q. Before you came to your position with the Atomic Energy Commission
as director of research, did Dr. Oppenheimer have a conversation with you in
which he urged you or asked you whether you would be willing to spend some
time in Government work in Washington?
A. It is very likely that this was the case. I am not sure.
Q. In your testimony earlier about a meeting at Princeton— there have been
so many meetings at Princeton—I am talking about the weekend you spent at
Princeton when you spoke to Dr. Oppenheimer about the hydrogen-bomb pro-
gram in the fall of 1949, and also the fellowship program.
Mr. ROBB. I don't think he spent a weekend there.
Mr. SXLVERUAXT. As long as we have the time. As to the length of time, It
doesn't matter. I am making no point about it being a weekend at all.
706
By Mr. SH.VERMAN :
Q. What was the fuss about the fellowship program?
A. This is a long story* The essence of it was that the Congress of the
United States introduced a rider in the Appropriation Act which required investi-
gation and a decision as to loyalty for all fellows under the program in the
future.
Q. What was your view on that?
A. I was very sorry to see such a requirement introduced into the program.
Q. Was Dr. Oppenheimer's view in accord with yours on that?
A. In that general way, yes. I was sorry to see it introduced. I was equally
sorry and disturbed by the events and situations which had come to the attention
of the Congress and which led them to introduce it
Q. Were you against this requirement?
A. As I say, I was opposed to the introduction of a requirement for full
investigation. I was hoping that the situation could he handled by some loyalty
oath or some other procedure which would not require a full field investigation,
but which would still give a case of reasonably substantial certainty of loyalty
to the United States.
I might add that this was the course taken with respect to the National Science
Foundation later.
Q. Were you critical of the work of the Reactor Safeguard Committee?
A. Yes; I have been critical of that
Q. Do you recall who the chairman of that committee was during the period
when you were critical of it?
A. Surely. My good friend Edward Teller. I have argued with him in a
friendly fashion on many times.
Q. And you don't for a moment question his good faith and what he did
there?
A. Not at all.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Thank you.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Pitzer, are you familiar with the exchange of letters between
General Nichols and Dr. Oppenheimer? Have you read them?
The WITNESS. I have read that double-page spread in the New York Times,
which contains I believe what you are referring to.
Mr. GRAY. I suppose that was accurate. I never checked it. I would like
to read you a part of General Nichols' letter. This is in a paragraph which in
its entirety related to the hydrogen bomb, starting about the middle of the
paragraph :
"It was further reported that even after it was determined as a matter of
national policy to proceed with development of a hydrogen bomb, you continued
to oppose the project and declined to cooperate fully in the project"
That is a sentence in that paragraph. In order to get a clearer view of your
opinion in my own mind, may I assume it is an accurate reflection of your
testimony that this suggestion is not borne out by your understanding of events,
that is, you have not testified that Dr. Oppenheimer continued to oppose the
project?
The WITNESS. I am forced to say that my impressions of that period were
more consistent with the hypothesis that he was still personally opposing the
project than with the hypothesis that he had made a major change in his views
and was now strongly supporting the project.
Mr. GBAY. I suppose there is a difference of finding oneself in personal oppo-
sition and finding oneself opposing. I must say I had not thought of a distinc-
tion of this sort in this language until this moment But I would like to know
what you feel. Let us assume that this means actively opposed as distinguished
from holding to personal views in opposition. Is that a clear distinction in
your mind?
The WITNESS. I must admit that I am likewise trying to make a finer distinc-
tion than I thought about commonly before. What I mean to say is essentially
this: I have no persooal knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer going to Mr. X and
saying don t work at Los Alamos, or of his making a technical recommendation
obviously and distinctly contrary to the demonstrable good of the program.
0tiSr<haSk I ^^ &*** fluted* believing that the program would
Ce^? SS^*8 that !t md haye at *&** tt*6 " *» had enthusi-
urged individuals to participate in the program, because as I said
before, he was a great personal influence among theoretical physicists at that
time. I am afraid the distinction is primarily one of ignorance.
707
Mr. GBAT. It is clear that you have said that yon feel that Dr. Oppenhetmer
failed to encourage people or did not encourage people— I don't mean to nse
a word that is loaded— did not encourage people to work on the project You
have said you didn't know of any instances in which he actively sought to
discourage people from working on the project
The WITNESS. At least not at this time. Part of my impressions may have
carried over from instances known in greater detail at a date nearer the time of
events.
Mr. GBAT. You could not name anyone that you thought had failed to work
on the project because of Dr. Oppenheiiner's persuasive powers?
The WITNESS. I know, for example, there was much discussion about Hans
Bethe at that time. It is entirely plausible to me that had Dr. Oppenheimer
encouraged Dr. Bethe he might have very likely entered the program actively
at that time. This is supposition. I was certainly not present at the conver-
sations between Dr. Bethe and Dr. Oppenheimer. I mention Dr. Bethe in part
by way of example.
Mr. GBAT. Would you return for a moment to the second GAO meeting in
late 1949—1 have forgotten when that was. December, I tM*Ofc.
The WITNESS. I believe so.
Mr. GRAY. At which time you and General McOormack were invited to present
your views to the General Advisory Committee. I believe you said that General
McOormack spoke at some length and you supported his views. What was
Getieral McOormack's view and yours at the time? What was expressed to the
GAO as well "as you recall it?
The WITNESS. -My recollection is rather vague of that particular time, and
I am somewhat reluctant to try to put words in General McCormack's mouth
after this lapse, but the view that I believe I would have been attempting to
present at that time was essentially the one, that one could not improve the
national defense by remaining in ignorance in an area where there are develop-
ments of potentially very great importance to the national defense. I was
unable to see how a policy of intentionally not pursuing a vigorous program
could possibly be consistent with optimum defense of the country.
Mr. GBAT. You referred to what you supported as a more vigorous program
than was in effect at that time. It is clear that the General Advisory Committee
recommended in October and again in December against an all out production
effort of the so-called super. That was clearly one of the recommendations, as
I understand it.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAT. I would like to put to you a question I have put to other witnesses
with very little success, and it may be my ignorance or just my failure to ask
a question properly. In your judgment was there something that the GAG could
have recommended at this time which was short of an all-out production pro-
gram but more than was recommended?
The WITNESS. Oh, indeed; obviously, to me.
Mr. GBAT. Was that your position at the time, or were you for the all-our
production? You see I am a little confused when you say a more vigorous
program.
The WITNESS. Let me put it this way. I was for a very vigorous program, one
which would have the highest possible priority, subject to reasonable continu-
ation of other important programs. In other words, I was not in favor of
stopping a lot of other important activities, but I was thoroughly convinced
that the necessary manpower could be recruited, the necessary facilities pro-
vided, for a very vigorous program of the general nature that was being dis-
cussed and advocated at that time by Dr. Lawrence and Dr. Teller and others.
I believe I said at that time— I am sure I felt— that this business of a crash
program was largely what we called a strawman. In other words, it seems to
me that the General Advisory Committee was clearly in a position to have
recommended a program of intermediate intensity if such had been their
judgment
The recommendations that were actually made, as you gentlemen have them,
are almost entirely negative in character. They are in terms of not doing this
and not doing that
Mr. GBAT. The reason I started to smile is I think you answered my question,
the question I have been trying to ask, at least you have given me your opinion
about it, and you made it clear to me that perhaps there is a valid distinction,
at least in your mind, between something that was all out and something that
was more vigorous than was then in progress.
708
May I turn now to another thing about which you testified very briefly, Dr.
Pitzer. You referred to your unhappiness with respects to events that led up
to congressional action in attaching the rider to the appropriation bill. What
are these events that you have in mind?
The WITNESS. The sequence began with a young man by the name of Priestad.
Mr. GEAT. I didn't mean to bring my university into this hearing.
The WITNESS. I am sorry; the facts are that way.
Mr. GRAY. I honestly did not know this is what you were talking about.
The WITNESS. He was first essentially exposed and discussed as essentially, I
believe, an admitted Communist and holding a fellowship. Hearings were held
and there was a great deal of discussion in the press, and as it were, one thing
went on to another, until, the Senate in due time attached this rider to the bill
and the House accepted it.
Mr. GRAY. Prior to this time when the Congress established the requirement
which you fbund yourself unhappy about, did you participate in any kind of
discussions with respect to what should be required of these fellows in the way
of disclosure of political offlliations as we seem to refer to them, in this hearing?
The WITNESS. Yes. There were discussions within the Commission at that
time. I have forgotten exactly the details. I certainly participated in such
discussions.
Mr. GRAY. Would the GAG have participated in this kind of discussion? You,
of course, were not a member of the GAC.
The WITNESS. I don't recall the chronology. This fellowship business hap-
pened pretty fast, and I rather doubt if there happened to occur a GAC meeting
in that period. I believe I recall that the then Chairman, Mr. Lilienthal, got in
contact with Dr. Oppenheimer and possibly other members of the GAC by tele-
phone—they may have to come to Washington specially— and it may have been
that a meeting was held, but I don't recall such.
Mr. GRAY. Let us leave the GAC out of it at this point and let me approach
it from another angle the thing that I am trying to get clear in my mind.
There were discussions, I assume, in which a suggestion was made that
there should be no inquiry put to an Atomic Energy Commission fellow with
respect to his political affiliations. This was the view of some people at that
time, is that correct?
The WITNESS. I believe such views were held at that time. *
Mr. GRAY. My question is this : Was this the view of the Commission at that
time, or could the Commission be said to have had a view?
The WITNESS. I don't believe the Commission could be said to have had a
view at that time. At least if as a Commission it reached any decision, I am
not aware of it now.
Mr. GRAY. I don't think I will pursue that any further, Dr. Pitzer. Dr.
Evans?
Dr. EVANS. Dr. Pitzer, you said you were not a nuclear physicist, is that right?
The WITNESS. That is correct
Dr. EVANS. Would you call yourself a physical chemist or a physicst?
The WITNESS. I would call myself a physical chemist; yes, sir.
Dr. EVANS. I want to ask you if you met a man in recent years, a graduate
of OaL Tech., by the name of Sheehan? It is one of my students that I sent out
there. I thought he was particularly brilliant He got a Ph. D. degree.
The WITNESS. I have met, I believe, casually, a young Sheehan, but I don't
know enough about his background to complete the identification with certainty.
Dr. EVANS. Have you met any Communists in the course of your career, that
you knew were Communists?
The WITNESS. It may well have happened. They didn't have Communist labels
pinned on them at the time.
Dr. EVANS. They don't often have, do they?
The WITNESS. No, they don't often have.
Dr. EVANS. Did you know David Hawkins?
The WITNESS. The name is familiar to me. If I ever met hire, I do not recall it
Dr. EVATO. Did you know Bernie Peters?
The WITNESS. Again if I ever met him personally, I do not recall It, although
I recall very vividly the case of getting him a passport to India that took a
definite Commission action, so that his name is definitely familiar to me.
Dr. EVAKS- Did you know Fnchs?
The WITNESS, I don't believe I ever knew Fuchs, or ever met him. I knew of
Mm from the scientific literature.
Dr. EVANS. I have no further questions.
709
BEDIBECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Doctor, is it or is it not true in your opinion that in the case of a scientist
as influential as Dr. Oppenheimer a failure to lend enthusiasm and vigorous sup-
port to a program might constitute hindrance to the program or opposition to
the program?
A. There is a certain element of semantics in that question, hut I would say
yes.
Mr. BOBB. Thank you.
He-cross-examination by Mr. SILVEBMAN:
Q. I think I have just one more question. You testified about the difficulty of
obtaining staff on the thermonuclear program. I think you indicated that Dr.
Oppenheimer was not helpful. Is Dr. Karplus at CaL Tech.?
A. I believe so.
Q. Do you know whether he is a man that Dr. Oppenheimer recommended to
go there?
A. I don't know the details.
Q. He is or has been from time to time a temporary member of the Institute
for Advanced Study, has he not?
A. As I say, I am not familiar with the details in that case. The staffing at
Livermore In the physics area has been in the very able hands of Earnest Law-
rence and other physicists, including Edward Teller. I simply have not felt it
necessary or needful to pay attention to details in that area.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. That is alL
Mr. BOBB. That is alL
Mr. GBAY. Thank you very much, Dr. Pitzer.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GRAY. We will recess now, gentlemen, for a few minutes.
Mr. GBAY. Dr. Teller, do you wish to testify under oath?
Dr. TELLER. I do.
Mr. GRAY. Would you raise your right hand and give me your full name?
Dr. TELLEB. Edward Teller.
Mr. GBAY. Edward Teller, do you swear that the testimony you- are to give
the board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing bu»t the truth, so help
you God?
Dr. TELLEB. I do.
Whereupon, Edward Teller was called as a witness, and having been first duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GBAY. Will you sit down.
Dr. Teller, it is my duty to renr""^ you of the existence of the so-called perjury
statutes with respect to testifying in a Government proceeding and testifying
under oath. May I assume that you are generally familiar with those statutes?
The WITNESS. I am.
Mr. GBAY. May I ask, sir, that if in the course of you<r testimony it becomes
necessary for you to refer to or to disclose restricted data, you let me know in
advance, so that we may take appropriate and necessary steps in the interests
of security.
Blnally, may I say to you that we consider this proceeding a confidential
matter between the Atomic Energy Commission, its officials and witnesses on
the one hand, and Dr. Oppenheimer and his representatives on the other. The
Commission is not effecting news releases with respect to these proceedings, and
we express the hope that witnesses will take the same view.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. Dr. Teller, may I ask you, sir, at the outset, are you appearing as a witness
here today because you want to be here?
A. I appear because I have been asked to and because I consider it my dujty
upon request to say what I fo^ir in the matter. I would have preferred not to
appear.
Q. I believe, sir, that you stated to me some time ago that anything you had
to say, you wished to say in the presence of Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. That is correct
Q. May I ask you, sir, to tell the board briefly of your academic background
and training.
A. I started to study in Budapest where I was born, at the Institute of Tech-
nology there* chemical engineering for a very short time. I continued in Ger-
710
many, first in chemical engineering and mathematics, then in Munich for a short
time, and finally in Leipzig in physics, where I took my doctor's degree.
After that I worked as a research associate in Goettingen, I taught in London.
I had a fellowship, a Rockef eller fellowship in Copenhagen.
In 1935 1 came to this country and taught for 6 years at the George Washington
University, that is, essentially until the beginning of the war.
At that time I went to Columbia on leave of absence, partly to teach and
partly in the very beginnings of the war work in 1941-42, as I remember, and
then I participated in the war work. After the war I returned to teach in
Chicago at the University of Chicago, which also was interrupted with some
work for the ABC, and now for the last year I am at the University of California
in Berkeley.
Q. Dr. Teller, you know Dr. Oppenheimer well ; do you not?
A. I have known Dr. Oppenheimer for a long time. I first got closely asso-
ciated with him in the summer of 1942 in connection with atomic energy work.
Later in Los Alamos and after Los Alamos I knew him. I met him frequently,
but I was not particularly closely associated with him, and I did not discuss
with him very frequently or in very great detail matters outside of business
matters.
Q. To simplify the issues here, perhaps, let me ask you this question: Is it
your intention in anything that you are about to testify to, to suggest that Dr.
Oppenheimer is disloyal to the United States?
A. I do not want to suggest anything of the kind. I know Oppenheimer as
an intellectually most alert and a very complicated person, and I think it would
be presumptuous and wrong on my part if I would try in any way to analyze
his motives. But I have always assumed, and I now assume that he is loyal
to the United States. I believe this, and I shall believe it until I see very
conclusive proof to the opposite.
Q. Now, a question which is the corollary of that. Do you or do you not
believe that Dr. Oppenheimer is a security risk?
A. In a great number of cases I have seen Dr. Oppenheimer act— I under-
stood that Dr. Oppenheimer acted. — in a way which for me was exceedingly
hard to understand. I thoroughly disagreed with him in numerous issues and
his actions frankly appeared to me confused and complicated. To this extent
I feel that I would like to see the vital interests of this country in hands which
I understand better, and therefore trust more.
In this very limited sense I would like to express a feeling that I would feel
personally more secure if public matters would rest in other hands.
Q. One question I should have asked you before, Dr. Teller, Are you an
American citizen, sir?
A. lam.
Q. When were you naturalized?
A. In 1941.
Q. I believe you said that about 1941 you began to work on the atomic bomb
program.
A. I don't think I said that Certainly I did not intend to say it.
Q. I will rephrase the question. When did you begin to work on the atomic
bomb program?
A. That again I am not sure I can answer simply. I became aware of the
atomic-bomb program early in 1939. I have been close to it ever since, and I
have at least part of the time worked on it and worried about it ever since.
Q. Did you work during the war at Los Alamos?
A. I did.
Q. When did you go there, sir?
A. In April 1948.
Q. What was the nature of your work there?
A. It was theoretical work connected with the atomic bomb. Generally speak-
ing— I do not know whether I have to go into that in any detail — I was more
interested by choice and also by directive in advanced development, so that at
the beginning I think my work was perhaps more closely connected with the
actual outcome or what happened in Alamagordo, but very soon my work shifted
into fields which were not to bear fruition until a much later time.
Q. Will you tell the board whether or not while you were in Los Alamos in
1943 or 1944, you did any work or had any discussions about the so-called thermo-
nuclear weapon?
A. Excuse me, if I may restate your question. I got to Los Alamos in early
April 1943. To the best of my recollection, although I might be wrong— I mean
711
my date might not be quite precise — I left at the beginning of February 1946.
Throughout this period I had very frequent discussions about thermonuclear
matters.
Q. Will you tell us whether you ever discussed the thermonuclear method with
Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I discussed it very frequently indeed with him. In fact my discussions
date back to our first association in this matter, namely, to the summer of
1942.
Q. What was Dr. Oppenheimer's opinion in those discussions during those
years about the feasibility of producing a thermonuclear weapon?
A. This is something which I wish you would allow me to answer slightly in
detail, because it is not an easy question.
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I hope that I can keep my answer in an unclassified way. I hope I am not
disclosing a secret when I say that to construct the thermonuclear bomb is not
a very easy thing, and that In our discussions, all of us frequently believed it
could be done, and again we frequently believed it could not be done. I
think Dr. Oppenheimer's opinions shifted with the shifting evidence. To the
best of my recollection before we got to Los Alamos we had all of us consider-
able hopes that the thermonuclear bomb can be constructed. It was my under-
standing that these hopes were fully shared by Dr. Oppenheimer.
Later some disappeared and perhaps to counterbalance some things that
might have been said, I think I have made myself some contributions in dis-
covering some of these difficulties.
I clearly remember that toward the end of the war Dr. Oppenheimer encour-
aged me to go ahead with the thermonuclear investigations. I further remember
that in the summer of 1945, after the test at Alamogordo it was generally under-
stood in the laboratory that we are going to develop thermonuclear bombs in a
vigorous fashion and that quite a number of people, such as the most outstand-
ing, like Fermi and Bethe, would participate in it
I also know that very shortly after the dropping of bombs on Japan this plan
was changed and to the best of my belief it was changed at least in good
part because of the opinion of Dr. Oppenheimer that this is not the time to
pursue this program any further.
I should like to add to this, however, that this also thoroughly responded
to the temper of the people in the laboratory, most of whom at that time
understandably and clearly and in consonance with the general tempo of the
country, wanted to go home.
Q. Did you have any conversations with Dr. Oppenheimer at or about
September 1946 about working on the thermonuclear?
A. We had around that period several conversations and in one of them,
to the best of my recollection, Oppenheimer and Fermi and Allison and I were
present. Oppenheimer argued that this is not the time at which to pursue
the business further, that this is a very interesting program, that it would be a
wonderful thing if we could pursue it in a really peaceful world under interna-
tional cooperation, but that under the present setup this was not a good idea
to go on with it.
I perhaps should also like to mention that to the best of my knowledge at
that time there was a decision by a board composed of several prominent people,
one of them Dr. Oppenheimer, which decided in effect that thermonuclear work
either cannot or should not be pursued that it at any rate was a long-term under-
taking requiring very considerable effort. To my mind this was in sharp
contrast to the policy pursued a short time before.
But I also should say that this sharp contrast was at least in part motivated
by the fact that in Los Alamos there was a crew of exceedingly able physicists
who could do a lot and at the end of the war were trying to get back to their
purely academic duties, and in this new atmosphere it might have appeared
indeed hard to continue with such an ambitious program.
One member of the board which made this decision, Fermi, and who concurred
in that decision, told me about that decision and told me that he knew that I am
likely to disagree with it, and asked me to state my opinion in writing. This I
did, and I gave my written statement to Oppenheimer, and therefore, both the
opinion that the thermonuclear bomb at that time was not feasible, and my own
opinion that one could have proceeded in this direction are documented.
Q. Did there come a time when yon left Los Alamos after the war?
A. That is right. As I mentioned, I left in February 1946. May I perhaps add
something here if we are proceeding in a chronological manner?
Q. Yes.
712
A. Perhaps if I might interject this not in response to one of your questions.
Q. That is perfectly all right, sir.
A. I would like to say that I consider Dr. Oppenheimer's direction of the Los
Alamos Laboratory a very outstanding achievement due mainly to the fact that
with his very quick mind he found out very promptly what was going on in
every part of the laboratory, made right judgments about things, supported work
when work had to be supported, and also I think with his very remarkable insight
in psychological matters, made just a most wonderful and excellent director.
Q. In that statement were you speaking of Dr. Oppenheimer's ability as an
administrator or his contribution as a scientist or both?
A. I would like to say that I would say in a way both. As an administrator
he was so busy that his purely scientific contributions to my mind and in my
judgment were not outstanding, that is, not insofar as I could see his original
contributions. But nevertheless, his scientific contributions were great by exer-
cising quick and sound judgment and giving the right kind of encouragement in
very many different cases. I should think that scientific initiative came from a
great number of other excellent people whom Oppenheimer not let alone but also
to a very great extent by his able recruiting effort he collected a very consider-
able number of them, and I should say that purely scientific initiatives and contri-
butions came from many people, such like, for instance, von Neumann, Bethe,
Segre, to mention a few with whom I am very closely connected, and very many
others, and I cannot begin to make a complete list of them.
Q. Ooming back to a previous question, Doctor, you say you did leave the
laboratory in January 1946?
A. I believe February 1946, but it might be the last days of January. I do not
remember so accurately.
Q. Would you tell us whether or not before that happened you had any conver-
sations with Dr. Bradbury and Dr. Oppenheimer about the question of whether
you should leave or not?
A. I had several conversations.
Q. Would you tell us about those conversations?
A. Of this kind. I am not at all sure that I can mention them all to you. One
was to the best of my recollection in August of 1946, at which time the laboratory
was still apparently going at full tilt Dr. Oppenheimer came to see me in my
office.
Q. You said August 1946?
A. August 1945. Thank you very much for catching this mistake.
He had a long conversation with me from which it became clear to me that
Dr. Oppenheimer thought that the laboratory would inevitably disintegrate, and
that there was not much point in my staying there, at least that is how I under-
stood him. I had been planning to go to Chicago where I was invited to go, and
participate in teaching and research work, which I was looking forward to.
Then somewhere during the fall of 1945, 1 believe, Bradbury asked me to take on
the job of heading the Theoretical Division.
I was very much interested in seeing the continuation of Los Alamos in a
vigorous manner, and in spite of my desire to go back to academic work, I con-
sidered this very seriously. I asked Bradbury about the program of the labora-
tory and in effect I told him— I certainly do not remember my words— that I
would stay if 1 or 2 conditions would be met, not both, but one of them. Either
if we could continue with the fission program vigorously and as a criterion
whether we would do that or not, I said let us see if we could test something
like 12 fission weapons per year, or, if instead we would go into a thorough
investigation of the thermonuclear question.
Bradbury, I think realistically, said at that time that both of these programs
were unfortunately out of the question, I still did not say no. Oppenheimer
was going to come and visit the laboratory shortly after, and I wanted to discuss
it with him.
I asked him or I told him that Bradbury had invited me, and asked him whether
I should stay. Oppenheimer said that I should stay and he also mentioned that
he knows that General Groves is quite anxious that I should. Then I mentioned to
him the discussion with Bradbury. I said something to this effect This has
been your laboratory. This Is your laboratory. It will not prosper unless you
support it, and I don't want to stay here If the laboratory won't prosper.
Q. If what?
A. If the laboratory will not prosper. I* think I said, I know that there can
be no hard and fast program now, but I would like to know whether I can count
on your help In getting a vigorous program somewhere along the lines I men-
tioned established here.
713
Again I am sorry I cannot quote any literal reply by Oppenheimer, but my
recollection of his reply was that it meant that he is neither able nor willing to
help in an undertaking of this kind. I thereupon said that under these condi-
tions I think I better leave the laboratory.
Oppenheimer's statement was that he thought that this was really the right
decision, and by leaving the laboratory at that time, I could be of greater service
to the atomic energy enterprise at a later period.
I remember having seen Oppenheimer the same evening at some party. I
forget in whose house it was. He asked me then whether having made up my
mind, I don't feel better, and I still remember that I told him that I didn't feel
better. But that was where the matter rested at that time.
I think this tied in more or less with my general impression that Oppenheimer
felt at least for 1 year after the laboratory that Los Alamos cannot and probably
should not continue, and it is Just as wise and correct to abandon it.
I am exceedingly glad that due to the very determined action of Bradbury,
who was not deterred by any prophecies of this kind, the laboratory was not
abandoned, because I am sure had that been done, we would be now in a much
worse position in our armament race than we happen to be.
Q. Do you recall any remark by anybody to the effect that the laboratory
should be given back to the Indians?
A. I heard this statement attributed to Oppenheimer. I do not remember
that he ever said so to my hearing.
Q. Thereafter, you did in fact leave Los Alamos, Doctor?
A. I left Los Alamos, but I did go back very frequently as a consultant.
Q. Where did you go from Los Alamos?
A. To the University of Chicago.
Q. When you went back as a consultant what was the particular problem you
were working on?
A. Actually I have been working on quite a number of problems as required.
I, of course, continue to be very much interested in the thermonuclear develop-
ment, and I did continue to work on it, as it were, part time. This, however,
at that time was a very minor portion of the enterprise of the laboratory. I
would say that on the average between 1945 and 1949 — I don't know — a very
few people worked on it steadily. I would not be able to say whether this
number was 8 or 4 or 5 or 6 out of a thousand or more than a thousand in the
laboratory. But this was the order of magnitude, and therefore popularly ex-
pressing and crudely expressing the state of affairs, in spite of my working there
and in spite of some reports being issued, I can say that the work was virtually
at a standstill
Those were also the years when after some initial hesitation, the testing
program was resumed. I understand that this resumption of the testing pro-
gram was encouraged by the General Advisory Committee on which Oppen-
heimer was the Chairman. I was also a little bit involved in planning the first
extensive test after the war. I don't mean now the Bikini test, but the following
one, which I flh1nk was called Sandstone. So I would like to say that even
the fraction of the time which was considerably less than one-half, which was
one-third, it perhaps was not even as much as one-third, I was spending at
Los Alamos. Perhaps one-third of my time went into Atomic Energy Commis-
sion work, and this was divided between thermonuclear work and other sup-
porting work for Los Alamos, and work on an appointment which I got on the
recommendation, I believe, of the General Advisory Committee, on the safety of
reactors.
So I would say that of my own time a really small fraction has gone into
thermonuclear development during those years and that altogether the effort
was very, very slow, indeed.
Q. You were familiar with the effort that was being put in at Los Alamos
in respect of thermonuclear?
A. I was.
Q. Doctor, let me ask you for your opinion as an expert on this question.
Suppose you had gone to work on thermonuclear in 1945 or 1946 — really gone
to work on it— can you give us any opinion as to when in your view you might
have achieved that weapon and would you explain your opinion?
A. I actually did go to work on it with considerable determination after the
Russian bomb was dropped. This was done in a laboratory which at that time
was considerably behind Los Alamos at the end of the war. It is my belief that
if at the end of the war some people like Dr. Oppenheimer would have lent
moral support, not even their own work— Just moral support— to work on the
714
thermonuclear gadget, I think we could have kept at least as many people In
Los Alamos as we then recruited in 1949 under very difficult conditions.
I therefore believe that if we had gone to work in 1945, we could have achieved
the thermonuclear bomb just about 4 years earlier. This of course is very much
a matter of opinion because what would have happened if things had been dif-
ferent is certainly not something that one can ever produce by any experiment.
Q. That is right.
A. I think that statements about the possible different course of the past
are not more justified but only less hazardous than statements about the future.
Q. Doctor, it has been suggested here that the ultimate success on the thermo-
nuclear was the result of a brilliant discovery or invention by you, and that
might or might not have taken 5 or 10 years. What can you say about that?
A. I can say about it this. If I want to walk from here to that corner of
the room, and you ask me how long it takes to get there, it depends all on what
speed I am walking with and in what direction. If I start in that direction
I will never get there, probably. It so happened that very few people gave any
serious thought in this country to the development of the thermonuclear bomb.
This was due to the fact that during the war we were much too busy with things
that had to be done immediately in order that it should be effective during the
war, and therefore not much time was left over.
After the war the people who stayed in Los Alamos, few and discouraged
as they were, had their hands full in keeping the laboratory alive, keeping up
even the knowledge of how to work on the simple fission weapons. The rest of
the scientists were, I think, equally much too busy trying to be very sure not
to get into an armament race, and arguing why to continue the direction in
which we had been going due to the war would be completely wrong. I think
that it was neither a great achievement nor a brilliant one. It just had to be
done. I must say it was not completely easy. There were some pitfalls. But
I do believe that if the original plan in Los Alamos, namely, that the laboratory
with such excellent people like Fermi and Bethe and others, would have gone
after the problem, probably some of these people would have had either the same
brilliant idea or another one much sooner.
In that case I think we would have had the bomb in 1947. I do not believe
that it was a particularly difficult thing as scientific discoveries go. I do not
think that we should now feel that we have a safety as compared to the Rus-
sians, and think it was just necessary that somebody should be looking and
looking with some intensity and some conviction that there is also some-
tiling there.
Q. Is this a fair summary
A. May I perhaps say that this again is an attempt at appreciating or evalu-
ating a situation, and I may be of course quite wrong, because this is clearly not
a matter of fact but a matter of opinion.
Q. Is this a fair summary of your opinion, Doctor, that if you don't seek,
you don't find?
A. Certainly.
Q. Do you recall when the Russians exploded their first bomb in September
1949? Do you recall that event?
A. Certainly.
Q. Will you ten the board whether or not shortly thereafter you had a con-
versation with Dr. Oppenheimer about the thermonuclear or about what ac-
tivity should be undertaken to meet the Russian advance?
A. I remember two such conversations. One was in the fall and necessarily
superficial. That was just a very few hours after I heard, returning from a
trip abroad, that the Russians had exploded an A-bomb. I called up Oppen-
heimer who happened to be in Washington, as I was at that time, and I asked
him for advice, and this time I remember his advice literally. It was, "Keep
your shirt on."
Perhaps I might mention that my mind did not immediately turn in the direc-
tion of working on the thermonuclear bomb. I had by that time quite thor-
oughly accepted the idea that with the reduced personnel it was much too
dlfllcult an undertaking. I perhaps should mention, and I think it will dear
the picture, that a few months before the Russian explosion I agreed to rejoin
Los Alamos for the period of 1 year on leave of absence from the University of
Chicago.
I should also mention that prior to that Oppenheimer had taiked to me and
encouraged me to go back to Los Alamos, and help to the work there. I also
went back to Los Alamos with the understanding and with the expectation that
715
I shall just help along In their normal program in which some very incipient
phases of the thermonuclear work was included, but nothing on a very serious
scale.
I was quite prepared to contribute mostly in the direction of the fission
weapons. At the time when I returned from this short trip abroad, and was
very much disturbed about the Russian bomb, I was looking around for ways
in which we could more successfully speed up our work and only after several
weeks of discussion did I come to the conclusion that no matter what the odds
seemed to be, we must at this time— I at least must at this time put my full
attention to the thermonuclear program.
I also felt that this was much too big an undertaking and I was just very
scared of it. I was looking around for some of the old crew to come out and
participate in this work. Actually if anyone wanted to head this enterprise,
one of the people whom I went to visit, in fact the only one where I had very
strong hopes, was Hans Bethe.
Q. About when was this, Doctor?
A. To the best of my recollection it was the end of October.
Q. 1949?
A. Right. Again I am not absolutely certain of my dates, but that is the best
of my memory. I can tie it down a little bit better with respect to other dates.
It was a short time before the GAC meeting in which that committee made a
decision against the thermonuclear program.
After a somewhat strenuous discussion, Bethe, to the best of my understanding,
decided that he would come to Los Alamos and help us. During this discussion,
Oppenheimer called up and invited Bethe and me to come and discuss this
matter win him in Princeton. This we did do, and visited Oppenheimer in his
office.
When we arrived, I remember that Oppenheimer showed us a letter on his desk
which he said he had just received. This letter was from Conant I do not
know whether he showed us the whole letter or whether he showed us a short
section of it, or whether he only read to us a short section. Whichever it was,
and I cannot say which it was, one phrase of Conant's sticks in my mind, and
that phrase was "over my dead body," referring to a decision to go ahead with a
crash program on the thermonuclear bomb.
Apart from showing us this letter, or reading it to us, whichever it was,
Oppenheimer to the best of my recollection did not argue against any crash
program. We did talk for quite awhile and could not possibly reproduce the
whole argument but at least one important trend in this discussion— and I do
not know how relevant this is— was that Oppenheimer argued that some phases
of exaggerated secrecy in connection with the A-bomb was perhaps not to the
best interests of the country, and that if he undertook the thermonuclear develop-
ment, this should be done right from the first and should be done more openly.
I remember that Bethe reacted to that quite violently, because he thought that
if we proceeded with thermonuclear development, then both— not only our
methods of work — but even the fact that we were working and if possible the
results of our work should be most definitely kept from any public knowledge or
any public announcement.
To the best of my recollection, no agreement came out of this, but when Bethe
and I left Oppenheimer's office, Bethe was still intending to come to Los Alamos.
Actually, I had been under the impression that Oppenheimer is opposed to the
thermonuclear bomb or to a development of the thermonuclear bomb, and I don't
think there was terribly much direct evidence to base this impression on. I am
pretty sure that I expressed to Bethe the worry, we are going to talk with Oppen-
heimer now, and after that you will not come. When we left the office, Bethe
turned to me and smiled and he said, "You see, you can be quite satisfied. I am
still coming."
I do not know whether Bethe has talked again with Oppenheimer about that
or not I have some sort of a general understanding that he did not, but I am
not at all sure that this is true.
Two days later I called up Bethe in New York, and he was in New York at that
time, and Bethe then said that he thought it over, and he had changed his mind,
and he was not coming.
I regretted this very much, and Bethe actually did not join work on the
thermonuclear development until quite late in the game, essentially to put on
the finishing touches.
I do not know whether this sufficiently answers your question.
716
Q. Yes, sir. Then, Doctor, the record here shows that on October 29 and 30,
1949, the GAC held its meeting, and thereafter reported its views on the thermo-
nuclear program. Did you later see a copy of the report of the GAO?
A. I did.
Q. Would you tell us the circumstances under which you saw that?
A. Immediately following the meeting, the decision of the General Advisory
Committee was kept very strictly confidential. I have seen at least one member
of the committee namely, Fermi, who in spite of our very close relationships and
the general support of my work in Los Alamos and his knowledge of my almost
desperate interest in the undertaking, said that for the time being he Just could
not even give me an indication of what is happening except from the general
tenor of his remarks it was clear that whatever decisions were reached were not
terribly favorable to a crash program.
I sort of understood that some kind of action or discussion was under way
which can proceed properly only if it is kept in the very smallest circles. This
also, of course, became known in Los Alamos, and caused quite a bit of worry
there.
After passage of a little while— and I do not know how much time, but I would
say roughly 2 weeks — the secretary of the General Advisory Committee, Dr.
Manley, who also was associate director in Los Alamos, returned to Los Alamos.
He called me into his office and showed me both the majority and minority
report of the General Advisory Committee, and in showing me these reports, he
used words which I at least at that time interpreted as meaning that Oppenheimer
wanted me to see these reports, which I thought was kind. My general under-
standing was that these reports were also shown to something like half a dozen
or dozen of the senior people in the laboratory.
At any rate, the contents of the report were known without my telling it to
people. It was just public knowledge among the senior people practically
then and there. Of course I was just most dreadfully disappointed about the
contents of the majority and minority reports, which in my eyes did not differ
a great deal.
I also should say that in my opinion the work in Los Alamos was going to be
most seriously affected by the action of the General Advisory Committee, not only
as an official body, but because of the very great prestige of the people who were
sitting on it. Therefore, it seemed to me at that time, and it also seems to me
now entirely proper that this document should have been made available in Los
Alamos.
Q. Doctor, in what way did you th*«V that the work would be affected by the
report?
A. I would say that when I saw the report, I thought that this definitely was the
end of any thermonuclear effort in Los Alamos. Actually I was completely mis*
taken. The report produced precisely the opposite effect.
Q. Why?
A. Immediately, of course, it stopped work because we were instructed not to
work, but it gave people in Los Alamos much greater eagerness to proceed in this
direction and from discussions I had in Los Alamos in the following days, I
gathered the following psychological reaction :
First of all, people were interested in going on with the thermonuclear device
because during the war it had been generally understood that this was one of
the things that the laboratory was to find out at some time -or other. It was
a sort of promise in all of our minds.
Another thing was that the people there were a little bit tired— at least many,
particularly of the younger ones — of going ahead with minor improvements and
wanted to in sort of an adventurous spirit go into a new field. However, I think
the strongest point and the one which was a reaction to this report was this:
Not only to me, but to very many others who said this to me spontaneously, the
report meant this. As long as you people go ahead and make minor improve-
ments and work very hard and diligently at it, you are doing a fine job, but if
you succeed in making a really great piece of progress, then you are doing
something that is immoral. This kind of statement stated so bluntly was not
of course made in the report. But this kind of an implication is something which
I think a human being can support in an abstract sense. But if it refers to
his own work, then I think almost anybody would become indignant, and this is
what happened in Los Alamos, and the result was that I ffifTifc the feelings of
people in consequence of this report turned more toward the thermonuclear
development than away from it
Q. Yon means it made them mad.
A. Yea.
717
Q. Doctor, In the absence of the President's decision of January, would that
anger have been effective?
A. No.
Q. Let us go back for a moment
A. There is no doubt about it. The laboratory Just could not put aside a major
fraction of its effort on a program of this kind unless we were going to be
instructed to do it. Actually, I am pretty sure the anger in a way would have
been effective in that more people would have been willing to put aside a little
part of their time and worry about it and think about it, and so perhaps it
would have been a little effective. But I think that still would have been a
very slow and painful progress and probably even now we would be Just nowhere.
Q. Dr. Manley has submitted an affidavit here to the effect that he showed
you those reports as a result of an impending visit to Los Alamos by Chairman
McMahon, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.
Would you comment on that, and tell us Just what it was that Dr. Manley said
that gave you the impression that it was Dr. Oppenheimer who wanted you
to see the report and tell us whether or not Dr. Manley's remarks were sus-
ceptible of the interpretation that it was Chairman McMahon who wanted you
to see them?
A, I must say this is possible. To the best of my recollection, I was even
struck at that time by these words— Manley said something of that kind, that our
Chairman, or the Chairman, I don't know which, sends his regards and wants
you to see this. Now, this is to the best of my recollection, and I don't remember
that Qppenheimer's name was mentioned. At that time I interpreted this as
meaning that it was the Chairman of the General Advisory Committee--that is
Oppenheimer. I am quite sure that Manley did not say explicitly that it was
McMahon, and to refer to him as simply Chairman would seem to me to be a
little remarkable. However, Manley has been showing this document to quite
a few people, and perhaps in repeating the phrase a few times parts of the phrase
got dropped off. I interpreted it at that time as meaning that Oppenheimer
wanted me to see the document. I think it is not excluded that it was Senator
McMahon who wanted me to see the document; and if Manley says this, then
it must be so.
Q. Did you know Senator McMahon?
A. Yes.
Q. Let me ask you whether or not in that conversation with Manley he men-
tioned Senator McMahon by name.
A. To the best of my memory, no. I do remember that Senator McMahon
came out shortly afterward. I believe I heard about his visit only later, but
I might be mistaken.
Q. On the subject of Senator McMahon, will you tell the board whether or not
you had proposed to see Senator McMahon about the thermonuclear matter?
A. I did.
Q. When was that?
A. This was quite shortly after the meeting of the General Advisory Com-
mittee.
Q. Did you see him?
A. I did.
Q. Did you have any conversation with Dr. Manley before you saw him?
A. I did.
Q. Tell us about that
A. I had two conversations with him ; the one which I think is more relevant,
and which certainly strikes more clearly in my mind, was a telephone conversa-
tion. This was after the meeting of the General Advisory Committee. I was
on my way from Los Alamos to Washington. The main purpose of my visit was
to see Senator McMahon. On the way I stopped in Chicago and saw Fermi in
his office. It was at that time that I got the impression which I mentioned to
you earlier. During my conversation with Fermi, Manley called and asked
me not to see Senator McMahon. I asked why. He said that it would be a good
idea if the scientists presented a united front—I don't know whether he used
that word— I think what he really said was something of this kind, that it would
be unfortunate if Senator McMahon would get the impression that there is a
divided opinion among the scientists, or something of that kind. I said I had
an appointment with Senator McMahon and I wanted to see him. Manley insisted
that I should not. Thereupon I made the suggestion that I would be willing to
call up Senator McMahon and tell him that I had been asked not to see him,
and for that reason I would not see him.
718
At that point Manley— I don't knew whether I said to Manley that I had been
asked by him or whether I would just say I had been asked — and thereupon
Manley said, "All right; you better go and see him." That was essentially the
contents of my discussion with Manley over the phone.
When I arrived in Washington, Manley met me at the station. I had already
the feeling from the discussion with Fermi that at least Fermi's private feelings
were not for a crash program. I knew what was in the wind, but I did not know
what the decision was. Manley had originally in Los Alamos agreed that we
should proceed with the thermonuclear weapon. At least, that was my clear
understanding.
He received me on the station with these words, "I think you sold me a gold
brick." I remember this particularly clearly, because my familiarity with the
English language not being excellent, I did not know what he meant, and I had
to ask him what a gold brick is, which he proceeded to explain.
Q. What did he explain, Doctor?
A. A brick covered with gold fill which is not as valuable as it looks.
Q. What did you understand him to refer to?
A. To the thermonuclear program, which, in my opinion, was what we should
do, what would be the effective way for us to behave in that situation. Manley
implied that in the discussions of the General Advisory Committee another pro-
posal emerged, which was much better, much more hopeful, a better answer to
the Russian proposals — excuse me, to the Russian developments — he, however,
would not tell me what it was. I was a little mystified. I then went to see
Senator McMahon. He did not tell me what was in the report of the General
Advisory Committee, but he used some very strong words in connection with it,
and did so before I had opened my mouth, words to the effect, "I got this report,
and it jnst makes me sick," or something of that kind.
I did then say that I hoped very much that there would be some way of pro-
ceeding with the thermonuclear work, and Senator McMahon very definitely
said that he will do everything in his power that it should become possible.
Q. What was your purpose in seeing Senator McMahon?
A. May I say very frankly I do not remember. One of my purposes, I am
quite sure, was a point not connected with the thermonuclear development It
was this, that at some earlier time — I am not sure whether it was a year or
earlier or when — Senator McMahon was in Los Alamos at the time when I was
visiting there. I had an opportunity to talk to him. Senator McMahon asked
me to talk with him, and he asked me what I thought would be the best method
to increase effectiveness of Los Alamos. I made a few general remarks at that
time, which I do not recall, but I remember very clearly that Senator McMahon
asked me a question, which I answered, and the answer to which question I
regretted later. It was whether the salary scale in Los Alamos was adequate
Later, when I got a little bit closer back and talked with people, I felt that I
had given the wrong answer and I wanted to correct this, and therefore I wanted
to see Senator McMahon. However, by the time I actually went to see him, the
thermonuclear discussion had gone, as I have indicated, to a point where it was
perfectly clear to me that I wanted to talk with him about that question and cer-
tainly even by the time I left Los Alamos and before Hartley's telephone conver-
sation, I fully hoped to discuss this matter with him because by that time it was
quite clear to me that this was one of the very important things that was going
on in Los Alamos. This is to the best of my recollection. But I am not at all
sure. It may even be possible that I had seen Senator McMahon about another
matter at an earlier time. I believe, however, that all this took place in the
same conversation.
Q. In January 1950, the President decided that we should go ahead with the
thermonuclear program. Do you recall that?
A. I do*
Q. After that decision was announced, did you go to work on the thermo-
nuclear?
A. I most certainly did.
Q. Was the program accelerated?
A. It was.
Q. What was done in general to accelerate it?
A. A committee was formed which for a strange and irrelevant reason was
called a family committee.
Q. Who was on that committee?
A. I was the chairman and there were a number of people representing various
divisions in the laboratory, and this committee was in charge of developing some
thermonuclear program and within a very short time this committee made a
719
number of proposals directed toward some tests which were to give us informa-
tion about the behavior of some phenomena which were relevant.
At the same time I exerted all possible effort and influence to persuade people
to come to Los Alamos to work on this, particularly serious because theoretical
work was very badly needed.
Q. What was done in respect of the number of personnel working on the thermo-
nuclear? Was it increased, and if so, how much?
A. It was greatly increased. As I say prior to that there was at most half a
dozen people working on it. I am not able to tell you how many people worked
on the thermonuclear program in that period. I would say that very few people
worked on it really full time. I am sure I didn't work on it full time although
in that time the major portion of my effort was directed toward the thermonuclear
work. I believe that Los Alamos has prepared an official estimate in response
to a question, and that would be, I think, the best source of how many people
worked on the thermonuclear program at that time. I would guess, but as a
very pure guess, and I should not be surprised if that document would disprove
me, that the number of people working on the thermonuclear program increased
then to something like two, three, or four hundred, which still was something
like 10, 20, or perhaps a little more percent of the laboratory's effort. Perhaps
it was closer to 20 percent. I might easily be mistaken.
Q. At all events it was a very large increase.
A. It was a very large increase. As compared to the previous one it was Just
between standing still and starting to go.
Q. Did you. at or about that time, that is, shortly after the President's decision,
have any discussion with Oppenheimer as to whether or not he would assist you?
A. I had two discussions with him, but one was shortly before. I would like to
quote it a little. Actually the time when President Truman made the announce-
ment I happened to be in Los Angeles and was planning to stay there, in fact had
accepted an appointment at UCLA which I at that time had to postpone at any
rate because I saw this in the paper. You see, I was not going to stay in Los
Alamos much longer, and the fact that there came this announcement from
President Truman just changed my mind. Prior to the announcement, preceding
it perhaps by 2 or 3 days, I saw Dr. Oppenheimer at an atomic energy conference
concerning another matter, and during this meeting it became clear to me that
in Dr. Oppenheimer's opinion a decision was impending and this decision would
be a go-ahead decision.
At that time I asked Oppenheimer if this is now the decision, would he then
please really help us with this thing and help us to work, recalling the very effec-
tive work during the war. Oppenheimer's answer to this was in the negative.
This was, however, very clearly before President Truman's decision. However,
I also should say that this negative reply gave me the feeling that I should not
look to Oppenheimer for help under any circumstances.
A few months later, during the spring, I nevertheless called up Oppenheimer
and I asked him not for direct help, but for help in recruiting people, not for his
own work but for his support in recruiting people. Dr. Oppenheimer said then,
"You know in this matter I am neutral. I would be glad, however, to recom-
mend to you some very good people who are working here at the Institute,*9 and
he mentioned a few. I wrote to all of these people and tried to persuade them to
come to Los Alamos. None of them came.
Q. Where were those people located?
A. At the Institute of Advanced Study In Princeton.
Q. There has been some testimony here that a scientist named Longmire came
down to Los Alamos to assist you with the cooperation of Dr. Oppenheimer.
Do you recall whether he came down there before the H-bomb conference or
afterward?
A. I should like to say first of all that Dr. Longmire did help in the H-bomb
development and helped very effectively indeed. I should say helped In fission
work and in the thermonuclear work, and is now one of the strongest members
of Los Alamos. He came before all this happened. I remember that I tried to
get v>t™ on the recommendation of Bethe some time early in 1049. I also remem-
ber that a little later in the spring or early in the summer I learned— I think it
was in May-— that Longmire had declined an invitation to Los Alamos, and I
also learned that the salary offered him was some 20 percent less than the salary
1 had recommended. I thereupon talked with the appropriate people in Los
Alamos and got them to make a second offer to Longmire at the original salary
level, and after I secured agreement on that I called up Longmire and told him
that we can offer Mm this salary and would he please come. Longmire said
sosais— 54 *e
720
"Yes." He would come. However, he had accepted an invitation in the mean-
time at the Institute of Advanced Study and he now no longer could change his
mind. Thereupon I said, "Well, what about it if I try to get this chance? Come
with us anyway for a year. After a year you can go back to the Institute.
I will talk to Oppenheimer about this." Longmire said, "If Oppenheimer will
agree to this, I will consider coming very seriously."
I thereupon called up Oppenheimer on the phone, and at least I believed I
approached him directly, I am not sure, somebody approached him, but I think
I did it directly, and I remember on that occasion Dr. Oppenheimer was exceed-
ingly cooperative and did give whatever formal assurances he could give. It
was not terribly formal He gave assurances that after a year if Longmire
wanted to come back to the Institute, he would be very welcome, and if he wants
to go to Los Alamos, that is a very good idea, and so on, and after this was
arranged, Longmire did come.
Q. This was when?
A. This was all, however, before anyone of us dreamed about the Russian
explosion. That was in the early summer or late spring of 1949. I should also
say that after Longmire got to Los Alamos, he not only worked effectively, but
liked it so much that then on his own choice he really just stayed there, and is
still there, although in the meantime he also taught for certain periods In Roches-
ter, I believe, or in Cornell.
Q. Except for giving you this list of names that you have told us about of
people all of whom refused to come, did Dr. Oppenheimer, after the President's
decision in January 1950, assist you in any way in recruiting people on the
thermonuclear project?
A. To the best of my knowledge not in the slightest
Q. After the President's decision of January 1950, did Dr. Oppenheimer do
anything so far as yon know to assist you in the thermonuclear project?
A. The General Advisory Committee did meet, did consider this matter, and
its recommendations were in support of the program. Perhaps I am prejudiced
in this matter, but I did not feel that we got from the General Advisory Com-
mittee more than passive agreement on the program which we evolved. I should
say passive agreement, and I felt the kind of criticism which tended to be
perhaps more in the nature of a headache than in the nature of enlightening.
I would like to say that in a later phase there is at least one occurrence where
I felt Dr. Oppenheimer's reaction to be different.
Q. Would you tell us about that?
A. I will be very glad to do that. In June of 1951, after our first experimental
test, there was a meeting of the General Advisory Committee and Atomic Energy
Commission personnel and some consultants in Princeton at the Institute for
Advanced Study. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Oppenheimer. Frankly I
went to that meeting with very considerable misgivings, because I expected that
the General Advisory Committee, and particularly Dr. Oppenheimer, would
further oppose the development By that time we had evolved something which
amounted to a new approach, and after listening to the evidence of both the test
and the theoretical investigations on that new approach, Dr. Oppenheimer warmly
supported this new approach, and I understand that he made a statement to
the effect that if anything of this kind had been suggested right away he never
would have opposed it
Q. With that exception, did you have any indication from Dr. Oppenheimer
after January 1950 that he was supporting and approving the work that was
being done on the thermonuclear?
A. My general impression was precisely in the opposite direction. However,
I should like to say that my contacts with Oppenheimer were infrequent, and
he might have supported the thermonuclear effort without my knowing it
ft When was the feasibility of the thermonuclear demonstrated?
A. I believe that this can be stated accurately. On November 1, 1952. Al-
though since it was on the other side of the date line, I am not quite sure whether
it was November 1 our time or their time.
ft What?
A. I dont know whether it was November 1 Eniwetok time or Berkeley time.
I watched it in Berkeley.
Q. Did you have a conversation with Dr. Oppenheimer in the summer of 1950
about your work on the thermonuclear?
A. To the best of my recollection he visited Los Alamos in the summer of
1950 and then in the early fell the General Advisory Committee met in Los
Alamos — I mean he visited in Los Alamos early in the summer, and then they
721
met In Los Alamos sometime, I believe, in September, and on both occasions
we did talk.
Q. What did Dr. Oppenheimer have to say, if anything, about the thermo-
nuclear?
A. To the best of my recollection he did not have any very definite or concrete
advice. Whatever he had tended in the direction that we should proceed with
the theoretical investigations, which at that time did not look terribly encourag-
ing, before spending more money or effort on the experimental approach, which
I tMTift was at that time not the right advice, because only by pursuing the
experimental approach, the test approach, as well as the theoretical one did
we face the problem sufficiently concretely so as to find a more correct solution.
But I also should like to say that the opinion of Dr. Oppenheimer given at that
time to my hearing was not a very decisive or not a very strongly advocated
opinion, and I considered it not helpful, but also not as anything that need worry
us too much.
I must say this, that the influence of the General Advisory Committee at that
time was to the best of my understanding in the direction of go slow, explore all,
completely all the designs before looking into new designs, do not spend too
much on test programs, all of which advice I consider as somewhat in the nature
of serving as a brake rather than encouragement.
Q. Doctor, I would like to ask for your expert opinion again.
In your opinion, if Dr. Oppenheimer should go fishing for the rest of his life,
what would be the effect upon the atomic energy and the thermonuclear pro-
grams?
A. You mean from now on?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. May I say this depends entirely on the question of whether his work would
be similar to the one during the war or similar to the one after the war.
Q. Assume that it was similar to the work after the war.
A. In that case I should like to say two things. One is that after the war
Dr. Oppenheimer served on committees rather than actually participating in the
work. I am afraid this might not be a correct evaluation of the work of com-
mittees in general, but within the AEO, I should say that committees could go
fishing without affecting the work of these who are actively engaged in the work.
In particular, however, the general recommendations that I know have come
from Oppenheimer were more frequently, and I mean not only and not even
particularly the thermonuclear case, but other cases, more frequently a hin-
drance than a help, and therefore, if I look into the continuation of this and
assume that it will come in the same way, I think that further work of Dr.
Oppenheimer on committees would not be helpful
What were some of the other recommendations to which you referred?
A. You want me to give a reasonably complete list? I would be glad to.
. Q. Yes.
A. And not distinguish between things I know of my own knowledge and things
I know from hearsay evidence?
Q. Yes.
Mr. BOBB. May I go off the record Just a moment?
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. GEA.T. We will take a short recess.
(The last question and answer preceding the recess were read by the reporter.)
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. Doctor, in giving your answer, I wish you would give the board both those
items that you know of your own knowledge and the others, but I wish you
would identify them as being either of your own knowledge or on hearsay.
A. Actually, most of them are on some sort of hearsay. I would like to include
not only those things which have occurred in committee but also others.
I furthermore felt that I should like at least to make an attempt to give some
impression of the cases in which Dr. Oppenheimer's advice was helpful. His first
major action after the war was what I understand both from some part of
personal experience and to some extent of hearsay, as I have described, his
discussions which led at least to some discouragement in the continuation of
Los Alamos. I think that it would have been much better if this had not
happened.
Secondly, Oppenheimer published shortly after in connection with the Acheson-
Lilienthal report a proposal or supported a proposal, I do not know which, which
was based on his scientific authority to share denatured plutonium with others
722
with whom we might agree on international control. I believed at that time and
so did many others that denaturing plutonium is not an adequate safeguard.
One of the first actions of the General Advisory Committee— this *s hearsay— -
Q Excuse me, doctor. Have you finished your discussion of the other matter?
A I intended to have it finished hut I will be glad to stop and answer questions.
Q. Let me ask a question in that connection as to whether or not Dr. Oppen-
heimer either at that time or subsequently recommended some inspection of the
Russian atomic plants.
A My understanding is that inspection was an integral part of tne Acneson-
Lilienthal report, and that, in turn, Dr. Oppenheimer had very actively partici-
pated in drafting this report
I should like to say that in my personal opinion— perhaps I should have said
that right away— the Acheson-Lilenthal proposal was a very good one, would
have been wonderful had it been accepted, and the inspection to my mind was a
very important portion of it I did not follow these things very closely but I
believe it was something with which Dr. Oppenheimer had also agreed or recom-
mended. Which ever the case was, if I am not mistaken in this matter, I
really should include that among the very valuable things he did after the war.
Q. Excuse me, and now go ahead.
A. Thanks for bringing up this matter.
One of the first actions of the General Advisory Committee was to advise that
reactor work at Oak Ridge should be discontinued and the reactor work should
be concentrated at the Argonne Laboratory in Chicago. That was recommended,
as I understand, by a great majority.
I also understand that Fermi opposed this recommendation. All this is hearsay
evidence but of the kind which I heard so often and so generally that I think
it can be classed as general knowledge within AEO circles.
Now, I should like to say that it appeared to many of us at the time, and I
think it has been proved by the sequel, that this recommendation was a most
unfortunate one. It set our reactor work back by many years. Those exceed-
ingly good workers who left — the great majority of those very good workers who
left Oak Ridge— did not find their way into the Argonne Laboratory but discon-
tinued to work on atomic-energy matters or else worked in a smaller group on
the side very ineffectively. The very small and determined group which then
stayed behind in Oak Ridge turned out in the long run as good work as the
people at the Argonne Laboratory, and I feel that again being a little bit uncer-
tain of what would have happened if this recommendation had not been and
would not have been accepted, we would be now a couple of years ahead in reactor
development. I would like to count this as one of the very great mistakes that
have been made.
I understand, having finished with this one, that among the early actions of
the General Advisory Committee was, after it was decided that Los Alamos
should go on, to recommend strong support for Los Alamos and particularly
for the theoretical group. I understand that Oppenheimer supported this and
I again think that this was helpful I have a little. personal evidence of it,
although it is perhaps somewhat presumptuous of me to say so, that Oppen-
heimer was active in this direction, for instance, by advising me unambig-
uously to go back at least for a limited period. I know similarly that in
that period he helped us to get Longmire. I also have heard and have heard
in a way that I have every reason, to believe that in a number of minor but
important details in the development of fission weapons, Oppenheimer gave his
expert advice effectively, and this included the encouragement of further tests
when these things came along.
Q. Tests on what?
A. Tests of atomic bombs, of fission bombs.
Now, the next item is very definitely in the hearsay category, and I might
just be quite wrong on it, but I have heard that Dr. Oppenheimer opposed
earlier surveillance, the kind of procedures
Mr. SXLVXBMAN. I did not understand. Opposed what?
The WITNESS. Earlier surveillance, the sort of thing which was designed to
find out whether or not the Russians have detonated an atomic bomb. If this
should prove to be correct, I think it was thoroughly wrong advice. Then I
think generally the actions of the General Advisory Committee were adverse to
the thermonuclear development, but to what extent this is so and why I believe
that it is so, we have discussed and I do not need to repeat any of that
Finally, when, about 3 years ago, the question arose whether this would be
a good time to start a new group of people working in a separate laboratory,
723
along similar lines as Los Alamos and competing with Los Alamos, the General
Advisory Committee, or the majority of the General Advisory Committee and
in particular Dr. Oppenheimer, was opposed to this idea, using again the argu-
ment which was used in the case of Oak Ridge, that enough scientific personnel
is not available. In this matter I am personally interested, of course, and I
was on the opposite side of the argument and I believe that Dr. Oppenheimer's
advice was wrong. Of course, it is quite possible that his advice was right and
mine was wrong. In the meantime, however, we did succeed in recruiting quite
a capable group of people in Livermore. I think this is essentially the extent
of my knowledge, direct or indirect, in the matter. I think it would be proper
to restrict my statements to things in close connection with the Atomic Energy
Commission and to disregard advice that I heard that Oppenheimer has given
to other agencies like the Armed Forces or the State Department This would
be hearsay evidence of a more shaky kind than the rest.
By Mr. EOBB:
Q. Doctor, the second laboratory, is that the one in which you are now working
at Livermore?
A. That is one at which I had been working for a year and at which I am now
working part time. I am spending about half my time at the University of
California in teaching and research and half my time in Livermore.
Q. Did you have any difficulty recruiting personnel for that laboratory?
A. Yes, but not terribly difficult
Q. Did you get the personnel you needed?
A, This is a question I cannot really answer, because it is always possible to
get better personnel. But I am very happy about the people whom we did get
and we are still looking for very excellent people if we can get them, and I am
going to spend the next 3 days in the Physical Society in trying to persuade
additional young people to Join us.
Q. Numerically at least, you have your staff; is that right?
A. I would say numerically we certainly have a staff but I do not think this
answer to the question is relevant It is always the question of whether we
have the right sort of people and I do believe we have the right sort of people.
Q. Is that laboratory concerned primarily with thermonuclear weapons or is
that classified?
A. To the extent that I can believe what I read in Time magazine, it is not
classified, but I would like to say that my best authority on the subject is Time
magazine.
Q. What does Time magazine say about it?
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Well
Mr. HOBB. I will skip that.
By Mr. EOBB:
Q. I will ask you this, Doctor : Will you tell us whether or not the purpose
of establishing a second laboratory was to further work on the thermonuclear?
A. That was a very important part of the purpose.
Mr. BOBB. Mr. Chairman, that completes my direct examination, and it is
now 5 : 30.
Mr. GRAY. I think we had better ask the witness to return tomorrow morning
at 9: 30.
Mr. GAEBISON. Mr. Chairman, we only have one or two questions.
The WITNESS. I would be very glad to stay for a short time.
Mr. GRAY. I have some questions, but I do not think it will take too long, and
if you only have a few
Mr. SILVEBMAN. We have so very few, I am almost tempted not to ask them.
CBOSS-HXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVEBMAN ;
Q. You were Just testifying about the Livermore Laboratory?
A. Right
Q. Did Mr. Oppenheimer oppose the Livermore Laboratory as it was finally
set up?
A. No. To the best of my knowledge, no.
Q. His opposition was to another Los Alamos?
A. It was to another Los Alamos, and when the Atomic Energy Commission,
I think, on the advice from the military did proceed in the direction, the General
Advisory Committee encouraged in particular setting up a laboratory at the site
724
where it was set up. But prior to that, I understand that the General Advisory
Committee advised against it
Q. That is when there was a question of another Los Alamos?
A. Eight.
Q. Dr. Teller, when was Llvermore set up in its present form?
A. This is something which is more difficult
Q. Yon thiTife that is classified?
A. No. It is more difficult to answer than the question of when a baby is born
because it is not born all at once. I think the contracts were signed with the
Atomic Energy Commission sometime in July 1952. There was a letter of
intent sent out earlier and the work had started a little before that. Actually,
we moved to Llvermore on the 2d of September 1952 and work before that was
done in Berkeley.
Q. Do you now have on your staff at Livermore some people who had been or
who are members of the Institute for Advanced Study? I am thinking particu-
larly of Dr. Karplus.
A. The answer is no. Dr. Karplus has been consulting with us for a period.
He had accepted an invitation to the University of California and he is main-
taining his consultant status to the Radiation Laboratory in general, of which
Livermore is a part. I believe, but this is again a prediction about the future
and my expectation, that Dr. Karplus in the future will help us in Livermore
by consulting, but I also believe that for the next couple of years, if I can predict
his general plans at all and I talked a bit with him, this is likely not to be terribly
much because he will have to adjust himself to the new surroundings first.
Q. Do you know whether Dr. Oppenheimer recommended that Dr. Karplus go
to work at Livermore?
A. I have no knowledge whatsoever about it. It is quite possible that he did.
Mr. SILVERMAN. I have no further questions.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Teller, I think earlier in your testimony you stated that in
August 1945, Dr. Oppenheimer talked with you and indicated his feeling that
Los Alamos would inevitably disintegrate. I believe those were your words, and
that there was no point in your staying on there. Is my recollection correct?
The WITNESS. Yes. I am not sure that my statement was very fortunate, but
I am pretty sure that this is how I said it.
Mr. GRAY. Would you say that his attitude at that time was that it should
disintegrate?
The Wrrarass. I would like to elaborate on that for a moment. I think that
I ought to say this : I do not like to say it. Oppenheimer and I did not always
agree in Los Alamos, and I believe that it is quite possible, probably, that this
was my fault This particular discussion was connected with an impression I
got that Oppenheimer wanted me particularly to leave, which at first I inter-
preted as his being dissatisfied with the attitude I was taking about certain
questions as to how to proceed in detail. It became clear to me during the con-
versation—and, Incidentally, it was something which was quite new to me because
prior to that, while we did disagree quite frequently, Oppenheimer always urged
no matter how much we disagreed in detail I should certainly stay and work.
He urged me although on some occasions I was discouraged and I wanted to
leave. On this occasion, he advised me to leave. I considered that at first as
essentially personal matters. In the course of the conversaiton, it became
dear to me that what he really meant at that time— -I asked him— we disagreed on
a similar thing and I forget the thing, but I do remember asking him in a similar
discussion that, 3 months ago— "You told me by all means I should stay. Now
you teU me I should leave." He said, "Yes," but in the meantime we had developed
these bombs and the work looks different and I think an of us would have to go
home— something to that effect. It was at that time that I had the first idea
that Oppenheimer himself wanted to discontinue his work very rapidly and
very promptly a Los Alamos. I knew that changes were due but it did not
occur to me prior to that conversation that they were due quite that rapidly
and would affect our immediate plans just right then and there. I do not know
whether I have made myself sufficiently clear or not
I failed to mention this personnel element before. I am sorry about that I
think it is perhaps relevant as a background.
Mr. GRAY. Do you think that Dr. Bradbury has been an effective director of
the Las Alamos Laboratory?
The WITNESS. I am quite sure of that
Mr. GRAY. It is my impression that he was selected by Dr. Oppenheimer. Do
you know about that?
725
The WITNESS. I heard that statement. I also heard the statement that it was
General Groves who recommended Bradbury. I have not the least information
upon which to decide which of these statements or whether any of these state-
ments are correct. Perhaps both of them are correct.
Mr. GBAY. It could be. Were you aware of the presence of any scientists on
the project following the January 1950 decision who were there for the purpose
of proving that this development was not possible rather than proving that it was
possible?
The WITNESS. I certainly would not put it that way. There have been a few
who believed that it was not possible, who argued strongly and occasionally pas-
sionately for it. I do not know of any case where I have reason to suspect in-
tellectual dishonesty.
Mr. GBAY. Excuse me, Dr. Teller. I would like the record to show that it was
not my intention to impute intellectual dishonesty to anybody, but you have no
knowledge of this.
The WITNESS. I would like to say that on some visits when Bethe came there,
he looked the program over someway critically and quite frankly he said he
wished the thing would not work. But also he looked it over carefully and what-
ever he said we surely agreed. In fact, we always agreed.
Mr. GBAY. Yes, I think that clears it up perhaps.
You talked with Dr. Fermi soon after the October 1949 meeting of the GAG,
and whereas he was not at liberty to tell you what the GAO decided, you got the
impression that they were not favorable to a crash program, as you put it.
The WITNESS. Actually, Dr. Fermi gave me his own opinion, and this was an
essential agreement with the GAG. This discouraged me, of course. He also
gave me the impression that the GAG really decided something else, something
essentially different
Mr, GRAY. You subsequently saw the GAG report?
The WITNESS. I did.
Mr. GBAY. Is my impression correct that the tenor of the report was not alto-
gether only a question of not moving into a crash program but was opposed to
the development of the weapon altogether.
The WITNESS. This was my understanding. In fact, that is definitely my
recollection.
Mr. GBAY. Now, Dr. Teller, you stated that the GAC report stopped work at
Los Alamos. I assume you meant work on thermonuclear devices.
The WITNESS. I said that and may I correct it, please. What I really should
have said was prevented the start of work because work really did not get started.
Mr. GBAY. I think that is important because I thought I heard you say that
you instructed not to work. What you mean is that you were instructed not to
start anything new.
The WITNESS. That is correct. I am sorry if I expressed erroneously.
Mr. GBAY. Was a result of the GAC report that the 6 or 8 or 10 or whatever it
was people who were then working, did they stop their work?
The WITNESS. No, certainly not In fact, there was an increase of people
working right then and there, which was in the relatively free community. Not
all of this work was directed in this relatively free atmosphere. It was evident
that some work would continue. It was quite dear that in the period November-
December-^January, we did do some work and more than we had done earlier.
However, we did not make a jump from, let us say, 6 people to 200, but we made a
jump of from 6 people to 12 or 20. I could not tell you which.
Mr. GBAY. Dr. Teller, General Nichols' letter to Dr. Oppenheimer, which I
assume you have some familiarity with
The WITNESS. I read it That is, I read the New York Times. If that is
assumed to be a correct version
Mr. GBAY. As far as I know, it is correct There is one sentence which reads
as follows:
"It was further reported that you departed from your proper role as an advisor
to the Commission by causing the distribution, separately and in private, to top
personnel at Los Alamos of the majority and minority reports of the General
Advisory Committee on development of the hydrogen bomb for the purpose of
trying to turn such top personnel against the development of the hydrogen bomb."
If this conversation you had with Dr. Manley about which you have testified
and in which he referred to our chairman or the chairman was the source of
this report, am I right in assuming that your testimony is that you are not pre-
pared to say that Dr. Oppenheimer did cause the distribution of this?
The WITNESS. My testimony says that I cannot ascertain that Dr. Qppenheimer
caused distribution. I have presented in this matter all that I can remember.
726
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Teller, you are familiar with the question which this board is
called upon to answer, I assume.
The Wrrrass. Yes, I believe so.
Mr. GEAY. Let me tell you what it is and inyite counsel to help me out if I
misstate it. We are asked to make a finding in the alternative, that it will or
will not endanger the common defense and security to grant security clearance
to Dr. Oppenheimer.
I believe you testified earlier when Rr. Robb was putting questions to you
that because of your knowledge of the whole situation and by reason of many
factors about which you have testified in very considerable detail, you would
feel safer if the security of the country were in other hands.
The WITNESS. Right
Mr. GRAY. That is substantially what you said?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. I think you have explained why you feel that way. I would then
like to ask you this question: Do you feel that it would endanger the common
defense and security to grant clearance to Dr. Oppenheimer?
The WITNESS. I believe, and that is merely a question of belief and there is
no expertness, no real information behind it, that Dr. Oppenheimer's character
is such that he would not knowingly and willingly do anything that is designed
to endanger the safety of this country. To the extent, therefore, that your
question is directed toward intent, I would say I do not see any reason to deny
clearance.
If it is a question of wisdom and judgment, as demonstrated by actions since
1945, then I would say one would be wiser not to grant clearance. I must
say that I am myself a little bit confused on this issue, particularly as it refers
to a person of Oppenheimer's prestige and influence. May I limit myself to
these comments?
Mr. GBAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. I will be glad to answer more questions about it to you or to
counsel.
Mr. GBAY. No, I think that you have answered my question. I have, I think,
only one more.
' I believe there has been testimony given to this board to the effect — and
again I would like the assistance of counsel if I misstate anything— that the
important and significant developments in the thermonuclear program since
January of 1950 have indeed taken place at Los Alamos and not at Livermore.
Am I wrong in stating that?
Mr. ROBB. Somebody said that
Mr. GBAY. Do you recall?
Mr. SILVERMAN. My recollection is that there was testimony that the important
developments in the thermonuclear bomb which have thus far been tested out
and which were the subject of the recent tests were developed at Las Alamos.
I think that was the testimony.
Mr. GBAY. Will you assume that we have heard something of that sort? Do
you have a comment?
The WITNESS. Is there a ruling that I may answer this question in a way
without affecting security? I would like to assume that. I think I should.
Mr. ROLANDIEB, If you have any worry on that point, perhaps the board may
wish you to give a classified answer on that
The WITNESS. I mean I would like to give an unclassified answer to it and
if you think it is wrong, strike it later. I understand that has been done
before. I would like to make the statement that this testimony is substantially
correct. Livermore is a very new laboratory and I think it is doing a very nice
job, but published reports about its importance have been grossly and embar-
rassingly exaggerated.
Dr. EVANS. I have one question.
Dr. Teller, you understand
The WITNESS. May I leave that in the record? I would like to.
Mr. ROLANDER. Yes.
Dr. EVANS. You understand, of course, that we did not seek the job on this
board, do you not?
The WITNESS. You understand, sir, that I did not want to be at this end of
the table either.
Dr. EVANS. I want to ask you one question. Do you think the action of a
committee like this, no matter what it may be, will be the source of great dis-
cussion in the National Academy and among scientific men In general?
727
The WITNESS. It already is and it certainly will be.
Dr. EVANS. That is all I wanted to say.
Mr. ROBB. May I ask one further question?
RE-DIBEOT EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Dr. Teller, you did a great deal of work on the thermonuclear at the old
.aboratory, too, at Los Alamos.
A. Certainly.
Mr. SH.VERMAN. I have one question.
RE-CROSS-EXAKINATION
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. I would like you, Dr. Teller, to distinguish between the desirability of this
country's or the Government's accepting Dr. Oppenheimer's advice and the
danger, if there be any, in Dr. Oppenheimer's having access to restricted data.
As to this latter, as to the danger in Dr. Oppenheimer's having access to re-
stricted data without regard to the wisdom of his advice, do you think there is
any danger to the national security in his having access to restricted data?
A. In other words, I now am supposed to assume that Dr. Oppenheimer will
have access to security information?
Q. Yes.
A. But will refrain from all advice in these matters which is to my mind a
very hypothetical quetion indeed. May I answer such a hypothetical question
by saying that the very limited knowledge which I have on. these matters and
which are based on feelings, emotions, and prejudices, I believe there is no
danger.
Mr. GBAY. Thank you very much, Doctor.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GBAY. We will recess until 9 : 30 tomorrow.
(Thereupon, the hearing was recessed at 5:50 p. m., to reconvene at 9:80
a. m., Thursday, April 29, 1954.)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER or J. EGBERT OPPENHEIMER
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
BUILDING T-3, BOOM 2022,
Washington, D. <7., Thursday ', April 29, 1964.
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to recess,
before the board, at 9 : 30 a. m.
Personnel Security Board: Dr. Gordon Gray, chairman; Dr. Ward
T. Evans, member; and Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Eoger Robb, and C. A. Rolander, Jr., counsel for the
board; J. Robert Oppenheimer, Lloyd K. Garrison, Samuel J. Silver-
man, and Allan B. Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer ; Herbert
S. Marks, cocounsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
(729)
PBOCEEDZNOS
Mr. GBAY. Do you wish to testify under oath, Mr. Mcdoy. You are not re-
quired to do so. I think I should say to you the every witness appearing has
so testified.
Mr. MoOLOT. Yes.
Mr. QEAT. Would you stand and raise your right hand, and give me your full
name.
Mr. MoCLOY. John J. Mcdoy.
Mr. GBAT. John J. McCloy, do you swear that the testimony you are to give
the Board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you God?
Mr. MoCix>Y. I do.
Whereupon, John J. Mcdoy was called as a witness, and having been first
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. It is my duty to remind you of the existence of the perjury statutes.
May I assume you are familiar with them and their penalties?
The WITNESS. Never personal, but I am familiar with them.
Mr. GRAY. I would like to make one other statement to you in behalf of the
board, that is, we treat these proceeding as a confidential matter between the
Atomic Energy Commission and its officials on the one hand, and Dr. Oppen-
heimer and his representatives and witnesses on the other. The Commission
is making no releases with respect to these proceedings, and on behalf of the
board, I express the hope that witnesses will take the same view.
The WITNESS. I will be glad to do so.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Mr. Mcdoy, will you state for the record your present position?
A. I am presently the chairman of the board of the Chase National Bank.
Q. Would you also state for the record the positions that you held in the
Defense Establishment during the war?
A. In the summer of 1940 I came to the War Department as a consultant to
the Secretary of War, and remained in that position until I became Assistant
Secretary of War some months later. I remained as the Assistant Secretary
of War throughout the entire period of the war, and I left the War Department
in the fall of 1945.
Then I have been on various special committees in connection with the de-
fense. I was on the President's Committee — I forgot the name of it — it was the
one upon which Mr. Acheson and General Groves served, dealing with the
question of the control of atomic weapons.
I thiTiTr that completes my defense experience.
Q. Will you tell the board your contacts with the atomic energy program dur-
ing the war and your acquaintance with Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. During the war I was very closely associated with Mr. Stimson. In the
early days of the war, I had many conversations with him in regard to the
menace of a possible German development of an atomic weapon. He had been
in conversation with the President and had deeply interested himself In this
particular matter. Although I was not on any particular committee nor was I
in direct charge of any element of the atomic development, as 'a result of my
position with Mr. Stimson as a general consultant with him, he frequently
talked to me about the state of the program, character of the threat, and what we
should do about it Generally these conversations took place at the house here
in Washington which was called Woodley at the close of the day after the normal
routine of the Department was over.
This contact lasted throughout the war and on into the conference at Pots-
dam, until finally I left the Department, as I did shortly after his departure.
I think I ought to say that I' was also in contact with General Groves from
time to time. I visited not all the establishments, but some of the establish-
ments which had been erected, and from time to time helped in connection with
732
the priorities and the allocations to insure that the atomic project was given the
fullest of priorities and the greatest of cooperation and support so far as the
War Department was concerned.
I think that sketches it.
Q. Bid you have any occasion to talk with Mr. Stimson or General Groves
about Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Yes ; not at the beginning of the war. I did not hear of Dr. Oppenheimer
until well toward the end of the war. I can't exactly fix the dates in my mind,
but I do recall that some substantial period before we left for the Potsdam con-
ference we learned of the real progress that had been made at Los Alamos, and
the name of Dr. Oppenheimer was mentioned in that connection. Somewhere
I should say around 1944, or perhaps as early as 1943, 1 heard the name, but in
1944, and the beginning of 1945, it was a rather prominently mentioned name.
Frequently Mr. Stimson referred to the work that Dr. Oppenheimer was doing,
and the great possibility that at Los Alamos things were developing which would
shortly and within the measurable future produce rather spectacular results.
I may volunteer the information that it was only in respect of it that Dr.
Oppenheimer was making. There was no question of security in that regard,
althought I do remember General Groves speaking to me from time to time
as he sometimes did about his problems, saying that he did have some security
preoccupations. I am trying to remember back as best I can. They were, as
far as I can remember, confined to a concern that information that the English
were getting from our atomic developments might be leaked to the French,
where General Groves had -real suspicions, particularly because of the association
of Dr. Curie with the atomic development in Prance. He referred somewhat to
his security precautions and indicated to me that he had dismissed one or two or
a few people from Los Alamos, but never was the question raised in any regard
to Dr. Oppenheimer, nor did Mr. Stimson, as I say, have anything but great
admiration and praise for the achievements that Dr. Oppenheimer was accom-
plishing.
Q. Did you come into contact with Dr. Oppenheimer at the time of the Acheson-
Tififentiiai report?
A. Yes. 'I would say there were 3 phases of my experience with Dr. Oppen-
heimer. The first I have already described, which I would say was the Stimson-
\Var Department contact, and that was a very slight personal contact, but I
knew him, and I knew his name, and knew what was going on in general.
The second was the Lilienthal-Acheson Committee report, and the third,
apart from some intermittent contacts of no consequence, was my association
with Dr. Oppenheimer on the so-called Soviet study group, which is a group .
set up by the Council of Foreign Belations in New York City, which was erected
In consultation with the State Department to see what we could do by gathering
together a group of knowledgeable people — a rather small group, but well ex-
perienced and somewhat distinguished group— that would quietly study this
whole problem of our relations with the Soviet, toj see if we could do any-
thing that would be of benefit to the Government or to general public opinion
in that field.
Dr. Oppenheimer was a member of that group. He was selected primarily
because of his outstanding reputation in the atomic field, and since the atomic
element was important in the consideration of our relations with the Soviet
we felt that we should have someone on the board who was well equipped to
advise us in that connection.
Incidentally, in respect to that second phase, I think I probably should say
that apart from Dr. Oppenheimer's membership on the panel, I think we called
it— a panel which was composed, as well as I remember—you would have
the records of It
Q. I think that is In the record,
A. Wlnne, Thomas, Barnard, and so forth. Apart from his expositions to
the Committee at that time of the technical aspects of the problem, I endeavored
to learn a little something about the art so that I would be more familiar and
more capable of understanding some of the technical expositions and better
equipped to discuss the whole problem. He undertook to tutor me in the art,
I don't think with any great success. But that was not his fault
During the course of that experiment on his part, I got to know him fairly
well, and that was Just a side comment on the. extent of my relationship with
him. ' -
Q. Do you know anything at first hand about his attitude toward Russia
and the whole problem at that point of time?
733
A. Growing out of the concern we all had after the successful dropping of
the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the great preoccupation that par-
ticularly Mr. Stimson, as well as many others, had as to what we were going
to do from here out, there were many discussions in Washington and from
time to time I was consulted by members of the Government as to what I
thought about it
After Mr. Stimson retired, we talked about it a good bit in his home at
Long Island. As you know, this committee was set up and a report was made.
In connection with the committee's action, as I say, Dr. Oppenheimer was
a member of the panel and we looked to him for the technical expositions. Our
technical questions were mainly directed to him. There was then a very in-
triguing problem of the possibility of denaturing this material so that it would
not have an explosive or at least a lethal weapon effect. It was thought that
by a certain process you could denature it or delouse it in such a way so that
it would not have the harmful effects that the weapon itself might have. That
was gone into at some length and Dr. Oppenheimer explained the limitations
and possibilities of that.
I remember at that time, or at least I gathered the impression at that time,
that he was quite alert to the interests of the United States in connection with
this. The proposals that were made for international control were to be hemmed
about by certain provisions which we thought would secure the interests of the
United States, as best we could consistent wtlh the overall philosophy of having
an international control in effect I generally am of the impression that Dr.
Oppenheimer at that time was as sensitive as I should say any one was in regard
to the security interests of the United States.
There were, as I recall it, one or two points of difference in the committee
on which I don't believe Dr. Oppenheimer, if he had any knowledge at all, cer-
tainly expressed no view. There was a question as to whether we would publish
the report Some members of the committee were in favor of publishing it,
and others were opposed to it I think a vote was taken and we decided not
to oppose it, and then somehow or other it did see the light of day, but I never
knew how it got out
Q. Not not to oppose, but not to publish.
A. I meant to say not to publish. There were some questions that developed in
the Committee as to whether we ought to be a little more rigid than we were
with regard to security provisions. In that I remember General Groves differed
somewhat with some of the other members of the Commission. But as I recall
it, General Groves1 position, which was supported by me and others, prevailed.
I can't recall any participation by Dr. Oppenheimer in that discussion. I do re-
call very definitely in responding to questions, it seemed to me that he was very
objective in just what we could expect in the way of safety precautions and what
we could not.
So I did gain the impression that he was alert to the necessity of protecting
in so far as it was possible to protect the interests of the United States, as I say,
consistent with the concept of international control.
There is one other contact with Dr. Oppenheimer that I am a little vague
about, and I am not absolutely certain that he was present at a meeting that
took place well before Potsdam in the War Department in Secretary Stimson's
office, where we discussed with the Committee that Mr. Stimson had set up, and
with some scientists. I have the impression — I know Van Bush was there — that
Dr. Oppenheimer was there, and that was as to whether or not we should drop
the bomb and generally where this whole thing was leading, where we were
going with it
I recall either as a result of my presence at that meeting, or Dr. Oppen-
heimer's presence at that meeting, or from what Mr. Stimson told me, that all
of the scientists, I believe, but certainly Dr. Oppenheimer, were in favor, all
things considered, of dropping the bomb.
Mr. ROBB. May I interpose and ask which bomb we are talking about?
The WITNESS. I am talking about whether we should drop it on the Japanese.
Mr. ROBB. Yes. We have had so many bombs.
The WITNESS. Yes. I am talking about the first one. At that time we had
not even picked the target There was a good bit of discussion about the target
before we left abroad and some further discussion at Potsdam about it
By Mr. GABBXSON:
Q. Coming down to the Soviet study group which you mentioned in the Council
of Foreign Relations, you were the presiding officer of that group?
A. Yes, I was the presiding officer.
734
Q. And Dr. Oppenheimer was a member of the group?
A. Yes.
Q. And who were some of the other members?
A. I don't know that I have a list of the members. I think I can remember
them mainly from memory.
Ferdinand Eberstadt was a member. Averill Harriman was a member. Dr.
Wriston, president of Brown, is a member. Devereux Josephs, president of the
New York Life Insurance Co., was a member. Professor Fainsod of Harvard,
who was the head of the Russian studies at Harvard, Is a member.
We have observers from the Government there who were not strictly members,
but who have asked to sit in and who do sit in. General Lemnitzer is one of
them. Mr. Bowie, adviser to the Secretary of State, and professor at Harvard
Law School, acts as observer, and Mr. Allen Dulles or his deputy from CIA.
There are other members of the group, but I suppose I better get you a com-
plete list
Q. Would you just say a word about Dr. Oppenheimer's participation in the
group, and particularly the character of the views which he has expressed in
his discussions with respect to our relations with Russia?
A. We have adopted a rule in that group not to give any publicity to the views
expressed around the table there, and certainly not to attribute anything In
respect of a particular individual. But I suppose if I have Dr. Oppenheimer's
consent, I can go ahead.
Q. Yes.
A. I feel a certain responsibility as chairman of that group, and being so
insistent upon the fact that there should not be attributions and no leaks from
that group, I don't like to be the first one to violate it. We selected in the first
place, as I have already indicated, Dr. Oppenheimer, because of his knowledge
in this field, because of the pronounced importance of this whole subject in
regard to our relations with the Soviet He at one meeting expounded to us
at considerable length.
Q. Would you say about what year this was?
A. I suppose that was last fall, I think.
Q. That is near enough.
A. Last fall, yes. He has been a member of the group from the beginning, but
he was abroad.
Q. When did the group begin?
A. It began at the beginning of 1958. It has been going for a year, and it
will probably go for another year. He was selected at the outset and attended
one or two meetings and then he went to lecture abroad so we didn't have him
present at a substantial number of meetings. Then he did give us a picture of
where he thought we stood generally in relation to the Soviet in respect to atomic
development
Q. Without going into the details of what he said, what impression did his
talk leave on you about his general attitude toward the situation?
A. The impression that I gathered from him was one of real concern that
although we had a quantitative superiority, that that didn't mean a great deaL
* * * We were coming to the point where we might be, he used the graphic
expression like two scorpions in a bottle, that each could destroy the other,
even though one may have been somewhat larger than the other, and he was
very much concerned about the security position of the United States. He
pressed vigorously for the continued activity in this field, and not letting down
our guard, so to speak. Taking advantage of any opportunity that really
presented itself that looked as if it was substantial, but if there was to be any
negotiation, be certain that we were armed and well prepared before we went
to such a conference. Indeed, I have the impression that he, with one or two
others, was somewhat more, shall I say, militant than some of the other members
of the group. I think I remember very well that he said, for example, that we
would have to contemplate and keep our minds open for all sorts of eventualities
in this thing * * *.
In the course of this, I think I should say that he was questioned by the mem-
bers of the group from time to time. In a number of cases, he refused to reply,
saying that he could not reply because in doing so that would involve some
security information. His talk was generally in generalities, to some extent
following the line that he took in an article which I saw later on published in
Foreign Affairs.
I got the very strong impression of Dr. Oppenheimer's sensitivity to what
he considered to be the interests of the United States and to the securitv of
the United States.
735
Q. Based on your acquaintance with Dr. Oppenheimer, and your experiences
with him, would you give the board your opinion as to his loyalty and as to his
security risk or want of risk?
A. In the first place, just to get it out of the way, let me say that there is
nothing that occurred during the entire period of my contact with Dr. Oppen-
heimer which gave me any reason to feel that he was in any sense disloyal to the
United States. But I would want to put it more positively than that, and also
add that throughout my contacts with him, I got the impression, as one who has
had a good bit of contact and experience with defense matters, that he was very
sensitive to all aspects of the security of the United States.
I gathered the impression that he was deeply concerned about the consequences
of this awful force that we had released, anxious to do what he could toward
seeing that it was not used or did not become a destroyer of civilization. He
was somewhat puzzled as to what form that would take and still be consistent
with the interests of the United States. That perhaps more than a number of
others who were, so to speak, laymen in this field, who were members of that
study group, was aware of the techniques of the defense of the United States.
He was a little more aware than those who had not been really associated with
the Defense Department of the military position of the United States some-
what apart from the atomic situation. So much for loyalty.
I can't be too emphatic as to my impression of Dr. Oppenheimer in this regard.
I have the impression of his being a loyal, patriotic citizen, aware of his responsi-
bilities and that I want to accent
As to his security risk — to use the current phrase — I again can state that
negatively certainly. I know of nothing myself which would make me feel that
he was a security risk. I don't know just exactly what you mean by a security
risk. I know that I am a security risk and I think every individual is a security
risk. You can always talk in your sleep. You can always drop a paper that you
should not drop, or you can speak to your wife about something, and to that
extent no human being is an absolutely secure person. I don't suppose we are
talking about that
I never heard of any of Dr. Oppenheimer's early background until very recently,
and so that has never been an element in my thinking. I have only thought of
him as being a figure whom I feel I know, and I feel I am somewhat knowledge-
able in this field, and one I feel I know is as much responsible as anybody else
if perhaps not more than anybody else in this particular field of the weapon for
our preeminence in that field. Too many reports came in to us as to the work
that he was doing, the difficulties under which he was laboring, and they were
difficulties because there had to be very great security precautions and a lot of
barbed wire and what not which introduced serious human problems in connec-
tion with the plants where he was operating, and the reports all were that in
spite of all this, and in spite of the little squabbles that took place among this
confined group of scientists, there was a certain inspiration to their work and
enthusiasm and a vigor and energy that many ascribed to Dr. Oppenheimer, and
which I am quite clear played a major part in bringing about the achievement
of the weapon at the critical point, and time that it was achieved.
There is another aspect to this question of security, if I may just go on, that
troubles me and I have been thinking about it a good bit since I have read the
charges and the reply of Dr. Oppenheimer, and have talked to a number of people
who are somewhat familiar with this whole subject. It seems to me that there
are two security aspects. One is the negative aspect. How do you gage an
individual in terms of his likelihood of being careless with respect to the use of
documents or expressions, if he is not animated by something more sinister?
There is also for want of a better expression the positive security. I remember
very vividly the early days when the warnings that Neils Bohr— I was not in
Washington when JNeils Bohr first came over, but I saw him from time to time
after that—when he announced to us and to the President that the uranium
atom had been split, and we might look forward with some concern to the possi-
bility that the Germans would have an atomic weapon, and our eagerness at that
time to take on, practically speaking, anyone who had this quality of mind that
could reach in back of and beyond, from the layman's point of view, at least, and
deal with this concept and reduce it to reality.
As I try to look back to that period, I think we would have taken pretty much
anybody who had certainly the combination of those qualities, the theoretical
ability, plus the practical sense, to advance our defense position in that field.
In those days we were on guard against the Nazis and the Germans. I *Mnfr we
would have grabbed one of them if we thought he had that quality, and snr-
808S1&— 54 47
736
rounded him with as much security precautions as we could. Indeed, I think
we would have probably taken a convicted murderer if he had that capacity.
There again is this question of the relative character of security. It depends
somewhat on the day and age that you are in.
I want to emphasize particularly this affirmative side of it. The names we
bandied about at that time included a number of refugees and a number of people
that came from Europe. I have the impression — I may be wrong about it —
but I have the impression that a very large element of this theoretical thinking
did emanate from the minds of those who immigrated from this country, and
had not been generated here as far as it had been in Europe. There were names
like Fermi and Wigner and Teller, Eabi, another queer name, Szilard, or some-
thing like that— but I have the impression they came over here, and probably
embued with a certain anti-Nazi fervor which tended to stimulate thinking, and
it is that type of mind that we certainly needed then.
We could find, so to speak, practical atomic physicists, and today there are
great quantities of them being trained, and whether we are getting this finely
balanced imagination which can stretch beyond the practicalities of this thing
is to my mind the important aspect of this problem. The art is still in its infancy
and we still are in need of great imagination in this field.
In a very real sense, therefore, I think there is a security risk in reverse. If
anything is done which would in any way repress or dampen that fervor, that
verve, that enthusiasm, or the feeling generally that the place where you can get
the greatest opportunity for the expansion of your mind and your experiments
in this field is the United States, to that extent the security of the United States
is impaired.
In other words, you can't be too conventional about it or you run into a security
problem the other way. We are only secure if we have the best brains and the
best reach of mind in this field. If the impression is prevalent that scientists
as a whole have to work under such great restrictions and perhaps great suspi-
cion, in the United States, we may lose the next step in this field, which I think
would be very dangerous for us.
From my own experience in Germany, although they were very backward in
this field, and in that respect there is a very interesting instance which I have
seen referred to in print
Mr. GBAY. Mr. Mcdoy, may I interrupt you for a minute? As a lawyer, you
must observe we allow very considerable latitude in these hearings, and we
have tried in no way to circumscribe anything that any witness wishes to say,
and in fact, almost anything the lawyers wanted to say has gone into the record.
You were asked a question, I believe, by Mr. Garrison, about Dr. Oppenheimer's —
it has been a long.time and I have forgotten.
Mr. GABBISON. Loyalty, and him as a security risk.
Mr. GBAY, Yes. Whereas I think your views are entitled to great weight
on these matters generally, I would respectfully and in the most friendly spirit,
suggest that we not wander too far afield from this question.
The 'WITNESS, i didn't mean to wander too far.
Mr. GRAY. Yes, sir.
The WITNESS. I did want to make one point. I have been asked this recently
in New York frequently: Do you think that Dr. Oppenheimer is a security risk,
and how would I answer that. This is long before I had any idea I was going
to be called here. What do you mean by security, positive, negative, there is
a security risk both ways in this thing. It is the affirmative security that I
believe we must protect here. I would say that even if Dr. Oppenheimer had
some connections that were somewhat suspicious or make one fairly uneasy,
you have to balance his affirmative aspect against that, before you can finally
conclude in your own mind that he is a reasonable security risk, because there
is a balance of interest there ; that he not only is himself, but that he represents
in terms of scientific inquiry— I am very sorry if I rambled on about that and I
didn't mean to.
Mr. GBAY. I don't want to cut you off at all, but you were getting back about
something of the Nazis during the war.
The WITNESS. Yes. Let me tell you why I did that, if I may.
Mr. BOBB. Mr. Chairman, may I interpose one thought I think the rules do
provide that no witness will be allowed to argue from the witness stand. I think
the witness should bear that in mind, if I might suggest it.
The WITNESS. Yes. I don't mean to argue. I am trying honestly to answer
the question whether this man is a security risk in my judgment from what I
know of him.
Mr. BOBB. I -understand.
737
The WITNESS. Take the case—and perhaps I should not argue and maybe
this ought to he off the record.
Mr, ROBB. The rule is quite specific, Mr. Chairman, that is the only reason
I bring it up.
Mr. GRAY, Mr. Robb is correct that the regulations by which this proceeding
is governed state that no witness shall be allowed to argue.
The WITNESS. I am trying to think out loud rather than argue.
Mr. GRAY. May I ask that you proceed.
The WITNESS. I will come to the point on it. I think I could give a rather
vivid example of what I am trying to say, but I won't refer to that. I will
say that as far as I have had any acquaintance with Dr. Qppenheimer, I have
no doubt as to his loyalty, and I .have absolutely no doubt about his value to
the United States and I would say he is not a security risk to the United States.
Mr. GABEISON. Thank you.
Mr. GRAY. Do you have any questions, Mr. Bobb?
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. How long have you been president of the Chase National Bank?
A. A little over a year.
Q. Had you previously had experience in the banking business?
A. I was president of the so-called International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, which is known as the World Bank.
Q. Chase is the largest bank in the world?
A. No ; it is the third. The Bank of America and National City are larger.
Q. Have you a great many branches?
A. Yes; 28.
Q. As far as you know, Mr. McOloy, do you have any employee of your bank
who has been for any considerable period of time on terms of rather intimate
and friendly association with thieves and safecrackers?
A. No ; I don't know of anyone.
Q. I would like to ask you a few hypothetical questions, if I might, sir.
Suppose you had a branch bank manager, and a friend of his came to fr*™ one
day and said, "I have some friends and contacts who are thinking about com-
ing to your bank to rob it. I would like to talk to you about maybe leaving the
vault open some night so they could do it," and your branch manager rejected
the suggestion. Would you expect that branch manager to report the incident?
A. Yes.
Q. If he didn't report it, would you be disturbed about it?
A. Yes.
Q. Let us go a little bit further. Supposing the branch bank manager waited
6 or 8 months to report it, would you be rather concerned about why he had not
done it before?
A. Yes.
Q. Suppose when he did report it, he said this friend of mine, a good friend of
mine, I am sure he was innocent, and therefore I won't tell you who he is. Would
you be concerned about that? Would you urge him to tell you?
A. I would certainly urge him to tell me for the security of the bank.
Q. Now, supposing your branch bank manager, in telling you the story of his
conversations with his friend, said, "My friend told me that these people that he
knows that want to rob the bank told me that they had a pretty good plan. They
had some tear gas and guns and they had a car arranged for the getaway, and
had everything all fixed up," would you conclude from that it was a pretty well-
defined plot?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, supposing some years later this branch manager told you, "Mr. Mcdoy,
I told you that my friend and his friends had a scheme all set up as I have told
you, with tear gas and guns and getaway car, but that was a lot of bunk. It
just wasn't true. I told you a false story about my friend." Would you be a bit
puzzled as to why he would tell yon such a false story about his friend?
A. Yes; I think I would be.
Mr. ROBB. That Is all.
Mr. GBAY. Mr. McCloy, for the record, you were speaking about Mr. Stimson's
report as to the position of the scientists with respect to the dropping of the first
bomb?
The WITNESS. Yes.
738
Mr. GRAY. As I recall it there was some sort of interruption, and I don't believe
the record reflects what you were about to say the position of the scientists was
on that matter.
The WITNESS. That they were in favor of dropping the bomb, and that Dr.
Oppenheimer was one of those who had been in favor.
Mr. GRAY. Perhaps the interruption was in my own mind.
Mr. ROBB. I think I asked him which bomb, and then he said it was the Japa-
nese bomb, and Dr. Oppenheimer favored the dropping of it.
Mr. GRAY. Yes. Pardon my lapse.
Second, I think the record ought to reflect all the names of the members of this
group you were discussing.
The WITNESS. I think I may have it in my brief case if I may look it up. My
brief case is in the other room. This is the Council of Foreign Relations that you
are referring to?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. I certainly can supply you with that.
Mr. GBAY. We will get that from you.
(The list is as follows:)
MEMBERSHIP OF THE STUDY GROUP ON SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS
John J. McCloy, chairman, Chase National Bank.
Frank Altschul, General American Investors Corp.
Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations.
McGeorge Bundy, Harvard University, resigned from group in 1953.
Arthur Dean, Sullivan and Cromwell, joined group, Spring, 1954.
William Diebold, Council on Foreign Relations.
F. Eberstadt, F. Bberstadt & Co., Inc.
Merle Fainsod, Harvard University.
William T. R. Fox, Columbia University.
George S. Franklin, Jr., Council on Foreign Relations.
W. A. Harriman, Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
Howard G. Johnson, Ford Foundation.
Devereux C. Josephs, New York Life Insurance Co.
Milton Katz, Ford Foundation.
Mervin J. Kelly, Bell Laboratories.
William L. Langer, Harvard University.
Walter H. Mallory, Council on Foreign Relations.
Philip E. Mosely, Russian Institute, Columbia University.
J. Robert Oppenheimer, Institute for Advanced Study.
Geroid T. Robinson, Columbia University.
Dean Rusk, Rockefeller Foundation.
Charles M. Spofford, Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl.
Shepard Stone, Ford Foundation.
Jacob Viner, Princeton University, inactive because of ill health.
Henry M. Wriston, Brown University.
GOVERNMENT OBSERVERS
Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency.
Robert R. Bowie, Department of State.
Lyman L. Lemnitzer, General, Department of the Army.
RESEARCH STAFF FOR THE STUDY GROUP ON SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Henry L. Roberts, research secretary, Council on Foreign Relations.
Gerhart Niemeyer, formerly with the Department of State.
Marina S. Flnkelstein, formerly with the research program on the U. S. S. R.
Perry Laukhuff, formerly with the Department of State (with group for
5 months).
A. David Redding, formerly with the Rand Corp.
Donald Urguidi, former student at the Russian Institute, Columbia.
Paul E. Zinner, formerly at Harvard University.
Mr. GRAY. Have you read the letter of December 23 from General Nichols to
Dr. Oppenheimer, and Dr. Oppenheimer's reply perhaps as they appeared in the
press?
The WITNESS. Yes, I didn't read them critically, but I know pretty much what
is in them, because I read them rather hastily.
.739
Mr. GRAY. Is this the first knowledge you had of the reported associations of
Dr. Oppenheimer?
The WITNESS. No. I think I heard somewhere about a year ago, and I can't
place where I heard it, that there was some question about Dr. Oppenhelmer's
early associations, that his brother or wife had been a Communist. It was
within a year that I heard it.
Mr. GBAY. Mr. McCloy, following Mr. Robb's hypothetical question for the
moment, let us go further than his assumption. Let us say that ultimately you
did get from you branch manager the name of the individual who had approached
him with respect to leaving the vault open, and suppose further that your branch
manager was sent by you on an inspection trip of some of your foreign branches,
and suppose further that you learned that while he was in London he looked up
the man who had made the approach to him some years before, would this be a
source of concern to you?
The WITNESS. Yes; I think it would. It is certainly something worthy of
investigation, yes.
Mr. GBAY. Now, Mr. McCloy, you said in referring to Dr. Oppenheimer that
he more than perhaps anybody else is responsible for our preeminence in the field
of the weapon. You are referring now to the atomic bomb ?
The WITNESS. Yes ; the atomic bomb.
Mr. GRAY. Could you make the same statement with respect to the H-bomb?
The WITNESS. I don't know enough about the development of the H-bomb.
That occurred after I left the Defense Establishment.
Mr. GBAY. So you are confining your testimony to the development of the
atomic bomb.
The WITNESS. Yes ; to the development of the atomic bomb.
Mr. GBAY. On the basis of what you know, which specifically includes of course
your associations with Dr. Oppenheimer, and on the basis of what you read in
the newspapers, would you feel that any further investigation in this matter was
necessary at all? Would you be prepared to say that the Atomic Energy Com-
mission should just forget all about it?
The WITNESS. I don't know what I read in the newspapers really. This thing
that Mr. Robb questioned me about, I have imagined that relates to some inci-*
dent in connection with Dr. Oppenheimer's past or has some bearing on it. I am
not familiar with that. If that was in the answer and the reply I didn't read
it critically. It was about some approach but it didn't stay in my mind. I just
read it going downtown in the morning.
No, I would say that anyone in the position of Dr. Oppenheimer with his great
knowledge on this subject, the very sensitive Information that he has, most of
which I guess is in his own brain, if association which was suspicious turned up
in connection with him, I think it would be incumbent upon this group or some
other group to investigate it. I don't suggest in any way that it should not be
investigated or that it can be cast off casually. All I say is that I think you have
go to look at the whole picture and the contributing factors of this man, and
what he represents, before you determine the ultimate question of security.
Mr. GBAY. So that you would say as of today that it is appropriate and proper
to have this kind of an inquiry?
The WITNESS. As far as I know, certainly if you have something there that
trips your mind, you ought to make an inquiry about it.
Mr. GBAY. I meant this proceeding that we are involved in.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. Would you take a calculated risk with respect to the security of
your bank?
The WITNESS. I take a calculated risk every day in my bank.
Mr. GBAY. Would you leave someone in charge of the vaults about whom you
have any doubt in your mind?
The WITNESS. No, I probably wouldn't.
Mr. GBAY. My question I can put in a more straightforward way, and it is
one of the basic issues before the country, and certainly one involved in this
country. And that is, when the paramount concern is the security of the country,
which I believe is substantially the language of the Atomic Energy Act, can you
allow yourself to entertain reasonable doubts?
Before you answer, let me say if this leads you to tfHnTr that I or the mem-
bers of the board have any conclusions about this matter at this point, I wish
you would disabuse yourself of that notion.
The WITNESS. Surely.
Mr. GRAY. What I am trying to get at is this relates yourself in your discus-
sion about the other things you have to take into consideration.
740
The WITNESS. Surely. That brings me back again on this problem which I
was checked a little because I was going a little far afield, and I don't think
I can get the pat analogy to the bank vault man. But let me say, suppose that
the man in charge of my vaults knew more about protection and knew more
about the intricacies of time locks than anybody else in the world, I might think
twice before I let him go, because I would balance the risks in this connection.
Take the case of the bank teller business, because I saw Mr. Wilson's remark,
and I pricked up my ears when he said that, because I am a banker, and he
was comparing my profession to this thought of reforming a bank teller. This
was the incident I was about to speak of, if I may now inntroduce it with your
consent.
Mr. GKAT. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, may I make myself plain? I have no objection to
Mr. McCloy giving a full explanation of any of his answers.
The WITNESS. One of my tasks in Germany was to pick up Nazi scientists
and send them over to the United States. These Nazi scientists a few years
before were doing their utmost to overthrow the United States Government by
violence. They had a very suspicious background. They are being used now,
I assume — whether they are still, I don't know, because I am not in contact
with it — on very sensitive projects in spite of their background. The Defense
Department has been certainly to some extent dependent upon German scien-
tists in connection with guided missiles. I suppose other things being equal,
you would like to have a perfectly pure, uncontaminated chap, with no back-
ground, to deal with these things, but it is not possible in this world. I think
you do have to take risks in regard to the security of the country. As I said
at the beginning, even if they put you — I won't be personal about it — but let us
say put Mr. Sttmson or anybody in charge of the Innermost secrets of our de-
fense system, there is a risk there. You can't avoid the necessity of balancing
to some degree.
So I reemphasize from looking at it, I would think I would come to the con-
clusion if I were Secretary of War, let us balance all the considerations here
and take the calculated risk. It is too bad you have to calculate sometimes.
But in the last analysis, you have to calculate what is best for the United States,
because there is no Maginot Line in terms— it is just as weak as the Maginot
Line in terms of security.
Mr. GRAY. Do you understand that it is beyond the duty of this board to make
the ultimate decision as to who shall be employed by the Government on the
basis of his indispensability or otherwise?
The WITNESS. Surely.
Mr. GBAY. We are more narrowly concerned with the field of security as we
understand the term.
The WrFNEsa. I understand that.
Mr. GRAY. I think I have no more questions. Dr. Evans.
Dr. EVANS. Mr. McCloy, you say you talked to Bohr?
The WITNESS. Yes ; Neils Bohr.
Dr. EVANS. Where did you talk to Neils?
The WITNESS. I talked to him abroad and here. He visited Washington, you
know.
Dr. EVANS. I know. Did he tell you who split the uranium atom over there?
The WITNESS. Wasn't it Halm and Straussman?
Dr. EVANS. Yes. I am just giving you a little quiz to find out how much
you associated.
The WITNESS. You terrify me.
Dr. EVANS. Did you read Smyth's book?
The WITNESS. Yes ; I did. I was also tutored by Babi; I may say that when
Dr. Oppenheimer gave me up as a poor prospect
Dr. EVANS. And you think we should take some chances for fear we might
disqualify someone who might do us a lot of good?
The WITNESS. Yes; I do.
Dr. EVANS. You do?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Dr. EVANB. There is nothing in the regulations applying to this board that
mentions that point
The WITNESS. Yes.
Dr. EVANS. You understand this is not a job we tried to seek.
The WITNESS. Goodness knows, I know that
Dr. EVANS. You think that there are very few scientists that could do Dr.
Oppenheimer*s work?
741
The WITNESS. That is my impression.
Dr. EVANS. That is, yon think he knows perhaps more about this, as you
mentioned in your vault business, than anybody else in the world?
The WITNESS. I wouldn't say that ; no. But I would certainly put him in the
forefront.
Dr. EVANS. And you would take a little chance on a man that has great
value?
The WITNESS. Yes, I would; particularly in the light of his other record,
at least insofar as I know it. I can't divorce myself from my own impression
of Dr. Oppenheimer and what appeals to me as his frankness, integrity, and
his scientific background. I would accept a considerable amount of political
immaturity, let me put it that way, in return for this rather esoteric, this rather
indefinite theoretical thinking that I believe we are going to be dependent on for
the next generation.
Dr. EVANS. That is, you would look over the political immaturity and pos-
sible subversive connections and give the great stress to his scientific information?
The WITNESS. Provided I saw indications which were satisfactory to me, that
he had reformed or matured.
Dr. EVANS. I have no more questions.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Garrison?
Mr. GABEISON. I would like to put one question, if I may.
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GAEEISON:
Q. Having in mind the question that Dr. Evans last put to you, I would just
like to read you a paragraph from the Atomic Energy Commission's criteria
for determining eligibility, which is a guide to the board here, as I understand
it, and ask you if this is something of what you yourself had in mind when
you talked about positive and negative security:
"Oases must be carefully weighed in the light of all the information and a
determination must be reached which gives due recognition to the favorable as
well as unfavorable information concerning the individual, and which balances
the cost to the program of not having his services against any possible risks
involved."
I also should read you the section from the Atomic Energy Act which pro-
vides that, "No individual shall have access to restricted data until the FBI
shall have made an investigation and report to the Commission on the char-
acter, associations, and loyalty of such individual and the Commission shall
have determined that permitting such person to have access to restricted data
will not endanger the common defense or security."
Having read the portion of the Commission's criteria which I read to you
and the section of the statute which I read to you, would you or would you not
say that your observations about positive, as well as negative, security have a
place within this framework?
A. Yes ; I would say so.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, may I Just point out for the record — I don't wish
to get into any debate about the matter— the section that Mr. Garrison read
from the criteria, I believe, applies to the decision which is to be made by the
general manager as an administrative matter in determining whether the
subject is to be kept on.
Dr. EVANS. It is not the action of this board.
Mr. ROBB. It does not refer to this board.
Dr. EVANS. This board doesn't have to do that
Mr. GRAY. I think it is sufficient in the presence of this witness to simply
raise that question. I think otherwise there would appear as a part of Mr.
Mcdoy's testimony very considerable argument about the meaning and provi-
sions of this.
The WITNESS. May I say I was not familiar with that provision.
Mr. GBAY. That is one reason I don't want to debate it while you are in the
witness chair, Mr. McOloy. I think I ought to say to you that there are a
good many other provisions in this criteria document which was referred to by
Mr. Garrison, establishing categories of derogatory information, et cetera, and
I would just call your attention to the fact that these other things appear and
the discussion you have is by no means conclusive as to the duties of this
board.
Mr. ROBB. That is all I wanted to point out.
742
Dr. EVANS. Mr. McCloy, our business is simply to advise. We don't make
the decision.
The WITNESS. I see. You make an advisory report to the general manager.
Mr. GRAY. We make a recommendation.
Dr. EVANS. And sometimes the recommendations of a board like this are not
carried out at all.
By Mr. GARBISON :
Q. I would like to put one final question to you. Is it your opinion that in
the light of the character, associations, and loyalty of Dr. Oppenheimer as you
have known him, that his continued access to restricted data would not endanger
the common defense and security?
A. That is my opinion.
Mr. GABEISON. That is alL
Mr. ROBB. That is all. Thank you, Mr. McCloy.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GARRISON. May I read one sentence from the criteria into the record, not
by way of argument, but simply because I would like to respond to it.
Mr. GRAY. I have no objection to your reading one sentence from the criteria,
but I don't want to get into a discussion of the meaning of these regulations.
You may read your sentence and if Mr. Robb wants to read a sentence, I will
give him one crack.
Mr. GARRISON. This is section 4.16 of the United States Atomic Energy Com-
mission Rules and Regulations. This is entitled: "Recommendations of the
Board :
"(a) The Board shall carefully consider all material before it, including
reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the testimony of all witnesses,
the evidence presented by the individual and the standards set forth in AEG
personnel security clearance criteria for determining eligibility."
Mr. GBAY. We will recess for a short period.
(Short recess.)
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Griggs, do you wish to testify under oath? You are not re-
quired to do so, but all witnesses have.
Mr. GRTGGS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. What is your full name?
Mr. GBIGGS. David Tressel Griggs.
Mr. GRAY. Would you raise your right hand, please. David Tressel Griggs,
do you swear that the testimony you are to give the board shall be the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. GRIGGS. I do.
Whereupon, David Tressel Griggs was called as a witness, and having been
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. It is my duty to remind you of the existence of the so-called perjury
statutes. I should be glad to review those with you if you feel the need of it, or
may we assume you are generally familiar with them?
The WITNESS. I am not familiar with it.
Mr. GRAY. Forgive me if I briefly tell you that section 1001 of title 18 of the
United States Code makes it a crime punishabl eby a fine of not more than
$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years or both for any person to
make any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation in any
matter within the jurisdiction of any agency of the United States.
Section 1621 of title 18 of the United States Code makes it a crime punish-
able by a fine of up to $2,000 and/or imprisonment of up to 5 years for any person
to state under oath any material matter which he does not believe to be true.
Those are in general the provisions of the statutes to which I had reference.
The WITNESS. Thank you.
Mr. GBAY. I should like to request, Mr. Griggs, that if in the course of your
testimony it becomes necessary for you to refer to or to disclose restricted data,
you let me know in advance so that we may take the necessary steps in the
interest of security.
The WrrNEsa May I ask, sir, does this apply to only restricted data or any
classified matters?
Mr. GRAY. I think clearly it applies to restricted data. If you find yourself
getting into matters with respect to which there Is a serious classification, as
contrasted with what I used to know as the restricted label not in the atomic
energy sense, I don't think you need to bother about that But if you get
into secret matters, I think you better let me know yon are entering into that
field.
743
The WITNESS. I understood that I had a measure of protection in this in that
there was a person here who would
Mr. GRAY. If any question arises and no one here can give you the answer
to it, a classification officer can be made available.
Mr. ROIANDEB. That is right.
Mr. OKAY. Finally, I should say, Mr. Griggs, that we consider this proceeding
a confidential matter between the Atomic Energy Commission, its officials and
witnesses on ,the one hand, and Dr. Oppenheimer and his representatives on the
other. The Commission is making no release with respect to this proceeding
and on behalf of the board, I express the hope to all the witnesses that they will
take the same view.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
DTBECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Mr. Griggs, where do you live at present, sir?
A. My home address is 190 Granville Avenue, Los Angeles, Calif.
Q. You are appearing here today in response to a subpena?
A. Tes, I am.
Q. You are not here, Mr. Griggs, because you want to be here?
A. No. I do feel it is my duty to testify as requested, however. The reason
that I am glad that there is a subpena in the case is because some of the testi-
mony that I may have to give may involve matters of Air Force concern.
Q. You said you felt it was your duty to testify as requested. Just to make it
clear, you don't mean that you had been requested to testify in any particular
way, do you?
A. No.
Q. Mr. Griggs, what is your present occupation or employment?
A. I am professor of geophysics at the University of California at Los Angeles.
Q. How long have you been in that position?
A. Since May of 1948.
Q. Would you tell us something of your academic training and background?
A. I graduated from Ohio State University in 1932, and stayed theer for a year
taking a master's degree. I went to Harvard where for 7 years I was a member
of the Society of Fellows. In approximately June of 1940, I left to be a member
of the Radiation Laboratory at MIT. You have asked only about my academic
training. That includes my academic training.
Q. Just for the benefit of those of us who are not experts, would you tell us
what you mean by geophysics? What kind of physics is that? We have heard
about nuclear physics and physical chemistry. What is a geophysicist? I don't
means a complete explanation.
A. In general it is the application of physical methods to the problems of the
earth.
Q. You mentioned that you began work on radar in 1940?
A. In 1940, yes.
Q. At MIT?
A. Excuse me. I beg your pardon. I made a mistake. This is in 1941. I hope
the record can be corrected on that
Q. How long did you stay there in that work?
A. I was there until August of 1942.
Q. What did you do after that? Would you go ahead now and in your own
way tell us chronologically what you did after that?
A. Yes. During my time at the radiation laboratory I was concerned primarily
with the development of airborne radar. In August of 1942, 1 was requested to
come down to the War Department to serve as an expert consultant in the Office
of the Secretary of War, and particularly within the office of the Secretary I
was working in the office of Dr. Edward L. Bowles. My duties there were to do
what I could to insure the integration of our new weapons, principally radar, since
that was the subject with which I was familiar, into the operational units of the
War Department, and since the Air Force was the principal customer of this, I
worked primarily with the Air Force.
I went overseas for extensive periods and spent between 2% and 3 years, I
believe, overseas in the European theaters, and after Y-E Day I was transferred
to the Far Eastern Air Forces, where I was served as chief of the scientific ad-
visory group to the Far Eastern Air Forces, still, however, on assignment from
the Office of the Secretary of War.
Q. Who was the head of your group over there in the Far East?
.744
A. I was the head of the scientific advisory group directly under General
Kenney as the commanding general of the Far Eastern Air Forces.
Q. Was Dr. Compton over there?
A. After V-J Day, Dr. Compton headed a mission of which I was a part
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Which Dr. Compton?
The WITNESS. Dr. K. D. Compton.
This was called the scientific intelligence advisory section, I believe, of GHQ,
General MaeArthur's command based in Tokyo after the occupation.
I was there for 2 months and returned to the United States in November of
1945.
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. What did you do then?
A. I had looked for the end of the war hoping that I could immediately return
to my academic pursuits. After having seen so much destruction of principally
urban destruction, both in Germany and Japan, I had hoped that the world
would have come to a realization that steps necessary to prevent war must be
taken. I left the War Department and spent perhaps 6 weeks trying to get back
into the swing of things. I had no position to return to at that time, so I was
looking for an academic position.
Then I became convinced that as a result, I fo^fe, largely of the activities of
the United Nations with regard to Persia, that we were in for a long-term mili-
tary problem. Because of my nearly unique experience in integrating new
weapons into the military, I felt that I should remain in that work for some time
until a new group of people could be brought along. For that reason I responded
in the affirmative when I was asked to join what later became the Band project in
the Band Corp., and I did join them in February 1946.
Q. In what capacity?
A. I was the first full-time employee of the Band project and as the project grew
and divided into sections, I was head of the atomic energy section, I believe it was
called, at that time. It is now called the nuclear energy division of the Band
Corp.
Q. Go ahead.
A. I remained there until May of 1948, when I left to go to the University of
California. At that time the section had been built up to the point where I
felt that if anything, it could carry on better after I left than it had been doing.
Q. You went back to the University of California where?
A. At Los Angeles.
Q. In what capacity?
A. As I have already said, I was professor of geophysics in the Institute of
Geophysics at Los Angeles.
Q. Did you entirely terminate your relationship with Band or not?
A. No. My agreement with President SprauUe at the time I joined the
university, I felt free to and did act in consulting capacity on defense problems.
I have been ever since consultant to the Band Corp. with the exception of the
1 year I served here in the Air Force, and at various times I have been con-
sultant to the Armed Forces Special Weapons project, to the radiation laboratory
at the University of California, to the Air Force, and the Corps of Engineers.
Q. Will you tell us whether or not Band was doing work for the United States
Government in the field of nuclear weapons?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. You mentioned that you were with the Air Force. When did tha.t start?
A. I left on leave of absence under a strong request from the Chief of Staff of
the Air Force to serve as chief scientist of the Air Force, which I did for the
period of September 1, 1951, through June 80 of 1952.
Q. In that capacity did you concern yourself with the thermonuclear problem?
A. Yes.
Q. May I interrupt the course of your narrative for a moment to ask you
whether or not you met Dr. Oppenheimer?
A, Oh, yes.
Q. When?
A, I can't be sure of the first time that I met him, but I have seen him on
a number of occasions since 1946.
Q. In other words, you know Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. And you have known him since about 1946?
A. Yes. I think I did not know him before.
745
Q. Getting back to your work with the Air Force in respect of thermonuclear
matters, what was your first connection with that when you were with the
Air Force?
A. I should say that through my Band connections largely I had heen f ollow-
ing as well as I could from afar the course of developments in this field at Los
Alamos and about the time I came to Washington there was, as you have abund-
ant testimony, intensification of this program and reason for much more op-
timism than had been generally present in the past.
Q. You mentioned that we had abundant testimony. Of course you have not
been present. What did you mean by that?
A. I referred to the implications I got from conversations with you and Mr.
Kolander.
Q. All right Go ahead.
Mr. MABKS. What was the testimony about? I am very sorry.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Griggs said "as you have abundant testimony there was op-
timism about the program in 1951." I merely wanted to draw from him what
he meant by the testimony.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. You mean in the course of interviewing you as a witness, we took it for
granted that there was in 1951 increased optimism in respect of the thermo-
nuclear program, is that it?
A. I would have assumed this whether you said anything to me or not. I
presume you have been getting into this business pretty thoroughly and I cer-
tainly hope that the board has.
Q. All right, sir. Go ahead. I am sorry I interrupted your course of thought
You were about to tell us about what you had to do with the thermonuclear
program, and I believe you were explaining why you were interested in it when
you came to the Air Force.
A. Shortly after I started work In the Air Force at that time as chief scientist,
it became apparent that it was possible to think of actual weapons of this family,
and there were estimates as to performance of these weapons which made them
appear to be extraordinarily effective as weapons for the Air Force. If these
estimates could be met, it was perfectly clear to my colleagues in the Air Force
that it was of the utmost importance that the United States achieve his capa-
bility before the Russians did.
In this regard the opinions of the Air Force coincided with the opinions ex-
pressed by General Bradley for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his memorandum of
October 1949.
Q. Go ahead.
A. This is a long story.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. What is the question?
Mr. ROBB. I asked him to tell us about his connection with the thermonuclear
program, and Just what you first did when you came with the Air Force.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. What was the first step you took in respect to the thermonuclear program?
A. I can hardly remember what the first step I took was. The first step I took
was to get additional information as to the status.
Q. To whom did you go for that information?
A. To the Office of Atomic Energy of the Air Force and to the Atomic Energy
Commission.
Q. What did you find out about the status of the program?
A. As I have already testified, everything I found at that time gave indication
or gave promise of the fairly early achievement of an effective weapon.
Mr. GARRISON. Could I understand what time was this?
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Was this in the fall of 1951?
A. Yes.
Q. Did there come a time when you had some discussion about the establish-
ment of a second laboratory?
A. Yes ; we were verly deeply concerned in this.
Q. Why?
A. In the President's directive of January 31, 1950, it was stated the rate and
scale of effort on thermonuclear weapons should be jointly determined by the
Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. It was therefore
a part of our responsibility as a part of the military to make taftwn, our Tiew.s
746
on this matter. We felt at tlie time we are speaking of, namely, late 1951
and early 1952, the effort on this program was not as great as the circumstances
required under the President's directive.
Q. So what did you do?
A. I personally first tried to find out from the AEG what action they were
taking in this direction. The things that I -found out led me to helieve
Q. Well, pardon me. Go ahead.
A. You were going to ask a question?
Q. I was going to save time. Did the Air Force commend the establishment
of a second laboratory?
A. The Air Force did. So did the Department of Defense.
Q. Did you at that time ascertain what the position of Dr. Oppenheimer was
on that?
A. I did not talk as near as I can recall to Dr. Oppenheimer about this question.
By hearsay evidence, I formed a firm impression that he was opposed to it. I
have since read the appropriate minutes of the General Advisory Committee,
and believe that this is substantiated in those minutes.
Q. Did there come a time when a project known as Vista was carried out?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you familiar with that project?
A. Yes, surely.
Q. Would you tell us what you can of the origin of that and its history?
A. May I volunteer a statement?
Q. Yes, indeed, sir.
A. The testimony that I have to give here before this board, as I understand
the line that your questions are following, is testimony which will be concerned
at least in part with two very controversial issues on which I was a participant
in the controversy in my clear understanding on the opposite side of this con-
troversy from Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. And you wish what you have to say to be taken in that context?
A. Yes. I want to make it clear that I was an active participant in the con-
'troversy, and may not be fully capable of objectivity.
Q. Because you were an active participant, we have asked you to come here
because you know about it. Now, would you go ahead, sir, and tell us what you
know about the origin of this Vista project, and in particular reference to any
connection Dr. Oppenheimer had with it, and then what happened in the Vista
project?
A. I am not hesitant to answer this question and I don't want that impression
to be conveyed if I can avoid it However, I do feel the need of some clarifica-
tion of what is obviously going to follow from your present trend of questions,
because a great many of my scientific colleagues are involved in this controversy
and on both sides. In my mind there existed at the time and today a possible
distinction between the position of my other scientific colleagues and that of
Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. When did you first become aware of the starting of the so-called Vista
project?
A, The Vista project was started, as near as I can remember, in the spring
or summer of 1951, largely through the activities of Dr. Ivan A. Getting and
Dr. Louis N. Bidenour, who were at that time serving full time with the Air
Force. Dr. Getting was serving as assistant for evaluation in the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Development. Dr. Bidenour was serving as chief
scientist. In other words, as my predecessor. They, after a very considerable
persuasive effort, induced the California Institute of Technology to undertake
the Vista project which can be briefly characterized as a project to study the
tactical warfare * * *. This project was undertaken by Gal. Tech. as a joint
project between the three services^-the Army, Air Force, and the Navy.
Q. Were there various meetings* of scientists in Pasadena in connection with
this study?
A. Yes.
Q. When did those meetings come to a close, approximately?
A. As nearly as I can remember, the Vista report was submitted in January
of 1952, and the Vista project was terminated essentially with the presentation
of the Vista report
Q. Was there a section of that report, section 5, I believe, which dealt with
atomic and nuclear matters?
A. Chapter 5.
Q. Did you attend any of the sessions in California?
A. Yes; I did.
747
Q. Were you present at the sessions about the middle of November 1951?
A. I visited the Vista project about the middle of 1951 ; yes, sir.
Q. Will you tell us whether or not you recall an occasion when a draft of
chapter 5 was presented to the assembly?
A. Yes ; I do recall.
Q. Do you recall who it was who presented it?
A. Some of us from the Air Force were there to have a preview of the Vista
report as it then existed in draft form— partially at least in draft form — and
this included Mr. William Burden, who was assistant to the Secretary of the
Air Force for Research and Development ; Mr. Garrison Norton, who was deputy
to Mr. Burden ; Lt. Col. T. F. Walkowicz, and myself. We had a session which
was officially presided over, I think, by Dr. Fowler, but in which Dr. DuBridge
as senior member of Cal. Tech. took the leading role, essentially, and in which
Dr. Lauritsen, Dr. Milliken, and Robert Bacher were active. There were doubt-
less others there. Tour question, I believe, was who presented this draft?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I don't remember in detail, but I think the proper answer to your question
is that parts of it were presented by all of these people.
Q. Do you recall anyone making any statement as to who prepared the
introduction to this draft?
A. There was a part of the Vista in draft form which we were told had been
prepared by Dr. Oppenheimer, and we were told that what we were shown was
a verbatim draft as he had prepared it.
Q. Who told you?
A. We were told that by DuBridge, Bacher, Lauritsen, and perhaps others.
Q. Did you examine that draft?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there anything about it which impressed itself on your mind? •
A. Yes ; indeed.
Q. What was it?
A. There were three things about this general area of the Vista report that
I regarded as unfortunate from the standpoint of the Air Force. I can't be
sure that all three of these things were in the draft that was written by Dr.
Oppenheimer, but I think they were. However, the first and perhaps most
controversial point as far as we in the Air Force were concerned, I am quite
sure, was in the part that was said to have been prepared by Dr. Oppenheimer.
*******
Q. Was there anything else in that draft that struck you?
A. As I said, there were two other points. I can't swear to it that these were
in the draft written by Dr. Oppenheimer, but I am sure that he was aware of
these points.
Q. Did you understand that Dr. Oppenheimer approved these points?
A. Yes ; I did. I fo^Tr there is no question about that
* * * * * * *
Q. What is SAO?
A. The Strategic Air Command. And because of these facts, I considered
this to be contrary to the national interest.
Q. What was the third point which impressed itself upon you?
(No response.)
Q. I might ask you this question. Was there anything in the draft at that
time concerning the feasibility or the use of thermonuclear weapons?
A. May I say. before I respond to your last two questions that coupled with
this second point, * * * there was a recommendation as to the specific nature
of the weapons which should form a stockpile. This recommendation was
substantially different from the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Department of Defense, and in my mind, coupled with the other recom-
mendation of the tripartite allocation, had that second recommendation as to
the specific nature of the weapons to be stockpiled been accepted, it would also
have acted to restrict our military atomic capability.
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Now, as to the third point of the Vista report which troubled me, there
was the statement to the effect that in the state of the art it was impossible
to assess the capabilities of thermonuclear weapons adequately to evaluate
their tactical significance. Bear in mind this was in the late fall of 1951. As
near as I can recall, this particular piece was written by Dr. Oppenheimer,
according to the testimony as I have already cited.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. You mean according to what you heard?
748
The WITNESS. According to the testimony of DuBridge and Bacher. I am
using testimony in too loose a word.
Mr. SILVERMAN. You don't mean their testimony.
The WITNESS. No.
Mr. GRAY. Let me suggest that you will have the opportunity to cross-
examine.
Mr. SILVHRMAN. This was not intended as cross-examination. It seemed to
me that there was a slight error whiich I thought— if I am wrong, forgive me—
that the witness would like to have corrected.
The WITNESS. I do appreciate clarification of that point. I meant what we
bad been told by DuBridge, Bacher, Lauritsen, and others at the time.
This statement seemed to me to be quite contrary to the technical expectations
in the field of thermonuclear weapons at that time, with which Dr. Oppenheimer
as Chairman of the General Advisory Committee should certainly have had
complete familiarity. I have said that poorly, but I hope the sentence is clear.
I might say further on that, that Dr. Teller had previously spent a period
of a few days, I believe, at the Vista project, * * *. There have since been
other analyses of this specific problem * * *.
Have I made clear what I am talking about ?
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. I am told I may not ask you specifically what the final recommendations
of the Vista report were— at least not in open session here—but I would like
to ask you whether or not the statements which you have told us about the
draft were substantially modified or changed?
A. Yes ; they were. These statements that I have talked about
Q. Yes.
A. These were ones which our party — the people I have named from the
Air Force who were there — felt very strongly about and which Mr. Elnletter
felt strongly about and General Vandenberg, and I believe as a result of their
action, in part directly with Dr. Oppenheimer, these statements were revised.
Q. May I ask you, sir, was there any particular reason at that time why you
paid especial attention to any recommendations or views of Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. This is what you would call a leading question?
Q. I don't think so.
A. May I interrupt to say some other things about the Vista Beport?
Q. Yes, sir.
A, With the exception of these three statements— perhaps a few other things—
we found, the Air Force, and I as & part of the Air Force, that the Vista Beport
was a very fine job, and particularly in connection with the recommendations for
the use of atomic weapons. This contrasted to thermonuclear weapons. The
activities of the Air Force at that time were aided in this direction by the Vista
Report, and specifically, I think, it is quite appropriate to say that Dr. Oppen-
heixner's contribution in this direction was helpful to the Air Force. This is a
matter that I personally know to have extended over a period of several years.
Have I made what I am trying to say clear?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. Read the question, please.
(Question read by the reporter.)
The WITNESS. It seems to me this question can be answered only in broad
context, if you will allow me.
Mr. GRAY. Yes; you may answer it any way that seems best to you, Mr. Griggs.
The WITNESS. It seems obvious to me that what you are asking as I under-
stand it is one of the purposes of these hearings, namely, to investigate loyalty.
I want to say, and I can't emphasize too strongly, that Dr. Oppenheimer is the
only one of my scientific acquaintances about whom I have ever felt there was
a serious question as to their loyalty. The basis for this is not any indi-
vidual contact that I have had with Dr. Oppenheimer or any detailed knowledge
that I have had of his actions. But the basis is other than that and perhaps it
is appropriate that I say what it is.
I first warned about this when I Joined the Rand project, and was told that
Dr. Oppenheimer had been considered during the Los Alamos days as a calcu-
lated risk. I heard very little more about this until I came to Washington as
chief scientist for the Air Force.
In that capacity I was charged with working directly with General Vanden-
berg, who was then Chief of Staff of the Air Force, on matters of research and
development, and I .was charged with giving advice as requested to the Secretary
749
of the Air Force, who was then Mr. Finletter. I worked closely with General
Doolittie, who was Special Assistant to the Chief of the Air Force. '
Shortly after I came to Washington I was told in a way that showed me It
was no loosely thought out— let me correct that statement. I was told In a
serious way that Mr. Finletter— or rather, I was told by Mr. Finletter that he
had serious question as to the loyalty of Dr. Oppenheimer. I don't know in
detail the basis for his fears. I didn't ask. I do know that he had access to
the FBI files on Dr. Oppenheimer, at least I think I am correct in making that
statement I had this understanding.
I subsequently was informed from various sources of substantially the infor-
mation which appeared in General Nichols' letter to Dr. Oppenheimer, which
has been published. I feel I have no adequate basis for Judging Dr. Oppen-
heimer's loyalty or disloyalty. Of course, my life would have been much easier
had this question not arisen.
However, it was clear to me that this was not an irresponsible charge on the
part of Mr. Finletter or on the part of General Vandenberg, and accordingly I
had to take it into consideration in all our discussions and actions which had
to do with the activities of Dr. Oppenheimer during that year.
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. You mentioned General Vandenberg; did you have conversations with him
about the matter?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Ten us about that
A. I had numerous conversations with General Vandenberg about this.
Q. To shorten it up, could you tell us whether or not the purport of what
General Vandenberg said was similar to what was said by Mr. Finletter?
A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Griggs, did there come a time when a project known as the Lincoln
Summer Study was undertaken?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you tell us briefly what that was and when it took place ?
A. May I answer a broader question in my own way?
Q. Yes. I am merely trying to bring these matters up and let you tell us
about them in your own words.
A. It became apparent to us— by that I mean to Mr. Unletter, Mr. Burden, and
Mr. Norton, that there was a pattern of activities all of which involved Dr.
Oppenheimer. Of these one was the Vista project— I mean was his activity in
the Vista project, and the things I have already talked about We were told that
in the late fall, I believe, of 1951, Oppenheimer and two other colleagues formed
an informal committee of three to work for world peace or some such purpose,
as they saw it We were also told that in this effort they considered that many
things were more important than the development of the thermonuclear weapon,
specifically the air defense of the continental United States, which was the
subject of the Lincoln Summer Study. No one could agree more than I that air
defense is a vital problem and was at that time and worthy of all the scientific
ingenuity and effort that could be put on it We were, however, disturbed at the
way in which this project was started.
* * * * « * *
It was further told me by people who were approached to join the summer study
that in order to achieve world peace— this is a loose account, but I think it
preserves the sense — it was necessary not only to strengthen the Air Defense of
the continental United States, but also to give up something, and the thing that
was recommended that we give up was the Strategic Air Command, or more
properly I should say the strategic part of our total air power, which includes
more than the Strategic Air Command. The emphasis was toward the Strategic
Afr Command.
It was further said in these initial discussions with people who it was hoped
would join the project that the Lincoln Summer Study would concern itself
with antisubmarine warfare.
I hope it is dear to the board. If It is not, I should like to make clear why it
is that I felt upset by the references to the relative importance of the Strategic
Air Command and the Air Defense Command, and to the suggestion that we, the
United States, give up the Strategic Air Command. Should I amplify that?
Mr. GBA.Y. Yes; if you will.
The WITNESS. The reason that I felt this was unfortunate as a part of the
Lincoln Summer Study is similar to the reason that I felt that a similar sugges-
tion which I have already referred to was unfortunate in the case of the Vista
750
study, namely, that neither of these two studies had the background nor were
charged with the responsibility of considering in any detail or considering at all
the fact of the activities of the Strategic Air Command. I felt that for any
group to make such recommendations it was necessary that they know as much
about the Strategic Air Command and the general strategic picture as they knew
about the Air Defense Command.
Also we have learned to be a little cautious about study projects which have
in mind making budget allocations or recommending budget allocations for major
components of the Military Establishment gratuitously, I might say. There are
of course groups charged with this, but the Lincoln Group was not charged with
this.
There was another aspect of the initial phases of the Lincoln Summer Study
which upset me very greatly, and that is that the way in which it was first started
gave considerable promise— considerable threat, I might say — of destroying the
effectiveness of the Lincoln project. The Lincoln project was one which the
Air Force relied on to a very great extent in developing the future air defense
capability of the United States Air Force, and of the United States in large
measure.
Sir, If I am getting too detailed about this
Mr. GBAY. No, you proceed.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Had you completed your answer on that?
A. Yes, unless you desire amplification.
May I say one more thing in that connection? I probably have not made it
very clear, but as near as we could tell the Lincoln Summer Study came about
as one of the acts of this informal committee of three which I mentioned of which
Dr. Oppenheimer was one.
Q. Who were they?
A. As I have said, Dr. Oppenheimer and two other scientists.
Q. Who were the other scientists?
A. Dr. Rabi and Dr. Lauritsen.
Q. There has been some mention of a group called ZORC. Was there any
such group as that that you knew about?
A. ZORC are the letters applied by a member of this group to the four people.
Z is for Zacharias, O for Oppenheimer, R for Rabi, and C for Charlie Lauritsen.
Q. Which member of the group applied it?
A. I heard it applied by Dr. Zacharias.
Q. When and under what circumstances?
A. It was in the fall of 1952 at a meeting of the Scientific Advisory Board In
Boston— in Cambridge— at a time when Dr. Zacharias was presenting parts
of a summary of the Lincoln Summer Study.
Q. In what way did he mention these letters? What were the mechanics of it?
A. The mechanics of it were that he wrote these three letters on the board
Dr. EVANS. Did you say three letters?
The WITNESS. Four. You said three.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. That was my mistake. Wrote them on what board, a blackboard?
A. Yes.
Q. And explained what?
A. And explained that Z was Zacharias, O was Oppenheimer, R was Rabi and
C was Charlie Lauritsen.
Q. How many people were present?
A. This was a session of the Scientific Advisory Board, and there must have
been between 50 and 100 people in the room.
Q. To sum up, Mr. Griggs, in the Lincoln Study did they come up with a report
of some sort?
A. I don't know.
Q. There has been some
A. When I say I don't know, I mean I don't know whether there was a formal
written report.
Q. Did you attend the sessions or any of the sessions?
A. I attended only the initial sessions, the first three days or so of the summer
study. That was while I was still chief scientist of the Air Force, and after I
left I had no further contact with it. That is, no further attendance at these
meetings.
751
Q. There has been estimony here, I think, to the effect that the burden of
thinking of the Lincoln study was that there should be a balance between an
offensive or strategic air force and the continental defense of the Untied States.
Would you care to comment on that?
A. I have already tried to give the board the impression that I may not be a
thoroughly objective witness in controversial matters, and this was a con-
troversial matter, but the impression I had was that there was a strong element
in the Lincoln Summer Study -activities and subsequent activities which can best
be described as being similar to the article by Joseph Alsop, I believe, in the
Saturday Evening Post, about the Lincoln Summer Study. As I recall it, this
article recommended a Maginot Line type of concept in which we depend on air
defense rather than our retaliatory capability. I think in this article the im-
pression was given that through the technological breakthroughs, which had
been exploited in the Lincoln Summer Study, it would be possible if their recom-
mendations were followed to achieve a very high rate of attrition on attacking
aircraft.
This, of course, can easily be checked by referring to the article. But as I
recall it, rates of attrition approaching 100 percent were considered to be
possible in that article.
This article reflected, as near as I could see, the spirit of a part of the Lincoln
Summer Study. From what I knew then and from what I know now, I think
that any such optimism is totally unjustified, and if we based a national policy
on such optimism, we could be in terrible trouble.
Q. Now, Mr. Griggs, coming to May 1952, I will ask you whether you recall
visiting Dr. Oppenheimer at Princeton?
A. Yes.
Q. In general what was your purpose in going to see him?
A. Do you mind if I answer this* again fairly fully?
Q. No," sir.
A. During the meetings of the National Academy of Science in Washington
in the spring of 1952, we had a luncheon meeting at Mr. Burden's house at which.
Dr. DuBridge and Dr. Babi were present, as well as Mr. Burden, Mr. Norton of
the Air Force, whose name I have mentioned before, and myself.
The purpose of this meeting was to allow Mr. Burden and Mr. Norton, who
were charged with important recommendations with respect to our thermonuclear
program, to talk to two eminent people who were familiar with aspects of the
activities of the Atomic Energy Commission bearing on the thermonuclear prob-
lem— much more familiar with these — than I was and who were on the opposite
side of this particular controversy which has already been mentioned, namely, the
second laboratory controversy, who were on the opposite side of that than
I was.
During that meeting, I made some statements to DuBridge and Babi as to
what I thought of the activities of the General Advisory Committee of the ABO
with respect to the development of the thermonuclear weapons. These state-
ments of mine were such as to imply that I didn't feel that the General Advisory
Committee had been doing anywhere near as much as it could do to further
the development of the thermonuclear weapon, nor anywhere near as much as
it should, under the President's directive, and the subsequent directives which
came out setting the rate and scale of effort on the thermonuclear program.
When I made these statements, based on as good information as I was able
to obtain prior to that time, Dr. Rabi said that I was quite wrong, and that
my sources of Information had been inadequate. I responded, as near as I can
recall, that I would be glad to get all the information I could so that I would
have a proper view of the activities of the General Advisory Committee in this
respect.
He then said that I couldn't get a clear picture of this without reading the
minutes of the General Advisory Committee. I responded that I would be very
happy to have the opportunity to read these minutes, and asked how I could get
access to them, and whether I should request clearance for this by a member of
the Atomic Energy Commission.
He responded, very much to my surprise, that the Atomic Energy Commission
was unable to grant access to the minutes of the General Advisory Committee,
that these were the personal property of the Chairman, Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Who was it that this conversation was with?
The WITNESS. This was Dr. Rabi. I don't recall exactly the next thing in
the conversation, but before we parted, Dr. Babi suggested that he arrange a
meeting at Princeton with Dr. Oppenheimer and myself and himself , Dr. Babi,
303518—54 18
752
at which time I would have a chance to review the minutes of the General
Advisory Committee so that I would be set straight on these matters.
That meeting turned out to be impossible, because Dr. Eabi had an illness at
the time when we tentatively set up the date, and somewhat after that time I
was in Princeton on other business, and called Dr. Qppenheimer, reminding him
of this and suggesting that I would be happy to meet with him on this general
subject if he so desired. Thereupon, we had this meeting.
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. What was the subject of your discussion when you did meet with him?
A. I, of course, brought up this background and the reason for my interest,
as I recall it I didn't really expect that I would be allowed to read the minutes
of the General Advisory Committee, and it turned out that this was not offered
by Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. Did you ask?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he say?
A. I don't recall
Q. In all events, you didn't get to read them?
A. No. I was shown by Dr. Oppenheimer at that time, two documents which
have been referred to in Dr. Oppenheimer's letter in response to General
Nichols. These were the documents with which I am sure the board is
familiar, submitted, I believe, as annexes to the report of the General Advisory
Committee in late October of 1949. These were the recommendations as to action
in the thermonuclear weapon and the 2 documents were, 1 signed by—- perhaps
I need not go into this.
Q. I think it is pretty dear in the record already. This was in May 1952?
A. I would have to check my records on this. I can find out exactly when It
was. I recall only that it was in the late spring of 1952.
Q. What, if anything, did Dr. Oppenheimer say in response to your suggestion
that the GAO had not been doing everything possible in furtherance of the
thermonuclear program?
A. We had, as near as I can recall, a fairly extensive or fairly lengthy dis-
cussion which I would estimate lasted something like an hour. This was, of
course, one of the main topics of our discussion. So we both said Quite a lot.
So I can't answer your question simply.
Q. In general, did he accept your suggestion or did he say on the contrary that
he thought they had been doing everything possible?
A. I am reasonably sure that I am accurate in saying that he attempted to
convince me that they had, in fact, been doing everything possible. He men-
tioned specifically at that time the actions of the General Advisory Committee— I
may not have this technically right when I say the actions of the General Ad-
visory Committee— but the actions taken by people, including members of the
General Advisory Committee, at a meeting in Princeton following the Greenhouse
tests.
Q. In the course of that conversation that you told us about, will you tell us
whether there was anything said by you about certain remarks which yon
attributed to Dr. Oppenheimer about Mr. Finletter?
A. I don't believe I attributed remarks to Dr. Oppenheimer during this dis-
mussion. However, I did have a question as to the origin of a story which
I. had heard repeated from a number of sources, I believe, including Dr. Qppen-
heimer, about Finletter.
Q. Would you tell us what was said between you and Dr. Oppenheimer about
that subject?
A. First I better repeat the story or the burden of the story.
Mr. SELVBBMATT. Mr. Chairman, I assume Mr. Bobb knows what is coming,
and he things it has some bearing on this, because I am having a great deal
of difficulty even in trying to guess.
Mr. BOBB. So far as anybody can know the workings of another man's mind,
I think I know what the testimony will have to be. I spent until half past 1
o'clock this morning trying to find out
Mr. SILVEBMAHT. It is hard for me to see, but all right.
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. Would you go ahead and answer the question?
A. During the spring of 1952, there had been a series of briefings within the
Defense Department on the thermonuclear weapon possibilities and on their
military effectiveness. The story to which I refer is said to have occurred or was
said to have occurred during one of these briefings. As near as I could find
753
ont the story was supposed to have reported a statement said to have been
made by Mr. Finletter during one of these briefings.
The story was that Mr. Finietter had said in the course of the briefing, if
we only had * * * of the bombs we could rule the world. This story had been
told in my hearing in a context which suggested that we had irresponsible
warmongers at the head of the Air Force at that time.
I was anxious to find out what part Dr. Oppenheimer had in spreading this
story, and what basis there was for such a story. I asked specific questions
Q. Of whom?
A. Of Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. On this occasion?
A. Yes. I specifically asked Dr. Oppenheimer as I recall it if he had repeated
this story. His answer as near as memory serves was that he had heard the
story* I then tried to question him as to the person to whom these remarks
which I had already quoted were attributed. While I don't tlilnk he said so by
name, he left no doubt in my mind that these remarks were supposed to have
been made by Mr. Finletter. I believe I assured Dr. Oppenheimer— excuse me.
May I say one other thing first?
I tried to get enough information in this conversation with Dr. Oppenheimer
to be sure in my own mind at which one of these several briefings these remarks
were supposed to have been made. This remark was supposed to have been
made. I became convinced that this was supposed to have been made at a
briefing of Mr. Lovett by Dr. Teller and the Rand group at which I had been
present, and which I still remember clearly the list of all those people who
had been present I believe I told Dr. Oppenheimer that Finletter made no
such remark, and that insofar as I knew anything about Iftnletter's feelings
on the matter, nothing could have been further from Mr. Finletter's thoughts.
And I think I knew Mr. Finletter well enough to be sure of this. I was certain
that no such remark had been made.
Dr. Oppenheimer said to me, I believe, that his source was one which he
could not question. In other words, I clearly got the impression that he be-
lieved that Mr. Finletter said these remarks, and that my story of the occasion
was not correct.
Q. Let me ask you whether you had ever heard Dr. Oppenheimer repeat this
story?
A. I believe I have, although here my memory does not suffice, but according
to my notes of the time which I looked at yesterday they say that I had heard
him say that
Q. Did you at that time make some memorandum of this matter?
A. Yes. No. Excuse me. I did not at that time make a memorandum, but
on a later occasion I did.
Q. Either' at that time or shortly thereafter?
A. Yes. I did as I recall a few weeks thereafter. The reason, as I recall
it, for my making a memorandum at all, and I may point out that this mem-
orandum I typed myself, and put on "Eyes only" classifications on it, because
I thought it should be kept very close. The reason I made this memorandum
was because Mr. Finletter was scheduled to have a meeting with Dr. Oppen-
heimer and because of what I had been told as to the possible nature of subject
to be discussed. I thought he ought to have this information as accurately as I
could describe it
Q. In that conversation with Dr. Oppenheimer at Princeton was there any
mention of a statement or announcement by the United States with respect to
the development of the thermonuclear — any public announcement as to whether
we would go ahead with it or not?
A. As I have already mentioned, Dr. Oppenheimer showed me these docu-
ments of the General Advisory Committee which were on this subject
Q. Ip. that context, did you follow up that matter with Dr. Oppenheimer in
any way, and if so, what response did he make?
A. Let me make clear or let me emphasize that at this time I was on the
opposite side of the controversy with respect to he second wjeapons laboratory,
and Dr. Oppenheimer knew full well I was on the opposite side.
Q. I will put the question to you directly.
A. Excuse me, but let me say hence I was surprised that he would show me
these documents. They were shown to me as near as I can recall in the context
of the actions of the General Advisory Committee, and to me they seemed wholly
had. In other words, I have not mentioned this before, but my view was and
is that if the policy recommended by the General Advisory Committee had been
adopted, it could be a national catastrophe.
754
Q. Do you recall whether or not yon expressed some such view to Dr. Oppen-
helmer on that occasion?
A. I don't think I used words like that, but I made it quite clear I am sure
that these documents semed to me unfortunate.
Q. What was his response to that?
(No response.)
Q. I will put the question to you directly.
Was there any discusion between you and Dr. Oppenheimer about your views
on his loyalty ?
A. Yes, there was.
Q. What was that?
A. I have forgotten the sequence of these things. I have of course forgotten
the details of it, but I believe at one point Dr. Oppenheimer asked me if I
thought he was pro-Russian, or some word of this sort, or whether he was
just confused. As near as I can recall, I responded that I wished I knew. I
might say that is my position today, and I hope that all of us who have ques-
tion will be reassured by the proceedings of this board one way or the other.
Does that answer your question?
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer say anything further in that context?
A. I believe it was after this that he asked me if I had impugned his loyalty
to high officials of the Defense Department, and I believe I responded simply,
yes, or something like that. If I were to answer that question — I think that
before an answer should have been given, because as I understand the literal
meaning of this word, I had not impugned his loyalty, but his loyalty had
been impugned in my hearing, and we had discussed this— I had discussed thig
with high offiicals of the Defense Department, as I have already said, Mr.
Finletter and General Vandenberg.
Q. Do you recall whether Dr. Oppenheimer had any comment to make on your
mental process?
A. Tes, he said I was a paranoid.
Mr. ROBB. That is all I care to ask.
Mr. GBAY. I think we better recess now and meet again at 1 : 45.
(Thereupon at 12 : 25 p. m., a recess was taken until 1 : 45 p. m., the same day. )
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. GBAY. Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Silverman?
Whereupon, David Tressel Griggs, the witness on the stand at the time of
taking the recess resumed the stand and testified further as follows :
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVESSMAN :
Q. Dr. Griggs
A. Excuse me, Mr. $riggs.
Q. Mr. Griggs, I think you testified about a dispute about a second laboratory.
A. Tes, sir.
Q. Did you at first favor a separate Air Force laboratory?
A. I can only answer that question properly since we have not laid the
foundation for it by a rather extensive answer. Is that all right?
Q. Let me ask you this first.
A. In other words, you don't want me to make an extensive answer.
Q. If you can fairly do so.
A. I would like to, because if I answer the specific question out of context,
I think it might give the wrong impression.
Q. I assure you you will have your opportunity to answer quite in context
and immediately. I Just want to know whether there was a time when you
favored a separate Air Force laboratory.
A. There was a time at which we suggested that the Air Force, if necessary,
undertake a separate laboratory.
Q. Now, do you feel that you want to add something to that?
A. Yes. In late January or nearly that time
Q. Which year, sir?
A. Excuse me, of 1952. I tried to find out what the status of the effort was
within the ABO in terms of furthering the nuclear weapon development. I found
that there had been a suggestion for the formation of a second laboratory that
went under a variety of names at that time. If we need not qualify it further
than that, I won't.
755
At one stage In the proceedings preliminary negotiations had been undertaken
with the University of California, specifically with Dr. Ernest Lawrence, to this
end.
In my discussions with Commissioner Murray on this subject, I confirmed my
suspicion, speaking loosely, that roadblocks are being put in the way of this
development. Unless I misinterpreted what he said, he confirmed my fear that
the General Advisory Committee, and specifically Dr. Oppenheimer had been
interfering with the development of the institution or the initiation of the second
laboratory.
We in the Air Force waited a period to see what was going to happen and when
progress was not positive in this direction, we then discussed with Dr. Teller the
possibility of forming a second laboratory. One of the things that motivated us
in this was that Dr. Teller was no longer working regularly at Los Alamos on
the project. Knowing his ability and contributions in the past, I felt and it was
felt by the Air Force that he should be encouraged to participate.
We felt further that the effort that was then being applied at Los Alamos was
not commensurate or was not large enough to be commensurate with the need
for effort in order properly to pursue the President's directive and the subsequent
directives setting the rate and scale of effort.
The question had already been looked into within the Air Force as to- whether
it was appropriate— whether it was legal for the Air Force to establish such
a weapons laboratory. Our legal advice from the Air Force counsel was that
the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act placed a responsibility on the Air Force
as a branch of the military services to insure that the weapon development was
adequate.
It was further the legal opinion of our counsel that it was legally possible
within the framework of the Atomic Energy Act for the Air Force to establish a
second laboratory.
We knew as a practical matter that this would be a-very difficult way in which
to increase our effectiveness in the development of nuclear weapons. We further
knew that although it might be legally possible to set up a second laboratory, it
could not have any possible chance of success unless this activity received the
real blessing and support of the Atomic Energy Commission. We did, fcowever,
look into the possibilities of setting up a second laboratory and had preliminary
negotiations about this with the University of Chicago, who had an Air Force
contract, at which university Dr. Teller was at that time.
Dr. Teller already had relations with this Air Force contract at the University
of Chicago, and he had confidence of the ability of the people on this project
to undertake the development of a second laboratory, and felt that he could get
support— in fact, he had discussed with his colleagues, Fermi and others— who
could be very helpful in such a laboratory, and there were preliminary discus-
sions with the administration of the University of Chicago already preparatory
in the forms of staff work to see if the Air Force could accept such a responsibility
if the Atomic Energy Commission desired it.
Does that answer your question?
Q. I think your first answer answered my question. The rest of the explana-
tion was what you wanted to make.
Mr. ROBB. I am sorry, I can't hear.
Mr. SILVERMAN. The witness asked me if I thought he answered my question
and I said the first answer answered my question, and the next was the explana-
tion he wished to give.
The WITNESS. May I ask the chairman, since I am not too familiar with your
procedure, whether such an explanation on my part is desirable from your
standpoint, or whether you would rather get on with the proceedings?
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Griggs, our procedures are very flexible, here, and we are not
in any way adhering to ordinary rules which would apply in a court of law, and
therefore within limits a witness can say anything he believes to be pertinent to
the question asked him, except that he is not supposed to engage in argument.
In reply to your question as it related to that answer, it was perfectly appro-
priate for you to say that you would not want to answer that question without
explanation.
The WITNESS. I want to follow your desires, sir. If you will stop me when
I get too extensive, I would appreciate it
Mr. SILVBRMAN. It is the desire of all of us that the testimony given shall be as
dear and as truthful and as full as possible. I thinir on that there is no doubt
that we all join. If you have some doubts that something you are being asked
may result in a misleading answer, try to answer the question, and if you think
you want to add something, tell me so.
756
The WITNESS. Yes. I felt a little bad because this was the first question you
asked me, and I had gone into this extent.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. Are you now satisfied that Livermore is a good solution of the second
laboratory problem?
A. Livermore is the -solution of the second laboratory problem adopted by the
AEG. I have been, although not actively, a consultant to the Livermore project,
and hence I am not without bias in this field. What I have heard and what I
have experienced at the Livermore project convinces me that it is a very fine
effort in that direction.
I might specifically say that one of the objections which was raised to the for-
mation of a second laboratory was the Impossibility or stated impossibility of
recruiting personnel, that Is, appropriately trained personnel. I think Livermore
Laboratory has been spectacularly successful in this respect.
Q. I take it the purport of your answer is that you think Livermore is a good
solution to the second laboratory problem?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know whether Dr. Oppenheimer opposed the Livermore solution?
A. Of my direct knowledge, I do not.
Q. There has been testimony here that he did not oppose it Does that surprise
A. You mean surprise me that there has been testimony to that effect?
Q. Yes.
A. No, but I certainly would not be surprised if there had been testimony to
the effect that he had opposed it, either. I think it depends on who you ask.
Q. You have no personal knowledge on that subject?
A. No; not to my recollection.
Q. And I take it you would agree that the testimony of the people who did have
personal knowledge would perhaps be the most reliable guide?
A. If all of the testimony that has been given before this board indicates that
Dr. Oppenheimer did not oppose this laboratory then I would feel that you didn't
have all the expert opinion in.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer tell you at Princeton that he favored the Livermore
solution?
A. I don't recall that he discussed this. I would be almost certain that he
didn't tell me that he favored the Livermore solution.
Q. In that discussion at Princeton at which this story about Secretary Finletter
came up, I think you said that you mentioned the story first?
A. That is right In the discussion at Princeton.
Q. Yes, that is what I meant
A. Yes.
Q. And Dr. Oppenheimer said he had heard some such story?
A. He. said he had heard the story.
Q. Did he say that he had heard that story with respect to Mr. Finletter, or
did he say that there was a story around the ABO that somebody in the Air Force
had said something like that?
A. I think you will find my testimony on that is fairly explicit, and with the
hope that I don't contradict that I said before
Q. Just tell what your best recollection Is, sir.
A. My best recollection is that he did not mention the name of Mr. Finletter
in connection with this story, but the things that he did say left no doubt in
my mind that it was Finletter to whom the story was supposed to have been
attributed.
Q. What did he say?
A. You see, I was anxious to find out who was supposed to have made these
remarks and hence I asked a number of leading questions. I was first interested
in discovering at which one of the several briefings this remark is supposed to
have been said. From what Dr. Oppenheimer said, I became satisfied that it
was the briefing of Mr. Lovett in Mr. Lovett's office at which this took place.
' Q. Excuse me; If you can tell us what it was he said?
A. I can't tell you what he said. Do you expect me to be able to remember
word for word what he said?
Q. Of course not I am asking you to try to recall the substance of what he
said. You said from what he said you got the impression that he was talking
about Mr. Finletter.
The WITNESS. Mr. Chairman, since the question seems to be going beyond the
ability of .my memory— it seems that way to me— I do have notes on this subject
757
which are in my files at the Pentagon. I was unable to bring them with me. If
you wish amplification of this, the best record is what are in my files at the
Pentagon.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. When did you make these notes?
A. They were made at a time shortly after our discussion.
Q. Can you give any idea of about how long after the discussion you made
these notes?
A. Excuse me. The document I was referring to is the one that you have
here.
Mr. BOBB. That we have a photostat of.
The WITNESS. I think so.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. If it will refresh the witness' recollection. [Document handed
to witness.]
Mr. ROLANDEB. I don't think he can read this memorandum. I will hare to
check with the classification officer.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. If the witness is going to testify from a document used to
refresh his recollection, which I cannot see, I would rather skip the testimony.
Mr. ROBB. As far as I am concerned you can see it, Mr. Silverman. I would
like to have it read into the record.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. If you want to read it into the record, that is fine, but I do
not wish to be in the position of examining a witness who is testifying from
a document I cannot see.
Mr. GRAY. What is the security problem?
Mr. ROLANDEB. May I check it with the classification officer?
Mr. GBAT. Yes.
Mr. ROLANDEB. This memorandum is satisfactory from a security standpoint
if one item, a number, is deleted, a numeral.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. This numeral will have nothing to do with this.
Mr. ROLANDEB. That is right.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. It is all right with me. Hie witness will read this into
the record, I assume, because otherwise I will not be able to know what is in it.
Mr. ROBB. If you will ask him, I am sure he wilL
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I don't know whether they will let me.
Mr. ROBB. Sure.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Put your finger over the number.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, might the witness read it into the record since it
has been discussed?
Mr. GBAT. It is my understanding that is why we delayed to let the security
officer check it, to be read into the record. Do you object to It being read into
the record?
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I would as soon like to see it I don't know what is in the
document.
Mr. GBAT. There has been enough discussion about this conversation. I take
it this document relates to the conversation you had. Is that correct?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. Does this document relate about this conversation about which you
cannot recall precisely?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. I think the Chair will ask the witness to read it
The WITNESS. You want me to read it verbatim including the title?
Mr. GBAY. Leave out the number.
The WITNESS. This is a memorandum to Mr. Unletter "Byes Only" classifica-
tion, June 21, 1952 :
"1. In view of your possible meeting with Oppenheimer I want to record as
accurately as I can my recollection of parts of my conversation with him on
May 23, 1952.
"2. I said that I had heard from associates of his a story, as follows : 'At one
of the briefings given by Teller on the implications of the H-bomb, a high official
of the Department of Defense exclaimed, "If only we could have blank of those
(H-bombs) we could rule the world." ' Oppenheimer said that he was familiar
with the story, said that it had occurred at the briefing of Mr. Lovett"
Then there is an asterisk, and a list of the people as far as my recollection
served who were present at that particular briefing. I was one of them.
"I told him that I was present at that briefing, and that nothing could be
further from the actual reaction of those present He then stated that he had
758
confidence in the reliability of his information, and further, that it was 'my
boss' who is supposed to have said it." The "my" of course refers to me. "On
further questioning, he left no doubt hi my mind that it was you to whom he
was referring, although he did not use your name.
"3. I have heard this story used by him and others as an illustration of the
dangerous warmongers who rule the Pentagon, and who are going to precipitate
this Nation into a war unless a few scientists can save it.
"4. After he had showed me the GAG recommendation of December 1949 that
the United States not intensify H-bomb development, but publicly renounce its
development and when I was pressing the point that such a course of action
could well be disastrous to this country, Oppenheimer asked if I thought he were
pro-Russian or just confused. After a moment I replied frankly that I wish I
knew. He then asked if I had 'impugned his loyalty.' I replied I had." In
my testimony this morning I expanded that "He then said he thought I was
paranoid. After a few more pleasantries our conversation came to an end."
Signed by me. Shall I read the footnote?
Mr. GBAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. This refers to the Lovett briefing: "This briefing took place
in March 19, 1952. Those present, as far as memory serves, were : Lovett, Foster,
Finletter, Pace, Whitehair, LeBaron, Nash, Burden, Norton, Griggs, Teller,
Oollbohm, Henderson, Blesset, Hitch, and Brodie."
At the bottom of the page it says, "This is the only copy of this memorandum,"
but since I am reading a certified true copy, that obviously is not so.
Does that answer your question?
By Mr. SILVEBMAW :
Q. You were asked by the chairman to read the memo.
A. No; you asked the question to which I was trying to respond, and this is
for the purpose of refreshing my memory. Does that answer your question?
Q. That is your best recollection?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank yon.
Mr. BOBB. Mr. Chairman, I don't know whether the witness knows it or not,
but this is on the stationery of the Department of the Air Force, Washington.
The WITNESS. Should I have read that into the record?
• Mr. ROBB. I don't know.
The WITNESS. I really don't think that applies, because this is not the original.
Mr. BOBB. Igetit
By Mr. SILVEBMAET.
Q. You testified to being present at a session or some sessions in California
in, I think, November 1951 with respect to the Vista report
A. Yes.
Q. How did you happen to go there?
A. Of course, since the Air Force had been instrumental in establishing the
Vista project, we were very much interested in the results of their extensive
studies, and we also, of course, were interested in seeing the shape of the report
at this, which was the draft stage, for two reasons, of course, both obvious
reasons. One, that we wanted to be able to act on any recommendations which
were favorable before waiting for the formal report. We made frequent visits
to the Vista project. This was not our first. It had been after some interval
and things were happening at a substantial rate there.
And second, of course, as we always are, we were interested in reviewing the
document to see if it contained any things to which we violently objected so
that we could discuss these with the authors at that time.
Q. Had Mr. John McCone suggested to Secretary Finletter that somebody
go out there to confer with the people who were working on Vista?
A. I should not be surprised if he had. You can get more accurate testimony
from others on this.
Q. Mr. McCone was formerly the Under Secretary of the Air Force?
A. I believe that is correct
Q. Was it your understanding that he had seen a draft of the Vista report
and called Mr. Finletter? *"* cpo '
A. You are asking me about a matter of which I have no personal knowledge
Q. There have been a certain number of things in your testimony on which
yon did not have personal knowledge.
A. No. What I mean is I don't think— at least my memory is not adequate
to tell me whether I had heard that Mr. McCone had been over a draft of the
Vista report
759
Q. Let me complete my question, and then if you don't recall, you don't recall.
A. I do clearly that Mr. McCone had been in touch with Mr. Finletter, and
I think that he had been in touch with him in connection with the Vista report,
but my memory does not suffice— in fact, I am not sure I knew at the time the
details that you are asking me.
Q. Did you know or did you understand that Mr. McGone had said that the
Vista report had a lot of good things in it, and that the Air Force ought to be
interested in it?
A. As I say, this is the same as the last question.
Q. If you don't recall
A. I don't know this, but I would expect that he would if that is helpful. As
I tried to say in my testimony, the Vista report had a lot of things in it, and
as I also tried to say, I am reasonably sure that some of the things I regarded
as favorable in the Vista report were in some measure at least the product of
Mr. Oppenheimer's contribution.
Q. There was a draft of chapter 5 presented at this session in November
1951 which you testified to. I think you said that there were points which you
found most controversial which I take it is your polite way of saying you
disagreed with most strongly. The first point was a recommendation that the
President of the United States announced that the United States would not use
the strategic Air Force in an attack on cities or urban areas except in retaliation.
A. Those are not my exact words, but certainly this is the substance, except
in response to an attack by the Russians on us, not in retaliation. This is quite
a difference. On our cities.
Q. I thought you used the word "retaliatory" but it is all right.
A; I did use the word "retaliatory," but not in this connection.
Q. I just didn't want to mislead you as to wnat I though you had said. How
sure are you that recommendation was In a draft of chapter 5?
A. I am sure as I can be of anything which I studied extensively 2 years ago,
and which was of considerable concern to me.
Q. Tou actually saw this in a document?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Would it surprise you to learn that Dr. Oppenheimer never advocated such
an announcement, and was opposed to any such announcement?
A. Yes.
Q. Bearing in mind my last question, and the obvious implication of it, how
confident are you that Dr. Oppenheimer was responsible for such a suggestion
in the Vista report?
A. The basis for my belief that he was responsible for it I have already given
in my testimony, namely, that we were told by DuBridge, Backer, and Lauritsen,
possibly others, that the document we were shown was a draft of an Introduc-
tion prepared by Oppenheimer, and it was, word for word, his text.
Q. Did these gentlemen say that was Dr. Oppenheimer's suggestion?
A. No; they said this was his text It follows it was his suggestion. I may
have answered that last question wrong. I would rather think that they did
say it was his suggestion. When I answered the question, I was thinking of
what they said as they gave us this report. But we had a considerable discus-
sion of this point with them afterward, and it is quite possible; in fact, I would
certainly expect that they had said it was his suggestion in our discussion, but
not in presenting the document to us.
*******
Q. Do you recall whether the draft made the point that there might be circum-
stances in which it might be unwise to use our full strategic airpower, and yet
it might still be important to use atomic bombs for tactical uses?
A. I believe it contained Information to the effect.
Q. Did it contain a recommendation that we, therefore, be prepared with some
degree of flexibility to be able to use either strategic airpower or tactical, which-
ever, or both, might be desirable in the light of the circumstances which might
arise?
A. Yes ; I am quite sure it contained strong emphasis on the desirability for
flexibility in the use of atomic weapons.
*******
Q. Was that not also Dr. Oppenheimer's recommendation?
A. I don't know that for a fact, but I certainly would expect that Dr. Oppen-
heimer would have made such a recommendation, in view of what I knew of
his activities at the time, and his beliefs. If it is appropriate to mention it again,
I saw Dr. Oppenheimer on a number of occasions in the general time period
760
advocating strongly the development of weapons lor tactical use. On each one
of these occasions when I saw him in this role I was impressed with his f orce-
fuOness, and I was also impressed with the fact that I agreed with the stand
that he was taking on the use of tactical weapons.
I also should say, as I said this morning, I felt very strongly about this point,
and I was urging within the Air Force, although my colleagues in Vista would
not believe it, the development of the capability of delivering tactical weapons,
and there are lots of stories that go with this.
Q. Mr. Griggs, the suggestion that we be prepared to use both strategic air-
power and tactical would hardly be consistent with the suggestion to abolish,
to give up our strategic atrpower, would they?
A. No. One of the troubles I have is lack of consistency, as I mentioned before.
However, there was no statement in this Vista document that I saw which sug-
gested that we give up strategic airpower. There was this suggestion which I
have said, which had it been adopted, would have restricted the use of the
Strategic Air Force.
Q. You understood later from Dr. Oppenheimer — I don't want to put words
in your mouth, sir— in connection with the Lincoln study, I think you said, that
you had heard that some people were saying that it was necessary to give up
strategic power of our airpower.
A. In order to get world peace. This was the way it was said. I should
amplify that, I flhfofr This statement was made, not by Dr. Qppenheimer, to my
knowledge, but by Dr. Zacharias. It was made, however, after considerable
discussions of this matter with Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. Do you know whether Dr. Oppenheimer was ever in favor of giving up the
strategic part of our airpower?
A. I have seen numerous indications that Dr. Oppenheimer felt that it is
necessary for the United States to give up something in order to achieve world
peace. Perhaps that is a little too loose; but if it is adequate for you, I won't
expand. That is, the world-peace thing.
Q. Did you ever see
A. Just a moment. I am sorry. This was merely an introduction to your
question. It is clear that this was a position taken in the recommendation for
the H-bomb.
Q. Which was the position?
A. That we must give up something. It was recommended in the case of the
H-bomb that we give up the H-bomb, which to me, as I have indicated, could have
been national calamity if the Russians got that first, as I was sure that they
would if we didn't press. I don't think I have any reason — I can't recall any
reason — other than this indication from the talk of Dr. Zacharias that Dr.
Oppenheimer had advocated giving up the Strategic Air Force. That is one
reason I was interested in the matter, because this was going a little further
than he had according to my understanding of the past.
I believe it is recorded in the minutes of the meeting of the State Department
panel of consultants that Dr. Oppenheimer suggested that since it was necessary
for the United States to give up something in order to achieve world disarma-
ment, that we consider giving up strategic missiles.
Q. Have you seen those minutes?
A. I have seen those minutes.
Q. And have you seen that statement of Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. According to my memory, I have seen that statement of Dr. Oppenheimer.
This is subject to check by looking up the minutes of the first meeting of the
panel.
Q. When did you see those minutes?
A. I saw them shortly after the meeting.
Q. You mean in 1946?
A. No. This was In the panel which was established in the spring of 1952,
by the State Department, as announced by the Alsops' column.
Q. Whose column?
A. JoeAlsop.
Q. You saw this yourself?
A. I am Just identifying the panel. I don't remember the exact tittle, but
it was essentially on the subject of nonatomic disarmament, if I recall cor-
rectly. It was a panel of the State Department. It included Dr. Oppenheimer,
Dr. DuBridge, Dr. Bush, and others.
Q. Where did you get your information as to the membership of this panol?
A. As I say, I have seen the minutes.
Q. Who were the members again?
761
A, My first information as to the membership of the panel came from the
Alsop column.
Q. Yon saw the minutes?
Mr. ROBB. Let him flnigii the answer.
The WITNESS. I told yon I saw the minutes. Ton asked me another question.
I said my first Information as to the membership of the panel I believe came
from the Alsop column, which as near as my memory serves described this panel
as having been brought into being as the result of activities of Drs. Oppenheimer,
Rabi, and Lauritsen,
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. You gave some of the members of the panel a minute or two ago. Would
you mind telling us again?
A. Yes. I said I believe this panel included Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr. DuBridge,
Dr. Conant, and others. I think the complete membership of the panel should
be available.
Q. And where did you get the information as to the membership of the panel?
A. You have asked me three times.
Q. Yes ; and you said the minutes, and then you went to the Alsop column.
Mr. ROBB. Then you cut him off.
The WITNESS. Would you mind repeating?
Mr. GRAY. What do you want repeated?
The WITNESS. He has asked this question three times. I have answered It in
two different ways. I am not communicating very well. I don't know what your
difficulty Is. Since it takes time to read these minutes suppose I try again.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. You know what my question Is, sir?
A. How I knew about the membership of the panel. My first knowledge of this,
as I have said, I think came from the Alsops' column. It turned out to be sub-
stantially correct when I was able to check it both by contacts In the State
Department and by reading the minutes, which recorded, of course, the
membership.
Q. And the members were who?
A. I have testified so far as my memory serves me Dr. Qppenhelmer, Dr.
DuBridge, Dr. Bush were members, and others.
Q. I think you also mentioned Dr. Oonant?
A. Did I mention Dr. Oonant? I am not perfectly dear on this. I should
like to refresh my memory. I think Dr. Oonant was — no, I am sorry I Just can't
remember.
Q. You did mention Dr. Oonant, didn't you?
A. Pardon?
Q. You did mention Dr. Oonant as a member?
A. The people that I meant to mention were Oppenheimer, DuBridge, and Bush.
If I mentioned Oonant — as I say, right now I am not clear whether he was a
member or was not a member. It would be real easy to find out.
Q. It is easy to find out I have the list here. Would you be surprised to find
that Dr. DuBridge was not a member?
A. It would certainly indicate that my memory is in error If Dr. DuBridge
was not a member.
Q. Would it surprise you to find out that there are no minutes of that panel?
A. That would surprise me very much.
Q. Where did you see these minutes?
A. I asked for them and had them sent over to me, minutes of the first
meeting.
Q. Whom did you ask for these minutes?
A. As near as I can recall I asked my executive officer at the Pentagon, Colonel
Walcowicz.
Q, Where did he get them from?
A. We have a liaison contact with the State Department
Q. Where are those minutes now?
A. I haven't got any personal knowledge.
Q. When did you see them?
A. in {jhe spring of 1952.
Q. Oan you obtain those minutes for this board?
A. I haven't any idea, but I can obtain them if they are in my own files.
Q. Will you please do so?
762
Mr. ROBB. Wait a minute, Mr. Chairman. I don't know how this witness can
be asked to obtain minutes from the State Department I don't think that is
fair.
Mr. GBAY. I think the point is well taken. If the witness is referring to some-
thing in his own ales, he can be asked. But the witness cannot be asked to obtain
documents from the State Department
The WITNESS. I am sorry, when I said my own flies, I meant my old files from
the Pentagon, and I was told yesterday that I cannot get anything out of there
except from the Liaison Division of the Air Force. I am sure if this document
is in my file or if it is in the Air Force or can be tracked down, those documents
can be made available to this board. But I am not clear what the best way of
doing it is.
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Was the document minutes?
A. That is my recollection.
Q. You are not talking about a report now?
A. No ; I am not talking about a report.
Q. I want to return now to the third of the controversial points in the Vista
report.
A. Yes.
Q. As I have it here it is that in the state of the art as it then existed, it was
impossible to assess the capabilities of thermonuclear weapons with respect to
their tactical use.
A. Yes,
Q. Do you know whether Dr. Oppenheimer put that statement into the report?
A. No, I don't know.
Q. Do you think that Dr. Oppenheimer's judgment
A. May I amplify that. The whole of this chapter 5 on atomic weapons which
we have referred to as it was then presented to us was comprised of two parts.
It was comprised of a part, essentially the body of the chapter, which had been
written by the people of Vista, I believe, prior to Dr. Oppenheimer's visit, or at
least he was not the direct author of that part. Then there was a separate docu-
ment which, as near as I can recall, bore the title only of introduction, which
was composed of a few pages. That is the part that was said to have been
written by Dr. Oppenheimer. Because of the similarity in the subject matter
of these two reports, I -can't be sure which thing I associate with Vista was in
which one of these two documents. What I have just said indicates that my
memory is that the third point was in the main body of the Vista report. The
main body of chapter 5 was in the Vista report, rather than in the piece written
by Dr. Oppenheimer. I think there was some confusion about this when I first
testified, because there were two reports, and I would like to make that clearer.
Q. Do you recall what other nuclear physicists participated in the Vista
project?
A. There were quite a few. Do you want me to name as many as I can?
Q. Name a few; yea
A. Of course, you asked nuclear physicists; there were Dr. Bacher, Dr
Lauritsen
Q. I should say I am referring specifically to those who participated with re-
spect to chapter 5.
A. All right, Dr. Fowler.
Q. Dr. Lauritsen and Dr. Bacher participated in chapter 5?
A. Yes, I think so. Dr. William Fowler. Dr. DuBridge participated. I don't
think he took an active writing part. I believe he could be classed as a nuclear
physicist
Q. Do you think that these people were in a pretty good position, or perhaps
in a better position than you, to judge as to the technical capabilities of the
thermonuclear weapon as they appeared in November of 1951?
A. Yes, I think— you mean these latter people?
Q. Yes.
A. With the exception of Dr. Bacher, no ; and I am not sure what his state of
knowledge was.
Q. Dr. Lauritsen.
A. It is, however, clear to me that Dr. Oppenheimer was better informed than
Q. How about Dr. Lauritsen?
A. Lauritsen I would tMnk no. As I mentioned before Dr Teller who T
think was better informed than any of these people, had visited the Vista' project
763
not very long before this, and had attempted to persuade the Vista people that a
thermonuclear weapon was in such a state that it should be included in studies
of * * * atomic warfare. As I mentioned also before, there were other agencies
who at nearly the same time came to roughly the same conclusion that Teller did.
Q. With respect to the Lincoln study, do you know what part Dr. Oppenheimer
played in the actual study?
A. As I have said, my attendance at the Vista study was limited to, I believe,
the first 3 days. At that time Dr. Oppenheimer was present and participated
fairly actively.
Q. Who appointed the people who made the Lincoln study?
A. Who appointed them?
Q. Yes, did they appoint themselves, or what?
A. As in the history of all these things, there is a little complicated genesis.
It. was pretty clear in the lines of the group who were pressing for this action
which I have already mentioned as to who were most useful and likely candidates.
The appointment of the group itself I do not know in detail but I would certainly
presume that the appointment of these was made by the Lincoln project. I believe
I have seen letters of invitation— that is a form of a letter of invitation that was
sent out to the participants in the Lincoln summer study. Does that answer your
question?
Q. And who signed those letters?
A. I believe they were signed by Dr. Hill, who was then the director of the
Lincoln project.
Q. I think you used the phrase about the Lincoln group being in favor of a
Maginot line type of defense.
A. I believe I mentioned this in connection with the Alsop article.
Q. Do you know whether Dr. Oppenheimer favored such a thing?
A. I did not hear Dr. Oppenheimer use any such word.
Q. Do you know what Dr. Oppenheimer's views were about the possible effec-
tiveness of continental air defense at that time?
A. My last direct knowledge of this came from the contacts during the first
3 days of the sessions and this is all as far as Dr. Oppenheimer's personal views
are concerned. At that time it was too early in the study to say with any definite-
ness what the views would be after the study. It was certainly the hope of all of
us that as a result of the summer study the effectiveness of our air defense would
be materially improved. I should say what I don't believe I did say this morning,
that I believe that as a result of the Lincoln summer study our air defense is
materially improved.
Q. Was that the main object of the Lincoln summer study, to find ways to
improve our air defense?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did the Lincoln study ever recommend the giving up of any part of
our strategic airpower?
A. No, not to my knowledge.
Q. I think you have already said so far as your knowledge goes, Dr. Oppen-
heimer did not recommend that
A. That is right. I would like to amplify my answer on that for the benefit
of the board, since this is the first mention of the summer study in this much
detail.
We were- concerned by the thing I have already mentionecl that is, the fear
that the summer study might get into these things which* we regarded as in-
appropriate for Lincoln, and as of questionable value to the Air Force— I refer
to the giving up of our strategic air arm, and the allocation of budget between
the Strategic Air Command and the Air Defense Command— but we were
also very much concerned in the early days of the formation of the Lincoln
Summer Study, because it was being done in such a way that had it been
allowed to go in the direction in which it was initially going, every indication
was that it would have wrecked the effectiveness of the Lincoln laboratory.
This was because of the way the thing was, the summer study was being
handled administratively.
So far as I know, it was not because of any direct action on the part oH Dr.
Oppenheimer. On the other hand, I felt at the time that Dr. Oppenheimer
should have been well enough informed and alert enough to see that this
would be disastrous to the Lincoln Summer Study.
After having reported this to the Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Finletter,
who had been actively concerned with the summer study, and had been very
much— excuse me, I made a mistake— I said Mr. Finletter had been actively
764
concerned with the summer study. I meant to say he had been concerned with
project Lincoln. He had been in touch with President KHUan, and Provost
Stratton of MIT on the prosecution of project Lincoln. So I reported this to
Mr. Finletter, and he essentially charged me with trying to find out if the summer
study was going to be conducted in such a way as to result in a net gain to the
effectiveness of Lincoln or a net loss.
If it looked to me as though it were going to be a net loss, I was askedi to
inform him so that steps could be taken to correct this condition, or to cancel
the summer study if that were necessary.
I got in touch with Provost Stratton at MIT. I found that he hardly knew
about the existence of the plan for the summer study. He undertook to look
into it. I told htm the things that worried me and worried Mr. Finletter about
it. He did look into it Some corrective action was taken in terms of dis-
cussions with people most involved and in terms of changing the organizational
structure by which the summer study was to be introduced into the Lincoln
project, and at a slightly later date Mr. Killian of MIT called me and told me
that he was satisfied partly as a result of the recent activities that he and Dr.
Stratton had been engaged in, which I have already mentioned, and that the
Lincoln Summer Study would operate to the benefit both of Lincoln and the
interests of the Air Force.
He further said, since I had mentioned that one of the things we were afraid
of was that the Lincoln Summer Study results might get out of hand, from our
standpoint, in the sense that they might be reported directly to higher authoriy,
such as the National Security Council, President Kllllan reassured me that he
had taken steps so that he was sure that the summer study would be—I think
his words were "kept in bounds."
On the basis of this assurance we had no further— that is, Mr. Finletter,
myself, and General Yates, and the other Air Force people— had no further
immediate worries about the summer study and we encouraged it
Q. WiU you tell us what part did Dr. Oppenheimer play in this?
A. Oppenheimer played the part in it that I have already mentioned, in that
the summer study, as near as my information goes, was conceived at a meeting
at which he was present, that he allowed his name, and I believe encouraged the
use of his name, in recruiting for the Lincoln Summer Study. That he was
closely associated with the people who were recruiting for the summer study
and who were preparing its plans. I think that covers the question.
Q. Was the idea of the Lincoln Summer Study to be a study of continental
air defense?
A. No ; that is too narrow a definition.
Q. What was it?
A. There had already been a study of continental air defense * * * only 1 or
2 years before, so one of the things that we were concerned with in the Air Force
was whether this was to be a going over the same ground, or what new ground
it was intended that this study cover*.
Q. Would you just tell us what was it you found that the Lincoln Summer
Study was supposed to do?
A. I believe in the literature that was sent out— I should not say literature—
In the letters of invitation that were sent out that the Lincoln Summer Study
should consider the problems of air defense * * *.
Q. Didn't you agree that it was a good idea to consider that?
A. I am still referring to your earlier question, if I may.
Q. Which one?
A. Your last question.
Q. Which question?
A, The question you asked just before.
Q. Will you tell me what it is because I have forgotten.
A. Yqu asked one as to the subject matter of the Lincoln Summer Study. I
responded that this was the information that was contained in the letter of
invitation that was sent out. However, I had other information which gave me
concern about some aspects that were considered for the programing of the
Lincoln Summer Study. Particularly I had been present at a preliminary meet-
ing before the existence of the summer study project in which it seemed to me
that there was perhaps too much emphasis assigned to the development of an
early warning line across— is there any security problem involved here?
Mr. ROLANDEB. I don't think so.
Mr. MARSHALL. That is all right.
The WITNESS. Across our northernmost approaches, and that this problem— I
should say that one reason that this problem received such particular emphasis
765
at that time was because of the rather exciting new developments, technological
developments in this field, which had been brought forward to my knowledge
principally by Dr. Lloy Berkner. However. I was worried because it seemed to
me and to some of the responsible people in project Lincoln that I talked to that
it was necessary to consider this in context of our whole air defense system, and
this was not being done, to my mind, adequately in the early discussions which
I heard on this subject.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. Did you hear Dr. Oppenheimer in these early discussions ?
A. No ; he was not in this particular early discussion to which I referred.
Q. You did agree, I assume, that it was a good idea to study the feasibility
of an early warning line?
A. The feasibility of an early warning line had been studied before by more
than one agency. It certainly seemed to me a good idea in the light of recent
technological development which I mentioned.
Q. Isn't that exactly what the Lincoln study did do?
A. The Lincoln Summer Study?
Q. Yes.
A. It did do this. It did not restrict its activities to this, as far as I am aware.
As I have testified, my detailed knowledge of the Lincoln Summer Study activi-
ties is very incomplete.
Q. What troubles one is that you were worried that the result might be dis-
astrous, that the direction in which it was going might be disastrous. Which
direction was it going?
A. I have tried to make clear, perhaps I have not adequately, that the things-
I was worried about were that first there would be a diversion of effort created
in the Lincoln Laboratory, which could have an adverse effect of the total pro-
gram of Lincoln Laboratory. This diversion of effort I have tried to illustrate
by the suggested consideration of the relative role of the- Strategic Air Command
and the Air Defense Command, by the suggested introduction of antisubmarine
warfare into the Lincoln project, which had no bearing on the Air Defense prob-
lem as I saw it, and more importantly by the possibility, at one time a probability,
that if the Lincoln Summer Study proceeded as it was then planned, there was
substantial indication that it would wreck the laboratory in terms of its adverse
effect on the people who were then contributing to the effort I can go into more
detail on this, if you wish.
Q. You did not wish them to study the problem of antisubmarine defense?
A. As I have said, I considered this inappropriate to project Lincoln. I am
certainly in favor of studying antisubmarine warfare. Bear in mind the Lincoln
project was supported roughly 85 percent — although it was a three service con-
tract—it was supported between 80 and 90 percent by Air Force funds.
Q. Did you ever hear that Dr. Oppenheimer was in favor of studying anti-
submarine warfare in connection with the Lincoln study?
A. No. As I have told you, my information on that came from suggestions by
Dr. Zacharias in approaching people to work at the Lincoln summer study.
Q. Do you know what Dr. Oppenheimer's views were at that time, or are now
as to the effectiveness of continental air defense?
A. At which time, sir?
Q. I asked about both the time of the Lincoln study and now.
A. What do you mean by the time of the Lincoln study? You mean the be-
ginning or the end?
Q. We will start with the beginning. Do you know what his views were at
the beginning of the Lincoln summer study?
A. I think his views were the same as mine and I believe the same as all of
us that we were hopeful that there would be really substantial improvement in
the air defense capability of the United States.
Q. Did you ever talk to him about that?
A. Yes, I think so.
Q. Was it his view that you could not have a 100 percent defense?
A. I don't know. As I have said, this was at the beginning of the study.
Whether he thought it was possible or not would not have had any effect on me.
Q. Do you know what his views were at the end of that study?
A. I do not
Q. Do you know what his views are today?
A. I do not
Q. Did you ever hear Dr. Oppenheimer say that it was possible to have a 100
percent continental air defense?
766
A. No ; I have had no contact with Oppenheimer so far as memory serves, as
far as I now recollect, since that first session at the beginning of the Lincoln
summer study.
Q. And you did not stay through to the end of the Lincoln summer study
because you left?
A. I came there as part of my duties in the Air Force and I left the Air Force
on the 1st— I left Washington on the 1st of July 1952.
Q. Returning to this visit in Princeton in May of 1952, what was. the purpose
of that visit?
A. I was asked that question I believe by Mr. Bobb, and I tried to answer it
as clearly as I could. Did you not understand it, or do you wish me to amplify
it, or do you wish me to answer it again?
Q. I would like you to answer my question, sir.
A. In my answer to this question, which as near as I can recall was almost an
identical question this morning, I said as a part of the discussion that we had had
at lunch at Mr. Burden's house between Dr. DuBridge and Dr. Rabi, Mr. Burden,
Mr. Norton, and myself, it had been mentioned by Dr. Rabi that in order to correct
impressions that I had I should read the minutes of the General Advisory Com-
mittee. He told me that these minutes were the personal property of the chair-
man, that I could see them only by Dr. Oppenheimer 's permission. He under-
took to see if a meeting could not be arranged at Princeton to provide me the
opportunity to study these minutes for this purpose. As I testified this morning,
this tentative plan was not possible because of the illness that Dr. Rabi
contracted.
When I was in Princeton for other purpose, therefore, in May of 1952, 1 called
Dr. Oppenheimer and reminded him of this with the object of seeing whether it
would be possible for me to see the minutes in his office or — this was in my
mind— if that was not possible, to discuss these matters on which there seemed
to be very considerable divergence of opinion between himself and me.
Does that answer your question?
Mr. GRAY. Does that answer your question, Mr. Silverman, or did you hear his
answer?
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I heard his answer.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer tell you that the minutes were his personal property
rather than the property of the Commission?
A. No; I didn't say Mr. Oppenheimer. As I testified this morning, Dr. Rabi
told me that.
Q. Aren't you certain that Dr. Rabi didn't tell you that the minutes were the
property of the committee, as distinct from the property of the chairman?
A. No, sir ; as far as recollection serves.
•Q. You said Dr. Oppenheimer did show you the majority and minority annexes
to the October 1949 report?
A. That is correct.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer say to you that it was the practice of the committee
not to show minutes of the committee to any person without the consent of the
members of the committee in order that the discussion might be Quite free at
committee meetings?
A. I don't recall whether or not he said that to me. Since I didn't expect him
to show the minutes to me anyway, it would not make much Impression.
Q, Did you expect him to show the report to you?
A. No; frankly I didn't.
Q. Had you tried to see the report before?
A. No; not to my recollection.
Q. Did you know that there was a copy of the report In the Defense 3De-
partment? . ^^
A. I don't think I did know that
Q. I think that Mr. Robb asked you a question about whether in that con-
versation in May of 1952 with Dr. Oppenheimer there was any mention of
a public announcement as to whether we would go ahead with the thermonuclear
developments and my notes don't show the answer to that question.
• A. My answer, as I recall it, was that this subject was mentioned in one of
the two annexes, and that we might nave discussed this in connection with
that, but I don't recall with any degree of reliability that we did discuss this
particular subject
Q. There had in fact been a public announcement as to our going ahead with
ttenaomicleat developments 2 years before?
A. What is your question?
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Mr. Reporter, would you mind reading it?
(Question read by the reporter.)
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I think in fairness to the witness I should say
that my recollection is that my question had to do with whether there was
any discussion of an announcement that we would renounce the H-bomb.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I don't want to get into a dispute with Mr. Robb about our
respective recollections. We are all trying to get the record clear on it. My
own notes are the other way*
The WITNESS. My recollection jibes with what has just been said.
Mr. SILVEEMAN. Then perhaps in the interest of clarity would it not be
desirable to read my last question and the answer, and if the witness misunder-
stood my question and gave an answer
Mr. GRAY. I suggest that you ask the witness the question you want to put
to the witness, Mr. Silverman, and I would suggest that you listen to his reply.
You have been so busy taking notes that is one reason you have missed some
of these questions. I don't mind your asking the witness any question if you
are trying to develop any point, including anything concerned with the veracity
of the witness, but I think it is wasting the time of the board to ask an identical
question of the witness, and go through these long answers when the transcript
already reflects the question and answer.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Mr. Gray, I do not wish to be in a position of differing with
you sharply on a matter as perhaps as relatively unimportant as this. My
own recollection is that the answer was not precisely given before and if I
am mistaken and taking up the time of the board, I am sorry.
The WITNESS. May I ask, Mr. Silverman, if you were going to ask for my
reply to Mr. Robb's question that we go back to his original question, since I
think there is a difference of opinion as to what his original question was. Is
that what you want to do?
Mr. SILVEBMAN. It is fine by me.
Mr. GRAY. You ask any question you want, Mr. Silverman.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I have asked the question. I have been told in effect that
I have misstated Mr. Robb's question. I am sorry that Mr. Robb should feel
that. My note Is rather clear as to what Mr. Robb's question was.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Question, may I just say this: I don't want to take up too
much time. It is perfectly obvious that my question was directed to the first
sentence of the fourth paragraph of a memorandum which the witness has
read into evidence, which reads as follows: "After he showed me the GAC
recommendation of December 1949 that the United States not intensify H-bomb
development, but publicly renounce its development, and when I was pressing
the point that such a course of action could well be disastrous to this country,
Oppenheimer asked if I thought he were pro-Russian or just confused."
It is perfectly obvious that my question was bringing out from the witness
that portion of his discussion with Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. It is perfectly obvious, and it seems to me that portion
you have just read is exactly what I was asking about, and not at all the question
you had thought you had asked, Mr. Robb.
The WITNESS. Just a moment. You said in following this up that there was
a public announcement, did you mean that there was any such public announce-
ment as the one mentioned there.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Yes. There was a public announcement by the President
that we would go ahead with thermonuclear development.
The WITNESS. That is not what it says there.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. There was the recommendation of a public announcement the other way.
A. That is right. That is quite different.
Q. Was there any discussion in 1952 at your meeting with Dr. Oppenheimer
in Princeton that there should now be an announcement, in 1952, that we would
not go ahead with thermonuclear development.
A. I don't think so.
Q. And the discussion that you had with Dr. Oppenheimer in 1952 was about
the recommendation in the GAG committee report in 1949.
A. As near as memory serves insofar as our discussion had anything to do
with public announcements, it was.
308818—54 19
768
Q. And yon knew of course that question had already been resolved and that
the President had announced we were going ahead with the thermonuclear
development?
A. If what I said this morning gave any impression to the board that in May
of 1952 Dr. Oppenheimer was pursuing in his discussion with me a recommenda-
tion that we at that time in May of 1952 publicly renounce the H-bomb, I think
that such an impression would be false, and I did not mean to give that. You
were attempting to clarify this.
Q. I was attempting to clarify what that discussion was about, yes.
I think you said in your direct testimony, did you not, that such question as
you have as to Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty was hot based on any individual con-
tact or detailed knowledge by you of his acts?
A. That is correct.
Q. I think you went further and said you did not feel that you really had an
adequate basis for judging his loyalty or disloyalty.
A. That is certainly correct, and I think it is correct that I said it and it is
certainly correct that I feel it.
Q. I think you also said that based on hearsay you have been suspicious or
troubled about it for some time.
A. Troubled, yes.
Q. Would it be fair to say you have been suspicious of it for some time?
A. The circumstances which I pieced together by hearsay evidence, as I think
I testified, were substantially similar to those that were listed among the allega-
tions in General Nichols' letter were sufficient to cause me grave concern.
Q. Weren't you suspicious back at the time when you were first warned about
Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty when yon joined the Rand project?
A. This, as I testified this morning, it was said to me that Dr. Oppenheimer
during Los Alamos days had been considered a calculated risk. This state-
ment was made to me by a person that I respect and it was not made as an idle
statement I took it seriously.
Q. And thereafter in your contacts with Dr. Oppenheimer you could not help
being a little bit on your guard?
A. That is correct
Q. And perhaps trying a little bit to see what might be beneath the surface of
what Dr. Oppenheimer was saying?
A. That is correct. May I amplify this point?
Q. Certainly.
A. As I testified, particularly during my term with the Air Force as chief
scientist for the Air Force— I don't want to emphasize this chief scientist busi-
ness, because it doesn't mean anything, but this is just to identify the time that
I am referring to— as I testified, I was on the opposite side of a pretty violent
controversy from Dr. Oppenheimer in at least two cases. I was also on the
opposite side— I mean on his side about people as to whom I had no question as
to loyalty or motives. I have been involved in a great many— not a great many
but a number of pretty strong controversies in the military, and I think it is
a fair general observation that when you get involved in a hot enough contro-
versy, it is awfully hard not to question the motives of people who oppose you
This, I am sure, could not but have colored my views on the subject.
The nagging uncertainty in this particular case was the fact that I had heard
the loyalty question raised by responsible people In a serious way.
If it ever comes to the day when we can't disagree and disagree violently In
public and on national policy, then of course I feel that it will be a calamity
for our democracy. I think perhaps I have said enough.
Q. I think since yon candidly told us much of the information you have given
is based not on your personal knowledge, I would like to review with you the
items relating to Dr. Oppenheimer that you have of your own knowledge and
see if those are correct I will Just run through them and see if they are
correct as to your personal knowledge. y
That you visited Vista and you heard a draft report
A. Bead.
Q. Read. With which you disagreed as to three points
A. Which was said to have been written by Oppenheimer
A. Yes.
Q. Your personal knowledge
769
A. My personal knowledge includes the fact that the three people In whom I
have the utmost confidence said it was written by Dr. Oppenheimer, as my per-
sonal knowledge.
Q. Was Dr. Oppenheimer there?
A. No, he was not there.
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer contributed or made valuable contributions in the Vista
report which were helpful to the Air Force. I think you said you personally
know that
A. I can't say I know this in detail, but I am reasonably sure that this is so.
I extended that of course to include the other fields of activity, fields of activity
other than Vista as well.
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer's views with respect to the Lincoln summer study, you
know only by hearsay?
A. Except as they were expressed during the first 3 days of the study, yes.
Q. In those first 3 days, he didn't say anything about giving up strategic air-
power?
A, No.
Q. And you know that Dr. Zacharias
A. I might point out that after the first session—I think it was the first
session — in which Dr. Oppenheimer had taken a fairly active part and he came
up to me afterward and said, "Did I do all right?"
Q. And what did you say?
A. I said "Yes," or words to that effect.
Q. Were you just being polite?
A. No.
Q. And you were present when Dr. Zacharias wrote the initials "ZORG" on the
blackroad?
A. Yes.
Q. And you went to see Dr. Oppenheimer and you have told us of the conversa-
tion with him in May of 1952?
A, Yes.
Q. And, of course, you were there and you heard that conversation and parti-
cipated in it.
Mr. SILVERMAN. That is all. Thank you.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Griggs, if I though you could make the 3 :30 plane, I would not
ask you a couple of questions, but you have missed that plane.
The WITNESS. I am at your service, sir.
Mr. GRAY. I don't have very much actually. On the ZOBC thing, you saw
Dr. Zacharias write the things on the board. Had you before heard these letters
used together?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. You may have testified about this, but do yon remember when you
first heard them?
The WITNESS. I did not testify about it. As near as I can recall, I learned
about this abbreviation first in a telephone conversation with George Valley, and
I would guess that this 'was roughly halfway through the summer study. But
I can't be sure about that.
Mr. GBAT. The summer study was in 1950?
The WITNESS, 1952.
Mr. GRAY. When did this meeting take place at which Dr. Zacharias wrote the
letters on the board, if you remember?
The WITNESS. That was at the Scientific Advisory Board meeting in Gam-
bridge in, I believe, September of 1952. It was after the completion of at least
the formal phases of the summer study, and it was on the occasion at which Dr.
Zacharias was presenting some of the conclusions of the Lincoln summer study
to the Scientific Advisory Board of the Air Force.
Mr. GRAY. The magazine article you mentioned came out later than either
of these events?
The WITNESS. I don't know, sir. I would have to look it up.
Mr. GRAY. Was this name in 1952 well known among physicists, that is, the
summer and fall of 1952?
The WITNESS. Well known among the physicists, speaking of the physical
Mr. GRAY. That is right
The WITNESS. No ; I don't think it was well known.
Mr. GRAY. Do you know that it had appeared publicly in print at the time that
you saw Dr. Zacharias use it? My question should be, Do you know whether it
had? I don't know myself .
770
The WITNESS. I am afraid, sir, I would have to check dates on that. As near
as I can recall, it did appear in print in the Fortune article and whether that
was before or after the Scientific Advisory Board meeting, I would really have to
check.
Mr. GBAY. Do you know the origin of the putting of those letters together?
The WITNESS. No more than I have told you and Zacharias on explaining of
what the letters stood for, which coincided with what George Valley had told me
over the telephone.
Mr. GRAY. A question now about the Vista report. You have been questioned
a good deal about the meeting you attended in November 1951, I suppose it was.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GBAY. And the first draft or the draft of the introduction to chapter 5,
were there substantial changes in that introduction between the time you heard
it read at this meeting and when the report finally appeared and was published?
The WITNESS. Yes, there were. There were some very substantial changes.
The first time I referred to was deleted. If you are going to get into this question,
however, I should point out that there were two versions of the printed Vista
report, one of which was called back, I believe, for cecurity reasons. The first
edition was called back for security reasons, I believe, and later reissued. The
changes to which I refer, as near as I can recall, and I am reasonably sure with
regard to this grst point, that was deleted in both of these published versions.
Mr. GBAY. So that the two version really are not important in trying to get at
the question as to whether there were substantial changes.
The WITNESS. No.
Mr. GBAY. Could you agree with the description that the changes were only
an emphasis and not in substance?
The WITNESS. One of the changes which I was most concerned was the deletion
of this particular statement with respect to withholding the use of our Strategic
Air Force until — the Strategic Air Force for attack on their cities until our cities
were attacked. That was deleted. I would say this is a change in substance,
if I understand your question.
Mr. GBAY. Do you have any questions?
Dr. EVANS. No.
Mr. MORGAN. No.
Mr. KOBE. No.
Mr. SILVERMAN. I am just wondering on this business of Dr. Zacharias writing
on the blackboard the initials ZORC.
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Is It possible that the occasion of his doing that might have been after
the magazine article?
A. As I say, I would have to check dates to find out.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Thank you.
The WITNESS. I am reasonably sure that— in fact, I am as sure as I can be of
anything in my memory— that my first hearing of these initials, which as I said
came in a telephone conversation to the best of my memory, that was prior to
any publication of these initials in this connection that I saw.
Mr. SILVERMAN. I have no further questions.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Alvarez, do you wish to testify under oath? You are not re-
quired to do so.
Dr. ALVAREZ. I would like to testify under oath, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Would you give me your full name.
Dr. ALVAREZ. Luis Walter Alvarez.
Mr. GRAY. Would you raise your right hand? Luis Walter Alvarez, do you
swear that the testimony you are to give the board shall be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Dr. ALVAREZ. I do.
Mr. GRAY. Would you be seated, please.
Whereupon, Luis Walter Alvarez was called as a witness and, having been first
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. It is my duty to remind you of the so-called perjury statutes. Are
you familiar with them?
The WITNESS. In a broad way I am, yes,
Mr. GRAY. May I ask that if in the course of your testimony here it becomes
necessary for you to disclose or refer to restricted data you notify me in advance
so that we may take the necessary steps in the interest of security
771
Finally, I should say to you that we treat these proceedings as a confidential
matter between the Atomic Energy Commission and its officials and witnesses,
on the one hand, and Dr. Oppenheimer and his representatives on the other.
The Commission will make no releases about these proceedings. On behalf of the
board, I express the hope that the witnesses will follow the same course.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Robb, will you proceed.
Mr. ROBB. Thank you.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Where do you live at present, Dr. Alvarez?
A. I live at Berkeley, Calif.
Q. What is your present occupation or position?
A. I am professor of physics at the University of California.
Q. How long have you been there?
A. I have been at the university for the past 18 years with time off for war-
work.
Q. Would you tell us something about your academic training and background,
please, sir.
A. I went to the University of Chicago both for my undergraduate training
and also my graduate work in physics. In my graduate career, I was very for-
tunate in having as my research professor Dr. Arthur Compton who is perhaps
best known to this board as the director of the wartime Metallurgical Labora-
tory. I worked with him in the field of cosmic rays. I took my doctor's degree
in the field of optics.
Q. In the field of what?
A. Optics. After I left the University of Chicago with my Ph. D.
Q. Did you publish any papers?
A. I published 2 or 3 papers during that period, one of them as coauthor with
Dr. Compton.
Q. Very well, go ahead.
A. After I received my Ph. D. degree, I had the opportunity to go to the radia-
tion laboratory at the University of California at Berkeley. This was probably
the most important thing that happened to me in my scientific career. I became
associated with Professor Lawrence and got into the field of nuclear physics,
which I had not been in before.
For the first 2 years there in Berkeley, I was a research assistant in the labora-
tory and then I was asked to join the faculty of the university, first as an; in-
structor and then working up through the ranks to the position of professor of
physics, which I was given in 1946 just after the war. I have been professor
of physics ever since.
Q. You mentioned an interim period during the war. Did that begin in about
1940?
A. Yes ; in November 1940. The National Research Defense Council set up a
laboratory at MIT to work on microwave radar. This was a field which had
been developed by the British. We in this country had nothing in that field
and so this laboratory was set up. I was one of the charter members.
Q. With whom did you work there?
A. The director of the laboratory was Dr. Lee DuBridge and there were many
other nuclear physicists, roughly of my age, who worked in the laboratory.
Q. How long did you stay there?
A. I stayed there until the summer of 1943 at which time the main radar
projects in which I was concerned were well along toward production or in
production, and since my primary usefulness is not in the field of production but
rather in research and development, I felt this was a natural time to leave and
join the Manhattan District
Q. How did you happen to join the Manhattan District?
A. I had had several offers from men in the district. I had at least one from
Dr. Oppenheimer, I had one from Arthur Compton, and I had conversations with
Professor Lawrence about joining his staff.
Q. Do you recall any particular conversation you had with Dr. Oppenheimer
at about that time with respect to whether or not you would join the Manhattan
District?
A. Sometime, I believe, in 1942, Dr. Oppenheimer asked me to come down to
New York from Boston to talk with him about problems in the field of the
Manhattan District He was anxious that I join him in his work, and I remem-
ber a most interesting afternoon we spent together, during which time he told
me for the first time the possibility of building a thermonuclear weapon.
772
Q. What did he tell you about it?
A. He told me in some detail of the scientific design, as he then envisaged it,
and pointed out how it wonld be triggered. * * *
By Mr. EOBB :
Q. Would that have been a weapon of great power, in the megaton range?
A. Yes. As Dr. Oppenheimer pointed out to me, there was no apparent limit
to the magnitude of the explosion, whereas there appeared to be a limit to the
magnitude of the explosion from what we now call an atomic bomb.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer in that discussion raise any question with you either
about the feasibility or the morality of constructing such a weapon?
A. He certainly raised no question about the morality of the thing. We had a
technical discussion to which I contributed essentially nothing about the feasi-
bility of it from the scientific point of view.
Q. By the way, how long have you known Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I have known him for 18 years.
Q. Are you here as a witness today because you want to be here or because
you were asked to come?
A. I certainly find it an unpleasant duty but I consider it to be a duty to be
here. I was asked by General Nichols to come.
Q. Following that discussion, did you go to Los Alamos?
A. Not following that discussion ; no.
Q. I mean subsequently to it
A. Subsequently to it, I did go to Los Alamos, yes ; but not as a result of that
conversation, no.
Q. How long afterward was it?
A. In the spring of 1943 1 went to California in connection with the radar work
and stopped at Berkeley, which was the first time I had been in Berkeley since
1940, and I spent a week with Professor Lawrence looking at the work that was
going on at Berkeley In the isotope separation and asked Professor Lawrence
whether it would not be a good idea to join. I was homesick for the kind of
work in physics which was going on there and it had great appeal to me.
I told Professor Lawrence that my usefulness at the radiation laboratory at
MIT was almost coming to an end, and I could make a break at this point
He said he would be very happy to have me come and we made a tentative
arrangement that I would come as soon as I got back from a trip to England
which I had to make in the summer. Shortly after that, Dr. Backer and Dr.
Bainbrldge, who were both at the radiation laboratory at that time, talked with
me and told me that they thought it would be better for me to go to Los Alamos
where they were going. They were both leaving the radiation laboratory at
about this time and said if I were shifting to the atomic program, it would be
better to go to Los Alamos where the problems were more difficult rather than to
Berkeley where the problems were essentially solved. So, I agreed with them
and made arrangements with Dr. Oppenheimer to go to Los Alamos. When I was
in England, I received a wire from Dr. Oppenheimer asking me if I would, for
a while, work with Fermi at Chicago. Apparently Fermi had been trying to
get his former student, Segre, who was then at Los Alamos to come to Chicago
to help him, and the professor suggested I go instead of Segre because Segre
was deep in business.
Q. So you paused at Chicago?
A. So I went to Chicago for 6 months and then proceeded to Los Alamos.
Q. You arrived at Los Alamos approximately when?
A. In the spring of 1944.
Q. When you got to Los Alamos, will you tell us whether or not you found
there constructed a liquid hydrogen plant?
A. Yes, * * *.
Q. Was the liquid hydrogen plant a facility for making a fission weapon?
A. I can think of no importance that it had in that connection.
Q. How long did you stay at Los Alamos?
A. I stayed there until approximately November of 1945.
Q. What was your duty there?
A. When I first arrived, I was assigned as a sort of assistant to Dr. George
Kistiakowsky who was in charge of the explosives work in connection with the
implosion weapon.
My first technical job was to set up an experiment designed to test some
important features of the implosion method. Then, shortly after that, some
young men working with me and I got Into the field of the detonating mechanism
773
for the high explosive, and I think that this was my most important con-
tribution at Los Alamos in the system of setting off the bomb. I do not believe
it could have been done without this contribution.
Q. Did there come a time when you made a rather long airplane flight?
A. Yes ; in the spring of 1945 when our detonator system was through its
development and was to proceed to production it was turned over to Dr. Bain-
bridge to put into final form, and I was essentially out of a job at that point.
I went to Dr. Oppenheimer and asked him what I should do now that this first job
of mine was complete, and I said that I hoped he could get me a job which
would get me overseas. He said that the laboratory wanted to have some
method of testing the effectiveness of the bomb over enemy territory.
You see, normally a military weapon is tested on a proving ground. Many
rounds are shot and one knows all its characteristics. But, in this particular
case, the weapon was so expensive and there were so few of them that it seemed
more reasonable to take the proving ground over the enemy territory to measure
the blast wave, the pressure shock waves and thereby to measure the efficiency
of the bomb.
So, I took that job on in the spring of 1945.
Q. What did you do?
A. A small group working with me designed equipment which could be fitted
into a parachute-borne pressure gage which could be dropped over the point
where the bomb was released, and then these pressure gages had radio trans-
mitters which would send signals back to an airplane where they could be
recorded on cathode ray oscilloscopes by photography, and when the films were
analyzed later, one could measure the peak pressure in the shock-wave and by
scaling laws in aerodynamics one could then compute the blast of the bomb.
Q. Did you go to Japan?
A. I spent about 2% months on Tinlan Island and I rode In the observation
plane during the raid on Hiroshima.
Q. How far behind the plane that dropped the bomb were you?
A. As I remember, we flew formation approximately a quarter-of-a-mile
behind from the time we left Iwo Jima until we got back from the Japanese
coast on the way out
Q. And you measured the effect of this explosion?
A. Yes. I had to be adjusting the receiving apparatus for this instrumenta-
tion during our sharp turn after our bomb was dropped and our getaway run.
We were essentially running away from the shock-wave with our airplane. So
I was quite preoccupied during this time.
Q. And thereafter you returned to Los Alamos?
A. As soon as I got back from Tinian, I packed up my household goods as
quickly as possible and moved my family back to Berkeley ; yes. There was
nothing essentially for me to do at Los Alamos. Both of my jobs were complete.
Q. And you resumed you academic career?
A. Yes; I did.
Q. Did you continue any work as a consultant for the Atomic Energy Com-
mission or the radiation laboratory?
A. For the first 2 years after the war, I believe that most, if not all, of my
salary was paid by the Atomic Energy Commission. Since then, one-third of It
has been paid by the University of California for one-third teaching duties that
I now exercise and the other two-thirds is paid by the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion through the University of California as a contractor.
Q. Doctor, directing your attention to September 1949 when the Russians
exploded their first atomic bomb, did that cause some concern on your part?
A. Yes; it caused a great deal of concern on my part. I tried to make up
my mind what was the right thing to do. I had been spending 4 years doing
basic research again. I think of it as sort of being recharged after 5 years of
military development work. I had to take awhile to get back into the frame
of mind of a practicing physicist. I had been concentrating my attention on
that phase of my career and now, suddently, it appeared that a crisis had arrived
and perhaps I should get back into the field of atomic energy.
Q. Why did you think a crisis had arrived?
A. The Russians had exploded an atomic bomb, and I thought that your own
program had not been going terribly fast. It certainly had not been going
at nearly the rate it had during the war, but this is quite natural.
Q. Did you discuss with any of your colleagues what ought to be done?
A. Yes; I did. I saw Professor Lawrence the next day, and I told him that
I thought we should look seriously into the business of constructing the super
774
weapon which had, as far as I knew, been neglected in this 4-year period. I had
not followed the situation closely enough to be sure that it had been neglected
but that was my impression.
Q. Did you make any inquiry to see whether or not your feeling was correct
as to whether It had been neglected?
A. Yes. Professor Lawrence and I got on the phone that afternoon and called
Edward Teller at Los Alamos and asked him if we could come down and talk
to him in the near future, and, as I remember, within a day or two, we took a
plane to Los Alamos where we did talk to Dr. Teller and found out the present
rather inadequate status of the super program.
Q. Beginning at about that time and the next few weeks, Doctor, did you keep
any notes in the form of a diary as to what your activities were in respect of
a program for the development of the super bomb?
A. Yes; I did. I woidd like to explain how I came to do that. I am not by
nature a particularly methodical person, and I have never kept a diary except
for a few months when I was in high school and one other rather important
occasion, and that was when I was in charge of coordinating the activities dur-
ing the first few months of the radiation laboratory at MIT. Dr. DuBridge put
ine in charge of meeting schedules and during that period I kept a detailed diary
of everything that was going on in the laboratory, the state of development, so
that I knew where things were.
At the end of the war, Dr. DuBridge told me that this turned out to be
one of the most valuable documents they had because there was no other record
of the early days of the laboratory. Later on, there were lots of notes, memo-
randa, and reports, but in the first 3 months, the only record that was there was
my diary of the laboratory. It turned out to be of great use in the patent
field and it had a lot to do with clarifying the ideas of the person who wrote up
the history- So, I was aware of the fact that I had done this once to good
avail and it seemed now that a new program was about to be started and I
might as well keep a diary again. That is my reason for doing it.
Q. Do you have with you, Doctor, the original of that diary?
A. Yes, I have my typewritten sheets here. They cover the period of about
3 weeks from the time the Russian bomb was dropped.
Q. Typewritten or longhatid?
A. They are In longhand.
Q. Doctor, the security officer using my jackknife has removed 2 or 3 words
from the typewritten copy.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Bolander, 1 wonder if you would hand that copy with those
excisions which have to do with technical matters to our friends across the
table.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Can we take a minute to look at this? Are you going to
question him about it?
Mr. ROBB. Yes, right now.
Mr. SILVEEMAN. Let us toke a minute or two to glance over it.
Mr. GRAY. All right.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Unlfass you are going to read it into the record
Mr. ROBB. I am goinfc to read it item by item and ask the witness to explain it
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. I would like to run this through with you and ask you to amplify.
"October 5, 1949. Latimer and I independently thought that the Russians could
be working hard on the super and might get there ahead of us. The only
thing to do seems to get there first— 4>ut hope that it will turn out to be
impossible."
Would you explain to us what you meant by that "hope that it will turn
out to be impossible."
A. By that I meant that there might be some fundamental reason in the
physics of the bomb that would prevent anyone from making it work just in
the same sense that people have often said that you cannot make a thermonuclear
weapon that will burn up the atmosphere and the ocean. I hoped that some
such law would prevail and keep anyone from building it, because then our
stockpile of atomic weapons gave us the lead on the Russians.
Q. You mean if it turned out that it would violate some law of nature the
Russians could not make it either?
A. That is right, because If they did make it, that would give them a great
jump ahead of us and essentially nullify our stockpile of atomic weapons.
Dr. EVANS. The laws of thermodynamics might tell you it could not be
done?
The WITNESS. Yes, something of that sort
775
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. You thought you ought to find out
A. I said we can't trust this hope, but let us find out.
Q. Who is Latimer?
A. He is dean of chemistry at the University of California.
Q. Is there anything you have to add to that first item?
A. No, I can't think of anything.
Q. "October 6, 1954: Talked with E. 0. L. about the project and he took it
very seriously— in fact he had just come from a session with Latimer. We
called up Teller at Los Alamos to find out how the theory had progressed in
the last 4 years. Since E. O. L. and I were to leave tomorrow for Washington,
we decided to go a day earlier and stop in for a day at Los Alamos to talk with
Teller. Left San Francisco at 7 : 30 p. m."
Q. Who wasE-O.L.?
A. H, O. L. is the director of the radiation laboratory at the University of
California, Prof. Ernest O. Lawrence.
Q. Have you any recollection of what Dr. Teller told you In the call that you
mentioned about how the theory had progressed in the last 4 years?
A. You mean during the visit, not during the telephone call? He obviously
could not tell us on the telephone.
Q. I will get to October 7. Is there anything further to add to that item,
October 6?
A. No.
Q. "October 7, 1949 : Arrived Albuquerque 3 a. m., and spent rest of night in
Hilton Hotel. Left by Carco plane for Los Alamos at 10 a. m., and spent rest
of day talking to Teller, Gamov, Manley, and Ulam. They give project good
chance if there is plenty of tritium available. There must be a lot of machine
calculations done to check the hydrodynamics, and Princeton and L. A. are get-
ting their machines ready. We went back to Albuquerque with Teller and talked
until bedtime. We agreed that a conference should be called at L. A. next
month to see what should be done. L. A. had been talking about one for early
next year. We can't wait too long. Teller brought up DiO pile as easy way to
xet excess neuts. E. O. L. and I said we would get going on that at once. Left
Albuquerque at 3 : 30 a. m."
In your talk with Teller, Dr. Manley, Gamov, and Ulam, did you ascertain
from them how much work had been done on thermonuclear?
A. Yes. As far as I can recall, Dr. Teller told us that he had been working
on the program essentially since the end of the war. Dr. Gamov had been there
for approximately a year on leave from George Washington University. Dr.
Ulam had done some work on it and there had been a modest program of machine
calculations to check hydrodynamics. But that is essentially all. The program
had essentially not been of any magnitude worthy of the name.
Q. Beg pardon?
A. The program essentially did not exist except for Teller.
Q. You mention "must be a lot of machine calculations done to check the
hydrodynamics, and Princeton and L. A. are getting their machines ready."
What did you mean by that?
A. I referred there to the so-called Maniac, an electronic calculating machine
invented by Dr. Von Neumann of the Institutte of Advanced Study which was
being built at Princeton and a copy being built at Los Alamos to do these terribly
involved calculations.
Q. Was that the machine at Princeton under Dr. Oppenheimer's auspices?
A. I don't know. I know Dr. Von Neumann is a member of the Institute and,
therefore, is under Dr. Oppenheimer, but I do not know whether the machine
was the property of the Institute or the property of the University of Princeton.
Q. Did you have any reason to believe at that time that Dr. Oppenheimer would
not be ready to go ahead with this program?
A. Of course not. The most enthusiastic person I had ever met on the program
of the super weapon was Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. Is there anything further to add in connection with this October 7 entry?
L. A!, I assume, means Los Alamos.
A. That is right
Q. Los Alamos?
A. It means Los Alamos. I would like to say something about this program,
about the D»0 pile. This is a heavy water reactor and it has virtue because in
a heavy-water reactor there are lots of free neutrons available that are not
available in the graphite moderated reactors which the Commission then owned
776
almost entirely. As Teller pointed out, tritium was * * * material for the
production of hydrogen bombs. To produce tritium, one needs excess neutrons
and, therefore, Professor Lawrence and I, who were looking for something to do
to help the program along, said we would start a program to build such piles
for the Commission.
Q. "October 8, 1949: Arrived Washington after lunch. Went to ABC and
talked with Pitzer, Gen. McCormack, Latimer, and Paul Fine. Told them what
we planned to do and got good response.
"Had dinner with Alfred and Mannette Loomis at Carleton Hotel."
Pitzer, who he is?
A. He is Dean Kenneth Pitzer who was then Director of Research of the Atomic
Energy Commission.
Q. General McCormack, who was he?
A. I believe he was the head of the Military Liaison Committee.
Q. Latimer is the same La timer?
A. Yes.
Q. And Paid Fine, who was he?
A. Paul Fine was, I would guess, a sort of administrative assistant to Dr.
Pitzer. I might say that I was somewhat surprised at Dr. Fine's reaction,
because he was the first person that I had met since the Russian bomb went
off who was not enthusiastic about the problem of building the Super weapon.
I attributed this to the fact that he had all during the war and was still then
sort of an administrative assistant and I put him down as a person with
essentially no imagination and discounted this.
Dr. EVANS. He was not enthusiastic?
The WITNESS. No. He was not, but knowing liis nature, I was not upset by this.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. "Told them what we planned to do." What was that?
A. That we planned to go into a vigorous program of building heavy water
moderated supplies to supply free neutrons to make tritium.
Q. The item about dinner does not refer to the thermonuclear program, I
assume.
"A. No.
Q. "October 9, 1949— Sunday: Had breakfast with Mr. LeBaron— Deputy
Secretary of Defense for Atomic Affairs. Told him of our plans. Went to
R. W. panel meeting for most of the day. Program approved but probably
nothing will happen. 'Gram of neutrons1 recommended — that ties in well with
our program. (At noon, E. O. L. heard he was a father for the 6th time.)
Spent afternoon and evening with Mr. and Mrs. LeBaron and talked with him
about several phases of the situation."
"Told him of our plans" ; are those the same plans you referred to?
A. The plans to build a heavy-water reactor.
Q. "Went to RW panel meeting." What does that mean?
A. That was an ad hoc panel on radiological warfare. This was a subject
which was very close to Professor Lawrence's heart. He had made serious pro-
posals in the Defense Department that warfare could be waged effectively by
the use of radioactive products. I was not a member of the RW panel but
Professor Lawrence asked me to come along since I was part way there after
my trip to Los Alamos.
Q. "Program approved but probably nothing will happen." What did you
mean by that?
A. People agreed that the idea of radiological warfare was attractive in many
ways but again the country had no supply of free neutrons * * *.
Q. "Gram of neutrons recommended." Is there any comment to make about
that?
A* No. The panel said that it believed the Atomic Energy Commission should
initiate a program to provide this gram of neutrons ; and when I say this fits
in well with our program, our program to build heavy water piles would pro-
vide we hoped considerably more than a gram of neutrons. Therefore, we would
have available either tritium or radioactive warfare agents.
Q. What was the attitude of Mr. LeBaron with respect to your proposals?
A, He was, of course, quite enthusiastic about it
Q. I guess there is nothing further to add about that item, is there?
A. No.
Q. "October 10, 1949 : Saw Ralph Johnson at AEG and made arrangements to
go to Chalk River to see their pile. Talked with General McCormack about
plans. Went to Capitol and had lunch with Senator McMahon and Represents-
777
tive Carl Hinshaw. Told them of our plans and got good reactions. Stressed
need for cooperation between British, Canadians, and ourselves. They said
they would be in Berkeley within 10 days. Also said to call them if anything
held up our plans. Back to AEG — saw Lilienthal. He was only lukewarm to
proposition. Saw all four other Commissioners, who seemed to like what we
were setting out to do. They weren't too happy about our going to Chalk River
but finally agreed to give us their blessing, and make it official. We had planned
only a personal visit to Bernard Kinsey. On way to plane stopped in to see RCA
color television demonstration."
Who was Ralph Johnson?
A. He was one of the administrative people at the ABC. I do not remember
him in detail.
Q. What was the pile at Chalk River?
A. Chalk River is the Canadian atomic energy establishment where they had
built the outstanding heavy water pile. There was only one in this country;
it was a very low-power pile at the Argonne Laboratory. The Canadian one
was the one which we planned to use as a prototype of the ones which we were
contemplating building, and we thought as long as we were in the East we should
have a look at this thing. We had only seen pictures and heard descriptions
of it
Q. "Talked with General McCormack about plans." He Is the same one you
mentioned before?
A. Yes.
Q. "Went to Capitol and had lunch with Senator McMahon and Representative
Carl Hinshaw.*1 Would you tell us about that?
A. Yes; I would like to do that because various members of the scientific
fraternity at various times told me that Professor Lawrence and I used undue
influence by going to see Senator McMahon and various Congressmen to try to
influence them to get the hydrogen bomb program started. What actually hap-
pened was that about a month before this, and before the Russian explosion,
Carl Hinshaw, who is the leading Member of Congress in the field of aviation
and air navigation and things of that sort, called at the laboratory and he and I
had a very long discussion on the present state of the air navigational art in
this country. This is a field in which I got some competence during the war.
Mr. Hinshaw found that my views on the subject were somewhat different than
the official CAA views and asked me if I would write him a detailed letter
explaining my views. I prepared a 35-page typewritten document with lots of
diagrams expressly for his personal use, and I had this with me when I arrived
in Washington. So, I called up Congressman Hinshaw and told him that I
had the document and I would like to bring it to him at the CapitoL I men-
tioned that Professor Lawrence and I were there together. As soon as he heard
that he said, "Please hold down and I will call you back in about 5 minutes."
He called back and said, "I have just spoken with Senator McMahon, who would
like you and Professor Lawrence to have lunch with him at his. chambers in
the Capitol today if you can do So." And that is why we had our conference
with Senator McMahon and Congressman Hinshaw.
Q. The next sentence, "Told them of our plans and got good reactions/1 What
can you tell us about that?
A. Both of these gentlemen told us that they thought we were doing the right
thing. They were very happy to see some action in the field of thermonuclear
weapons. They both expressed concern about the fact that so little was going
on in the ABC in this fielfl. They said, "We hope you can get something going."
Q. I guess the next sentence or two needs no explanation unless you think
they do, "Stressed need for cooperation between British, Canadians, and
ourselves."
A. By that I meant that the Canadians were far ahead of us in the heavy
water pile technology and that if we were to be able to move rapidly, we would
need cooperation of the Canadians.
Q. "They said they would be in Berkeley within 10 days. Also said to call
them if anything held up our plans/1
Was there any discusion about what might hold up your plans?
A. I can't remember anything of that nature.
Q. "Back to AEG-Hsaw Lilienthal. He was only lukewarm to proposition."
Have you any added comment to make about that?
A. I must confess that I was somewhat shocked about his behavior. He did
not even seem to want to talk about the program. He turned his chair around
and looked out the .window and indicated that he did not want to even
778
the matter. He did not like the idea of thermonuclear weapons, and we could
hardly get into conversation with him on the subject"
Q. "Saw all 4 other Commissioners, who seemed to like what we were setting
out to do. They weren't too happy about our going to Chalk River, but finally
agreed to give us their blessing and make it official."
Is there any comment on that?
A. I do not know the reasons for them not wanting us to go, but I assume
it had something to do with the political situation, and I have nothing to add
there.
Q. "We had planned only a personal visit to Bernard Kinsey." Who is he?
A. Dr. Bernard Kinsey is one of the chief physicists at the Chalk River lab-
oratory, and he was a member of the radiation laboratory in 1953 and 1936 and,
therefore, a personal friend of both Professor Lawrence and me.
Q. I guess the RCA color television demonstration is immaterial to this.
A. To this, yes, sir.
Q. "October 11, 1949: In New York, found we were unable to get seats to
Ottawa. We went to see Rabi and found him very happy at our plans. He is
worried, too. I took plane home and arrived in Berkeley at 11 p. m.M
What can you tell us about your conversation with Dr. Rabi?
A. I think I can sum it up best by trying to paraphrase what Dr. Rabi said.
It was somewhat complimentary and I hope you excuse it if I say it. What
he said was essentially that "It is certainly good to see the first team back in."
He said, "You fellows have been playing with your cyclotron and nuclei for
4 years and it is certainly time you got back to work, and I am awfully happy
to see you back in the business."
Q. What was he worried about?
A. I can't remember that he was worried about anything.
Q. You said that he was worried, too.
A. He was worried about the Russian explosion and the fact that our lead
in the field of atomic energy had apparently been cut. He agreed with us
that the hydrogen bomb program was a very good program, and he was happy
we were doing something to get it reactivated.
Q. "October 12, 1949 : Told some of the men at the lab of our trip. Don Oook-
seyt Brobeck, McMillan, Serber, Seaborg, Thornton, Gordon, Fidler. All said
they would join new project."
By the laboratory, you meant what laboratory?
A. I mean the top man at the radiation laboratory at the University of
California.
Q. Who is Don Oooksey?
A. Associate director of the laboratory.
Q. Brobeck?
A. Assistant director and chief engineer.
Q. McMillan?
A. Professor of physics and Nobel prize winner in physics.
Q. Serber?
A. Professor of theoretical physics at the university.
Q. Seaborg?
A. Professor of chemistry, also a Nobel prize winner.
Q. Was he a member at that time of the GAG?
A. Yes; he was.
Q. Thornton?
A. Robert Thornton, professor of physics and in charge of the 184-inch cyclo-
tron.
Q. Gordon?
A. He was Brobeck's assistant in the engineering department.
Q. Fidler?
A. He was, I believe, at that time AEC representative in the Bay Area.
Q. "All said they would Join new project"
A. That means the project of building heavy water piles. I might point out
that this meant quite a change for all of them. Mr. Brobeck was at that time
busily engaged in designing the bevatron which recently ran for the first time
and everyone else was busily engaged on a program that he would much rather
do than build heavy water piles, but all agreed that it was the right thing to do
at that time.
Q. Project for building heavy water piles was for the purpose of developing
the thermonuclear ; is that right?
A. It was for the purpose of supplying tritium for tests of the thermonuclear
weapon ; yes, sir.
779
Q. Is there anything else to add about that entry?
A. I can't thinfe of any.
Q. "October 13: EL 0. L. returned and we had long conference about plans.
Discussed site and technical plans." H. O. L., I assume, is Dr. Lawrence?
A. That is right
Q. Site for what?
A. That was the site for the heavy water piles. The main requirement there
is lots of cooling water.
Q. "October 14: Larry Hafstad, Head of Reactor Division of ABC, was
present — we had called him from Washington. Dave Griggs and Bob Christie
were present also. Decided sea water cooling O. K and decided put pile on
ocean north of S. F. and south of Tomales Bay. Hafstad will be in Chicago on
Monday and will send out some pile experts as soon as possible next week.
Decided to build pile in units, to give chance for rapid change. Probably H>O
cooling O. K. as at Chalk Elver. Took Hafstad to airport and went to Woodside
to see Mr. Neylon. Home at midnight."
How did you happen to call Mr. Hafstad, or Dr. Hafstad?
A. Dr. Hafstad was the Director of the Reactor Division of the ABC, and we
were people who wanted to build piles but who had no technical qualification
in that field. We had never been in the reactor business. We thought the one
thing we could supply was the ability to build large-scale apparatus and build
it fast. This is what Professor Lawrence's laboratory did during the war, and
the instance of the Oak Ridge isotope separation plant.
Q. What was the status at that time of the realtor program so far as you
knew?
A. I thought it was in the doldrums. I don't know precisely how many piles
had been built since the war. These records are available, but essentially no
new additional piles had been built for several years after the war as contrasted
with the fact that during the war there was the original Chicago pile, the Oak
Ridge pile of a different design, the Hanford piles, water-cooled gravity moder-
ated piles, and the heavy water pile at Chicago, four different kinds of piles had
been built in a very short space of time, and in several years after the war no pile
had been built.
Q. "Dave Griggs and Bob Christie were present also." Who was Dave Griggs?
A. Dave Griggs was the gentleman who Just came out of this room. He was
professor of geophysics of the University of California at Los Angeles.
Q. Christie?
A. Bob Christie is professor of physics at California Institute of Technology,
and is the man who did the theoretical design on the Nagasaki bomb.
Q. What was their function at this meeting?
A. Dave Griggs was there because we hoped that he would want to join us.
He is an enthusiastic person who likes to get things done in a hurry. He was
sympathetic to our point of view that such piles should be built Bob Christie
was there because he was an expert in the field of neutron diffusion and pile
technology. He designed to so-called water boiler at Los Alamos.
Q. "Decided sea water cooling O. K. and decided to put pile on ocean, north
of S. F." I guess that means San Francisco.
A. Yes.
Q "And south of Tomales Bay." That is near San Francisco?
A. No.
Q. Have you anything to add to that?
A. No ; it was not a good decision and we changed it in a couple of days.
Q "Hafstad will be in Chicago on Monday and will send out some pile experts
as soon as possible next week." Am I to gather with that that Dr. Hafstad
W^. It certainly seemed that way to us. He came out himself and he said he
would send people who were competent in the field of pile design to help us.
One of his great difficulties, as I see it, was that piles were not getting built
because apparently people wanted to design the perfect pile and build the perfect
Dile and noT take it in easy steps. We on the other hand were a group who said
we don't care about the niceties of the thing; we are not experts. We want to
get some piles buUt, and we will build them fast. It was a different approach
^Q! ^u meiui^ wanted to find out and didn't think you had the chronometer
to do it?
A nrTifli" is prficifldv it
Q! "Decided to build pile in units, to give chance for rapid change." What do
you mean by that "give chance for rapid change"?
780
A. I believe Professor Lawrence thought we should build a very large con-
crete shield with a number of tanks in it to hold heavy water, and to provide
facility for changing the geometrical arrangement. This philosophy is now
incorporated in the so-called swimming pool reactors where one can make
changes easily whereas the first piles were built so that no fundamental changes
could be made. The geometry was set in the design.
Q. "Probably HaO cooling O. K. as a Chalk Biver." I assume that speaks for
itself.
A. Yes, that means you can cool the pile with ordinary water rather than
with heavy water. The Chicago pile was cooled with heavy water. The Chalk
Biver was moderated with heavy water and cooled with light water.
Q. "Took Haf stad to airport and went to Woodside to see Mr. Neylon."
A. Mr. Neylon is a member of the Board of Begents of the University of
California, and at that time was the chairman of the Radiation Laboratory Com-
mittee of the Begents.
Q. What was your purpose in seeing him?
A. Professor Lawrence wanted to tell him that the radiation laboratory was
thinking of embarking on a large-scale construction program, and he thought it
right that Mr. Neylon should know that such a thing was in the wind.
Q. Did he approve?
A. Yes, he approved. We didn't tell him anything about tritium. I don't
know whether he was cleared.
Professor Lawrence said this was an important thing from the national stand-
point, and Mr. Neylon agreed it was the right thing to do.
Q. "October 15: Cal beat USO. Parties at Jenkins and Serber. Long talk
with Dave Griggs at latter. He thinks we are doing the right thing, but isn't
ready to join yet."
Who is Jenkins that you mention?
A. He was professor of physics at the University of California.
Q. And Serber?
A. I have already mentioned him.
Q. And Dave Griggs is the same Dave Griggs you mentioned?
A. That is right. I would like to point out here that the reason that we
didn't try to get Dave Griggs to work with us is that he alone of all the people
in the field of radar had stayed on in war work for 2 years after the war. He
was through all in setting up the Band project at Santa Monica which is doing
such a fine job for the Air Force. I had once told Griggs privately that if there
was another war he had 2 years of credit in my book, that he didn't have to
come in for 2 years, because he had stuck out the last war for 2 years overtime.
So we didn't try to ask him to join.
Q. "October 16 : Sunday— Best. Drew Pearson's first mention of 'H-bomb'."
I guess there is no need for explanation of that.
"October 17. Monday : Talked with Haf stad, Zinn and Pitzer this afternoon
on phone. Things are going as well as possible. Zinn will send out someone
toward the end of this week. He hopes to be here after the Oak Bidge info,
meeting, which starts in about a week. He says he has ideas about how to do
the job, and is not sure we should just start off copying Chalk Biver. Talked
to Teller at Los Alamos. Notes on all conversations in file."
Start with that last item "Notes on all conversations in file." Are those notes
still available, or have you destroyed them?
A. I think I have destroyed them. I could not find them the last time I looked.
Q. Coming back to the beginning, yon have already stated who Hafstad is.
Who Is Zinn?
A. Waiter Zinn, director of the Argonne laboratory and probably the coun-
try's leading technical man in the design of reactors of all sorts.
Q. Pitzer?
A. Director of Besearch at AEO.
Q. What was the subject of that conversation?
A. I can only tell by refreshing my memory in looking at the notes.
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I gather that Zinn thought that we should build one of the more exotic
types of piles which he had under construction. This is a natural reaction
from a man in his position who is concerned with the proper design of piles.
We on the other hand were not concerned with that at all. We wanted to build
some piles, and we knew that the Chalk Biver design was sound, and we thought
we would go ahead and build those.
Q. Was there any Question that Dr. Hafstad and Dr. Zinn and Dr. Pitzer were
behind yon?
781
A. I didn't think there was, no.
Q. "Talked to Teller at Los Alamos." Do you recall anything about that?
A. No, I don't
Q. The next item, "October 18: B. O. L. said I had been elected to carry out
our program. He looked at sites on Sunday and Monday, and favors some land
east of Benicia fronting on Suisun Bay. He says I will be director of the Suisun
Laboratory. I am therefore going on almost full time as director of a nonexist-
ent laboratory on an unauthorized program. Cleared out my desk in the linac
building and had my file moved down to the director's office in the new building.
Decided to talk with L. A. DuBridge and B. F. Bacher tomorrow in Pasadena."
Is there any comment to make on that item, Doctor?
A. This day was the day that I felt I stopped being a physicist after 4 years,
and went back to war work. I moved my office out of my research buildin/r and
became an office worker.
Q. Linac.
A. Linear accelerator. That is the abbreviation.
Q. October 19
Mr. GRAY. Are you moving to another date? I just want to ask for clarifica-
tion, you referred to moving into the director's office in the new building.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Was there an existent place known as the Suisun Laboratory then?
The WITNESS. No. Suisun Bay is the north stem of San Francisco Bay, and
we had picked out a tentative site on the north shore of that bay where it was
far enough from inhabited buildings that we thought it would be safe to put
our piles. We wanted to have them close enough to the lab so we could go there
very often.
By Mr. KOBE:
Q. What was the new building?
A. The new building was the building which had been erected by the Atomic
Energy Commission on the radiation laboratory land in the past few months
and was just being occupied as a laboratory and administrative building at that
time.
Q. You mean it was new as compared to other buildings which had been built
previously.
A. Yes, people were just moving in, and I moved into the director's office.
Q. "October 19 : Spent all day in Pasadena discussing project with L. A. D. and
R. F. B. They had no objections and I felt they were impressed with the serious-
ness of the situation, and thought we were doing the right thing."
Who were L. A. D. and R. F. B?
A. L. A. D. is Dr. B. A. DuBridge, who was then and is now president of the
California Institute of Technology. He was also a member of the General Advi-
sory Commission, and had been my boss at the radiation laboratory at MIT
for 3 years. I had talked with Professor Lawrence a great deal, and I wanted
to check up with my other wartime boss to get his ideas and also to see whether
he thought that this program we had in mind was something that would be attrac-
tive to the General Advisory Commission.
Q. How well did you know Dr. DuBridge?
A. I would say that there are very few people that I know better. One of the
reasons for this is that Dr. DuBridge and I for 8 years during the war were
members of a 3 man driving club to conserve gasoline. We drove to work every
morning and drove back home again every night for 3 years, and I think one
gets to know a person very well under those circumstances.
Besides this, of course, we had our association as director and member of the
laboratory staff.
Q. B. F. B. who was he?
A. He is Prof. Robert Bacher, who at that time was professor of physics at
Cal. Tech., and who had previously been a member of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, one of the original Commissioners.
Q. How well did you know him?
A. I knew him exceedingly well. We had worked together for 3 years at the
radiation laboratory at MIT. We had worked together at Los -Alamos. We
were close personal friends. Our wives were goods friends. Whenever I went
to Cal. Tech. I always stayed at the Bacher home, and whenever he came to
Berkeley he stayed in our guest room. We were very close friends.
Q. Without going into great detail, did you explain to these gentlemen what
your plans were?
A. Yes, I explained in considerable detail.
782
Q. Was there any doubt in your mind that they approved?
A. No, there was absolutely no doubt in my mind that they approved. I know
them so well that we had a real meeting of the minds. They expressed their
interest and approval in many ways and I am sure that they thought it was a
fine idea.
Q. "October 20 : George Weil and Henry Ott, from the ABC Reactor Division
arrived. Spent most of the day with them. Inspected the Suisun sight for the
first time — it looks very attractive. George had to leave tonight as he is due
in London on Monday. Ott is staying for a few days to help out on pile design."
These two men came from where, Washington?
A. Washington.
Q. And were sent by whom?
A. Mr. Hafstad, I assume.
Q. In other words, at that time, October 20, you were really getting moving?
A. We were getting all the cooperation we could ask for.
Q. Is there anything further to add to that entry?
A. I don't think so.
Q. "October 21, Friday : Spent most of the day reading reports on piles, and
relearning elementar pile theory."
"October 22, Saturday : More report reading."
Is there anything to add to those two items?
A. Just the fact that for 4 years or 5 years I had not thought anything about
piles 01* reactors. I had worked with Fermi at Chicago in 1943, and had some
acquaintance with piles, and their theory, but I had forgotten the essential
points.
Q. "October 24, Monday: Made several telephone calls. Hafstad (at Oak
Ridge Conference) says nothing has happened in the last week about our pro-
gram. This is very disappointing in view of Hafstad's enthusiasm last week
when he left. Talked to Pitzer— also at Oak Ridge— for the first time in a week.
He had just come from afternoon meeting with Zinn- Weinberg, etc., to discuss
our program. Apparently Zinn has thrown a lot of doubts into peoples' minds
about the wisdom of our program. Have sensed this from conversations last
week with Zinn and Hafstad. Pitzer wants us to present our plans at GAC
meeting this weekend in Washington. Agrees with me that had better be done
in person than by letter.
"Had lunch with B. O. L. and Mr. Neylon in S. F. Mr. N. said things were
moving well, as witness unfreezing of AEC funds by Congress. Advised us
essentially to keep our shirts on.
"Talked with Teller, who had just met Fermi at airport in Chicago. No
reaction from Fermi, as he was tired from his long trip from Italy. Said he
felt he could count on Bethe. Felt Oppie was lukewarm to our project and
Conant was definitely opposed. Said Los Alamos was trying to set up conference
for Nov. 7.
"B. O. L. talked to Senator Knowland— has date for Senator to come up
the hill on Friday at 11 a. m."
Coming back to the first of that entry for October 24, would you explain to
us a little bit the entry about Mr. Hafstad's apparent change in attitude? What
did you mean by that?
A. I think it is clear that I concluded from what he said that he was no
longer as enthusiastic as he had been. The fact that Zinn was thinking that
perhaps we were doing the wrong thing, I think is a very natural reaction on
his part. After all, he had been designing piles for 4 years since the end of the
war, and he had seen none of these being reproduced in hardware. Now if a lot
of money was to be made available to build piles, I can appreciate his point of
view that he would like to see some of his ideas get into the piles, and not have
his merely copy what he probably considered to be an outmoded design of the
Canadians.
Q. You mentioned Weinberg here. Which Weinberg is this?
A. This is Alvin Weinberg, director of the Oak Ridge Laboratory.
Q. It is not Joe?
A. Definitely not Joe.
Q. Pitzer wants us to present our plans at GAO meeting this weekend in
Washington. "Agrees with me that had better be done in person than by
letter."
Who was the "us" that he spoke of?
A. I assume he meant Professor Lawrence, Mr. Brobeck and myself.
Q. Did you at or about that time start to get ready to go to Washington to
present your plans?
783
A. Yes. Mr, Reynolds, who is our business manager, worked day and night
preparing cost estimates for the project and Mr. Brobeck was busy on the design
features of it, and we had a presentation to make, and we were getting pre-
pared for it
Q. "Had lunch with E. O. Ir. and Mr. Neylon in S. F. Mr. N. said things were
moving well, as witness unfreezing of ABO funds by Congress."
Does that require any amplification?
A. Perhaps it does. As I recall, Professor Lawrence and I were both getting
worried about the fact that there seemed to be a lack of enthusiasm suddenly
pervading the scene and we were worried about this, whether it was a change
in climate in Washington or what was happening, so we went to a man with
some experience in the political field, and asked him whether he thought that
this was bad enough that we should be worried about it, and he reassured us
and said no, things are moving well. Congress is showing its enthusiasm for
an expanded AEC program by unfreezing some funds. He said, "Keep your
shirts on, boys, it is going to be all right."
Q. You talked with Teller and so forth. Where did you talk with him?
A. I can't recall.
Q. Was it by phone or in person?
A. I suppose it was by phone, but I really could not be sure. I gather from
the entries on this Monday that I was in Berkeley, and I don't recall that Teller
came to Berkeley in that period, so I assume it was by phone.
Q. Do you recall whether you knew why he thought he could count on Bethe?
A. I assume that he had had conversations with Bethe and Bethe agreed that
the super program should be reactivated. I can't give any definite testimony
because he just told me that.
Q. The next item : "Felt Oppie was lukewarm to our project and Conant was
definitely opposed/7
Does that require any amplification?
A. This is quoting Dr. Teller if I read my notes correctly. I had no conver-
sation with Dr. Oppenheimer on this subject, and I had no reason to feel that
he would not be enthusiastic about it ' In fact, I assumed he was enthusiastic
as were all the other people with whom I talked.
Q. "Said Los Alamos was trying to set up conferences for November 7."
Conferences for what?
A. This was the conference that I believe was referred to in one of the first
day's notes. Dr. Teller said he thought it would be an excellent idea to bring
together all of the men who had thought about problems of the super during
the war, together with new theoretical physicsts, young ones who had appeared on
the scene since the war, and to discuss the present state of the art, to see what
new things had come in, just a sort of reorientation conference, I think.
Q. Did that conference come off?
A. That conference as far as I know never did come off.
Q. "E. O. "L. talked to Senator Knowland — has date for Senator to come up the
hill on Friday at 11 a. m."
A. This is up the Berkeley hill to the radiation laboratory. Senator Know-
land is an alumnus of the University of California and Professor Lawrence met
him at the Faculty Club one day and invited him to come up the hill. He was
there on other business.
Q. "October 25, 1949— Tuesday : Decided to go to Chicago— Argonne— with
Brobeck and Gordon, leaving tomorrow. Should get to Argonne Thursday morn-
ing when Zinn returns from Oak Ridge. After 2 days there should go to Wash-
ington for GAG meeting. Talked to Berber about GAC meeting. He volun-
teered to see Oppie before the meeting. Called Opple who said he had hoped
to be able to talk to him. Therefore Berber is going with us tomorrow and will
continue to Princeton and have a day with Oppie, before he leaves for meeting
in Washington.
"Reynolds working on cost figures for presentation to GAC. My thinking about
pile is along direction of fewer larger fuel rods. Called Gale Young at Nuclear
Development Associates in New York City. He was out of town. We would like
to get him as a consultant on our project"
Mr. SDQVERMAN. I think you read "we."
Mr. RQBB. I think that is what it is. Will you look at the original and see
whether it would be "we" or "he."
The WITNESS. In the case of "we would like to get him," it is "we."
Mr. SILVEEMA.K. It is evidently a typograhpicai error.
Mr. ROBB, Yes.
30S81&—54 50
784
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. "Chicago meeting— then on to Washington— talked with all GAO and most
of AEO Commissioners. Particularly interesting talk with Oppie Just after he
briefed Bradbury and Norstad at GAC meeting. Pretty foggy thinking.11
That is the last entry in your diary?
A. That is right, because after that the project was dead.
Q. Going back to the beginning of that entry, which apparently covered several
days
A. Yes. This I wrote up after I got back from the trip to Washington.
Q. What was your purpose in going to Chicago to the Argonne Laboratory?
A. As I said earlier, Dr. Zinn is the leading designer of piles in the country
and they were most cooperative and said they would supply us with any infor-
mation they had available that would help us in modernizing slightly the Chalk
River pile.
Q. Brobeck, I believe you identified.
A. Brobeck is the chief engineer of the laboratory and Gordon his assistant
went along with me to communicate and talk with the pile designers at the
Argonne.
Q. In other words, you did go to Chicago.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. As you planned.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Talked to Serber about GAC meeting. Where did that conversation take
place?
A. That took place in Berkeley. Could I expand a bit on that?
Q. Would you do that, please, sir?
A. Yes, As I said earlier, Dr. Serber was one of the group that had expressed
a willingness to work hard on the program of building heavy-water piles. He
was to be our chief theoretical adviser, and we were counting on his help.
There is one thing in here which is not written down, and I think I am correct
in remembering it this way. I believe I called Dr. Oppenheimer from Berkeley
and asked him if I could see him before the General Advisory Commission meet-
ing to talk over our plans. You will note that in this whole diary there is no
mention of any talks between me and Dr. Oppenheimer. I was anxious in view
of the fact that I had heard that he was lukewarm to the program to have a
chance to brief him on the program and if possible to get a little enthusiasm
on his part.
As I remember it, Dr. Oppenheimer said he would be very glad to see me
in Princeton, and in fact invited me to stay overnight in their guestroom.
Then it turned out that our time in Chicago was limited and I thought I
had better stay and talk pile design because I had spoken with Dr. Serber about
this meeting with Oppenheimer and Serber said he would be glad to present
our case to Dr. Oppenheimer and try to convince him of its worthwhileness.
So essentially I deputized Dr. Serber to transmit my point of view to Dr.
Oppenheimer. In fact, I was glad to do so, because Dr. Serber and Dr. Oppen-
heimer are somewhat closer friends than Dr. Oppenheimer and I. They have
been closer personally. Dr. Oppenheimer and I were certainly excellent friends
at the time and Dr. Serber, I thought, could perhaps do a little better Job than
I could. I thought and felt strongly that he would present the point of view
which was the laboratory point of view at that time, namely, that this was a very
worthwhile program and we should get it going.
Q. You had no doubt at all about Dr. Serber's enthusiasm for your program?
A. Aboslutely none.
Q. Do you know whether Dr. Serber did go to Princeton to see Dr. Oppen-
heimer?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. We will come to that a little later.
''Reynolds working on cost figures for presentation to GAC." You have already
told us of that.
A. Yes.
Q. "Called Gale Young at Nuclear Development Associates." Who was he?
A. Gale Young was a very competent theoretical physicist in the field of pile
design. He and I had been classmates and he was one of the leading men at
the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago during the war, on the design of the
Hanford reactors. He had for awhile after the war worked for the Atomic
Energy Commission, and then he and a group of his friends set up a company
to do consulting work on pile design. Dr. Lawrence and I felt that if we were
786
to make too much use of the Augonne Laboratory and the Oak Ridge Laboratory
in the design of our piles that people could criticize us for taking effort away
from those laboratories which were designing piles, and we thought it would
be much better if we could get a company which was set up to advise people, and
was interested in making money by doing this, and if we could get them as
essentially auxiliary to our design department.
Q. The next item: The Chicago meeting you have already told us about
that.
A. Yes. This was purely a technical meeting in which I was pretty much in
the background. It was an engineering meeting to a large extent
Q. And then on to Washington. "Talked with all of GAG and most of ABC
Commissioners." What can you tell us about that?
.Mr. GAKEISON. Could we ask the date of that?
The WITNESS. The date of that meeting is in the record some place. I don't
happen to have it down. I believe we spent 2 days in Chicago ; if I were to hazard
a guess it would be the 27th plus or minus a day.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Of October 1949?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you tell us about your talking with GAC and most ABC Commis-
sioners?
A. Since I have no notes, I can't remember any details of those conversations.
Q. You did see them all and did present your program?
A. Yes; before the meeting. This normal procedure before you go into a
meeting with a formal plan to talk it over formally to get peoples' views and to
clarify any misunderstandings they might have about it.
Q. You mention here, "Particularly interesting talk with Opple just after
he briefed Bradbury and Norstad at GAC meeting." Were you -at that GAC
meeting?
A. No ; I had no reason to be at that GAC meeting. That was a closed meeting,
if I remember correctly, at which time the Commissioners met with the GAC,
and the top military men in the country.
Q. Where were you?
A. I was standing inside the main entrance to the Atomic Energy Commission
building and I watched my friends go upstairs, and I saw the famous military
men whom I recognized from their pictures follow along. The meeting lasted
for some while. I watched the people come back out again and in a few minutes
Dr. Oppenheimer came along and invited Dr. Serber and I, who were standing
together outside the building, to have lunch with him.
Q. Did you have lunch with him?
A. Yes. We went to a small restaurant in the immediate neighborhood of
the Commission building, and that was the first occasion that Dr. Oppenheimer
told me of his views on the building of the hydrogen bomb.
Q. What did he tell you?
A. He said that he did not think the United States should build the hydrogen
bomb, and the main reason that he gave for this if my memory serves me correctly,
and I think it does, was that if we built a hydrogen bomb, then the Russians would
build a hydrogen bomb, whereas if we did not build a hydrogen bomb, then the
Russians would not build a hydrogen bomb.
I found this such an odd point of view that I don't understand it to this day.
I told Dr. Oppenheimer that he might find that a reassuring point of view, but
I didn't think that very many people in the country would accept that point of
view?
Q. Was Dr. Serber present?
A. Dr. Serber was present and agreed with Dr. Oppenheimer and this surprised
me greatly in view of the fact that 2 or 8 days before he had gone to see Dr.
Oppenheimer telling me that he would try to convert Dr. Oppenheimer's luke-
warmness into some enthusiasm for our project.
Q. What was the impact of all this on you?
A. Well, for the first time I realized that the program that we were planning
to start was not one that the top man in the scientific department of the ABC
wanted to have done. We thought that we were doing this as a public service.
We were interrupting our own work to do this job. We certainly were not going
to try to force anybody to take these piles. We had thought all along that
everyone would be enthusiastic about having a big source of free neutrons.
Q. Did you stay In Washington until the end of the GAC meeting?
786
A. I believe I left right away after ray conversation witli Dr. Oppenheimer.
I have no way of refreshing my memory on that. I felt that the program was
dead, and that is the reason the diary ends at this point.
Q. Until revived by the Presidential pronouncement in January 1950, was the
program dead?
A. Dr. Teller was still working at Los Alamos and as far as I know that was
all that was going on in the program.
Q. What did you do?
A. As I remember I went back to doing physics.
Q. Did you reflect on this development which you observed in your conversation
with Dr." Oppenheimer?
A. Yes, I did. Of course, I later became aware of the contents of the GAG
policy memorandum to the Atomic Energy Commission. I was not allowed to read
it because there was no particular reason for me to do so, but I was told that
the GAG had said that the United States should not build the hydrogen weapon.
1 have since heard a great deal of talk about the fact that the GAG was opposing
a crash program, but after rereading some of the document last night that is not
my impression of what it said.
Q. Which document do you refer to?
A. The GAG policy report.
Q. I will ask your opinion, Doctor. Suppose the thermonuclear program had
gone ahead full steam beginning in 1940, how soon do you think we would have
gotten the weapon?
A. That is a very difficult question to answer, but I would add to the date 1946
the number of years that it took after the Presidential directive was given and
arrive at an answer which would probably not be off by more than a year.
Q. Which would be what?
A. Would you do the arithmetic?
Q. It has been suggested here that the achievement of the thermonuclear
weapon was the result of a brilliant invention or discovery which might have
taken many years or might have taken a very brief time, and therefore it is im-
possible to project the length of time that it might have taken had the program
begun 2 or 3 or 4 years earlier than it did. What could you tell us about that
suggestion?
A. I think brilliant inventions come from a concentrated effort on a program.
The reason there were not any brilliant inventions in the thermonuclear program
for 4 years after the war is that there was no climate to develop in. Lots of
people were not thinking about the program. Essentially one man was, and it
is very hard to generate ideas in a vacuum.
Q. Were there further inventions which speeded up and furthered development
of the atomic weapon?
A. Yes. I would like to give one instance of that. When I arrived at Los
Alamos, as I say, my job was to help Dr. Kistiakowsky hi the development of the
implosion weapon. Dr. Kistiakowsky was the country's leading expert in the
field of high explosives. He had been director of the Bruceton Laboratory of
Army Ordnance, and Dr. Oppenheimer exerted great effort to get him to Los
Alamos, and fortunately was successful. I had a number of conversations with
Dr. Kistiakowsky on the feasibility of the implosion weapon and on every
occasion for quite some time Dr. Kistiakowsky said that he felt Dr. Oppenheimer
was mad, almost, to think that such an absurd object could ever be made to
work. Here was the leading explosive expert saying that Dr. Oppenheimer was
Just wrong, this thing could not be built, and yet it was buflt.
Dr. Oppenheimer was absolutely right, and he was right because he set up a
group of people that put a concentrated effort on the program and 2 or 3
brilliant inventions did come out which made this thing possible. Dr. Oppen-
heimer always said that the implosion program would work and he was right
and he had good reasons for saying it would work, even though at that time
the technology did not permit it.
The technology was developed because of the climate at Los Alamos, en-
thusiastic people who said we don't care what the experts say, we will make it
work. This was the thing that was missing in the hydrogen bomb program
after the war, and the thing which came into it some while after the Presidential
directive.
Q. Jfow, directing your attention to a time perhaps a couple of months after
your return from Washington in 1949, I will ask you if you will recall a
conversation with Dr. Vannevar Bush about Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Yes.
Q. Gould yon tell us what that was and the circumstances?
787
Mr. GAEBISON. When was this?
Mr. KOBE. Perhaps a couple of months after his return from Washington in
October 1949.
The WITNESS. I can give you some information that will place this conversa-
tion to within a day, because Dr. Bush was in California to inspect one of the
Carnegie Institution facilities at Stanford University. As you know, Dr. Bush
is director of the institution. I remember that when I arrived home after our
conversation with Dr. Bush, I found in the mailbox a copy of Life magazine
which had a condensation of the book Modern Arms and Free Men. So that
places the date within a day.
What Dr. Bush said to Professor Lawrence and me was that he had been
appointed by the President to head an ad hoc committee to assess the evidence
for the Russian explosion. The Atomic Energy Commission and the Armed
Forces, particularly the Air Force, had collected a good deal of information,
all of which tended to indicate that the Russians had exploded a bomb, but
before announcing that to the public the President wanted to make sure that
the evidence was conclusive. If I remember Dr. Bush correctly, he said that he
was made chairman of that. If I can paraphrase Dr. Bush's statement and give
them in the first person, they went something like this. He said, ''You know,
it is a funny thing that I should be made head of such a committee, because
I really don't know the technical facts in this field. I am not an atomic physicist,
and I am not the one to assess these matters." But, he said, "I think the reason
the President chose me is that he does not trust Dr. Oppenheiiner and he wants
to have someone in whom he has trust as head of this committee."
Dr. Bush then said that the meetings of the committee were very interesting.
In fact, he found them humorous in one respect, because he said, "I was ostensibly
the chairman of the committee. I called it to order, and as soon as it was called
to order, Dr. Oppenheiiner took charge as chairman and did most of the ques-
tioning." I believe Dr. Bush said that Dr. Oppenheiiner wrote the report.
This was the first time that I had ever heard anyone in my life say that Dr.
Oppenheimer was not to be trusted.
Dr. EVANS. Would you make that statement again?
The WITNESS. This was the first time that anyone had ever said in my presence
that Dr. Oppenheimer was not to be trusted.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. You and Dr. Lawrence and Dr. Bush, you say, were driving some place?
A. This was driving back from Stanford to Dr. Bush's hotel in San Francisco.
Mr. GRAY. We will have a recess for 2 minutes.
(Short recess.)
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Dr. Alvarez, coming now to the winter of 1950, did you serve on a com-
mittee called the Long Range Planning Committee?
A. Yes ; I did. I did that at the request of Dr. Oppenheimer who called me
and said, "We are having a meeting of a committee to try to find out the future
of the military applications of atomic energy." He said, "I would like to have
you on this committee because I know you represent a point different from
mine,' and I think it would be healthy to have ypu on this committee." I felt
very happy about this. I thought Dr. Oppenheimer was being very fair in
inviting me to join this committee, and I accepted the appointment.
Q. Who else was on the committee?
A. The scientific members were Dr. C. C. Lauritsen, of Gal. Tech., Dr. Bacher,
of Cal. Tech., I believe Dr. Whitman was on the committee, General Nichols
attended one meeting of the committee, but he did not sign the report, Dr. M. J.
Kelly was on the committee. I should say I have refreshed my memory on
this by reading the report, and I would not have remembered all of these gen-
tlemen without doing so.
Q. What was the purpose of that committee, again?
A. This committee was a committee of the RDB, the future of the atomic
weapons program for periods ranging from 2 to 5 or 10 years.
Q. Where did you meet?
A. We met in Washington in the Pentagon.
Q. How long a period did you meet?
A. I believe it was 2 days.
Q. What can you tell us about the discussion that went on with respect to
atomic weapons and the thermonuclear?
788
A. As I bad expected from the makeup of the committee there was great
enthusiasm for small-scale weapons for tactical use.
Q. Great enthusiasm on the part of whom?
A. Dr. Lauritsen particularly. I had been on a committee the summer before
with Dr. Lauritsen which investigated antisubmarine warfare and I had talked
at some length with him on the subject, and I knew that he had a great enthu-
siasm for this program which was not then a part of the atomic-energy program
which I had not thought very much about, and I had no strong views one way
or another. I went on the theory that if Charlie Lauritsen thought it was a
good idea, it was a good idea, because I had such great respect for his judgment
in the field of scientific weapons.
Q. Now, would you go ahead and tell us what happened? I interrupted your
recitation.
Mr. SILVBBMAN. Could we have the date of that meeting? I think we had
winter of 1950.
The WITNESS. Yes, I think it was December 1950.
Mr. ROBB. We have had a lot of testimony about it.
By Mr. EOBB:
Q. Go ahead, Doctor.
A. There was a good deal of discussion about tactical weapons, small weapons,
using small amounts of fissionable materials. There was discussion of the
tactical use of these weapons. General Nichols briefed us on the present status
of the guided-missiles program, of which he was then Deputy Director, since
there was much Interest in the use of atomic warheads on guided missiles. This
part of the program I thought was in competent hands so I didn't have much
to say one way or the other. I thought Dr. Lauritsen and Oppenheimer handled
this part of the program very well, and I had no disagreement with this.
I found, however, that I was in serious disagreement with them one one
point and that was that they thought that the hydrogen program was going
to interfere seriously with the small-weapons program by taking away man-
power at Los Alamos which could otherwise be put on the hydogen bomb. My
view was that the things were not mutually exclusive, if I can use the scientific
phraseology. That is, there was no reason to say we have to have hydrogen
bombs and not small weapons and vice versa. It seemed to me that there were
great resources of scientific manpower in the country and that one could have
both of these programs simultaneously. I did not object to the small-weapon
program because it would interfere with the hydrogen bomb and I was surprised
that they objected to the hydrogen-bomb program because it would interfere with
the small-weapons program.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer have anything to say specifically about the hydrogen-
bomb program being carried on?
A. I remember one statement that Dr. Oppenheimer made because it shocked
me so greatly and I repeated it to several people when I got home. I remember
telling Professor Lawrence about it, and I believe I told Dr. Cooksey. Again
if I can be excused for paraphrasing and using first person, Dr. Oppenheimer
said essentially this: "We all agree that the hydrogen-bomb program should
be stopped, but if we were to stop it or to suggest that it be stopped, this would
cause SQ much disruption at Los Alamos and in other laboratories where they
are doing instrumentation work that I feel that we should let it go on, and it
will die a natural death with the coming tests"— which were the Greenhouse
tests— "when those tests fail. At that time will be the natural time to chop the
hydrogen bomb prorgam off."
I assumed I had been put on this committee to present views in favor of the
hydrogen bomb because I had been always of that point of view. I didn't object
to Dr. Oppenheimer's statement, because he said that he was not planning to
stop the program. My feeling at the time was that if the Greenhouse test
failed, and then Dr. Oppenheimer or the GAC did something to stop the
hydrogen-bomb program, then would be a good time to fight It seemed to me
to be quite useless to express disapproval of this because nothing was being
don to stop the program.
However, I found later much to my dismay that my own political naivete
in matters of this kind led me astray and I found that the report which I signed,
and I am sorry to say I signed, did do the program great harm.
Q. Why?
A. Dr. Teller saw me several months later, and lie said, "Louis, how could
you have ever signed that report, feeling the way yon do about hydrogen
bombs?" I said, "Well, I didn't see anything wrong with it It said the hydro-
780
gen-bomb program was an important long-range program. Our particular
emphasis was on small weapons, but that is a program which has no standing
in the Commission's program now, and I think we should go ahead with it."
He said, "You go back and read that report and you will find that that essen-
tially says that the hydrogen-bomb program is interfering with the smaU-
weapons program, and it has caused me no end of trcuble at Los Alamos. It
is being used against our program. It is slowing it down and it could easily
kill it" I have recently reread that report in the last day, and I am also
shocked as was Dr. Teller. I can only say in my defense that I have not spent
much time on policy reports, staff papers, and things of that sort, and I am not
attuned to them and I didn't catch this implication. I should have done so,
and I didn't
Q. Who wrote it?
A. Dr. Oppenheimer wrote it I think that probably Dr. Lauritsen and Dr.
Bacher and I made minor changes in it, but certainly the main draft was
written by Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. Dr. Alvarez, how well do you know Dr. Edward Teller?
A. I think I know him quite well.
Q. Have you worked with him for many years?
A. I worked with him at Los Alamos, not as an intimate worker. He was
in the field of theoretical physics, whereas I was in the experimental program.
But he and I often discussed matters of physics and bomb technology. He was
my introduction to Los Alamos technology. He and I rode from Chicago to Los
Alamos in the same drawing room when I first went there, and he spent the
whole time briefing me on the program.
Q. Are you familiar with the work he is now conducting at Livennore?
A. Yes, I am ; in some detail.
Q. Do you know other people out at Livennore who also know Dr. Teller and
work with him?
A. I do.
Q. Many people?
A. I probably know 100.
Q. There has been a suggestion here by some people that Dr. Teller is a hard
man to get along with, a hard man to work with. Have you found that to be
true?
A. I can hardly think of a statement that is further from the truth. I am
sure that Dr. Teller would be a hard man to work with if the man above him
were trying to stop his program and to put obstacles in his path. Then I am
sure he would be a very hard man to work with because he would fight strongly
for what he thought was right. But in any friendly climate, Dr. Teller Is a
perfect colleague, scientifically and personally. I can't think of a finer man In
almost every respect than Dr. Teller.
Q. Would you say that is his reputation and standing among the people who
work with him at Livennore?
A. I can say that is the uniform opinion of everyone at the Livermore Lab-
oratory and at the Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley. I don't think if I
searched the laboratory with a fine tooth comb that I could find anyone who had
a bad word to say for Edward Teller.
Mr. ROBB. That is all I care to ask, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. QBAT. It is now 25 minutes to 6. I assume you will have some questions
to ask?
Mr. SILVERMAN. I think so.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I am sure it could be an accommodation to the
chairman if it would be brief, if we could do it now.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I hate to incommode the witness but I really think It will be
much shorter if we resume tomorrow morning, sir.
Mr. GBAT. I think we will recess until 9 : 30 tomorrow.
(Thereupon, at 5 : 35 p. m., a recess was taken until Friday, April 30, 1954, at
9: 30 a.m.)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER or J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
BUILDING T-3, ROOM 2022,
Washington, D. C., Friday, April SO, 1954.
The above entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to recess,
before the board, at 9 : 30 a. m.
Personnel Security Board: Mr. Gordon Gray, chairman: Dr. Ward
T. Evans, member; and Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Roger Robb, and C. A. Rolander, Jr., counsel for the
board; J. Robert Oppenheimer, Lloyd K Garrison, Samuel J. Silver-
man, and Allan B, Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer ; Herbert
S, Marks, cocounsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
(701)
PROCEEDINGS
Mr. GRAY. We will resume.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I have two questions I would like to ask.
Mr. GRAY. I suggest you proceed.
Whereupon,, Luis Walter Alvarez, the witness on the stand at the time of
taking the recess, resumed the stand and testified further as follows :
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Dr. Alvarez, your dairy showed, and you testified that you talked to various
individuals about your plan and the plans of others for the development of the
thermonuclear weapon in early October 1949 ; is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. At that time these individuals were enthusiastic for going ahead with it;
is that right?
A. That was my very strong impression.
Q. To your knowledge, were those conversations in advance of any talks that
these people had with Dr. Oppenheimer?
' A. I think that Is so, sir. I am sure it is so in the case of Dr. Serber. I ain
quite sure in the case of Drs. DuBridge and Backer, and also in the case of
Dr. Rabi.
Q. Subsequently these people changed their views; is that right?
A. Quite drastically; yes.
Q. Did you learn at that time whether in the interim they had talked to
Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I am sure that in the interim they talked with Dr. Oppenheimer, because
the interim extends until now.
Mr. ROBB. That is all I care to ask on direct, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Silverman.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Self evidently these people have talked to a lot of other people?
A. That is absolutely right.
Q. Dr. Alvarez, when you came east with Dr. Lawrence in the trip of which
you kept a diary, am I correct in my understanding that the specific thing you
were trying to promote for want of a better word, or push, was a reactor pile
that would produce excess neutrons?
A. That is right, sir.
Q. Did the Commission thereafter build or cause to be built a reactor to
produce excess neutrons?
A. There are some reactors of that general class now under construction at
Savannah River ; yes.
Q. Is that Savannah River reactor not in operation at all?
A. I don't know. I have no knowledge of this except what I read in the paper.
I believe, however, they have not been turned on. That is my impression. This
can be checked easily.
Q. Do you know whether the reactor at Savannah River was based largely
on Mr. Zinn's design?
A. I haven't really any idea, sir. I would assume that his advice was taken,
but I believe that the reactors were designed by the engineers of the du Pont
Co., and the only consultant that I know of personally employed by them was
Dr. John Wheeler, who was their consultant on the Hanf ord pile designed during
the war. I fofair it was pretty much of a company design job, rather than an
AEO design.
Q. Do you know designs for reactors to produce excess neutrons were fairly
well along in October of 1949?
A. The files of the AEG were bulging with designs for reactors; this is just
the point that I made. There were designs by the gallon, but no piles.
(798)
794
Q. Do you know whether the Savannah Eiver pile more nearly followed the
designs that Mr. Zinn had participated in making, and he was enthusiastic about,
than the Chalk River pile or something based on it?
A. My impression is that Mr. Ziiin believed strongly that the piles of the future
to give excess neutrons should be enriched uranium piles of the type now in
operation at Arco, Idaho. Zinn has believed strongly in the small enriched piles
as against the Savannah River design, which is along the broad general lines of
the Canadian pile.
Q. You think the Savannah River pile is along the broad general lines of the
Canadian pile?
A. I have never seen its design, but it is a heavy water moderated pile, using
natural uranium, which is certainly what the Canadian pile is, and very definitely
different from the many designs which Dr. Zinn had to do with and eventually
has constructed.
Q. Are you aware that the GAC did in fact recommend going ahead with the
Savannah River project?
A. Oh, yes, I am quite aware of that. I would be interested in the date when
that project was supported.
Q. You don't know the date?
A. I don't know the date. I know, however, it was after the Presidential direc-
tive, of course.
Q. Do yon know that the GAO had been recommending a production facility
that would produce excess neutrons for well over a year before the President's
directive?
A. I knew that everyone was in favor of piles but nonetheless no piles got built,
Q. The GAC was an advisory committee?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. And it advised that such piles be built?
A. I have never seen their recommendation, sir, so I don't know, but being
in favor of piles is like being against sin. I think everyone is .for piles, but
nonetheless none got built.
Q. But it was not the GAC's Job to build them?
A. That is true, yes.
Q. Do you know what the Savannah River pile cost?
A. I would guess it was in the neighborhood of $1% billion, Just from what I
see in the newspapers.
Q. And who built the pile?
A. The du Pont Co.
Q. Do you think that the Atomic Energy Commission was perhaps Justified in
entrusting the bunding of a billion and a half dollar project to the du Pont Co.
rather than to your group?
A. Oh, absolutely. They had tremendous competence in the field, and we had
no competence whatsoever in pile design. The only thing we had to offer to the
Commission was the ability to build things rapidly in the scientific field. This
was a demonstrated capacity of the Radiation Laboratory.
Q. The du Pont Co. had that capacity, too?
A. Yes, to an even greater extent than we did, obviously.
Q. And the du Pont Co. had experience in building piles?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you didn't
A. That Is right. The right decision was certainly made there. The duPont
Co. was certainly better equipped to build piles than we were. There is no
question about that
Q. Are you sure that the development of the Savannah River project was not
carried at Argonne tinder Zinn?
A. I have no knowledge of this, but looking at the pile in the broad sense, I
would say it doesn't look like a Zinn pile, and the way that an architect would
look at a building and say this was not designed by such and such an architect.
Q. It would surprise you to learn that that development was carried out at
Argonne under Zinn?
A. It would not surprise me particularly. I would guess that it was not a
development of Zinn, but rather of du Pont This Is purely a guess.
Q. That would be purely a guess.
I would like now to turn to the discussions in the panel— I think perhaps you
called It the panel on long-range planning, something like that
A. I believe that was the official name.
Q. I believe you called it that I am not sure. It may have been referred to
at other times as the Military Objectives Committee?
795
A. Perhaps it was.
Q. In December 1950, you referred to a statement by Dr. Oppenheimer some-
what to the effect that we all agree that the hydrogen-bomb program should be
stopped. If we did this and recommended it, it would cause too much disruption
at Los Alamos?
A. That is right
Q. And let it go on and the project would die when the Greenhouse test failed,
as Dr. Oppenheimer expected them to. Is that substantially correct?
A. That is substantially the way I remember it, yes.
Q. I would like you to turn to the first part of that statement that we ail agree
that the hydrogen-bomb program should be stopped. I want to ask you whether
it is possible that what Dr. Oppenheimer said was that "We all agree that the
hydrogen-bomb program Ooes not look very hopeful now.'*
A. No, I am quite sure I remember it the other way. It was such a startling
statement to me that it is indelibly in my mind. I don't think I could be mistaken
on that.
Q. You of course were a representative of the other view ?
A. That is right.
Q. And when Dr. Oppenheimer said that "We all agree that the hydrogen-bomb
program should be stopped," did you as a member of the panel say, "We don't
all agree; I don 't"
A. I didn't interrupt him until he finished his statement at the end of which
time, as he pointed out, he said he was not going to stop it, and I pointed out
since he said he was not going to stop it, there seemed to be no point in arguing
about it
Q. But you did not correct him and say "We do not all agree."
A. No. I am sure from what I have said in this hearing you would know that
I did not agree.
Q. It is sometimes necessary on cross examination to emphasize points.
A. Very well, sir. Had he stopped his statement with that first sentence, I
am sure that I would have dissented vigorously.
Q. Was it the fact that everybody there agreed that at that time the hydrogen
bomb program did not look very hopeful?
A. I don't know whether everyone did agree on that
Q. Did you think at that time that the hydrogen bomb program did not look very
hopeful?
A. I thought it looked exceedingly hopeful. Again I can only see it through
the eyes of people like Edward Teller, who have the technical competence, who
know the details of the program. I am not a theoretical physicist All I can
do is base my judgment on people in whom I have great scientific trust.
Q. Wasn't everybody pretty depressed in December 1950?
A. No. I certainly didn't sense that at all, but I was not at Los Alamos. I
did not know that things were going very badly. Perhaps they were, I don't
know. I was not aware of the fact that people were depressed.
Q. And you had not heard from other people working on the project in
December of 1950 that things didn't look so good?
A. I had heard that the requirements for tritium had temporarily taken
a turn toward larger quantities being required. But I had seen the requirements
go up and down and up and down on many occasions, and this did not disturb
me at all.
Q. You had not heard at the time that this was a temporary turn, that it
turned out to be temporary?
A. I really couldn't say positively one way or the other.
Q. Did the others at the meeting agree that the hydrogen bomb program did
not look hopeful?
A. I can't recall. I do know that Dr. Lauritsen apparently had strong reasons,
probably some of a moral nature for not wanting the hydrogen bomb. I do
know that Dr. Lauritsen's closest associate, Dr. William Fowler, had been giving
lectures on the radio against the hydrogen bomb. I was in Pasadena staying
with Dr. Bacher one night when I was giving a lecture at Cal. Tech., and at a
dinner party that night all I heard was stories about why you should not have
hydrogen bombs, and the fact that the members of the staff at Cal. Tech. were
giving public lectures and talking on the radio against the hydrogen bomb.
I thought Dr. Lauritsen wanted no part of the hydrogen bomb.
Mr. GRAY. In what period of time was this?
The WITNESS. This was at the time of the panel at the end of 1950.
796
Br. Mr. SILVEBHAN :
Q. Before or after the panel, would you say?
A. During that general period. I could not pinpoint the date precisely.
Q. Did Br. Lauritsen express any views at this panel meeting as to either
whether the hydrogen bomb program should be stopped or as to its feasibility?
A. I discussed the program with him on a number of occasions and I always
got the impression that he thought that the small weapons program and the
hydrogen bomb were mutually exclusive. The country could not do both of them
at the same time; since he had strong reasons for desiring a small weapons
program, he felt that the hydrogen bomb program should not go ahead.
Q. Did the report the panel filed say that the small weapons program and
the hydrogen bomb program were mutually exclusive?
A. Not in exactly those words, but it certainly pointed out that the hydrogen
bomb program was taking manpower and eftort of the Los Alamos Laboratory
away from the small-weapons program and the panel recommended that it not
do so in the future.
Q. And you signed that report?
A. I signed the report, and as I have said, I am sorry I signed it
Q. Do you recall whether Dr. Lauritsen at the panel said anything about the
outlook for feasibility of the hydrogen bomb?
A. Whether Dr. Lauritsen said that it was .feasible or not feasible would
have made no impression on me, because Dr. Lauritsen like myself was not
entitled to scientific opinion. Neither he nor I have enough knowledge in this
field to form an opinion ourselves.
Q. And you do not recall whether- he said anything about it?
A. No ; but had he said so, it would have made no impression on me.
Q. Did Dr. Backer say anything about what the outlook was at the panel for
the feasibility of the hydrogen bomb program?
A. Again, I can't recall for the same reason. Dr. Bacher was not entitled to
an opinion, nor am I.
Q. Did Admiral Parsons express a view on that subject?
A. I think Admiral Parsons stayed very neutral throughout the whole thing.
He was a good naval officer, and I don't think that he was trying to inject his
own personality into this thing.
Q. Did General McCormack express a view?
A. I don't believe so. I don't know.
Q. So that when Dr. Oppenheimer said, "We all agree," they all just sat?
A. Tes. No one commented on this at all. That is to the best of my recollection.
Q. I understand you are testifying from your recollection, sir.
I think you said that Dr. Oppenheimer indicated that he thought that the
Greenhouse tests would f aiL
A- Tes.
Q. Just what does that mean?
A. That no thermonuclear reaction would take place in the Greenhouse test
explosive device. In order for a thermonuclear reaction to take place, very
high temperatures must be reached, as you know. I think that Dr. Oppenheimer
felt that those high temperatures would not be reached, if you can permit me
to read his mind.
Q I would rather you tell us what he said.
A. I have already told you what he said.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, everybody else is reading Dr. Oppenheimer's mind.
Mr. GRAY. The Chair will say that there has been a parade of witnesses
here who testified on their intimate knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer, and that
they would know exactly what his reaction would be in any particular situ-
ation. I do not think this witness should be denied an opportunity to make
his own guess about what Dr. Oppenheimer might think.
Mr. SILVKEMAN. I do not wish to cut a witness off. I would point out between
opinion evidence testimony as to a man's character and evidence as to what a
man was thinking about a scientific project
Mr. GBAT. I will ask you, Mr. Stlvennan, if you have not asked witnesses in
this proceeding what did Dr. Oppenheimer think about so-and-so.
Mr. SILVERMAIT. I would certainly not be prepared to say
Mr. G*±Y. Would it surprise you to learn that you have asked such a question?
The WtTNBSs. Could I be allowed to say what I was going to say in a dif-
ferent way? I testified that Dr. Oppenheimer made a certain statement, that
he thought the thing would fail. There are only two possibilities that the
thing should fail, as far as I can see One is that the device misfired. When the
797
button was pressed, nothing happened. Certainly the atomic bomb primer of
the device would work. We have great experience In this line. After that fired,
then the temperature of the reactants would rise. If they rose high enough, I
doubt if you could find a scientist in the world who would not agree that the
thermonuclear reaction would take place. It is taking place In the sun all the
time. Therefore, when Dr. Oppenheimer said that the thing would fail, it.
could mean to me only one thing, namely, that he thought the temperature would
not rise high enough. That is why I said I thought I could read his mind.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. Let me suggest this to you, and see whether it does not refresh your recol-
lection as to what Dr. Oppenheimer did say, if he said it; that he thought that
the Greenhouse tests wouldn't fail, but fail or not, they would not be particu-
larly relevant to deciding the question of the feasibility of the Super?
A. I am quite sure that he didn't say that.
Q. In fact, the Greenhouse test did not fail, is that not right?
A That is right
Q. In fact, did they demonstrate the feasibility of the Super?
A. You are asking me a question in a field in which I have no sufficient com-
petence to answer. All I can say is that everyone connected with the Green-
house tests was elated at the outcome of the Greenhouse tests. I believe that
the success of the Greenhouse tests led to the successful tests at Ivy.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer say that he thought the Greenhouse tests were
not directly relevant to the determination of the feasibility of the classical
Super, but that it was far along and people at Los Alamos had their hearts so
much in it that it ought to be allowed to continue; otherwise it would disrupt
things too much and discourage them?
A. I testified what I remember Dr. Oppenheimer to say, and I don't see much
point in the question, sir.
Q. Ton ultimately signed the report.
A. Yes,
Q. And there is a part of it that you have regretted signing?
A The thing that I regret is that the report was used to slow down the
hydrogen bomb program. The statements having to do with the hydrogen
bomb come in the last three paragraphs, save for one rather trivial one.
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer use the report to slow down the hydrogen bomb
program?
A. I don't know who used the report I have had Edward Teller tell me, as I
said yesterday, that the report was used to slow down the program.
Q. This being a matter where Dr. Oppenheimer personally Is very seriously
concerned, it becomes a matter of considerable importance as to whether Dr
Oppenheimer used it
A. Dr. Oppenheimer wrote the report, I am sure. Dr. Oppenheimer ordered
the statements presumably in the order of the importance he attached to them,
and the super was more or less damned by faint praise.
Q. Did everybody go over the report?
A. On the last day of the meeting with everybody with an airplane ticket in
his pocket, one goes over a report and if there is not something that is obviously
terribly wrong, one signs it
Q. There were changes made in the report?
A. Of a rather trivial nature.
Q. You suggested some?
A. I can't recall whether I did. It is possible that I did.
Q. It was a pretty serious matter, this report, obviously.
A. You see, this was the point that I was not sure of. I did not know that
this report was anything more than a document to go into the flies to be looked
at in 2 or 3 years, so that one could see in what direction the program should
be then oriented. * * * It was a so-called long-range objective panel. I thought
of it as something that-would be pulled out of a file.ln a couple of years, someone
would look at it and say, "Well, perhaps we ought to get into some of these
things that are in this long-range panel report9*
Q. Wasn't this report prepared in the light of a possibility of our being
involved in all-out war in the near future?
A. I understood the, panel to be called to review the long-range objectives of
the military weapons program as it had been reviewed in the past I believe
this was the second or perhaps the third meeting of such a paneL
: Q. This panel was meeting just after the Chinese intervention to Korea, wasn't
It?
798
A. When you state that I am sure that you have checked the dates. It would
take me some time to be sure of that. Certainly the Korean war was on at
the time.
Q. Did you consider the small-weapons program a long-range thing?
A. No. I thought the small-weapons program was a rather simple program
to develop compared to the program of developing the implosion weapon in the
first place, or developing the hydrogen bomb. The principles of making small
weapons were well known. It seemed to me mainly what we call a hardware
program. One takes designs which are theoraUcally good and one builds the
small weapons. No fundamental research so far as I know had to be done to
implement this program. This is one of the reasons why I thought it should
not interfere with the hydrogen-bomb program. It took a different type of man
to do the work.
Q. The small-weapons program was one of the major things discussed in this
report.
A. That is right.
Q. And since it was mainly a hardware problem, it was not very much of a
long-range thing, was it?
A. It was in the zero to 2-year period, which was one of the 2 periods which
the program was concerned with.
Q. Would you consider zero to 2 years long range?
A. 1 believe that our directives were to consider long-range programs in 3
stages, zero to 2 years, which was called the short-range program ; 2 to 5 years,
called the intermediate program, and beyond that, the long-range program.
Q. As to the zero to 2 years part, that was not a mattter that was going to be
long range looked at after some years?
A. No, but I was not setting the agenda of this meeting. That was in Dr.
Oppenheimer's hands, and he spent most of the time or a good part of the time
talking on this phase. That was not my doing, sir.
Q. I think you said Dr. Oppenheimer invited you as the representative of the
opposite view.
A. He said as much. As I said, I admired him for doing that
Q. And you considered yourself the representative of the opposite view?
A. I think that is true, yes.
Q. And that was the opposite view on the hydrogen bomb?
A. That is right.
Q. As the representative of the opposite view on the hydrogen bomb, weren't
you perhaps more Interested in what was said in the report about the hydrogen
bomb than anything else?
A. I was only interested in seeing that the hydrogen bomb program was not
stopped. The hydrogen-bomb program was at that time on the rails. The
Greenhouse device was being fabricated; people were working hard to build
the instrumentation to tell whether the thermonuclear reaction took place. I
thought the hydrogen bomb program at that time was In very good shape. The
only thing that could have happened was that it be stopped. It could not have
been speeded up tremendously at that point
Q. Surely that was not the only thing that you were interested in the report
in relation to the hydrogen bomb—that it should not be stopped?
A. After I heard Dr. Oppenheimer's statement that was my main interest,
yes.
Q. Didn't you read with particular care the portions of the report that referred
to the hydrogen bomb?
A. I thought I did, but as I pointed out, one who is not trained in the legal
ways of reading documents would not have found this thing to be a document
which would slow down the hydrogen bomb program. It turned out to be that.
Q, Was Dr. Oppenheimer a man trained in the legal ways of reading docu-
ments? .
A. I would certainly say that Dr. Oppenheimer is one of the most skilled docu-
ment writers that I have ever run across.
Q. That is slightly different from being trained in the legal way of reading
*ind writing documents.
A. If he is trained or not, I say he has the skill. I don't say this in a derogatory
Dr. BOBB. Mr. Chairman, these questions are getting a bit frivolous.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. There is nothing frivolous about them. Here is a man that
signed the report and didn't know what was in it, although he was the representa-
tive of the opposite camp on that precise point
Mr. GEAY. Mr. Silverman will proceed.
799
By Mr. SILVEEMAN :
Q. As the representative of the opposite camp, did you not read — I withdraw
that
Was it lawyers who were reading the document and misreading it?
A. I really don't know. Someone in the Atomic Energy Commission read the
document and apparently tried to reorient the program at Los Alamos to the
detriment of the hydrogen bomb program. This I have been told by Edward
Teller. That is my only source of information on this point.
Q. Dr. Alvarez, would it be fair to say that the document that you signed was
a document which fairly represented the views of the Committee, that after-
wards you were informed that it was misused, and that you thereafter regretted
that you had signed it?
Mr. ROBB. Could I have that question read back?
(Question read by the reporter.)
The WITNESS. 1 would say this, sir, that the main emphasis of the document
was on the small weapons, and this represented the opinions of most of the
members of the Committee. As I said, I was essentially neutral on this point
I had no strong feelings one way or the other. I appreciated the fact that small
weapons were useful things.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. You have not regretted the part about the small weapons?
A. I have certainly not regretted the part about building small weapons, l have
regretted the part that recommendations apparently were interpreted to ineitt
that the small weapons had a higher priority than the hydrogen bomb, an
therefore were to be allowed to interfere with the hydrogen bomb. That is my
objection to the report
Q. When you read the report at the time, did it seem to reflect the views
of the panel, Including yourself?
A. As I said, I didn't appreciate this fine point in the emphasis. I signed
the thing and therefore I agreed. My name Is signed to the thing.
Q. Are you sure that your present disagreement with the report isn't the re-
sult of a change of mind on your part?
A. I am completely convinced of that. I have reread the report and knowing
now what happened at Los Alamos, I can see why it happened, and I can see
that I was not careful enough to guard against this possibility.
Q. That is what I am suggesting to you, that it is what happened afterward
that made you regret signing the report ; that when you read the report, it did
seem to you to reflect the views of the panel.
A. It is quite clear to me that my regrets come from the fact that the report
was used this way, and it was used this way because of the lack of vigilance on
my part to see that the report did not act adversely to the hydrogen bomb I
thought in view of Dr. Oppenheimer's statements that things were under control.
Q. You feel you fell down on the job as the representative of the opposite camp?
A. That is right, and I am reminded of a recent case that has been much in
the papers
Mr. SELVBBMAN. We have been stopped
Mr. ROBB. Wait a minute. I think he has a right to explain the answer.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Mr. McCloy was stopped.
Mr. GRAY. He later testified on the point that I stopped it on.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. He never gave the example.
Mr. GRAY. Yes, he did.
Mr. SILVERMAN. All right.
The WITNESS. I said we have a recent example of a man more skilled than
I in the political field who thought after having a meeting with another gentle-
man that he had his points across, he felt very happy about it, he signed the
document and went out of the room saying, "I have won my point," and he took
a terrible beating in the press. I find that I was in the same position. I thought
1 had gotten my points across. I signed the document which I thought fairly re-
flected title views which I heard expressed in the meeting. I found out later that
I had been had, if you don't mind my using that expression.
By Mr. SH.VERMAN :
Q. Now, you testified to a statement by Dr. Bush. I think you said it was 2 or
3 months after the GAC meeting — a couple of months or so.
A, No ; I didn't testify in that way. I testified that It was at the week that
Dr. Bush's article was reprinted in Life magazine.
303313—54 51
800
Q. Yes ; I remember you said that. You said that would give you the date
within a day or two.
A. That Is right
Q. And I thought you said you thought it was a couple of months
Mr. BOBB. That was my question. I thought that is what it was. I was trying
to bring him down to the date.
By Mr. SILVEKMAW :
Q. Have you since checked the date of that?
A. No, I haven't As a matter of fact, I have never even asked whether such
a. meeting took place. I have never checked with the Atomic Energy Commission
or anyone else to find out that such a meeting took place.
Q. What meeting?
A. The meeting to evaluate the effects of the bomb. I am going completely on
my memory there.
Q. Did I understand you said that Dr. Bush said that the reason he was
Chairman— the reason the President had named him as Chairman was that the
President didn't trust Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. That was the reason that he said he thought he had been named Chairman.
I. rather doubt that the President told him that he didn't trust Dr. Oppenheimer.
I think this was Dr. Bush's construction.
Q. Have you heard since that that panel was not named by the President but
by the Air Force?
A. I have never heard a single word about this panel, sir. As I said, I re-
freshed my memory on the long range objective panel. I reread the report. I
have never checked at all anything to do with this. As a matter of fact, I had
forgotten this thing until recently. I did not mention it to the gentlemen who
questioned me in Berkeley some months ago.
Q. You mean Mr. Bobb?
A. Yes.
Q. How long ago were you questioned at Berkeley?
A. It was probably in February or March.
Q. You gathered, you said, that Dr. Bush— I withdraw that.
Dr. Bush said that he understood the reason that he, Dr. Bush, had been named
Chairman and not Dr. Oppenheimer was that he, Dr. Bush, thought that the
President didn't trust Dr. Oppenheimer?
Mr. BOBB. Wait a minute. -I don't think the witness so testified.
Mr. GBAY. I think that is correct. That was not the witness1 testimony.
Mr. SILVEBMAN, I thought the witness Just said that.
Mr. BOBB. No, he said he thought that.
Mr. SILVEEMAK. I thought that is what I said.
Mr. GRAY. No, you said that he understood. The witness testified that he did
not have any reason to believe the President had told Dr. Bush that, that he
thought that Dr. Bush said that because he, Dr. Bush, thought it Is that correct?
The WITNESS. I pointed out the fact that Dr. Bush was trying to justify to
himself his chairmanship of this Committee. He pointed out his own limitations
and said essentially, "Why have I been chosen? Why wasn't it Dr. Oppenheimer?
He is the logical man."
By Mr. SILVEBMAW :
Q. Tliis was a pretty Important Committee.
A. I think it was a very important Committee.
Q. The President was about to make a momentous announcement.
A. That is right
Q. And he wanted to be sure he was advised by people he trusted.
A. That is right
Q. Didn't you say to Dr. Bush, "Look, if the President doesn't trust Dr.
Oppenheimer, why does he name him to the Committee at all"?
A* As I pointed out to you, this was the first time I had ever heard Dr.
Oppenheimer' s trustworthiness challenged. Until that time I had always thought
that Dr. Oppenheimer was the most loyal person, the most wonderful man.
He is one of my scientific heroes. I had never had any reason to believe that
Dr. Oppenheimer would not do anything that was not right
Q. In any event you did not say to Dr. Bush why did the President appoint
him at all if he didn't trust him, and Dr. Bush didn't say why.
A. No, this question didn't come up.
Mr. SILVERMAN. That is alL Thank you.
801
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Alvarez, for the purposes of the record, references have been
made in the direct and cross examination to the panel on which yon served,
and there has been considerable discussion. I would like to get clear on this
point. Would the correct title of this committee have been, as you recall it,
Panel on Military Objectives in the Field of Atomic Energy? I am not trying to
confuse you.
The WITNESS. That is possible. I believe it is always referred to as the long
range objective paneL The.precise title I am not clear on, sir.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SILVEEMAN. Mr. Chairman, perhaps if it is helpful, may I point this out:
There was a panel on long range objectives in 1948 of which Dr. Alvarez was not
a member, and which I assume is perhaps what you are looking at. There is a
panel in 1950, Research and Development Board, Committee on Atomic Energy,
ad hoc panel on military objectives in the field of atomic energy, from November
21, 1950, to January 30, 1951, of which Dr. Oppenheimer was chairman, and of
which Dr. Alvarez was a member, and which is the panel I assume Dr. Alvarez
was testifying about.
The WITNESS. I believe this is the reason the panel I served on was referred
to as the long-range objectives panel, because we considered it to be a continua-
tion of the first panel. At least during that discussion, Dr. Oppenheimer read to
us the report of the first panel, and led us to believe that we were the second
such panel to be installed.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you. I think that identifies for me and I hope for the record
which panel we are talking about.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Mr. Chairman, while we are on this subject of panels, and the
biography, I find a slight correction that has to be made in the biography with
respect to one of the panels that has been testified about here.
Mr. GRAY. Has it been testified about by this witness?
Mr. SILVERMAN. Yes, sir. It was the panel on the Soviet explosions in 1949,
of which Dr. Bush was chairman. In this biography Admiral Parsons is men-
tioned as chairman. You recall that Dr. Oppenheimer testified that this was
gotten up by his secretary, and the biography names Admiral Parsons as a
chairman. That is an error. It was Dr. Bush who was chairman. It is the
Department of the Air Force AFOAT-1 advisory panel to Gen. Hoyt Vanden-
berg, review panel on the Soviet explosions, September 1949.
Mr. GRAY. Now, Dr. Alvarez, is it quite clear to you that you signed this report
rather than subscribed to it?
The WITNESS. I certainly signed it; yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. I believe we have had testimony from one member of that panel
who was not quite clear as to whether the report was signed by the membership
or not, but you are clear on that point?
The WITNESS. I can't remember the physical act of signing it
Mr. GRAY. You have seen the document recently?
The WITNESS. I have seen the document
Mr. GRAY. And your name is on it?
The WITNESS. I have seen my name typewritten on the document I believe
that I signed it, and I certainly should have signed it Whether I went through
the physical act or not, I don't recall. I mean I would have signed it The
only reason for not signing it would have been that I had to catch an airplane
before the final draft was in or something of that sort.
Mr. GRAY. Has this report or any portions of it been in the record?
Mr. ROBB. No, sir ; I don't think so. Has it?
Mr. SILVERMAN. It is a classified report, or am I wrong?
Mr. ROLANDER. To clarify the signature, Dr. Alvarez saw a copy of the report
which is in the possession of the AEG. He did not see the original which would
have had signatures. In fact, signatures did appear. The record that Dr.
Alvarez saw was an official copy.
Mr. GRAY. I understand that, and I think he cannot remember whether he
signed so we still don't know whether it was a signed document on the basis of
testimony before this board.
The WITNESS. I would certainly not try to get out of my responsibility by say-
ing that I perhaps had not signed it
Mr. GRAY. This Is not my* purpose, Dr. Alvarez. I am trying to get it clear
in my mind whether this was the kind of a report that each of the members
signed, or whether the members more or less left it to the chairman to write
the report saying that they subscribed to his summary of it
802
The WITNESS. Excuse me. I believe that I do recall now how the signatures
took place. I believe the final document was typed up after I had left Wash-
ington, and that it was brought to me to sign by a courier of the Atomic Energy
Commission. I have this remembrance of it on one occasion having signed a
report of a committee in this fashion. Perhaps this happened this time.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Mr. Chairman, my recollection is that Mr. Bobb examined
Dr. Kelly, I think, about the same document and perhaps if Mr. Robb has a copy,
he can tell it I don't know. This was done in a classified session.
Mr. BOBB. I don't have a photostat, Mr. Chairman. If that is the report I
examined Dr. Kelly about, I had only an excerpt
The WITNESS. Sir, my memory is now complete. I do remember how I signed
this report. It was brought by courier to Pasadena, and I went down and signed
it in the office of Dr. Lauritsen together with Dr. Bacher. The three of us
signed it in Pasadena.
Mr. GRAY. I think that answers the question.
Dr. Alvarez, what was the period of your service at Los Alamos?
The WITNESS. I believe, sir, that I arrived there in April of 1944, and left
in approximately November of 1945.
Mr. GBAT. My next question is one which has not been the subject of testimony
at all, by you here this morning, so it is something new to you. First of all,
do you remember when the news about the Fuchs treachery took place, or I mean
came to you?
The WITNESS. Yes ; I do.
Mr. GKAT. Do you remember approximately when that was?
The WITNESS. I think it would take me some little while to find in my memory
exactly when that took place.
Mr. GRAY. Let me see if I can help you on that.
Mr. BOLANDEB. It was approximately February 1950, when the first news came
to the ABC.
Mr. GRAY. When the news first came to the ABC?
Mr. BOLANDER. Yes, from the investigative channels.
Mr. GRAY. Can you remember under what circumstances you first heard
about it?
The WITNESS. I read it in the paper, sir.
Mr, GRAY. You never heard any intimation before that about this?
The WITNESS. Absolutely none.
Dr. EVANS. Did you know Fuchs?
The WITNESS. I nodded to him in the halls when we passed in Los Alamos.
I had no scientific business with him. He was a very retiring person. He didn't
want to make friends for fairly obvious reasons. I understand that when there
were parties at Los Alamos, he would take care of the children of the people who
went to the parties so he had an excuse not to go. He was not a particularly
social person. I had no reason to know him scientifically, and I certainly never
got to know him socially. I recognized him and nodded to him in the halls That
is my only recollection of him, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Have you ever heard it intimated that these facts about Fuchs were
known to anybody in the scientific community in this country before the public
announcement and the events immediately leading up to the public announcement?
The WITNESS. I had never heard any such allegation.
Mr. GRAY. Do you have any questions, Dr. Evans?
Dr. EVANS. I have some questions ; yes.
Dr. Alvarez, you have been asked a good many questions and been sitting on
that chair quite a time, and that main thing that we have gotten out of you is
that you have tried to show that Dr. Oppenhelmer was opposed to the develop-
ment of the super weapon ; is that true?
The WITNESS. I believe that has been known for a long time, and I think I just
have given some corroborative testimony in this regard.
Dr. EVANS. What does this mean in your mind — anything?
The WITNESS. By itself it means absolutely nothing because I have many other
friends in the scientific world who feel precisely this way. The point I was
trying to bring out was that every time I have found a person who felt this way,
I have seen Dr. Oppenheimer's influence on that person's mind. I don't think
there is anything wrong with this. I would certainly try to persuade people of
my point of view, and Dr. Oppenheimer is quite free and should try to persuade
people of his convictions. I Just point out the facts as I see them, that this reac-
tion has always taken place in the people that I know who have been opposed to
the bomb.
803
Dr. EVANS. It doesn't mean that he was disloyal?
The WITNESS. Absolutely not, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Might it mean that he had moral scruples about the development
of the atomic bomb?
The WITNESS. I have heard that he has. He has never expressed them to me.
I told you the one occasion on which Dr. Oppenheimer expressed to me his reasons
for not wanting to build the hydrogen bomb, and it had nothing to do with morals,
in the usual sense.
Dr. EVANS. You think it might have been peculiar for fri™ to have moral
scruples after he had been so active in developing the atomic bomb?
The WITNESS. I have never had any moral scruples about having worked on
the atomic bomb, because I felt that the atomic bomb saved countless lives, both
Japanese and American. Had the war gone on for another week, I am sure that
the fire raids on the Japanese cities would have killed more people than were
killed in the atomic bombs. I am also quite convinced that the atomic bomb
stopped the invasion of Japan, and therefore saved well over 100,000 American
lives. I believe there are estimates of up to a half million.
Dr. EVANS. Don't we always have moral scruples when a new weapon is
produced?
The WITNESS. That is a question I can't answer, sir.
Dr. EVANS. After the battle of Hastings, a little before my time
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Would you give the time, sir?
Dr. EVANS. I cannot give the time, but it was before I was born.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. That is 1066, sir.
Dr. EVANS. There was great talk about ostracizing the long bow, because it was
so strong that it could fire an arrow with such force, it occasionally pierced armor
and killed a man. They felt they ought to outlaw it.
When the Kentucky rifle came in, it was so deadly that they talked of getting
rid of it When we had poison gas, I made a lot of lectures about it, that it was
terrible. So we have had that after every new weapon that has been developed.
The WITNESS. Yes, I recognize that
Dr. EVANS. This opposition that Dr. Oppenheimer had, might he have been
jealous that someone else was becoming prominent in this field, rather than
himself?
The WITNESS. I don't think so ; no.
Dr. EVANS. You don't think so?
The WITNESS. No.
Dr. EVANS. Do you think that Dr. Oppenheimer had considerable power with
men like Conant, Bush, and Groves?
The WITNESS. I don't think power is the right word. Dr. Oppenheimer is
certainly one of the most persuasive men that has ever lived, and he certainly
had influence. They respected his opinions and listened to him.
Dr. EVANS. Looking by hindsight, do you think he showed good judgment in
the fact that he opposed this bomb in the light of present conditions?
The WITNESS. I think he showed exceedingly poor judgment. I told him so the
first time he told me he was opposed to it. I have continued to think so. The
thing which I thought at that time was the overpowering reason for building the
hydrogen bomb was that if we did not do it, some day we might wake up and
read headlines and see pictures of an explosion such as we saw a month or so
ago, only this would be done off the coast of Siberia. I felt sure that this would
be one of the most disastrous things that could possibly happen to this country.
I thought we must not let this happen.
Dr. EVANS, His opposition to it, might it mean that he feared the spending of
a large sum of money and the using of time on a project that would not work and
might thus endanger the security of our country by not going ahead with a project
that we knew would work?
The WITNESS. I think he has expressed an opinion somewhat as you just
stated it.
Dr. EVANS. You see, Dr. Alvarez, as a member of this board, I am trying to get
something about what is in your mind and what is in Dr. Oppenheimer's mind.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Dr. EVANS. We have a recommendation to make and we have to do the best
we can. You understand that?
The WITNESS. I do, sir.
Dr. EVANS. You mentioned Professor Serber. That is the same Professor
Serber that had these leftwing tendencies, or do you know anything about that?
The WITNESS. I know nothing of that personally. I have no personal knowl-
804
edge of it. I have read and I have been told by other people that this might
be so.
Dr. EVANS. Were there a number of other men in the country that could have
built the A-bomb?
The WITNESS. I am sure that there are. I don't want in any way to minimize
Dr. Oppenheimer's contribution, because to my way of thinking he did a truly
outstanding job at Los Alamos. I think he was one of the greatest directors of a
military program that this country has ever seen. I stand in awe of the job he
did at Los Alamos.
Dr. EVANS. You spoke of Dr. Bush?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Dr. EVANS. Possibly having made a statement— I forget what your statement
was — but this is the question I want to ask you. Did Dr. Bush sometimes make
statements that are not quite accurate? Do you know anything about that?
The WITNESS. I really could not say. I have great admiration for Dr. Bush
as a scientist and as a scientific administrator, and I like him as a man.
Dr. EVANS. That is all I have.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Eobb.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. EOBB :
Q. Dr. Alvarez; Mr. Silverman asked you some questions about the relative
competency of you and your group and the du Pont Co. to build reactors. I
would like to ask you, sir, were you intending to suggest in any way that you
were to be compared with the du Pont Co.?
A. No ; that is ridiculous. .
Q. Would you care who built the reactors, as long as they were built?
A. Of course not As a matter of fact, I didn't want to build reactors. I
disliked the idea of building reactors. I suggested that we build reactors only
because I felt the country needed them and we could be of help.
Q. And if the Government employed the du Pont Co. to come and build them
out near San Francisco, you would have been very happy?
A. It would have made no difference where the du Pont Co. built them. I
am sure the du Pont Co. would not have asked me for any advice, because I
have no special competence in that field.
Q. Your point was that we ought to get going on the hydrogen bomb?
A. That is right.
Q. Whoever did it?
A. That is right.
Q. You testified as others did that Dr. Oppenheimer did a splendid job at Los
Alamos. Did it strike you as peculiar that one who had done such a splendid
job at Los Alamos could entertain opinions which you considered so wrong in
respect of the hydrogen bomb?
A. I was very surprised when I found that he had these opinions, since he had
used the super as the primary incentive to get me to join the Manhattan District
in the first place. He had spent almost a solid afternoon telling me about the
exciting possibilities of the super, and asked me to join and help with the building
of such a. device. So I was therefore very surprised when I found he had these
objfecttons. You will note in my diary that I had no hint of this until essentially
the last entry.
Q. To use a homely simile, did it strike you as peculiar that such a wonderful
batter as Dr. Oppenheimer should suddenly begin striking out the way he did?
A. It certainly struck me as peculiar.
Q. One further question, Doctor. Have you had any hesitation in answering
questions here or in any way restricted your testimony in answer to any question
put to you because of the presence here of Dr. Oppenheimer and his counsel?
A. No. I must confess that it is a little hard for personal reasons to say
some of the things that I have said, but I have said them anyway.
Mr. ROBB. Thank you.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Silverman.
BE-CBOSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. Did it strike you as peculiar that Dr. Bacher had these views about the
hydrogen bomb?
A. It did, as a matter of fact ; yes.
Q. Dr. Lauritsen?
A. Yes.
Q. Dr. Conant?
suo
A. No ; not in the case of Dr. Oonant for a reason which I will mention now.
Q. If you think it will be helpful.
A. I think it will; yes. I can remember an occasion a few months before
the Russian explosion when Dr. Lawrence, Dr. Conant and I were driving from
Berkeley to San Francisco.
Q. Which explosion was this?
A. The first one. The one that led to the hydrogen bomb controversy, in 1949.
Q. You mean the Soviet
A. The first Soviet operation, Joe. Dr. Lawrence was trying to get a reaction
from Dr. Conant on the possibility of radiological warfare and Dr. Conant said
he wasn't interested. He didn't want to be bothered with it. I have the strong
recollection that Dr. Conanat said something to the effect that he was getting
too old and too tired to be an adviser on affairs of this sort He said, "I did my
job during the war" and intimated that he was burned out, and he could not get
any enthuhiasm for new projects. So when Dr. Conant disapproved of the
hydrogen bomb, I interpreted it in the light of that conversation.
Dr. EVANS. Dr. Conant was not an authority in that field at all. He is an
organic chemist; isn't that true?
The WITNESS. Dr. Conant showed to me a remarkable degree of knowledge
about the details of nuclear physics and the construction of bombs on the two
occasions I talked with him at Los Alamos. I was almost overwhelmed by the
detailed knowledge he had on all fields. So although he was trained as an organic
chemist, he certainly got to know a lot of weapon technology.
Dr. EVANS. He had been briefed up very well.
The WITNESS. Yes.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. You say Dr. DuBridge worked on the atom bomb, had he not?
A. No ; he had not.
Q. Dr. Fermi had, of course.
A. Yes.
Q. Were you surprised that he was against going ahead with the hydrogen
bomb and did that strike you as peculiar?
A. I never knew that Dr. Fermi was. I knew Dr. Fermi worked quite hard at
Los Alamos for two summers since the Presidential anouncement
Q. Didn't you know that he was one of the members of the General Advisory
Committee?
A. I knew he was, and I heard that he was 1 of 2 men who signed an appendix
to the report expressing views somewhat different from those of the majority
group led by Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. Did you know whether the extent to which there was that difference that
perhaps they were even more opposed to the hydrogen bomb than the others?
A. I had not read the report, and I was led to believe that Dr. Fermi did not
have such strong objections. I may be wrong on this. That was my impression.
Q. How did Dr. Rabi feel? Had he worked on the atom bomb?
A. He was a consultant to Los Alamos. He would come out occasionally from
his job as assistant director of the radar laboratory and talk with people about
problems.
Q. Did it strike you as peculiar that he was opposed to going ahead with the
hydrogen bomb?
A. As I stated earlier, I was surprised that he changed his mind so drastically
after talking with Dr. Oppenheimer. I was not at all surprised by his initial
reaction, which was one of enthusiasm.
Q. And you have no way of knowing who else these people consulted?
A. No.
Mr. SXLVXRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. ROBB. That is all.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Doctor.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GRAY. Let me say for the record that in recognition of the fact that Mr.
Mitchell has been in and out of the hearing and T want him to be present when
we discuss the request for documents which has been earlier referred to, inas-
much as he was involved, and in view of the fact that we at this point are be-
tween witnesses, I would like to return to the discussion which was had—
whatever day it was — and allow Mr. Garrison to make his request at this time.
Mr. GABBISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I might just recapitulate for a
moment to explain the nature of the request, I previously referred to the fact
that back in the middle of February, I asked for the minutes and documents
806
relating to the question of the clearance of Dr. Oppenheimer by the AEC in 1947,
and that I was thereafter informed in General Nichols' letter of February 19,
1954, and in a conversation with Mr. Mitchell over the telephone — Mr. Mitchell's
letter of February 19, 1954, and in conversation with him over the telephone —
that the only information that could be supplied to us would be in the form of a
stipulation which has already been read into the record, and which in substance
contained the first half, but not the last half of the sentence in the minutes which
finally were supplied to us the other day in General Nichols* memorandum to you.
I also would note that in the course of Mr. Lilienthal's cross-examination
relevant documents to this whole matter were declassified by the Government
on the spot and put into evidence. I think there were four that were put in in
that fashion, and then two more at our request that followed that.
The testimony was left in a somewhat uncertain state, I think, and I don't
want now to argue its significance, except to say that in my own view the
second half of the sentence from the Commission's minutes would indicate to me
quite clearly that the Commission, as such, examined further reports, and had
taken them into account, and had reached the view that they contained no infor-
mation which would warrant reconsideration of a clearance which apparently
took place in February 1947, which apparently had been reopened as a result
of the Hoover letter of March.
Mr. GRAY. I am going to interrupt, Mr. Garrison. I do not wish at this time
to discuss the import of minutes. I have repeatedly indicated you will be given
an opportunity to address yourself to that. I would like now for you to confine
yourself to the request
Mr. GARRISON. Yes. Mr. Chairman, to put it in nontechnical terms, what I
would like to ask the board to request of the Commission that we have a state-
ment in as much detail as classification will permit of the items of derogatory
information which were contained in the files that went to the members of the
Commission. Those files are referred to in Mr. Jones' memorandum to Mr.
Bellesly. I think it is there stated that every member of the Commission received
these particular files or reports except two memoranda which were summaries— I
am doing this from memory— which Mr. Jones referred to in his memorandum.
I should think it would not be a difficult matter for the Commission to look at
those reports that we know from the record did go to the board members— I mean
to the Commission members— and to ask in as much detail as can properly be
given here a description of what the derogatory items consisted of so that we
may more clearly determine what was before the board— I mean before the
Commission.
I don't want to make a great thing out of this. I am not going to argue to this
board that the action which the Commission took in 1947 was in any way con-
clusive or binding upon this board at all. I don't want to make such an' argu-
ment. I do say it is quite relevant to consider what those five men who knew
Dr. Oppenheimer and went through the report thought and believed at that time.
I think, Mr. Chairman, you raised the question when I started to make this
request before as to whether we ought not to make the request directly of the
Commission. I should do it any way that you wish, but I do think from the
reading of the rules, it seems to me, sir, that it is appropriate and Indicated that
the Board itself should ask for relevant information. I would refer to section
4.15 (e) which says that the board will ask .the individual ABC representatives
and other witnesses any questions calculated to obtain the fullest possible dis-
closure of relevant and material facts.
Then there is another one, (g), the board will admit in evidence this and that
and so forth, and then it says, "Every reasonable effort will be made to obtain
the best evidence reasonably available."
"(/) The board shall endeavor to obtain all the facts that are reaaonnblv avail-
able in order to arrive at its recommendations."
< JLthlnk those are the Principal sections. Perhaps I should refer also to (n)
The board may request the manager to arrange for additional investigation
on any points which are material to the deliberations of the board which the
board believes need extension or clarification."
tJPfy0* to me aat the *>r°Per Procedure is for me to ask the board for
this information, and then for the board to try to obtain it
Mr. GBAY. With respect to Mr. Garrison's request, as I understood it, as we
cUscussed previously, you made particular reference to a conversation which was
had with Mr, Mitchell.
Mr. GARRISON. And General Nichols and Mr. Marks.
807
Mr. CRAY. I had forgotten who else was there. General Nichols and Mr.
Marks, with respect to a number of items, and it is my recollection you said
seven the other day.
Mr. GARRISON. I think I had five written down on the yellow piece of paper
which I showed to Mr. Mitchell the other day, and Mr. Marks had a number on a
typewritten memorandum.
Mr. GRAT. I would like to state the impression of the chairman of the board,
and be corrected if I am wrong.
Among those items were pertinent GAO reports and/or minutes.
Mr. GARRISON. Yes.
Mr. GRAT. It is my information that Dr. Oppenheimer had been notified offi-
cially by the Commission that he could have access to these reports and/or
minutes, and that he has not availed himself of this opportunity.
Among the items, as I understand it, requested was the minute which has
been read into the record. One. of the items involved was Dr. Oppenheimer's
testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, if that is the proper
title of the congressional committee concerned. One of the items was the
contents of Mr. Hoover's letter.
It is my impression that with respect to these items, whether 5 or 7 or
whatever the number, the request that they be made available in one way or
another has been met with respect to all but two, the two being the congres-
sional hearing record, which this board is not at liberty to make available,
and the other is the FBI letter, which under the regulations we are not at liberty
to make available.
With respect to the congressional testimony, I assume that it is not in-
appropriate for Dr. Oppenheimer to request of the committee the privilege of
seeing those portions of the hearings which contain his own testimony, but this
board does not have the power to produce such a document.
I think I have referred to the regulations which specifically cover informa-
tion from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. So the earlier discussion
centered around these requests which were made in a conversation between
Atomic Energy Commission officials and Dr. Oppenheimer's representatives, and
I think those requests have been met insofar as it is possible for this board
to have any influence in meeting them, or any power in meeting them.
Now, with respect to the current request which, if I understand it correctly, is
a list of all items of so-called derogatory information about Dr. Oppenheimer
in the hands of this board, again I would have to respond that information
which is contained in FBI reports cannot be made available.
I think I shall have to stop my observation at that point. It may be that my
interpretation of the procedures under which we operate is faulty, and I would
ask counsel for the board if he has anything to add to what I said.
Mr. ROBB. I certainly agree that your interpretation is entirely correct, Mr.
Chairman. I would add only one observation, which is that so far as we are
able to bring it together, all the information and reports which were before
the Commission in 1947 are now before this board for its consideration and its
evaluation.
Of course, as the chairman has said, the FBI reports under the rules of
these hearings may not be made available to counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer or
Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. GRAY. Let me make one other observation. I suppose it would be reason-
able for counsel to assume that the board in its effort to get at the truth with
respect to any matter of very material consequence has sought to have light
thrown on such a matter of material consequence. This, of course, involves,
I am sure, the question of anybody's reliance on the good faith of this board.
What I am trying to say is that I do not think you are materially disadvantaged
by not having the detailed list of information which you have requested.
Mr. GARRISON. I would like to make Just one observation. I want to make it
clear, Mr. Chairman, that so far as the fairness of the members of this board
and their desire to do the right thing, I have no doubt whatever. My problem
is one of knowing what seems to us to be relevant so that we may comment upon
it as one should in presenting Dr. Oppenheimer's case, as well as we can. In a
process of this kind I should suppose that the adversary process which we
seem to be engaged in should be carried out to the fullest extent that it can be
done within the limits of the governmental regulations with respect to the
preservation of whatever has to be confidential, that this process will aid rather
than to the contrary in the deliberations of the board.
I would like to make one or two things clear in the February discussions and
correspondence. The Commission did. indeed, say to Dr. Oppenheimer that he
might inspect minutes and reports of the GAO meetings in which he partici-
pated, and could also see any documents which he himself signed. What I am
talking about here is the action of the Commission in 1947. I am not asking
that the FBI reports be disclosed. I appreciate the rule that the reports of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall not be disclosed to the individual or to
his representative. I regretfully have to accept that rule. It does seem to me,
however, that, since in the very letter of General Nichols with which we are
concerned a very lengthy account is given of numerous derogatory items in the
file and disclosure has been made of that, I cannot see how it would violate this
rule to have us informed as to the derogatory items which were before the board
in 194T. I am not asking for a transcript of the reports or a copy of the reports,
but simply for a description of what the board acted on — I mean the Commis-
sion acted on.
Mr. KOBE. Mr. Chairman, as I interpret Mr. Garrison's last remark, lye does
not want a copy of the reports or the transcripts of the reports ; he merely wants
to know their contents, which seems to me to' fly right in the fact of the rule.
I am sorry.
Mr. GABEISON. Let me ask this final question : Would it fly in the face of the
rule if we were limited merely to being told which of the items now before the
board were before the Commission in 1947?
Mr. ROBB. I think it would, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GABEISON. I just don't understand that, Mr. Chairman, as to why we can't
be told of these items that such-and-such were before the board and such-and-such
were not. What disclosure of FBI reports is that any more than this letter itself
is a disclosure of FBI reports?
Mr. GBAY. I believe that what was before the Commission in 1947, and cer-
tainly from the testimony here, cannot be certain, because the recollection of
the four former Commissioners who have testified here is uniformly hazy as to
what happened. I hope that is not an incorrect statement about their testimony.
With respect, in any event, to what was before them at that time we are not
certain. I believe what was before them at that time was FBI reports. It
seems to me that comes into the rule.
I would make this further observation : That if counsel wishes at some sub-
sequent point in these proceedings to argue the import of the actions* of the
Commission insofar as they can be reconstructed in 1947, whether February,
March, or August, that opportunity will be given. As far as this board is con-
cerned, we must be concerned with everything before us; and what the Com-
mission did in 1947 is, of course, important, but, as you say, not conclusive.
I would like to suggest a recess at this point.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GBAY. Colonel Pash, do you care to testify under oath? Ton are not
required to.
Colonel PASH. Yes, sir.
Mr. GBAT. Would you give me your full name?
Colonel PASH. Boris T. Pash.
Mr. GRAY. Will you raise your right hand? Boris T. Pash, do you swear that
the testimony you are to give the board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Colonel PASH. I do.
Whereupon Boris T. Pash was called as a witness, and, having been first duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Will you be seated, please, sir.
It is my duty, Colonel Pash, to remind you of the existence of the so-called
perjury statutes. May I assume you are familiar with them and they need
not be reviewed?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. You understand, I suppose, or you should know, in any event, that
there are persons in this room who may not have clearance for certain classified
material. I would ask, therefore, in the course of your testimony, if yon are
getting into classified .areas, you seek to notify me in advance so we may take
the necessary steps.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Finally, Colonel, I should say to you that we consider this proceed-
ing a confidential matter between the Atomic Energy Commission officials and
witnesses, on the one hand, and Dr. Oppenheimer and his representatives, on the
other. The Commission is making no releases with respect to these proceedings.
809
I express the hope on behalf of the local board that witnesses will take the same
view.
The Wmrass. I am, sir.
Mr. GBAT. Mr. Robb, will you proceed?
DIBEOT EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Colonel Pash, will you give us for the record your present station?
A. My present station is Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.
Q. You are an officer in the United States Army?
A. lam.
Q. And have been for how long, sir?
A. I am a Reserve officer on active duty, and I have been on active duty for
about 14 years.
Q. What is your present assignment?
A. Presently I am Chief of the Counterintelligence Division in the office of
G-2, Headquarters, Sixth Army.
Q. What are your duties in that capacity?
A. In that capacity I review and pass on the activities of my branch offices
which are concerned with counteraction against espionage, sabotage, the conduct
of personnel security investigations, and industrial security investigations.
Q. Without going into detail for a moment, Colonel, how long have you been
engaged in that general sort of work for the Army?
A. About 12 years of the 14.
Q. Let me, if you will, get a little of your personal history. You came on this
present tour of duty when?
A. About the 1st of June of 1940.
Q. What was your assignment?
A. I was then for a short time the Counterintelligence officer of the Ninth
Corps Area.
Q. Where is that?
A. In Presidio of San Francisco. In about March of 1941—1 am not sure of
that date— -I became the Chief of Counterintelligence Branch of the Ninth Corps
Area, and later of the Western Defense Command and the Fourth Army.
Q. Will you tell us whether you took any course at about that time in connec-
tion with your work?
A. In January of 1941, 1 took the officers investigate course conducted by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Q. Where?
A. In Washington at the Justice Department Building. I think that is between
10th and 9th on Pennnsylvania.
Q. That had to do with espionage and sabotage?
A. Espionage, sabotage, interrogation, writing of reports, securing evidence, the
overall investigative course.
Q. What was your next assignment?
A. In November 1943, 1 left the Fourth Army Western Defense Command and
proceeded to Europe where I organized and commanded the scientific intelligence
mission of the G-2, War Department, known under the code name of the Alsos
mission.
Q. What was that mission, Colonel?
A. The primary mission was to determine the extent of German atomic develop-
ments and to find out whether they would or would not use the bomb in World
War II, and if possible secure the scientists and documents and any equipment
that they may have.
Q. How long did that mission last?
A. The commission was deactivated in December of 1945.
Q. In connection with that work, were you required to interrogate scientists
and other personnel?
A. Yes ; we did interrogate scientists.
Q. Following the completion of that mission, what did you do?
A. In March of 1946, 1 went to Japan, where I was assigned as the Chief of the
Foreign Liaison Section in G-2, Headquarters, Far East Command. In connec-
tion with those activities my primary responsibility as designated by the Chief of
Staff was to deal with the Soviet mission. Since I was a colonel, the Chief of
Staff felt I could deal with the Commission directly because I speak Russian,
Q. You speak Russian?
A. Yes; I speak Russian fluently.
Q. Were yon born in Russia or in this country?
810
A. I was born in San Francisco.
Q. Your father was a Russian bishop?
A. He arrived in the States in 1894, and in the later years he was known as
(lie Metropolitan, which is the top or senior bishop of the American Orthodox
Church, which officially, I believe, the name is the Russian Orthodox Greek
Catholic Church of North America.
Q. Was your mother a Russian or American?
A. No ; she was born in San Francisco.
Q. In all events, you learned to speak Russian from your father?
A. No ; I studied it and had experience, of course.
Q. You say you were in Japan for how long?
A. Two years.
Q. Dealing with the Russians?
A. Primarily. I dealt with all the foreign missions there.
Q. Who was the commanding officer in Japan then?
A. General MacArthur was then commanding.
Q. At the completion of that duty, what did you do?
A. At the completion of that duty I was assigned to G-2, Department of the
Army, in the Eurasian Branch.
Q. Will you tell us what your work was there?
A. Study of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Army.
Q. G-2 is Intelligence?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. At the end of the year, where did you go?
A. At the end of that year I was detailed to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Q. How long did you stay there?
A. I served with the Central Intelligence Agency for 8 years.
Q. Are yon able within the rules of security regulations to tell us anything
about your work there?
A. No, sir; I am not.
Q. You were there for 3 years.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Until when?
A. Until I believe the 7th of January 1952.
Q. Then where did you go?
A. Then I was assigned to Austria, Headquarters, United States Forces in
Austria, was stationed in Saltzburg.
Q. What was your duty there?
A. There I was in G-3, which is the Planning Section.
Q. How long were you there?
A. I returned from Austria in August 1953.
Q. And then you went to your present duty?
A. Went to my present station, reporting to the Presidio in September 1953.
Q. Now, going back to 1943, in what month was it, Colonel, that you reported
for duty at San Francisco in 1943?
A. I was in San Francisco at the time in 1943.
Q. What month did you begin your duty as what was it, now?
A. Chief of the Counterintelligence Branch.
Q. Yes, sir.
A. That was in 1941.
Q. And you stayed there until when?
A. I would like to make a correction. I am not sure whether it is early
1041 or late. I mentioned the early part of 1941. I am not sure of that date
and I didn't check it.
Q. Coming to May 1943, Colonel, I will ask you whether or not at or about
that time you began an investigation into certain reported espionage taking
plnce or which had taken place at the Radiation Laboratory In Berkeley?
A. Yes, sir ; we did.
Q. Would you tell us something of how that investigation began and what
you did?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Just tell us in your own way, and I will try not to interrupt you.
A. I believe It was In May of 1943 an officer from the Department of the
Army reported to General DeWitt, who was commanding general of the Western
Defense Command, requesting that an officer be designated to conduct a special
investigation connected with War Department activities.
General DeWitt designated me to take charge of that investigation.
811
Together with the initiation of this investigation, I received a report from
the Department of the Army. I think it was the War Department then, indi-
cating that there had been an attempt to secure information from the radiation
laboratory and that the personnel involved were Steve Nelson, of the Com-
munist Party, a prominent Communist Party member in California at the time,
and a man by the name of Joe.
We further knew that Joe had furnished some information, including informa-
tion of a technical nature, which I don't recall clearly, and I would not dare
to try to explain anything of the technical nature, and that he had furnished
Steve Nelson with a timetable pertaining to activities in which we were to
become interested — the technical activities.
We had very little information. The only thing we had definite was that
the man's name was Joe, and the fact that he had sisters living in New York,
and that he had come from New York.
We started the investigation. We immediately started procuring files of per-
sonnel working at the laboratory in order to try to analyze and determine who
this man may be. I will not go into the technical details of our surveillance
or operational methods except to say that we did conduct an Investigation.
We first thought this man may be a man by the name of Lomanitz.
Q. Would you tell us why you thought that?
A. Because of Lomanitz's past history. We were able to procure that. Lo-
manitz was affiliated with some Communist-front organizations, and actually
was reported to be a Communist Party member.
In our operational work, we were able to procure a photograph of 4 men,
and I had 1 of our men working on that photograph to determine the background
of the personnel In the photograph.
In the meantime we also found out that at some meetings sponsored by either —
I forget the organization sponsoring it — it was on Van Ness Avenue, we observed,
I believe it was either Bohni or Lomanitz going in with an unidentified man,
a man unidentified by us.
Q. Which Bohm was that?
A. His first name slips me. He was closely affiliated socially, and I suppose
in the school, with Lomanitz and Weinberg.
Q. By the way, did you ascertain what he was doing at the time, and where
he was employed?
A. Yes; we knew that he was employed at the Radiation Laboratory.
Q. How about Bohm?
A. Bohm also.
Q. Go ahead, sir.
A. We had an unidentified man and we had this photograph. As a result of
our study we determined and were sure that Joe was Joseph Weinberg.
Q. Where was he employed?
A. He was employed at the Radiation Laboratory.
Q. Were you able to ascertain whether Lomanitz, Weinberg, and Bohm were
associates or intimates?
A. Yes ; they were. The photograph consisted of Weinberg, Lomanitz, a man
by the name of Max Friedman, and I think Bohm.
With that in mind, we started our operational procedures and at the same
time a review of the file itself. I reported the identification of Joe to the War
Department at the time. This must have been some time in the early part or
the first half of June 1943.
Q. What did your investigation disclose with respect to the Communist ac-
tivities of this group— Weinberg, Lomanitz, Bohm, and Friedman?
A. We determined in the first place that these four men I mentioned were
very frequently together. I don't mean constantly with no interruption, But
very frequently they were together.
Through our operational procedures, we found out that Lomanitz was a mem-
ber of the Communist Party. From the conversations we also determined that
we had sufficient information to determine that both Weinberg and Bohm were
members of the party.
Q. By the way, Colonel, I might ask you whether, under security regulations,
you are permitted to disclose investigative techniques or operational procedures?
A, No, sir ; I would be glad to present them to the board.
Q. I might ask you, just for the record, Colonel, I assume you are here under
orders?
A. Yes, sir ; I have been ordered here by the Department of the Army.
Q. But the testimony you are giving Is your own testimony, and not what
someone told you to say?
S12
A. No, sir; I think I better correct that. The testimony is my own.
Q. Did there come a time when certain steps were taken with respect to the
draft status of this man Lomanitz?
A. Yes, sir ; when we determined and felt sure that Lomanitz was a member
of the Communist Party, we recommended that his draft deferment not be
renewed. I made that recommendation to General Groves' office.
Q. What happened then?
A. We received information from General Groves' office that the deferment
will be canceled, and we were to keep General Groves advised of the status of
the situation.
When Lomanitz heard the fact that his deferment was being canceled, he
started contacting a number of people. He contacted members of the union,
the FABCT union, which was interested in the Radiation Laboratory. He
contacted his friends. He discussed with his friends the situation. He also
called and, if I am not mistaken, wrote to Dr. Oppenheimer about it
Q. What?
A. GaUed Dr. Oppenheimer about it.
Q. About when was that, if you remember?
A. Thai was in the early part of August, I think. I don't know the date.
Q. Do you recall whether or not Dr. Oppenheimer manifested any interest
in this matter of Lomanitz' defendant?
A. Yes ; according to my recollection, Dr. Oppenheimer took some steps to
request that deferment be granted to Lomanitz.
Q. Did the activities of Dr. Oppenheimer in that connection strike you as usual
or unusual?
At Not having sufficient knowledge of the technical phase of this particular
situation, I am not expressing an opinion which is based on reactions other than
any technical reactions.
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Since we were interested in this investigation, we certainly followed very
closely the activities as they were proceeding, and we felt at the time that
pressure was being put on to keep Lomanitz on the project.
Q. Pressure by whom?
A. By Dr. Oppenheimer, by his associates, Max Friedman, Weinberg, and
Bohm.
Mr. SZLVEBMAN. May I interrupt for one moment? Who do you mean by
"his"?
The WITNESS. Lomanitz'.
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Did it strike you that the pressure put on by Dr. Oppenheimer was ordinary
or was out of the ordinary, as it struck you at that time?
A. It was my feeling that there was pressure beyond that which would be
normal.
Q. You mentioned the FAECT, the union ; did your investigation include any
study of the Communist tendencies or influences in that union?
A. We based our evaluation of the FABCT on reports received. We did not
investigate the union as such. However, we also received considerable infor-
mation from discussions among those people who are within our investigative
field, and whom we were investigating.
Q. Let me ask you at that point, Colonel, did you have any jurisdiction to
investigate or interview anybody who was not either In the Army or connected
with the project?
A. Yes, sir ; the project was given to us as our responsibility when the officer
came out from the Department of the Army.
Q. I don't think you quite caught my question. Did your investigative juris-
diction go beyond that? In other words, could you investigate people who
were civilians not connected with the project?
A. JNTo.
Q. All right, sir. Now would you come back to the matter of the union and
what you found out about the union?
A. Again based on the information available to us and from reports available
to us, we felt that there was a strong Communist influence among a group of
people— at least a group of people—in the union, and that the union was attempt
ing to place people in the radiation laboratory.
Q. Do you recall who any of the group of people of the union were that yon
had in mind?
813
A. There was a man by the name of Adelson. There was also a woman belong-
ing to the union called Rose— it starts with an "S."
Q. Would it be Segnre?
A. Segore ; yes.
Q. How about this group that you told us about, the Weinberg-Bohm-Friedman-
Lomanitz group ; were they in the union?
A. Yes ; they were members of the union. To the best of my knowledge they
were members of the union.
Q. Was Lomanitz finally drafted?
A. Yes ; Lomanitz' deferment was canceled and he was drafted.
Q. At or about that time did you receive certain information from Lt Lyall
Johnson concerning statements made to him by Dr. Oppenheimer ?
A. I did. Lyall Johnson reported to me toward the end of August that
Dr. Oppenheimer came to him and made some statements which he felt I should
know about My reaction was to request an immediate interview with Dr.
Oppenheimer on this matter.
Q. Who was Johnson?
A. Johnson was the intelligence officer for the radiation laboratory.
Q. Do you recall whether or not Johnson gave you any details of that
coijyersation?
A. Johnson told me it concerned a possible espionage effort in connection with
the radiation laboratory.
Q. Did you thereafter interview Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Yes, I interviewed Dr. Oppenheimer on the 26th or 27th of August 1943.
Q. Where did the interview take place, Colonel, and what were the circum-
stances under which it took place?
A. The interview was conducted on the University of California campus.
There was a building in which Lieutenant Johnson had his office. Captain
Fidler was a member of the staff. I don't recall his exact capacity at the time.
He was in the Army. We used Lieutenant Johnson's office to conduct this
interview.
Q. Did you make any arrangements to have it recorded?
A. Yes, We felt that this information was of considerable importance, and
we did not want to rely later on on what we may remember, so I made arrange-
ments for an officer in charge of my investigative unit to set up a recording for us.
Q. So far as you know, was that with the knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer, or
was he unaware that it was being recorded?
A. As far as I know, he was unaware.
Q. Subsequent to the interview, were the recordings transcribed?
A. Yes ; after hearing what Dr. Oppenheimer had to tell me, I immediately
had the recordings transcribed so I could forward them to General Groves' office.
I recall we made the first draft off the recordings and we tried to check that
as much as we could. Subsequent to that I wanted to hurry this to General
Groves, so I recall we started doing a second typing of it, and I stopped the typist
and forwarded it by airmail immediately to General Groves' office.
Q. So far as you were able to tell at that time did the draft that you forwarded
substantially state or reflect your conversation with Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. It did; yes.
Q, Would you say that every word was right?
A. No ; there were a few words missing. I personally made some corrections
in the draft
Q. After you forwarded it?
A. Before I forwarded it. That is before I forwarded this first draft.
Q. I have before me a copy of a memorandum dated August 28, 1948, indicating
that on that date you forwarded to Colonel Lansdale the transcript of your
interview with Dr. Oppenheimer. Would that enable you to tell us when you
did forward it to General Groves?
A. This was forwarded either on the 28th of August or it may be forwarded
the day after.
Mr. GHAT. May I ask was this covering memorandum in the record, too?
Mr. ROBB. I am not sure whether it was or not. Do you want me to read it in?
814
This is :
"HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY,
"OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2,
"Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.
"In reply refer to : ( OIB) .
"August 28, 1943.
"Subject: DSM Project
"To: Lt CoL John Lansdale, Jr., Room 2C, 654 Pentagon Building, Washington,
D. 0.
"1. Transmitted herewith in a transcript of an interview with Dr. J. R. Op-
penheimer, held in the office of Captain Fidler, University of California.
"2. No distribution of this was made other than to furnish one copy to Mr.
King of the San Francisco field division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
General Groves will be shown a copy of this transcription when he arrives on
the 1st of September 1943.
"3. No comments or conclusions are made until a thorough study is completed.
Any such recommendations or conclusions reached will be reported to you.
"For the A. C. of S., G-2:
"(S) BORIS T. PASH,
"Lt. Col, H. I., Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch.
"1 Incl : As indicated (dup)."
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Have you recently refreshed your recollection about this interview by look-
ing over a copy of that transcript?
A. I have.
Q. Do you recall, Colonel, whether or not in that interview Dr. Oppenheimer
said anything to you about somebody in the office of the Russian Consul?
A. Of the Soviet Consul, yes.
Q. Is there any question in your mind that was mentioned?
. A. No, sir ; that was mentioned.
Q. In what connection?
A. Dr. Oppenheimer told me that a man contacted him with the suggestion
that technical information can be made available through proper channels to
the Soviet Consulate and that there was a man available who was proficient
in microfilming, and that there were channels established for the transmission
of available information.
Q. Is there any question that Dr. Oppenheimer made that reference to the use
of microfilm?
A. No, sir ; not in my mind.
Q. Do you recall whether or not Dr. Oppenheimer mentioned to you whether
this man who had made the approach had made more than one approach to
people on the project?
A. Yes. He indicated three definite approaches that were made.
Q. Is there any question about that in your mind?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you ask Dr. Oppenheimer who the man was who had made these
approaches?
A. Yes, I did. I asked him for the name of the man.
Q. Did he give it to you?
A. No, he did not.
Q. Did he say why he would not give it to you?
A. He stated that this man was a friend of his, he felt that no information
was leaking out, and he felt that he did not want to give the man's name under
the circumstances since he felt that it wasn't successful in accomplishing his
mission.
Q. Were you anxious to know the name?
A. We were. As a matter of fact, I insisted several times and I told Dr.
Oppenheimer that without the knowledge of that name our activities were
going to be made much more difficult. Since he knew the name of the man,
I felt he should furnish it to me. I think we broached that subject through the
conversation on several occasions.
Q. Why were you so anxious to know the name?
A. Without the knowledge of the man, our job was extremely difficult We
knew definitely that there were espionage activities conducted in favor of the
Soviets in that area. We knew now that there was a new or at least an addi-
tional effort being exerted through this man. Our investigative unit was lim-
815
ited in itself, and if we had to start digging to find out who this man is, it
would put a tremendous burden on us.
I also felt, if I may say, that Dr. Oppenheimer knew the name of the man,
and it was his duty to report it to me.
Q. Did you thereafter send to General Groves a memorandum on the subject
of the importance of obtaining the name of the contact?
A. I did.
Q. I show you a copy of a memorandum dated September 2, 1943, and ask
you if that is the memorandum to which you refer?
A. Yes; this is it.
Mr. ROBB. I will read this in this record, if I may, Mr. Chairman.
"SEPTEMBER 2, 1943.
"Memorandum for : General Groves
"Re: DSM project (J. R. Oppenheimer)
"1. It is essential that name of professor be made available in order that
investigation can continue properly.
"2. If disposed to talk, also request names of individuals contacted by pro-
fessor in order to eliminate unnecessary investigation and following of leads
which may come to the attention of this office. If names of these people are
known, this office will not have to conduct investigation into their activities
if such names come to our attention through our own channels.
"3. It is desirable to have names of any people whom it is felt could be con-
tacted by the professor, particularly OP members or sympathizers.
"4. Has anyone approached JRO at any time while he was connected with
the project? If so, was it the professor, Bltenton, or some other party?
"B. T. P."
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. B. T. P. was what?
A. My initials.
Q. I call your attention to the use of the word "professor." To whom did
you refer by that?
A. The unidentified person. I was told by Dr. Oppenheimer that the man
was a member of the staff, or had been a member of the staff of the University
of California.
Q. "If disposed to talk"; what did you mean by that? Who was supposed
to talk?
A. If when General Groves would ask Dr. Oppenheimer for information, and
if Dr. Oppenheimer felt he would give additional information, to get additional
information we requested.
O. "Also request names of individuals contacted by the professor" ; the indi-
viduals were the three contacts?
A. Those three contacts ; yes.
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer did not give you those names?
A. No ; he did not. He told me at the time that two of the men were down
at "Y" that we called it, that was Los Alamos, and that one man had either
already gone or was to go to site X, which I believe was Oak Ridge.
Q. Did you conduct any investigation as a result of that lead?
A. Yes ; we did. That was another tedious project we had. We had to go
through files, try to find out who was going to go to site X. We determined,
and I took measures to stop — at least I asked General Groves to stop the man's
movement to that area.
Q. What man?
A. The third man. I can't recall the name at this time. I am not sure of
the name.
Q. But you felt that you had identified somebody who was about to be moved
to the site?
A. Yes. As a matter of fact, we did. But at this point I don't remember
the man's name.
Q. And you took steps to stop that transfer?
A. Yes.
Q. Thinking that he was the man referred to?
A. That is right. He was the only one who at the time was scheduled to go.
Q. Referring to the third paragraph of your memorandum, "CP members,"
that means what?
A. Communist Party members.
3088.18— 64— 58
816
Q. Fourth paragraph, "Has anyone approached JKO at any time while he
was connected with the project?" Calling your attention to that, Colonel, did
you have any suggestion from your interview with Dr. Oppenheimer that he
himself had been approached?
A. Yes.
Q. Beg pardon?
'A. Yes.
Q. What was that?
A. He told me that this unidentified professor contacted him.
Q. Yes ; but aside from that.
A. We felt that this was a vulnerable situation and if he was contacted by
one, he may be contacted by others.
Q. Will you tell us whether or not, Colonel, you believed there was any con-
nection between this episode of Dr. Oppenheimer's statement to you and the
situation which had recently arisen involving Lomanitz?
A. Definitely.
Q. Would you explain that to us?
A. When we first met in the room, I asked Dr. Oppenheimer or said that I was
interested in a certain incident. He immediately started telling me about the
Lomanitz situation. I told him then it was not the Lomanitz situation that 1
was interested in, but other contracts that had been made. If I am in order, as
a result of the study of the interview, it was my definite feeling at the time
that the interview Dr. Oppenheimer had with me was the result of Lomanitz's
situation. I felt definitely at the time that Dr. Oppenheimer knew or had reason
to know that we were investigating or making an investigation which was more
thorough than a normal background investigation. It was my opinion that Dr.
Oppenheimer wanted to present this information to us for the purpose of reliev-
ing any pressure that may be brought on him for further investigation of his
personal situation.
Q. In that connection, did you prepare a memorandum for General Groves?
A. Yes; I did.
Q. I will show you a copy of a paper dated September 2, 1943, with initials
"B. T. P." and ask you if that is the memorandum?
A. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. I will read this in the record, Mr.. Chairman.
"SEPTEMBER 2, 1943.
"Memorandum for : General Groves.
"Re: DSM project (J. R. Oppenheimer).
"1. This office is preparing a memorandum in which it is pointed out that O.'s
contact with Colonel Fash, through Lieutenant Johnson, was the result of the
following circumstances :
"(a) Lomanitz was denied deferment
"(&) Lomanitz told 0. of this and also told him that he felt he was being
investigated for subversive activities.
"(c) O. could conclude that this office is conducting some investigation and
would probably determine that contacts have been made.
"(d) 0. felt that it was safer to come out with the information at the present
time in order to clear himself of any future investigation.
"(e) In this way he would retain the confidence of the Army personnel
responsible for this project.
"2. Above, briefly, is a thesis of a memorandum which will be presented to you
through Colonel Lansdale in a more detailed form. This office is of the opinion
that 0. had an ulterior motive in furnishing this information at such a late date
and the above explanation seems reasonable. It is not believed that he should
be taken fully into the confidence of the Army in the matters pertaining to
subversive investigations."
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. "O." In that memorandum refers to whom?
A. Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. You mentioned a late date. What did you mean by that?
A. When I had the interview with Dr. Oppenheimer, he told me that the
incident which he was reporting to me had happened a few months prior to this
interview.
Mr. GRAY. Excuse me. Was this memorandum signed or identified?
Mr. ROBB. This is a copy I have here. I assume it was signed.
Mr. GBAY. You didn't read any initials.
Mr. ROBB. Signed "B. T. P." That was you, Colonel?
S17
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. I previously identified it.
Mr. GRAT. I am sorry.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Colonel, had you had this information about the approach to Dr. Oppen-
heimer immediately after it had taken place, would that have made a difference
to you in your investigation?
A. It certainly would.
Q. What difference would it have made?
A. Not having the name, I felt at the time, and I think I still feel impeded
seriously our investigation.
Q. Why?
A. We had to start an investigation of a factor which was unknown to us.
We knew that there was a man, a professor. There were many professors at
the University of California. The only thing I knew was that he was not
connected with the radiation laboratory, which put it into the University of
California, and the staff was tremendous there.
Q. Did Captain De Silva subsequent or at about that time prepare the analysis
to which you referred in your memorandum of September 2?
A. He had; yes.
Q. I will show you a photostat of a document dated September 2, 1943,
uMemorandum for Lt Col. B. T. Pash. Subject: *J. R. OppenheimerV signed by
"P. DeS." Is that the analysis prepared by Captain De Silva?
A. Those are his initials. Tes ; this is the memorandum that he prepared.
Q. Did you transmit that to General Groves through Colonel Lansdale?
A; I did.
Q. I will show you a memorandum dated September 6, 1943, signed "Boris T.
Pash," and ask you if that is your letter of transmittal of Captain De Silva's
memorandum?
A. Yes; it is.
Mr. ROBB. These two documents have already been read into the record, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. SILVEEMAN. Yes; pages 877 and following, if they are the documents
you are talking about
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. When did you finally learn the name of the unknown professor?
A. The name of the unknown professor was furnished to me by General
Groves' office. I can't recall the exact time. I presume it was either the end
of September some time
Q. End of when?
A. September or maybe October. I am not sure of the time.
Q. Let me see if I can refresh your recollection. I will show you a photo-
stat of a teletype addressed to the Area Engineer, University of California,
Berkeley, Calif., attention Lt Lyall Johnson, signed "Nichols," and asked if
looking at that you are able now to refresh your recollection about it?
A. Yes; this is the way we received the information.
Q. When was the date?
A. December 13. I must say that I had— there was another somewhat previ-
ous— this never reached me.
Q. That never did?
A. No.
Q. How did you get the information?
A. I never got the information— I was gone.
Q. Do you recall that you did receive the information before you went or not?
A. I think I was only informally informed of certain suspicions but I had
never received that information.
Q. When did you leave there?
A. About the 26th or 25th of November. It was the end of November.
Q. By the way, was there a Lieutenant Murray in your organization?
A. Yes; Lieutenant Murray was in charge of my investigative unit
Q. I will show you a photostat of a memorandum dated San Francisco, Calil,
November 22, 1943, bearing the signature of James S. Murray. Is that your Lieu-
tenant Murray?
A. That is the same Lieutenant Murray.
Q. I notice that the title of this inemorandum is, "Memo for the Officer in
Charge. Subject DSM Project Re Possible Identity of the Unnamed Professor
Referred to by Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer."
818
Do you recall having seen that memorandum?
A. Yes. Lieutenant Murray's memoranda to me were addressed in this form,
and I recall this memorandum.
Q. That would Indicate at that time at least you had not received the name of
the unidentified professor?
A. No, sir.
Q. Had not, would it not, Colonel?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. BOBB. I will ask Mr. Bolander if he might read this memorandum.
Mr. BOLANDEB. "San Francisco, Calif. November 22, 1943."
Mr. SILVERMAN. Mr. Bobb, do you think if we saw the memorandum it might
be unnecessary to read it? I don't know what is in it
Mr. BOBB. No ; I think we better have it in the record Just for completeness,
if the Chairman doesn't mind.
Mr. BOLANDER. "Memorandum for the Officer in Charge.
"Subject: DSM project
"Be Possible Identity of the Unnamed Professor Referred to by Dr. J. Robert
Oppenheimer. "
The date is November 22, 1943.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Have you an extra copy?
Mr. BOLANDER. I am sorry ; I do not
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Can I look over your shoulder, Mr. Bolander?
Mr. GRAY. I will follow the reading of it. It this a copy that counsel can
follow?
Mr. BOLANDER. Mr. Chairman, I didn't get a chance to glance at it again.
It may refer to the FBI, and I would have to note that we could not make
any mention of the FBI. This may not be the case, but I would have to read
it through to be sure.
Mr. GRAY. I will ask you to look at it, and see if there is anything you will
have to omit or not
I can tell you there is some material you will want to leave out Page 3.
Mr. BOBB. We had not gotten to that yet, sir. That seems to be the only
sentence or paragraph.
Mr. GRAY. Can you give pages 1 and 2?
Mr. BOBB. While we are at it, Mr. Chairman, I see attached to that memo-
randum is a covering memorandum dated November 27, 1943, signed Boris T.
Pash. I will show that to the colonel and ask him if he sent that memo-
randum.
The WITNESS. No ; I did not This was sent by a then Lieutenant or Captain
Maharg.
By Mr. BOBB :
Q.He signed your name?
A. Yes. In this investigation he was acting for me.
Q. Do his initials appear?
A. His initials appear below.
Q. Is there any question that this memorandum was sent on the date indi-
cated enclosing the memorandum prepared by Lieutenant Murray?
A. From this record it appears that this was sent. I would have no personal
knowledge of the fact
Mr. ROBB. I think we might read them both, Mr. Chairman, while we are
about it.
Mr. GARRISON. May we have a chance to read this before it is read on the
record, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, while my friends are reading that, I might say the
purpose of offering this is to show for the board the attempts that were being
made to identify this contact and what the knowledge was at that time.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Mr. Bobb, I represent only Dr. Oppenheimer, but there are
a lot of names of people here I never heard of. I wonder whether in fairness
to these people it might not be better when you read the memorandum to say
there are then given the names of 10, 11, or whatever number of people there
are, of whom Professor Chevalier is one, or is not one.
Mr. BOBB. He is not. I don't care about that I don't know who these people
are, either.
Mr. GRAY. Let me suggest that the first 2 paragraphs be read, which I take
it do not involve persons who may not be concerned in this proceeding, that then
counsel indicate that there is paragraph 1, name of an individual with 7 or
819
8 lines of Information about him, paragraph 2, and so on. I think counsel's
point that Colonel Fash's office or the office of the intelligence people was involved
in very extensive investigation to ascertain the name of the unidentified professor
is a well taken point. I see no reason
Mr. ROBB. I have no desire to read them in. I take it the paragraph about
Dr. Weinberg might be read.
Mr. GRAY. I think there is no reason why you should not indicate when you
came to his name.
Mr. ROBB. Yes, sir.
Mr. ROLANDER. May I proceed?
Mr. GRAY. Please.
Mr. ROLANDER. "San Francisco, Calif. November 22, 1943"
Mr. GRAY. Did you read the covering memorandum?
Mr. ROLANDER. I beg your pardon. The covering memorandum at letter :
"Army Service Forces, Headquarters, Ninth Service Command, Office of the
Director, Intelligence Division, Forward Echelon, Presidio of San Francisco."
The initials "SPRIG: FE."
The date, "November 27, 1943."
The written initials of "CLC" in the right-hand corner. There is also some
written comment on the left-hand corner which, since it mentions a name, I will
omit
Mr. GRAY. May I call your attention also to what would appear to be the
initials "YL" next to the initials "CLC."
Mr. ROLANDER (reading) :
"NOVEMBER 27, 1943.
"Subject: DSM Project. Possible identity of unnamed professor referred to
by Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer.
"To : Lt. Col. John R. Lansdale, Jr., 2G654 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
"Enclosed for your information and files find memorandum for the Office in
Charge, dated November 22, 1943, subject as above, for the Director, Intelligence
Division."
Signature, "Boris T. Pash." Typed, "Boris T. Pash, Lt Col. M. I.," and then
an initial beneath there which was referred to by Colonel Pash, "Chief, Counter
Intelligence Branch." One enclosure : "Duplicate, memo as indicated, cc Captain
Maharg with enclosure."
The memorandum itself:
"SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., November 2%, 194S.
"Memorandum for the Office in Charge.
"Subject: DSM Project
"Re: Possible identity of unnamed professor referred to by Dr. J. Robert
Oppenheimer.
"Reference is made to various conversations and interviews between Dr. J. R.
Oppenheimer, head of DSM project at site Y, and Lt CoL Boris T. Pash, Chief,
CE8, Forward Echelon, Ninth Service Command. Reference is also made to
conversations and interviews between Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer and Lt. Col. John R.
Lansdale, Jr., Chief, Investigations Branch, CIG, MIS. During the above-named
interviews, Dr. Oppenheimer has frequently made reference to a professor located
at the University of California campus who acted as a go-between for George
Eltenton, and 3 unnamed persons working on the DSM project in an endeavor
to gain information for Eltenton to transmit to the Soviet Government. On all
of the above-named occasions, Dr. Oppenheimer has refused to name the pro-
fessor or the 3 persons who were contacted. Dr. Oppenheimer stated that the
3 persons did not disclose any information, and therefore they are not pertinent
to any investigation promulgated by Military Intelligence Services. Efforts of
this office during the past month have been directed in an attempt to ascertain
the identity of the professor contact A record check of all professors and
associates In both the physics and chemistry departments at the University of
California was made with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the results
thereof contained in a progress report from this office dated October 20, 1943.
A continued survey and check has been made and it is believed that it is entirely
possible that the professor might be one of the f ollowing."
"1." and then a name and 7 lines of discussion.
"2." a name and 7 lines of discussion.
"3." a name and 6 lines of discussion.
"4." The name appears "Joseph W. Weinberg." It states further : "Weinberg
has been known to commit at least one espionage act, and on June 28, 1943, he
was awarded a Ph. D. degree by the University of California, and assumed an
associate urofessorshit) there*"
820
"5." A name and 5 lines of discussion.
"6." A name and 7 lines of discussion.
"7." A name and 6 lines of discussion.
"8." A name and 8 lines of discussion.
"9." A name and 5 lines of discussion.
Mr. BOBB. May it be agreed, Mr. Chairman, that none of the names was the
name of Haakon Chevalier?
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Certainly not on these two pages.
Mr. GRAY. That name does not appear in this memorandum.
Mr. ROBB. That is right, it does not appear in the memorandum.
Mr. GBAY. I would suggest that actually the remainder of this memorandum
is not pertinent to the question being put to the witness.
Mr. BOBB. I think not, Mr. Chairman. There is no point of cluttering up the
record.
Mr. GBAY. I see there is no point of cluttering up the record.
Mr. SILVERMAN. It has nothing to do with Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. GRAY. No, with other individuals. Let me say it does mention some
familiar names, Lomanitz, Friedman, Weinberg, Bohm, but really not connected
with what we are talking about.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Could I take a look at that part of it to see whether some-
thing occurs to me about it, which perhaps may not.
Mr. GBAY. I think you will have to accept my assurance that it would not help
you to see the remainder. It is not really related.
Mr. BOBB. Mr. Chairman, would you like to break for lunch?
Mr. GBAY. One of the members of the board has an engagement. Am I right
in assuming that you are not at this point finished with your direct examination?
Mr. BOBB. That is correct
Mr. GBAY. Therefore I think we should recess for lunch at this time, and we
shall return at 2 o'clock.
(Thereupon at 12: 35 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. GBAY. Let the record show that Mr. Garrison is not present at the beginning
of the hearing.
Will you proceed, Mr. Bobb?
Whereupon, Boris T. Pash, the witness on the stand at the time of taking the
recess resumed the stand and testified further as follows :
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Colonel, I think I asked you before the noon recess when you first learned
the name of Haaken Chevalier, and I believe you said some time in September.
A. Early October or September.
Q. In what connection did that name come to your attention?
A. We were receiving reports of other investigative agencies relating to Com-
munist activities in the area. I don't recall exactly who delivered those reports
to us, but they probably came from Washington, from General Grove's office.
Q. What was the purpose of the report about Dr. Chevalier? I don't mean for
you to give details.
A It concerned Communist activities in the area. It concerned contacts with
people who were either known or suspected Communists.
Q. I don't want to lead you but I am quite sure you are not very easily led
anyway. Was the burden of the report that Dr. Chevalier was in some way
connected with Communist activities?
A. That is right
Q. The identification of Dr. Chevalier as the unknown professor came later?
A. That is right It didn't come to me then.
Q. It did not come to you?
A. No.
Q. Would you say it came after you left Berkeley?
A. When I returned from a short tour in Europe, after being in the Mediter-
ranean Theater, I was Wrought up to date on certain things that transpired in
my absence.
Q. Is that when you first learned the identity of the unnamed professor?
: A. yes, sir, I believe so.
821
Q. When did you first begin giving attention and consideration to Dr. Oppen-
heimer in connection with your investigation of espionage and Communist activi-
ties in Berkeley?
A. At the early part of the investigation. It was either late in May or some
time early in June.
Mr. GBAY. What year?
The WITNESS. 1943, sir. Excuse me.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. I will show you a copy of a report with the typewritten signature, "Boris T.
Pash" dated June 29, 1943, and ask you whether you recall preparing that
report?
A. Yes.
Mr. ROBB, Do you have a copy of this for our friend across the way?
Mr. ROLANDER. I don't believe this can be read in its entirely.
Mr. ROBB. I am sorry ; this report has some references to FBI materials.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. At all events, Colonel, the subject of this report is "Julius Robert Oppen-
heimer," is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Without going into details about it, it concerns investigative information
in respect of Dr. Oppenheimer, is that right?
A. That is right.
Q. During the time that you were conducting this investigation, Colonel
Mr. SILVERMAN. Do you suppose you could read the portions that relate to
Dr. Oppenheimer?
Mr. ROBB. The whole thing relates to Dr. Oppenheiiner.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Is there some way we could see it without the FBI part?
Mr. GRAY. At this moment, I think this is true. The witness has had his recol-
lection refreshed with respect to a memorandum which he wrote.
Mr, ROBB. Yes, sir.
Mr. GBAY. I don't know what you propose to do.
Mr. ROBB. Nothing further,
Mr. GRAY. Can you do this in a way which will not make it necessary to read
It into the record?
Mr. ROBB. My purpose for referring to it was to have some specific date in the
record to show that by at least June 29, 1943, Dr. Oppenheimer was under
investigation by Colonel Fash's organization in respect of espionage, that Is all.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. In respect of suspected espionage by Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. ROBB. In the context of the espionage investigation that was going on. Is
lhat correct, Colonel?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I really think that in fairness it would be well to read as much
of that memorandum into the record as can be read by skipping the references of
the FBI. We are somewhat at a disadvantage. Our friends on the other side
have the memorandum before them. Doubtless the members of the board have it
before them.
Mr. GRAY. I don't know whether the members of the board have or not
Mr. RiQBB. Will you take the best I can do on it, Mr. Silverman?
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. ROBB. I will do the best I can, and I think it will be all right.
Memorandum June 29, 1943:
"Subject: Julius Robert Oppenheimer. .
"To : Lieutenant Colonel Lansdale, Jr., Room 20 654, Pentagon Building, Wash-
ington, D. C.
"1. Information available to this office indicates that subject may still be
connected with the Communist Party."
Then I omit the next sentence.
"This is based on the following specific information.
, -" (a) Bernadette Doyle, organizer of the Communist Party in Alameda County,
Calif., has referred to subject and his brother, Frank, as being regularly registered
within the party.
" (5) It is known that the Alameda County branch of the party was concerned
over the Communist affiliation of subject and his brother, as it was not considered
prudent for this connection to be known in view of the highly secret work on
which both are engaged.
(522
"2. Besults of surveillances conducted on subject, upon arrival in San Francisco
on June 12, 1943, Indicate further possible Communist Party connections.
"(a) Subject met and is alleged to have spent considerable time with one Jean
Tattock, the record of whom is attached.
"(ft) He attempted to contact by phone and was later thought to have visited
a David Hawkins, 242 32d Avenue, San Francisco, a party member who has con-
tacts with both Bernadette Doyle and Steve Nelson. A preliminary report on
Hawkins is attached.
"3. Further investigations of the possible connections of subject with the Com-
munist Party are being carried out by this office."
I omit the next sentence.
"4. In view of the fact that this office believes that subject still Is or may be
connected with the Communist Party, and because of the known interest of the
Communist Party in this project, together with the interest of the U. S. S. B. in it,
the following possibilities are submitted for your consideration :
"(a) All indications on the part of Communist Party members who have ex-
pressed themselves with regard to subject lead this office to believe that the
Communist Party is making a definite effort to officially divorce subject's affilia-
tion with the party and subject, himself, is not indicating in any way interest
in the party. However, if subject's affiliation with the party is definite and he is
a member of that party, there is a possibility of his developing a scientific
work to a certain extent then turning it over to the party without submitting
any phase of it to the United States Government. It is the understanding of
this office that subject is the only person who knows the exact progress and re-
sults of this research work, and, as a result, is difficult to check.
"(&) In view of the above there exists another possibility that while subject
may not be furnishing information to the Communist Party direct he may be
making that information available to his other contacts, who, in turn, may
be furnishing or will furnish such information, as it is made available to them
by subject, to the Communist Party for transmission to the U. S. S. B.
"5. On the basis of the present status of this case and with the limited knowl-
edge available to this office on the organization and administration of the project
the f ollowtng possible plans of action are recommended : '
"(a) That every effort be made to find a suitable replacement for subject
and that as soon as such replacement is trained that subject be removed com-
pletely from the project and dismissed from employment by the United States
Government.
"(ft) That subject be told that in view of the importance of the project and
the posibility of an accident which may incapacitate or eliminate him, that a
second in command be assigned to subject who will share in the knowledge of
all developments and processes of Interest In the project
"(c) That subject be called to Washington for purposes of being interviewed
by Chief, MIS, and General Groves; that subject first be told of the Espionage
Act and its ramifications; of the knowledge MIS has of Communist afilliations
and that this Government will not tolerate any leakage of information either
by subject or any of his associates to the Communist Party, whether this be
for the purpose of transmitting information as such or of informing the Com-
munist Party of the progress made by its members and, further, that this Gov-
ernment intends to maintain rigid control of the development of the project
"6. It is the opinion of this office that subject's personal Inclinations would
be to protect his own future and reputation and the high degree of honor which
would be his if his present work is successful, and, consequently, It Is felt
that he would lend every effort to cooperating with the Government in any plan
which would leave him In charge. It Is, therefore, recommended that the plan
outlined in paragraph 5-c be adopted upon completion of a thorough investiga-
tion of subject presently being conducted by this office. This investigation is
being made to secure all possible information on subject's background, particu-
larly his past and present affiliations with the Communist Party?
"It is further recommended that regardless of the plan adopted, or whether
any of the above-proposed plans are adopted, that subject be told that there
exists a .possibility of violence on the part of Axis agents who may wish to in-
terfere with this project and, therefore, the War Department deems It advisable
to assign to subject two bodyguards. These bodyguards will be selected from
specially trained Counter Intelligence Corps agents who win not only serve as
bodyguards for subject but also as undercover agents for this office
"For the A C of S, O-2.
''Boris T. Pash, Lt Col., M. I., Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch.
823
"2 Jnds:
"#1— Memo, 6-29-43, re Jean Tatlock (dup)
«#2— Memo, 6-29-43, re David Hawkins (dup)
"cc : Oapt H. K. Calvert"
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Colonel, do you know whether or not the two bodyguards were assigned?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Let me ask you as an expert
A. I don't think so.
Q. Let me ask you, Colonel, as an expert in these matters, how effective can
a surveillance be to prevent the transmission of information?
A. In my opinion, it is impossible to maintain a 100-percent surveillance or
maintain a surveillance which would assure 100-percent success.
Q. WJiy?
A. There are so many different ways in which information can be trans-
mitted and in this particular instance we did not have any qualified men who
knew the technical field sufficiently to be able to determine even in an open
conversation if any information is being transmitted.
Q. You mean would not understand it?
A. That is right.
Q. You mention in here a thorough investigation of subject. Subject being
Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was that conducted?
A. That was insofar as I was in charge there; that was discontinued on
instructions from Washington.
Q. When?
A. I believe some time in the middle of August
Q. Was any reason given for that?
A. Not to me.
Q. Did all the reports concerning communistic activities at Berkeley concern-
ing Dr. Oppenheimer come across your desk while you were there?
A. I believe so. During this period I had made some short trips. In that
case either DeSilva or Maharg would act for me. Normally they tried to bring
me up to date when I returned.
Q. You kept yourself thoroughly familiar with the investigation going on?
A. I tried to, yes.
Q. On the basis of the information which you had concerning Dr. Oppenheimer,
did you consider him to be a security risk?
A. Yes, I would.
Q. Did you then?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Do you now?
A. Yes, I think I do. I do, yes.
Q. Going back for a moment to your interview with Dr. Oppenheimer, you
mentioned that he had spoken to you or told you that this unnamed professor
had mentioned someone in the Bussian consulate, microfilm, the three contacts,
two of them having gone to Los Alamos and one being about to leave for Oak
Ridge ; did you have any opinion as to whether or not Dr. Oppenheimer in those
respects was truthfully reporting to you what the unnamed professor had
said to him?
A. Yes, I was sure of that.
Q. You were sure of that?
A. Yes.
A. In the first place, Dr. Oppenheimer spoke to Lyall Johnson, telling him
that he had something, as Johnson told me, something important to convey con-
cerning espionage. When I arranged for the interview and Dr. Oppenheimer
came in, when I told him that I wanted to discuss the incident, he immediately
started discussing Lomanitz with me. When I told him it was the other Inci-
dent where other parties may be interested in this, he immediately started then
relating the information he gave me. I don't think there was any break or
adjustment at the time. I felt he was giving something he already had or he
knew. Furthermore, as I believe I stated before, and reviewing the situation
after a while, I felt that he had this information and he felt that he wanted to
give it to us because of the fact that he found out we may be making a rather
thorough Investigation of the whole project and the activities. Finally, the
824
information given there was rather serious and to a certain extent detailed. It
referred to a plan. It included a plan that was supposed to be in existence. It
included some details such as the contract, about the availability of contact
with the Soviet consulate and the reference to a technical device for purposes of
recording what information may be available.
Q. What conclusion did .you draw from the fact that the information was in
some circumstantial detail? What did that indicate to you?
A. That indicated that it was information already available to a man, and in
a field which probably was more operational, and therefore I felt, and feel, that
it was transmitted to him rather than made up by him.
Q. Do you still feel that way?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. You had a great deal of experience, have you not, in interrogating wit-
A. I have had some experience, yes.
Q. You have been doing it for years, haven't you?
A. BV>r a few years.
Q. You have had a great deal of experience in evaluating statements made
by witnesses, have you not, sir?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Was there then and is there anything now to suggest to you that his
statements to you about these details Dr. Oppenheimer was not giving you an
accurate report of what he had been told by the unnamed professor?
A. No. I had no reason not to believe they were truthful.
Q. Do you have any now?
A. No, I only know this from newspaper information.
Q. Yes.
A. And whether it is correct, I don't know. But I read in Dr. Oppenheimer's
reply to General Nichols he relates this incident. I feel that the information
which Dr. Oppenheimer gave me in 1948 was far more damaging to him and to
any of his friends than the information as related in the newspaper. If Dr.
Oppenheimer was not telling the truth at that time, he was making up a story
which would be more damaging to him than it appears the situation was ac-
cording to the newspaper item. I don't think that that is a normal human re-
action. I feel that the story as told then — the story as related in the newspaper
probably is in favor of Dr. Oppenheimer. In evaluating that, I felt that the in-
consistentcy there in my mind would favor the truth in the preliminary inter-
view, the interview of 1943.
Q. Would you care to elaborate upon your statement that you now consider
Dr. Oppenheimer a security risk?
A. As far as I know, Dr. Oppenheimer was affiliated with Communist front
activities. I have reason to feel that he was a member of the Communist
Party. I have seen no indication which indicates any change from that. I
feel that his supposed dropping of the Communist party activities in the early
part of the war need not necessarily express his sincere opinions, since that
was done by most all members of the Communist party. As a result of that,
I feel that the opinion I had back in 1943 probably would stand.
Q. You say was done by most all members of the party. Just what do you
mean by that?
A. Members of the party who came into the service, members who continued
in Government work, disclaimed any affiliation with the party.
Q. Colonel, -did any incident or. episode occur shortly after your interview
with Dr. Oppenheimer which tended to confirm your doubts about Dr. Oppen-
heimer?
A. There was an incident which caused me to stop and think. The evaluation
was difficult, but the timing and coincidence was an important factor. Joseph
Weinberg wrote a note to a man, a Flanigan, also a known Communist, stating—-
in the letter, it was a card, he did not it, but it was in the letter which he
mailed, stating, "Dear A. Please don't contact me," or something to that
effect I can't recall. "Please don't make any contact with me, and pass this
message to 8 and B, only don't mention any names. I will take a walk with you
when this matter is all cleared up." That was dated the 6th of September.
Of course, we were very concerned over the entire situation and since Weinberg
had close contact and association with Dr. Oppenheimer I felt at the time that
it was the result of the situation which culminated in my interview with Dr.
Oppenheimer.
Q. How did you interpret the expression "take a walk with you"?
325
A. The Communist people at the time were trying to avoid any discussions.
They tried to carry on their discussions either outside or in an automobile or
out on the street.
Q. Why?
A. In order to avoid detection. They avoided fixed positions.
Q. Colonel, I will ask you what information you can give us in brief about
certain people whose names I will give you. William Schneiderman?
A. William Schneiderman was one of the top Communist functionaries in
California. His name appeared quite a bit in the process of our Investigation,
and it was always Communist connected. I believe he has been tried and con-
victed for advocating the overthrow of the Government by force and violence,
and has been convicted and if I am not mistaken, is now out on appeal.
Q. Rudy Lambert.
A. Rudy Lambert was also in the same class with Schneiderman, same type
of individual. He is now also under conviction for the same offense.
Q. Steve Nelson.
A. Steve Nelson, of course, was directly connected with the espionage efforts at
the Radiation Laboratory. He was convicted in the East for the offense of
advocating the overthrow of the Government by force and violence. I think he
was convicted and may be serving a jail term now.
Q. Isaac Folkoff?
A. Isaac Folkoff is a Communist in the bay area, I think in San Francisco —
I am not sure — and he was in a business, I believe, and served as an inter-
mediary.
Q. Intermediary for what purpose?
A. For contact between Communists.
Q. Louise Bransten.
A. Louise Bransten is a Communist Party member who has a record of con-
tacts with Soviet officials. She, according to reports I have read, I think, is
independently wealthy and has served the Communist cause. She is, I think,
in the East now.
Q. Contact with Soviet officials in what connection?
A. I presume that the contact with Soviet officials for the purpose of passing
information. She was in contact for instance with a man, KheifLts, who was a
Soviet official in San Francisco. I think he took the place of the initial contact
of the Soviet official who contacted Nelson.
Q. What was his name?
A. Ivanov.
Q. Joseph Weinberg you have already told us about. .
A. Yes.
Q. Dr. Thomas Addis.
A. I don't know much about Dr. Thomas Addis. He was a professor at
Sanford University, I think. As far as I can recollect there were allegations
that he was a Communist Party member.
(Mr. Garrison returned to the hearing room.)
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. David Jenkins.
A. David Jenkins was a member of the California Labor School. If I am
not mistaken, he was the head of it at one time in the early forties.
Q. Do you remember his wife's name?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Did you know of someone named Edith Arnstein?
A. No, I don't.
Q. John Pitman?
A. John Pitman, if I am not mistaken was on the staff of the Peoples World
Q. What was the Peoples World?
A. Peoples World was a Communist Party publication.
Q. Where?
A. In San Francisco.
Q. Hannah Peters.
A. The name Peters is familiar.
Q. And her husband, Bernard Peters.
A. Bernard Peters I know was a scientist, I think, but I don't know enough
about him.
Q. David Adelson.
A. David Adelson was very active in the FAECT, the union, Federation of
Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians.
826
Q. Do you have any information with respect to his Communist connections?
A. There were reports of his Communist connections. He was very active in
trying to penetrate the radiation laboratory with members of the union. As a
matter of fact, I think he was one of the men who were contacted by Leomanitz
and Weinberg, and so forth, when Lomanitz was inducted.
Q. Kenneth May.
A. I remember the name of Kenneth May as being connected with the Com-
munist Party. I don't know any particulars about him.
Mr. ROBB. That is all I care to ask, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Silverman.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Colonel Pash, how often have you met Dr. Oppenheiniej- ?
A. Once, for this interview.
Q. That was that meeting of August 26, 1943?
A. Yes.
Q. And as far as you can recall until today that is the only time you have
ever seen him in your life?
A. Physically, yes.
Q. I think you gave some testimony about four people, Messrs. Lomanitz,
Bohm, Friedman.
A. And Weinberg.
Q. And Weinberg, yes. Those people were employed at the radiation labora-
tory?
A. That is right.
Q. In Berkeley.
A. In Berkeley.
Q. They were not employed at Los Alamos?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. So far as you know, did Dr. Oppenheimer have any responsibility for their
employment at Berkeley?
A. I don't know enough about personnel administration there. I recall in'
reviewing the documents available to me at the time that I think he made some
comments with reference to Lomanitz.
Q. He didn't hire these people?
A. I don't know who hired them.
Q. He was not the director of the radiation laboratory the way he was at
Los Alamos?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Ton said he made some comments about Lomanitz. I think you said he
made some, I don't remember the word now, protest, pressure, or something
about it, when Lomanitz' draft determent was terminated?
A. When it was about to be terminated,
Q. Did Lomanitz' superiors on his job complain about it?
A. Weinberg and Bohm, to my knowledge.
Q. Did Lomanitz's superiors on his job complain about it?
A. I think that Dr. Lawrence may have.
Q. Did anyone else of his superiors?
A. That I don't know.
Q. You have recently had occasion to refresh your recollection as to what
Dr. Oppenheimer did about this matter ; have you not?
A. Yes.
Q. You have not had occasion to refresh your recollection as to whether —
before I finish this question, I want to be perfectly clear I am not and do not
intend to make any accusations about any people I am naming here, because I
consider all their actions perfectly innocent— you have not had occasion to re-
fresh your recollection recently as to what Dr. Lawrence did about protesting
or objecting to Mr. Lomanitz' deferment?
A. The only way that I knew that Dr. Lawrence may have taken part is
because Lomanitz mentioned in discussing the matter that Dr. Lawrence was
going to state that he was needed or something to that effect
Q. You, knew that Dr. Lawrence was very anxious to see that the work of his
laboratory went well?
A. Yes, I realize that
Q. And Dr. Oppenheimer was very anxious to see that the work of his labora-
tory went well?
A. I realize that
327
Q. And neither one of them would be very happy to lose a good technical man?
A. I presume so.
Q. And were you told that Dr. Oppenheimer said that if Lomantiz is drafted,
Dr. Lawrence will want to take somebody from Dr. Oppenheimer's staff?
Q. And Dr. Oppenheimer didn't like that.
A. That is right.
Q. And he so wrote you?
A. I know he stated that I don't know whether he wrote it
Q. I think that is in the record. By the way, in the course of refreshing your
recollection, have you also listened to the recording of your conversation?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you do that?
A. I think about 2 days ago.
Q. And you played it over once?
A. Yes.
Q. I would like to come to the incident of September 6 in which Joseph
Weinberg wrote a note to Flanigan omewhat to the effect, "Dr. A. Please don't
contact me, and pass this message to S and B, and I will take a walk with you"
and so on.
A. Yes.
Q. As far as you know, was A, S, or B, Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. No.
Q. You connected this with your talk with Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. Yes, with the situation around that time, which culminated in Dr. Oppen-
heimer's interview.
Q. One reason for that was the timing?
A. That is right
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer's interview with you was on August 26th ?
A. That is right
Q. And this letter was 11 days later, September 6?
A. Yes.
Q. Obviously you don't know what other problems Mr. Weinberg was worried
about in that period, or what else may have happened in that 11 days to stir
him up.
A. That is right.
Q. I think you said that another reason you connected was because of Dr.
Weinberg's close contact and association with Dr. Oppenheimer. Would you
tell us so far as you know what Dr. Weinberg's association with Dr. Oppenheimer
was?
A. Yes. He was a student of Dr. Oppenheimer's at the university. In two,
I think, instances when problems arose for him on one instance he went with
Bohin to see Dr. Oppenheimer. That was on the 2d of September, in connection
with the Loinanitz situation. And from the conversations that were bad in the
group, my impression was that he discussed Dr. Oppenheimer as sort of a man
they could advise with. I recall that was not the 2d of September. It may have
been during Dr. Oppenheimer's trip to San Francisco that Bohm and Weinberg
saw him on which they said they also feel that the draft may reach them, too.
Q. They also felt, too, what — the draft?
A. The draft may reach them because of their activities.
Q. Would you try to identify the approximate time of this? You say you think
it was not September?
A. No, if I am not mistaken it was during the trip of Dr. Oppenheimer to
San Francisco.
Q. When was that?
A. It was in those dates of 26th or 27th of August
Q. So that too was about 10 days before?
A. Yes.
Q. Did Lieutenant Johnson go to Dr. Oppenheimer and question him about
Elteuton or did Dr. Oppenheimer come to Lieutenant Johnson?
A. As Lieutenant Johnson related it to me, I don't know, he said Dr. Oppen-
heimer told me. I don't know the' details of where they met or what the cir-
cumstances surrounding that was.
Q. Did Lieutenant Johnson tell you that Dr. Oppenheimer at that very first
interview mentioned Mr. Eltenton's name?
A. No. I don't know whether it was the first interview he had with Johnson.
Q. Wasn't your interview with Dr. Oppenheimer the day after?
828
A. Excuse me. I thought you meant Johnson's first interview with Dr.
Oppenheimer. It is first because it preceded mine is what you mean, is that
right?
Q. Yes.
A. I understand.
Q. And according to Lieutenant Johnson's report, Dr. Oppenheimer came to
Lieutenant Johnson and mentioned Eltenton's name?
A. Yes. I don't recall that He mentioned the espionage activities.
Q. You do not now recall whether Dr. Oppenheimer mentioned to Lieutenant
Johnson Eltenton's name on the day before?
A. No, I am sorry, I don't.
Q. In your one interview with Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr. Oppenheimer did mention
the name?
A. Yes.
Q. He volunteered the name?
A. Yes.
Q. At that time
Mr. HOBB. Mr. Chairman, I don't mean to interfere but I think the question
whether he volunteered the name is a conclusion. I don't wish to concede
Mr. SILVEEMAN. There have been a fair number of conclusions suggested by
you, Mr. Robb.
Mr. ROBB. There certainly have.
Mr. GRAY. Proceed, Mr. Silverman.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Thank you, sir.
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. At the time that Dr. Oppenheimer gave you Mr. Eltenton's name, was Mr.
Bltenton already under suveillance by you?
A. We had no connection with Mr. Eltenton. We had his name, but he was not
under our surveillance. He was not connected with the radiation laboratory
as far as I know.
Q. So that when Dr. Oppenheimer gave you this name, this was an important
piece of information for you?
A. No, we had his name, but not in connection with our investigation.
Q. Did you have his name as someone who might be mixed up in an espionage
attempt?
A. Yes, as a Communist Party member. We would not have those details as to
his activities, because we were not conducting the investigation.
Q. You were conducting an investigation about espionage.
A. Yes, by the limitation agreement we did not investigate people who were
not connected with the military or specifically with the radiation laboratory.
Q. So far as you know was there any information— I withdraw that
You did not have any information that connected Mr. Eltenton with an
espionage attempt or approach?
A. We had information which connected Mm with the contacts of the Soviet
contacts, but I personally in my office did not have the details of those contacts.
Q. And did Dr. Oppenheimer say to you that the reason he was not giving
you the name of the professor was that he thought the man was innocent?
A. He thought that this was not serious and that he had not achieved anything.
Q. And of course Dr. Oppenheimer was very wrong not to give you that name.
A. Yes.
Q. And I think we would all agree with that Do you have any information
of any leakage of restricted data through Dr. Oppenheimer to any unauthorized
person?
Mr. ROBB. May I have that read back?
(Question read by the reporter.)
The WITNESS. No.
By Mr. SIEVEBMAN :
Q. And Dr. Oppenheimer did tell you that on the one instance when the
professor approached him, he refused to have anything to do with it?
A. Yes; he told me that,
Q. And some time in 1943, he did give the professor's name?
A. Yes.
Q. We all agree that Dr. Oppenheimer exercised poor Judgment, indeed, and
was very wrong not to give you the name of Professor Chevalier. Against that
agreement by everyone here, I would like to ask you these questions.
829
Mr. GRAY. Wait a minute. I take it that everyone here includes the members
of this board. The hearing is being conducted for the information of the mem-
bers of this board in the discharge of its functions. I as chairman have been
extremely lenient, perhaps unduly so, in allowing counsel to express an opinion.
This is not the first time that you have said, Mr. Silverman, that everyone here
agrees on something.
I should like to ask you please to refrain from expressions of opinions, and
not to try to give a witness an indication that you speak for anybody but your-
self, if you are expressing an opinion.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Very well, sir. I am sorry.
Mr. GRAY. It is all right ; proceed.
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. You have had a good deal of experience with security and intelligence
matters in the last 12 or 13 years.
A. I have had some experience ; yes.
Q. You were pretty new at security matters in 1943?
A. No; I don't think so.
Q. You had a couple of years of experience?
A. I have had past experience, too.
Q. I assume it is fair to say that in the last 12 or 13 years you have learned
a good deal about security and intelligence work?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And perhaps your own opinions have to some extent changed or crystallized
over that period?
A. Opinions as to operational procedures?
Q. Yes ; and the right things for people to do with respect to security and
so on.
A. No; I don't think they have changed much as to the right things to do.
Q. Do you believe it possible that Dr. Oppenheimer's opinions have changed
over that period?
A. I don't think I can speak for Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. You have only seen him once in your life.
A. That is right
Q. Do you believe that his record since 1943 should properly be weighed
against his admitted mistake and failure to make a prompt, frank and full
report in 1943, to determine whether he is now a security risk?
A. I don't know which record you are referring to.
Q. Whatever his activities have been since 1943 with which of course you are
not familiar.
A. Yes. I again think that is the position of the board
Q. Exactly.
A. To answer, not mine.
Mr. BOBB. I am sorry. I didn't get that
The WITNESS. I said that is not my position to answer that
Mr. SILVERMAN. That is all. Thank you.
Mr. GRAY. Colonel Pash, I would make reference now to your interview with
Dr. Oppenheimer. I don't have the date fixed in my mind, but the only interview
you had with him.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. In your earlier testimony, I believe you indicated that with respect
to this interview, Lieutenant Johnson reported to you that he had received some
information and you then decided you wished to talk personally to Dr. Oppen-
heimer.
The WITNESS. Yes. Lieutenant Johnson said he received It from Dr.
Oppenheimer.
Mr. GRAY. In the beginning of your interview, it seemed to you that Dr.
Oppenheimer thought you wanted to talk to him about Lomanitz?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir,
Mr. GRAY. But that the substance of the interview concerned the so-called
Chevalier episode.
The WITNESS. I may not quite understand you.
Mr. GRAY. I am afraid it was not a good question. In the beginning of your
interview with Dr. Oppenheimer, there was some mention of Lomanitz, and
then you had to make it plain to Dr. Oppenheimer you wanted to talk about
the Chevalier incident.
The WITNESS. About the incident which eventually involved Chevalier.
830
Mr. GBAY. Yes. And you testified also, I think, that it may have occurred
to you at the time that the reason Dr. Oppenheimer volunteered to Lieutenant
Johnson what he did about the episode was that he may have known there was
an investigation going on, and that this might have been found out about in
some other way, and therefore he thought he better get the information to the
security officers himself.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir; I apologize. Did you mention Johnson's name in con-
nection with that? I may have thought I heard it May I ask that it be reread?
I am sorry.
Mr. GBAT. Yes ; you may ask. I am going to be embarrassed when I read it
in print I might as. well be embarrassed when I hear it read back now. It was
a poor question. Can you read it back?
The WITNESS. I didn't mean to imply that
Mr. GBAT. There is no need to. I know it
(Question read by the reporter.)
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Is that the substance of what you said?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir ; and the question I think was clearly put to me.
Mr. GBAY. Now, if there had been only one person involved in the Chevalier
contact, that is, to Dr. Oppenheimer himself, it is unlikely, I suppose, that you
would have found out about it, except from Dr. Oppenheimer.
The WITNESS. That is right
Mr. GRAY. In other words, unless he had volunteered this information to Lieu-
tenant Johnson in the first place, and repeated It to you in the second place,
this may never have been a matter of discussion in a possible future hearing?
The WITNESS. Of course, we cannot exclude the possibility if the investigation
took some other tangent and that may have come out, but that is just a sup-
position.
Mr. GRAY. But if the contact had been just between Professor Chevalier and
Dr. Oppenheimer in Dr. Oppenheimer's home, it is pretty unlikely that you would
have known about it except from Dr. Oppenheimer?
The WITNESS. It is unlikely that we would know about ; yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Did It occur to you, and if it didn't, I wish you would say so, that
the fact that Dr. Oppenheimer in some detail mentioned two other people than
the individual who later turned out to be himself— I am not sure it was two
other people.
The WITNESS. It was three other people, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Three other people.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GBAY. Let me rephrase my question. Did it occur to you at the time
that the fact that Dr. Oppenheimer mentioned both to Lieutenant Johnson and
to you contacts with 3 people for information, 2 of whom were supposed to be
at Los Alamos and 1 of whom was supposed soon to go to Oak Ridge, that he
was giving you this information thinking that you possibly could find out about
these other 3 people? I am afraid that is not a clear question. I am trying to
ask you whether it occurred to you at the time that he was giving you the story
of the contact because he felt that it might be otherwise discovered, or that he
was giving you the story in this kind of detail because he felt these details
might be discovered?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir ; my impression was that he felt that we would discover
in our investigation the fact that there were these contacts, and the extent of
them.
Mr. GBAY. Is it true that he said he thought these were innocent contacts,
and therefore weren't worth pursuing in his Judgment? Is that correct?
The WITNESS. He said that ; yes, sir. But the reason— weU, excuse me.
Mr. GBAY. You did, indeed, try to find out at least who the individual was
who was scheduled to go to Oak Ridge?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir ; as I recall we did.
Mr. GBAY. So that at the time you did believe that people other than Dr.
Oppenheimer himself were involved in this.
The WITNESS. We didn't believe, sir?
Mr. GBAY. You did believe.
The WITNESS. We did believe. As a matter of fact, we didn't know how many
more contacts were made.
Mr. GBAY. But in fact, you never established that there were any other
contacts?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
831
Mr. GRAY. And the man whose orders you held up, who had been scheduled
for movement to Oak Ridge, turned out in fact not to have been Involved?
The WITNESS. I hate to bring up a name at a sort of very slim recollection,
but to emphasize the point, I believe, and in this instance I hope if I am mis-
taken it is excusable, because I feel it was a man whom we had under suspicion
as one of the men who was a Communist Party member or associate, and on
whom an Investigation was being run. We had never established his contact with
Chevalier.
Mr. GRAY. Just for the clarification of the record, Colonel Pash, am I correct
in thinking that after receiving Eltenton's name from Dr. Oppenheimer your
Jurisdictional limitations would have prevented your investigating Mr. Bltenton,
whatever your inclinations might have been? Is that correct?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. And that this then became a function of some other agency of
Government?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Did you communicate with the other agency of Government what
you learned?
The WITNESS. I did, sir, yes.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Evans.
Dr. EVANS. Colonel Pash, did you know, Fuchs?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Mr. EVANS. Did you know Greenglass?
The WITNESS. No, sir ; that happened in my absence.
Dr. EVANS. Having been connected with a couple of institutions of learning
myself, not radiations laboratories, of course, and not the high powered nuclear
physics that was going on here, I am surprised— maybe I should not be — at the
number of communists and fellow travelers gathered together at one point in
this radiation laboratory. Did that surprise you or is that Just normal?
The WITNESS. No, sir; that was a surprise. We did not expect it.
Dr. EVANS. It is a surprise to me. I am still concerned, and I don't under-
stand these three men that Dr. Oppenheimer mentioned, three contacts, is that
correct?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Did he mean there were three men besides Chevalier who had
approached him, or these other men were approaching somebody else besides
Dr. Oppenheimer?
The WITNESS. No, sir; this unknown professor contacted these three men,
which proved to be Chevalier later.
Dr. EVANS. He contacted Dr. Oppenheimer, and then he contacted three
other men?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Dr. EVANS. Possibly to get Information from them.
The WITNESS, Yes, sir.
Dr. EVANS. I Just wanted that clear for the record. Maybe everybody
understood it, but I didn't You tried to find out those other three men, didn't
you?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir; both from Dr. Oppenheimer and through investigative
procedures.
Dr. EVANS. That is all.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Silverman.
Mr. SILVERMAN. May we take just a moment, sir?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
Mr. SELVEBMAN. I have no further questions.
Mr. ROBB. That is all. Thank you very much.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you, Colonel Pash.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. ROBB. For the record, I think counsel have finally agreed upon the fl«*i
definitive text of the Pash interview.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Yes, I understand they have.
Mr. ROBB. I think that should be read into the record when we get it typed
up, and also I should like to have the Lansdale interview, read into the record.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, we had previously requested that it be read
aloud. We waived that in the interest of getting along.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Why doesn't the stenographer Just copy it?
Mr. GRAY. Yes, it will just be copied into the record.
(Brief recess.)
832
Mr. GfcAY. Do you wish to testify under oath?
Mr. BOBDEN. I would prefer to testify under oath.
Mr. GBAY. Would you stand and raise your right hand. Give your full name.
Mr. BOBDKN. My name is William Liscum Borden.
Mr. GRAY. William Liscum Borden, do you swear that the testimony you
are to give the board shall he the truth, the whole truth, and nothing hut the
truth, so help you God?
Mr. BORDBN. I do.
Whereupon, William Liscum Borden was called as a witness, and having been
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Will you be seated, please.
It Is my duty, Mr. Borden, to remind you of the existence of the so-called
perjury statutes. May I assume you are familiar in general with them?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Also I should like to request that if in the course of your testimony
it becomes necessary for you to refer to or to disclose restricted data or classified
material you notify me in advance so that we may take necessary security
measures.
Finally, Mr. Borden, I should say that we treat these proceedings as a con-
fidential matter between the Atomic Energy Commission, its officials and wit-
nesses on the one hand, and Dr. Oppenheimer and his representatives on the
other. The Commission is making no releases with respect to these proceedings
and on behalf of the board, I express the hope that witnesses will take the same
view of the situation.
The WITNESS. You may count on me to observe that suggestion.
Mr. GBAY, Mr. Bobb.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Where do you live at present?
A. 711 St James Street, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Q. What is your present occupation?
A. I work for the Westinghouse Electric Corp. in its atomic power division.
Q. What is your position?
A. My title is assistant to the manager of the Westinghouse atomic power
division.
Q. How long have you held that position?
A. Since July 1, 1953.
Q. What are your duties?
A. I assist the manager of the division in planning and coordinating matters,
serve as his alter ego as to certain designated matters which he stipulates.
Q. Prior to your assuming that position, what was your position?
A. I was executive director of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
Q. Of the United States Congress?
A. That is correct.
Q. How long did you hold that position?
A. From the last days of January 1949 until about June 1, 1953.
Q. Did you have a staff serving with you?
A. I did.
Q. How many people?
A. Approximately 19 or 20.
Q. In general what was the scope of your work?
A. It was the duty of the staff to collect facts concerning the atomic energy
program, and to make recommendations to the chairman and members of the
committee.
Q. Prior to assuming those duties, what did you do?
A. I was legislative secretary to Senator Brien McMahon for about 6 months.
I believe it was in the middle part of 1948 that I went to work for him.
Q. What is your educational background?
A. I hold an A. B. and LL. B. degree from Yale.
Q. What dates?
A. I got my A. B. in the spring of 1942, and my LL. B. in September 1947,
Q. Where were you in the interim?
A. .1 was a pilot in the Army Air Force for 3 years during the war.
Q. Where?
A. I served with the 8th United States Air Force based in England.
Q. After you graduated from law school, you went where, with Senator
McMahon?
833
A. No, I went to the Office of Alien Property of the Justice Department.
Q. As an attorney?
A. As an attorney, and I stayed there as I recall from January of 1948 until
mid-1948, when I went to work for Senator McMahon.
Q. In your capacity as executive director of the staff of the joint committee,
did you give consideration to the matter of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer?
A. I did, yes.
Q. Would you say you gave much or little consideration to Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I would say I gave increasing consideration over a period of years, Mr.
Robb.
Q. By the way, I might ask you, Mr. Borden, you are appearing today in
response to a subpena?
A. Thank you for giving me an opportunity of emphasizing that a subpena
commanding me to appear here has been served on me, and I testify under official
compulsion.
Q. As a result of your study of the matter of Dr. Oppenheimer, did you reach
certain conclusions in your mind with respect to him?
A. I did, yes.
Q. Did there come a time when you expressed those conclusions in a letter to
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation?
A. That is correct.
Q. When was that?
A. The letter was dated November 7, 1953.
Q. Was that subsequent to the termination of your connection with the joint
committee?
A. That was, yes.
Q. Prior to writing that letter, did you discuss the writing of it with anybody
connected with the Atomic Energy Commission?
A. I did not
Q. Did you in that letter express your conclusions with respect to Mr. J. Robert
Oppenheimer?
A. I did.
Q. Were those conclusions your own conclusions?
A. They are.
Q. Were they your honest conclusions arrived at after great thought?
A. That is correct
Q. Are they still your conclusions?
A. They are.
Q. Do you have a copy of your letter with you?
A. I have one in front of me.
Q. Would you be good enough to read it?
A. This letter is dated November 7, 1968.
Q. While our friends are looking at that, I might ask you whether you know
Dr. Oppenheimer personally?
A. I have met him on a few occasions.
Mr. ROBB. May we proceed, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. SXLVEBHAR. One moment, please.
Mr. GRAY. I would like to ask the counsel what the purpose of delay is. He
is simply going to read this.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I can hardly conceive that a letter, with due
respect to Mr. Borden, by a gentleman stating what he adds the evidence up to
can be enormously helpful to the board which has Itself heard the evidence.
There are statements in this letter, at least one that I see, which I don't think
anybody would be very happy to have go into this record, and under those
circumstances, I would like to look at it a minute longer. There may be serious
question whether anybody will be helped by having this letter in the record.
Mr. GEAT. I think you are now raising a question that counsel cannot deter-
mine, Mr. Silverman.
Mr. SH.VERMAN. Of course not, sir.
Mr. GRA.Y. if you have any argument about it, I shall be glad to hare it
If you wish to protest the reading of the letter into the record, you are certainly
at liberty to do so. I take it, however, that it is evident that Mr. Bordon is
before he committee, he states that this letter is his own letter, he wrote it with-
out consultation with the Commission, that it represents the views he held in
November 1958, it represents the views he holds today, he is the Individual
concerned, he is being confronted by Dr. Oppenheimer and Oppenhelmer's coun-
sel and will be available for cross-examination. In view of the fact that being
834
here as he Is under subpena, which has been made clear, presumably this being
his opinion, this is what he would testify to. I simply don't see the objection
to reading the letter. If I am wrong about that, I should be glad to hear it.
Mr SILVEBMAN. Mr. Chairman, much of the material in this letter, or some
of the material in this letter, at least, is matter that has already been before the
Mr GBAT Mr. Silverman, you are not suggesting that we should not hear
from any witnesses who will testify to the same matters previous witnesses have
testified to?
Mr SILVERMAN. Let me say it this way. The thing that struck my eye at once
Is subdivision (e) on page 2. . That troubles me going into the record. If you
think it will advance things to have it in, all right
Mr GBAT. I would like to take a moment to consider that objection.
Mr. GAEBISON. Mr. Chairman, the third paragraph on page 4, and some com-
parable material brings in accusations here that have not before been made in this
record or even indicted in the Commission's letter.
Mr. GBAT. You are referring to what?
Mr. GABBISOON. To the third paragraph on page 4, and to the first clause on
page 4, and also the last clause on page 3. .-„.*« «.. ,
Mr. GBAT. Mr. Garrison, is there any question in your mind that if this is
the view of the witness, he would not so testify?
Mr. GABBISON. I have no question about that.
Mr GBAT. I am puzzled by the objection to his reading the letter he wrote in
November 1963, which he states now represents his present views as distinguished
from giving his present views at this time. I am just honestly not clear as to
what the objection is.
Mr. GABBISON. It is simply my feeling, Mr. Chairman, that if these represent
his present views, and the Commission's counsel has brought him here to testify
to this board about accusations which are not in the Commission's letter and
are not even suggested in them, and have never before been suggested in these
proceedings, we now have a new case which it seems to me either does not belong
here or should be included in the Commission's letter, either in the first instance
or by amendment
Mr. GBAT. I think now you are making a point that the board should examine,
and specifically in that case you refer to material on page 4, is that correct?
Mr. GABBISON. That is correct, and on the bottom of page 3, and the first
sentence at the top of page 2.
Mr. GBAT. I repeat you are making a point which you are entitled to have
considered by the board; that was certainly not clear to me from anything Mr.
Silverman said earlier.
I would therefore ask everyone to retire from the room except the board and
counsel for the board.
(All persons with the exception of the board and counsel for the Board left
the hearing room, and after a brief time reentered the room.)
Mr. GBAT. In response to the objection raised by counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer,
I would have this to say on behalf of the board:
No. 1, the material which the witness was about to read constitutes testimony
by the witness, and does not become a part of the letter of notification from the
General Manager of the Commission to Dr. Oppeaheimer. I would remind coun-
sel that under the regulations pursuant to which this proceeding is conducted the
requirements are that this Board makes specific findings with respect to the
items in the letter of notification.
I should also remind counsel that much of the testimony here given has not
necessarily reflected either items in the letter of the General Manager of the
Commission to Dr. Oppenheimer, or Dr. Oppenheimer's reply to that letter.
With the exception of the personal items referred to on page 2, and I yvill
have something to say to the witness about that, the material as I understand
it specifically referred to by Mr. Garrison is stated as a conclusion of the author
of the letter. Again I take it that the witness would be permitted to present
his conclusion about matters which are before this board. Witnesses have done
so with constancy throughout this proceeding. Therefore, after consultation
with the members of the board, the witness will be allowed to read this letter,
and all concerned will understand that this is a part of his testimony which is
not necessarily accepted by the Commission, does not become a part of the Com-
mission's letter of notification, nor are the conclusions drawn in the testimony
necessarily to be considered accepted by the board. It is the conclusion of the
witness, one of many whom we have had before the board, with respect to
matters concerned in this proceeding.
835
Mr. GARRISON. May I ask the Chairman a question?
Mr. GRAY. Yes ; you certainly may.
Mr. GABRISON. Is it the opinion of the board that the matters which I identi-
fied by paragraph and page numbers
Dr. EVANS. What page is that?
Mr. GARRISON. The passages to which I previously directed your attention. Is
it the opinion of the board that those are matters into which inquiry should
be directed?
Mr. GRAY. These are conclusions drawn by a witness with respect to material
I think all of which in one way or another has been touched upon in testimony
before the board.
Mr. GARRISON. The conclusions that are here stated, Mr. Chairman, that I
referred to, refer to entirely new topics so far as this proceeding and the letter
is concerned about which there has not been one breath in this record. I take
it that the rule from which I am reading, paragraph (j) of section 4.15, is for
the protection of the individual. Being for the protection of the individual,
it is not likely to be disregarded, because the purpose of this is to give full
notice of the individual. If we are to be tried here upon the subject matter
of these conclusions, this is something that belongs in the criminal courts and
not here. But if it must be heard here, then there should be notice of it.
Mr. GRAY. I would say to counsel that it is not my understanding from con-
versations with the board that testimony of this witness is in any way going
to broaden the inquiry of the board.
Mr. GARRISON. How can it avoid it, sir? Supposing you should believe the
witness? Here is a witness produced by counsel engaged by the Commission
and delegated with the responsibility by this board of calling such witnesses
he wishes, and he brings a witness in to make this kind of an accusation not
dreamed of in this proceeding up to this point, and not mentioned in the letter.
I think if anything could be more of a surprise and more calling for time, If
this is to be the subject matter of the inquiry, I don't know what it is.
Mr. GRAY. I should like to ask, Mr. Garrison, whether you knew of the exist-
ence of this letter?
Mr. GARRISON. I had heard rumors that Mr. Borden had written a letter;
•yes, sir. I had no notion that this kind of material was in it.
Mr. GRAY. This is a conclusion of a witness that you are speaking to now.
Mr. GARRISON. Yes; but I take it you are going to permit the witness to
adduce his evidence upon these topics. Otherwise, there is no point of his
reading the letter unless he is going to testify about it.
I would suggest, Mr. Chairman — I don't want to delay the proceeding
Mr. GRAY. The board is very much concerned with protecting the interests of
the individual concerned, the Government and the general public. So that I do
not consider this discussion a matter of delay.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest one thing? I assume that in the
event the witness should be asked whether or not upon the basis of the evidence
he has considered that he considers Dr. Oppenheimer a security risks, and he
should say that he did, and should then be asked to give his reasons, he might
very well give the reasons that he set forth in this letter under conclusions. I
can't see much difference. I think it would not be contended the scope of the
inquiry is thereby broadened or would be thereby broadened.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Bobb is making a point of form and not of substance, Mr.
Chairman. We are here put on notice in advance — this is the only way in
which it happens to come up— that this witness proposes to make accusations
of a new character not touched upon in the letter, and not suggested before in
these proceedings by anybody, even by the most vigorous critics of Dr.
Oppenheimer.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, might I say one thing for the record? The witness
wrote this letter on his own initiative and his own responsibility, setting out
certain matters of evidence, I think all of which, if not all, certainly most all
of which, are mentioned in the letter from General Nichols to Dr. Oppenheimer.
This letter was to Mr. Hoover. The letter is a part of the files before the board.
It is, I think, an important letter. It seemed to the Commission, it seemed to
us, that under those circumstances it was only fair to Dr. Oppenheimer and
his counsel that this witness should be presented here, confronted by Dr. Oppen-
heimer, and his counsel, subjected to cross-examination on the matters set out
in this letter.
The conclusions drawn by this witness in his letter are not allegations in the
letter from General Nichols to Dr. Oppenheimer. They will not be allegations
in any possible amendment of that letter. The conclusions are the conclu-
336
sions of the witness alone. They are conclusions which he has drawn from the
evidence Just as other witnesses on behalf of Dr. Oppenheimer have drawn the
conclusions that Dr. Oppenheimer is not a security risk, but on the contrary
is a man of great honesty, integrity, and patriotism.
I assume that if the witness haying written this letter had concluded from
the evidence set out by him that Dr. Oppenheimer was not a security risk, that
he was a splendid American, a man of honor, that Mr. Garrison would have
no objection to reading those conclusions. It seems to me it cuts both ways,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GABBISON. May I ask how long the Commission has had this letter in its
file?
Mr. ROBB. I don't know, Mr. Garrison. Some time, of course.
Mr. GABBISON. Did it have it prior to the letter of December 23, 1053?
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Garrison, I don't think I should be subjected to cross-examina-
tion by you, but I can say to yon that I am sure Mr. Hoover did not wait 8
months to send it over to the Commission.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, at the bottom of page 3, it says, "From such
evidence considered in detail the following conclusions are Justified." You can
call them conclusions or allegations ; it is all the same thing.
Mr. GRAY. This is simply the testimony of a witness.
Mr. GABBISON. This is the testimony of a witness produced by the Commission's
counsel to whom this task has been delegated, on his own responsibility bringing
in here to make accusations of the kind that I don't think belong here.
Mr. GBAT. I will state to counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer that copies of this
letter have been in the possession of the board along with all other material
and have been read by members of this board. Mr. Borden's conclusions are,
therefore, known to the members of this board. The board has certainly made
no suggestion to the Commission and the general manager of the Commission
has not otherwise taken the initiative to broaden the inquiry to include these
stated conclusions of the witness. If you prefer not to have Dr. Oppenheimer
confronted by a witness and cross-examined by his counsel with respect to
material which you know is in the possession of the board, of course that would
be your decision in what you consider to be the best protection of the interests
of Dr. Oppenheimer.
I gather that is what you are saying, because you have been informed by the
chairman that a copy of this letter is in the possession of the members of the
board. That, again, if I need to repeat this, does not in any way indicate
that it is anything more than one part of material consisting of a record which
is to be thousands of pages long, and various other data voluminous in nature
which are before this board. You may not assume that any of the conclusions
of any of the witnesses may necessarily be those of the board. As far as this
board is concerned— I hope I may speak for my colleagues — I do not think
we will insist on either direct or cross-examination of this witness. The con-
clusion which w.e had reached in the period during which you were excused from
the room was that we would proceed. However, I shall be glad to consult
further with the members of the board to determine whether we shall proceed
with the introduction of this letter.
I take it that counsel would not object to direct examination of this witness?
Yon are not objecting to the winess?
Mr. GABBISON. No.
Mr. GBAT. Mr. Morgan has Just observed to me that he felt that it was the
fairest thing to Dr. Oppenheimer to give hiyn and his counsel the opportunity
to examine the witness with respect to this letter which was in the possession
of the board. He doesn't insist that we proceed. I have not yet consulted Dr.
Evans.
Dr. EVANS. That is all right with me.
Mr. GABBISON.. Mr. Chairman, it is needless to say that we would much rather
have an opportunity to cross-examine if the board considers that this topic is
properly a part of the case. If the board considers that it is, then let us proceed
with it I trust that in view of the circumstances if it be your decision to
proceed, that to the extent that we need time here to prepare on this new kind
of an allegation, that we may have it.
Mr. GBAT. Yes.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, with respect to the objection previously raised
by Mr. Silverman, we withdraw that objection and prefer that the letter in its
entirety be read, if we are to go ahead with it
Mr. GBAT. All right, sir.
837
The WITNESS. This letter is dated November 7, 1943. A copy went to the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The original went to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, J>. 0. :
"DEAB MB. HOOVER : This letter concerns J. Robert Oppenheimer.
"As you know, he has for some years enjoyed access to various critical activi-
ties of the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Department
of Defense, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Research and Development
Board, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Resources Board, and the National Science Foundation. His
access covers most new weapons being developed by the Armed Forces, war plans
at least in comprehensive outline, complete details as to atomic and hydrogen
weapons and stockpile data, the evidence on which) some of the principal CIA
intelligence estimates Is based, United States participation in the United Nations
and NATO and many other areas of high security sensitivity.
"Because the scope of his access may well be unique, because he has had
custody of an immense collection of classified papers "
Dr. EVANS. Documents. You said papers.
The WITNESS. That is right Perhaps I should state that the copy I have
before me is one that I typed myself, and It is possible that It does not conform.
"Because the scope of his access may well be unique, because he has had
custody of an immense collection of classified papers covering military, intelli-
gence, and diplomatic as well as atomic-energy matters, and because he also
possesses a scientific background enabling him to grasp the significance of classi-
fied data of a technical nature, it seems reasonable to estimate that he is and for
some years has been in a position to compromise more vital and detailed
information affecting the national defense and security than any other individual
in the United States.
"While J. Robert. Oppenheimer has not made major contributions to the
advancement of science, he holds a respected professional standing among the
second rank of American physicists. In terms of his mastery of Government
affairs, his close liaison with ranking officials, and his ability to influence high-
level thinking, he surely stands in the first rank, not merely among scientists
but among all those who have shaped postwar decisions in the military, atomic
energy, intelligence, and diplomatic fields. As chairman or as an official or
unofficial member of more than 35 important Government committees, panels,
study groups, and projects, he has oriented or dominated key policies involving
every principal United States security department and agency except the FBI.
"The purpose of this letter is to state my own exhaustively considered opinion,
based upon years of study, of the available classified evidence, that more prob-
ably than not J. Robert Oppenheimer is an agent of the Soviet Union.
'This opinion considers the following factors, among others:
"(a) He was contributing substantial monthly sums to the Communist Party;
"(&) His ties with communism had survived the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the
Soviet attack upon Finland ;
" (c) His wife and younger brother were Communists ;
"(d) He had no close friends except Communists ;
" ( e) He had at least one Communist mistress ;
"(f) He belonged only to Communist organizations, apart from professional
affiliations ;
"(0) The people whom he recruited into the early wartime Berkeley atomic
project were exclusively Communists ;
" (h) He had been instrumental in securing recruits for the Communist Party ;
and
"(i) He was in frequent contact with Soviet espionage agents.
"2. The evidence indicating that—
"(a) In May 1942, he either stopped contributing funds to the Communist
Party or else made his contributions through a new channel not yet discovered ;
"(o) In April 1942 his name was formally submitted for security clearance;
" (c) He himself was aware at the time that his name had been so submitted ;
and
"(d) He thereafter repeatedly gave false information to General Groves, the
Manhattan District, and the FBI concerning the 1939-April 1&42 period.
"3, The evidence indicating that—
"(a) He was responsible for employing a number of Comirmnists, some of
them nontechnical, at wartime Los Alamos ;
" (o) He selected one such individual to write the official Los Alamos history ;
"(o) He was a vigorous supporter of the H-bomb program until August 6, 194$
638
( Hiroshima V, on which day lie personally urged each senior individual working
in this field to desist ; and
"(d) He was an enthusiastic sponsor of the A-bomb program until the war
ended, when he immediately and outspokenly advocated that the Los Alamos
Laboratory be disbanded.
"4. The evidence indicating that:
"(a) He was remarkably instrumental in influencing the military authorities
and the Atomic Energy Commission essentially to suspend H-bomb development
from mid-1946 through January 31, 1950.
"(o) He has worked tirelessly, from January 31, I960, onward, to retard the
United States H-bomb program;
"(c) He has used his potent influence against every postwar effort to expand
capacity for producing A-bomb material ;
"(d) He has used his potent influence against every postwar effort directed
at obtaining larger supplies of uranium raw material ; and
"(e) He has used his potent influence against every major postwar effort
toward atomic power development, including the nuclear-powered submarine
and aircraft programs as well as industrial power projects."
From such evidence, considered in detail, the following conclusions are Justified :
"1. Between 1929 and mid-1942, more probably than not, J. Robert Oppenheimer
was a sufficiently hardened Communist that he either volunteered espionage
information to the Soviets or complied with a request for such information.
(This includes the possibility that when he singled out the weapons aspect of
atomic development as his personal specialty, he was acting under Soviet
instructions.)
"2. More probably than not, he has since been functioning as an espionage
agent; and
"3. More probably than not, he has since acted under a Soviet directive in
influencing United States military, atomic energy, intelligence, and diplomatic
policy.
"It is to be noted that these conclusions correlate with information furnished
by Klaus Fuchs, indicating that the Soviets had acquired an agent in Berkeley
who informed them about electromagnetic separation research during 1942 or
earlier.
"Needless to say, I appreciate the probabilities identifiable from gy*3«"g evi-
dence might, with review of future acquired evidence, be reduced to possibilities ;
or they might also be increased to certainties. The central problem is not
whether J. Robert Oppenheimer was ever a Communist ; for the existing evidence
makes abundantly clear that he was. Even an Atomic Energy Commission
analysis prepared in early 1947 reflects this conclusion, although some of the
most significant derogatory data had yet to become available. The central
problem is assessing the degree of likelihood that he in fact did what a Commu-
nist in his circumstances, at Berkeley, would logically have done during the
crucial 1939-42 period— that is, whether he became an actual espionage and
policy instrument of the Soviets. Thus, as to this central problem, my opinion
is that, more probably than not, the worst is in fact the truth.
"I am profoundly aware of the grave nature of these comments. The matter
is detestable to me. Having lived with the Oppenheimer case for years, having
studied and restudied all data concerning him that your agency made available
to the Atomic Energy Commission through May 1953, having endeavored to
factor in a mass of additional data assembled from numerous other sources, and
looking back upon the case from a perspective in private life, I feel a duty simply
to state to the responsible head of the security agency most concerned the conclu-
sions which I have painfully crystalized and which I believe any f airminded man
thoroughly familiar with the evidence must also be driven to accept
"The writing of this letter, to me a solemn step, la exclusively on my own per-
sonal initiative and responsibility.
"Very truly yours,
"(Signed) William L. Borden,
" (Typed) WILLIAM L. BOBDEW."
Mr. RQLANDER. Mr. Chairman, I had copies of this letter made, and Mr. Borden
read from the copies, and I think there is one error in the copy that he read.
That begins where the letter says, "This opinion considers the following factors
among others : (1) The evidence indicating that as of April of 1942" and then it
proceeds.
Mr. SILVKEMAN. Indicating that as of what date?
839
Mr. ROLANDER, "This opinion considers the following factors, among others :
"1. The evidence indicating that as of April 1942 (a)."
Mr. GBAY. Now, I should like to make a statement with respect to this letter
which I am authorized to make by the two other members of the board which I
think may ease Mr. Garrison's problem as he has seen it in this discussion.
I would say to you that the board has no evidence before it that Dr. Oppen-
heimer volunteered espionage information to the Soviets or complied with a
request for such information; that he has been functioning as an espionage
agent or that he has since acted under Soviet directive, with one qualification
as to that latter point, which I am sure will not surprise you. That is, there
has been testimony by various witnesses as to whether members of the Com-
munist Party, as a matter of policy at the time of the war years or entering
into Government or military service, complied with policy or policy directions
in that regard. With respect to that qualification, which I believe appears
already in the record, and which is certainly no surprise to Dr. Oppenheimer
and his counsel, I repeat that the members of the board feel that they have no
evidence before them with respect to these matters which I have just recited.
I repeat, therefore, that there are now before the board in the nature of
conclusions of the witness, stated to be his own conclusions on the basis of other
material which is set forth in some detail, and I believe practically all of which
has been referred to without making a judgment whether it has been established
or not.
Mr. EOBB. May I proceed?
Mr. GBAY. Yes.
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Mr. Borden, may I ask you, sir, why you waited until you left the joint
committee to write that letter?
A. Mr. Eobb, this case has concerned me over a period of years. My concern
has increased as time passed. Several actions were taken with respect to it
while I was working for the joint committee. It has consisted in the prepara-
tion of 400 questions raised on the case. This was the final work that I per-
formed before leaving the committee. I felt at that time that I had not pre-
viously fully measured up to my duty on this matter. As of the time I left,
the preparation of those questions constituted for me the discharge of the
duty. However, no position was taken in the formulation of those questions, or
at least if there was a position, it was implicit only.
After I left, I took a month off and this matter pressed on my mind. The
feeling grew upon me that I had not fully discharged what was required of me
in view of the fact that I had not taken a position.
Accordingly, by approximately mid-October, I had crystalized my thinking
to the point where I felt that this step was necessary. There is a letter which
I have written to the Joint committee on this subject, if you wish me to refer
to it, or to read it to you.
Q. Is there anything, Mr. Borden, that you can now add to what you have set
out in this letter as your conclusions?
A. I have no desire to add anything.
Q. I am not ask you that, sir. Is there anything that you feel that is
appropriate for you to tell this boajrd in addition to what you have set out
in that letter?
A. I feel, Mr. Hobb, that it is my obvious duty to answer any questions that
are asked me. If I were to volunteer information, I think it is obvious that I
could talk over a long period of time.
Q. I am not asking you to volunteer, but what I want to know is, Does that
letter fully state your conclusions?
A. This letter reflects my conclusions as of now.
Q. Does it frilly reflect your conclusions?
A. Yes.
Q. So there Is nothing that you feel you should add to it?
A. That is correct. Perhaps I misunderstood you.
Q. Let me see whether or not you feel any hesitation about answering any
questions that either have been or may be put to you here, because of the
presence of Dr. Oppenheimer and his counsel
A. I do not.
Q. The answer is no?
A. The answer is no.
Mr. BOBB. I think that is all I care to ask. You may cross-examine.
840
Mr. GBAY. We will now take a recess until Monday at 2 o'clock for many
reasons. One is commitments identified with this enterprise as to schedule.
Second, I think It is useful if time is required for Mr. Garrison. I would hope
that my statement that I made to the board takes care of most of the difficulties
that we discussed.
Mr. GABEISON. Is it to be understood that the witness will be back here on
Monday?
Mr. GRAY. The witness is under subpena, and he is not happy to be here in
the first place. It is understood that he will be.
We are now in recess until Monday at 2 o'clock.
(Thereupon, at 4:30 p. m., a recess was taken until Monday, May 3, 1954,
at 2 p. m.)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER or J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
BUILDING T-3, ROOM 2022,
Washinffton, D. #., Monday, May 8, 1954.
The above-entitled matter came on lor hearing pursuant to recess
before the board, at 2 : 30 p. m.
Personnel Security Board: Mr. Gordon Gray, chairman; Dr. Ward
T. Evans, member; and Mr, Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Roger Kobb and C. A. Rolander. Jr., counsel for board;
J. Robert Oppenheimer, Lloyd K. Garrison, Samuel J. Silverman, and
Allen B. Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer; Herbert S.
Marks, cocounsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
(841)
PBOCEEDDNJS
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Garrison.
Mr. GARBISON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a short -statement, sir.
Over the weekend we have examined Mr. Borden's letter to Mr. Hoover of
November 7, 1953, which he read into the record at the last session. Mr. Borden
In his brief testimony stated that the letter constituted his conclusions, and that
he had nothing to add. It is quite clear that the letter consists not of evidence,
but of Mr. Borden's opinions arrived at from studying FBI reports and other
unspecified data. These opinions relate essentially to the items contained in
General Nichols* letter to Dr. Oppenheimer of December 23, 1953, which have been
canvassed in the testimony, and the documents before this board. It is apparent
that except for Mr. Borden's conclusions about espionage, for which there is
no evidence, and as to which the chairman has assured us there is no evidence
before the board, Mr. Borden's opinions represent his interpretation of evi-
dentiary matters which this board has been hearing about for the past 3 weeks
from persons who actually participated in the particular events which have been
the subject matter of this investigation.
In view of these considerations, it has seemed to us that if we were now to
ask Mr. Borden to develop further his opinions and conclusions, we would merely
be inviting argument about the interpretation of evidence.
While the board has been lenient in permitting argument by witnesses, it hardly
seems to us that we would be Justified in provoking or inviting opinions and argu-
ment which could run the gamut of all the evidence before the board.
For these reasons it has seemed to us appropriate to respond to Mr. Borden's
letter in our rebuttal and summation as we expect to do. Consequently, we shall
dispense with cross-examination unless the board should wish to ask Mr. Borden
questions, in which event we would like to reserve the right to do ours when the
board is through.
Mr. GBAT. Of course, it is the right of Dr, Oppenheimer and counsel to decline
to cross-examine any witness before this board. Obviously there is nothing in
our procedure which requires cross-examination.
Mr. Garrison has stated that this letter constitutes conclusions of the witness
which, I think he has stated, was the case on direct examination. I think, how-
ever, it appropriate that the record reflect the fact which would be very obvious
to anyone who reads it, that there has been a great deal of testimony here of
conclusions with respect to these matters which were contained in General
Nichols' letter to Dr. Oppenheimer, and witnesses called by Dr. Oppenheimer, .
and his counsel, have repeatedly stated that they had certain conclusions with
respect to these matters which related to Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty, character,
and associations.
I think the present witness has not sought to state anything other than these
are his own conclusions.
Mr. GAEBISON. That is right, Mr. Chairman. I did not mean to suggest that
other witnesses have not stated their conclusions and opinions. Of course, they
have. I meant merely to say that those conclusions were derived from testimony
of their own with respect to matters in which they had participated either with
Dr. Oppenheimer or in other connections from which they derived their con-
clusions.
Mr. BOBB. Mr. Chairman, just one perhaps minor remark. I am sure Mr.
Garrison did not mean it that way. He stated that there was no evidence of
espionage. I think what the chairman said, and I have the transcript before
me, is, "I would say to you that the board has no evidence before it that Dr.
Oppenheimer volunteered espionage information to the Soviets or complied with
a request for such information, that he has been functioning as an espionage
agent'1
I assume that is what Mr. Garrison referred to.
Mr. GAEBISON. That is to which I had reference.
Mr. ROBB. Yes.
(843)
844
Mr. GBAT. From the circumstances, I would say the witness is excused. Thank
you very much, Mr. Borden. I offer the apologies of the hoard for having kept
you here through the weekend or having you required to return for this purpose.
Thank you very much. m
Mr. ROBB. That is all the testimony we have to offer, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to talk to Mr. Garrison and his colleagues ahout the so-called
Pash ad Lansdale transcripts. I think we finally worked out the final version
of the Pash transcript I would like to have them appear in the record at this
point, if there is no objection.
Mr. GABBISON. I iave not seen whatever Mr. Eolander and Mr. Bcker worked
out
Mr. ROBB. Neither have I.
Mr. GABBISON, Subject to looking it over and possible conference that might
be necessitated by that between us, I certainly have no objection to its going in.
Before it is considered to be finally in, we should have an opportunity to look
whatever they have agreed to over.
Mr. ROBB, Surely.
Mr. GRAY. The chairman would like to make a comment on this. It certainly
is to be hoped that counsel can agree. Perhaps I had misunderstood. I thought
each of you had delegated.
Mr. ROBB. I did, Mr. Chairman.
Mr* GBAT. I had the understanding that whatever Mr. Rolander and Mr. Bcker
agreed was to be. If in your examination of it you think there is some material
matter, of course, you will not be denied the opportunity to bring it to the atten-
tion of the board.
Mr. ROBB. So far as I am concerned, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rolander's deci-
sion is it
Mr. GBAT. If Mr. Garrison feels compelled to raise questions, then I think it
would be well for you to become It"
Mr. ROBB. Very well.
Mr. GABBISON. I would just like an opportunity to read it over.
Mr. ROLANDER. It is being typed now. There is a possibility for some typo-
graphical errors.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of completeness of the record, we feel
that the original typewritten transcript as prepared in the office of Colonel Pash
in 1948, as he has testified here, should also be set out in the record following
the appended table, and I ask that be done.
Mr. GBAT. Very well.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chariman, in respect of the so-called Lansdale transcript, which
is also being set out in the record, counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer wish the record
to reflect that in agreeing to the printing of the Lansdale transcript of September
12, 1943, they do not concede its correctness, since the original recording or tape
from which the transcript was made is not available to counsel for purposes of
comparison.
Mr. GBAT. I take it that there is agreement among counsel with respect to
these matters which you have read, and the record will reflect that
Mr. ROBB. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GABBISON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
STIPULATION
Counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer and counsel for the Atomic Energy Commission
have compared the recording of the so-called Pash interview of August 26, 1943,
with the typewritten transcript, portions of which were used in the cross-examina-
tion of Dr. Oppenheimer. The following is, as nearly as they can understand
the recording, a correct transcription. Where portions did not appear to counsel
for Dr. Oppenheimer and for the Commission to be reasonably decipherable, this
has been indicated by three asterisks. The appended table reflects the changes
from the typewritten transcript.
845
"UNCLASSIFIED, 4/19/54 OAR,
"San, Franoisco, CaUf., August 27, 194S.
"MEMORANDUM FOB THE OFFICER IN CHAB6E
"Subject: D. S. M. Project.
"Re : Transcript of Conversation between Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer, lit CoL Boris
T. Pash, and Lt. Lyall Johnson.
"Transmitted herewith is the transcript of conversation between Dr. J. R.
Oppenheimer, Lt. Colo. Boris T. Pash, and Lt. Lyall Johnson, held in Lt John-
son's office in the New Class Room Building, University of California, Berkeley,
Calif., on August 26, 1943. It is to be noted that in some places the conversa-
tion was very indistinct and that the running commentary may be indecisive in
these places, but the substance of the material discussed is herewith presented :
"P. This is a pleasure, because I am interested to a certain extent in activities
and I feel I have a certain responsibility in a child which I don't know anything
about General Groves has, more or less, I feel, placed a certain responsibility
in me and it's like having a child, that you can't see, by remote control I
don't mean to take much of your time
"O. That's perfectly all right Whatever time you choose.
"P. Mr. Johnson told me about the little incident, or conversation, taking
place yesterday in which I am very much interested and it had me worried
all day yesterday since he called me.
"O. I was rather uncertain as to whether I should or should not talk to him
[Rossi] when I was here. I was unwilling to do it without authorization. What
I wanted to tell this fellow was that he had been indiscreet. I know that that's
right that he had revealed information. I know that saying that much might
in some cases embarrass him. It doesn't seem to have been capable of embar-
rassing him— to put it bluntly.
"P. Well, that is not the particular interest I have. It is something a little
more, in my opinion, more serious. Mr. Johnson said there was a possibility
that there may be some other groups interested.
"O. I fMnfc that is true, but I have no first-hand knowledge that would be,
for that reason, useful, but I think it is true that a man, whose name I never
heard, who was attached to the Soviet consul, has indicated indirectly through
intermediary people concerned in this project that he was in a position to
transmit, without any danger of a leak, or scandal, or anything of that kind,
information, which they might supply. I would take it that it is to be assumed
that a man attached to the Soviet consulate might' be doing it but since I know
it to be a fact, I have been particularly concerned about any indiscretions which
took place in circles close enough to be in contact with it To put it quite
frankly— I would feel friendly to the idea of the Commander in Chief informing
the Russians that we were working on this problem. At least, I can see that
there might be some arguments for doing that, but I do not feel friendly to the
idea of having it moved out the back door. I think that it might not hurt to
be on the lookout for it
"P. Could you give me a little more specific information as to exactly what
information you have? You can readily realize that phase would be, to me, as
interesting, pretty near, as the whole project is to you.
"0. Well, I might say that the approaches were always to other people, who
were troubled by them, and sometimes came and discussed them with me; and
that the approaches were always quite indirect MI I fed that to give more,
perhaps, than one name, would be to implicate people whose attitude was one
of bewilderment rather than one of cooperation. I know of no case, and I am
fairly sure that in all cases where I have heard of these contacts, would not
have yielded a single thing. That's as far as I can go on that Now there is a
man, whose name was mentioned to me a couple of times — I don't know of
my own knowledge that he was involved as an intermediary* It seems, however,
not Impossible and if yon wanted to watch him it might be the appropriate
thing to do. He spent quite a number of years in the Soviet Union. He's an
TftigHflh * * * I foi"k he's a chemical engineer. He was — he may not be here
now— at the time I was with him here, employed by the Shell development
His name is Eltenton. I would think that there was a small chance— well, let
me put it this way : He has probably been asked to do what he can to provide
information. Whether he is successful or not, I do not know, but he talked to
a friend of his who is also an acquaintance of one of the men on the project,
and that was one of the channels by which this thing went. Now I think that
846
to go beyond that would be to put a lot of names down, of people who are not
only innocent but whose attitude was 100-percent cooperative.
"P. Now here's a point. You can readily realize that if we get information
like that we have to work in an absolutely discreet manner. In other words
we can't afford to even indicate
"0. That you are concerned.
"P. That we are concerned or through whom we get information. However
anything that we may get which would eliminate a lot of research work on
our part would necessarily bring to a closer conclusion anything that we are
doing.
"0. Well, I'm giving you the one name that I think is, or isn't— I mean I don't
know the name of the man attached to the consulate— I think I may have been
told or I may not have been told and I have, at least not purposely, but actually
forgotten. He is— and he may not be here now. These incidents occurred of the
order of about 5, 6, 7, months ago.
"J. I was wondering, Dr. Oppenheimer, if there was a particular person—
maybe a person on the project that they were trying to pump information
from — that if we knew who those were, would at least know where to look for
a leak, not from the standpoint of * * *, but looking at a certain picture.
"P. Here's the point that I would feel.
"0. I would feel that the people that they tried to get information from were
more or less an accident [interpolation] and I believe I would be making some
harm by saying that
"P. Yes. Here's the thing— we, of course, assume that the people who bring
this information to you are 100 percent with you, and therefore, there is no
question about their intentions. However, if
"0. Well, IH tell you one thing— I have known of 2 or 3 cases, and I think
two of the men were with me at Los Alamos — they are men who are very closely
associated with me.
"P. Have they told you that either they thought they were contacted for that
purpose or they were actually contacted for that purpose?
"0. They told me they were contacted for that purpose.
"P. For that purpose.
"0. That is, let me give you the background. The background was — well, you
know how difficult it is with the relations between these two allies, and there
are a lot of people who don't feel very friendly to Russia, so that the inf orma-
tionr— a lot of our secret information, our radar and so on, doesn't get to them,
and they are battling for their lives and they would like to have an idea of what
is going on and this is just to make up, in other words, for the defects of our
official communication. That is the form in which it was presented.
"P. Oh, I see.
"0. Of course, the actual fact is that since it is not a communication which
ought to be taking place, it is treasonable. But it wasn't presented in that method.
[Garble.] It is a method carrying out a policy which was more or less a policy
of the Government and the form in which it came was that an interview be ar-
ranged with this man Eltenton who had very good contacts with a man from the
embassy attached to the consulate who was a very reliable guy (that's his story)
and who had a lot of experience in microfilm work, or whatever the hell.
"P. Well, now I may be getting back to a little systematic picture. * * * These
people whom you mentioned, who (two?) are down with you now * * * were
they contacted by Bltenton direct?
"0. No.
"P. Through another party?
"0. Yes.
"P. Well, now, could we know through whom that contact was made?
"0. I think it would be a mistake, that is, I think I have told you where the
initiative came from and that the other things were almost purely accident and
that it would involve people who ought not be involved in this
"P. This will not involve the people but it would indicate to us Bltenton's chan-
nel. We would have to, now that this is definite on Bltenton. We, of course
"0. It is not definite in the sense that I have seen him do the thing. He may
Jl^J!?611 misau°ted. I don't believe so. Now Bltenton is a member of the
FAB3GT or not?
"P. That's the union.
fa'^nJ^'V^6 ^^^SSi Je'S a man whose ^Pathies are certainly very
tor left,' whatever his affiliations, or he may or may not have regular contacts
with a political group,
847
"P. Well, here's how I feel
"0. I doubt it. In any case, it is a safe thing to say that the channels that
would be f bllowed in this case are those involving people who have been generally
sympathetic to the Soviet and somehow connected peripherally with the Com-
munist movements in this country. That's obvious. I don't need to tell you
that
"P. Well, yes, the fact is, this second contact— the contact that Eltonton had to
make with these other people— is that person also a member of the project?
"O. No.
"P. That also is an outsider?
"O. It's a member of the faculty, but not on the project.
"P. A member of the faculty here? Eltenton made it through a member of the
faculty to the project.
"O. As far as I know— these approaches were— there may have been more than
one person involved. I don't know.
"P. Here's how I feel about this leftist inclination. I think that whether a
man has "left" or "right" inclinations, if his character which is back of it— if
he's willing to do this, it doesn't make any difference what his inclinations are.
It's based on his character primarily and not
"0. A thing like this going on, let us say, with the Nazis would have a some-
what different color. I don't mean to say that it would be any more deserving of
attention, or any more dangerous, but it would involve rather different motives.
"P. Oh, yes, sure.
"O. I'm pretty sure that none of the guys here, with the possible exception of
the Russian, who is doing probably his duty by his country— but the other guys
really were just feeling they didn't do anything but they were considering the
step, which they would have regarded as thoroughly in line with the policy
of this Government, Just making up for the fact that there were a couple of guys
in the State Department who might block such communications. You may or
may not know that in many projects we share information with the British and
some we do not, and there is a great deal of feeling about that, and I don't
think that the issues involved here seem to the people very different, except
that of course, the people on the project realize the importance and that this is a
little bigger and the whole procedure gets away. [Garble.]
"P. Now. Do you feel that would affect— and there could be continued
attempts now to establish this type of contract?
"0. I haven't any idea.
"P. You haven't any idea? *
"O. As I say, if the guy that was here may by now be in some other town and
all that I would have in mind is this — I understood that this man to whom I
feel a sense of responsibility, Lomanitz, and I feel it for two reasons. One, he
is doing work which he started and which he ought to continue, and, second,
since I more or less made a stir about it when the question of his induction came
up, that this man may have been indiscreet in circles which would lead to trouble.
That is the only thing that I have to say. Because I don't have any doubt that
people often approach him, with whom he has contact, I mean whom he sees,
might feel it their duty if they got word of something, to let it go further and
that is the reason I feel quite strongly that association with the Communist
movement is not compatible with the Job on a secret war project, it is just that
the two loyalties cannot go.
"P. Yes— well
"O. That is an expression of political opinion, I think that a lot of very
brilliant and thoughtful people have seen something in the Communist move-
ment, and that they maybe belong there, maybe it is a good thing for the coun-
try. I hope it doesn't belong on the war project
"P. I get your point. I don't want to seem to you insistent. I want to again
sort of explore the possibility of getting the name of the person of the faculty —
I'll tell you for what reason. Not for the purpose of taking him to task in any
way whether its nonofficially, officially, or openly or not but to try to see Elten-
ton's method of approach. You may not agree with me, but I can assure you
that that is one of the most important steps. *
"0. I understand that, but I have to take the following points of view: I
think in mentioning Eltenton's name I essentially said about the man that I
think that he may be acting in a way which is dangerous to this country, and
which should be watched. I'm not going to mention the name of anyone in the
same breath, even if you that you will make a distinction. I just can't do that,
808318— «4 W
848
because in the other cases, I am convinced from the way in which they handled
the thing that they themselves thought it was a bad business.
"P. These other people, yes ; I realize-^but if— here is the point— if that man
is trying to make other contacts for Bltenton, it would take us some time to
try to—
"O. My honest opinion is that he probably isn't— that he ran into him at a
party and they saw each other or something and Bltenton said, "Do you suppose
you could help me? This a very serious thing because we know that important
work is going on here, and we think this ought to be made available to our allies,
and would you see if any of those guys are willing to help us with it — and then
it wouldn't have to be much." You see, that is the kind of thing. [Remaining
statement unintelligible.]
"P. Were these two people you mentioned — were they contacted at the same
time?
"O. They were contacted within a week of each other.
"P. They were contacted at two different times?
"0. Yes : but not in each other's presence.
"P. That's right. And then from what you first heard, there is someone else
who probably still remains here who was contacted as well?
"O. I think that is true.
"P. What I am driving at is that means that there was a plan, at least for
some length of time, to make these contacts — and we may not have known all
the contacts.
"O. That is certainly true. That is why I mentioned it. If I knew all about
it, then I would say forget it. I thought it would be appropriate to call to your
attention the fact that these channels at one time existed.
"P. Yes.
"O. I really think that I am drawing [garbled].
"P. You see, you understand that I am sort of — you picture me as a bloodhound
on the trail, and that I am trying to get out of you everything I possibly can.
"O. That's your duty to a certain extent.
"P. You see what I mean.
"O. It is also my duty not to implicate these people, who are acquaintances,
or colleagues and so on of whose position I am absolutely certain — myself and
my duty is to protect them.
"P. Oh, yes.
"O. If I thought that— I won't say i Wt might be slightly off.
"P. Well, then here's another point, Doctor, if we find that in making these
various contacts, that we get some information which would lead us to believe
that certain of these men may have either considered it or are still considering
it (mind you I do not even know these men, so it can't be personal)
"O. Well, none of them that I had anything to do with considered it. They
were just upset about it. * * * [Garbled.] They have a feeling toward this
country and have signed the Espionage Act ; they feel this way about it for I think
that the intermediary between Bltenton and the project, thought it was the wrong
idea, but said that this was the situation. I don' think he supported it. In
fact I know it.
"P. He made about at least three contacts that we knew of.
"O. Well, I think that's right, yes.
"P. And two of these contacts, are down there. That means we can assume at
least there is one of these men contacted still on the project here.
"O. Yes, I believe that this man has gone, or is scheduled to go to Site X.
"P. This third man?
"O. I think so.
"P. Well that is, as I say, if I can't get across that line, I even certainly
appreciate this much, because it
"O. I think it's a thing you ought to know.
"P. Oh, no doubt
"O. I think it's probably one of those sporadic things and I do not think— I have
no way of thinking it was systematic but I got from the way In which it was
handled, which was rather loosely, and frankly if I were an agent I would not
put much confidence in people who are loose-mouthed or casual. I would not
think that this was a very highly organized or very well put-together plan but
I don't know and I was very much afraid when I heard of Lomanitz* indiscretion
that it might very well be serious. I hope that isn't the case.
"P. You mentioned that this man is a member of this FAEOT. Do you think
that, as a representative of the organization, he would sort of represent their
attitude or do you think he is doing this individually?
349
"0. Oh, the FAEOT is quite a big union and has got all sorts of people in it
I'm pretty sure and I don't think it is conceivable that he could be representing
the attitude of the union, but it is
"P. Well, I don't know enough about it to
"O. I think that at one time— well, I don't know— they had a strong branch
up at the Shell Development Research Laboratories, the PAECT— and I believe
it is the union which has got organized on the hill.
"J. Yes, it has been around for some time.
"P. This man Bltenton * * * is a scientist
"0. I don't know, I would guess he was a sort of a chemical engineer.
"P. Would he be in a position to understand the information furnished him?
"0. I don't know that either. It would depend on how well it was furnished.
I mean, he has some scientific training and certainly if you sat down with him
and took a little time. My view about this whole damn thing, of course, is that
the information that we are working on is probably known to all the govern-
ments that care to find out. The information about what we are doing is prob-
ably of no use because it is so damn complicated. I don't agree that the security
problem on this project is a bitter one, because if one means by the security
problem preventing information of technical use to another country from escap-
ing.. But I do think that the intensity of our effort and our concern with national
investment involved— that is information which might alter the course of the
other governments and don't think it would have any effect on Russia * * * it
might have a very big effect on Germany, and I am convinced about that and
that is as everyone else is.
"P. Oh.
"0. To give it roughly what we're after and I think they don't need to know
the technical details because if they were going to do it they would do it in a
different way. They wouldn't take our methods— they couldn't because of cer-
tain geographical differences so I think the kind of thing that would do the
greatest damage if it got out, would just be the magnitude of the problem and
of the time schedules which we think we have and that kind of thing. To
answer your Question— Bltenton if you were picking a man which would be an
intermediary he wouldn't be a bad choice, I would mention he had some kind
of chemical engineering job in Russia. He was trained In England, was in
Russia 4 or 5 years and things like that and here
"P. Does he speak Russian, do you know?
"0. I don't know— I don't know. He speaks with a slight English accent.
"P. If it is necessary would you mind and would it interfere with your work
much if I would have to come down and discuss this with you further. Counter
assurance — I mean this is — ah—
"0. This is important?
"P. Oh yes, I not only
"0. If I may express my own opinion as well as my conviction this is not
common knowledge.
"P. No, it isn't
" J. You see a lot of people hare reported it to us * * *.
"P. That's why Mr. Johnson called me up yesterday it sort of
"O, Yes. I mentioned this to Colonel Lansdale.
"P. You did.
"0. Yes.
P. Aha, well of course right now I say — ah—- it is all new and — it has come
tome
"0. Right now it means absolutely nothing but what you now find out at
"P. If— but
"0. I would like to say that if I think that * * * certain affiliations that
were incompatible to the best interests of this country and this business would
die * * *.
"P. It may be necessary for us to— to take certain steps in trying to trace this
down and so forth — if anything would develop where we would have to or
would be interested in either your place down at Los Alamos or other places,
you feel it would be all right for me to contact you on it so that
"0. Oh, certainly * * * certain precautions
44P. Oh, yeah, yes— what I mean is instead of going out on certain steps which
"0. Yeah
850
"P. Come to your attention and be a little bit disturbing to you, I would rather
discuss those with you first so that you will be aware of it I think that, that-
well that
"0. Well, I hope that won't * * *. If I had reason to believe * * *. I will if
anything ever comes up that I am convinced— I can always say that everything
I know is absolutely 100 percent negative.
"P. If we should find any information which would lead us to believe that
there still may be some of that going on, and if it would be important for us to
then know a little more in detail who the contacts were and everything and we
could show you and that is important to us, I hope you will then find it possible
"0, I am only trying to define our future and I will try to act reasonably.
"P. Fine.
•'0. As I say I am trying to draw the line here between people who took some
responsibility and the people who were purely pushed around and since nothing
occurred and the responses seem to have been 100 percent negative, I think I
am perhaps Justified in— in
"P. I am not persistent (ha ha) but
"O. You are persistent and it is your duty.
"P. That is, there is one point in there, that you say that the responses were
100 percent negative. Do you feel that you know everyone whom this intermedi-
ary contacted?
"O. Well, no, but I think it is practical to say that it is not inconceivable that
the people whom he contacted would be— would have come to my attention but
I am not sure.
"P. Well, I would like to say
"O. Well, I think it would be [one word missing] to say that I Just don't know.
"P. I would like to leave this thought with you, Dr. Oppenheimer, if you at
some time find it possible, we certainly would give a lot of thanks and appre-
ciation for the name of that intermediary because it's going to — I tell you — the
only reason why I would want it, is not for his sake but to see who his contacts
"O. Yes, I see
"P. I can see that we are going to have to spend a lot of time and effort which
we ordinarily would not in trying to
"O. Well-
"P. In trying to run him down before we even can get on to these others
"O. You'd better check up on the consulate because that's the only one that
Eltenton contacted and without that contact there wouldn' be anyhing * * *.
"P. You say his man is not employed in the consulate?
"O. Eltenton?
"P. No, no, I mean this man
"O. I have never been introduced to him * * * or heard his name or anything
but I have been given to understand that he is attached to the consulate.
*******
"O. Maybe this guy is a military attach^— I don't know.
"P. You don't know anything about him?
"O. I don't know anything about him and never have. I may have been told
the name, but it made no impression.
"P. Is this member of the faculty in any way— does he in any way come In
contact with your project? Why would he be contacted? Is it because he has
contacted these people?
"0. I think that Eltenton must have said to him * * * I don't know — that
would be my impression of the thing * * *.
"P. Well I think that
"O. Well, I am sorry. I realize that you would like more information but
I have been under a little bit of difficulty. The fact that I did not raise this [one
word omitted] for a long time
"P. That's right
"O. I have difficulty in * * * serious * * * what to do * * * I think my
general point of view is that there are some things there which would bear
watching.
"P. That's right.
"0. It is doubtful to me if there is anything there which can't be uncovered.
"P. Well, that— I can see where * * *. We will be hot under the collar until
we find out what is going on there. I mean — that's the point of view we have
to take
851
"O. Well, I don't know. * * * WeU I would think * * * that it's conceivable—
that it wouldn't hurt to have a man in the local of this union FABCT — to see
what may happen and what he can pick up.
"P. You feel there could be something— not in the organization itself but
some
"O. Within it.
"P. Within it
"0. I don't know, I am sure that if they had 20 members, 19 of them might
not be involved in it. But I am not sure of the 20th, you see.
"P. Yes.
"O. Forty members correspondingly and — let me put it this way — the bonds
that hold them together are very strong you see, and they talk over their prob-
lems with their sisters and brothers and it is rather difficult to maintain a
complete security in an outfit like that.
"P. Does this union that is up on the hill, do they have members which are
not connected with the hill at all?
"0. Oh, yes; they have an international union and has reprepresentatives
all over this country.
"P. And the same group then, the same mixture would be of people off and
on the project would be in the same
"O. Oh, I imagine so — I don't know ; I don't know about that
"P. Well, we can
"0. Ordinarily I think that they would have their own local.
"P. Which would be up there.
"0. Maybe not. Maybe it is all one big local. I'm not sure, but that varies
with the union.
"P. Well, that is certainly interesting a— you are going to be here for some
time?
"0. Oh, no ; I am leaving tonight.
"P. Oh, you are; are you flying?
"0. No ; I am not. I have orders not to fly.
"P. At least you get some relaxation in between your project Well, I think
that it may
"0. I will be very glad to see you there. I have a feeling though, a f ellow
can be fooled you see. I feel responsible for every detail of this sort of thing
down at our place and I will be willing to go quite far in saying that everything
is 100 percent in order. That doesn't go for this place up here.
"P. No.
"0. I think that's the truth. If everything weren't being done and if everything
weren't proper, I think that I would be perfectly willing to be shot if I had done
anything wrong.
"P. Well, ah
"0. I don't say that about this place. It's a very different situation, a very
much harder situation. I don't know the people but it's a hard situation ; in par-
ticular was put together in a casual way and I think that the problem of being
sure that there were no leaks * * * and that pressure can be brought with
discretion.
"P. I am then, as I say, I may have the pleasure of visiting your place because
it may
"0. My motto is God bless you.
"P. Well, as I say, if this becomes serious, that is to say, I don't know anything
about it, but if it becomes
"0. My guess is that it wouldn't but if I wern't first absolutely sure that it
wouldn't — that it were not serious, I wouldn't
"P. That's right Well, if it does become serious I may come down with some
of my persistency— I mean I would hate to — I have a responsibility of running
things down myself.
"0. I also tMnfc the particular way this was— that if there is anything going
on it would be very easy to find out. I am not worried about that — we can take
care of that ourselves.
"P. No; you wouldn't
"0. Well, I can handle in a way * * *
'T But it is a situation which would have to be handled very delicately. That's
what makes it so difficult If it is something that's easy to handle and you don't
have to worry about it, why you just sort of bull your way through, but these
things one has to be very careful.
"0. That's always the case— wanting to be very careful.
862
"P. I am not the Judge to tell whether they should or should not get the In-
formation. My business is to stop it going through illegally.
"O. Well, I tMnfr
"I don't actually know whether, if you were in Washington— asking advice
on the Question how far should cooperation go. I. don't know wherein the right
answer lies. I have heard of cases with very strong arguments on both sides.
"P. Yes.
"O. * * * we don't have to worry about * * *
"P. Yes ; that's right
"0. Well, I wish good luck
"P. We could work a hundred years (I mean) and never get this informa-
tion. That's where we start you see— I mean— we get this information and we
have something to start on— we have something to run down. I certainly
appreciate this opportunity to visit you.
"O. I hope it's not a waste of time
"P. Well, I know if s not a waste of my time and ah
"O. That's all I meant— perhaps as far as the project is concerned * * * a fair
starting point
"P. Oouldhave
"O. Why not take an about face?
"P. Do you
"0. And one could do anything about the attache* — that would be the natural
thing to watch.
"P. Do you know anyone— and because we like to eliminate unnecessary work
if we have to— do you know anyone who is on the project who is connected with
the FAIDCT, Dr. Oppenhelmer?
"O. Who would be willing to
"P. Thaf 8 right
"O. I don't know who is in the union at all. I have heard that a boy called Pox
is president of it
"J. David Fox.
"O. David Fox, but I would feel * * * I hope that the trade union isn't tied
up in this— and they would not act like this because I think it would give them a
very black eye and it is no love of mine from the start, and it might have conse-
quences beyond the reasonable. I doubt whether anyone mixed with, the union
in good faith would be very sympathetic.
"P. Yes.
"O. This isn't a suggestion that there is anything wrong. I have no reason
at an to believe that there is, except that it is inevitable that any left wingers still
interested in left-wing activity would join such a union. I think I can be quite
sure of it And I don't think that is due to unions who are seeking a selected
group of people
"P. Yes.
"0. You might get some— of course, this is just my opinion that there is no
harm in discussing it— well, I Just don't know.
"P. May I just ask then, Doctor, if you would please not discuss this with any-
one— so that they would not be aware of this fact that
"O. No ; I would not have raised the question if it had not seemed to me that it
deserved looking Into.
"P. Yes.
"0. And if I seem uncooperative I think that you can understand that it is
because of my insistence in not getting people into trouble
"P. I can assure you that if something comes to your attention out there
"O. Let me dispose of that statement which came over the long-distance phone.
Frankly, I got— from that boy a promise to stop all this sort of thing when he came
on the job. * * * to that promise [garbled]. * * * I do not know what he was
doing it for but I thought there was a possibility. He said he understood
that * * * I talked to him yesterday. He said he had no connection * * *,
"P. Well, what I mean, if anything does come to your attention in connection
with this phase, if you can
"O. It won't be really necessary-: —
"P. If, in the first place you will let me know, I will be glad to come down and
discuss the matter with you
"O. Well, I am very glad of that, and we may have other problems which we
would like to discuss.
"P. Yes.
"O. But I do not think that there will be any of this nature because really
we have * * *,
"P. Well, something may come to your attention relating to this place up here.
You may get it down there and I would really prefer to
"0. There is almost no contact I have official technical letters but really
no personal letters from here. I don't know what's going on, and I think the
chance of my being useful in that way is very slight. But you ought to be able
to find people here who could have their eyes and ears open and who know
what's going on. That would be, I would be, I would be fairly sure that there
are quite a few here who would be willing to give you-— who would realize the
importance of it and— I can't advise you any further.
"P. No ; 0. K. ; as a matter of fact I am not formulating any plans, I am just
going to have to digest the whole thing.
"P. Well, we appreciate it and the best of luck.
"O. Thank you very much."
STIPULATED TABLE OF CORRECTIONS OF TRANSCRIPT OF RECORDING OF CONVERSATION
BETWEEN DR. J. R. OPPENHEJMEE, Lr. COL. BORIS T. PASH, AND Lr. LTALL
JOHNSON OF AUGUST 26, 1953
Original transcript, page 1, line 12 of dialogue :
"O. I was rather uncertain as to whether I should or shouldn't talk to him
(Rossi) when I was here."
Should read:
"O. I was rather uncertain as to whether I should or should talk to him
[Rossi] when I was here."
*******
Original transcript, page 1, line 21:
"O. I tfttafc that is the case, but I have no first hand knowledge that would be,
for that reason, useful But I think it is useful, for a man, whose name I never
heard, who was attached to the Soviet consul, has indicated indirectly through
intermediate people concerned in this project that he was in a position to trans-
mit, without any danger of a leak, or scandal, or anything of that kind, informa-
tion, which they might supply. Since I know it to be a fact, I have been par*
ticularly concerned about any indiscretion which took place in aides dose enough
to be in contact with it. To put it quite frankly— I would feel friendly to the
idea of the Commander in Chief informing the Russians who are working on this
problem. At least, I can see that there might be some arguments for doing that,
but I don't like the idea of having it moved out the back door. I think that It
might not heard to be on the look-out for it."
Should read:
"O. I think that is true, but I have no first hand knowledge that would be,
for that reason, useful. But I think it is true that a man, whose name I never
heard, who was attached to the Soviet consul, has indicated indirectly through
intermediate people concerned in this project that he was in a position to trans-
mit, without any danger of a leak, or scandal, or anything of that kind, informa-
tion, which they might supply. I would take it that it is to be assumed that a
man attached to the Soviet consulate might be doing i, but since I know it to
be a fact, I have been particularly concerned about any indiscretions which took
place in circles dose enough to come in contact with it. To put it quite frankly—
I would feel friendly to the idea of the Commander in Chief informing the Rus-
sians that we were working on this problem. At least, I can see that there
might be some arguments for doing that, but I do not feel friendly to the idea of
having it moved out the back door. I think that it might not hurt to be on the
look-out for it."
*******
Original transcript, page 2, line 13 :
"O. Well, I might say that the approaches were always through other people,
who were troubled by them, and sometimes came and discussed them with me;
and that the approaches were quite indirect so I feel that to give more, perhaps,
than one name, would be to implicate people whose attitudes was one of be-
wilderment rather than one of cooperation. I know of no case, and I am fairly
sure that in all cases where I have heard of these contacts, would not have
yielded a single thing. That's as far as I can go on that. Now there is a man,
whose name was mentioned to me a couple of times— I don't know of my own
knowledge that he was involved as an intermediary. It seems, however, not im-
possible and it you wanted to watch Mm it might be the appropriate thing to do.
He spent a number of years in the Soviet Union. I think he's a chemical
engineer. He was — he may not be here now — at the time I was with him here,
854
employed by the Shell Development. His name is Eltenton. I would think
that there is a small chance — well, let me put it this way — he has probably been
asked to do what he can to provide information. Whether he is successful or
not, I do not know, but he talked to a friend of his who is also an acquaintance
of one of the men on the project, and that was one of the channels by which this
thing went. Now I think that to go beyond that would be to pat a lot of named
down, of people who are not only innocent but whose attitude was 100 percent
cooperative."
Should read :
"O. Well, I might say that the approaches were always to other people, who
were troubled by them, and sometimes came and discussed them with me ; and
that the approaches were always quite indirect so I feel that to give more,
perhaps, than one name, would be to implicate people whose attitude was one of
bewilderment rather than one of cooperation. I know of no case, and I am
fairly sure that in all cases where I have heard of these contacts, would not
have yielded a single thing. That's as far as I can go on that. Now there is a
man, whose name was mentioned to me a couple of times— I don't know of my
own knowledge that he was involved as an intermediary. It seems, however,
not impossible and if you wanted to watch him it might be the appropriate thing
to do. He spent quite a number of years in the Soviet Union. He's an English
* * * I think he's a chemical engineer. He was— he may not be here now— at
the time I was with him here, employed by the Shell Development. His name
is Eltenton. I would think that there was a small chance— well, let me put it
this way— he has probably been asked to do what he can to provide information.
Whether he is successful or not, I do not know, but he talked to a friend of his
who is also an acquaintance of one of the men on the project, and that was one
of the channels by which this thing went. Now I think that to go beyond that
would be to put a lot of names down, of people who are not only innocent but
whose attitude was 100 percent cooperative."
*******
Original transcript, page 2, line 41 :
"O. Well, I am giving you the one name that I think is, or isn't— I mean I don't
know the name of the man attached to the consulate— I think I may have been
told and I may not have been told, and I have, at least not purposely, forgotten.
He is— and he might not be there now. These incidents occurred in the order
of about 5, 6 or 7 months.
"J. I was wondering, Dr. Oppenheimer, if there is a particular person— maybe
a person on the project that you were trying to pump information from— that if
we knew who those were, would at least know where to look for a leak, not from
the standpoint of fellow hate, but looking at a certain picture.
"P. Here's the point that I would feel
"O. I would feel that the people that tried to get information from were more
or less an accident and I would be making some harm by saying that.
"P. Here's the thing— we of course assume that the people that bring this
information to you are 100 percent with you, and therefore, there is no question
about their intentions. However, if
"0. Well, I'll tell you 1 thing— I have known of 2 or 3 cases, and I think 2
of them are with me at Los Alamos — they are men who are closely associated
with me."
Should read:
"0. WeU, I'm giving you the one name that I think is, or isn't— I mean I don't
know the name of the man attached to the consulate— I think I may have been
told or I may not have been told and I have, at least not purposely, but actually
forgotten. He is— and he may not be here now. These incidents occurred of
the order of about 5, 6, 7 months ago.
"J. I was wondering, Dr. Oppenheimer, if there was a particular person—
maybe a person on the project that they were trying to pump information from—
that if we knew who those were, would at least know where to look for a leak, not
from the standpoint of * * * but looking at a certain picture.
"P. Here's^the point that I would feel
"O. I would feel that the people that they tried to get information from were
more or less an accident [interpolation] and I believe I would be making some
harm by saying that.
"P. Yes. Here's the thing— we of course assume that the people who bring
this information to you are 100 percent with you, and therefore, there is no ques-
tion about their intentions. However, If
1855
"O. Well, TU tell you 1 thing— I have known of 2 or 3 cases, and I think
of 2 of the men were with me at Los Alamos—they are men who are very
closely associated with me."
*******
Original transcript, page 3, line 23:
"O. That is, let me give you the background. The background was— well, you
know how difficult it is with the relations between these two allies, and there
are a lot of people that don't feel very friendly toward the Bussians so that the
information — a lot of our secret information, our radar, and so on, doesn't get
to them, and they are battling for their lives and they would like to have an idea
of what is going on and this is Just to make up in other words for the defects of
our official communication. That is the form in which it was presented.
"P. Oh, I see.
"O. Of course, the actual fact is that since it is not a communication that
ought to be taking place, it is treasonable. But it wasn't presented in that
method. It is a method that carrying out a policy which was more or less a
policy of the Government and the form in which it came was that could an inter-
view be arranged with this man Bltenton who had very good contacts with a
man from the Embassy attached to the consulate who was a very. reliable guy
and who had a lot of experience with microfilm, that's the story.
"P. Well, now I may be getting back to a little systematic picture * * *
these people whom you mentioned, that are down there with you now * * *
were they contacted by Bltenton direct?
"O. No.
"P. Through another party.
"0. Yes."
Should read:
"O. That is, let me give you the background. The background was— well,
you know how difficult it is with the relations between these two allies, and
there are a lot of people who don't feel very friendly to Russia, so that the
information— a. lot of our secret information, our radar and so on, doesn't get
to them, and they are battling for their lives and they would like to have an
idea of what is going on and this is just to make up in other words for the
defects of our official communication. That is the form in which it was pre-
sented.
"P. Oh, I see.
"O. Of course, the actual fact is that since it is not a communication which
ought to be taking place, it is treasonable. But it wasn't presented in that
method. [Garbled.] It is a method of carrying out a policy which was more
or less a policy of the Government and the form in which it came was that an
interview be arranged with this man Bltenton who had very good contacts with
a man from the embassy attached to the consulate who was a very reliable guy
(that's his story) and who had a lot of experience in microfilm work, or what-
ever the hell.
"P. Well, now I may be getting back to a little systematic picture * * *
these people whom you mentioned who [two?] are down there with you now
* * * were they contacted by Bltenton direct?
"O. No.
"P. Through another party?
"0. Tes."
*******
Original transcript, page 4, line 16 :
"O. It is not definite In the sense that I have seen him do the thing. He
may have been misquoted. I don't believe so. Now Bltenton is the member
of the FABOT.
"P. Thaf s the union.
. "0. That's the CIO union. He's a man whose sympathies are certainly very
far left, whatever his affiliations, and he may or may not have regular contacts
with a political group. I doubt it In any case, it is a safe thing to say that
the channels to be followed in this case are those involving people who have
been generally sympathetic to the Soviet and somehow connected peripherally
with Communist movements in this country. That's obvious. I don't need to
tell you that"
Should read:
"O. It is not definite in the sense that I have seen him do the thing. He may
have been misquoted. I don't believe so. Now, Bltonton is a member of the
PABCT or not?
856
"P. That's the union.
"0. That's the CIO union. He's a man whose sympathies are certainly very
far 'left' whatever his affiliations, and he may or may not have regular con-
tacts with a political group.
"P. Well, here's how I feel.
"0. I doubt it In any case, it is a safe thing to say that the channels that
would be followed in this case are those involving people who have been gen-
erally sympathetic to the Soviet and somehow connected peripherally with Com-
munist movements in this country. That's obvious. I don't need to tell you
that"
*******
Original transcript, page 5, line 18 :
"0. I am pretty sure that none of the guys here, with possible exception of
the Russian, who is probably doing his duty by his country— but the other guys
really were just feeling they didn't do anything, but they were considering the
step, which they would have regarded as thoroughly in line with the policy of
this Government, just making up for the fact that there were a couple of guys
in the State Department who would block such confcnunications. You may or
may not know that in many projects we share information with the British and
some we do not, and there is a great deal of feeling about that and I don't think
the issues involved here seemed to the people very different, except that of course
the people on the project realize the importance and that this is a little bigger
and the whole procedure gets away from them."
Should read:
"O. I'm pretty sure that none of the guys here, with the possible exception of
the Russian, who is doing probably his duty by his country— but the other guys,
really were just feeling they didn't do anything but they were considering the
step, which they would have regarded as thoroughly in line with the policy of
this Government, just making up for the fact that there were a couple of guys
in the State Department who might block such communications. You may or
may not know that in many projects we share information with the British and
some we do not, and there is a great deal of feeling about that, and I don't think
that the isues involved here seem to the people very different, except that of
course the people on the project realize the importance and that is a little bigger
and the whole procedure gets away [garbled]."
*******
Original transcript, page 6, line 7.
"P. I get your point I don't want to seem to you insistent I want to again
sort of explore the possibility of getting the name of the person of the faculty—
I'll tell you for what reason. Not for the purpose of taking him to task in any
way whether its nonofficially, officially, or openly or what but to try to see
Eltenton's method of approach. You may not agree with me, but I can assure
you that this is one of the more important steps.
"0. I have to take the following points of view: I think in mentioning
Eltenton's name I subsequently said about the man that I think that he may be
acting in a way which is dangerous to this country and which should be watched.
I am not going to mention the name of anyone in the same breath, even if you
say that you will make a distinction. I just can't do that, because in the other
cases, I am convinced from the way in which they handled the thing that they
themselves thought it was a bad business."
Should read:
"P. I get your point I don't want to seem to you insistent. I want to again
sort of explore the possibility of getting the name of the person of the faculty —
111 tell you for what reason. Not for the purpose of taking him to task in any
way whether it's nonofficially, officially, or openly or not but to try to see
Bltenton's method of approach. You may not agree with me, but I can assure
you that is one of the most important steps.
"0. I understand that, but I have to take the following points of view: I
think in mentioning Eltenton's name I essentially said about the man that I
think, he may be acting in a way which is dangerous to this country, and which
should be watched. I'm not going to mention the name of anyone in the same
breath, even if you say that you will make a distinction. I just can't do that,
because in the other cases, I am convinced from the way in which they handled
the thing that they themselves thought it was a bad business."
857
Original transcript, page 6, line 83 :
"P. Were these two people you mentioned— were they contacted at the same
time?
"O. Oh, no. They were contacted within a week of each other."
Should read:
"P. Were these two people you mentioned— were they contacted at the same
time?
"0. They were contacted within a week of each other."
*******
Original transcript, page 7, line 12 :
"O. I really think that I am drawing a line in the right place."
Should read:
"O. I really think that I am drawing [garbled]."
*******
Original transcript, page 7, line 18:
"0. It is also my duty not to implicate these people, acquaintances, or col-
leagues of whose position I am absolutely certain— myself and my duty is to
protect them.
"P. O yes.
"O. If I thought that— I won't say it— it might be slightly off.
"P. Well then, here's another point, Doctor, if we find that in making these
various contacts, that we get some Information which would lead us to believe
that certain of these men may have either considered it or are still considering
it (mind you, I do not even know these men, so it can't be personal)
"0. Well, none of them that I had anything to do with even considered it.
They were upset about it They have a feeling toward this country, and have
signed the Espionage Act; they feel this way about it for I think that the
intermediary between Eltenton and the project, thought it was the wrong idea,
but said that this was the situation. I don't think he supported it. In fact I
know it."
Should read:
"O. It is also my duty not to implicate these people, who are acquaintances, or
colleagues, and so on of whose position I am absolutely certain — myself and my
duty is to protect them.
"P. Oh. yes.
"O. If I thought that— I won't say it— it might be slightly off.
"P. Well then, here's another point, Doctor, if we find that in making these
various contacts, that we get some information which would lead us to believe
that certain of these men may have either considered it or are still considering
it (mind you, I do not even know these men, so it can't be personal)
"O. Well, none of them that I had anything to do with considered it. They
were just upset about it * * * [garbled]. They have a feeling toward this
country and have signed the Espionage Act; they feel this way about it for I
think that the intermediary between Eltenton and the project, thought it was the
wrong idea, but said that this was the situation. I don't think he supported it.
I fact, I know it."
*******
Original transcript, page 8, line 1 :
"P. And two of these contacts are down there. That means we can assume
at least there is one of these men contacted still on the project here.
"O. Yes, I believe that this man has gone, or is scheduled to go to site X.
"P. This third man?
"O. That is right"
Should read :
"P. And two of these contacts are down there. That means we can assume
at least there is one of these men contacted still on the project?
"O. Yes, I believe this man has gone, or is scheduled to go to site X.
"P. This third man?
"O. I think so.
*******
Oroginal transcript, page 8, line 29:
"P. This man Eltenton * * * is a scientist?
"O. I don't know, I would guess he is some sort of a chemical engineer.
"P. Would he be in a position to understand the information furnished
him?
"O. I don't know that either. It would depend on how well it was furnished.
T moATi TIA has some scientific training and certainly if you sat down with him
858
and took a little time. My view about this whole damn thing, of course, is that
the information that we are working on is probably known to all the governments
that care to find out. The information about what we are doing is probably of no
use because it is so damn complicated. I don't agree that the security problem
on this project is a bitter one, because if one means by the security problem
preventing information of technical use to another country from escaping. But
I do think that the intensity of our effort and our concern of the international
investment involved — that is information which might alter the course of the
other governments and don't think it would have any effect on Russia * * *
it might have a very big effect on Germany, and I am convinced about that and
that is as everyone else is.
"P. Oh.
"O. To give it roughly, what we're after and I think they don't need to
know the technical details because if they were going to do it they would do
it in a different way. They wouldn't take our methods— they couldn't because of
certain geographical differences so I think the kind of thing that would do
the greatest damage if it got out, would just be the magnitude of the problem
and of the time schedules which we think we have of that kind.
"P. To answer your question— Eltenton if you were picking a man which
would be an intermediary wouldn't be a bad choice, I would mention he had
some kind of chemical engineering job in Russia. He was trained in England,
also in Russia 4 or 5 years and things like that and here."
Should read :
"P. This man Eltenton * * * is a scientist?
"O. I don't know, I would guess he was a sort of a chemical engineer.
"P. Would he be in a position to understand the information furnished him?
"O. I don't know that either. It would depend on how well it was furnished.
I mean, he has some scientific training and certainly if you sat down with him
and took a little time. My view about this whole damn thing, of course, is that
the information that we are working on is probbably known to all the govern-
ments that care to find out. The information about what we are doing is
probably of no use because it is so damn complicated. I don't agree that the
security problem of this project is a bitter one, because if one means by the
security problem preventing information of technical use to another country
from escaping. But I do think that the intensity of our effort and our concern
with national investment involved— that is information which might alter the
course of the other governments and don't think it would have any effect on
Russia * * * it might have a very big effect on Germany, and I am convinced
about that and that it as everyone else is.
"P. Oh.
"0. To give it roughly what we're after and I think they don't need to know
the technical details because if they were going to do it they would do it in a
different way. They wouldn't take our methods— they couldn't because of cer-
tain geographical differences so I think the kind of thing that would do the
greatest damage if it got out, would just be the magnitude of the problem and
of the time schedules which we think we have and that kind of thing. To
answer your question— Eltenton, if you were picking a man which would be an
intermediary, he wouldn't be a bad choice, I would mention he had some kind
of chemical engineering job in Russia. He was trained in England, was in
Russia 4 or 5 years, and things like that and here."
*******
Original transcript, page 9, line 35 :
" J. You see a lot of people have put it to us."
Should read :
" J. You see a lot of people have reported it to us."
*******
Page 10, omission before line 1:
"P. You did.
"O. Yes."
*******
Original transcript, page 10, line 6 :
"0. I would like to say that if I think that if there are certain affiliations that
were incompatible to the best interests of the country and this business would
859
Should read:
"O. I would like to say that if I think that certain affiliations that are incom-
patible to the inerests of this country and this business would die * * *."
****** *
Original transcript, page 10, line 14 :
"O. Oh, certainly, it is perfectly obvious that certain precautions"
Should read:
"0. Oh, certainly * * * certain precautions"
***** * *
Original transcript, page 10, line 21 :
"O. Well, that won't I most fervently hope that they are not in any way
and if I had reason to believe that some technical men were Involved I would
certainly tell you and I will if anything comes up that I am convinced I can
always say that I know everything is absolutely 100 percent negative."
Should read:
"O. Well, I hope that won't * * * If I had reason to believe * * * I will If
anything ever comes up that I am convinced — I can always say that everything
I know is absolutely 100 percent negative."
* * • « ' * * *
Original transcript, page 10, line 26 :
"P. If we should find any information which would lead you to believe that
there may be some of that going on, and that it would be important for us to
know a little more in detail who the contacts were and everything and we could
show you that that is important for us, I hope you then find it possible to"
Should read:
"P. If we should find any information which would lead us to believe that
there may still be some of that going on, and if it would be important for us to
then know a little more in detail who the contacts were and everything and
we could show you that that is important to us, I hope you will then find it
possible to"
*******
Original transcript, page 10, line 33 :
"0. As I say I am trying to draw the line here between people who took some
responsibility and the people who were purely pushed around and since nothing
occurred and the responses seemed to have been 100 percent negative, I think
I am perhaps justified in — in"
Should read :
"0. As I say I am trying to draw the line here between people who took some
responsibility and the people who were purely pushed around and since nothing
occurred and the responses seem to have been 100 percent negative, I think I
am perhaps justified in— in"
*******
Original transcript, page 11, line 3 :
"P. That is, there is one in there, that you say that the responses were 100
percent negative. Do you feel that you know everyone whom this intermediary
contacted?"
Should read :
"P. That is, there is one point in there, that you say that the responses were
100 percent negative. Bo you feel that you know everyone whom this inter-
mediary contacted?"
*******
Original transcript, page 11, line 10 :
"0. Well, I think it would be creditable to say that I just don't know."
Should read :
"O. Well, I think it would be [one word missing] to say that I just don't know."
* * * * * - n *
Original transcript, page 11, line 11 :
"P. I would like to leave this thought with you, Dr. Oppenheimer, if you at
some time find it possible we certainly would give a lot of thanks and apprecia-
tion for the name of that intermediary and I am going to explain to you — I
ten you — If it is going to — the only reason I would want it, is not for his sake
but to see who his contacts are"
Should read :
"P. I would like to leave this thought with you, Dr. Oppenheimer, if you at
some time find it possible we certainly would give a lot of thanks and apprecia-
tion for the name of that intermediary because it's going to — I tell you — the
860
only reason why I would want it, is not for his sake but to see who his contacts
are"
***••••
Original transcript, page 11, line 20 :
"P. In trying to run him down before we even go on this"
Should read:
"P. In trying to run him down before we even can get on to these others"
• ****••
Original transcript, page 11, line 21 :
"O. You'd better check up on the consulate because that's the only one that
Eltenton contacted and without that contact he would be inefficient and that
would be my"
Should read :
"O. You'd better check up on the consulate because that is the only one that
Eltenton contacted and without that contact there wouldn't be anything. * * *"
# * * * * *
Original transcript, page 11, line 27 :
"O. I have never been introduced to him.
"P. Have you ever heard his name mentioned?
"O. I have never heard his name mentioned, but I have been given to under-
stand that he is attached to the consulate. * * *
"0. Maybe this guy is a military attach^— I don't know."
Should read:
"0. I have never been introduced to him * * * or heard his name or anything,
but I have been given to understand that he is attached to the consulate. * * *
"0. Maybe this guy is a military attach^— I don't know."
******
Original transcript, page 12, line 8 : *
"O. I think that Eltenton must— I said to him 'what can you do about it?f I
don't know — that would be my impression of the thing."
Should read :
"O. I think that Eltenton must have said to him * * * I don't know— that
would be my impression of the thing. * * *"
* * * - * * *
Original transcript, page 12, line 11 :
"O. Well, I am sorry, I realize you would like more information but I am
under a little bit of difficulty deciding what to do about it The fact that I did
not raise this question for a long time
"P. That's right
"0. I have been in difficulty about what to do realizing how serious it is. I
think my general point of view is that there are some things there which would
bear watching.
"P. That's right
"0. It is doubtful to me if there is anything there which can't be uncovered.
"P. Well, that— I can see where it would be highly difficult to find out what's
going on. We will be hot under the collar until we find out what is going on
there. I mean — that's the point we have to take
"O. Well I don't know what a job like this— well I would think it's con-
ceivable—that it wouldn't hurt to have a man in the local of this union, FAECT—
to see what may happen and what he can pick up.
"P. You feel there could be something in the organization itself?
"O. Within it."
Should read :
"Well, I am sorry, I realize that you would like more information but I have
been under a little bit of difficulty. The fact that I did not raise this [one word
omitted] for a long time
"P. That's right
"O. I have difficulty in * * * serious * * * what to do * * * I think my
general point of view is that there are some things there which would bear
watching.
"P. That's right
"O. It is doubtful to me if there is anything there which can't be uncovered.
"P. Well that— I can see where * * * we will be hot under the collar until
we find out what is going on there. I mean— that is the point of views we have
to take.
861
"0. Well, I don't know * * * well I would think * * * tlxat it's conceivable—
that it wouldn't hurt to have a man in the local of this Union, FABOT— to see
what may happen and what he can pick up.
'"P. You feel there could be something not in the organization itself but
some
"0. Within it"
* * * * * * *
Original transcript, page 13, line 5 :
"P. Does this union that is up on the hill, is it not connected with the hill
at all?
"0. Oh, yes. It is an international union and has representatives all over
this country."
Should read:
"P. Does this union that is up on the hill, do they have members which are
not connected with the hill at all?
"O. Oh, yes, they have an international union and has representatives all
over this country."
*******
Original transcript, page 13, line 11:
"O. Oh, I imagine so. I don't know, I don't know about that."
Should read :
"J. Oh, I imagine so.
"O. I don't know. I don't know about that."
*******
Original transcript, page 13, line 33 :
"P. Well, ah
"O. It's a very different situation, a very much harder situation. I don't
know the people but it is a hard situation and in particular to put together .in
a casual way and I think that the problem of being sure that there are no leaks
there is a real problem and that pressure can be brought with discretion."
Should read :
"P. Well, ah
"O. I don't say that about this place. It's a very different situation, a very
much harder situation. I don't know the people, but it is a hard situation ; in
particular was put together in a casual way and I W"k that the problem of
being sure that there are no leaks * * * and that pressure can be brought with
discretion."
* * * * v * *
Original transcript, page 14, line 12:
"P. That's right. WeU, if it does become serious I may come down. with
some of my persistency — I mean I would hate to— I have a responsibility of
running things down there.
"0. I also think the particular way this way— that if there is anything going
on it would be very easy to find out. I am not worried about that— we can
take care of that ourselves.
"P. No you wouldn't
"O. Well, I meant in a way which you think best
"P. But it is a situation which would have to be handled very delicately.
That's what makes it so difficult. If it is something that's easy to handle and
you don't have to worry about it, why you just sort of bull your way through,
but these things have to be, one has to be carefuL"
Should read:
"P. That's right Well, if it does become serious I may come down with some
of my persistency — I mean I would hate to— -I have a responsibility of running
things down myself.
"O. I also think the particular way this was—that if there is anything going
on it would be very easy to find out I am not worried about that— we can
take care of that ourselves.
"P. No you wouldn't
"O. Well, I can handle it in a way
"P. But it is a situation which would have to be handled very delicately.
That's what makes it so difficult. If it is something that's easy to handle and
you don't have to worry about it, why you Just sort of bull your way through, but
these things, one has to be very careful."
*******
Original transcript, page 14, line 29 : '
£62
"O. I don't actually know whether, if yon were in Washington— after advice
on the qnestion how far should cooperation go. I don't know wherein .the right
answer lies. I have heard of cases with very strong arguments on both sides.
"P. Yes.
"O. That's a particular we don't have to worry about, but in Washington there
are more ticklish situations"
Should read:
"O. I don't actually know whether, if you were in Washington — asking advice
on the question how far should cooperation go. I don't know wherein the right
answer lies. I have heard of cases with very strong arguments on both sides.
"P. Yes.
"O. * * * we don't have to worry about * * *."
*******
Original transcript, page 14:
Omission after last line (after words "more ticklish situations").
Should read:
Insert (after words; "to worry about * * *") :
"P. Yes, that's right.
"O. Well, I wish good luck.
"P. We could work a hundred years (I mean) and never get this information.
That's where we start you see — I mean we get this information and we have
something to start on — we have something to run down. I certainly appreciate
this opportunity to visit you.
"O. I hope it's not a waste of time.
"P. Well, I know it's not a waste of my time and ah
"O. That's all— I meant— perhaps as far as the project is concerned * * * a
fair starting point
"P. Could have
"O. Why not take an about face?
"P. Do you
"O. And one could do anything about the attachS— that would be the natural
thing to watch."
*******
Original transcript, page 15, line 1 :
"P. Do you know anyone— and because we like to eliminate unnecessary work
if we have to — do you know anyone on the project who is connected with the
FAECT, Dr. Oppenheimer?
"O. Who would be willing to
"P. That's right
"O. I don't know who is in the union at all. I have heard that a boy called
Fox is president of it.
"J. David Fox.
"O. David Fox, but I would feel that that boy could do the trick. I hope that
the trade union isn't tied up in this — and they would not act like this because I
tMnfe it would give them a very black eye and it is no love of mine from the
start, and it might have consequences beyond the reasonable. I doubt whether
anyone mixed with the union in good faith would be very sympathetic."
Should read :
"P. Do you know anyone— and because we like to eliminate unnecessary work
if we have to— do you know anyone on the project who is connected with the
FAECT, Dr. Oppenheimer?
"O. Who would be willing to
"P. That's right.
"0. I don't know who is in the union at alL I have heard that a boy called
Fox is president of it.
"J. David Fox.
"O. David Fox, but I would feel — I hope that the trade union isn't tied up in
this— and they would not act like this because I think it would give them a very
black eye and it is no love of mine from the start, and it might have consequences
beyond the reasonable. I doubt whether anyone mixed with the union in good
faith would be very sympathetic."
*******
Original transcript, page 15, line 27:
"O. No, I would not have raised the question if it didn't seem to me that it
deserved looking into—
"P. Yes.
.863
"O. And if I seem uncooperative I think that you can understand that it is
because of my insistence in not getting people into trouble
"P. I can assure you that if anything comes to the attention out there
"O. Now, wait a minute, let me dispose of that statement which came over
the long-distance phone. When I first talked with this boy I extracted from him
a promise to stop all this kind of thing when he came on the job. Of course, I
can't hold him to that promise * * * [unintelligible].
"P. Well, what I mean, if anything does come to your attention in connection
with this phase if you can"
Should read :
"O. No ; I would not have raised the question if it had not seemed to me that
it deserved looking into.
"P. Yes.
UO. And if I seem uncooperative I think that you can understand that it is
because of my insistence on not getting people into trouble.
"P. I can assure you that if something comes to your attention out there
"O. Let me dispose of that statement which came over the long-distance phone.
Frankly, I got — I extracted from that boy a promise to stop all this sort of
thing when he came on the job * * * to that promise * * * I did not know
what he was doing it for but I thought that there was a possibility * * * he
said he understood that * * * I talked to him yesterday. He said he had no
connection * * *.
"P. Well, what I mean, if anything does come to your attention in connection
with this phase if you can"
***** * *
Original transcript, page 16, line 10 :
"0. But I do not think there will be any of this nature because really we have
very little incentive"
Should read:
"0. But I do not think there will be any of this nature because really we
have * * *
***** * *
(The original typewritten transcript as prepared in the office of Colonel Pash
in 1943 is as follows:)
"SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., August 27, 194S.
"MEMORANDUM FOB THE OFFICES IN GHABGB
"Subject: D. S. M. Project
"Be : Transcript of conversation between Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer, Lt. CoL Boris T.
Pash. and Lt. Lyall Johnson.
"Transmitted herewith is the transcript of conversation between Dr. J. R.
Oppenheimer, Lt Col. Boris T. Pash, and Lt Lyall Johnson held In Lieutenant
Johnson's office In the New Class Room Building, University of California,
Berkeley, Calif., on August 26, 1943. It is to be noted that in some places the
conversation was very indistinct and that the running commentary may be
indecisive in these places, but the substance of the material discussed is here-
with presented :
"P. This is a pleasure, because I am interested to a certain extent in activities
and I feel I have a certain responsibility in a child which I don't know anything
about. General Groves has, more or less, I feel, placed a certain responsibility In
me and it's like having a child, that you can't see, by remote control. I don't
mean to take much of your time
"O. That's perfectly all right. Whatever time you choose.
"P. Mr. Johnson told me about the little incident, or conversation, taking place
yesterday in which I am very much interested and it had me worried all day
yesterday since he called me.
"O. I was rather uncertain as to whether I should or should not talk to him
[Rossi] when I was here. I was unwilling to do it without authorization. What
I wanted to tell this fellow was that he had been indiscreet. I know that that's
right that he had revealed information. I know that saying that much might
in some cases embarrass him. It doesn't seem to have been capable of embar-
rassing him— to put it bluntly.
"P. Well, that is not the particular interest I have. It is something a little
more, in my opinion, more seriousi Mr. Johnson said there was a possibility
that there may be some other groups interested.
80&313— 54 55
864
"O. I thin* that is the case, but I have no first-hand knowledge that would
be, for that reason, useful, but I think it is true that a man, whose name I never
heard, who was attached to the Soviet Consul, has indicated indirectly through
intermediate people concerned in this project that he was in a position to trans-
mit, without any danger of a leak, or scandal, or anything of that kind, informa-
tion, which they might supply. Since I know it to be a fact, I have been
particularly concerned about any indiscretions which took place in aides close
enough to be in contact with it. To put it quite frankly — I would feel friendly
to the idea of the Commander in Chief informing the Russians who are working
on this problem. At least, I can see that there might be some arguments for
doing that, but I don't like the idea of having it moved out the back door. I think
that it misht not hurt to be on the lookout for it.
"P. Could you give me a little more specific information as to exactly what
information you have. Ton can readily realize that phase would be, to me, as
interesting, pretty near, as the whole project is to you.
"O. Well, I might say that the approaches were always through other people,
who were troubled by them, and sometimes came and discussed them with me;
and that the approaches were quite indirect so I feel that to give more, perhaps,
than one name, would be to implicate people whose attitude was one of bewilder-
ment rather than one of cooperation. I know of no case, and I am fairly sure
that in all cases where I have heard of these contacts, would not have yielded
a single thing. That's as far as I can go on that. Now there is a man, whose
name was mentioned to me a couple of times — I don't know of my own knowl-
edge that he was involved as an intermediary. It seems, however, not impossible,
and if you wanted to watch him it might be the appropriate thing to do. He spent
a number of years in the Soviet Union. I think he's a .chemical engineer. He
Was — he may not be here now — at the time I was with him here, employed by the
Shell Development. His name is Eltenton. I would think that there is a small
chance—well, let me put it this way— he has probably been asked to do what
he can to provide information. Whether he is successful or not, I do not know,
but he talked to a friend of his who is also an acquaintance of one of the men
on the project, and that was one of the channels by which this thing went. Now
I think that to go beyond that would be to put a lot of names down, of people who
are not only innocent but whose attitude was 100 percent cooperative.
"P. Now here's a point. You can readily realize that if we get information like
that we have to work in an absolutely discreet manner. In other words we can't
afford to even indicate
"O. That you are concerned.
"P. That we are concerned or through whom we get information. However,
anything that we may get which would eliminate a lot of research work on our
part would necessarily bring to a closer conclusion anything that we are doing.
"O. Well, I'm giving you the one name that I think is, or isn't — I mean I don't
know the name of the man attached to the Consulate— I think I may have been
told and I may not have been told and I have, at least not purposely, but actually
forgotten. He is — and he may not be here now. These incidents occurred in the
order of about 5, 8, or 7 months.
" J. I was wondering, Dr. Oppenheimer, if there is a particular person — maybe
a person on the project that you were trying to pump information from— that if
we knew who those were, would at least know where to look for a lead, not
from the standpoint of fellow hate, but looking at a certain picture.
"P. Here's the point that I would feel
"O. I would feel that the people they tried to get information from were more
or less an accident and I would be making some harm by saying that.
"P. Here's the thing — we of course assume that the people who bring this
information to you are 100 percent with you, and therefore, there is no question
about their intentions. However, if
"O. Well, I'll tell you one thing— I have known of two or three cases, and I
think two of them are with me at Los Alamos— they are men who are closely
associated with me.
"P. Have they told you that either they thought that they were contacted
for that purpose or they were actually contacted for that purpose?
"O. They told me they were contacted for that purpose.
"P. For that purpose.
"0- That is, let me give you the background. The background was— well you
know how difficult it is with the relations between these two allies, and there are
a lot of people that don't feel very friendly toward the Russians, so that the
information — a lot of our secret information, our radar and so on, doesn't get
S65
to them, and they are battling for their lives and they would like to have an idea
of what is going on and this is just to make up in other words for the defects of
our official communication. That is the form in which it was presented.
"P. Oh, I see.
"O. Of course, the actual fact is that since it is not a communication that ought
to be taking place, it is treasonable. But it wasn't presented in that method. It
is a method that carrying out a policy which was more or less a policy of the
Government and the form in which it came was that could an interview be
arranged with this man Bltenton who had very good contacts with a man from
the Embassy attached to the consulate who was avery reliable guy and who had a
lot of experience with microfilm, that's the story.
"P. Well, now I may be getting back to a little systematic picture * * * These
people whom you mentioned, two are down there with you now. Were they con-
tacted by Eltenton direct?
"O. No.
"P. Through another party?
"O. Yes.
"P. Well now, could we know through whom that contact was made?
"O. I think it would be a mistake, that is, I think I have told you where the
initiative came from and that the other things were almost purely accident and
that it would involve people who ought not be involved in this.
"P. This would not involve the people but it would indicate to us Eltenton's
channel. We would have to, now that this is definite on Eltenton.
"O. It is not definite in the sense that I have seen him do the thing. He may
have been misquoted. I don't believe so. Now Eltenton is the member of the
FAECT.
"P. That's the union.
"O. That's the CIO union. He's a man whose sympathies are certainly very
far left, whatever his affiliations, and he may or may not have regular contacts
with a political group. I doubt it In any case, it is a safe thing to say that the
channels to be followed in this case are those involving people who have been
generally sympathetic to the Soviet and somehow connected peripherally with
Communist movements in this country. Thaf s obvious. I don't need to tell
yon that
"P. Well, yes. The fact is, this second contact— the contact that Eltenton had
to make with these other people — is that person also a member of the project?
"O. No.
"P. That also is an outsider.
"O. It's a member of the faculty, but not on the project
"P. A member of the faculty here? Eltenton made it through a member of the
faculty to the project
"0. As far as I know — these approaches were — there may have been more
than one person involved. I don't know.
"P. Here's how I feel about this leftist inclination. I think that whether a
man has left or right inclinations, if his character which is back of it—- if he's
willing to do this, it doesn't make any difference what his inclinations are.
It's based on his character primarily and not
"O. A thing like this going on, let us say, with the Nazis would have a some-
what different color. I don't mean to say that it would be any more deserving
of attention, or any more dangerous, but it would involve rather different motives.
"P. Oh, yes; sure.
"O. I'm pretty sure that none of the guys here, with possible exception of the
Russian, who is doing probably his duty by his country— 4>ut the other guys
really were just feeling they didn't do anything but they were considering the
step, which they would have regarded as thoroughly in line with the policy of
this 'Government, just making up for the fact that there were a couple of gays
in the State Department who would block such communications. You may or
may not know that in many projects we share information with the British and
some we do not, and there is a great deal of feeling about that, and I don't think
that the issues involved here seem to the people very different, except that, of
course, the people on the project realize the importance and that this is a little
bigger and the whole procedure gets away from them.
"P. Now, do you feel that would affect— and there could be continued attempts
now to establish this type of contact?
"O. I haven't any idea.
."P. You haven't any idea?
"O. As I say, if the guy that was here may by now be in some other town and
all that I would have in mind is this— I understood that this man to whom I
866
feel a sense of responsibility, Lomanitz, and I feel it for two reasons. One, he
is doing work which he started and which he ought to continue, and second,
since I more or less made a stir about it when the question of his induction
came up, that this man may have been indiscreet in circles which would lead
to trouble. That is the only thing that I have to say. Because I don't have any
doubt that people often approached him, with whom he has contacted, I mean
whom he sees, might feel it their duty if they got word of something, to let it go
further and that is the reason I feel quite strongly that association with the
Communist movement is not compatible with the job on a secret war project,
it is Just that the two loyalties cannot go.
"P. Yes— well
"O. That is not an expression of political opinion. I think that a lot of very
brilliant and thoughtful people have seen something in the Communist move-
ment, and that they may belong there, maybe it is a good thing for the country.
They hope that it doesn't belong on the war project.
"P. I get your point. I don't want to seem to you insistent. I want to again
sort of explore the possibility of getting the name of the person of the faculty-
Ill tell you for what reason. Not for the purpose of taking him to task in any
way, whether it's nonofficially, officially, or openly, or what, but to try to see
Eltenton's method of approach. You may not agree with me, but I can assure
you that that is one of the more important steps.
"O. I have to take the following points of view : I think in mentioning Elten-
ton's name I subsequently said about the man that I think that he may be acting
in a way which is dangerous to this country, and which should be watched.
I'm not going to mention the name of anyone in the same breath, even if you
say that you will make a distinction. I just can't do that, because in the other
cases I am convinced from the way in which they handled the thing that they
themselves thought it was a bad business.
"P. These other people, yes, I realize— but if— here's the point— if that man Is
trying to make other contacts for Eltenton, it would take us some time to
"O. My honest opinion is that he probably isn't— that he ran into him at a
party and they saw each other or something and Eltenton said, 'Do you suppose
you could help me? This is a very serious thing because we know that impor-
tant work is going on here, and we think this ought to be made available to our
allies, and would you see if any of those guys are willing to help us with it— and
then it wouldn't have to be much.' You see, that is the kind of thing [remaining
statement unintelligible].
"P. Were these two people you mentioned— were they contacted at the same
time?
"O. Oh, no. They were contacted within a week of each other.
"P. They were contacted at two different times?
"O. Yes ; but not in each other's presence.
"P. That's right
"And then from what you first heard, there is someone else who probably
still remains here who was contacted as well.
"O. I think that is true.
"P. What I am driving at is that there was a plan, at least for some length
of time, to make these contacts — and we may n6t have known all the contacts.
"O. That is certainly true. That is why I mentioned it. If we knew all
about it, then I would say forget it. I thought it would be appropriate to call to
your attention the fact that these channels at one time existed.
"P. Yes.
"O. I really think that I am drawing a line in the right place.
"P. You see, you understand that I am sort of— you picture me as a blood-
hound on the trail, and that I am trying to get out of you everything I possibly
can.
"O. That's your duty to a certain extent.
"P. You see what I mean.
"O. It is also my duty not to implicate these people, acquaintances, or col-
leagues of whose position I am absolutely certain — myself and my duty is to pro-
tect them.
"P. Oh, yes.
"O. If I thought that^-I won't say it— it might be slightly off.
"P. Well then, here's another point, Doctor, if we find that in making these
various contacts, that we get some information which would lead us to believe
that certain of these men may have either considered it or are still considering
it (mind you, I do not even know these men, so it can't be personal)
867
"0. Well, none of them that I had anything to do with even considered it.
They were upset about it. They have a feeling toward this country and have
signed the espionage act ; they feel this way about it for I think that the inter-
mediary between Bltenton and the project, thought It was the wrong idea, but
said that this was the situation. I don't think he supported it. In fact I know
"P. He made about at least three contacts that we know of.
"O. Well, I think that's right, yes.
"P. And two of these contacts are down there. That means we can assume
at least there is one of these men contacted still on the project here.
"0. Yes, I believe that this man has gone, or is scheduled to go to site X.
"P. This third man?
"O. That is right.
"P. Well that is, as I say, if I can't get across that line, I even certainly ap-
preciate this much, because it
"O. I think it's a thing you ought to know
"P. Oh, no doubt
"O. I think it's probably one of those sporadic things and I do not think— I have
no way of thinking it was systematic, but I got from the way it was handled,
which was rather loosely, and frankly if I were an agent I would not put much
confidence in people who are loose-mouthed or casual. I would not think that
this was a very highly organized or very well put-together plan but I don't
know and I was very much afraid when I heard of Lomanitz's indiscretion
that it might very well be serious. I hope that isn't the case.
"P. You mentioned that this man may be of this FAECT. Do you think that,
as a representative of this organization, he would sort of represent their atti-
tude or do you think he is doing this individually?
"O. Oh, the FAEOT is quite a big union and has all sorts of people in it. I'm
pretty sure and I don't think it is conceivable that he could be representing the
attitude of the union, but it is
"P. Well, I don't know enough about it to—
"O. I think that at one time they had a strong branch up at the Shell De-
velopment Research Laboratories, the FAECT— and I believe it is the union
which has got organized on the hill.
"J. Yes ; it has been around for some time.
"P. This man Bltenton * * * is a scientist?
"O. I don't know, I would guess he is some sort of the chemical engineer.
"P. Would he be in a position to understand the information furnished him?
"O. I don't know that either. It would depend on how well it was furnished. I
mean he has some scientific training and certainly if you sat down with him
and took a little time. My view about this whole damn thing, of course, is that
the information that we are working on is probably known to all the govern-
ments that care to find put. The information about what we are doing is prob-
ably of no use because it is so damn complicated. I don't agree that the security
problem on the project is a bitter one, because if one means by the security
problem preventing information of technical use to another country from
escaping. But I do think that the intensity of our effort and our concern of
the international investment involved — that is information which might alter the
course of the other governments and don't think it would have any effect on
Russia * * * it might have a very big effect on Germany, and I am convinced
about that and that is as everyone else is.
"P. Oh.
"O. To give it roughly what we're after and I think they don't need to know
the technical details because if they were going to do it they would do it in a
different way. They wouldn't take our methods — they couldn't because of
certain geographical differences so that I think the kind of thing that would
do the greatest damage if it got out, would just be the magnitude of the prob-
lem and of the time schedules which we think we have of that kind.
"P. To answer your question— Bltenton, if you were picking a man which
would be an intermediary he wouldn't be a bad choice, I would mention he
had some kind of chemical engineering job in Russia. He was trained in Eng-
land, also in Russia 4 or 5 years and things like that and here
"P. Does he speak Russian, do you know?
"O. I don't know— I don't know. Speaks wias a slight English accent.
"P. If it is necessary would you mind and would it interfere with your work
much if I would have to come down and discuss this with you further. Counter-
assurance — I mean this is — ah
868
"O. This is important?
"P. Oh, yes; I not only
"O. If I can express my own opinion as well as my conviction this is not
common knowledge.
"P. No ; it isn't
"O. You see a lot of people have put it to us.
"P. That's why when Mr. Johnson called me up yesterday it sort of
"O. Yes. I mentioned this to Colonel Lansdale.
"P. Aha ; well, of course, right now I say— -ah— it is all new and— it has come
to me.
"O. Right now it means absolutely nothing but what you now find out at
this
"P. If— but
"O. I would like to say that if I think that if there are certain affiliationfs
that were incompatible to the best interests of this country and this business
would retard.
"P. It may be necessary for us to — to take certain steps in trying to trace this
down and so forth — if anything would develop where we would have to or be
interested in either your place down at Los Alamos or other places, you feel
it would be all right for me to contact you on it so that
"O. Oh, certainly, it is perfectly obvious that certain precautions
"P. Oh, yeah, yes — what I mean is instead of going on certain steps
which may
"O. Yeah
"P. Gome to your attention and be a little bit disturbing to you, I would
rather discuss those with you first so that you will be aware of it. I think
that, that— well that
"O. Well, that won't. I most fervently hope they are not in any way and if
I had reason to believe that some technical men were involved I would cer-
tainly tell you and I will if anything comes up that I am convinced I can
always say that I know everything is absolutely 100 percent negative.-
"P. If we should find any information which would lead you to believe that
there still may be some of that going on, and that it would be important for
us to know a little more in detail who the contacts were and everything and we
could show you that that is important for us, I hope you will then find it
possible to
"O. I am only trying to define our future and I will try to act reasonably.
"P. Fine.
"O. As I say I am trying to draw the line here between people who took some
responsibility and the people who were purely pushed around and since nothing
occurred and the responses seemed to have been 100-percent negative, I think
I am perhaps justified in— in
"P. I am not persistent (ha ha) but
"O. You are persistent and it is your duty.
"P. That is, there is one in there, that you say that the responses were 100-
percent negative. Do you feel that you know everyone whom this intermediary
contacted?
"O. Well, no, but I think it is practical to say that it is inconceivable that the
people whom he contacts would be — would have come to my attention but I am
not sure.
"P. Well, I would like to say.
"O. Well, I think it would be creditable to say that I Just don't know.
VP. I would like to leave this thought with you, Dr. Oppenheimer, if you at
some time find it possible, we certainly would give a lot of thanks and apprecia-
tion for the name of that intermediary and I'm going to explain to you—- I tell
you — If it is going to— The only reason I would want it, is not for his sake but
to see who his contacts are
"O. Yes, I see.
"P. I can see that we are going to have to spend a lot of time and effort which
we ordinarily would not in try to—
«O. Well
"P. In trying to run him down before we even go on this
"O. You'd better check up on the consulate because that's the only one that
Eltenton contacted and without that contact he would be inefficient and that
would be my
"P. You say .this man is not employed in the consulate?
"O. Hltenton?
869
"P. No, no, I mean this man
"0. I have never been Introduced to him.
"P. Have you ever heard his name mentioned?
"O. I have never heard his name mentioned, but I have been given to under-
stand that he is attached to the consulate.
***** * *
"0. Maybe this guy is a military attach^— I don't know.
"P. You don't know anything about him?
"O. I don't know anything about him and never have. I may have been told
the name, but it made no impression.
"P. Is this member of the faculty in any way — does he in any way come
in contact with your project? Why would he be contacted? Is it because he
has contacted these people?
"0. I think that Bltenton must— I said to him 'What can you do about it?'
I don't know — that would be my impression of the thing.
"P. Well, I think that
"O. Well, I am sorry, I realize you would like more information but I am
under a little bit of difficulty deciding what to do about It The fact that I did
not raise this question for a long time
"P. That's right.
"0. I have been in difficulty about what to do, realizing how serious it is.
I think my general point of view is that there are some things there which would
bear watching.
"P. That's right
"O. It is doubtful to me if there is anything there which can't be uncovered.
"P. Well that— I can see where it would be highly difficult to find out what's
going on. We will be hot under the collar until we find out what is going on
there. I mean — that's the point we have to take
"0. Well, I don't know what a Job like this— well I would think that it's con-
ceivable— that it wouldn't hurt to have a man in the local of this union, FAEOT —
to see what may happen and what he can pick up.
"P. You feel there could be something in the organization itself?
"O. Within it.
"P. Within it
"O. I don't know, I am sure that if they had 20 members, 19 of them might not
be involved in it. But I am not sure of the 20th, you see.
"P. Yes.
"O. Forty members correspondingly and — let me put it this way — the bonds
that hold them together are very strong you see, and they talk over their prob-
lems with their sisters and brothers and it is rather difficult to maintain a com-
plete security in an outfit like that
"P. Does this union that is up on the hill, is it not connected with the hill
at all?
"O. Oh yes, it is an international union and has representatives all over
this country.
"P. And the same group then, the same mixture would be of people off and on
the project would be in the same
"Q. Oh, I imagine so — I don't know, I don't know about that.
"P. Well, we can
"O. Ordinarily I think that they would have their own local.
"P. Which would be up there.
"O. Maybe not. Maybe it is all one big local. I'm not sure, but that varies
with the union.
"P. Well, that is certainly interesting and— you are going to be here for some
time?
"O. Oh no, I am leaving tonight.
"P. Oh, you are, are you flying?
"O. No I am not. I have orders not to fly.
"P. At least you get some relaxation in between your project. Well, I
think that it may
"O. I will be very glad to see you. I have a feeling though, a fellow can
be fooled you see. I feel responsible for every detail of this rot of thing down
at our place and I will be willing to go quite far in saying that everything is
100 percent in order. That doesn't go for this place up here.
"P. No.
"0. I think that's the truth. If everything weren't being done and if every-
thing weren't proper, I think that I would be perfectly willing to be shot if I had
done anything wrong. - •
870
"P. Well, all
"O. It's a very different situation, a very much harder situation. I don't
know the people but It's a hard situation and in particular to put together in a
casual way and I think that the problem of being sure that there are no leaks
there is a real problem and that pressure can be brought with discretion.
"P. I am then, as I say, I may have the pleasure of visiting your place because
it may
"O. My motto is God Bless You.
"P. Well, as I say, if this becomes serious, that is to say, I don't know any-
thing about it, but if it becomes
"O. My guess is that it wouldn't but if I weren't first absolutely sure that
it wouldn't, that it were not serious, I wouldn't
"P. That's right. Well, if it does become serious I may come down with
some of my persistency — I mean I would hate to — I have a responsibility of
running things down there.
"O. I also think the particular way this way — that if there is anything going
on it would be very easy to find out. I am not worried about that — we can
take care of that ourselves.
"P. No, you wouldn't
"O. Well, I meant in a way which you think best.
"P. But it is a situation which would have to be handled very delicately.
That's what makes it so difficult. If it is something that's easy to handle and
you don't have to worry about it, why you just sort of bull your way through,
but these things have to be, one has to be careful.
"O. That's always the case — wanting to be very careful.
"P. I am not the Judge to tell whether they should or should not get the
information. My business is to stop it going through illegally.
"O. Well, I think— I don't actually know whether, if you were in Washing-
ton— after advice on the question how far should cooperation go. I don't know
wherein the right answer lies. I have heard of cases with very strong argu-
ments on both sides.
"P. Yes.
"O. That's a particular we don't have to worry about, but in Washington there
are more ticklish situations
"P. Do you know anyone — and because w& like to eliminate unnecessary
work if we have to — do you know anyone who is on the project who is connected
with the FABCT, Dr. Oppenheimer?
"O. Who would be willing to
"P. That's right.
"O. I don't know who is in the union at all. I have heard that a boy called
Fox is president of it.
"P. David Fox.
"O. David Fox, but I would feel that that boy could do the trick. I hope
that the trade union isn't tied up in. this — and they would not act like this
because I think it would give them a very black eye and it is no love of mine
from the start, and it might have consequences beyond the reasonable. I doubt
whether anyone mixed with the union in good faith would be very sympathetic.
"P. Yes.
"O. This isn't a suggestion that there is anything wrong. I have no reason
at all to believe that there is, except that it is inevitable that anyone— that
any leftwingers still interested in leftwing activity would Join such a union.
I think I can be quite sure of it. And I don't think that it is due to unions
who are seeking a selected group of people
"P. Yes.
"O. You might get some — of course, this is Just my opinion that there is no
harm in discussing it— well, I Just don't know-
"P. May I Just ask then, Doctor, if you would please not discuss this with
anyone — so that they would not be aware of this fact that
"O. No, I would not have raised the question if it didn't seem to me that
it deserved looking into.
"P. Yes.
"O. And if I seem uncooperative I think that you can understand that it is
because of my insistence in not getting people into.trouble.
"P. I can assure you that if anything comes to the attention out there
"O. Now, wait a minute, let me dispose of that statement which came over
the long-distance phone. When I first talked with this boy I extracted from
him a promise to stop all this kind of thing when he came on the Job. Of course,
I can't hold him to that promise * * * [unintelligible].
871
"P. Well, what I mean, if anything does come to your attention in connection
with this phase, if you can
"0. It won't be really necessary.
"P. If, in the first place, you will let me know, I will be glad to come down
and discuss the matter with you.
"O. Well, I am very glad of that, and we may have other problems which we
would like to discuss.
"P. Yes.
"O. But I do not think that there will be any of this nature because really
we have very little incentive.
"P. Well, something may come to your attention relating to this place up
here. You may get it down there and I would really prefer to
"O. There is almost no contact. I have official technical letters but really no
personal letters from here. I don't know what's going on, and I think the chance
of my being useful in that way is very slight. But you ought to be able to find
people here who could have their eyes and ears open and who know what's
going on. That would be, I would be, I would be fairly sure that there are
quite a few here who would be willing to give you — who would realize the
importance of it and— I can't advise you any further.
"P. No, okeh, as a matter of fact I am not formulating any plans, I am Just
going to have to digest the whole thing.
"P. Well, we appreciate it and the best of luck.
"0. Thank you very much."
*******
(The transcripts of interviews referred to are as follows:)
"TRANSCBEPT OOF INTERVIEW WITH DB. OPPENHEIMEB BY Lr. Cor* LANSDALE,
SEPTEMBER 12, 1943
"L. Well the thing I've been thinking very considerably about my earlier
conversation with you, then Colonel Pash's memorandum to me of his conversa-
tion with you.
"0. Well, the history of that— I spoke to Johnson briefly and I heard quite
a little bit about the chain * * * about the nature of the fuss that Lomanitz
was making, and I thought it might be a good idea if I talked to him. I thought
I might be able to talk him out of some of this foolishness so I asked Johnson
for permission to do that. I had a rather long discussion with Lomanitz which
I should describe as pretty unsuccessful, or at least only partially successful.
And, of course, Johnson had expressed the opinion that he was dangerous and
why, and that Pash ought to be brought in on it So I told Pash some of the
reasons why I thought it was dangerous and I suppose that is probably what
you mean.
"L. Well, now I want to say this— and without intent of flattery or compli-
menting or anything else, that you're probably the most intelligent man I ever
met, and I'm not sold. on myself that I kid you sometimes, see? And I'll admit
freely that at the time we had our discussion at Los Alamos I was not per-
fectly frank with you. My reasons for not being are immaterial now. Since
your discussion with Colonel Pash I think that the only sensible thing is to be
as frank with you as I can. I'm not going to mention certain names, but I think
that you can give us an enormous amount of help, and as I talk you will
realize, I think, some of the difficulties that have beset us.
"O. There are some I thin* I know already.
"L. That's right Now, I will say this, that we have not been, I might say,
asleep at the switch, to a dangerous extent We did miss some things, but we
have known since February that several people were transmitting information
about this project to the Soviet Government
"O. I might say that I have not known that I knew of this one attempt to
obtain information which was earlier, or I don't, I can't remember the date,
though I've tried.
"L. Now, we have taken no action yet except with respect to Lomanitz.
"0. Are they people who would be in a position to transmit substantial in-
formation?
"L. Yes, I'm so informed, I don't know personally, of course.
"O. Well, Lomanitz by virtue of being a theoretical physicist would probably
have a rather broad knowledge of the things he is working on.
"L. I get the impression that Lomanitz has a broad knowledge of the theory
of what you're trying to accomplish probably, but apparently a rather limited
knowledge of the practical manner in which It is being done.
B72
"0. That's right
"L. Now, which is the most important to transmit?
"O. There are two things which seem important to me. One is the extent of
the interest of this country and the nature of the commitment and the probable
time scale. Second, it wold be important to transmit when the situation is
suited to the Russian industrial machines, which I think maybe we don't have
at all.
"L. All right ; now I'll tell you this : They know, we know they know, about
Tennessee, about Los Alamos, and Chicago.
"O. And the connection of all that?
"L. And the connection. We know that they know that the method, I may
state it wrong, that the spectrographic method, is being used at Berkeley. They
know, of course, the method involved. They know that you would be in a posi-
tion to start practical production in about 6 months from, say, February, and
that perhaps 6 months thereafter you would be in a position to go into mass
production. Now, you arid I know, of course, how accurate those figures are.
"O. All I know is
"L. When they were reported to Pash, they may have been shaded one way or
the other. Now, that is the substance of what they know. Now, we, of course,
have acted. The people who are responsible for this thing have been willing to
take some risks in the hope of some return. It is essential that we know the
channels of communication. We never had any way of knowing whether we
have — whether the ones we know about are
"O. Are the main ones.
"L. Are the main ones, or whether this market will change them from time
to time, and so on.
"O. This information which has been transmitted has not been transmitted to
the consulate or
"L. Well, all we know is that it's gone through several hands to the Govern-
ment, some through consular channels. And, of course, they have many means
of transmitting information, perhaps, you know. The fact that it goes to the
consulate today doesn't mean that it's going to the consulate tomorrow. The
fact that it goes through Joe Doaks today doesn't mean it's going through him
tomorrow. Of course, that's our problem.
"O. No ; the only thing that it does mean is that an effort is being made to
get it.
"L. I can assure you that there's no question of the effort being made. We
know enough to know that It's not simply the Communist Party, U. S. A., off
on a frolic of their own. Now, that, of course, presents— I want to get into
more specific details lateiv-but that, of course, presents several problems. We
know, for instance, that it is the policy of the Communist Party at this time
that when a man goes into the Army his official connections with the party are
thereupon ipso facto severed.
"O. Well, I was told— I was told by a man who came from my * * * a very
prominent man who was a member of the Communist Party in the Middle West,
that it was the policy of the party there that when a man entered confidential
war work he was not supposed to remain a member of the party.
"L. That is correct That was Just the next point I was coming to. We know
that they do that with the Army, and we have strong suspicions that they do the
same with any confidential war work. That severance is not a severance in fact
It's merely to enable the person to state without lying, without perjuring him-
self, that he is not a member : 'Oh, yes ; I was a member, but I'm all over that
now. I'm not a member ; I don't have any connection with it'
"O. Well, there are some cases that I know about
"Ij. In some cases it may be true.
"O. That I'm quite clear about— not to irall any punches, my brother has made
a severance, in fact.
"In Well, we know that he has been a member.
"O. Tes.
"L. We also know that there has been in recent years no indication that he
is still a member.
"O. It's not only that he's not a member. I thf-nfc he has no contact.
"I know I overwhelmingly urged about 18 months ago, when we started,
that she should drop social ones which I regard as dangerous. Whether they
have, in fact, done that I don't know.
"L. Well, Pm quite confident that your brother Frank has no connection with
the Communists. I'm not so sure about his wife.
873
"0. I'm not sure, either, but I think it likely some of its importance has left
her. And, also, I believe it to be true thta they do not have any-r-I don't know
this for a fact— but if they had, I didn't know it, any well-established contacts
in Berkeley. You see, they came from Palo Alto, and they had such contacts
there. Then my brother was unemployed for 3 very salutory months, which
changed his ideas quite a lot; and when they started in Berkeley, it was for this
war job, and I do not know, but think it quite probable that his wife, Jackie, had
never had a unit or a group to which she was attached in any way. The thing
that worried me as that their friends were very left wing, and I think it is not
always necessary to call a unit meeting for it to be a pretty good contact.
"L. Now, I don't want you to feel that any of these questions that I'm going
to ask you — I'm going to ask you some pretty pertinent and direct ones — are made
for any purpose of embarrassing you in any way. It's only that I feel it my
duty to.
"O. I'll answer them as well as I can.
"L. I tried to explain to you my problem, which as you can see is due to
the nature of the kind of- espionage we're up against, is extremely difficult.
"O. Because it's so ramified.
"L. It's so ramified, and, after all, we're dealing with an allied nation.
"O. And who are the people in the project at Berkeley, are they my former
students?
"L. I'm not ready yet to tell you. As I say, I'm going to try to
"O. I'm concerned if they are people for whom I have some kind of respon-
sibility.
"L. Well, I'm not going to try to fence with you or mislead you at all as
I did without success, I feel, to some degree, at Los Alamos.
"O. Well, I felt there was a lot in your mind, and we were talking around,
the conversation was quite clear.
"L. It was perfectly obvious that you did read into it more than was stated.
Well, however, to refer again to this business concerning the party, those reasons
make it dear that the fact that a person says they have severed connection with
the party, the fact that they have at present no apparent interest or contact
in it does not show where they have unquestionably formerly been members that
they are not dangerous to us.
"O. I agree with that
"L. That again poses a terrific problem because so many of the people * * *
you know as well as I do how difficult it is to prove communism. I'm going
to discuss yourself with you in a few minutes, and that will serve to illustrate
as well as anything some of the difficulties involved. We've got to weigh, we
feel, I believe that the first and primary thing to do is to get the job done.
That is, the project completed. Now, if that involves taking. some risks, why,
of course, we'll take the risks. After all, you are risking your lives and every-
thing else to do this, and everything has to be done with a risk so that we don't
want to protect the thing to death. But, therefore, all persons who are essential
to the project in any marked degree, really unless they cease to make themselves
useful there's no use talking about severing their connections while they're there
whether we believe they're Communists, pro-Nazi, pro-Fascist, or what.
"O. I won't agree with that, I mean, I think one has to
"L. Tou have to weigh, you never know. I mean if you know it's compara-
tively easy. The only question that remains is whether we shall wait awhile
until we take somebody else or how we shall go about it. Shall we try to prose-
cute him for espionage or shall we just forget about it and weed him out I
mean, you see that once you've made the decision why then the problem is prac-
tical. The difficulty is making the decision. Now, I want to know. In the
first place I think we know now who the man that you referred to as approaching
the other college project was. I wonder if you feel that you're in a position
to tell me.
"0. I think it would be wrong.
"L. I'd like to discuss with you your attitude on that for a minute.
"O. It is primarily this, that this came to me in confidence and the actions
taken were negative, the actions of this intermediary were reported as essen-
tially negative, and although it would have been really negative not to have
touched it, I feel that I would implicate, so to speak', one f enow about whom,
who has initiative, would be persecuted.
"L. Tou mean Eltenton?
"0. Yes ; this is the way it came to me straight
"L. Well now, you see what you stated that he contacted, I believe it was
three persons on the project, and they told him to go to hell in substance.
S74
"O. Although probably more politely.
"L. And how do you know that he hasn't contacted others?
'O. I don't. I can't know that. It would seem obvious that he would have.
"L. If you heard about them they unquestionably were not successful.
"O Yes
"L. If you didn't hear about them they might be successful or they might
at least be thinking about it, don't you see? Now you can, therefore, see from
our point of view the importance of knowing what their channel is.
"O. Yes.
"L. And I was wondering, is this man a friend of yours by any chance?
"O. He's an acquaintance of mine, I've known over many years.
"L. Well do you — I mean there are acquaintances and there are friends. In
other words, do you hesitate for fear of implicating a friend?
"O. I hesitate to mention any more names because of the fact that the other
names I have do not seem to be people who were guilty of anything or people
who I would like to get mixed up in it, and in my own views I know that this
is a view which you are in a position to doubt. They are not people who are going
to get tied up in it in any other way. That is, I have a feeling that this is an
extremely erratic and unsystematic thing.
"L. Here is, I want you to in no derogatory way understand my position
again.
"O. Well * * * there is a very strong feeling. Putting my finger on it I did
it because of a sense of duty. I feel Justified * * *.
"L. Now, here is an instance in which there is an actual attempt of espionage
against probably the most important thing we're doing. You tell us about it 3
months later.
"O. More than that, I think.
"L. More than that. When the trail is cold it's stopped, when you have no
reason not to suppose that these cases which you hear about are unsuccessful,
that another attempt was made in which you didn't hear about because it was
successful.
"O. Possibly. I am very, very inclined to doubt that it would have gone
through this channel.
"L. Why?
"O. Because I had the feeling that this was a cocktail party channel. A
couple of guys who saw each other more or less by accident.
"L. Well, people don't usually do things like that at cocktail parties, I know.
All the stuff that we've picked up has certainly not been at cocktail parties.
"O. Well, that's where * * * I don't know, there may be many, many other
channels besides Eltenton, and I would assume that there would be, but I have
the feeling that Eltenton's suggestion to this f ellow was whether he was willing
to do this, was really a potential suggestion and not a systematic one.
"L. Well, I don't want to draw this out unduly, but I want to examine that
proposition for a few minutes. Why would Bltenton working for the Shell
Development Co. be interested on a frolic of his own, as it were, in trying to find
out for the Soviet Government what's going on?
"O. I don't think it was a frolic of his own, but my answer is that he worked
in Russia for 5 years * * * and had some contacts.
"L. That's right, so what I'm getting at is this— he unquestionably was asked
or directed.
"O. Depending upon the point of view.
"L. To see what he could find out?
"O. I would think so.
"L. Which would mitigate against any conclusion that this attempt here was
a mere casual thing?
"O. No ; I don't think, I mean let me put it this way. The reason I mentioned
Eltenton's name was because I thought it was likely that Eltention would per-
severe in this. But the reason I mention no other names is that I have not felt
that those people would. That they were all just accidental.
"L. Now, I don't want these names of the people who were contacted or the
person who contacted them. Let's stick to the persons that were contacts. To
do anything to them because it's perfectly evident to me that they sure as hell
would never come tell you about it if they were going to do it.
"O. Yes, that's right.
"L. Now, while I would like to have those names very much it's not as essential
as that we know the contact. Because I think, there's one channel, of course,
there's other channels, we know of. We don't know that one. Now we've got
no way of knowing whether the ones that we've picked up or the names that I
875
know of are identical with this man. Now, that's a simple reason why I want
that name, and I want to ask you pointblank if you'll give it to me. If you
won't, well 0. K., no hard feelings.
"0. No ; I've thought about it a good deal because Pash and Groves both asked
me for the name, and I feel that I should not give it. I don't mean that I don't
hope that if he's still operating that you will find it. I devoutly do. But I
would just bet dollars to doughtnuts that he isn't still operating.
"L. I don't see how you can have any hesitancy in disclosing the name of the
man who has actually been engaged in an attempt at espionage to a foreign
power in time of. war. I mean, my mind Just doesn't run along those channels,
"0. I know, it's a tough problem, and I'm worried about it a lot.
"L. I can understand personal loyalty, yet you say he's not a close friend of
yours. May I ask, do you know him as a Communist?
"0. I know him as a fellow traveler.
"L. You know him as a fellow traveler. Course in our book, membership in
the party is not material, it's whether they follow the party line which is a test.
"0. Well, I don't know whether the fellow has or has not in all detail, but he
certainy has so far as I know about it in a general way.
"L. He is now at the university?
"0. I don't know that. That is, I think, I don't know the date on this pre-
cisely, but I think it was some time maybe before Christmas of last year that this
matter was brought to my attention. I don't know how long it is. There was
some talk of his trying to get a job elsewhere * * *.
"L. Well, of course, that's the question. Do you now feel you can tell me
who it is?
"O. I do -not now feel that I ought to tell you.
"L. In what event would you feel that you should?
"0. If I had any evidence or anything came to my attention which was indica-
tive that something was transmitted * * *.
"L. Well I'm telling you it is. Right today, I can't tell you the last time
information was passed, but I think it was about a week ago.
"O. I mean something that there is a reasonable chance is the man whose name
I don't want to give to you.
"L. Well, of course, I
"0. There's a very strong feeling on my part that I ought not to.
"L. I have no way, of course, of knowing.
"0. What I want to say is this— I'm not kidding you and I'm not trying to
weasel out. It's my overwhelming Judgment that this guy isn't involved. That
isn't Judgment which is based on hope but his character5. If I am wrong, then
I am making a very serious mistake, but I think that the chances are very, very
small.
"L. Let me ask you a personal question — you don't have to answer it if you
don't want to. Is part of your feeling based on the fact, don't be insulted
please, that you don't consider that it would be such a catastrophe (sic) anyway
for us if they did find it out?
"0. That is not my feeling. I think it would be a catastrophe (sic) and I made
this clear when I talked Pash. If Russia found out except through official chan-
nels. I do not know whether what we are now doing with the British is the right
thing to do. I do not know whether it would be right to include Russia and China
in that. I think we are now reopening negotiations with the British, in fact
that is why I'm here. I don't know whether that is right That is a very hard
and tough question. I am sure that it is wrong for the Russians to find out
about those things in any way except through official channels.
"L, Well, if you won't do it, you won't do it, but don't think I won't ask you
again. Now, I want to ask you this. And again, for the same reason which
implies you're here, you may not answer. Who do you know on the project in
Berkeley who are now, that's probably a hypothetical question, or have been mem-
bers of the Communist Party?
"0. I will try to answer that question. The answer will, however, be incom-
plete. I know for a fact, I know, I learned on my last visit to Berkeley that
both Lomanitz and Weinberg were members. I suspected that before, but was
not sure. I never had any way of knowing. I will think a minute, there were
other people. There was a^ I don't know whether she is still employed or
was at one time a secretary, who was a member.
"L. Do you recall her name?
876
"O. Yes ; her name was Jane Muir. I am, of course, not sure she was a mem-
ber, but I think she was. In the case of my brother It is obvious that I know.
In the case of the others, it's just things that pile up, that I look at that way.
I'm not saying that I couldn't think of other people, it's a hell of a big project
You can raise some names.
"L. Did Lomanitz— was it Weinberg or Bohm?
"O. Weinberg. I do not know now, and did not know that Bohm was a member.
"L. Well, did you met both Weinberg and Bohm?
"O. They came over to Lawrence's office.
"L. Yes; I remember that. I think it was General Groves told me about that.
Well, anyway, did they tell you at this recent meeting that they were members?
"O. No; what they told me was the following: That they were afraid that
Lomanitz was being forced out because he was active in the union and that their
history was also somewhat red.
*'L. By their you mean the union or Weinberg and Lomanitz?
"O. Weinberg and Lomantiz. That they felt that they, as they put it, would
also be framed and they asked my advice as to whether they should leave the
project. That is what they came to discuss. I said in my opinion Lomanitz
was not being framed, that if they were fulfilling three conditions I thought that
they should stay on the project. The conditions were first, that they abided in
all strictness all of the security regulations ; second, that they had no political
activity or contacts of any kind ; and third, that they
"L. Now why isn't that— can you teU me the names of anyone at Los Alamos
that have been or are now party members ?
"O. I can't tell you the numbers of any who now are, but I know that at least
Mrs. Serber was a member. She comes from the Leof family in
"L. The Leof family in Philadelphia.
"O. And I know that my wife was a member.
"L. That was a long time ago.
"O. Yes — you haven't found out a lot about my wife.
"L. Well we might have missed some points. We were fairly confident that
she's not a member now, although she was years ago for a very brief time.
"O. Yes, she was a member for a very brief time. She was married to a
fellow who was working in Youngstown and was killed in Spain.
"L. Was that your wife's first husband?
"O. I believe she had an early marriage which was annulled, a very nasty
fellow — she has told me very little about it, but I think he was quite talented
a musician*
"L. Well I'm really not concerned much with that. She's a very attractive
girl I think.
"O. I feel I shouldn't hesitate to say these things.
"L. Now, do you know, was Mr. Serber a member of the party?
"O. I ttilTifr it possible, but I don't know.
"L. How about Mrs. Woodward?
"O. I don't know. I don't know them very well
"L. Do you know of anyone who came from Berkeley down there with you,
by with you I don't mean the same time, of course, who were members of the
party?
"L. I'm afraid I can't give you any names.
"O. No, there was a whole group of people of whom I would be rather
astonished if any of them were. Allison, Frankel, Miss Roper.
"L. How about Dave Hawkins?
"O. I don't think he was, I would not say so.
"L. Now, have you yourself ever been a member of the Communist Party?
"O. No.
"L. You've probably belonged to every front organization on the coast
"O. Just about
"L. Would you in fact have considered yourself at one time a fellow traveler?
"0. I think so. My association with these things was very brief and very
intense.
"L. I should imagine the latter anyway.
"O. It was historically quite brief and quite intense, and I should say I
"L. Now I have reason to believe that you yourself were felt out, I don't say
asked, but felt out to ascertain how you felt about it, passing a little informa-
tion, to the party.
"O. You have reason?
877
"L. I say I have reason to believe, that's as near as I can come to stating
it. Ana I right or wrong?
"O. If it was, it was so gentle I did not know it.
"L. You don't know. Do you have any one who is close to you, no that's
the wrong word, who is an acquaintance of yours, who may have perhaps been
a guest in your house, whom you perhaps knew, through friends or relatives
who is a member of the Communist Party. By that I mean
"O. Well, my brother, obviously.
"L. Well, no, I don't mean him.
"O. I think probably, you mean someone who just visited for a few hours.
"L. Yes.
"0. Yes ; certainly, the answer to that is certainly, yes.
"L. Well, would you care to give me any of their names?
"O. There is a girl called Bldred Nelson.
"L. Suppose I've got a bunch of names here, some of them are right and
some of them are wrong, you don't mind treating it that way do you?
"0. No.
"L. Did you know William Schneiderman?
"0. I know who he is. He's the secretary of the Communist Party. I've
met him at cocktail parties.
"L. You have no real personal acquaintance with him?
"O. No.
"L. Do you know a fellow named Rudy Lambert?
"O. I'm not sure, do you know what he looks like?
"L. No, I've never seen him. He's a member of the party. Do you know
a Dr. Hannah L. Peters?
"O. Yes ; I know her quite well.
"L. Do you know that she's a Communist?
"O. I certainly knew that she was very close. I did not know she was a
member.
"L. You don't know what her position in the party is?
"O. No ; I didn't even know she was a member.
"L. Do you have any more than just an acquaintance with her?
"O. Yes, I know her quite well. Her husband is on the project.
"L. How about a fellow by the name of Isaac Folkoff?
"O. I don't know. I knew a Richard Folkoff who was a member of consider-
able importance.
"L. How about a man by the name of Steve Nelson?
"O. He is a professional party member ; he's an organizer.
"L. Did you know him well at all — under what circumstances did you know
him?
"0. He was a friend of my wife's former husband who was killed in Spain.
I have a thoroughly unprofessional acquaintance with him.
"L. How about Haakon Chevalier?
"O. Is he a member of the party?
"L. I don't know.
"0. He is a member of the faculty and I know him well. I wouldn't be
surprised if he were a member, he is quite a Red.
"L. Do you know Alexander S. Kaun?
"O. I know him, in fact I once rented a house from him about 7 or 8 years
ago, but I never had any more relations with him,
"L. Do you know whether he is a member?
"O. No ; I don't. I know he's a member of the American Soviet Council.
"L. How about a girl named Jean Tatlock?
"0. She Is a close friend of mine, and I'm certain at one time she was a mem-
ber of the party.
"L. Whether or not she is now or not?
"O. I would rather doubt it. I know she dropped out at one time and I rather
think she probably still is.
"L. How about a man by the name of A. Flaniger?
"O. I know who he is, I've never met him but I've heard stories about htm.
"L. Do you know who he is?
"0. No.
"L. Is he a professor?
"O. I don't know. I know he was a graduate student at Berkeley at one
time. General Groves asked me about him.
''I/, Oh, he did.
"O. I don't know anything about him.
878
"L. Now, have any of these people that I've mentioned ever said anything
to you about your work? Snyder, Nelson, Peters, or Folkoff ?
"O. Well, I think— let's see, I don't know what words to use. Obviously,
Hannah Peters because there was some question of their going to Los Alamos,
and I am really rather surprised that she is a member of the party. They have
only very recently gotten their citizenship.
"L. What was her original nationality?
"O. German.
"L. Cigarette?
"O. No, I'll smoke my pipe.
"L. Did you say there was some question of them going to Los Alamos?
"O. Yes.
"L. About when was that?
"O. I would think that November would be a good guess on that.
"L. Have they ever been employed on the project?
"O. Peters is on it now.
"L. Oh, he is on it now?
"O. As a matter of fact the reason he didn't come was that Lawrence agreed
to his release and then at the last minute changed his mind. He's quite a good
mathematician.
"L. Now, I want to ask you to go back to Lomanitz. You told me when I was
down there that when you broke the subject to, what do you call him, Rossi?
"O. Rossi.
"L. Rossi. When you first broke the subject to him about going on the place
you stated that he was uncertain, he came up to your house and did what you
characterized as a good deal of soul searching. I would like to know whether
that soul searching or discussion of his own feelings had any relation to his
work in the party.
"O. None whatever, I did not know he was a member of the party.
"L. Until just recently.
"O. Yes, and I knew he was extremely 'Red., but frankly I thought he was a
member of the Trotskyite faction.
"L. Which would ipso facto prevent him from
"O. Being a member of the party. That's what I thought at that time. What
he said he wanted at that time was to be a soldier and be one of the American
people in that way and help to mold their feelings by being a soldier, and wasn't
that more worthwhile than working on this project I told him he obviously
had a lot of talent ; he had training that he was throwing right away and that
if he could make up his mind and it was a clear-cut decision to use himself as a
scientist and nothing else, that then that was the right thing to do.
"L. Now, what led you to exact from him a promise, or to make the condition
of giving up political activities?
"O. Because he had distributed leaflets and because it was just generally
obvious that he was a member of the union and radical societies.
"L. Now, you have stated to me and also I think to General Groves that in
your opinion membership in the party was incompatible with work on the project
from a loyalty standpoint.
"O, yes.
"L. Now, do you also go so far as to believe that persons who are not actually
members but still retain their loyalty to the party or their adherence to the party
line are in the same category?
"O. Let me put it this way. Loyalty to the party, yes ; adherence to the party
liiie, maybe no, is that it need not necessarily, although it often is, be the
sign of subservience. At the present time I don't know what the party line is
in too much detail, but I've heard from Mrs. Tolman, Tolman's wife, that the
party line at present is not to discuss postwar affairs. And I would be willing
to say that anyone who, well, let me put it this way, whose loyalty is above all
else to the party or to Russia obviously is Incompatible with loyalty to the United
States. This is, I think, the heart of it. The party has its own disciples.
"L. Now, I was coming to that. I would like to hear from you your reasons
as to why you believe— let's stick to membership in the party— is incompatible
to complete loyalty to the project. When, to state something a little bit fool-
ishly, membership in the Democratic Party certainly wouldn't be.
"O. It's an entirely different party. For one thing * * * I think I'd put it
this way. The Democratic Party is the framework of the social customs * * *
of this country, and I do not think that is true of the Communist Party. At
least, I think that there are certainly many Communists who are above all decent
guys, but there are also some who are above all Communists. It's primarily
879
that question of personal honor that I think is involved. I don't know whether
that answers the question but my idea is that being a Democrat doesn't guarantee
that you're not a floor-flusher [sic] and also it has no suggestion Just by virtue of
your being a Democrat that you would thinfr it would be all right to cheat other
people for a purpose, and I'm not too sure about this with respect to the Com-
munist Party.
"L. Let me ask you this — how in your opinion would the Communists engaged
in espionage on this project transmit their information. I want to ask it by a
question. Would it be necessary for them to pass it in writing?
"O. To be effective. It depends, I mean gossip could be effective but it could
only be effective on the first sort of thing we talked about, namely, the extent and
purpose and dates of the project and how many people were involved, where they
were involved, and if it were hopeful or not and stuff something like that But
it it were going to be anything of a technical nature well, I won't say it would be
impossible but it would be very difficult to find a method of transmission which
would preserve the technical details without having some of it written down.
"L. Do you have any real knowledge of the methods used in the party for the
transmission of information?
"O. No; I certainly don't.
"L. Such as their ordinary industrial espionage.
"O. I didn't know there was any. I'll put it this way. I would assume that it
existed because of their policies, but I couldn't know it existed because I'm not
in the party. Why do you look so worried?
"L. Because I'm not getting anywhere.
"O. Well, you're getting, except on that one point, I think that you're getting
everywhere than I can get you.
"L. Let we ask.
"O. I do not know, and let me Just make it simple. I have never been involved
in and I do not know anything about this Communist business. If there is such
an effort, and I assume there might be, I would assume that it might be very dif-
ferent in different parts of the country, I don't know.
"L. Do you feel that anything like this would be run by party headquarters or
by the Soviets themselves?
"O. I don't know, my general feeling is that the Soviets are too hard headed to
trust it to an organization which is as fly by night as the party. But I don't
know. That is, you understand Bltenton is also known to me only as a fellow
traveler and I see him around a lot of places where I was, and I can't from that
assume that his * * * were pretty leftwing and I know he was in Russia. I
do not know whether the initiative for what he was doing came from himself or
of it was something that he was told to do or something that he was ordered to do.
"L. Well, the fact that he would do it would indicate that he was much more
than a fellow traveler.
"O. Well, I'm saying that now. But my initial information.
"L. Well, try to put yourself in our position.
"O. All right, Lansdale.
"L. You're confronted with this situation. You've got a few men that you
know are actually doing it. You've got a few other men who are associated with
them closely. You can assume that if they're engaged in an organized attempt,
they're around propagandizing the party. That any two or more of several
people who are engaged Jointly in this enterprise are not going to be seen together.
Now, with the idea also you know what you have been able to pick up that you
haven't got everybody. Now, the only thing we've got to go on are peoples' associ-
ations and prior activities. All right, now to use an illustration which is per-
sonal but not pointed, you get my distinction, we've got the case of Dr. J. R.
Oppenheimer, whose wife was at one time a member of the party anyway, who
himself knows many prominent Communists, associates with them who belongs to
a large number of so-called front organizations and may perhaps have contributed
financially to the party himself, who becomes aware of an espionage attempt by
the party 6 months ago and doesn't mention it, and who still won't make a com-
plete disclosure. Now, I'm giving yourself, because by doing that I'm not giving
you information about anybody I don't want you to know anything about, and I
may say that I've made up my mind that you yourself are O. K. or otherwise I
wouldn't be talking to you like this, see? Now.
"O. I'd better be— that's all I've got to say.
"L. Well, that's my idea. Now, what are we to do in a case like that?
There are a good many people on this project who are somewhat in the same
position, who we have every reason to believe have been party members, who
30&31&— 54 66
880
are certainly not now whether for technical reasons or whether actually, who
certainly retain their, shall I say their feeling for the common man which
probably led them to the Communist fold in the first place. Their feeling that
all is not right with the world, and what Wilkie calls the palace on the hill
surrounded by the mud huts is all wrong. Now, what attitude are we to take
toward these people? What is our position? Here we are; we know that
information is streaming out from this place every day. We know about some
of it How much of it is there that we don't know about?
"O. Places other than the west coast?
"L. Sure, we know that definite efforts are being made to find out. They
wouldn't be going to those efforts unless they really wanted it. Now, what
shall we do? Shall we sit back and say well, my God, maybe the guy recanted,
maybe he isn't at all?
"O. Hard for me to say because of my own personal trends, and as I say I
know that the Serbers afford a good illustration of this I would hesitate to
say to a stranger * * * about another closeup * * * person whose history was
the same as that of Mrs. Berber's, sure she's all right but I know the Serbers
and I am confident of them. Now, I have worked on rather a personal basis.
I don't know the Woodwards are members, I did not know that until General
Groves mentioned it the other day that there was some question of it. I feel
that in the case of the Serbers I could understand that very welL But I just
don't know in a general case ; it's impossible to say. I don't know any of these
people in Berkeley, I don't know Weinberg or Lomanitz well enough to
swear * * *
"L. Why is he moving heaven and earth to keep out of the Army?
"O. He told me that he thought he was being framed, and I said I think that's
nonsense why would you be framed, and he said, "Well, part of the general
scheme * * * maybe they're after bigger game than the party."
**L. Did you ask him what the bigger game was?
"O. He said he thought you were after the union.
"L. We're not
"O. Well, I suggest you keep your eyes open.
"O. * * * I persuaded him, I think, that he should not try to stay on the
project there.
"L. He's gotten notice of his induction on the 20th of September. Well, sup-
pose we tell you, and I'm not telling you now, of course, for the sake of illustra-
tion which is way off the beam, intentionally so, say we told you that Backus
(Bacher?) was unquestionably a member of the party, at least up until a short
time before he came on the project and he's one guy we don't have anything on,
would you concur in his removal?
"O. Just on the basis of his having been a member?
"L. Just on the basis of his having been a member of the party.
"O. That's pretty hard to say. I would try, myself, to get some information
about him from people in whom we could have confidence. I wouldn't take it
on the face of that until I saw what it looked like. Because Backus (Bacher?)
is a pretty valuable man and assuming the fellow is * * *
"L. Yes, that's the reason I used him as an illustration. How close are you
to members of the party? Are you close enough to get any information from
them?
"O. Well, in a way at Berkeley I could. I don't think I could get information
about this business. But I think I could get information about who is doing
what
"L. Gould you get information about who is and who isn't a member of the
party?
"O. I don't know whether I could now. At one time I could have. I never
tried to.
WL. Would you be willing to?
"O. Not in writing, I think that would make a very bad impression.
"L. No ; not in writing.
"O. I don't know anyone at Los Alamos who could give information of that
kind. I could get partial Information.
"L. Do you think that you you'd be In any position to be of assistance in uncover-
ing the ramifications of this case?
"0. It would obviously depend a hell of a lot of where it was.
"L. Well, I was coming to that on the next question.
"O. I think it's like this. I think that my being at Los Alamos very seriously
interferes with their actions there, but I wouldn't want to give a general answer.
881
I wouldn't want to say "no" in a general way; and I can't very well say "yes"
in a general way.
"L. My next question which yon have already partially answered is wicked,
and you've answered at least that you probably would if you were persuaded,
but you wouldn't want to.
"O. That's it. That isn't my business at all.
"L. It's not your business and I don't think you ought to be asked unless * * *
"O. Unless it would be a desperate attempt
"L. Well, we have, of course my job operatively is to try to prevent the escape
of information, and of course since that is my job, although this project is only
part of it, It probably looms larger in my daily problems of course than it does in
yours. You have other things to worry about and you ought not to have to worry
about this. And the only reason you are being worried about it is because you
do have some information. Now I say this that we have been fairly sure for a
long time that you knew something you weren't telling us.
"O. How did you know about it because I wouldn't have known. How did you
know that?
"L. Well, you don't mind if I don't tell you. It wasn't anything you did or
said. And don't you think, I'm coming up on the other beam now, don't you
think that you'd be a whole lot happier and have a whole lot less worries if you
were in the position of having told us everything you know about it, that could
possibly help us, and then forget about the whole damn thing, and not be bothered
any more.
"O. I would be bothered by thinking it was something I shouldn't have done.
I mean I've told you technically everything except this guy's name.
"L. You haven't told me his name. Now I don't, if your description of your
relation with him is so, I'm in an extreme quandary as to whether I know him or
not and here we've gone to great risks to try and button this whole thing up, and
it's perfectly obvious that here's a big hole in our net that we haven't stopped.
"O. I don't know how much you've got, but it seems to me that you want me to
give you more information about many others who are not involved. You may
have it; I don't know.
"I/. For instance, I don't follow you.
"O. Well, it seems to me that the essential position you have — EELtenton for
instance.
"L. Oh, sure. You know the way these things operate. You have one guy here,
we'll call him the master spy, he has a lot of people * * * he may have more
people working on the same titling all unknown to each other, and they may each
have others. That spreads out. They may have missed on these three men that
you mentioned. Let me ask you this question. How did this intermediate con-
tact happen to go to these three particular people?
"O. I would suppose it was because the way it was told to me, he was told to.
It was well the relations between Russia and the United States are not what they
ought to be and we are not giving them half of all of our technical information
that is important for an alliance. They know about as much as they can, they're
working at great 'odds and so on. Well, I suppose he picked people who might
be susceptible to that approach.
"L. In other words people who were apt to be sympathetic to Russia?
"O. That's right
"L. Who were apt to feel that the State Department, or whoever was respon-
sible was rapidly leading this country into the position of making a break with
the Soviet Union, when it was to the enormous interests of this country and if not
to the U. S. S. R. that we maintain the most cordial relations.
"O. I would think it might be.
"L. Now, are these three people to your knowledge members of the party or
have been?
"O. No—no.
"L. Are they in the category of what you would call f ellow travelers?
"O. I actually don't know except in one case where I would say he was a fellow
traveler.
"L. Now, why did they come to you?
"0. I suppose for 2 reasons ; 1, because I was more or less responsible for the
work, and 2, because they thought I wouldn't hit the roof over it I might say
I did.
"I*. I know, of course, that you probably have administratively the best miming
outfit, in the project, and that it's largely because of the intense personal loyalty
which you seem to be able to inculcate in the people that work for you.
"O. I have my troubles.
882
"L. Yes, I can imagine you do. I can see one of the reasons for it— they stick
by yon and you stick by them, which after all is the secret of obtaining people's
loyalty.
"O. I do have my troubles.
"L. Let me skip to a slightly different subject. Do you know anything about
any difficulties at the metallurgical laboratory? Administrative difficulties?
"O. Yes, I do.
"L. What do you know?
"O. I don't know very much, I don't know nearly enough about them to be of
any use.
"L. Do you know anything about the incipient, I guess more than incipient,
intramural organization, you might say?
"O. I know about it. Allison told me about it last time I was there. I do not
know of a single member of it. I know nothing about it except what Allison told
me which was that there were too darned many Jews on it
"L. How do you feel about any intramural organization like that?
"O. Personally, it doesn't bother me so much although * * *.
"O. It is not dangerous in the sense in which the enemy is * * * how it came
into all this because of the fact that the PABOT is organized on this project,
that I know that one of its most zealous members is Bltenton, and I was frankly
afraid that I was being used or might be used for the provocation of leaks, that
is the reason why I spoke of these things.
"L. Do you know how close the heads of that union are to the party?
"0. Which union?
"L. The FABOT.
"0. No, I don't. I don't even know who the heads at Berkeley are. I met
once the international vice-president, or whatever he was called, Scheres, but
I do not know whether he was a party member or not
"L. And you just don't know anything about any party activities in connection
with that?
"O. No, I would somewhat doubt whether there were any, but I don't know.
"L. Of course, you now know that Weinberg and Lomanitz are both members
of the party and members of the union.
"0. I didn't know Weinberg was a member.
"L. Well, as a matter of fact, I dont either.
"O. I had a feeling of surprise * * *
"L. He's probably mixed up. He's close to Lomanitz who unquestionably is
a member.
"O. Well, that's certain. Lomanitz said to me that he had been very active.
"L. And, of course, nobody can be very active in the union and do the union
any good or offer anything unless they do know considerable about the work
that's going on.
"O. I feel that any place like this project should not be unionized. * * * I
know nothing about the Chicago thing except that it was being a great .headache
to my good friend Allison.
"L. Do you know of any action to prevent the unionization? *
"0. In Chicago or at Berkeley?
"L. No, at Berkeley. I'm talking about Berkeley. These intramural things
don't bother me, I mean I've got nothing against unions as such, and as long
as its an intramural affair why then it can't have the effects. I mean I don't
care whether they demand higher wages.
"O. The union at Berkeley I don't think is getting very far.
"L. I don't seem to make much progress, but I certainly try hard. Well,
they've got to know all of the people who are working on the damn thing.
"O. It would seem to me that this may strike you as being a very foolish thing
to do, and I don't want to do it if that's the case. If I were in your shoes I
would ask to speak to the * * * or counsel or executive committee or whatever
they have in that including the officers if possible. Also, who was instrumental
in getting it started and I would make a rather clear and helpful expose of why
it was an undesirable thing. I'm sure that it would have a very great effect.
You might not be able to do it, and if you can't Fidler can do it for you, and maybe
some civilian could do it for you, I don't know, but I mean, let me put it this
way— if the word gets started at Los Alamos I shall go to the boys and talk to
them, I shall tell them some of the reasons which * * *. Whether that would be
helpful at Berkeley or not I don't know.
"L. I don't think we can get Lawrence to do it
"O. No, maybe you can't. And then of course there are some advantages that
are of interest to * * *.
883
"L. There are some advantages to what?
"O. To having a Red history like mine.
"L. So they know that you're not antiunion,
"O. So they know that I'm not a banker <
"L. Well, of course you're right, you're perfectly right, they know from your
past history that whatever anyone might say about you, you're certainly not
antilabor.
"0. Well, I was only trying to say that if I were at Berkeley now, as a matter
of fact it wasn't my business, but I did try to discourage the FAEOT. It was
getting started before I left Berkeley, but that was in the form of talking to
other people, my brother, and one or two others, and saying this looks like a
bad thing. I did nothing at all deliberate about it.
"L. Can you tell me any more, did Weinberg, it was Weinberg and Bohm who
came to you, wasn't it?
"O. Yes, they came to me in Lawrence's office.
"L. Yes. Did Weinberg and Bohm say anything? What did they say about
the party?
"O. They didn't say anything about the party.
"L. They didn't? Did they talk about the union?
"O. They talked, well they didn't even talk about the union. They talked
about, I think I've given you a fairly good, I don't know what they might have
said if we had met in the woods some place, but we met after all where there
were two secretaries in the room.
"L. Oh, they were there.
"O. I don't know whether the door was closed or not, but it was extremely
open interview. I saw Lomanitz more or less, well I saw him first at one of
the offices of a man and we walked out to telegraph * * * but his discussion
was a little bit more uninhibited than the others. These 2 fellows were con-
cerned with only 1 thing— they said they had worked closely with Rossi, they
thought he was a good guy and that they thought he was being framed for his
activities in the union and his political sympathies, and they thought that be-
cause of this they were also in danger of such a nature that they .should get out
of the project into some other useful work or were they likely to be treated in
the same way.
"L. Now let me ask you this. From what you stated to them, if they were in
fact not fulfilling the conditions which you mentioned to them, which you said
to them would have been tantamount to telling, then if you are doing that you'd
better get out.
"0. Yes.
"L. That is correct, isn't it?
"O. Yes, that is if they were violating any of the three rules which meant
active in union, maintaining any contact with Reds, not maintaining discretion,
they were useless in the project.
"L. Now, you still don't want to tell me that name?
"O. Not if I can help it.
"L. Well, is there anything else that you believe you can tell me that could
give us any assistance?
"0. Let me walk around the room and think.
"L. Sure, it's getting warm isn't it?
"0. I have been thinking about this. I can tell you that I doubt very seriously
whether (I don't know Bohm very well), I doubt very seriously whether Wein-
berg would do anything along the lines of what we were talking about. I * * *.
"L. Well, do you base that on his character or what?
"O. Yes. I should have told you before, but I have told you since, no I haven't,
but I will tell you now, you said that Mrs. Peters was a member of the party. I
do not know whether her husband is or not, but I know that he was in Germany,
and that he was actually in prison there, and I also know that he has always
expressed a very great interest in the Communists, and I think whether he is
a member or not would perhaps partly depend on whether he was a citizen or
whether he was working on a war job. That is, it may just have happened that
the has had no period where he could be and that he would otherwise be.
"L. Is his wife also German?
"O. Yes.
"L. How recently did they come over here?
"O I don't know ; they were in New York for some time, I met them first, oh,
it must be 4 or 5 years that I met them first, they had been in California some
time before that. I believe that they came over very early because immediately
884
after Mr. Peters was imprisoned in Dukon (sic, Dachau) then he escaped, at
least that's the story that I have heard from more than one person and that
she was * * * and they tried * * *.
"L. By the way, what was your wife's husband's name that was killed in
Spain?
"O. Dallet ; I never knew him.
"L. You never knew him.
"O. He wa sa big shot in the party * * *. I have heard that * * *.
"L. Great for sentiment those boys.
"O. Oh, they were. Those that went over there were I suppose * * * I've
met 2 other people, 1 was a young man called Thompson who was working in
San Francisco * * *.
"L. Let me ask you a question, I don't want to draw this out unduly, I know
you're busy.
"O. Well, you're having trouble.
"L. But you see, that I'm in, you might say mental difficulties over this thing.
I feel I have a heavy responsibility and I'm trying to find out everything I can
that will help.
"O. I would warn you, you see that the fact that there aree som people at-
tached to the Communist machinery, who may, or may be not attached, who may
be guilty of passing but its a hell of a bad reason for suspecting everyone.
"I». Of course, of coiirse. For the same reason that it's a hell of, if you're
just out for who are Communists and who isn't it's a hell of a bad thing to say
well everybody who is a labor union man or everybody who hollers for a second
front or some of the other things which so happen to be same things that the
Commies are interested in, to say they're Commies. Of course, many people, we
have to guard against them all the time who want to say Just that and of course
it's just dam foolishness. At the same time we're presented with a thing of
such terrific importance that * * *.
"O. I think it is in a sense of business and loyalty a terribly serious thing.
I have not felt that this information in the hands of the Russians was likely to
be dynamite in the way of action because of the fact that that * * * because
they're so tied up with the Nazis they wouldn't know what to do with it.
"L. There's something I want to ask you about. Do you believe the Russians
having this information would have any greater effect than perhaps, I might
say, guiding their foreign relations regarding how far they would be willing
to go to hold the friendship of the United States, let us say. Of course * * *.
"O. I think it's like this, I think that once the pressure on Russia is reduced
to such that they can turn to * * * that they like any other great nation would
probably turn to working on this. I think that at a time like that that any infor-
mation they had gotten about what we are doing would certainly have an influ-
ence, but I don't know, I somehow don't see how in the present war.
"I/. In other words, you question seriously the whether any serious effects
could come of this. We're not interested in the answer to that question. For
instance, I don't give a damn whether Hawkins or Peters or anybody are working
on this thing because they think it's a chance of a lifetime to learn physics or
whether they* are supremely ambitious to see this thing completed above all
else, or whether they're doing it because they want to give it to their country,
or because they want to win the war because they are against Germany and for
the United States. I mean, the question really, and practically is not material.
"O. Well, information going to Russia is a very serious thing even if that
information is not used in Russia because we have no control over what happens
to it.
"L. And they may make a separate peace.
"O. I don't think for this reason that it's a minor point by any means. I don't
personally have the feeling that they're working on it.
"L. There's this thing to be considered, dealing as we must with possibili-
ties— they may next month or 2 months from now make a separate peace with
Germany.
"O. I don't think that it utterly impossible. I've thought about it a great
deal.
"L. And put themselves in precisely the same position they were in when they
precipitated the European war by making an alliance in 1939. When they did
that they did everything in their power in a neutral way to help Germany.
You might also go so far as to say that they followed a state of nonbelligerency
of Allied nonbelligerency where they did everything in their power to further
strikes and sabotage in this country and propagandize to prevent this country
from getting into a position to defend itself.
885
"O. I may say that I never understood that policy. Even from the point of
view which I think is right; namely, that the intent of Russia Is to make a
strong Russia. I just don't see the point * * *.
"L. Now, can I ask you one more theoretical question. Do you have any, did
you ever arrive at any conclusion as to what peculiar psychological trait, or what
advantage held out makes native-born Americans of three generations stock go
wild, be members of the Communist Party and act in the sole interest of Russia
as distinguished from the interests of the United States?
"0. It could be a lot of things, but there have been examples of this strange
loyalty to instructors ( ?) which you might call treachery. * * * It was certainly
true in religious wars and I think also during a period in which your emotions
or a rather similar situation * * * where people * * * There was tremendous
opposition to this revolution. Remembers the Jacobins? And I think that
(sic)
"L. You mean allegiance to the church accomplished the same thing as alle-
giance to Russia?
"O. It's not quite the same.
"L. It's more or less of a religious aspect
"O. I think that the one thing that I was trying to say was that a lot of these
people Join the party and would seem to have no reason to do so, do so out of
a very deep sense of right and wrong which does not express itself * * * it's a
combination of religious temperament and actual relations * * * that probably
comes closest to it
"L. Have you ever read any of Ruth McKenny's stuff?
"O. I've read one novel.
"L. Did you ever read Jake Home?
«0. No.
"L. She continually speaks in that novel of the central character feeling the
call, much as you might refer
"O. To an evangelist.
"L. To an evangelist or a minister.
"0. There is something like that involved, and some of the people who are
on that list that you read me or who I know well have a very deep fervor.
"L. But I can't understand ; here's the particular thing about it They are not
adhering to any constant ideals.
"O. No ; I more or less feel.
"L. They may be adhering to Marxism, but they f ollow the twistings and turn-
ings of a line designed to assist the foreign policy of another country.
"O. This conviction that makes it not only hysterical but * * * I tMr*fr abso-
lutely unthinkable. My membership in the Communist Party. At the period in
which I was involved there were so many positions in which I did fervently
believe, in correctments (sic) and aims of the party * * * at that time * * * ,
"L. Can I ask you what period that was?
"0. That was at the time of the Spanish War, up to the pact.
"L. Up to the pact. That is the time you broke, you might say?
"0. I never broke; I never had anything to break. I gradually disappeared
from one after another of the organizations. I didn't like the way some came
out and wrote letters to the Republic saying they had seen the light, and I had
some personal loyalty involved * * * and, too, some of these organizations which
I may say all pretty well cracked up.
"L. Yes; they certainly did let them down during that period. I think I've
about talked myself down.
"0. I wish, Colonel, that I could do what you want. I'm thinking about this
specific point you want this information. I can't deny that I could give you that
information. I wish I could do it
"L. And don't think it's the last time I'm going to ask you, 'cause it isn't
"O. I think I believe in what you say tibat you'd stop asking that question if
I answered it.
"L. Well, I want to say that personally I like you very much and I wish you'd
stop being so formal and calling me Colonel, 'cause I haven't had it long enough
to get used to it.
"O. I remember at first you were a captain, I think.
"L. And it hasn't been so long since I was a first lieutenant, and I wish I could
get out of the Army and back to practicing law, where I don't have these troubles.
"O. You've got a very mean Job and
"L. I want you to know that I like you personally, and believe me it's so. I
have no suspicions whatsoever, and I don't want you to feel that I have, \
"0. Well, I know where I stand on these things. At least I'm not worried
about that. It is, however, as you have asked me, a question of some past
loyalties * * * I would regard it as a low trick to involve someone where I
would be dollars to doughnuts he wasn't involved.
"L. O. K., sir."
*******
Mr. GRAY. You have concluded witnesses?
Mr. BOBB. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Garrison, I feel it my duty to raise a point with respect to these
proceedings upon the conclusion of testimony by witnesses called by Mr. Robb.
This has to do with the scope of the Commission letter to Dr. Oppenheimer and
the testimony which has been adduced before this board. You will recall that in
your direct examination of Dr. Oppenheimer and in the examination of witnesses
called by him, there developed much discussion about matters in which Dr.
Oppenheimer participated in the postwar years, which are not referred to in the
Commission's letter, and I have in mind specifically as examples the Vista report,
the long-range detection problem, various attitudes and statements about strategic
offensive air power, some testimony about relative emphasis in the use of this
new kind of energy for military purposes as between sea vessels and aircraft, and
so forth. These various items are the ones I refer to. I think that I should say
to you that these have necessarily and under the circumstances become material
to the matters under consideration by this board.
I think I should say to you that I am quite sure that the board will not dis-
regard the testimony and other material before it with respect to these matters.
I am concerned that there be no element of surprise to Dr. Oppenheimer or to his
attorneys, and I wish to therefore notify you at the conclusion of the evidence
which Mr. Robb has presented that these matters are considered material by the
board.
Mr. GARRISON. I think the chairman is quite right and we certainly raise no
question of the broadening of the Commission's letter in order to avoid surprise.
We make no contention of that sort, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. I want to be sure I understand it. I believe it was your statement
quite early in these proceedings that with respect to these matters there would
be no request that the Commission's letter be broadened. I am not sure we
were talking about these precise things, but I do remember your making an
observation of that nature. I should want to make it perfectly clear that if the
Commission's findings ultimately do concern themselves with these matters,
among other things, that no one be surprised that that has happened. I want it
to be particularly clear.
Mr. GARRISON. It is clear.
Mr. ROBB. I believe you said the "Commission's findings" ; I believe you mean
the board's findings.
Mr. GRAY. I am sorry, I certainly did mean the board's findings.
Mr. ROBB. Excuse me for interrupting.
Mr. GRAY. No, I am pleased that you did.
May I ask ^whether you have anything to say with respect to this?
Mr. ROBB. Not at all. We have no objection whatever to the issues being
taken in that light. The matter was thought by Mr. Garrison to be material.
I am sure it is. Dr. Oppenheimer testified about it, and a number of his witnesses
did. I think those are matters which should have been brought to light. I
think it entirely appropriate that these issues should be taken to include those
matters.
Mr. GRAY. Now, Mr. Garrison, I indicated to you the other day that I thought
it was likely that the board would like to put a few questions both to Dr. Oppen-
heimer and Mrs. Oppenheimer.
I should like now to ask you what you have in mind with respect to anything
else you want to offer as attorney for Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. GARRISON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We were a little at a loss to know quite
how to plan, because in the first place, we didn't know whether the board itself
might want to go into matters further with Mr. Borden. We also understood
from Mr. Robb that he might have another witness, and that he would not be able
to tell us until lats this morning wether he would have another witness or not.
So we were a little uncertain whether we would run over this afternoon or not
We tried to reach Mr. Robb at lunch time and were unable to do so
Mr. ROBB. I am sorry. I could not have told you then.
Mr. GARRISON. We want to introduce a limited amount of rebuttal testimony.
We have in mind calling Dr. Oppenheimer, naturally. We have some very
short testimony to put into the record from Dr. Bush, Dr. Zacharias, and Mr.
887
Hill. Mrs. Oppenheimer wiU be, of course, available whenever you would like
to question her. If it would be acceptable to the board it would be helpful to us
if we could adjourn and commence tomorrow morning. I think we could prob-
ably be done by certainly the early afternoon with our rebuttal Then if you
would like to have Mrs. Oppenheimer present for f uther questioning after that
we could do it very easily.
If you would like to put what questions you have to Dr. Oppenheimer we can,
of course, do that. The only point is that it would be unlikely to begin rebuttal
tomorrow because of the uncertainties of the afternoon and the relative lateness
of the hour. Dr. Oppenheimer is available, and he would be very happy to sub-
mit himself to your questions if you would like to put some yourself to him.
Mr. GRAY. I think we would like to put such questions as we have to him this
afternoon. Would there be any chance of getting Mrs. Oppenheimer this after-
noon also, because I don't think these would be long appearances, and perhaps
we could finish up with that, and then let your start your rebuttal in the morning.
Mr. GABRISON. May I speak to Dr. Oppenheimer about it?
Mr. GRAY. Yes. We will take a short recess.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GABRISON. Mr. Chairman, I find Mrs. Oppenheimer is not available this
afternoon, but will be in the morning. I am now putting in a telephone call to
Dr. Bush, so when you are through asking questions to Dr. Oppenheimer, I think
we can get him down here on 5 minutes notice. His testimony will not be long.
Mr. GBAY. All right, sir.
Whereupon, J. Robert Oppenheimer, a witness having been previously duly
sworn, was recalled to the stand and testified further as f ollows :
EXAMINATION
By Mr. GRAY:
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, I think it is probably my duty to remind you that you are
still under oath in this proceeding.
A. Thank you.
Q. I have some questions I would like to ask you, and possibly some other
members of the board will.
I want now to go back to the so-called Chevalier incident.
A. Bight
Q. I should like to give you something of a summary of what I believe to have
been your testimony before the board. If it is not an accurate summary in your
opinion, or your counsel thinks it is not an accurate summary, I would like to
know about it But on the basis of a summary, then, of your testimony, I
should like to ask some questions.
The summary would be this: You said that Chevalier was your friend in
whom you had confidence, and that you were convinced that his remarks about
passing information to the Russians were innocent For these reasons, you
testified, it did not occur to you for a long time that you should report this
incident to the security officers, and when you did tell them about it, you de-
clined to name Chevalier, because you were convinced that he was innocent,
and in effect wanted to protect him from the harrassment of an investigation
because of your belief in his innocence.
You testified on the other hand that the story of the Chevalier incident which
you told to Colonel Fash in August 1947, and reaffirmed to Colonel Lansdale in
September 1943, was false in certain material respects. Let me repeat, you testi-
fied here that that story was false in material respects. I believe you testified
that this story was a cock and bull story, and that the whole thing was a pure
fabrication except for the name Eltenton, and that this fabrication was in some
very considerable circumstanital detail, and your testimony here as to your
explanation for this fabrication was that you were an idiot, and that you were
reluctant to mention Chevalier and no doubt somewhat reluctant to mention
yourself.
However, I believe that your testimony indicated that you agreed that if the
story you told Pash had been true, it showed that Chevalier was deeply involved,
that it was not just a casual conversation, that it would not under those circum-
stances just have been an innocent and meaningless contact, and that it was a
criminal conspiracy.
In short, with respect to that portion of your testimony I believe you led the
board to believe that you thought that if your story to Colonel Pash had been
true it looked like a very unsavory situation, to say the very best about it.
Now, here is my question : If Chevalier was your friend and you believed M™
to be innocent and wanted to protect him, then why did you tell a complicated
888
false story that on the face of it would show that the individual was not innocent,
but on the contrary, was rather deeply involved with several people in what
might have been a criminal espionage conspiracy?
Or to put the question in another way, I ask you whether it is not a fair infer-
ence from your testimony that your story to Pash and Lansdale as far as it went
was a true story, and that the fabrication may have been with respect to the
current version.
A. Let me take the second part of your question first
Q. Yes.
A. The story I told to Pash was not a true story. There were not three or
more people involved on the project. There was one person involved. That
was me. I was at Los Alamos. There was no one else at Los Alamos involved.
There was no one in Berkeley involved. When I heard the microfilm or what
the hell, it didn't sound to me as to this were reporting anything that Chevalier
had said, or at that time the unknown professor had said. I am certain that
was not mentioned. I testified that the Soviet consulate had not been mentioned
by Chevalier. That is the very best of my recollection. It is conceivable that
I knew of Eltenton's connection with the consulate, but I believe I can do no
more than say the story told in circumstantial detail, and which was elicited
from me in greater and greater detail during this was a false story. It is not
easy to say that.
Now, when you ask for a more persuasive argument as to why I did this than
that I was an idiot, I am going to have more trouble being understandable.
I think I was impelled by 2 or 3 concerns at that time. One was the feeling
that I must get across the fact that if there was, as Lansdale indicated, trouble
at the Radiation Laboratory, Kitenton was the guy that might very well be
involved and it was serious. Whether I embroidered the story in order to under-
line that seriousness or whether I embroidered it to make it more tolerable
that I would not tell the simple facts, namely, Chevalier had talked to me about
it, I don't know. There were no other people involved, the conversation with
Chevalier was brief, it was in the nature of things not utterly casual, but I
think the tone of it and his own sense of not wishing to have anything to do with
it, I have correctly communicated.
I think I need to say that it was essential that I tell this story, that I should
have told it at once and I should have told it completely accurately, but that it
was a matter of conflict for me and I found myself, I believe, trying to give a
tip to the intelligence people without realizing that when you give a tip you must
tell the whole story. When I was asked to elaborate, I started off on a false
pattern.
I may add 1 or 2 things. Chevalier was a friend of mine.
Dr. EVANS. Did you say is a friend.
The WITNESS. He was* friend of mine.
Dr. EVANS. Today?
The WITNESS. He was then. We may talk later of our present relations. He
was then a friend, of mine. As far as I know he had no close relations with
anyone else on the project The notion that he would go to a number of project
people to talk to them instead of coming to me and talking it over as we did
would have made no sense whatever. He was an unlikely and absurd inter-
mediary for such a task. I think there are circumstances which indicate that
there was no— that there would not have been such a conspiracy— but I am in
any case solemnly testifying that there was no such conspiracy in what I knew,
and what I know of this matter. I wish I could explain to you better why I
falsified and fabricated.
By Mr. GBA.Y:
Q. Of course, the point I am trying to make with you, and that is the reason
for the question I asked, is the inference to be drawn from your motive at the
time, as I think you have testified, was the protection of an innocent person,
because the story you told was certainly not calculated to lead to the conclusion
of innocence on Chevalier's part. These inferences neessarily present themselves.
Let me ask this : First, you heard Colonel Pash testify that as a result of the
intrvlew with him in which you indicated that there were three other people
involved, he and his associates actually held up orders with respect to an
individual who was to transfer to Oak Eidge, I think. Were you aware of that
at the time?
A. I was not, not until Friday.
Q. I think a few moments ago, you questioned whether you had discussed
this interview with Colonel
A. Then I didn't make myself clear. I asserted that I had not discussed it
with Chevalier or Chevalier with me. When I mentioned to Colonel Pash, it
came in the form of microfilm or whatever the hell, that was the phrase, which
is not very precise. May I add a point, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. GABRISON. Just a minute. Tou are clear he means the phrase in the
recording as it was played?
Mr. GBAY. Yes, I understand.
The WITNESS. May I add a point. When I did identify Chevalier, which was
to General Groves, I told him of course that there were no three people, that
this had occurred in our house, that this was me. So that when I made this
damaging story, it was clearly with the intention of not revealing who was the
intermediary.
By Mr. GBAY :
Q. Again with respect to Chevalier, can you recall any efforts you have ever
made in his behalf with respect to passport difficulties or problems that he may
have had? I think you testified about one.
A. Yes. I remember that at the time .when his wife had divorced him and he
was determined to go to France, I recommended counsel to him to obtain an
American passport He had also a French passport. Without discussing it
with me, nor I believe with anyone else, while the negotiations or the effort to
secure an American passport were in process, he did leave on his French
passport.
Q. Is it clear to you that in your visit in the late fall of 1953 to Paris, you
did not in any way get involved in Dr. Chevalier's passport problems as of the
present time?
A. I don't believe I became involved in them. I am not even sure he discussed
them with me.
Q. You say .he did discuss them with you?
A. I am not even sure he discussed them with me. I am sure he discussed
one point with me at length, which was his continued employment at UNESCO.
Q. You don't remember discussing with him the best possible way to get infor-
mation on his part about a passport, or the way to obtain a passport?
A. That could well have happened and I would have referred MTH to the
embassy.
Q. Did you in fact do so?
A. If I were sure I would tell you.
Q. I am putting some of the same questions to you now, Dr. Oppenheimer,
that Mr. Robb put earlier.
A. Bight.
Q. You had luncheon I believe with Mr. Wymans of the embassy?
A. That is right.
Q. I believe you testified on the question of Mr. Robb you did not discuss Mr.
Chevalier's passport problem with Mr. Wymans?
A. No, I saw Mr. Wymans long before I saw Mr. Chevalier ; not long before,
but well a week before.
Q. Have you been in communication with Chevalier since the time you had
luncheon with Mr. Wymans?
A. Yes ; I saw Chevalier after my lunch with Wymans, but not the other way
around.
Q. Have you been in communication with Chevalier since the evening you
spent with him?
A. The next day we drove out to visit Malraux.
Q. Yes ; you testified about that. Have you been in communication with him
since that time?
A. No. Well, we had a card from him, just for my birthday.
Dr. EVANS. When did you get that card?
The WITNESS, Around my birthday, which was during these hearings. I
don't recall this. I could have advised Chevalier to consult Wymans with
regard to his passport.
By Mr. GBAY :
Q. I am sure that you could have, because I believe it to be true that he did,
and specifically stated that it was at your suggestion that he do so. I want again
to ask you whether you had conversations with anybody else other than Chevalier
about his passport problem while you were in Paris in the late fall? I think I
am asking you, is it clear to you that you did not?
890
A. It is quite dear to me. If— I believe I saw no one at the Embassy after
seeing Chevalier or no one connected with the Embassy.
Q. Do you have any guess or knowledge as to whether Chevalier today is active
in Communist Party affairs?
A. I have a strong, strong guess that he is not I have no knowledge. His
new wife is an extremely sensible, wholly un-Communist girL The other person
we saw together was a man who has become a violent anti-Communist and is now
apolitical. I don't have knowledge.
Q. The record shows, I believe, Dr. Oppenheimer, that you continued probably
until sometime in 1942 to make financial contributions which went to Communist
causes, with money passing to different people, but among others, Folkoff was one
who was known to you to be a Communist Party officer.
A. That is right
Q. Did you discuss these contributions with Mrs. Oppenheimer? Was she
aware that you were making these contributions?
A. I would assume that we discussed everything in our life at that time.
Q. Did she make any contributions on her own account?
A. I have no knowledge of that.
Q. I see.
A. I am sure that everything was quite open between us. She has told me that
she may have given Steve Nelson some money. She remembers that not as
a contribution for a cause, but as something she was giving Nelson for his own
use. But I have no recollection of it.
Q. If you made contributions as late as 1942, and this fact were known to Mrs.
Oppenheimer, it was certainly clear to her at that time, or should have been clear
to her at that time, that these funds were going to Communist Party causes
because of her previous membership and presumably full awareness of the
methods of operation.
A. I hate to say so, but I think as to this you will have to ask her. My
recollection of her Communist Party experience was a very limited one — very
hard work with the steel union and mimeographing and things like that— and
I doubt whether she was at any time what you would call an expert on how
Communists dealt with things.
Q. I don't think I have heard suggested at any time that Mrs. Oppenheimer
was politically naive. I don't believe that you have made that suggestion,
although there has not been much testimony about her, I might say that any-
thing I have read or heard in or about these proceedings would indicate nothing
other than a pretty full knowledge of what she was about I agree with you,
however, that some of these questions should be put to her.
I want to go back now, Dr. Oppenheimer, to a portion of your testimony which
related to this matter of ceasing political activity by those who came into the
active service on the project. I believe you testified that as to some of these
individuals, whose names I don't recall at the moment, you told them that they
would have to cease their political activities, and you testified that by that you
meant making speeches, et cetera.
Now, do you today take the view that ceasing political activity, whatever is
encompassed in that phrase, is an adequate safeguard even though you think
you know the individual and trust his innocence and loyalty completely?
A. Today? No. Well, I think there is nothing better to go on than the Judg-
ment of a man, but I am not suggesting that it should not be supplemented by
whatever evidence is available as to what the man is up to.
Q. Let me put a hypothetical question to you.
A. Perhaps I did not understand you.
Q. Suppose you today had a friend in whom you had the highest degree of
confidence as to his loyalty to this country and his discretion and his character;
assume further that you could make the Judgment to your own satisfaction
that this man would never yield in the matter of protecting the security interests
of this country? Incidentally, you happen to have reason that he was a member
of the Communist Party. I am asking whether again you would say, well, it
depends on the individual
A. Let me first point out an implausibility in the hypothetical question. I
would not today suppose that a man who is a member of the Communist Party,
was now or recently a member of the Communist Party, whatever his other
merits, could put the interests of the United States above those of a foreign
power. But if we can relax it a little bit and say that I know a man who once
was a member or who I had reason to think was once a member of the Com-
munist Party, and whom I knew well and trusted, and of whom there was
question of his employment on serious secret work, I would think it would not
891
be up to me to determine whether his disengagement from the Communist Party
was genuine. I would tfripTr that at this time investigation would be called for.
But I could have a very strong conviction as to whether that disengagement had
in fact occurred and was real or whether the man was fooling me.
I would like that conviction to be supported by other evidence. It should be.
In other words, I would not act today as I did in 1943 for a whole lot of reasons.
Q. What would you consider to be adequate in the way of an act of disengage-
ment? What kind of thing?
A. A man's acts, his speech, his values, the way he thinks, the way he talks,
and the fact of his disengagement The fact that there are no longer any
threads binding him to an organization or connecting him with an organization.
These would be some of the things. And no doubt his candor.
Q. Would you expand on this candor point a little bit because I am wondering
whether you are saying that his own statement about disengagement is to be
made a primary factor in a determination.
A. That certainly does depend on the man. His statement that there was
something to disengage from is something I should think would be relevant.
Q. Let me turn now to the so-called Vista report about which there has been
very considerable testimony and not altogether consistent Did you in fact
prepare a draft of an introduction to chapter 5 of the Vista report?
A. Yes ; I did. It was not a solitary labor. When I got there, I found a mass
of drafts, papers, and notes. People who had written these were Christie,
Bacher, Lauritsen, possibly others. But those were the principal ones. Christie
had spent quite a lot of time at Los Alamos quite recently. We went over what
they wanted to say and sometimes discussed it from the point of view, did they
really want to say it, and were they sure that this was what they wanted to
say. I tH.nir my contribution to the writing of this was that I— well, let me
back off.
The principal thing they wanted to say was that atomic weapons would be
useful in the defense of Europe, in the anttair campaign, and many other ways
that you will know as much about as I do, and that for this to happen, develop-
ments of hardware, of tactics, of command structure, of habits of behavior, of
exercises needed to be gone into, which would give to our tactical readiness at
least a small part of the training and precision which the Strategic Air Force
already had. I believe my contribution apart from incidentals to the writing
of this report was a notion that occurred very early and I believe has remained
in all drafts, and that is still basic to my own views, and that is that this is
not a very fully known subject— what atomic weapons will do, either tactically
or strategically, that as you go into battle, you will learn a great deal, and the
primary preparation must be of two kinds. First that you have capabilities
which allow you a lot of options, which give you choices that you can make at
the time, and second, that you be so set up that if your guesses have been wrong,
your technical preparations are such that you can change quickly in the course
of the battle. If you are wrong about the effect of a bomb on an airfield, if you
are not getting away with it, that you can make the proper reassignment of
fissionable material and hardware and aircraft to do what is effective. These
were the two guiding ideas that I believe I brought into the organization of the
report
I then with the help of the others drafted a chapter— either chapter 5 or Its
introduction, I don't remember which it was called. It was a matter of some
20 pages, I believe, and had some twenty-odd recommendations.
Q. Was there in this draft at any stage the suggestion that the United States,
this country* should state that it would not use atomic weapons strategically
against the Soviet Union until after such weapons had been used against Amer-
ican cities?
A. Let me say the best of what I recollect was in there. It is related to the
question you asked but it is not identical with it We said that we were in a
coalition with the Europeans and that one of the things which we must be alert
to is how the Europeans would view the destruction of their own cities by the
enemy. Therefore, we needed to envisage the situation that would occur if we
used our strategic air as a deterrent to the destruction of Europe's cities, as well
as our own, and in that circumstance there was still a great deal that could
and should be done with atomic weapons, and that we should be prepared for
that contingency. We did not recommend a proclamation.
Q. Was there in the language of the draft at any time a recommendation
A. I believe this is pretty close to the language of the draft what I have told
you. It was not a recommendation that this be the course of history. It was
the contemplation of a possible course of history.
892
Q. Did what you recall and what you have just testified to appear in the final
document?
*******
I may say, Mr. Chairman, that I think in the papers that were sent down to
Washington, there is not only a copy of the final "Vista report, but there is a
chapter or draft of chapter 5 as we took it to Europe. I have not seen it for
several years, but if these are material points, I think that they can be found
by you, if not by me.
Q. I have stated earlier, I think, that in the course of -this proceeding the board
has come to the conclusion that they have a material bearing. I will indicate
to you, Dr. Oppenheimer, another respect they might be material.
First of all, it is true that the statement of the strategic use of atomic weapons
was very important to the Air Force, particularly, and to the Defense Depart-
ment. So therefore it was a material thing in this report.
A Yes
Q. We have had testimony from witnesses called by you of people who should
have known everything that went on from beginning to end of this Vista report,
who testified clearly and unequivocally that there was no important change,
that it was only a minor language change and a minor change in emphasis. I
as a member of the board am confused by this testimony.
A. May I say a few words more?
Q. Yes.
A. We took this chapter 5 — I will not say as I had drafted it, but as it had
been drafted, and perhaps amended and fiddled with a little bit, but with at
least some of the provisions in it which were disturbing and the language which
was disturbing. We took it to Europe. We showed it, I think, to General
Schuyler, General Gruenther, and General Eisenhower. While we had been
on our way to Europe General Norstad had been called home for consultation.
It was several days later that we showed it to General Norstad. He expressed
an objection. This objection was in rather formal terms. * * * There was so
much in the report that was good that he hoped we would take out the things
that were not acceptable. He said possibly in a couple of years, a few years,
the kind of thing you are thinking about will be realistic, but this is too early.
It just won't work.
We said to him, after recovery, we think that this may be a matter of sub-
stance, and it may be a matter of language. Let us rewrite this in order to
remove from it those phrases and those arrangements of ideas which appear
to be bothering you and see if then this statement of the case is one which is
satisfactory to you.
We did so. We showed it to him a day or so later and he said, "If I am
asked, I will tell the Chief of Staff and the Secretary that I think this is a fine
report and very valuable."
Now, it is clear that our critics thought these were substantial changes. It
is clear that the authors of the report didn't think so, or they would not have
made them.
Q. Was it clear to the authors that the critics thought they were substantial?
A. It was clear to me, sir.
Q. You would never describe these changes as mere changes in language or
minor shifts in emphasis ; would you? Excuse me for putting the question that
way. Would you so describe them?
A. Since the principal purpose of the report was to point out the many ways
in which atomic weapons— or at least relatively new ways in which atomic
weapons could play a part in the battle of Europe, I think that the heart of the
report was wholly unchanged. I still think if we are ever called to fight the
battle of Europe, we will have to face up to the questions of how deep, how
massive, and of what quality will our atomic source be. I do not think it was
necessary to raise this question in that chapter of Vista because our arguments
were solid without it But they were even more solid. The reason we did was
float at the time we didn't have much armament. Europe was not easy to defend,
and the point that we wished to make was that there was more than one way
in which the atom could be used in what might be a very critical campaign.
Have I lost your question?
Q. Yes; it is all right, but I want to get back to it. You did not suggest— I
think you are testifying that you did not suggest— in any draft that we make a
statement that we would not use these weapons strategically, that is, with respect
to the TJ. S. S. ft., unless and until they had first been used against our cities, and
industrial centers.
A. We did not recommend such a statement.
893
Q. Did you by implication recommend such a position?
A. My memory, and I probably should be less categorical than I am, my
memory is that we contemplated a situation in which we would in fact not do this.
In fact, we would not use an all-out strategic attack, but consider our Strategic
Air Force as a deterrent to Soviet attack upon the cities of our allies and our own.
Q. As far as you know, about the final version of the Vista report, did that
notion appear?
A. Yes ; there was still a remark that the deterrent effect of our Strategic
Air Command with regard to the protection of allied capitals would be an impor-
tant factor to take into consideration along with many others. This is from
memoryi but they were things I was interested in and I believe I am telling the
true story.
Q. As long as your memory serves, did you at the time think we should have n
policy, whether publicly announced or not, which would lead us to suffer atomic
attack upon our cities before we would make a similar attack upon Soviet
cities?
A. I think the question of our own cities, Mr. Gray, never came into this report,
or at least was not the prominent thing. The prominent problem
Q. I didn't ask about the report, then. I asked in your best recollection was
this a view you entertained.
A. That we would welcome an attack on our own cities?
Q. No ; I don't think that is an accurate restatement of my question. I said
that we would suffer an attack upon our cities with the use of atomic weapons
before we would ever make a strategic strike against the U. S. S. R.
A. Oh, lord, no. I mean the very first thing we would do against the U. S. S. R.
is to go after the strategic air bases and to the extent you can the atomic
bases of the U. S. S. R. You would do everything to reduce their power to impose
an effective strategic attack upon us.
Q. Which might include attacks on cities and industrial concentrations.
A. It might, although clearly they are not the forward component of the
Strategic Air Command.
Q. Perhaps we are tangled up with the question of strategic?
A. I have always been clear that the thing that you do without fail and with
certainty is to attack every air base that has planes on it or may have planes
on it the first thing. I believe our report said that.
Q. I will try again. Did you have at that time the view that we should not
use the atomic weapons against any militarily promising target which might
includes cities in the U. S. S. R. until after such weapons had been used against
such targets in this country?
A. I think I have never been entirely clear on that. This seemed to me one of
the most difficult questions before us. I am sure that I have always felt that
it should be a question that we were capable of answering affirmatively and
capable of thinking about at the time.
Q. This is not clear in your mind as to what our position should be, you say.
Have you ever thought about it in terms of a public announcement as to policy
in that regard?
A. This has always struck me as very dangerous.
Q. Then you did not advocate a public announcement?
A. You mean have I publicly advocated it?
Q. No. I mean did you feel that the United States should make a public
announcement about its policy, whatever it might be, with regard to the use
of atomic weapons against the Soviet Union against whatever targets might
present themselves?
A. In the 9 years we have been talking about these things, I have said almost
everything on almost every side of every question. I take it you are asking
whether in some official document 1 unequivocally recommended that we make a
public pronouncement of our policy with regard to this, and to that my best and
fairly certain answer is "No."
Q. I really asked you what your own personal view was.
A. I tM*fe that we had better not make public announcements about what we
are going to do, if and when. But I do think we need to know more about it
and think more about it than we had some years ago.
Q. You don't think the import of the original draft of the introduction to
chapter 5 was to this effect?
A. No. It was to call very prominently to the attention of the services that
there might be considerations against the then present air plan, and that never-
theless there were very important things to do with the atom.
£94
Now, I would feel a little more comfortable if I had a draft of chapter 5
of Vista that we are talking about before me.
Q. I have not seen it my self, Dr. Oppenheimer.
I have asked yo a lot of questions about how the crash program, as the issue,
came before the General Advisory Committee in the meeting in October 1949.
Perhaps I asked you some questions about that.
A. I think you did.
Q. But in any event, has the testimony, all that you have heard in the last
weeks, made it clearer to you how this came as the alternative, crash program
or not?
A. I am a little clearer. I think the greatest clarification came from Dr.
Alvarez' testimony. It is clearer to me now than it has been before that in the
meeting with the Commission, the Commission probably through its chairman —
told us what was on their minds. It is clear to me that the Commission was
being beselged by requests to authorize this, to proceed with that, all on the
groud that these were the proper ways to expedite the thermonuclear program,
and all on the ground that the thermonuclear program was the thing to do. It Is
clear to me that the Commission asked for our views on this.
Q. Looking back on it, do you feel that the GAC in consistency and with
technical integrity could have recommended something short of the crash pro-
gram, but something at the same time that was more active and productive than
the alternate program?
A. Indeed I do. Indeed I do. We could have very well written the report
to the following effect, that the present state of the program is such and such as
we see it. This we did do. That in order to get on with it, this and this and this
and this would need to be done. This we did do. We could have said that the
present state of fog about this is such that we don't really know just what the
problem is that is to be decided. Let us get to work and remove as much of
this fog as fast as possible.
We could further have said the decision as to whether this is the important,
the most important, an important, an undesirable or disastrous course involves
lots of considerations of which we are dimly aware in the military and political
sphere, and we hope that these will be taken into account when the decision is
made. We could have written such a report.
I think apart from what personal things, feelings, still of the people involved,
the best explanation of why we wrote the kind of report we did was that we said
what we thought, rather than pointing out that there were other people who
could be asked to evaluate (a) because we thought, and (ft) because the pres-
sure, the threat of public discussion, and the feel of the time was such that we
thought our stating our own case, which was a negative case, was a good way,
and perhaps the only way to insure mature deliberation on the basic problem,
should we or shouldn't we.
Q. And your position as reflected in the report under no circumstances should
we?
A. I think that is not quite right. I think the report itself limits itself to
saying that we are reluctant, we don't think we should make a crash program,
we are agreed on that, and that the statement in the majority annex that it would
be better if these weapons were never brought into being was a wish, but it was
not a statement that there were no circumstances under which we would also
have to bring them into being.
Q. Wouldn't you say that the impression that the majority annex was cal-
culated to give was that those who signed it were opposed to anything that
would lead to the development of the hydrogen bomb?
A. That is right, under the then existing circumstances.
Q. So that really the majority in effect would not have been sympathetic with
any acceleration of the program which would lead to the development of the
bomb?
A. Of course. That does not mean that we would not have been sympathetic
to studies and clarification. This was a question of whether you were going to
set out to make it, test it, and have it.
May I make one other comment? This was not advice to Los Alamos as to
what it should or should not study. This was not advice to the Commission as
to what it should or should not build. Some such advice we gave in that report
This was an earnest, if not very profound, statement of what the men on that
committee thought about the desirability of making a superbomb.
Q. And they felt that it was undesirable?
A. We did.
Q. If the Commission had taken their advice, or if the Government ultimately
had taken the advice of the General Advisory Committee, we would not now
have it.
A. I am not certain of that, but it is possible.
Q. Your advice, it seems to me, has said, and as I interpreted, it, the majority
annex was that we should never have it I would guess if that advice had been
taken literally the Commission would have
A. The majority annex I still think never said that we should not have it
I think it said that it would be better if such weapons never existed.
Q. I think this is an important point, and I would like to hold on that.
A. All right But could we have the context which I also have forgotten?
Q. Yes. I will try not to take it out of context
Mr. ROBB. Here is the majority annex.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, would it not be helpful if Dr. Oppenheimer
could look at the report which he has not seen for some time?
The WITNESS. I saw it the other day.
Mr. GBAT. I will show it to him again. I want to pick out the portions that
I think are pertinent here, and let him make any observations about context
The security officer cautioned me that I am really getting on difficult ground.
May I interline this?
Mr. ROLANDEB. Yes.
The WITNESS. Does the majority annex contain information which should not
be on this record?
Mr. GBAT. I do not know.
(Mr. Rolander handed copy of report to Dr. Oppenheimer.)
The WITNESS. I would like to quote the entire paragraph, if that is permissible.
I see something— well, I don't know.
Mr. GBAT. I see no reason why the whole paragraph should not be quoted.
Mr. ROLANDEB. It is all right.
The WITNESS. This is the fourth paragraph of a six paragraph annex :
"We believe a super bomb should never be produced. Mankind would be far
better off not to have a demonstration of the feasibility of such a weapon until
the present climate of world opinion changes."
That is that paragraph in its entirety.
By Mr. GBAT :
Q. That language is pretty dear, isn't it, that "We believe a super bomb should
never be produced"?
A. Sure it is.
Q. So that there was not any question that the six people of the majority were
saying that we should not take steps to develop and produce.
A. Let me indicate to you
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, could he read it once more, because it Is the
first we heard it
The WITNESS. This is one paragraph. The document is full of the word
"mankind" and this paragraph reads :
"We believe a super bomb should never be produced. Mankind would be far
better off not to have a demonstration of the feasibility of such a weapon until
the present climate of world opinion changes."
Let me indicate
By Mr. GBAT:
Q. The question I would ask which would be related to this paragraph is— I am
not attacking the motivation of those who held that belief, I am simply saying
that the belief is clearly stated there, that the super bomb should never be
produced.
A. That a super bomb should never be produced. But look at what that means.
If we had had indication that we could not prevent the enemy from doing it, then
it was clear that a super bomb would be produced. Then our arguments would
be clearly of no avail. This was an exhortation— I will not comment on its
wisdom or its folly— to the Government of the United States to seek to prevent
the production of super bombs by anyone.
Q. Again, without reference to its wisdom or its folly, is it unreasonable to
think that the Commission, reading this report or hearing it made, whichever
form it took, would believe that the majority of the General Advisory Committee
recommended that the Government not proceed with steps which would lead to
the production of a super bomb?
308318—64 67
A. That is completely reasonable. We did discuss this point with the Com-
mission on two subsequent occasions. On one occasion we made it clear that
nothing in what we had said was meant to obtain, should it be clear or should
it be reasonably probable that the enemy was on this trail
In another, w.e made it clear that there was a sharp distinction between theo-
retical study and experiment and invention and production and development on
the other hand. So that the Commission, I think, had a little more than tMg
very bald statement to go on.
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, I am looking at
A. May I see that, too?
Q. Yes ; you may. I am going to show it to you.
A. Do I have it?
Mr. ROLANDEB. Yes. Part 1.
The WITNESS. Right I have it before me.
By Mr. GRAY:
Q. May I ask whether all of Dr. Alvarez' or if none of Dr. Alvarez* testimony
was treated as restricted?
Mr. ROBB. No, sir ; it was not.
By Mr. GRAY:
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, in part 1, paragraph 3
Mr. GARRISON. What document?
The WITNESS. This is a top secret report of the General Advisory Committee
dated October SO, 1949. This is the report as such, as distinct from the annexes.
Mr. GRAY. May I read this sentence?
Mr. ROLANDER. The difficulty is that I have not obtained from the Commis-
sion the approval to quote directly the minutes of this meeting. It seems to
me that if general statements are made with reference to either Dr. Oppen-
heimer's recollection or general questions are raised, it would be proper.
Mr. GRAY. All right.
The WITNESS. Is it the last sentence?
By Mr. GRAY:
Q. That is right.
A. Fine.
Q. Again, that is pretty clear, isn't it?
A. Indeed it is. I think this has been read into the record by Mr. Robb.
Mr. ROBB. I don't know. I was under the same handicap that Mr. Gray is
laboring under. I don't know whether I read it to you or paraphrased it, but
you and I knew what we were talking about.
The WETNESS. Yes ; it is in the record.
Mr. ROBB. It may have been that it was in the classified portion of the
testimony.
The WITNESS. We recommended a certain reactor program, we had a lot
of reasons for it, and we said that one of the reasons might be that this would
be useful for the super and that reason we did not agree with it, and it was
understood that building this reactor was not a step in making the super.
That seems to be a paraphrase.
By Mr. GRAY:
Q. If yon will look at page 4 of that document, the first sentence in the last
paragraph that begins on that page.
A. Right
Q. Reference to the majority of the committee there makes it clear—
A. Wait now. I am not with you. The second paragraph, page 4?
Q. No; the first sentence in the last
A. I have only two paragraphs on my page 4.
Q. There is a sentence that begins, "We are somewhat divided"
A. Right, I have that
Q. That sentence, and the following sentence.
A. Bight
Q. From that it would appear that the majority of the members of the GAC
at that time felt unqualifiedly that they opposed not only the production, but
the development
A. Right
' Q. So that my question to you is, in this proceeding there has been a lot of
testimony that the GAC was opposed to a particular crash program. Isn't it
dear that it was not only the crash program that the majority of the GAC
897
found themselves in opposition to, but they were just opposed to a program at
all which had to do with thermonuclear weapons?
A. I think it is very clear. May I qualify this?
Q. Yes, you may.
A. I think many things could have qualified our unqualified view. I have
mentioned two of them. I will repeat them. One is indications of what the
enemy was up to. One of them is a program technically very different from
the one that we had before us. One of them a serious and persuasive conclusion
that the political effort to which we reefrred to in our annexes could not be
successful.
Q. Now, following the Government's decision in January 1950, would it be
unfair to describe your attitude toward the program as one of passive resistance?
A. Yes.
Q. That would be unfair?
A. I think so.
Mr. GARRISON. Unfair, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. GRAY. He said unfair to so describe it.
By Mr. GBAT:
Q. Would it be unfair to describe it as active support?
A. Active could mean a great many things. I was not active as I was during
the war. I think it would be fairer to describe it as active support as an adviser
to the Commission, active support in my job on the General Advisory Committee.
Not active support in the sense that I rolled up my sleeves and went to work and
not active support in the sense that I assumed or could assume the job of at-
tracting to the work the people who would have come to a job in response to a
man's saying, "I am going to do this ; will you help me."
Q. You testified tnat you did not seek to dissuade anyone from working on the
project.
A. Bight.
Q. There have been a good many others who have given similar testimony. It
also, however, has been testified there there would have been those who would
have worked on the project had you encouraged them to do so.
A. There has been testimony that there were people who believed this.
Q. Yes. Do you believe that?
A. I think it possible. Let me illustrate. In the summer of 1952, there was
this Lincoln summer study which had to do with continental defense. On a few
limited aspects of that I know something. On most I am an ignoramus. I
think it was Zacharias that testified that the reason they wanted me associated
with it was that that would draw people into it. The fact that I was interested
in it would encourage others. In that sense I think that if I had gone out to
Los Alamos even if I had done nothing but twiddled my thumbs, if it had been
known that I had gone out to promote the super, it might have had an affirmative
effect on other people's actions. I don't believe that you can well inspire en-
thusiasm and recruit people unless you are doing something about it yourself.
Q. Furthermore, it was fairly well known in the community— that is, the
community of physicists and people who would work on this— that you had not
been in favor of this program prior to the Government's decision. That probably
was a factor?
A. I would think inevitably so.
Q. Do you think that it is possible that some of those individuals who were at
Princeton whose names were suggested for the project might have gone had they
thought you were enthusiastic for the program?
A. I don't believe this was the issue. For one thing, I know that I said to
all of them that it was a very interesting program and that they should find out
about it. For another— I am talking about a group of people that has been testi-
fied to, but as to whom I don't know who they were, I don't know what these
names are— but the issue has usually been, should a man give up his basic re-
search in science in favor of applied work, and I believe it was on that ground
and on the personality ground as to whether they did or did not want to work
with Dr. Teller, and whether they did or did not want to go to Los Alamos the
decisions would have been made. I don't think my lack of enthusiasm— I don't
believe I would have manifested any, nor do I believe it would have been either
persuasive or decisive. This Is in that period after we were going ahead
Q. Do you remember at approximately what date it was that you offered to
resign as chairman of the General Advisory Oommittee?
I « Jf^aw!r2X?Mtelfi J* Wts when **' Dean Md taken office> toe first time
I saw him. That would have been perhaps late summer of 1950. I believe I
testified that at the time of the President's decision Dr. Conant told me he
had recently talked with the Secretary of State, that the Secretary of State felt
that it would be contrary to the national interest if either he or I at that time
resigned from the General Advisory Committee ; that this would promote a debate
on a matter which was settled. The question was how soon after that could this
b<? done.
I talked to Mr. Dean, not primarily about quitting the Advisory Committee,
but about quitting the chairmanship about which by then I felt not too comfort-
able. That would have been August, September of 1950.
Mr. GBAY. I think I have no more questions. Dr. Evans.
Dr. EVANS. Dr. Oppenheimer, you said you had received a birthday card from
Chevalier?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Dr. EVANS. He is now in France, is that it?
The WITNESS., Yes.
Dr. EVANS. Is he teaching or writing?
The WITNESS. I remember very much what he is doing because he discussed
this with us. He is translating, and part of his job is translating for UNESCO,
or was. I don't know that it still is.
Dr. EVANS. May I ask you this question. Have you received any cards or
letters from any of these other men like Peters, Hawkins, Weinberg, or Serber?
The WITNESS. We had a birthday card from Mr. and Mrs. Serber, not from the
others.
Dr. EVANS. Where is Mr. Serber now?
The WITNESS. He is a professor at Columbia and a consultant to the Atomic
Energy Commission establishment at Brookhaven.
Dr. EVANS. And you say you didn't hear from the others?
The WITNESS. No.
Dr. EVANS. This has not much to do with this case. Did you see a little squib
in the Washington Post this morning saying if the English had made a super-
bomb
The WITNESS. I didn't see it
Dr. EVANS. I was interested in it. I didn't put much confidence in it, but I
was interested.
The WITNESS. I didn't see it
Mr. EVANS. That is alL
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Bobb.
By Mr. BOBB:
Q. Doctor, what was the address on that card from Dr. Chevalier? Was it
addressed to you at Princeton or here?
A. I think it was addressed to Princeton and forwarded here. I don't know.
Q. Was there any note with the card?
A. I think there was.
Q. Do you recall what it said?
A. No ; I can find this. It is back
Q. Do you receive a card from him every year at your birthday?
A. No; this was my 50th birthday.
Q. Do you know how he knew that?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall what the note said?
A. Not very much.
Q. Any?
A. It didn't say very much, and I dont recall it It was written by his wife
and it said greetings from our Butte.
Q. Our what?
A. Our Butte. Thqy live on a hilL
Q. Doctor, you testified you didn't feel too comfortable as chairman of GAO in
1950; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Why not?
A. Because on a very major point of policy I had expressed myself, had become
Identified with a view which was not now national policy. I thought that there
could be strong arguments for having as chairman of that committee someone
who had from the beginning been enthusiastic and affirmative.
Q. Did you feel that others of the scientific community might well feel that you
still were not enthusiastic?
A. This is not a consideration that crossed my mind at that time. I think I
had more in mind that when on an important thing a man is overruled, his word
is not as useful as it was before.
Q. Do you now feel that others in the scientific community might then have
believed that you still were not very enthusiastic about the thermonuclear?
A. I know that now.
Q. Do you now feel that your lack of enthusiasm which might have been com-
municated to other scientists might have discouraged them from throwing them-
selves into the program?
A. I think this point has been discussed a great deal. I don't have substantive
knowledge about it. I think that the critical, technical views which the General
Advisory Committee expressed from time to time had a needling effect on the
progress at Los Alamos which probably had something to do with the emergence
of the brilliant inventions.
Q. To get back to the question, Doctor, would you mind answering that
question?
A. Could you say it again?
Mr. ROBB. Would you read it?
(Question read by the reporter.)
The WITNESS. I suppose so.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Doctor, you mentioned the brilliant invention. That was Dr. Teller's?
A. It was indeed.
*******
Q. Who were the principal, to use the newspaper phrase, architects of the
thermonuclear?
A. Teller.
Q. Teller. You would not say you were?
A. No. There is a part of all these things that I did invent. As I testified,
it is extremely useful, but it is not very bright.
Q. Is that the one you got the patent on?
A. This is mentioned in the patent, but it is only a part of what we got the
patent on. Most of what we got the patent on was wrong,
Q. Doctor, exploring for a bit your work in recent years on the thermonuclear,
I believe you testified previously some days ago that you had been thinking about
it and trying to learn about the program ; is that right?
A. It would be a reasonable thing for me to have said.
Q. When you did do any work for the Atomic Energy Commission, you were
on the basis of a per diem consultant, were you?
A. You mean since I left the GAG?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you did any work for other agencies, you were on the basis of
a per diem consultant?
A. I think with the GAO, with the BDB, with most of these we were paid for
days at work and in travel.
Q. Yes.
A. In the case of the Science Advisory Committee, there was no pay. In the
case of the State Department panel there was no pay. But there was some kind
of subsistence allowance.
Q. Any work that you may have done on the thermonuclear program would
have been done for the Atomic Energy Commission, wouldn't it?
A. Any traveling around or anything like that. If I thought about things at
home, that would not be charged to the Atomic Energy Commission.
Q. No. I have before me a record showing that in 1953 your total compensation
received from the Atomic Energy Commission was $250. Would that accord
with your recollection?
A. It would be consistent with it I would have no recollection.
Q. That would amount to some
A. Two and a half days. This would certainly correspond to a visit to Los
Alamos or Sandia.
Q. Did you in 1953, go to Los Alamos or Sandia in connection with the thermo-
nuclear program?
A. I did in 1953.
Q. But that amount of work would fall within the scope of your statement
that you did not take your coat off on this program, wouldn't it?
A. I was thinking of the earlier days when I was a member of the GAO.
900
Q. Yes.
A. I still didn't take my coat off.
Q. Doctor, I would like to return briefly to Vista. That was a project which
was carried out in Pasadena?
A. The headquarters were in Pasadena, and all the activities I know of where
in Pasadena. No, no. There were things that I didn't participate in, field trips,
inspections.
Q. But your connection with it had to do with Pasadena.
A. It did.
Q. Did you go to Pasadena in November 1951?
A. I went out in the fall. I don't remember the date.
Q. How long were you out there?
A. Not less than a week nor more than two is my best guess. Perhaps only
6 days.
Q. Was that toward the end of the project?
A. It was toward the end of the writing of the report.
Q. Did you complete your answer?
A. Yes, I answered the question.
Q. While you were there on that occasion did you prepare a draft of an intro-
duction to chapter 5 of the report?
A. I prepared what I believe to be a draft or had helped to prepare a draft of
chapter 5, not the introduction.
Q. Was that presented to the people who were there by Dr. DuBridge?
A. As to that I have heard only his testimony or your questioning. I was not
there.
Q. You were not there?
A. No.
Q. Let me ask yon, Doctor, in order that you may have a chance to comment
on it on the record, and that the record will be plain, in that draft that you pre-
pared was there anything about dividing the stockpile of atomic weapons into
three parts?
A. There was indeed. I think again the phrasing was not quite that This
was something that I found in the working papers when I got there. It had been
worked over with great elaborateness. I believe that the phrasing was, we may
consider, or we may think of, our stockpile should be thought of as divided roughly
into three equal parts. I think that is the way it went.
Q. One part to be held in reserve, one part assigned to the Strategic Air Com-
mand, and the third part assigned to the tactical defense of Europe, is that
right?
A. To tactical air.
Q. That was in that draft
A. I believe so. It was certainly in tKe talk, in the papers that I found there.
I am not even sure that it was missing from the final Vista report
Q. That was my next question. First, was it in the draft of chapter 5 which
you testified yon prepared after you got there?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. Was that in the final report?
A. As to that, I don't remember.
Q. The best evidence of that would be the final report
A. That is right
Q. Did yon inform yourself as to what the final report was?
-JLl^T1*- I Jj^ ^ awful time getting it Everybody had an awful time
getting it I read it long after it was submitted.
Q. That suggestion as to the division of atomic stockpile was a pretty important
matter, wasn't it?
A. We thought of it as rather important because we thought it diverged from
the existing policy, and wonld almost certainly not be accepted in fulL tat that
the direction in which it went was a healthy direction.
Q. It represented in effect some restriction on the freedom of action of the Air
Force, didn't it?
A. Very little, because the main emphasis was that whatever you thought yon
should be able to convert from one to the other at a minute's notice
Q. But if the Air Force could use its atomic weapons in any way it chose, it
was a restriction to say that yon ought to divide it up * * * and assign each
part to a particular function, wasn't it? *
A. I think this is quite a misrepresentation. We were not given an Air Force
which could use its atomic weapons in any way it chose. « <*u * ««*
901
Q. Given an Air Force which had no such restrictions, this certainly repre-
sented a change in policy.
A. If the Air Force had no restrictions, any restriction would he a change of
policy.
Q. Was there In the draft of the report which you prepared or your visit to
Pasadena in the fall of 1951 any suggestion that the United States should an-
nounce that no strategic air attack would he directed against Russia unless such
an attack were first started hy Russia, either against the European Zone of
Interior or against our cities or against our European allies?
A. I have testified on this as fully as I could in response to the chairman's
questions.
Q. I want to have it specific, if I may, Doctor— a specific response to that
particular question.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, is Mr. Robb reading from the record?
Mr. ROBB. No, sir, I am not. I don't have it. This is a draft, and we can't
find this draft
The WITNESS. I can tell you where you can find it.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Before you do that, would you mind answering the question?
A. I would mind answering it, because I have been over this ground as care-
fuly as I know how. When you say "suggest," I don't know whether you mean
recommendation or consideration.
Q. Was there any language in the report to that effect ?
A. To what effect ; that this might be the state of affairs?
Q. That this might be a good idea.
Mr. GARRISON. What might be a good idea? I am lost.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Was there any language in the draft to the effect that it would be a good
idea if the United States should announce that no atomic attack would be directed
against Russia unless such an attack was first started by Russia either against
our Zone of Interior or against our European allies?
A. To the very best of my recollection, we said we may be faced with a situa-
tion in which this occurs.
Q. We may be faced with a situation in which that was desirable ; is that
right?
A. Yes ; in which it is wise, or in which it is done.
Q. Was there any language in the final draft or the final report which said
that?
A. In the final draft of the final report it said that in the consideration of the
use of our strategic airpower, one of the factors should be the deterrent value—
I have not got the words— the deterrent value of this strategic air in the pro-
tection of European cities.
Q. Do you consider that to be different from the language we have talked
about before?
A. It is manifestly different language.
Q. Yes. And don't you think the difference is important ?
A. It was very important to our readers.
Q. Was there any language in the draft of the Vista report when you were
out there to the effect that at the present state of the art the value of the thermo-
nuclear weapons could not be assessed, and therefore they were not included in
your study?
A. This is something which I found written when it was out there. It is not
something that I myself wrote, and I don't know whether it was in my draft or
not.
Q. Did you agree with it?
A. As far as tactical things, quite definitely. I was not present during the
discussions to which Griggs referred at which Teller had talked about it. I
don't know whether the value of thermonuclear weapons as tactical weapons has
been or can be assessed.
Q. You restrict it to tactical weapons. Suppose you take that restriction off.
Was there anything in the report that the value of the thermonuclear weapon
could not be assessed?
A. As to that, I don't remember.
Q. Doctor, you testified that Mrs. Oppenheimer has told you that she may have
given some money to Steve Nelson ; is that correct?
A. Yes.
902
Q. Did she tell you how much?
A. No.
Q. Did you ask her?
A. Yes.
Q. What did she say?
A. She said she didn't remember. Not that she had told me that she had given,
but that she may have given.
Q. Did you ever give Nelson any money?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. Mr. Gray asked you some questions about your contributions that you
made from time to time that you told us about before. Let me ask you, did you
ever receive any receipt for those contributions?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. Did you ever sign any pledge to make contributions?
A. Oh, no.
Q. Did you ever make any moral agreement with respect to the amount of your
contributions?
A. No, I don't think so.
Q. Were these contributions made at any regular interval?
A. There may have been some sometimes when they were more or less regular,
but over the time they were not regular.
Q. You say they may have been more or less regular. You mean monthly?
A. I have no reason to think that.
Q. Yon say you have no reason to think it?
A. Bight
Q. What was the basis for your suggestion that might have been the case?
A, Because I don't remember the timing of it.
Q. It could have been, maybe, or maybe it wasn't ; is that your answer?
A. It could not have been monthly over years. It might have been monthly
over a«few months.
Q. There are 1 or 2 things in the record I would like to clear up a little bit.
Has Paul Crouch ever been in your house?
A. I think not.
Q. You mentioned having seen Miss Tatlock on various occasions. Were any
of those occasions meetings of Communist groups?
A. No.
Q. Or left-wing groups?.
A. If you are willing to include Spanish bazaars. I never saw her at a political
meeting.
Q. Did you ever see her at a meeting where a Communist talk was given?
A. I certainly don't remember.
Mr. GABBISON. What kind of a talk?
Mr. ROBB. Communist
Mr. GABBISON. A Communist talk?
Mr. ROBB. Yes.
The WITNESS. We went together to some CIO affair, but I don't remember
who talked.
Mr. GBAT. Could this have been the FABOT?
The WITNESS. No, it wasn't It was in San Francisco. I don't know what
it was.
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Did you ever go with her to any meeting of any kind at which literature was
passed out?
A. The only meeting at which literature was passed out that I recollect is the
one at my brother's house, which I described.
Q. What Miss Tatlock there?
A. No.
Q. What kind of literature was that, Communist literature that was passed
out?
A. I think so; yes.
Q. At that meeting were any pledges of contributions made by any of the people
present?
A. I am not certain. My Impression is that it was some kind of a dues
gathering.
Q. I believe you testified to that
A. I am not certain.
90S
Q. By the way, you mentioned the meeting you went to at the home of Miss
Louise Bransten. Do you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. Who invited you to go to that meeting?
A. I don't remember. I can presume that it was the hostess.
Q. Do you recall how you happened to hear the meeting was going to be
held that particular time?
A. We were invited, whether by phone or by personal invitation, by letter,
I don't know.
Q. You knew Miss Bransten fairly well?
A. Not very well, not
Q. Beg pardon?
A. Not well enough to know the things you said about her.
Q. Doctor, did you ever notice a man named Albert Lang Lewis?
A. I don't remember. Can you tell me how or where I might have known
him? The name means nothing as you read it.
Q. Who lived in, I think, Los Angeles.
A. It means nothing to me so far.
Q. Did you know a man named Allen Lane?
A. It also means nothing to me.
Q. Did you ever know a man named Melvin Gross?
A. The name doesn't sound as unfamiliar as the others but it rings no belL
Q. You mentioned the other day a man named Straus.
A. Yes.
Q. I believe you mentioned him as perhaps having been present at one or
more of these meetings you attended. Do you remember that?
A. That is right.
Q. Was he a businessman in San Francisco?
A. Or an attorney, I don't know. He was not a college person.
Q. Did you see him around rather frequently?
A. No, I believe I once had dinner at his home, maybe my wife and I had
dinner with them once. I think that is the only time.
Q. Do you recall when that was?
A. No.
Q. Why did you think perhaps he might have been present at one of these
meetings that you went to?
A. My recollection is that he said something very foolish, but if you press
me to try to remember who was at these meetings
Q. I was curious because you searched your recollection as to who might
have been present, and he was one of the men that came up and I wanted to
ask you how you happened to remember him.
A. I think either he was involved in an argument or he and my wife were
Involved in an argument, or he said something that made an impression.
Q. Do you recall what the foolish thing he said was?
A. No, I certainly can't.
Q. Was it before or after that meeting that you had dinner at the house?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Did you ever hear of a man named Bernard Libby?
A. I don't think so. ^ * «,,«,.
Q. Doctor, is it your testimony that you told a false story to Colonel Pash
so as to stimulate him to investigate Eltenton?
A. That appears not to have been necessary.
Q Was that your testimony?
A No It is not I testified that I had great difficulty explaining why I told
him a false story, but that I believed that I had two things in mind. One was
to make it clear that there WAS something serious, or rather I thought there
might be something serious, and the other was not to tell the truth.
Q. Did you have any reason to believe that Colonel Pash would not be active
In investigating the story you told?
Mr. GARRISON. Mr, Chairman, isn't this covering ground that has already been
gone over this afternoon with you, and already over again in cross-examination?
I mean do we have to go on and on with this?
Mr GRAY I think that clearly this is one of the important things in the
Commission's letter. I think I will ask Mr. Robb to proceed unless he feels
he is simply covering ground that has already been covered.
Mr. GARRISON. I think he ought to try as much as possible not to put words
in the witness' month.
Mr. ROBB. I am cross-examining him.
1904
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. I asked you whether you had any reason to believe that Colonel Pash
would not be active in investigating your story?
A. I had no reason to believe anything. I had never met Colonel Pash before.
Q. Are you really serious, as you stated to the Chair, that you told Colonel
Pash for the purpose of stimulating him?
A. I have been very serious in all my testimony and certainly not less in this
very bizarre incident
Q. Tou would agree that testimony is somewhat bizarre, wouldn't you?
A. That is not what I said.
Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, he is arguing with the witness.
Mr. ROBB. No ; I am asking.
Mr. GABBISON. Tou are asking, wouldn't you agree, and this and that, which
seems to me to be argument. I let it go if the chairman thinks not But it seems
to me to be an attempt to make him say what does not come from him in his own
natural way.
Mr. ROBB. The word "bizarre" was his, not mine.
The WITNESS. I said the incident was bizarre.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, you testified in response to a question by Mr. Gray that
you told General Groves that there were not three men ; is that right?
A. That is right
Q. To whom did you make the first disclosure of the identity of the unknown
professor?
A, I believe General Groves.
Q. What were the circumstances?
A. I think that it was at Los Alamos.
Q. If you told him that there were not 3 men, would you give us your thoughts,
Doctor, on why it was that the telegrams that went out announcing the name
of Haakon Chevalier all -referred to 3 men?
A. I found this quite comprehensible when you read them.
Q. Have you seen Dr. E. U. Condon since 1951?
A. Oh, surely.
Q. Frequently?
A. No.
Q. Did you see him in 1952?
A. I would assume so. He is a member of the visiting committee to the
physics department at Harvard of which I am chairman. We see each other
at meetings. I would assume I saw him in 1952, but I don't recall.
Q. 1953?
A. As to that I am much less sure.
Q. Have you received any other letters from him other than the letters he
wrote you about Peters and the one he wrote you about Lomanitz?
A. Yes ; I have had other letters from him.
Q. When?
A. He has recently been having his clearance reviewed.
Q. His what?
A. His clearance reviewed, and he wrote me a letter about it.
- Mr. GABBISON. Mr. Chairman, I wonder why we have to go into his relations
with Dr. Condon. Are they a part of this case?
Mr. GBAT. Dr. Condon
Mr. GAEBISON. I don't know what this is about
Mr. GBAT. Dr. Oppenheimer testified earlier
The WITNESS. I have no reason not to answer these questions.
Mr. GABBISON. I withdraw my objection.
Mr. GBAT. I would like to complete my sentence that it was probably due to
Dr. Condon's f rantie^-I am not sure about the language— at least Dr. Condon's
disturbance about Lomanitz that he made the representations on behalf of
Lomanitz. I believe that was your testimony.
Mr. GAEBISON. I think the testimony was that was Bethe
The WITNESS. No, that was a different matter.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. I think you said that Dr. Condon wrote you about his clearance
A.. Right.
Q. I was about to ask you whether he asked you to testtfy in his behalf.
A. He did.
905
Q. How long ago was that?
A. It was shortly after my own case was opened.
Q. I assume yon wrote him back you had troubles of your own, is that right?
A. No.
Q. What did yon write him?
A. I think he asked me not to testify, but to write him a statement I wrote
him a letter outlining a statement that I could put in the form of an affidavit.
In the meantime it seemed only fair for him to know about my situation, or
at least for his attorneys to know about. I tried to keep this as quiet as I could.
Therefore, my counsel got in touch with Dr. Condon's counsel. I believe that
they explained the situation to Dr. Condon's counsel. This is
Q. Tour statement that you submitted to him, I suppose, was favorable to him,
was it?
A. I am sure it was.
Q. By the way, speaking of counsel, Doctor, there has been some mention
here of a Mr. Volpe in connection with the review of your matter in 1947. Has
Mr. Volpe represented you since that time?
A. Yea
Q. Is he now representing you?
A. No.
Q. When did he represent you?
A. He represented me along with Mr. Marks in connection with the Govern-
ment's action against Weinberg.
Mr. GBAY.^ Against whom?
The WITNESS. Weinberg, where it seemed possible I might be called as a
witness.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. That was in 1951 or 1952?
A. 1952 and 1958.
Q. Did Mr. Volpe conduct the investigation in New Mexico to determine your
whereabouts during the month of July
A. Mr. Volpe and Mr. Marks had joint responsibility for finding out where
I was.
Q. Just a couple of more questions. I am not sure if the record discloses this.
If it does, I am sorry.
When you saw Dr. Chevalier, in Paris, as you testified, in November or De-
cember of 1953, how did you get in touch with him?
A. I had a letter from him before we left home saying that Professor Bohr
Q. I believe you did testify.
A. Had told him we were coming to Europe and urging that if we were in
Paris we try to have an evening with them. My wife called Mrs. Chevalier, found
out that he was away, but that he probably could arrange to return before we left.
We then did have dinner with them.
Mr. ROBB. I think that is all.
Mr. GRAY. I have one question. Back to Vista, Dr. Oppenheimer. Is it pos-
sible that some of these witnesses who felt there were no material changes in
this draft were in effect saying that the draft really was not changed, and the
military only thought it was being changed, or that was the essential notion?
The WITNESS. I will simply quote what either DuBridge or I said to General
Norstad. We said we were much disturbed by what you said yesterday. We
don't know whether there is a difference between us as to real things, or whether
there is a difference between us as to the words that are used. We have there-
fore sought to put our views in a form which will be as little irritating to you
as possible and still keep them our views. We don't know whether you will
like what we have now written down or not This is not a literal quotation. I
should think that was as good an expression of what we thought we were doing
in that change as we could give.
Mr. GEAT. Do you have some questions, Mr. Garrison, because if you do, I
want to have a short break.
Mr. GABBISON. I think, Mr. Chairman, we would like to have some rebuttal
testimony, but it is now 5 o'clock, and I wonder if we might not do that tomorrow
morning.
Mr. GBAT. You have already indicated you would probably call Dr. Oppen-
heimer tomorrow morning for rebuttal testimony, and that is quite all right
Mr. ROBB. May I ask one question?
Mr. GBAY, Yes.
006
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Was Dr. Condon's counsel Clifford Durr?
A. In this recent undertaking?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. I thought it was. f _
A. It was not at least the counsel my counsel saw. My counsel saw Hayes.
I think I should not testify . _ _. _ ,
Mr MASKS. I should state for the record it was I who saw Dr. Condons
counsel, and his counsel was Mr. Henry Fowler and Mr. Alexander Haas.
Mr. TRAY. We will recess now until 9 : 30 tomorrow morning.
(Thereupon at 5 : 05 p. m., a recess was taken until Tuesday, May 4, 1954, at
9: 30 a.m.)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER OF J. EGBERT OPPENHEIMER
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
BUILDING T-3, ROOM 2022,
Washington, D. (7., Tuesaay, May h 1954.
The above entitled matter came on for hearing before the board,
pursuant to recess, at 9 : 30 a. m.
Personnel Security Board: Dr. Gordon Gray, chairman; Dr. Ward
T. Evans, member ; and Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Roger Robb, and C. A. Rolander, Jr., counsel for the
board; J. Robert Owenheimer, Lloyd K. Garrison, Samuel J. Silver-
man, and Allan B. Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer; Her-
bert S. Marks, cocounsel for J, Robert Oppenheimer.
(907)
PROCEEDINGS
Mr. GRAY. The proceeding will begin.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Rolander has a brief statement about a matter, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROLANDER. During the course of this hearing it has been stated that the
transcript of this hearing is being reviewed for declassification purposes by the
AEG and other agencies. For the purposes of clarification of the record, in regard
to AEC declassification of the transcript of this hearing, it should be stated that
the AEC is taking full responsibility for such declassification. When classified
information inadvertently enters the record, and when such information is of
primary concern to other Government agencies and when the AHO feels that
advice is necessary to a proper decision, we are asking the advice of the in-
terested agency as to whether such information should be deleted.
Representatives of these other agencies review only those portions of the
record in which the ABC thinks they may have a prime interest. These reviews
are being made in the AEO offices, and in the presence of an AEC declassification
expert.
Mr. GARRISON. Does Mr. Rolander know when the remaining volumes will be
made available to us to take from the building?
Mr. ROLANDER. I understand that they are working on it, Mr. Garrison. I will
have to check with the classification official. Perhaps I can do that at recess.
Mr. GRAY. Will you proceed, Mr. Garrison.
Whereupon, Vannevar Bush, a witness having been previously duly sworn, was
called in rebuttal, examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. It is my duty to remind the witness that he continues to be under
oath.
The WITNESS. Quite right, sir.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Dr. Bush, I want to read you from the testimony of Dr. Luis Alvarez
before this board a short passage which mentions yourself, and I want to ask
you to comment on it I am reading from the direct testimony at page 2697, and
it may run over to 2698. Perhaps the shortest way is to read it to you as it
actually is. Recalling a conversation with you, he says : "I can give you some
information that will" -
"A. I think I ought to have the time of that and the circumstances.
Q. He says it was perhaps a couple of months after Dr. Alvarez1 return from
Washington in October 1949. Then he goes on to talk about the date a littte
more precisely.
Mr. ROBB. That is what I said, Mr. Garrison.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Robb said that Then he goes on to give his own fixation
of the date. I think it will become clear when I read this to you.
By Mr. GARRISON :
Q. Dr. Alvarez says : "I can give you some information that will place this
conversation to within a day, because Dr. Bush was in California to inspect one
of the Carnegie Institution facilities at Stanford University. As you know, Dr.
Bush is director of the institution. I remember that when I arrived home after
our conversation with Dr. Bush, I found in the mailbox a copy of Life magazine
which had a condensation of the book 'Modern Arms and Free Men;' So that
places the date within a day."
If I can pause a moment, that date would be approximately when, Dr. Bush,
do you recall?
A. I suppose that is along in October 1949.
Q. I don't think it is of any particular moment here.
A. I think that is the date of that article,
Q. Going on quoting: "What Dr. Bush said to Professor Lawrence and me
was that he had been appointed by the President to head an ad hoc committee
to assess the evidence for the Russian explosion. The Atomic Energy Oommis-
(909)
910
sion and the Armed Forces, particularly the Air Force, had collected a good
deal of information, all of which tended to indicate that the Russians had ex-
ploded a bomb, but before announcing that to the public the President wanted
to make sure that the evidence was conclusive. If I remember Dr. Bush cor-
rectly, he said that he was made chairman of that. If I can paraphrase Dr.
Bush's statements and give them in the first person, they went something like
this. He said, "You know, it is a funny thing that I should be made head of
such a committee, because I really don't know the technical facts in this field.
I am not an atomic physicist, and I am not the one to assess these matters."
But, he said, "I think the reason the President chose me is that he does not trust
Dr. Oppenheimer and he wants to have someone in whom he has trust as head
of this committee."
I will stop at that point, because I want to ask you about that I should say
on cross-examination — I will read the passage at pages 2731 01 2730, I guess
it begins. This is the question put to Dr. Alvarez :
"Did I understand you said that Dr. Bush said that the reason he was chair-
man, the reason the President had named his as chairman, was that the Presi-
dent didn't trust Dr. Oppenheimer?
"A. That is the reason he said he thought he had been made chairman. I
rather doubt that the President told him that he didn't trust Dr. Oppenheimer.
I think this was Dr. Bush's construction
"Q. Have you heard since that panel was not named by the President, but by
the Air Force?
"A. I have never heard a single word of this panel, sir. As I said, I re-
freshed my memory on the long-range objective panel. I read the report
I have never checked at all anything to do with this. As a matter of fact, I
had forgotten this thing until recently. I did not mention it to the gentlemen
who questioned me in Berkeley some months ago."
I think that is all I need to read, unless Mr. Robb or the. chairman thinks
there is more.
Mr. ROBB. No.
By Mr. GARRISOR:
Q. Dr. Bush, who appointed you to the chairmanship of the committee that
Is here under discussion?
A. General Vandenberg.
Q. And not the President?
A. No. I had no contact with the President in connection with that matter,
either before or after the panel's action.
Q. Did President Truman ever indicate to you any distrust of Dr. Oppen-
heimer?
A. He did not
Q. Any doubt about him of any sort?
A. Not at any time.
Q. Did you ever gather from anyone else that President Truman had any
doubt about Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall having made any statement of this general kind to Dr.
Alvarez?
A. I don't remember that conversation in detail, of course. I go to the coast
about twice a year, once or twice a year, to visit Carnegie installations. I sup-
pose 8 times out of 4 I see Dr. Lawrence. He is one of my trustees, and I have
been a friend of his for many years. Occasionally I see others, including
Alvarez, from his group. I don't remember in detail that particular conversa-
tion. I am quite sure I didn't say to him that the President had doubts about
Dr. Oppenheimer simply because it was not true.
Q. Did anybody in the Air Force at the time of your appointment say that
you were being made chairman because of doubts about Dr. Oppenheimer's
loyalty?
A. No; they did not The only thing that occurred there — I think it was
General Nelson who visited me in this connection— when he told me of the
makeup of the committee, I remember saying to him, "But wouldn't it be more
reasonable for Dr. Oppenheimer to be chairman, since he is chairman of the
General Advisory Committee," and he said to me something to the effect that
they would prefer it the way it was. That is all there was.
Q. Going back now to Dr. Alvarez's direct testimony at page 2697 or 2698 :
"Dr. Bush then said that the meetings of the committee were very interesting.
In fact, he found them humorous In one respect, because he said, 4I was
911
ostensibly the chairman of the committee. I called it to order, and as soon as
it was called to order, Dr. Oppenheimer took charge as chairman and did most
of the questioning/ and I believe Dr. Bush said that Dr. Oppenheimer wrote
the report. This was the first time I had ever heard anyone in my life say that
Dr. Oppenheimer was not to be trusted."
That is referring back to the alleged statement of President Truman.
Do you recall saying anything of the sort that I have just quoted to you?
A. On the contrary, I am sure I did not make that statement for the same
reason as before ; the statement is not true.
Q. In what sense is it not true?
A. No part of it is true. The procedure of that panel was one exactly of
what one would expect of a panel of that sort. I acted as chairman. I have
acted as chairman of a great many meetings. I can't recall any instance where
any member of the committee has taken over my functions as chairman while
I was chairman. Certainly nothing of the sort occurred at that time. We all
questioned witnesses. I think that probably Dr. Bacher, Admiral Parsons, and
Dr. Oppenheimer did more questioning than I did, becauae there is just one
thing that is correct in there, and that is namely, that I am not a nuclear
physicist. Hence they conducted most of the detailed questioning. But I acted
as chairman.
When we came to the report, we wrote that report around the table. It
was a very brief report. I remember writing a paragraph of it myself. I don't
remember who contributed what parts of it today. It was the sort of job that
a committee of four would do around the table. Dr, Oppenheimer contributed
throughout in a normal and perfectly proper manner.
Mr. GARRISON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Dr. Bush, did you ever discuss Dr. Oppenheimer with General Vandenberg?
A. No, sir.
Q. It did strike you as unusual that you were chairman of that committee, in-
stead of Dr. bppenheimer?
A. Merely because I had no official connection at that time with the United
States Government. He was chairman of the General Advisory Committee of the
Atomic Energy Commission, and it seemed to me that it would have been more
normal for him to have been the chairman of this panel reviewing the evidence.
Hence I raised the question. I think it was General Nelson of the Air Force that
was talking to me — I can't be sure I have the right general — when he said that
the Air Force would prefer the panel the way it stood, we went no further.
Q. Did you ask him why?
A. No.
, Q. Do you recall the occasion when you and Dr. Alvarez and Dr. Lawrence
were driving in a car after inspecting one of your places?
A. I don't remember in detail. There have been dozens of such occasions and
I can't separate that out and recall it in any detail.
Q. You would not question that Dr. Alvarez was correct about that?
A. No; I wouldn't question that he was correct, that he picked me up at
Palo Alto and we drove somewhere. Whether it was a hotel — I think you said
something about a hotel— I don't remember going to a hotel. But several times —
well, quite frequently — Dr. Lawrence would join me at Palo Alto and we would
drive over to his laboratory at Berkeley.
Q. And your suggestion is that nothing like that at all happened, and there
was no reason for Dr. Alvarez to even have that impression of his conversation
with you, is that right?
A. I made it very clear the parts of that statement which I say did not occur.
There are two parts and I say those did not occur because neither of them
was true. I don't make false statements. Hence I know I didn't make that
one.
Q. What I am getting at is do you think you said anything from which Dr,
Alvarez might have gotten that impression?
A. No ; I certainly do not remember anything of the sort.
Q. You made no remark which was in your opinion susceptible of any such
construction?
A. I am sure that I made no remark that would reflect upon Dr. Oppenheimer's
loyalty or integrity or judgment in which I have had great confidence for many
years.
308318—54 58
912
Q. Did you make any remark, Dr. Bush, which in your opinion was susceptible
of the construction which Dr. Alvarez placed upon it in his testimony?
A. I have no recollection of any remark from which he could get any such
impressions.
Q. Would you say you didn't make any such remark?
A. I say I don't rememher the conversation in detail.
Q. I see. If I might, Dr. Bush, clear up something in the record having to do
with your testimony when you came here before. Do you recall you were
rather critical of the letter written to Dr. Oppenheimer by Mr. Nichols?
A. Quite right
Q. And in particular you were critical of the paragraphing?
A. No, sir. I don't remember I was critical of the paragraphing. I was critical
of one particular statement in there because I said that it could be interpreted
readily by the public, and in my opinion was being thus interpreted, as putting
a man on trial for his opinions.
Q. Don't you remember that you made some particular reference to the
paragraphing?
A. I don't remember. Can you give it to me?
Q. I will read it to you at page 1984. This was in answer to a question t>y
Mr. Morgan :
"Doctor, on what ground would you ask for a bill of particulars if you didn't
know the record?"
And you answered :
"I think that bill of particulars was obviously poorly drawn on the face of it,
because it was most certainly open to the interpretation that this man is being
tried because he expressed strong opinions."
A. Bight
Q. (Reading.) "The fact that he expressed strong opinions stands in a single
paragraph by itself. It is not directly connected. It does not have in that
paragraph, through improper motivations he expressed these opinions. It merely
says he stated opinion, and I think that is defective drafting and should have
been corrected."
Do you recall that?
A. Yes ; I remember that
Q. You had read that particular paragraph in the New York Times, I take it?
A. Yes ; I believe I said so.
Q. Yes ; I think you did. I want to show you the New York Times for Tuesday,
April 13, 1954, page 16, carrying the text of the letter to Dr. Oppenheimer, and
ask you if you will show us the paragraph you were talking about. I think you
will find it here some place.
A. Yes, sure; this is it through here.
Q. Which is the one paragraph you had in mind?
A. This is the paragraph I referred to, I think, isn't it?
Q. I don't know, Doctor.
A. Yes.
Q. Would you read us the paragraph you had in mind?
A. Let me be sure I have the right one. "It was further reported" — no, wait
a minute. Yes. "It was reported that in 1945 you expressed the view that there
was a reasonable possibility—" wait a minute. This is the one. "It was further
reported that in the autumn of 1949 and subsequently you strongly opposed the
development of the hydrogen bomb on moral grounds, by claiming that it was not
feasible, by claiming that there were insufficient facilities and scientific personnel
to carry on the development, and four, that it was not politically desirable."
Q. That is the paragraph you had in mind?
A. That is the one I referred to.
Q. And you felt that putting that sentence in a separate paragraph was im-
proper and damaging; is that correct?
A. The fact that it was in a separate paragraph was secondary. I feel that
statement as a whole is fully open to the interpretation that a man is being
tried for his opinions. That any reasonable man, particularly not a man with
legal training, reading that entire statement, would feel that this man is being
tried because he had strong opinions and. expressed them, which I think is an
an entirely un-American procedure.
Q. But the fact of the matter is, Doctor, that you felt that the paragraphing
was of sufficient importance that you made a point of it
A. I think the paragraphing as I read it emphasized the point, but is not
necessary to the point that I am making, which Is that the statement as a whole,
the letter as a whole, was open to that interpretation.
913
Q. I am directing your attention to your testimony about the paragraph and
you concede, Doctor, you gave that testimony, didn't you?
A. I gave the testimony and I referred to that particular paragraph.
Q. And you were not giving testimony before this board about a matter which
you thought was trivial?
A. I was giving testimony about a very importhant matter, indeed.
Q. Yes, sir. Now, Doctor, you took that paragraphing from the New York
Times' didn't you?
A. So I said.
Q. Yes, sir. Now, I am going to show you the letter, the actual text of the
letter sent to Dr. Oppenheimer, and ask you if you don't see from that that
that paragraph which you read was not a separate paragraph, in the letter at
all, but was part of a much longer paragraph beginning, "It was reported that in
1945 you expressed the view that there was a reasonable possibility" and so
forth, and ending "of which you are the most experienced, most powerful and
most effective member, had definitely slowed down its development."
In other words, Doctor
A. But the wording is the same
Q. May I finish my question, and then you can finish your answer.
In other words, Doctor, the New York Times in its story broke up the para-
graph of General Nichols' letter, into four paragraphs.
A. Without changing the wording.
Q. That is right.
A. I don't need to read that, if you tell me that.
(Document handed to witness.)
The WITNESS. This is u separate paragraph [indicating].
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Where?
A. Here [indicating].
Q. It starts up here, "It was reported in 1945."
A, Oh, yes. Right.
Q. So you agree, Doctor, that the Times no doubt for greater clarity to its
readers or for reasons of newspaper technique broke the paragraph in the
Nichols letter into four separate paragraphs.
A. I would have expressed exactly the same opinion had I read the thing
you later showed to me, namely, that is fully open to the interpretation that
a man is being tried for his opinions.
Q. But if you read the original letter, you would not have made your point
about the separate paragraphs.
A. No.
Q. Because it was not based on fact, was it?
A. It was based on what facts I cited.
Q. Yes, sir. Wouldn't you conclude from that, Doctor, that before making
such statements it is well to know all the facts?
A. Yes; I think you sitting here, if you find me operating on a basis of a pub-
lished statement, which is not exact, should have called it to my attention at
that time.
Q. That is exactly what I am doing now, Doctor. It was not until after you
testified that I realized you had been in error. Thank you.
Mr. GBAY. Dr. Bush, I think I should say to you that this board was confused
about some of your testimony, especially on this particular point. I think that
no member of the board was aware that this paragraphing change had been
made at the time you were here, so this is not an unimportant matter because
we have had another distinguished witness before this board, a man of interna-
tional distinction, who in milder terms, but in somewhat the same spirit, was
critical of the general manager's letter. I don't think he went as far as you-
did in saying that the board should have refused to serve at the call of the
country Tpptft •
The WITNESS. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt? I don't think I said that.
Mr. GBAY. You have interrupted me.
The WITNESS. Excuse me, sir.
Mr. GRAY. You said until the letter had been rewritten.
The WITNESS. Excuse me.
Mr. GRAY. I was in the middle of that sentence.
The WITNESS. Excuse me. , .
Mr. GBAY. But the other witness to whom I refer made a particular point about
the construction of the letter. There was no uncertainty in his views whatso-
914
ever, and the thing that concerns me, also, about all of this is puhlic misappre-
hension of which I am sure there is a great deal. So that if witnesses before
this board have testified in such strong terms about the construction of this
letter, before the board, they no doubt are testifying in equally strong terms
among their associates, perhaps in the scientific community. This is another
case of misapprehension or misunderstanding.
I want to make it clear that this discussion which I am conducting with you
is for the purpose of emphasizing the seriousness of some of these misapprehen-
sions, and not in defense of or attack upon the letter which was written by the
general manager with which this board was not concerned.
I would like to ask you another question which relates now to the Alvarez
testimony.
The WITNESS. -I think I might clarity a point if you will let me.
Mr. GBA.Y. You certainly may.
The WITNESS. I have not discussed the procedure of this board with anyone,
of course, while it is going on — scientists or otherwise. I have not given any
statement to the press. I have talked over that particular matter which I raised
here and which I think is so important with several men, not scientists, as it
happens— there was one scientist among them— but men that I have great
confidence in, In order to attempt to clarify my own thinking. One of those was
tf Justice of the Supreme Court. One or two others were men whose names you
would recognize.
I realize what an important thing it is that I am calling attention to there.
I realize how serious a thing it is in this country if the public gets the impres-
sion that a man is being tried for his opinions. Hence, before appearing before
you, I talked to a number of men for the purpose of clarifying my own thinking.
But otherwise, I have not discussed this matter with scientists, and I certainly
have not done so generally in public.
Mr. GEAT. All right, sir.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, would it be appropriate for me to make a state-
ment about this Times paragraphing which I would like to do, but I don't want
to interrupt the course of your .questioning.
Mr. BOBB. I was about to say that if Mr. Garrison was going to say that he was
not responsible for the Times paragraphing, I think that is a fact.
Mr. GARRISON. I would like to say this. It was brought to our attention for
the first time yesterday, Mr. Chairman, that this passage in the Times had been
broken up into four paragraphs. We checked with Mr. Beston, who verified the
fact that the copy which we had given him was a Chinese copy, in the journalistic
phrase, of General Nichols' letter, that is, with every page the same and every
paragraph the same identically as it appeared. He sent it up to New York to be
set up, and without any instructions from him or any knowledge on his part it
was broken up into these paragraphs, presumably, he said, because it was so
very long.
I should also say that this having come to my attention in this fashion, I
showed it to Dr. Bush before the session began to ask him if he wanted to
modify his testimony about the effect which the reading of the passage in ques-
tion made upon him, and he told me he could not
Needless to say, Mr. Chairman, I regret very much indeed that the matter
was broken up in the manner described.
Mr. GRAY. I think the Board understands that the newspaper reconstruction
of this thing is frequently done in the press.
Dr. Bush, I would like to go back to the Alvarez testimony about which there
was some discussion.
The WETNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GBAT. Let me ask this question: If you substitute the name General
Vandenberg for President Truman— this is a hypothetical type of question-
suppose Dr. Alvarez's testimony had been to the effect that General Vandenberg
appointed this committee — I am substituting Yandenberg for Truman — and that
your guess was that General Yandenberg appointed you chairman rather than
Dr. Qppenheimer because he, Yandenberg, probably did not trust Dr. Oppen-
heimer, assume for the purpose of the question that Alvarez testimony had
been to that effect, is it possible, then, that a conversation with him might
have left with him the impression that he testified to ?
A. That certainly also was not true, sir, so I know I did not make any such
statement to him.
Q. This means, then, I take it, that you have no question in your mind about
General Vandenberg's attitude?
,915
A. I have no question in my mind. There was no statement to the contrary.
He appointed Oppenheimer as a member of this panel. There was no point at
any time questioning Oppenheimer's qualifications or his loyalty or anything else.
Mr. GHAY. I think you are very clear on that in your recollection.
Are there any more questions?
Mr. BOBB. Nothing further.
Mr. GBAT. Thank you, Doctor.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GARRISON. May we have a couple of minutes, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. GBAT. Yes.
(Short recess.)
Whereupon, Katherine Fuelling Oppenheimer, a witness, having been pre-
viously duly sworn, was recalled to the stand and testified further as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Mrs. Oppenheimer, it is my duty to remind you that you are still
under oath in this proceeding.
The WITNESS. Bight.
EXAMINATION
By Mr. GRAY:
Q. We have asked you to come before the board again for some further
questions.
Do you remember a man named Jack Straus?
A. I have heard him mentioned in the last few days. I could not have said
that I remembered him ; no.
Q. So you don't recall then, getting into an argument or discussion with him
at a meeting, or one of the meetings that Dr. Oppenheimer testified about.
Are you familiar with the fact that he testified that to the best of his recollec-
tion, Mr. Straus attended one or two meetings, was it, Mr. Bobb, do you remember?
Mr. ROBB. I think the meeting at Miss Bransten's house.
Mr. SILVERMAN. There is also testimony of a meeting at Mr. Chevalier's house
earlier.
Mr. ROBB. One or the other.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Perhaps both.
By Mr. GRAY:
Q. In any event, Dr. Oppenheimer testified that he recalled Mr. Straus was
there. You say you do not remember Mr. Straus at all?
A. I don't remember Mr. Straus.
Q. Were you personally acquainted with an individual named David Adelson?
A. I think I have met him, but I am not sure.
Q. You don't have any clear recollection?
A. No; I don't
Q. Do you recall a man named John Steuben?
A. Yes.
Q. Who was he?
A. He was the section organizer of the Communist Party when I was a member
of the party in Youngstown, Ohio.
Q. And that was back in the thirties sometime?
A. 1945—193^85.
Q. When you knew him in Youngstown, did you ever have any association
with him following the years when you were in Youngstown?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you tell us about that?
A. I saw. him when I returned from Europe in 1987 to go back to school.
I saw him in New York.
Q. And didn't see him after 1987?
A. I don't think so. ^ ___ ^ ^ HMfr A. x
Q. Did you ever have any telephone conversations with him after 1937 that
you recall?
A. No ; not that I recall. I am quite sure I didn't.
Q. Did you know a man named Paul Pinsky?
A. As I recall, he also comes up in this letter from General Nichols, and I
think I may have met him, too.
Q. Did you ever have any discussion with anybody about Dr. J. Robert Oppen-
heimer running for Congress from the seventh district, or whatever the appro-
priate district is?
A. No.
916
Q. So you would not have received the suggestion from David Adelson and
Paul Pinsky to this effect, or you don't recall?
A. I am sorry it makes me giggle, but it does. I have never heard of such
a thing.
Q. Do you know someone named Barney Young?
A. Barney?
Q.' B-a-r-n-e-y.
A. No.
Q. I want to refer now to the contributions that Dr. Oppenheimer was making
through Isaac Folkoff and possibly others as late as sometime in 1942. Were
you familiar with the fact that these contributions were being made at the time?
A. I knew that Robert from time to time gave money ; yes.
Q. Do you remember whether he gave money on any regular or periodic basis?
A. Do you mean regular, or do you mean periodic?
Q. I really mean regular.
A. I think he did not.
Q. Were you aware that this money was going into Communist Party
channels?
A. Through Communist Party channels? .
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. You had yourself broken with the Communist Party as early as 1937.
I believe?
A. 1936 1 stopped having anything to do with the Communist Party.
Q. Would it be fair to say that Dr. Oppenheimer's contributions in the years
as late as possibly 1942 meant that he had not stopped having anything to do
with the Communist Party? I don't insist that you answer that yes or no.
You can answer that any way you wish.
A. I know that. Thank you. I don't think that the question is properly
phrased.
Q. Do you understand what I am trying to get at?
A. Yes; I do.
Q. Why don't you answer it that way?
A. The reason I didn't like the phrase "stopped having anything to do with
the Communist Party" because I don't think that Robert ever did
Dr. EVANS. What was that?
The WITNESS. It is because I don't think Robert ever had anything to do with
the Communist Party as such. I know he gave money for Spanish refugees ; I
know he gave it through the Communist Party.
By Mr. GRAY:
Q. When he gave money to Isaac Folkoff, for example, this was not necessarily
for Spanish refugees, was it?
A. I think so.
Q. As late as 1942?
A. I don't think it was that late. I know that is some place in the record.
Q. I may be in error. My recollection is that Dr. Oppenheimer testified
that these contributions were as late as 1942. Am I wrong about that?
A. Mr. Gray, Robert and I don't agree about everything. He sometimes re-
members something different than the way I remember it.
Q. What you are saying is that you don't recall that the contributions were as
late as 1942?
A. That is right
Q. Are you prepared to say here now that they were not as late as 1942?
A. I am prepared to say that I do not think that they were that late.
Q. But you do think it is possible that they could have been?
A. I think it is possible.
Q. I mean, it is possible, if you don't have a very dear recollection
Mr. SH.VEBMAN. Would it be helpful for me to state my recollection of the
evidence on this point, or would you rather not, sir?
Mr. GBAT. No, I would prefer to proceed. What I am trying to get at, Mrs.
Oppenheimer, is at what point would you say Dr. Oppenheimer's associations or
relationships with people in the Communist Party ceased?
The WITNESS. I do not know, Mr. Gray. I know that we still have a friend of
whom it has been said that he is a Communist
Mr. ROBB. I beg your pardon?
The WITNESS. I said I know we still have a Wend of whom it has been said
that he is a Communist
017
Mr. GBAY. You refer to Dr. Chevalier?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. OKAY. I really was not attempting to bring him into the discussion at this
point. I believe the import of the testimony you gave the other day was that
at one time you felt that the Communist Party in this country was of an in-
digenous character and was not controlled or directed by international com-
munism.
The WITNESS. That is right.
Mr. GBAY. I think also that you testified that knowing today what you do, you
would think it would be a mistake to be identified
The WITNESS. That is right.
Mr. GBAY. Now, I am trying to get at the point of by what mechanics one who
has been associated becomes clearly disassociated.
The WITNESS. I think that varies from person to person, Mr. Gray. Some
people do the bump, like that, and even write an article about it. Other people
do it quite slowly. I left the Communist Party. I did not leave my past, the
friendships, just like that. Some continued for a while. I saw Communists after
I left the Communist Party. I think that I did not achieve complete clarity
about it until quite a lot later.
Mr. GBAY. About when would that be, do you suppose?
The WITNESS. I find that very hard to say, but I have been thinking about it.
I would roughly date a lot of it around Pearl Harbor.
Mr. ROBB. Around what, Mrs. Oppenheimer?
The WITNESS. Pearl Harbor. I mean as sort of an end point There were
other things that happened much earlier that made me feel that the Communist
Party was being quite wrong.
Mr. GBAY. Would you attempt to date Dr. Oppenheimer's conclusion to that
effect?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. About when would that be?
The WITNESS. I thought you said to that effect, meaning Pearl Harbor.
Mr. GBAY. No. I mean by that the conclusion that the Communist Party was
quite wrong. At what time would you guess that he came to the same conclu-
sion with clarity?
The WITNESS. I think earlier than I.
Mr. GBAY. Earlier than you?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. Which would have been earlier than December 1941?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. Mrs. Oppenheimer, a witness testified here as to an opinion he held,
which was this": That he felt that you had decided that the most important thing
in the world was your husband and his career. That is not an unreasonable
assumption. And that he felt that you were determined to help him not make
mistakes. Let me say that this is certainly not a verbatim recital of what he
said, but I am sure it is the import.
If you had thought that Dr. Oppenheimer's contribution to Folkoff and; others
would adversely affect his career, would you have attempted to dissuade him
from making such contributions?
The WrrNEsa If I thought that?
Mr. GBAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. Did you ever discuss with him the necessity for avoiding associa-
tions with people who were identified with the Communist Party, to your knowl-
edge, or whom you might have suspected that were identified with the Communist
Party?
The WITNESS. I do not remember thinking of anybody as being identified with
the Communist Party in those days, except people whom I knew were out-and-out
Communists.
Mr. GBAY. Yes. And did you ever discuss with him the desirability of not
continuing an association with those people?
The WITNESS. I did not think of anybody as being a Communist Party member
except certain party functionaries. We have to have that straight.
Mr. GBAY. Let us hold it to the party functionaries. Let us mention the name
Folkoff.
The WITNESS. I did not think that Robert's contacts with Folkoff as an asso-
ciation-
Mr. GBAY. Yon did not consider the contributions to Folkoff as an association?
The WITNESS. No.
918
Mr. GRAY. What would constitute an association in your judgment?
The WITNESS. Let us take a man like William Schneiderman, who is definitely
a Communist in San Francisco. I think if one were friends with him, that
would be association with the Communists.
Mr. GRAY. If one gave money to him, would that be an association?
The WITNESS. It would depend for what reason one gave him some money.
Mr. GRAY. If one knew that the money was going into Communist Party chan-
nels, would it make any difference for what reason the party membership said
the money was going to be used?
The WITNESS. I think so.
Mr. GRAY. Tou do?
The WITNESS. I do not think so now, but I did then.
Mr. GEAY. Today you would say yon would not think so?
The WITNESS. Indeed not
Mr. GRAY. And you think then that the conclusion you hold now was one that
if you had to date it might have come around Pearl Harbor?
The WITNESS. Or later.
Mr. Gray, let me make quite clear that my prorgess of thought has not been
A clear chain about these things. I have been quite fuzzy about a lot of things.
I have always to differentiate between what I thought at a certain time and
what I think now. It is not easy.
Mr. GRAY. I am going back now to John Steuben.
The WITNESS. Stueben?
Mr. GRAY. Steuben. You are quite sure that you do not recall any kind of
communication with or from him as late as 1944, 1945, or 1946?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Evans?
Dr. EVANS. Mrs. Oppenheimer, there has been a lot of talk here about the
Communists and fellow travelers. Could you tell me so' that you and I can
understand the difference between a Communist and a fellow traveler?
The WITNESS. To me, a Communist is a member of the Communist Party who
does more or less precisely what he is told.
Dr. EVANS. He does what?
The WITNESS. Rather precisely what he is told to do by the Communist Party.
I think a fellow traveler could be described as someone to whom some of the
aims of the Communist Party were sympathetic and in this way he knew Com-
munists. For instance, let us take the classic example that is bandied about
all the time nowadays ; that is, the Spanish War. Many people were on the side
of the Republicans during the Spanish War. So were the Communists. I
think the people who were not Communists and were on the side are now always
known as fellow travelers,
Dr. EVANS. Did yon ever try to get your husband to Join the party?
The WITNESS. No.
Dr. EVANS. You never did?
The WITNESS. I was not a Communist then.
Dr. EVANS. How Is that?
The WITNESS. I was not a Communist then. I would not have dreamed of
trying to get anybody to be a member of the Communist Party.
Dr. EVANS. Do yon think you have been completely disillusioned now or are you
still fuzzy? *
The WITNESS. No, I have been disillusioned for a long time.
Dr. EVANS. Did you ever talk to your husband about eome of the men that
worked at the Radiation Laboratory and the possibility of their being Com-
munists, men like Lomanitz, Peters, Hawkins, and those?
The WITNESS. As being members of the Communist Party?
Dr. EVANS. Yes.
The WITNESS. No.
Dr. EVANS. I am not quite sure, but I thought there was some evidence here
that some witness said that Mrs. Oppenheimer tried to talk to her husband
about some of these people. Do you remember that? That she tried to get
him to stop his association with them. Was there such a thing as that in the
record?
Mr. GRAY. I think, Dr. Evans, you probably have reference to Mr. Lansdale's
testimony. This is the thing I was referring to.
Dr. EVANS. I just wanted to know. It was Lansdale's testimony. You have
ansewered the question. I have no more questions.
Mr. GRAY. I have one more. In early 1944, where would you have been?
The WITNESS. Los Alamos.
919
Mr. GRAY. Did you stay there pretty constantly and regularly?
The WITNESS. I went away once when my mother had pneumonia, but I for-
get what year that was.
Mr. GRAY. Where did you go, then?
The WITNESS. To Bethlehem, Pa.
Mr. GRAY. You only left Los Alamos once in the year that you lived there during
the war?
The WITNESS. I went to Santa Fe sometimes.
Mr. GRAY. Did you go to Berkeley?
The WITNESS. I do not think so. I would say, "no."
Dr. EVANS. Does your mother still live in Bethlehem?
The WITNESS. She has until— she has come and gone quite a bit the last few
years— but until 1 or 2 years ago, they were in Bethlehem.
Mr. ROBB. May I ask a couple of questions?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Mrs. Oppenheimer, did you used to read the People's Daily World?
A. I have seen it, yes.
Q. That is the west coast Communist newspaper?
A. That is right
Q. Did you see it around your house in Berkeley?
A. I think it got delivered to our house on Shasta Road.
Q. On where?
A. On Shasta Road.
Q. 'Who subscribed to it, you or Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I do not know. I did not subscribe to it Robert says he did. I sort of
doubt it The reason I have for that is that I know we often sent the Daily
Worker to people that we tried to get interested in the Communist Party without
their having subscribed to it So I do not know whether or not Robert sub-
scribed to it I know it was delivered to the house.
Q. You say "we" ; do you mean the Communists? Do you mean when you
were a Communist?
A. Yes, that is what I mean.
Q. Tell me, Mrs. Oppenheimer, you said you knew this man Adelson.
A. I think I have met him, yes.
Q. Do you recall how you happen to know those men?
A. Mr. Robb, I have read the letter from General Nichols quite a lot of times
and I have naturally thought about a lot of things. The names Adelson and
Pinsky were not unfamiliar to me. I do not know how I met them. I think I
did.
Q. Do you remember when there was some discussion about Frank Oppen-
heimer running for Congress?
A. I have heard that since. I do not remember it as of then, no.
Q. You took no part in it?
A. No.
Q. Did you know some people named Barttett?
A. Bartlett?
Q. Perhaps I can help you. Did they occupy the garage apartment at Frank
Oppenheimer's place?
A. I know some people did. I did not know that.
Q. You did not know them?
A. In that connection the name Bartlett does not mean anything. I met the
people who occupied that apartment but I do not remember them.
Q. Did you ever discuss Adelson with Dr. Oppenheimer?
A. I do not know.
Q. By the way, did you ever hear of Steve Nelson given the nickname Stephen
Decatur?
A. No.
Q. You mentioned that you still had a friend who people say was a Communist
Was that Dr. Chevalier you had in mind?
A. Yes.
Q. You heard it said that he still is a Communist?
A. No, I have heard it said he was.
Q. Did you know anything about his activities in Communist causes?
A. I think he went to Spanish relief parties. I know he had this party at his
house at which Schneiderman spoke.
Q. Had you finished your answer?
920
A. I am trying to think if I knew anything else about him. I think I know no
other facts in that direction.
Q. Did you ever see his name in the Daily Worker or the Daily People's World
as haying endorsed the so-called purge trials in Russia?
A. No.
Q. You saw Dr. Chevalier in France last fall?
A. That is right, in December.
Q. In Paris?
A. In Paris.
Q. How long were you in Paris on that occasion?
A. Well, let's see. We went over— I think we spent 2 days and then went up
to Copenhagen and came back, and I think we spent something like a week again.
It may have been 5 days or it may have been a little longer than a week ; I do not
remember.
Q. Was it on the first 2 days that you saw Dr. Chevalier?
A. No. '
Q. You mean after you came back from Copenhagen you saw him?
A. I think so, yes.
Q. Do you recall how you happened to get in touch with him?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Would you tell us that?
A. I called his wife and said we would like to see them. She said that Haakon
was in Italy, but she thought he would be back and she would let us know.
Q. Do you remember how you happened to have her telephone number?
A. It was in the book. I think it was in the book. I think I looked it up. On
the other hand, I may have had a note from Haakon in my purse with the tele-
phone number on it, which I would have taken along because if we went to Paris
we wanted to see them.
Q. Do you recall how you happened to know they were in Paris at all?
A. Yes. I think Haakon wrote us.
Q. How long before you went there?
A. I think he has written us probably 3 or 4 times in the last few years.
Q. I suppose he expressed a hope that if you came there you would look him up?
A. Certainly.
Q. Do you know how he happened to know you might come to Paris?
A. I remember his wife saying to me that they had read in the paper that
Robert was giving lectures in England.
Q. This was the occasion of these Keith lectures?
A. Bre-i-t-h.
Q. Do you recall whom else you saw in Paris on that occasion?
A. Yes. Oh, my, now wait We saw LePrince-Ringuet and we saw a number
of physicists. I do not know whether both Auger or Perrin or whether it was
Just one of them. We went to the apartment of another physicist whose name I
can't remember. I will have to ask Robert
Dr. OPPENHEIMEB. May I answer? Goldschmidt
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. You saw a number of physicists. I don't care about the names.
A. We saw Francois and Yvonne de Rose.
Q. I believe you had lunch with the Chevaliers or dinner.
A. Dinner. We had dinner at their house.
Q. And then did you take them to lunch or something?
A. Oh, yes, no.
Q. Did they take you to lunch?
A. No. Haakon called for us and we went out to see Malrauz.
Q. Do you remember any discussion about Dr. Chevalier's passport difficulties?
A. I do not remember It but it has been recalled to me since.
Q. How was it recalled to you?
A. I think Robert mentioned 'it to me.
Q. Would you tell us what he had to say about it?
A. He said that he had been asked whether Haakon had spoken to him about
it and he did not remember it
Q. Did Dr. Oppenheimer tell you pretty generally what he had been asked
about matters of which you had knowledge?
A. Yes.
Q; Did you meet a Mr. Wymans when you were in Paris on that occasion?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. How did you happen to meet him?
921
A. He is a— I don't know— a classmate or something of Harvard. He was at
the embassies. We had lunch with him.
Q. Mrs. Oppenheimer, do you know or have you ever seen Paul Crouch?
A. I do not think so, Mr. Robb. I have seen his picture in the paper a few
years ago and I saw his picture in Time recently. He doesn't look to me like
anybody I have ever seen.
Q. Do you know this so-called 10 KenUworth Court episode about which
there has been some controversy?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall such a meeting having taken place?
A. No.
Q. Would you say it did not?
A. I would say it did not.
Q. So far as you know, Paul Crouch has never been in your house?
A. That is right
Q. You could not be mistaken about that?
A. I could be mistaken about almost anything, but I do not think I am.
Q. I understand that
Mr. GRAY. Let me ask a question while he is looking at his paper. When
was it that you lived at this address that you gave to which the People's World
rame?
The WITNESS. When I first got married to Robert
Mr. GRAY. This was in 1940?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. Do you remember seeing People's World in the house as late as
1941?
The WITNESS. I do not know. I think the paper caine to the house at 10
Keniiworth Court, too, but how long it came there, I do not know.
Mr. GRAY. You lived at Eeuilworth Court after this — I have forgotten the
address that you mentioned.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Shasta.
Mr. GRAY. You lived at Keniiworth Court after you lived at Shasta Road?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. And you think the People's World came to Keniiworth Court?
The WITNESS. I think so.
Mr. ROBB. That is all I care to ask.
Mr. SH.VERMAN. I think I have one or two questions to ask Mrs. Oppenheimer.
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Mrs. Oppenheimer, Mr. Gray asked you about your leaving Los Alamos, and
you referred to a visit to Bethlehem, Pa., when your mother had pneumonia. I
think you gave a date in 1944.
A. I gave no- date because I do not remember when it was.
Q. I thought that she adopted a date that had been given. It had been sug-
gested that it was May 1945. Would you recall one way or the other?
A. I am afraid I wouldn't
Q. Did you, in fact, attempt to dissuade your husband from making contribu-
tions or having associations with Communist Party people?
A. I think not
Mr. SILVERUCAN. That is alL
Mr. GRAY. Are you familiar with a Thornwall Telephone Co.?
The WITNESS. Cornwall— I think that is a Berkeley exchange. .
Mr. GRAY. Thornwall 6236 ; does that mean anything to you?
The WITNESS. No.
Mr. GRAY. That never was your telephone number?
The WITNESS. I do not know. It does not mean anything to me, Mr. Gray
I do not remember our Berkeley telephone number.
Mr. GRAY. Could it have been Dr. Frank Oppenheimer's number?
The WITNESS. All I can say is that I do not know.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Mrs. Oppenheimer.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GARRISON. Could we have a short recess?
Mr. GRAY. Yes ; we will recess for a few minutes.
(A short recess was taken.)
Whereupon Jerrold R. Zacharias, a witness, having been previously duly sworn,
was called in rebuttal, examined, and testified as follows :
022
Mr. GRAY. I think the record should show that Dr. Zacharias is here, as I
take it Dr. Bush was, in the capacity of what we have informally referred to as
rebuttal witnesses.
Mr. GARRISON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. It is my duty, Dr. Zacharias, to remind you that you continue under
oath in the proceeding.
The WITNESS. I do.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Marks.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. MARES :
Q. Dr. Zacharias, I wish you would state for the record whether or not 1 asked
you to read testimony which has been given in these proceedings by Mr. Griggs
when you arrived this morning?
A. Yes ; you did. You gave me that, and I read a part of the Griggs testimony
that had to do with the summer study and the so-called ZORC.
Q. Testimony given before this board by Mr. Griggs described a meeting in
the fall of 1952 in Cambridge, a meeting of the Scientific Advisory Board.
Were you present at that meeting?
A. I was present for a panel discussion that had no bearing on the subject at
issue, a small panel discussion, and present to give a report of the summer study
findings to the full Science Advisory Board of the Air Force.
Q. I don't understand what you mean when you say you were present with
respect
A. I am not a member of the Science Advisory Board. There was a 3-day
meeting. I was present for a subcommittee meeting which has no bearing on
the present discussion and present at a report made by the Lincoln Laboratory to
the Science Advisory Board. It is that full discussion of the full committee
that I think comes into question here.
Q. Did you make any presentation to the Scientific Advisory Board on that
occasion?
A. I did.
Q. Will you tell us whether or not in the course of any of the meetings of the
Scientific Advisory Board at that occasion you had occasion to say anything
about or do anything about a term that has been used— ZORO?
A. I testified under oath the last time I was here, and I will repeat the testi-
mony, that I had never heard of any such organization or name of organization
or anything resembling it until I read it in an article in Fortune magazine.
Q. And when would that have been?
A. When that magazine article came out, in May of 1953, a year after the
beginning of the summer study, about.
Mr. ROBB. Pardon me. I suppost that is an answer to the question. Maybe
the witness would like to have the question read back. I am not sure that is a
direct answer to the question,
Mr. MARKS. Let us read it back, Mr. Reporter.
(Question read by the reporter.)
Mr. MARKS. I would like to ask another question.
The WITNESS. Do you want me
Mr. ROBB. I just want to make sure the witness understands the question.
Mr. MARKS. May we proceed, Mr. Robb?
Mr. ROBB. Certainly. I just want to be fair to the witness, that is alL
Mr. GRAY. You may proceed, Mr. Marks.
Mr. MARKS. Thank you.
By Mr. MARKS :
Q. Did you or did you not, Dr. Zacharias, on the occasion of the 1952
Scientific Advisory Committee meeting, in the fall of that year in Cambridge,
write on the blackboard in the course of that meeting the term "ZORG" and
explain it?
A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, I did not write on the board the
letters "ZORC." May I state this a little more fully?
Being a school teacher, I naturally emphasize things by writing on the board.
This is one of our chief methods for emphasis. I don't remember seeing any
reason now why I should have wanted to emphasize my own name. I had been
properly introduced and Lauritsen was a member of the Science Advisory
Advisory Board, and was present in the audience. So all I can say is to the
best of my knowledge and belief, I did not write any such thing on the black-
board. I have even gone so far as to check the memory of a few other people
923
on this very point, and none who has been questioned remembers any such
thing.
Q. Are you or are you not clear as to when you first heard the term "ZORG"?
A. I am very clear that I first heard the term "ZORO" when I read it in
Fortune magazine of May 1953, 9 months after the meeting of the Science
Advisory Board in question.
Mr. ROBB. I am awfully sorry. Could I have that answer read back?
(Question and answer read by the reporter.)
By Mr. MARKS :
Q. Dr. Zacharias, I should be, but I am not, clear in my memory as to whether
when you previously appeared in these proceedings you testified concerning your
participation in and the circumstances under which the so-called Lincoln Sum-
mer Study originated. I would like to ask you now to describe the circumstances
or such of them as you know about under which the Lincoln Summer Study
originated and the specific purposes, if you know them, of that summer study.
A. I was from the beginning of the Lincoln Laboratory until I resigned shortly
after the end of the summer study, associate director of the Lincoln Laboratory*
Q. When did the laboratory originate?
A. It is hard to know exactly. It was in June of 1951, roughly. You can't
nail it down too tight. So that for approximately a year and a half I was asso-
ciate director of the Lincoln Laboratory. In roughly March of 1952, I visited
Pasadena-Los Angeles area— in fact, as I remember it, I paid a visit to the Hughes
Aircraft Oo. One evening Dr. Lauritsen, and I had a discussion about air
defense, and the participation of Lincoln and how it would be possible to make
an air defense in the face of a growing threat * * *. Dr. Lauritsen and I
thought it would be a good idea to set up a study group to investigate the question
of defense of the North American continent.
I got in touch with Dr. Hill, then the director.
Q. The director of what?
A. Of the Lincoln Laboratory. More specifically, he was deputy director, but
indeed running the laboratory. We decided that it would be a good thing to do,
that it would help air defense if we did it, and it would also likely help the
Lincoln Laboratory's growth.
We had a discussion about this with Dr. Lauritsen, Dr. Oppenheimer, and
Dr. Rabi. I remember that it was in a room in the Hotel Statler. Five of us, as
1 remember it, certainly Dr. Hill was there.
Q. When would this have been?
A. In early April or the end of March of 1952. We discussed the possibility
of going ahead with the study, and one of us, namely either I or Dr. Hill, made
the suggestion that the prestige of Drs. Oppenheimer, Rabi, and Lauritsen,
would help to bring in some of the bright people who would otherwise find other
things to do.
They agreed to help with the study and did, not on a full-time basis. We
proceeded to try to recruit people for the study, some from within the Lincoln
Laboratory— a few within the Lincoln Laboratory, so as not to deplete the Lincoln
Laboratory force— and several or many from the outside.
The summer study got going about the first of July 1952, and continued for
2 months thereafter, with Drs. Oppenheimer, Rabi, and Lauritsen participating
on a part-time basis in the initial discussions and in the terminal discussions.
By Mr. MAKES :
Q. What were the specific purposes of the summer study as they were conceived
by you in its inception?
A. The purpose of the summer study was simply this. We knew that the
Russian threat might grow in a variety of ways. The types of aircraft, the types
of delivery means, including ballistic missiles and so on would increase, and we
wanted to see whether the kind of air defense planning that was going on and
the air defense work going on within Lincoln was appropriate to the growing
threat There is no sense in trying to make an air defense against yesterday's
airplanes. The defense that one develops has to be against the airplanes that
will be in being and threatening when the air defense is in being. Remember,
that technical discussion and technical work has to precede use by a number of
years.
Q. Dr. Zacharias, was it ever suggested to you or intimated to you by Dr.
Oppenheimer that the summer study should have other purposes?
A. Not that I can possibly remember.
924
Q. Was it ever a contemplated purpose of the summer study to bring about
a reduction in the power of the Strategic Air Command?
A. Certainly not. In fact, it is clear to anyone who tries to think of defense
of the continent— let me he a little specific about this— that there are essen-
tially what you might call four possible rings of defense. One is an innermost
last-ditch affair, largely from the ground with the aid of missiles or antiaircraft
guns; a second ring, which can be provided by interceptor aircraft of short
range and moderately close to home ; a third ring which is further out away
from our shores, and away from our borders ; and a fourth which is the destruc-
tion of enemy bases by means of long-range bombardment aircraft. All of
these elements for defense of the continent are terribly important, regarded
as very important by all members of the study group, and the Strategic Air
Command is included in the last 1 of the 4. Not last in order of priority, but
only last because if you start from the inside out, you get to Russia last.
Q. Was there any purpose in the summer study to effect a reduction in the
budget of the Strategic Air Command?
A. There certainly was not.
Q. Was there ever any purpose in the summer study, or was any such purpose
ever suggested to you, of studying or considering submarine warfare?
A. * * * Several of us had participated in the project on antisubmarine
warfare 2 years prior to this. We saw no reason to examine the situation again.
Maybe I have not answered the question quite. You said was it ever suggested.
It is very difficult to remember who suggested what. I certainly remember no
emphasis at all on the antisubmarine problem.
* * *****
Q. When you speak of argument at the summer session, who do you have in
mind as involved in that argument, if anybody?
A. The summer-study group that was full time worked on that. I don't have
the names directly at my fingertips. Those of us who were involved full time
besides myself were Lloyd Berkner, Brockway McMillan from the Bell Tele-
phone Laboratories, Julian West from the Bell Telephone Laboratories, Wip-
panie, M. M. Hubbard, of the Lincoln Laboratory. I would rather find a list
than to try to cite one here.
Let me say that the detailed discussion of relegating the problem of counter-
ing missiles launched from submarines, relegating that to the countersubmarine
force, was largely done by the full-time members of the group.
Q. Mr. Griggs has testified that "we;" that is, I take it, he and his asso-
ciates, whoever might have been, were concerned with the fear that the summer
study might get into things which he and his associates regarded as inappro-
priate for Lincoln, and as of questionable value to the Air Force. He referred
specifically to the strategic air arm and allocation of budget between the Stra-
tegic Air Command and Air Defense Command.
You have already commented on these matters. I think at this point in
his testimony, he went on to say that we also were very much concerned in the
early days of the formulation of the Lincoln summer study because it was
being done in such a way that had it been allowed to go in the direction in which
it was initially going, every indication was that it would have wrecked the
effectiveness of the Lincoln Laboratory.
This, Mr. Griggs said, was because of the way the thing was, the summer
study was handled administratively.
Mr. ROBB. What page are you reading from, Mr. Marks?
Mr. MASKS. This is from pages 2617 and 2618 of volume 14.
By Mr. MARES:
Q. He went on to say, "So far as I know, it was not because of any direct
action on the part of Dr. Oppenheimer. On the other hand, I felt at the time
that Dr. Oppenheimer should have been well enough informed and alert enough
to see that this would be disastrous to the Lincoln summer study."
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I think it fair to say in the interest of accuracy that
Mr. Marks was not reading a verbatim portion of the record when he did that.
I think you left out several things and paraphrased in other cases, did you not,
Mr. MARKS. May I show the witness the transcript?
Mr. ROBB. I think the record ought to reflect whether or not you read from the
record verbatim or whether or not you paraphrased or omitted certain portions
of what you have been reading.
Mr. MARKS. This is a rather pointless discussion.
Mr. ROBB. It is not pointless to me.
925
Mr. MARKS. I did change some "we's" to "they." Let me, if I may, show Dr.
Zacharias the portion of the transcript from which I was reading.
Mr. GBAY. I think you should read the portion, whatever it was, Mr. Marks,
and then put your question to the witness.
By Mr. MARKS :
Q. I would like to read to you, Dr. Zacharias, a portion of the transcript,
namely, pages 2617 and 2618, relating to testimony of Mr. Griggs, and ask you
whether you have any comment to make on it. Starting at page 2617 :
"Q. Was that the main object of the Lincoln summer study, to find ways to
improve our air defense?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And did the Lincoln study ever recommend the giving up of any part of
our strategic air power?
"A. No, not to my knowledge.
"Q. I think you have already said so far as your knowledge goes, Dr. Oppen-
heimer did not recommend that?
"A. That is right. I would like to amplify my answer on that for the benefit
of the board, since this is the first mention of the summer study in this much
detail.
"We were concerned by the thing I have already mentioned, that is, the fear
that the summer study might get into these things which we regarded as in-
appropriate for Lincoln, and as of questionable value to the Air Force — 1 refer
to the giving up of our strategic air arm, and the allocation of budget between
the Strategic Air Command and the Air Defense Command — but we were also
very much concerned in the early days of the formation of the Lincoln summer
study, because it was being done in such a way that had it been allowed to go
in the direction in which it was initially going, every indication was that it would
have wrecked the effectiveness of the Lincoln Laboratory. This was because of
the way the thing was, the summer study was being handled administratively.
"So far as I know, it was not because of any direct action on the part of
Dr. Oppenheimer. On the other hand, I felt at the time that Dr. Oppenheimer
should have been well enough informed and alert enough to see that this would
be disastrous to the Lincoln summer study."
Now, unless Mr. Robb would like me to read more, which I would be glad to
do, I would like to ask Dr. Zacharias the question, if he has any comment to make
on the passage that I have read.
Mr. ROBB. No, Mr. Chairman, it is not my satisfaction. It is a question that
I merely want the record to be accurate. •
Mr. GRAY. The witness will proceed with any comment he has to make.
The WITNESS. Those of us who were trying to start the summer study felt —
let me say specifically I felt—that we were trying to help air defense and also the
Lincoln Laboratory. That the Lincoln Laboratory is an important part of our
air defense development system and strengthening the Lincoln Laboratory would
strengthen air defense.
Correspondingly we also wanted to see whether the technical means that we
were trying to employ were adequate. Remember that this was at a time when
the early warning for the Air Force against incoming raids was pitifully short
in time. Substantially no warning until enemy bombers might be directly on
us. We therefore wanted to look at the early warning, the air battles, and possi-
bilities of defense against new types, new mechanisms of delivery. This was our
objective. This is something of interest to the Air Force and specifically of
interest to the three services. Remember, the Lincoln Laboratory is an Army,
Navy, Air Force laboratory, despite the fact that the Air Force contributes the
major share. So we felt that we were helping the Air Force, or that we would
help the Air Force by our efforts.
I would like to make the comment that Dr. Griggs, the witness there in ques-
tion, was then I think called the chief scientist for the Air Force, and as we saw
it, or as I saw it— "we" is indefinite, that is why I use "I"— as I saw it, he was
doing everything he could to prevent our starting this summer study. He tried
to influence people not to join it. He tried to influence President Killian and
Provost Stratton to prevent the Initiation of the summer study. By his own
admission— Dr. Griggs' own admission— the summer study turned out to be a
good thing. This is what we thought it would be. You can never promise in
advance, before you start a study, what the study will end up with. You can't
be sure that it will turn out to be fruitful, whereas this one, in my opinion, did
turn out to be fruitful.
926
Dr. Griggs' efforts — let me use a strong word — to sabotage the summer study
from a position of power as chief scientist for the Air Force I regarded as
unwise, but not subversive. I would not want to bring up Dr. Griggs on charges
of being disloyal in his effort to sabotage an effort in which I was the major
promoter. However, let me say rather informally that it is a bit of a pity that
dueling has gone out of style. This is a very definite method of settling differ-
ences of opinion between people than to try to bring out all the detail in a
hearing.
About the administrative part of that question, to my memory there were no
administrative changes involved in the initiation of the summer study. We had
planned to hold it in the Lincoln Laboratory somewhere, that I was going to direct
it, as the director of the Lincoln Laboratory I would thereby report to Dr. Hill
on this.
Griggs' efforts to stop the summer study did result in a delay of several weeks,
critical weeks, as a matter of fact, in trying to gather the people to form a
summer study. Remember a summer starts at a fairly definite time for univer-
sity people, and a delay of 3 weeks in my opinion then and in my opinion now
resulted in our not having as large a group or even as capable a group as we might
have had if it were not for obstructive tactics used by Griggs in this matter.
But the administrative detail of the running of the summer study was carried
out the way it was initially conceived.
Mr. MASKS. I have no further questions.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Bobb.
CBOSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Doctor, you either knew or assumed, did you not, that in his position with
respect to the Lincoln summer study Dr. Griggs was following out the policies of
his. superiors in the Air Force?
A. Is that a loaded question, sir? I had no way of knowing whether he was
carrying out orders or acting on his own initiative. When I say "knowing" I use
the word very carefully. I believe, however, that he was acting on his own
initiative.
Q. You think he was just carrying out a personal vendetta?
A. I think not. I think again that he was not doing this because of any
personal animosity toward me or to some of the other members of the group. I
would not want to go on record to say that he was doing it because of a personal
animosity toward Dr. Oppenheimer. I am sure that Dr. Oppenheimer's presence
on the group colored Griggs' actions and thoughts considerably.
Q. Why?
A. The question is why do I think so or why were they colored?
Q. Why do you think that?
A. Because Griggs spoke to some people in a very derogatory way regarding
Dr. Oppenheimer.
Q. What reason do you have for believing or feeling, whichever it is, that
Dr. Griggs' attitude toward the Lincoln summer study was not in accord with
the wishes of his superiors in the Air Force?
A. I didn't say that. I said that I thought he was acting on his own initiative.
Q. All right.
A. That the stimulus for doing what he was doing came from him. It is
perfectly possible for a man to convince his superiors to do something, or to
order M™ to do something that he wants to do. I have talked with Mr. Fin-
letter a little about the early history here, and his mind was rather vague on
the subject, because I wanted to be sure that it was not Mr. Finletter who was
directing these delays.
Q. At the time that Dr. Griggs made his position on the summer study known
to you, did you communicate with any of Dr. Griggs' superiors in the Air Force
to see whether or not Dr. Griggs was carrying out their wishes?
A. No, I don't remember. I remember some discussion with Mr. Norton,
but I don't remember the substance of it very, much. It certainly would not
have been in this form.
Q. Can you tell the Board, Dr. Zacharias, any single specific fact or circum-
stance which indicated to you that Dr. Griggs' attitude in respect to the Lincoln
summer study was not acting in conformity with the wishes or orders of his
superiors?
A. Mr. Bobb, I would have had to be there to answer that question. When a
man is acting or doing something, if he is in military uniform, I think he can
927
always rely— he can always depend on being able to say that he is acting
under orders. Civilians in the military don't always do that
Q. Dr. Zacharias, you have testified, have you not, that in your opinion I>r.
Griggs— strike that.
You have testified, have you not, that Dr. Griggs' attitude in your opinion was
his personal attitude, and did not necessarily reflect the attitude of his superiors?
Is that a fair statement?
A. Yes, I have no proof of that, however.
Q. Yes.
A. I have no proof of that. I have tried to keep that part of the record clear.
Q. Yes. So is it not a fair question, Doctor, to ask you what your proof, if
any, is?
Mr. MASKS. The witness has already said he had no proof.
The WITNESS. That is a very telling kind of question in the sense
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Thank you.
A. In order to get to the answer I would have to pull into my memory all of
the details of the back and forth talk on this and in particular on what Griggs
said to me and said to others. In order to get this thing clear, I thlnfr it would
take a fair time of the committee.
Q. We have lots of time, Doctor. Your answer is that you can't do it as of
now; isn't that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Doctor, so that there may be no misunderstanding, may I ask you, sir, is
it your testimony that the first time you ever heard this name or expression
"ZORC" was when you read it in the Fortune article in May 1953?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Just so we can be sure we are talking about the same thing, I have before
me that article or a photostat of it, and I will read you a few sentences from
it to make sure that is what you are talking about. The byline is "ZORC Takes
Up the Fight," "A test of Teller's thermonuclear device was scheduled for late
1952 at Bniwetok. Oppenheimer tried to stop the test In April 1952, Secretary
Acheson appointed him to the State Department Disarmament Committee of
which he became chairman. Here was generated a proposal that the President
should announce that the United States had decided on humanitarian ground not
to bring the weapon to final test and that it would regard the detonation of a
similar device by any other power as an act of war. Mr. Truman was not per-
suaded. That project cost Oppenheimer his place on the General Advisory
Committee. When his term expired that summer he was not reappointed.
Neither were DuBridge nor Conant who supported him throughout. Now came
a shift in tactics. At a meeting of scientists "
Mr. GKA.Y. Let me ask, are you going to ask a question about the substance of
the article, or is this for the purpose of identification?
Mr. ROBB. It is just for the purpose of identification. The first paragraphs
I read merely to get the time fixed and I don't intend to question the witness
with those.
"Now came a shift in tactics. At a meeting of scientists in Washington that
spring there formed around Oppenheimer a group calling themselves ZORC,
Z for Zacharias, an MIT physicist, 0 for Oppenheimer, R for Rabi, and C for
Charles Lauritsen."
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Is that the piece to which you referred?
A. Yes, sir; it is.
Q. When you read that reference to ZORC, were you surprised by that name?
A. Yes.
Q. You never heard it before?
A. I had never heard it before.
Q. You are sure about that?
A. I am sure about that
Q. You could not reasonably be mistaken about it?
A. I could not be reasonably mistaken about that
Q. Did that reference rather anger you?
A. Very much so.
Q. Why?
A. Because it implied that there was a cabal group of people who were trying
to do things or to influence policy one way or another by existing in a group. To
808818—54 59
928
the best of my memory, which certainly is not adequate here, I can't think of any
time when those four people sat together alone in a room to discuss anything. In
other words, there was so little to their being a group that if there was a time —
there may have been — when those four people, including myself, were together
alone in a room, it would surprise me very much.
Q. In other words, you thought it was quite a material point whether there
had been such a group calling itself ZORC, or not?
A. I felt that it was a journalistic trick to bring into focus the kind of scurrilous
charges that were being made in the article.
Q. You thought it was an important point?
A. I thought it was an important journalistic trick. This is very different
from its being—yes, I agree, I thought it wa&— if it were, true, if it had been
true — it would have been a point Therefore, maybe to^get to what you are
thinking I believe it is germane to these hearings.
Q. Yes. In other words, if it were true as you have testified, it tended to show
that there was a cabaL
A. Yes.
Q. Was Dr. Griggs present at that meeting of the Scientific Advisory Board in
Boston or Cambridge in the fall of 1952?
A. I don't know.
Q. How many people were present there?
A. I don't know exactly. There was rather a roomfull, a room that might
hold 50 to 100. A number I think given in Griggs' testimony.
Q. You did address the meeting, I suppose?
A. I did.
Q. And never having heard the expression or dreamt of it, you could not have
written it on the blackboard. Is that your testimony?
A. No, sir. Never having heard of something, you could still— letters might
go together. Remember, this is a rather technical point here. Let me say I
never heard of it and certainly did not write it on the blackboard.
Q. Doctor, if you were surprised and angered when you saw that expression
"ZORO" in the Fortune article in May 1953, you could not very well have written
it on the blackboard In the fall of 1952, could you?
A. That is my feeling, sir.
Q. Aren't you sure about that?
A. I am as sure of that as I am sure of anything in my memory for which I
don't have written documentation. Let me say this, if someone presented me
with a photograph of the blackboard at that time with me in front of it, I would
say sure, that must be it. But my memory aids in this are simple. I see now no
reason why I should have put those initials there for any point of emphasis that
I might have wanted to make. Remember that I was at that meeting trying
to impress the Science Advisory Board with the sum of the results of the summer
study, and that there were tangible results. Some of the people in the group were
impressed by those results. I had no need for recourse to prestige. The results
stood on their own feet as they still do.
Q. Just to draw the issue plainly, Dr. Griggs has testified here that you wrote
those letters on the board and explained that Z was Zacharias, O was Oppen-
heimer, R was Rabl, and 0 was Charlie Lauritsen. Did that take place?
A. To the best of my memory, it did not take place.
Q. Could you reasonably be mistaken about it?
A. I am afraid I am a scientist, sir, and I could be mistaken about anything
that is not written down in my notebook.
Q. Aren't scientists usually pretty accurate?
A. No more accurate on things of this sort than anyone else. I think if you
wanted tfc establish this point very carefully you might have to call a fair number
of the witnesses of the people at that meeting.
Q. Do you recall at that meeting in the f all of 1952 that you were anxious to
impress people that Dr. Oppenheimer was participating or had participated in
this study in some way?
A. No, sir. I had in my mind two most important things. One was to get
going on an early warning system, and the second to get going on a remote
intercept system. I wanted those understood in a technical way.
Q. Is there any other meeting that you can think of that that incident de-
scribed by Dr. Griggs might have occurred?
A. I can think of no other meetings where Dr. Griggs was present and like
this meeting, I can think of no reason for having written such things on the
board anywhere.
Q. So far as you know you have never written such letters on the board?
029
A. As far as I know I have never written any such things on the blackboard.
I might do it now because it is a short word and is, as I say, a neat Journalistic
trick. Whether all journalistic tricks are dirty, I don't know. I rather feel this
one was.
Q. So far as you know, you never used that word "ZORC" prior to seeing it in
the Fortune article?
A. Yes, sir. I did not use that word prior to seeing it in the Fortune article.
Mr. ROBB. That is all I care to ask.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Zacharias, if you were today shown a photograph of the black-
board and the letters "ZORO" on the blackboard and you standing beside it with
a piece of chalk in your hand, you would say then "I was mistaken in my
testimony"?
The WITNESS. What with the present trend in doctoring photographs, I might
want to question the photographer.
Mr. GRAY. That was my next question. Would your reaction be, "I did
actually do this" or would your first reaction be that must be a dloctored
photograph?
The WITNESS. My first reaction would be one of considerable surprise to the
extent that I would doubt the veracity of the photograph and would want to
question the photographer.
Mr. GBAT. Earlier when you were before the board, you testified that you had
no knowledge of the origin of the nomenclature. This refers to "ZORO," now.
Then you said, "I do know one friend of mine went around; to a meeting of the
Physical Society and hunted for people that had heard of it, found one, and I
would rather not mention his name, because it has nothing to do with this thing.
He may have heard it, or it may have been the invention of the man who wrote
the article."
You were not asked, Dr. Zacharias, who this man was. I would like now to
ask you
The WITNESS. You would?
Mr. GBAY. I would like to, yes. Who is the man who had heard of it?
The WITNESS. This is a second-hand report. The man who said he had heard
of it was Alvarez. My memory of the man who told me of this is James B. Fisk.
Mr. GBAY. I asked you this question because Mr. Griggs testified very clearly
that he saw you perform this act of writing the letters on the blackboard, and
you have testified pretty strongly that you think it hardly possible that this
happened.
Dr. Zacharias, in a rather long response to a question from Mr. Marks, Inviting
comment on some testimony of Mr. Griggs which was read, you made some
observation about dueling having gone out of style. Do you mind telling me —
I didn't stop you when you were giving your answer, because I have tried very
hard not to restrict witnesses in their answers— what was your reference to
dueling?
The WITNESS. I meant that where there are personal differences that are very
strong, that in the old days some of these were settled by dueling. Let us take
the McCarthy-Stevens difference. * * * It might well have been settled that way
rather than at such extensive length. Apropos of this, having read some of
Dr. Griggs' testimony, my blood begins to boil a bit. I feel no great liking for
Dr. Griggs at this particular point
Mr. GRAY. Is this only since you have read his testimony that you have
no liking for him?
The WITNESS. I would say that my respect for Dr. Griggs has been defining
rapidly over the past 2 or 3 years, and it hits a rather low point with this sworn
testimony of his.
Mr. GRAY. Did you have this feeling about him at the time of the summer
study?
The WITNESS. It certainly was not as strong then as it is now.
Mr, GRAY. If dueling had not gone out of style at the time of the summer
study, would you have felt strongly enough to challenge him at the time of the
summer study?
The WITNESS. Perhaps.
Mr. GRAY. So you did feel pretty strongly?
The WITNESS. I felt pretty strongly then.
Mr. GRAY. And it is not just his testimony before this board?
The WITNESS. Certainly the testimony has added to it.
Mr. GRAY. You stated that you felt that Dr. Griggs attempted to sabotage
this project, I believe.
930
The WITNESS. I said that I wanted to use a strong word. He tried in every
way he could to stop it, to prevent its happening.
Mr. GRAY. Do you wish to withdraw your characterization of it as sabotage?
The WITNESS. I don't know the full implication of withdrawing this.
Mr. GRAY. This is not involved
The WETNESS. I said it was a strong word with color to it. I think it is more
appropriate than not. Let me say it this way. The word sabotage has many
implications. One is that it was being done without the knowledge of many
others. Griggs was quite open in his opposition to this summer study. In that
sense I would only say that he was doing his best to stop or to prevent the project.
Mr. GRAY. I asked you whether you thought that was a very serious matter
at the time.
The WITNESS. Yes ; I did.
Mr. GRAY. And you felt, I believe you said, that it was resulting in appreciable
delay?
The WITNESS. It did, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Appreciable delay was resulting from Mr. Griggs'
The WITNESS. An appreciable delay did result from it.
Mr. GRAY. Did you discuss these problems of getting underway with the
summer study with anybody other than Mr. Griggs who was identified with the
Department of Defense?
The WITNESS. I don't remember exactly who we discussed this with.
Mr. GRAY. My purpose in asking the question is not to confuse the situation
at all. I am simply asking what you did, if anything, to overcome the obstacles
which you felt Mr. Griggs was putting in the way of something that you also
felt was extremely important to the security of the country.
The WITNESS. Remember that Dr. Griggs was working on my superiors,
namely, Dr. Killian and Dr. Stratton, and I talked with them about it. I would
have to look at the record to see whether I talked with General Craigie. I very
likely did, but I can't be certain.
Mr. GRAY. So if you had a protest or complaint to make, you, would have made
it normally through Dr. Killian and Dr. Stratton, and not the Air Force people?
The WITNESS. Griggs' major attempt to stop the project was his trying to
influence them, at least from my point of view at that time. I didn't know of all
the things that he was doing.
Mr. GRAY. You said you talked with Mr. Finletter about this. When was that?
The WITNESS. I talked with Finletter
Mr. GRAY. Was it within the last year?
The WITNESS. Within the last 8 months, I believe. He was just vague on the
subject, and I didn't press it.
Mr. GRAY. That was not in connection with your appearance before this board?
The WITNESS. It was not; no, sir. It was something like last June.
Mr. GRAY. Have you ever known of a study under contract with the Armed
Services, say at MIT, as an example, in which there was official complaint by
the services that the reasonable bounds of the study had been exceeded?
The WITNESS. I know of none.
Mr. GRAY. You don't have any?
The WITNESS. I know of no official complaint, not even in this case.
Mr. GRAY. You know of no study, for example, which might have concerned
itself with electronic problems which came up with recommendations with respect
to foreign policy?
The WITNESS. I know of a study that was concerned with electronics problems
and also discussed, questions of foreign policy. I was not a member of that
study.
Mr. GRAY. But you have heard of it?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. And you never heard that there was any complaint from the De-
fense Department about the study having exceeded its reasonable bounds?
The WITNESS. I was not a member of that study. I did truly not ever hear of
this complaint.
Mr. GRAY. If you were directing a study which had to do with electronics, a
pretty clearly defined field, and it started to come up with recommendations with
respect to foreign policy, would you feel that an official of the Defense Department
who urged that you stick to electronics was acting with impropriety?
The WITNESS. I think I would not direct a project that was as restrictive as
that, sir, as to be restricted only to electronics.
Mr. GRAY. I am not going to press you further, because I don't think It is
getting us anywhere.
931
The WITNESS. No.
Mr. GRAY. The question was related to the somewhat conflicting testimony
here about whether the summer study was tending to get into budget matters,
for example, as distinguished from what was to have been the main purpose of
the study.
The WITNESS. The study did not get into budget matters.
Mr. GRAY. And it did not tend to at any time?
The WITNESS. And did not intend to at any time. One must not confuse the
word "budget" with what things might possibly cost. In other words, you can't
make a technical evaluation of anything without trying to decide whether It
could be afforded, whether it is possible to have that much money available to
make what you want. But that is not a budgetary question. That is a technical
question.
Mr. GBAY. Do you think that the writer of the Fortune magazine article is the
originator of the four letter word we have been discussing?
The WITNESS. I have no idea.
Mr. GRAY. You are saying you don't know where is originated?
The WITNESS. I don't know.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Evans, do you have any questions?
Dr. EVANS. Dr. Zacharias, did you ever know a Robert M. Zacharias?
The WITNESS. No.
Dr. EVANS. He was a classmate of mine. I Just wondered if he might be a
relative of yours.
The WITNESS. No, sir. I come from Florida.
Dr. EVANS. I suppose I ought to know this, but I don't Do you know why
Griggs was so opposed to this study?
The WITNESS. I don't know. I think he makes it pretty clear in his testimony.
He was opposed to this for one thing because of Dr. Oppenheimer's possible par-
ticipation, and he was opposed to it because he said he thought it might alter the
course of the Lincoln laboratory, an air defense laboratory. This is his own
testimony. I only paraphrase it. It is better given there.
Dr. EVANS. That is all.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Marks.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. MARKS :
Q. Dr. Zacharias, I am not sure I caught one of your answers to question
Mr. Robb put, but I think you said something to the effect that you had never
been alone in a room with Rabi, Lauritsen, Oppenhelmer.
A. I said I don't remember any such circumstance, only to lend weight to
the fact that I know of no such organization. It is certainly possible to have any
four people in a room, especially physicists who know each other well. I didn't
make the point that they had never been together. The point is that the only
time I remember we were together there were other people present
Mr. MARKS. I have no further questions.
RE-CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Dr. Zacharias, did you undertake to find out who wrote that Fortune
article?
A. I didn't undertake to find out It was found out pretty quickly.
Q. Did you ever talk with that gentleman?
A. No, sir ; I never have. I understand that he has recanted considerably.
Q. What was his name?
A. The name is Charles Murphy, as I understand it.
Q. Did you make any protest or representations either to him or to Fortune
about the article?
A. No, sir.
Q. You didn't write to the editor or anything like that?
A. No.
Q. You read the article pretty carefully.
A. I read it once or twice.
Mr. ROBB. That is all.
Mr MARKS. I do have one other question, if I may.
Mr. GRAY. All right
The WITNESS. Could I interpose?
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
932
The WITNESS. Mr. Bobb's question about my writing to the editor of Fortune,
or so on, might be used as a gage of my anger on reading it. I think it is not
such a gage. There are many of us who try to work with the military. The
more we can do to keep our names and ideas out of the public, away from the
public, the better can we get along with the military and work with them. I
would not write a letter to the editor in protest or do anything of that sort
because of straining relations with people who, like all the rest of us, are people,
too, and like to get credit for what is going on. You see, there is a simple theory
that you can either get something done and get credit for doing it, and not both.
The scientific people who try to work with the military try as much as possible
to get credit for what gets done allocated to the military. In this sense, in this
kind of context, I would not write a thing of this sort, and therefore my answer
to the question could not be used to indicate that my blood pressure didn't hit
the top when I read the article.
Mr. BOBB. I was not intending to indicate that. Your point is the fact that
you didn't write doesn't show you were not all wrought up about it
The WITNESS. That is right
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. MASKS :
Q. In response to a question by the Chairman, Dr. Zacharias, I think you
indicated that the first use of the term "ZOBC" by a scientist that had come
to your knowledge was attributed to Alvarez. Did I understand
- Mr. BOBB. I don't think that is what he said.
The WITNESS. No ; I didn't say that
Mr. MASKS. I am sorry. I didn't understand that testimony, Mr. Chairman,
and I would like to see if I couldn't understand it
Mr. GRAY. I think Dr. Zacharias testified that after he first heard about
the "ZOBC" phrase and tried to find out if anybody else had heard about it, he
found one scientist who indicated that he had.
The WITNESS. I found out second hand.
Mr. GRAY. He found out second hand that there was a scientist who had heard
of it and that scientist was Alvarez.
Mr. MASKS. Thank you, that clears it up.
Mr. GRAY. I am sorry to hold you, Dr. Zacharias, but that leads me to another
question. Credibility of witnesses is now involved. What are your personal re-
lationships with Dr. Alvarez, as you see them? Are you on friendly terms?
The WITNESS. I would say moderately friendly. I would say he and I have
never been, that I can remember it, fond of each other.
Mr. GSAY. Have you ever felt strongly enough about it to wish that dueling
had not gone of style as far as Dr. Alvarez is concerned?
The WITNESS. Oh, I respect Dr. Alvarez very much. He is a very intelligent
man. In his own way, I think, he tries to be reasonable. But he has very
strong opinions, and I think it is his arrogance
Mr. BOBB. His what?
The WITNESS. His arrogance—that bothers me most
Mr. GRAY. Do you question his veracity?
The WITNESS. I would not question his veracity in the real sense. I believe
that if he says something he believes it.
Mr. GBAY. I guess that is a pretty good definition of veracity, isn't It?
The WITNESS. Yes.
Mr. GBAY. Do you question Mr. Griggs' veracity?
The WITNESS. Yes ; I would.
Mr. GSAY. You do question his veracity. Are any of the differences you may
have with Dr. Alvarez in any way related to Dr. Oppenheimer?
The WITNESS. No.
Mr. GSAY. That would not be involved at all. Let me explain to you why
I ask the question. You have testified that you thought that Mr. Griggs felt
strongly about the summer study because of the possibility of Dr. Oppeuheimer's
association with it I believe therefore that your testimony brings the Griggs-
Oppenheimer relationship squarely into this proceeding, or at least Griggs'
attitude toward Dr. Oppenheimer. I am trying to find out whether, since Dr.
Alvarez has come into this, whether that is at all involved in your difficulties
with Dr. Alvarez.
The WITNESS. I have no direct knowledge of what Dr. Alvarez thinks about
things specifically germane to the hearing of Dr. Oppenheimer. I think the
933
difference between me and Alvarez are matters of taste and subtle things of that
sort In some cases matters of substance. Dr. Alvarez participated in the
Hartwell project the * * * study study that I directed. He picked on a par-
ticular part of antisubmarine warfare that he thought should be pushed very
hard. Very few of the other members of the Hartwell group agreed with him.
I did not agree with him, but this was not anything but a difference of opinion
on a technical matter.
Mr. GRAY. That is not related in any way to this hearing.
The WITNESS. It is not related to this at all.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Evans.
Dr. EVANS. You know Dr. Teller quite well?
The WITNESS. I don't know him very well ; I know him.
Dr. EVANS. Do you rather like him or don't you, or can't you answer that?
The WITNESS. That is hard to answer. I don't know how to answer that
question, sir. I would think hard to try to do it, if you press me.
Dr. EVANS. I won't press you.
Mr. GRAY. Perhaps this might not be difficult. Do you consider Dr. Teller a
difficult man to work with? Have you ever worked with him?
The WITNESS. I have never worked with Dr. Teller.
Mr. MARKS. No further questions.
Mr. ROBB. Nothing further.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GRAY. I want to get on the record a couple of things. I think we have had
so much discussion about the Fortune magazine article that that should go in
as an exhibit because parts of it have been read into the record and it has been
referred to a good deal. I assume nobody objects to that?
Mr. GARRISON. My problem about that is, Mr. Chairman, that if that goes in
it seems to me we ought to have a chance to answer it. I just think it is going
to prolong the record. I am perfectly content with what was read into the
record out of it. I don't ask that the rest of it be put in. If it does, it contains
various veiled allegations that I just think ought not to stand in the record
without some answer to them. I have not myself read it. I have only got a sense
of what it is like.
Mr. GRAY. I think I would say, Mr. Garrison, that I don't think it is in any
way prejudicial to Dr. Oppenheimer to have this as an exhibit I am a little
uncomfortable about having so many references to the article.
Mr. GARRISON. All right
Mr. GRAY. I say to you I don't think you need to make any more answer than
you have made or are making.
Mr. GARRISON. It may very well not be worthy of any answer. I haven't read it.
(The document was received as exhibit No. 2.)
Mr. GRAY. Yesterday you asked me about further procedure, particularly with
respect to what the board would like to have in the way of proposed findings
of fact and briefs. I have read the procedure under which we operate, and they
are silent with respect to that matter, as far as the board is concerned. There
in some reference to briefs in the event of an appeal to the standing board of
the Commission, the Personnel Security Review Board. So I take it there are
no requirements in this matter under the procedures. If you wish to present to
the board proposed findings of fact, of course, we would certainly consider them.
If you wish to present briefs, of course, we would consider them. In that event,
if you do wish to file documents of this sort, the board requests that they be filed
with the board no later than May 17, which Is 2 weeks from yesterday. I am
not sure whether that answers the question that you raised yesterday or not.
Mr. GARBISON. What day of the week is that?
Mr. GRAY. That is Monday.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, we will do our best It is a very tight time
schedule, but we will do our best. If there is any possible give on that at all,
if would be helpful.
Mr. GRAY. I am authorized to say that this matter has been discussed with
the other board members, and the board feels that this is a date we will request
you to observe.
Mr. GARRISON. All right. Among our problems is that of transcripts which is
ft perennial one with us. We can't take them out of the building here except
a certain number that have been released. It Is fearfully difficult for us to work
here out of our oflftces. I suppose in "due course we will get them, but there are
these problems.
034
Mr. GRAY. In recognition of this difficulty, I can only ask Mr. Rolander and his
associates to do the best, with all their problems they have, that they can.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I might say just for the record that I think it should
be said that we have made available to Mr. Garrison and his associates a room
here with a table in it which they have been using as their office in this building.
Mr. GARRISON. I appreciate that.
Mr. ROBB. We have done our best for them.
Mr. GAEBISON. I am not raising any question of the courtesy that has been
provided, but of the problem of working away from one's headquarters.
Mr. Chairman, did you have any further thought about a hearing of argu-
ment and summation by counsel?
Mr. GHAT. I have assumed that you would wish to present a summation to
the board. I would assume that it would contain some argument.
Mr. GARRISON. As far as I can put into it.
Mr. GRAY. Yes. I want to have that before we adjourn or recess this series
of daily meetings, as it were. We are ready for that when you have finished
with your rebuttal witnesses.
Mr. GABEISON. You mean this afternoon?
Mr. GRAY. I would hope we could get started this afternoon.
Mr. GARRISON. I just can't, Mr. Chairman. It is Just physically not possible
to do it
Mr. GRAY. May I ask how many more witnesses you will put on rebuttal?
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Hill and Dr. Oppenheimer. I imagine it will take the after-
noon, the way we go.
Mr. GRAY. We then will ask you to start your summation and argument with
the morning session tomorrow.
Mr. GARRISON. Would it be possible to do it at the afternoon session, and have
the morning free to do a little work? Mr. Chairman, I don't—well, I won't
sketch to you our problems, but it has been a matter of night work every night
for the last 3% weeks, apart from the transcripts. I have been with my client,
my colleagues and the witnesses, the transcripts have been down here, and I
have not even quite finished reading a summary of them prepared by Mr. Ecker,
let alone reading the transcripts themselves. I am just so hard pressed to try
to gather anything together that would be of use to the board, if I could at
least have a half day clear in which to do a little work ; it would be a great help.
I think in the end to the board also.
Mr. GRAY. I will discuss this with the board during the noon recess.
Mr. GARRISON. I would prefer a whole day if it could be had, but I would
greatly prefer to do it on Thursday if it could be done.
Dr. EVANS. May I Just say
Mr. GARRISON. If you are going to be here.
Dr. EVANS. I know Just how you are pressed for time, Mr. Garrison, but you
must remember that some of us
Mr. GARRISON. I know that, Dr. Evans ; indeed I do.
Dr. EVANS. We are in pretty bad shape, too.
Mr. GARRISON. I know you are. I should say one thing, Mr. Chairman, if you
don't mind. At Mr. Baruch's request, Dr. Oppenheimer saw him on Sunday— Mr.
Bernard Baruch— and as a result of that conversation, Mr. Baruch said that he
would be glad to have me get in touch with him with respect to testifying here.
I did as soon as I could reach him. He said— this was last night that I reached
him— that the earliest that he can come would be Thursday morning. He could
come down on the 10 : 15 plane and testify. I told him I didn't know whether this
would be possible, because of the probable close of testimony today, but I would
mention the matter to the board, which I do now.
Mr. GRAY. We should be glad to receive a written statement from Mr. Baruch.
Mr. GARRISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. Can we start at 2 : 15?
(Thereupon at 12 : 40 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 :15 p. m., the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. GRAY. Would you be good enough to stand. Give your full name.
Dr. HTTT.. Albert Gordon Hill.
Mr. GRAY. Albert Gordon Hill, do you swear the testimony you are to give the
board shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Dr. Hnx. I do.
935
Whereupon Albert Gordon Hill was called as a witness, and having been first
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows :
Mr. GRAY. Would you be seated, please.
It is my duty, Dr. Hill, to remind you of the existence of the so-called perjury
statutes. I should be glad to review their general provisions with you if it is
necessary. I won't do so if you are familiar with them.
The WITNESS. I think I know them generally well.
Mr. GRAY. It is not clear to me, Mr. Hill, whether it is likely that you might
get into a discussion of restricted data, but in any event, I should like to request
that if in the course of your testimony you find it necessary to disclose classified
material, that you notify me in advance so that we may take the necessary steps
in the interest of security.
Finally, I should like to say to you that we consider this proceeding a confiden-
tial matter between the Atomic Energy Commission and its officials on the one
hand, and Dr. Oppenheimer, his representatives and witnesses on the other. The
Commission is making no releases about these proceedings, and on behalf of the
board I express the hope that witnesses will take the same view.
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Marks.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. MARKS :
Q. Dr. Hill, what is your present occupation and position?
A. I am a professor of physics at MIT, and also director of the Lincoln Labora-
tory.
Q. How long have you been connected with the faculty at MIT?
A. I think 17 years, except for a brief 6 months period before the war.
Q. Without going into detail, what war work did you do?
A. I was at the radiation laboratory during the entire war.
Q. The radiation laboratory where?
A. MIT.
Q. Turning now to more recent days, how long have you had a connection with
the Lincoln Laboratory?
A. Since its inception. It was preceded by a Project Charles which began
January of 1951. This terminated in the summer * * *. The exact genesis and
birthday of Lincoln would be hard to give. Somewhere before September 1, 1951.
Q. What positions have you held in connection with the Lincoln Laboratory?
A. I was assistant director, I guess, when it started, became deputy director
in the spring of 1952, and director on July 1, 1952.
Q. Became director when?
A. July 1, 1952.
Q. In your capacity, as you have described it, in connection with the Lincoln
Laboratory, did you have anything to do with the inception of the so-called sum-
mer study?
A. Yes, quite a bit I should say the inception took place likely before I became
director. It began in the last week in June. I should say that the former director,
Dr. Loomis, of the University of Illinois, resigned effective July 1. This was done
on March 1, and I was then appointed deputy director and director-elect, if you
like. Loomis continued to run the laboratory, but we had a rather firm agree-
ment that things that were going to extend beyond July 1 1 would take responsi-
bility for them. So although the inception of the summer study took place while
I was not director, I was completely responsible for it as the senior Lincoln person.
Q. What can you tell us about the circumstances of the origination of the
summer study?
A. There are probably threefold. A number of us have always worried a bit
about how to improve continental defense and the like. I should perhaps paren-
thetically say that the Lincoln Laboratory is devoted primarily to continental
defense and air defense in general.
During the late winter and spring of 1952, Lloyd Berkner, who was then di-
rector—I am sorry— who was president of Associated Universities and very active
in the East River project, which they ran, this was a study on civil defense, early
concluded that civil defense would be very difficult, if not impossible, without
some measure of early warning. Lloyd used to come periodically to see a number
of us at MIT, at Lincoln, talking about the possibility of early warning. We
invented various things on the cuff, found most of them wanting, and it was my
feeling that a rather serious study of early, warning, whether it was possible or
not, should take place.
936
That was one genesis. Another genesis came from Zaeharias talking I believe
first with Charlie Lauritsen on the broad question of whether air defense is pos-
sible. Zacharias and I talked over the summer study one night at his house.
There may or may not have been others present. I don't know. We agreed it was
a good idea. I said I would only go along with it if he would be the head of the
summer study which he agreed to. I also insisted that early warning be looked
at He was Quite in favor of that
Q. I meant to ask you to state at the outset, Dr. Hill, whether I asked you when
you arrived this morning to look at the transcript of testimony in these proceed-
ings given by Mr. David Griggs.
A. I did look at it not all of it. I looked mostly at the part that pertained to
Lincoln or the summer study.
Q. You liave spoken of your interest in the problem of early warning. Did the
summer study have any other specific purposes?
A. Oh, yes.
*******
I should like to add one thing. Before coming down I thought I was going to
be asked to testify only as to the origin of this word "ZORC," and I did refresh
my memory on that point. I have not refreshed my memory by referring to files or
anything on these general questions about the summer study. I may have to hesi-
tate at points and say I would like to refresh my memory, if that is all right
with the committee.
Q. Since you have mentioned "ZORC," what is your memory about that?
A. All the soul and memory searching I can do, I first saw it in an Issue of
Fortune that came out just about a year ago. I think it was the May 1953 issue
of Fortune.
Q. Do you remember a meeting of the Scientific Advisory Committee in Boston
in the fall of 1952?
A. If I may correct you, Scientific Advisory Board of the Air Force. Yes,
I did.
Q. Did you attend?
A. The session, as I recall, was 3 days. I was not a member of the board,
but we were asked to make a presentation from the Lincoln Laboratory.
Q. When you say "we," who do you mean?
A. Well, I was. The presentation occupied about half of one morning's ses-
sion. I attended certainly all of the Lincoln presentation and most of what
came before. I cannot swear I was there all the time before we went on. But
I rather chairmaned our presentation which was made by 5 or 6 people.
Q. Did Dr. Zacharias have anything to do with that presentation?
A. Yes. He had the final presentation on the results of the summer study
I believe he spoke for 30 or 40 minutes.
Q. Do you recall any incident occurring during the occasion that you Just
described of the meeting of the Scientific Advisory Board in which the word
"ZORC" or anything like that figured?
A. I cannot recall any such thing. The statement was made in Griggs' testi-
mony that Zacharias wrote this on the blackboard. I cannot believe that, because
it would have been a cute trick in a very public and formal meeting, and I know
Zacharias well enough to know that I would have been quite angry with him had
he done it. I am convinced he did not do it To the best of my knowledge as
I say, I never saw or heard the word before the Fortune article of last May.
Q. Returning to the inception of the so-called summer study, do you have any
recollection of any part that Dr. Oppenheimer played in that?
A. I believe that Zacharias and I approached Charlie Lauritsen, Robert Oppen-
heimer, and 1. 1. Rabi, and talked to them about it to get their opinion.
Q. When would that have been?
A. That would have been around the time of the Physical Society meeting in
1952. I think it was that period. That is the first week in May and the last
week in April. We discussed it at some length with Robert then.
Q. Discussed at some length with whom?
A. With Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. ROBB. He said Robert
Mr. MAKES. I just didn't understand him, Mr. Robb.
By Mr. Mures:
Q. Do you remember anything of the views that were expressed at that time
about the purposes that should or might be served by the summer study that you
were then
037
A. I think in general this group agreed with Zacharias and, I think a study
would be a worthwhile thing. We talked some about the problems that might
be looked at, * * * and I think it was the general opinion of the three gentlemen
that Zacharias and I approached that they would support this by joining to the
extent that their time permitted, and would help us in any way on call.
Q. Was there any discussion then or at any other time about the relation
between the summer study and the problems of the Strategic Air Command?
A. I don't specifically recall in that period that there was such discussion. I
can recall other discussions with this group and others, like Dr. Piore of the
Navy, and Dr. Haworth of Brookhaven, and Berkner, whom I have already men-
tioned, of general discussion of offense and defense, and so on. In all these
discussions I believe the only positive statement made about the Strategic Air
Command was that it should be strengthened.
Having seen Griggs' testimony, I should add that there is some inference
somewhere in it that increasing defense might weaken Strategic Air Com-
mand, and hence increasing defense is bad, or that some scienticts definitely were
against the Strategic Air Command, and thought it should be cut or abolished.
I have never heard any such statement in my discussion with scientists cleared
for military work. As I say, the only thing I can recall in this sense is that
in general we thought it should be strengthened.
We also thought air defense should be strengthened.
Dr. Hill, I would like to read you a portion of the testimony given by Mr.
Griggs, and I will then ask you a Question about it. I am reading from page
2617 of the transcript, and the passage that I intend to read runs from page
2617 to page 2620.
"And did the Lincoln study" (I am reading just a little after the middle of
page 2617)
Mr. ROBB. This is a question by who, Mr. Marks?
Mr. MARKS. This is a question on cross-examination of Mr. Griggs. I believe
Mr. Silverman conducted it.
"And did the Lincoln study ever recommend the giving up of any part of our
strategic air power?
"A. No, not to my knowledge.
"Q. I think you have already said so far as your knowledge goes, Dr. Oppen-
heimer did not recommend that.
"A. That is right. I would like to amplify my answer on that for the benefit
of the board, since this is the first mention of the summer study in this
much detail.
"We were concerned by the thing I have already mentioned, that is, the fear
that the summer study might get into these things which we regarded as in-
appropriate for Lincoln, and as of questionable value to the Air Force— I
refer to the giving up of our strategic air arm, and the allocation of budget
between the Strategic Air Command and the Air Defense Command — but we were
also very much concerned in the early days of the formation of the Lincoln
summer study, because it was being done in such a way that had it been allowed
to go in the direction in which it was initially going, every indication was that
it would have wrecked the effectiveness of the Lincoln Laboratory. This was
because of the way the thing was, the summer study was being handled
administratively.
"So far as I know, it was not because of any direct action on the part of
Dr. Oppenheimer. On the other hand, I felt at the time that Dr. Oppenhetmer
should have been well enough informed and alert enough to see that this would
be disastrous to the Lincoln summer study.
"After having reported this to the Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Finletter,
who had been actively concerned with the summer study, and had been very
much— excuse me, made a mistake— I said Mr. Finletter had been actively
concerned with the summer study. I meant to say he had been concerned with
project Lincoln. He had been ixx touch with President Kiilian, and Provost
Stratton of MIT on the prosecution of project Lincoln. So I reported this to
Mr. Finletter, and he essentially charged me with trying to find out if the
summer study was going to be conducted in such a way as to result in a net
gain to the effectiveness of Lincoln or a net loss.
• "If it looked to me as though it were going to be a net loss, X was asked to
inform him so that steps could be taken to correct this condition, or to cancel
the summer study if that were necessary.
"I got in touch with Provost Stratton at MIT. I found that he hardly knew
about the existence of the plan for the summer study. He undertook to look
into it I told him the things that worried me and worried Mr. Finletter about
938
it. He did look into it. Some corrective action was taken in terms of discus-
sions with people most involved and in terms of changing the organizational
structure by which the summer study was to be introduced into the Lincoln
project, and at a slightly later date Mr. Killian of MIT called me and told me
that he was satisfied partly as a result of the recent activities that he and Dr.
Stratton had been engaged in, which I have already mentioned, that the Lincoln
summer study would operate to the benefit both of Lincoln and the interests
of the Air Force.
"He further said, since I had mentioned that one of the things we were afraid
of was that the Lincoln summer-study results might get out of hand, from
our standpoint, in the sense that they might be reported directly to higher
authority, such as the National Security Council, President Killian reassured me
that he had taken steps so that he was sure that the summer study would be—
I think his words were *kept in bounds.' "
Mr. ROBB. I think you ought to read next the paragraph.
Mr. MASKS. I would be glad to (reading) :
"On the basis of this assurance we had no further— that is, Mr. Finletter,
myself, and General Tates and the other Air Force people— had no further
immediate worries about the summer study and we encouraged it."
By Mr. MABKS :
I would like to ask you generally, Dr. Hill, whether you have any comment
to make in respect to the passages that I have read to you?
A. In the first place, I should Just like to comment on Griggs' ideas of what
he thought' the summer study was going to be. He evidently was concerned
that the purpose would come out with some supermaster plan — I mean the pur-
pose was to come out with a master plan— of how to divide money between Stra-
tegic Air Command and Air Defense Command. Such was farthest from our
thoughts. We at no time, to the best of my knowledge, considered worrying
about the problems of Strategic Air Command any way except insofar as they
relate to defense and defense relates to them.
I don't know where Griggs got this idea, and I don't doubt that he had because
I know for a while he was quite concerned about this summer study, and about
allowing it to be set up. I know this only by hearsay. He never came to me
with his qualms. He did talk to a lot of other people. He discouraged some
people from participating, so I have been told, and he evidently talked to my
superiors at MIT.
The inference is made — I can't quarrel with what Griggs thought— the in-
ference is made that he somehow by this maneuvering changed our purpose.
This I deny.
Q. Did you talk to your superiors at MIT about this project?
A. Yes. In setting up this we first talked to our superiors at MIT and very
briefly with the Air Force and there seemed to be good support for it. Then I
know that this occurred during the physical society meetings. Several people
came to me and said they were quite concerned about setting us up. One,
that it might wreck the program already going on in a growing laboratory,
and, secondly, they were concerned about Dr. Oppenheimer's participation in it
for security reasons.
I said it was my practice to leave security matters entirely to those people
charged with them ; that we would put Dr. Oppenheimer's name in for clearance
Just as we would anyone else. This created enough of a stir so that Zacharias
and I went back to Kmian and Stratton, our own superiors, told them about it,
and it was then agreed rather than going ahead immediately— I had already
prepared letters to send out to people whom we hoped would participate— in-
stead of , that, to make sure at the highest levels that we should talk to in the
Air Force, Army, and Navy, that we make certain this was all right.
Zach and I spent several weeks seeing all the proper people, and I know the
persons I talked to, the senior ones : Admiral Bolster and his associates in the
Navy ; General Maris in the Army ; and first General Putt in the Air Force ; and
later General Craigie, all of whom expressed a certain amount of concern and
a certain amount of enthusiasm, and the net result was that they all agreed
we should go ahead.
So instead of starting our recruiting procedure, shall I say, May 1, we started
about May 20. So that there was a delay while we reexamined these fears that
Griggs an<L others had raised.
Had i, Answered the question? It was rather lengthy if you consider the
background, and I may have left something out there.
939
Q. I would like to direct your attention specifically to one matter that was
referred to in the passage that I read. In the passage I read to you there
occurred at one point the following : This was in one of Mr. Griggs' answers, and
I am starting in the middle of the answer on page 2618 :
"* * * we were also very much concerned in the early days of the formation of
the Lincoln summer study, because it was being done in such a way that had
it been allowed to go in the direction in which it was initially going, every indi-
cation was that it would have wrecked the effectiveness of the Lincoln Labora-
tory. This was because of the way the thing was, the summer study was being
handled administratively.
"So far as I know, it was not because of any direct action on the part of Dr.
Oppenheimer. On the other hand, I lelt at the time that Dr. Oppenheimer
should have been well enough informed and alert enough to see that this would
be disastrous to the Lincoln summer study."
Have you anything to add to what you have already testified that would ex-
plain the reference in the passage that I have just read about how things were
being handled administratively?
A. I make no claim to knowing all about administrative procedures. It seems
to me there are two ways to wreck a laboratory. One is to ruin the morale on
the inside, and the other is to ruin the confidence of those on the outside who
must support it
With regard to the former, although Griggs doesn't say so specifically, I think
this has to be brought in. Some people were concerned that bringing in a group
of some rather high-powered physicists and others, and putting them down in
the middle of an organization might be so glamorous that people would neglect
their work and so on.
It was my feeling that the ability to bring in outside people of stature in this
field was very valuable and rather than hurt morale, would rather help it I
think events have proved me right on this. The amount of time that any mem-
bers of the laboratory took off or neglected their work because of the presence of
this group was completely negligible.
As far as destroying confidence on the outside is concerned, first of all, of
course, I must have the confidence of my superiors, and this was carefully
cleared with them before any move was made to solicit any help. We had talked
to other people and we received advice, but to solicit any help from the outside,
not a titling was turned until Zacharias and I felt we had the complete confidence
of Killian and Stratton. They in turn said you must get the Air Force, who is the
contractor, and the primary support behind you, too.
It was my feeling— here I will have to refresh my memory from the files,
gentlemen,— that I would naturally have gone to General Putt in this Instance,
since he is the chairman of our Military Advisory Committee. I know I went to
someone, I believe it was Putt We discussed the pattern, thought it a good
idea.
So this business about administrative procedures, I don't understand. I
point out that Griggs was not around the laboratory at any time. He could
know nothing of these directly. He never consulted me or asked what we were
doing. So I can only tell you what we did. I must leave to your Judgment
whether it was good administrative policy or not.
After the fuss was made my Griggs around the first of May, then things
got in an uproar, and I was called in by Killian and Stratton as you might
expect, and we went through it again. Then we had this other go-around which
I explained earlier, seeing all the services and seeing them in detail. They
bought it.
Q. They bought it?
A. That is what I said. Maybe I better put it in good English. They agreed
that what we were planning to do was quite all right, and probably a good thing,
and if we wanted to do it, we should be supported.
At no time, I reiterate, did we change what we had started out to accomplish.
Mr. MARKS. I have no further questions.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Bobb.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, you told us about going to see the various representatives of the
services, General Putt, and others, and you said they expressed a certain amount
of concern, and a certain amount of enthusiasm. Could you explain that a little
bit to us?
940
A. Let me point out, I believe that Vista was just reporting then. This had
created a certatin amount of stir in the military. They were afraid, as I recall,
that Vista would carry too much weight with higher authorities that did not
understand their problems, and would hurt their program. They were afraid,
and they expressed some concern, if we started a program of this sort, to take
a general look at a broad military problem, that this in turn might give them
a headache rather than do good. I think events have proved that this concern
was all right, but there was no undue problem that resulted from it
Q. You felt, of course, that the Air Force being the contractor who was going
to pay for this had a perfect right to be concerned about it?
A. Oh, yes, sir.
Mr. ROBB. That is all. Thank you.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Hill, have you read Dr. Zacharias' testimony here before this
board?
The WITNESS. The testimony that was given last week I skimmed through
quickly ; yes, sir. I did not discuss with him what he talked about this morning.
Mr. GRAY. How much other testimony have you read besides Griggs' and
Zacharias'?
The WITNESS. I confess to glimpsing $t some of the others while I was sitting
out in the room, the others that were in those two volumes. I can't say that
I read any of the testimony so as to remember it. I sort of skimmed a page and
read a paragraph.
Mr. GRAY. With respect to "ZORC," you said you were confident that Dr.
Zacharias would not use this phrase or go through this procedure which Mr.
Griggs testified about Am I correct in my recollection?
The WITNESS. That is correct I am also confident, if I may add, that had he
done it, I would have been quite annoyed, and would have let Mm know it
Had I seen him do this, I am sure I would have remembered. That is the point
I was trying to make .
Mr. GBAY. If he did it today, would you be annoyed with him?
The WITNESS. I think that would depend entirely on the circumstances, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Is this a matter of time? I think we ought to tell you that he
testified today that he might do it today.
The WITNESS. I don't know. If he were in a group with friends, and they
were talking about things like that Fortune article, and he happened to write
"ZORC" on the blackboard, I would not be surprised. If he did it at a formal
meeting, I would be quite surprised.
Mr. GRAY. I see. You said in your direct testimony that you never heard
any scientist who was cleared for military work argue for the dissolution of
the strategic arm. Have you heard any scientist argue for the dissolution
of the strategic arm?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Mr. GRAY. So the "cleared for military work" had no significance?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Mr. GRAY. You said that Dr. Griggs had discouraged people from working
on the summer study, so you had been told. Who told you that?
The WITNESS. Dr. Getting— I tried to say that this was inferred, and also
second hand— Dr. Getting, for instance, had seemed quite enthusiastic about
working on this summer study. I know he talked to Griggs at length and after
that he cooled off completely.
Mr. GRAY. And you would draw the conclusion from that that it was as a
result of talking with Griggs
The WITNESS. I infer that, yes, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Who told you that he had kept people from working on the
project?
The WITNESS. Well, this was the inference of other people, too. I cannot
testify that this actually happened. It was inferred by other people. I think
Zacharias would say this.
Mr. GRAY. Did Zacharias tell you this? Was he the source of your information?
The WITNESS. I think he did.
Mr. GRAY. Did anybody else tell you that Griggs had been instrumental In
persuading people not to work on this project?
The WITNESS. No; but I know one of my colleagues was very bitter about it
and very much set against starting it
Dr. BVANS. Set against what?
The WITNESS. Set against starting the project. I also know this was shortly
after a talk with Griggs. Again this is only inference.
941
Mr. GRAY. Do you think it is fair to draw such an inference and to conclude
from that that he was responsible for people not working on the project?
The WITNESS. No, sir ; it is not.
Mr. GRAY. You have me confused now. Do you wish to have it appear that you
testified here that Griggs was responsible for people not working on this project?
The WITNESS. If I can state it now, I would like to.
Mr. GEAY. I wish you would. I am not trying to trap you, Dr. Hill.
The WITNESS. I understand that perfectly. In trying to talk around Griggs'
testimony which was rather general in spots, I had to give some flavor of my
feeling of his activities at that time, too. I tried to make clear that Griggs
never talked to me about his concern, and that I never talked to him about my
concern about his activities. Therefore, I think it only fair that I drew certain
inferences just as he did. I think it would be strictly unfair on my part to
accuse him of having dissuaded people from taking part in the study.
Mr. GRAY. If you had come here without knowing what Dr. Zacharias had
testified to this board, would you have stated that Griggs had been instrumental,
so you had been told, in keeping people from working on this project?
The WITNESS. Sir, about Zacharias' testimony, I skimmed through his earlier
testimony of a week ago, and I don't recall from it any mention of Griggs. My
statements about Griggs have been drawn from Griggs' testimony and my own
memory. As I say, I did not talk to Zacharias about his testimony this morning.
Mr. GRAY. Did you talk with Dr. Oppenheimer's attorneys about Dr. Zacharias'
testimony this morning?
The WITNESS. No, sir. I have not talked to anybody about it Both Zacharias
and I talked with Mr. Marks very briefly this morning about the flavor of what
might go on.
Mr. GRAY. Was there any mention made of persuading people not to work
on this project?
The WITNESS. I can't recall.
Mr. GRAY. This conversation took place this morning and you can't recall?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir. You will recall you asked me a question about
Zacharias' testimony and inferences I drew from it. There may have been
discussion this morning about Griggs, but if there was, I brought it up from
having read Griggs' testimony.
Mr. GRAY. It is not a question of who brought it up. I am asking you whether
in your preparation for this appearance there was any discussion of Griggs
having been instrumental in persuading people not to work on this project
The WITNESS. Yes, there was.
Mr. GRAY. And so, therefore, you are unable to tell me who told you other than
that conversation in preparation for this that Griggs had been instrumental in
persuading people not to work on this project?
The WITNESS. No. Dr. Getting gave me this impression and Dr. Zacharias
gave it to me 2 years ago at the time we were setting it up. There we had long
conversations on the subject.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Hill, you testified on direct examination that at a meeting
several persons came to you and expressed concern about the project, at least
partially on the score of Dr. Oppenheimer's security status. Do you remember
who some of these people were?
The WITNESS. If I said several, I was wrong; only one, and that was Dr.
Getting.
Mr. GRAY. You did say several.
The WITNESS. I am sorry, then. That was a slip of the tongue.
Mr. GRAY. What was Dr. Getting's official position?
The WITNESS. He is now vice president of the Raytheon Manufacturing Co.
Mr. GRAY. But he was then in the Navy?
The WITNESS. No; he was then at that job, but the year previous he had
worked on a staff job in the Air Force.
Mr. GRAY. And he was the only one that mentioned concern about Dr. Oppen-
heimer's security?
The ^VCTNESS. Yes, sir. Quite a few others mentioned that Griggs was talking
about it and had talked to them.
Mr. GRAY. Do you remember who they were?
The WITNESS. I know of one. Dr. FIsk of Bell Laboratories.
Mr. GRAY. Was he concerned?
The WITNESS. He was not concerned about Dr. Oppenheimer. He was very
much concerned about Griggs making this sort of statement.
Mr. GRAY. He rejected the notion that there was any question?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir.
942
Mr. GRAY. I think I should tell you, Dr. Hill, that I am very much concerned,
as are my colleagues on the board, about the fact that there is testimony before
this board which indicates very clearly that some one or more witnesses have
not told the truth to this board. There has now developed in this proceeding a
real question in some cases of veracity.
I have another question which is not related to the remark which I made in
any way.
The WITNESS. May I ask you a question, sir?
Mr. GRAY. Yes, sir.
The WITNESS. Were you referring to the "ZORC" incident?
Mr. GRAY. Among others; yes. Do you have anything to add about the
"ZORO" incident?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Was Griggs the only person who was responsible for the delay in
the beginning of the summer study?
The WITNESS. That is a very difficult question to answer.
Mr. GRAY. Let me remind you that you testified on direct examination that
there was a delay of several weeks as a result of the activities — this may not be
your words— but as a result of the activities of Griggs and others. If you are
uncomfortable about my statement of your testimony, I will be glad to have it
read back to you.
The WITNESS. No ; I would be very happy to clear this up.
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. I said that a stir took place around the 1st of May which
resulted in a delay.
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. I later, I think, said I thought that Griggs was in part responsi-
ble for that stir. I don't know of others.
Mr. GRAY. So you think Griggs was probably the one responsible.
The WITNESS. As much as anyone. The one I know anything about. I have
no way of knowing that there were others.
Mr. GRAY. Would you characterize Griggs' activities in this episode as sabotage?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Mr. GRAY. What would you call it?
The WITNESS. I would call it difference of opinion.
Mr. GRAY. Would you call it honest difference of opinion?
The WITNESS. I would think so. I would think also, however, that a good
deal of misinformation about what we were trying to do, if this present testimony
reflects what he thought then.
Mr. GRAY. You didn't question his right as a senior scientist of the Air Force
to have an opinion about the shape and form of the study?
The WITNESS. Not at all ; no, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Now, after Dr. Killian and Dr. Stratton called you, and perhaps
others, in, following the "stir," and you were authorized to go ahead, I believe
you said, was there any change whatsoever in the plan of the study?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Not the slightest change?
The WITNESS. No, sir.
Mr. GRAY. So therefore your interpretation of the situation was that there
had simply been delay of several weeks without consequence otherwise?
The WITNESS. That is correct.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Evans.
Dr. EVANS. Dr. Hill, would you tell us something about your education ; where
you were educated?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir. I attended Washington University in St. Louis from
1926 to 1930, receiving a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering. After
3 years working, I came back and took a master's degree in physics, and then
went to the University of Rochester and finished a Ph. D., in 1937, in physics.
Dr. EVANS. From what I heard here — I am just trying to get my thinking
cleared up— there seems to have been two schools of thought engaged in this
work, and there doesn't seem to be much love lost between them ; is that true?
The WITNESS. I have heard this, sir. I don't consider myself a member of
any school of thought I have heard that there is quite a difference of opinion
among certain groups of physicists.
Dr. EVANS. You would say that if there were two schools of thought, you
would say you belong to Dr. Oppenheimer's school ; is that it?
The WITNESS. I think I would have to have the definition of the school of
thought. If you mean about the H bomb
943
Dr. EVANS. No; I mean about this laboratory we are talking about— this
summer course, I beg your pardon.
The WITNESS. Summer study.
Dr. EVANS. Yes ; the summer study.
The WITNESS. There I certainly can identify myself with a school, and that
was that it was a very good thing and needed doing. If Dr. Oppenheimer
belongs to that school, then we are joint members.
Dr. EVANS. Would you care to name some of the men besides Qriggs that
belonged to the other school?
The WITNESS. If you mean now, people who questioned the wisdom of the
summer study in the scientific field?
Dr. EVANS. Yes.
The WITNESS. The three I can think of most quickly are Griggs, Getting, and
Valley.
Dr. EVANS. Where did Alvarez fit in this?
The WITNESS. I don't recall ever talking to him about it.
Dr. EVANS. You don't know anything about Teller?
The WITNESS. No, sir. He would not—in general, the people we would have
talked to about this would have been those more closely associated with elec-
tronics than with nuclear weapons. There are some exceptions. So Teller
never entered into our discussion, to the best of our knowledge.
Dr. EVANS. I have no other questions.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Marks.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. MASKS :
Q. Dr. Hill, when you came from the train this morning to Mr. Garrison's
office and met me, did I ask you any questions about whether Griggs had dis-
couraged people from working on the summer study?
A. I don't recall that you did.
Mr. MARKS. I have no other questions.
Mr. ROBB. I have no questions.
Mr. GRAY. Is it your testimony, then, Dr. Hill, that you did not discuss with
the attorneys this morning this question of discouraging people from working
on the study?
The WITNESS. Sir, I have already given you an answer to it
Mr. GRAY. I don't believe you have given me a clear answer.
The WITNESS. I am trying to dear it up.
Mr. GRAY. I would like to have you clear it up. That is my entire purpose.
The WITNESS. I should really go back to make this completely clear 2 years,
to this time when Zacharias and I were trying to set up this summer study. At
that time we felt rather clear that Griggs was quite opposed to it and doing
what he could to put it in the best light for Griggs to see that it was in its proper
perspective. In talking to each other we may have used other words. That
brings us up to this morning, and I honestly felt I was here only to testify as to
the "ZORG" incident So I had not reviewed my memory at all, and I have been
trying to all day, which is why I hesitate just a little about when who said what
to whom. I know after reading Griggs' testimony I made a statement that it
looks to me like Dave was really in there pitching and trying his best to keep
people from joining. I can't recall that Mr. Marks asked me a question. His
question to me was did he ask the question, and I said no.
Now, then, Zacharias and I sat out in the waiting room together and we dis-
cussed it some more about Griggs and 2 years ago, you see. So my discussion
on that subject with Zacharias and with Marks, I think, mostly my talking. I
don't recall what Zacharias said except as a sort of nod agreement Does that
clarify my testimony on this point?
Mr. GRAY* tot me answer your question this way — I am trying to clarify it :
On the direct question by Mr. Marks you made the statement that Mr. Griggs
had discouraged people from working on the project, so I have been told. I
would be glad to have this read back to you if you wish.
Mr. MARKS, Mr. Chairman, I don't think I asked him a question about that.
I think that was a reference to the general question which I asked.
Mr. GRAY. In his direct testimony he made this statement I will ask the
reporter to read the statement that has me concerned.
(The reporter thereupon read the record, as follows :)
303318—64 60
944
"By Mr. MARKS :
"Q. I would like to ask yon generally, Dr. Hill, whether yon have any comment
to make in respect to the passages that I have read to yon.
"A. In the first place, I should Just like to comment on Griggs' ideas of what
he thought the summer study was going to be. He evidently was concerned that
the purpose would come out with some supermaster plan— I mean the purpose
was to come out with a master plan— of how to divide money between Strategic
Air Command and Air Defense Command. Such was farthest from our thoughts.
We at no time, to the best of my knowledge, considered worrying about the prob-
lems of Strategic Air Command any way except insofar as they relate to defense
and defense relates to them.
"I don't know where Griggs got this idea, and I don't doubt that he had because
I know for a while he was quite concerned about this summer study, and about
allowing it to be set up. I know this only by hearsay. He never came to me
with his qualms. He did talk to a lot of other people. He discouraged some
people from participating, so I have been told, and he evidently talked to my
superiors at MIT."
Mr. GRAY. "He discouraged some people from participating, so I have been
told."
The WITNESS. Yes, sir. If I could retract my words, I would say that this way.
Inferences have been made by me and others that he discouraged other people
from working on it. When I say I have been told, I meant as of 2 years ago,
and the thing I was trying to bring out was that this was completely inference
on my part. Does that clear it up, sir?
Mr. GRAY. I think so.
I should like to say for the record that if in my questioning of this witness I
have seemed to impute to Dr. Oppenheimer's attorneys any impropriety, I have
no such intention.
Mr. MASKS. Thank you.
Mr. GARRISON. Thank you.
Mr. GRAY. I should say further that I understand that the witness did not
discuss with Mr. Marks the question of discouragement of employment at the
summer study although it is my understanding that this matter did come up
in conversation with the witness with Dr. Zacharias.
The WITNESS. That is right.
Mr. GRAY. Is that a correct statement?
The WITNESS. That is correct.
Mr. MARKS. I think I need to add to that, sir, that I believe some remarks to
that effect about discouraging people on the summer study was made in my pres-
ence when I first met with Dr. Zacharias and Dr. Hill this morning. I don't
recall which of them made it. I didn't pay any attention to it.
Mr. GRAY. Do you have any further questions?
Mr. MARKS. No, sir.
Mr. ROBB. No, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Dr. Hill.
The WITNESS. Thank you.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, could we just talk about procedure for a
minute?
Mr. GRAY. Yes. I have talked with the members of the board at the noon
recess, and I may say I am authorized to say we will allow you to start your
summation and argument tomorrow afternoon, rather than tomorrow morning,
which I believe was your request
Mr. GARRISON. I appreciate that very much. May I then say that in the lunch
hour which we did not spend with Dr. Zacharias and Dr. Hill, I reached the con-
clusion in my conscience as a lawyer that I just must finish the reading of the
summary which I can do in a few hours before reaching a final decision as to
whether to ask Dr. Oppenheimer to make a rebuttal or not. I am just not quite
clear at this point whether it is going to be necessary. If I could have some
means of communicating with you and with the other board members either late
this afternoon or very early this evening as to whether or not I would like to put
him on or ask him to resume testifying in the morning or not, I would like to
leave it in that manner, if it is feasible for you. I realize the inconvenience that
this may mean, but I should certainly arrive at the decision early enough this
evening-— I should think by dinner time.
Mr. GRAY. We will proceed tomorrow afternoon with your summary.
Mr. GARRISON. Yes.
945
Mr. GRAY. I think I can say on behalf of the board that we will not insist that
you tell us now that yon will or will not call Dr. Oppenheimer back as a witness
tomorrow morning. I would like to know as early as possible about that so that
we may make our own plans.
Mr. GARRISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. GRAY. You have presented your witnesses except for possibly Dr.
Oppenheimer?
Mr. GARRISON. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. I take it, then, gentlemen, we are in recess until 9 : 30 tomorrow
morning. If you decide in the meantime you will not call Dr. Oppenheimer to
the stand, we will meet at 2 o'clock tomorrow afternoon.
Mr. GARRISON. Yes, sir.
(Thereupon at 3 : 35 p. m.t a recess was taken until Wednesday, May 5, 1954, at
9: 30a.m.)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER or J. EGBERT OFPBNHEIMER
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
BUILDING T-3, ROOM 2022,
Washington^ D. C., Wednesday, May 5, 1954-
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to recess,
before the board, at 9 : 30 a. m.
Personnel Security Board: Mr. Gordon Gray, chairman; Dr. Ward
T. Evans, member ; and Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Roger Robb and C. A. Rolander? Jr., counsel for the
board; J. Robert Oppenheimer ; Lloyd El Garrison, Samuel J. Silver-
man, and Allan B. Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer; Herbert
S. Marts, cocounsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
(947)
PROCEEDINGS
Mr. GRAY. You may proceed, Mr. Silverman.
Whereupon J. Robert Oppenhelmer, a witness, having been previously duly
sworn, was called in rebuttal, examined, and testified as follows :
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q. Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr. Alvarez testified that when he came to Los Alamos
there was a hydrogen liquefaction plant there. Will you tell us what that was
used for?
A. Yes. It was actually one of the first structures erected at Los Alamos, and
reflected the opinion, which turned out to be erroneous, that going from the
fission weapon to the fusion weapon would not be too tough a step.
Its initial purpose was to make studies of the thermodynamics, and steresis
phenomena in the liquefaction of hydrogen isotopes. This work was also con-
ducted by a subcontractor at the University of Ohio.
About halfway through the war, a number of points arose which changed the
program. One I think Dr. Teller referred to. He discovered in the work we
had earlier done we had left out something very important and very serious,
which proved that the ideas we had had about how to make this machine would
not work in the form we then had. The pressure on the whole laboratory to
get the fission job done and the difficulties of that job both increased. The
cryogenic facility actually played a small part in our researches for the fission
job but I do not propose to describe it I think it is classified.
The head of that group, Earl Long, now of the University of Chicago, left the
cryogenic job and became director of the shop. I believe that very little was
done with the cryogenic facility in the last year before the war ended.
I may, if this is still responsive to your question, describe what else was going
on at Los Alamos during the war related to the thermonuclear program.
Q, I wish you would, yes.
A. As nearly as I can recollect, there were two groups in addition to the cryo-
genic group concerned. One was Dr. Teller's group which toward the end of
the war was in the part of the laboratory that Fermi as associate director ran.
It was called the advanced development division, and several young people under
Teller were figuring and calculating on aspects of the thermonuclear program.
There was another group in which there were three members of the British
mission, and a number of Americans who were measuring the reactivity of the
materials which seemed to us relevant to a hydrogen bomb, and who actually
completed some measurements on this before the war was over. I think this is
about the whole story.
Q. As a matter of characterization, would you say that at Los Alamos during
the war years the laboratory was actively working on the development of the
thermonuclear bomb?
A. We planned to be, but we were in fact not
Q. And why not?
A. I have outlined the two major reasons. First, we didn't know how to do it,
and second, we were busy with other things.
Q. At the end of the war, was there any expression to you of Government
policy with respect to going ahead with the thermonuclear weapon?
A. I think I have already testified, but I am willing to repeat. After the
Trinity test, the Alamagordo test, but before Hiroshima, I went to Chicago to
consult General Groves largely about the major mechanics of the overseas mis-
sion, and how we would meet our time schedules. In the course of that, I put
up to General Groves — I think I had already put in writing an account of the
problem — the fact that we had not moved forward, and perhaps had moved
somewhat backward on the thermonuclear program, and was this something that
he wanted the laboratory to take hold of. This was while the war was still on.
He was fairly clear in saying no. I believe — I will not speculate as to his reasons
for that, but it was clear to me.
(940)
950
The only other communication to me of a view on the matter was incidental.
In August, Dr. Backer and I had come on to report to General Groves, and it
was at that time that I told him that I thought I should not continue as director
of the laboratory, and that we began discussing the problem of who was to run
it. Just before I flew west, I had a message to consult General Groves. I did
so. He told me two things. He had had a conversation with Mr. Byrnes, who
was then the President's representative on the Secretary of War's Interim
Committee.
Mr. ROBB. Oould we have the date on this?
The WITNESS. This would have been after the 15th of August, but not much.
Mr. ROBB. What year?
The WITNESS. 1945. This is all in the period immediately around the sur-
render.
Mr. MORGAN. Was that General Byrnes?
The WITNESS. No ; this was James Byrnes who was very shortly thereafter
to be Secretary of State. It was then Justice Byrnes.
Groves said that in the present state of the world, the work on weapons must
continue, but that this did not include, he thought, the super. That was about
all. These were not formal expressions of opinion;. they were from my boss
to me in a most informal way at a time when I was preparing not to retain
active responsibility.
By Mr. SELVEEMAN :
Q. Dr. Teller testified about a board of four people at the end of the war, or
near the end of the war, who he understood decided that the thermonuclear
program should not be pushed. Can you cast some light on that?
A. I think I can. I think I know what Dr. Teller was talking about.
There was a panel of four people. Their names were Arthur Compton, Ernest
Lawrence, Enrico Fermi and me, Robert Oppenheimer. We had been asked to
advise on the use of the bombs, on the general nature of the future atomic
energy program, but we were asked specifically through Mr. Harrison, on behalf
of the Secretary of War, to prepare as detailed an account as we could of every-
thing we knew that could be done or needed doing in the field of atomic energy.
This was not just military things. It involved the use of isotopes and the
power problem and the military problems. As a part of this report, we discussed
improvements in atomic weapons and in the carrier problem. As a part of
this report, we discussed the thermonuclear bomb, the super, as it was called.
That was all we had in mind then. I believe that section was written by Fermi.
I believe that Dr. Teller correctly testified that his own view on what the
problem was, was attached as a slightly dissenting or even strongly dissenting
view to our account.
We wrote an account which was not a recommendation of policy at all, as I
remember, but was an analysis of where we thought the matter stood. I think
General Nichols' letter to me quotes from it, and says this program did not
appear on theoretical grounds as certain then as the fission-weapon program had
at some earlier stage. This was a rather long and circumstantial account of
what we knew about it. It was not intended and was not a statement of what
should be done. It was an assessment of the technical state of the problem.
This board had no authority to decide, it was not called on to recommend
a decision, it did not decide nor recommend a decision. It described. I tfrfafr
Dr. Teller was a little mistaken about what our function was.
*******
By Mr. SELVEBMAN :
Q. Between January 1947 and January 1950, which is the first 3 years of your
chairmanship of the GAO, how many new reactors were started by the Atomic
Energy Commission?
A. This would be better found by reading the Commission's reports, and I have
not done so. This work was very slow to get started, but if you include all kinds
of reactors, for development, for research, and for production, perhaps around
eight
Q. And did the GAO express its views to the Commission about the slowness
of getting started?
A. The GAC wrote reams on the subject of getting the reactor program off
the dime. The reams may not have been very sensible, but they were clearly
addressed to this problem,
Q. Dr. Idbby and Dr. von Neumann are now members of the GAG, are they not?
A. Yes; they are.
931
Q. And they are both enthusiastic proponents of the hydrogen bomb ?
A. Yes ; they are. I believe today everybody is an enthusiastic proponent.
Q. But were they when they were appointed?
A. Yes ; they were.
Q. Did you have anything to do with their appointment?
A. I don't know. The appointments were presidential. I did, however, in-
clude the names of von Neumann and Libby on the list, I believe, of five names
that I submitted to Mr. Dean in the summer of 1950.
I should for completeness say that the other people on that list, as I recollect,
though very competent, were not identified with enthusiasm for the hydrogen
bomb. Bacher, Fermi, and Bethe were also on the list. Libby was appointed
in the summer of 1950. Von Neuman was not, but he was appointed as soon as
a vacancy appeared through the resignation of Dr. Cyril Smith. Both men
served on the GAC for a while while I was chairman.
Q. General Wilson testified, I believe, that at some stage you did not support
the installation of 2 of the 3 methods of long-range detection. Did you ulti-
mately support those 2 methods?
A. Yes.
Q. And was your decision about supporting the installation of those 2 or 3
methods made on the basis— on what basis was it made?
A. This is not recollection.
Mr. GRAY. This is not what?
The WITNESS. This is not a recollection. The only ground for holding up the
installation of something is doubt as to whether its development had reached
the right stage for it to be effective. That is the best answer I can give to you.
By Mr. SILVEBMAN :
Q. As to the third method, the one you did support, do you recall the circum-
stances of the initiation of that method?
A. Yes; I do. This was just after Hiroshima, and we developed at Los
Alamos — I believe that the man directly in charge was Kenneth Bainbridge—
what we hoped might be an effective long-range detection device. I directed
that we try this out with the cooperation of the Air Force, and we did succeed in
identifying and describing the Hiroshima explosion by flights over the continental
United States.
Later, when I was on the General Advisory Committee, I believe the committee
wrote something to this effect, that the problem of detection of foreign explosions
was of unparalleled importance. That since this was not clearly a Commission
problem, we did not insist on being informed of the progress of the work, but
we wished to record our view that progress was urgent and important It was
in the Defense Department that I had a more direct connection with the develop-
ment of this method. It was completely successful in detecting and describing
the first Soviet explosion, at least the first one we know about.
Dr. EVANS. That was radiation detector; was it not?
Mr. ROLAWDER. I don't think we should discuss that
The WITNESS. I am sorry.
Dr. EVANS. Excuse me.
By Mr. SUPERMAN :
Q. Of the three methods, was that first method the one that has furnished the
most significant and important information, as far as you know, or is that
classified?
A. Let me say simply that it has furnished an enormous amount of informa-
tion which is technically very valuable. For some purposes the other methods
are quite useful in giving supplementary data. I think I can't go further.
Q. Dr. Alvarez testified that at a meeting of the Military Objectives Panel in
about December 1950, you said something to the effect that "We all agree that
the hydrogen bomb program should be stopped, but to do so will disrupt the
people at Los Alamos and other laboratories, so let us wait for the Greenhouse
tests, and when those fail that will be the time to stop the program. Can you
cast any light on that?
A. I am clear as to what my views were, and therefore fairly clear as to what
I would have said, which resembles to some extent what Dr. Alvarez recounted.
I did not think the Greenhouse test would fail. It was well conceived tech-
nically, and there was no ground such an opinion. * * * I could not have said
that I expected it to fail, because I didn't think it would, and I could not have
said that I expected it to fail, because this sort of statement about a test is some-
952
thing none of us ever made. The reason for making the test was that we wanted
to find out.
What I did believe, and for the wisdom of this view I am not making an argu-
ment, was that the real difficulties with the Super program, as it then appeared,
were not going to be tested by this Greenhouse test ; that the test was not relevant
to the principal question of feasibility. I am fairly sure that in the course of
discussions at the panel, we would have commented on this.
On the question of where the Super program stood, on the relevance of that
to the Greenhouse test, of the doubts that I felt as to whether this part of the
Greenhouse test was a sensible thing technically to do, I would have said that
to stop this part of the Greenhouse test, even though it made no technical sense,
would be disruptive and destructive of all parts of the Los Alamos program.
I think that is the true story of what I would have said at this panel meeting
and Dr. Alvarez1 recollection is in some respects mistaken.
Q. What were your views as to the feasibility of the Super at that time?
Mr. ROBB, What time are we talking about?
Mr. SH.VEBMAN. This is December 1950, at the time of the military objectives
panel.
The WITNESS. On the basis of then existing ideas it was highly improbable
that this could be made; that we needed new ideas if there was to be real hope
of success.
May I add one comment? In actual fact this component of the Greenhouse
test had a beneficial effect on the program. This was in part because the con-
firmation of rather elaborate theoretical prediction encouraged everybody to feel
that they understood and when they then made very ambitious inventions, the
fact that they had been right in the past gave confidence to their being right in
the future.
It may also to a smaller extent have provided technical information that was
useful. Certainly its psychological effect was all positive. It would have been
a great mistake to stop that test.
By Mr. SILVBBMAN :
Q. And you thought so at the time and said so?
A. But not for the right reasons.
Q. There have been discussions on your views on continental defense and
tactical and strategic use of weapons and so on. Perhaps if we could do this
very briefly, could you give very briefly your views on continental defense?
A. As of when?
Q. As of now, if you like. As of the last year or two.
A. If the board is not saturated with this, I will say a couple of sentences.
Q. -As of the time of the Lincoln study.
A. The immediate view after the war was that defense against atomic weapons
was going to be a very tough thing. The attrition rates of the Second World
War, though high, were wholly inadequate to this new offensive power.
Q. By the attrition rates, you mean the number of attacking airplanes you
could shoot down and kill?
A. Precisely. In the spring of 1952, the official views of what we could do
were extremely depressing, * * * and there were methods of attack which
appeared to be quite open to the enemy where it was doubtful that we would
either detect or intercept any substantial fraction of the aircraft at aJL
I knew that on some aspects of the defense problem, valuable work was in
progress at Lincoln and elsewhere. I knew something of the Charles study * * *
My view is that this is by no means a happy situation, and I know of no reason
to think that it ever will be a happy situation, but that the steps that are mow
being taken and others that will come along as technology develops are immensely
worth taking if they only save some American lives, if they only preserve some
American cities, and if they only create in the planning of the enemy some doubt
as to the effectiveness of their strikes. I don't know whether this answers the
question.
Q. I think that answers the question.
A. I have never gone along with the 90 to 95 percent school. I hope they are
right, but I have never believed them. y
Q. The 90 to 95 percent school is the school
A. That thinks you can eliminate practically all of the enemy attack
Q. What did you conceive to be the relation between continental defense and
strategic alrpower?
A. Jtert, strategic aiitfower is one of the most important ingredients of con-
tinental defense. Both with the battie of Europe and with the interconttoental
953
battle, clearly the best place to destroy aircraft is on the ground on enemy fields,
and that is a job for strategic airpower.
Second, at least the warning elements and many of the defensive elements of
continental defense are obviously needed to protect the bases, the aircraft,
which take part in the strategic air campaign. This is the two-way relation
which I think has been testified to by others. This has always been my under-
standing.
Q. It has been suggested that perhaps you had more interest in the tactical
than the strategic use of atomic weapons. Could you comment on that?
A. It has been talked about a great deal. When the war ended, the United
States had a weapon which revolutionized strategic air warfare. It got improved
a little. The Air Force went hard to work to make best possible use of it. * * *
Even during World War n we had a request through General Groves from the
Army as to whether we could develop something that would be useful in the
event of an invasion of Japan to help the troops that would be faced with an
entrenched and determined enemy. The bomb that was developed and em-
bellished in the years 1945 to 1948, and the aircraft that go with it, the whole
weapons system, can of course be used on any target, but it is a very inappropriate
one for a combat theater. Therefore, there was a problem of developing the
. weapon, the weapon system, the tactics to give a new capability which would be
as appropriate as possible under fire, and in the combat theater. This is not
because it is more important. Nothing could be more important than the arma-
ment that we had, and which is now to be extended, perhaps to some extent super-
seded, by thermonuclear weapons. It was simply another job which needed doing,
and which is not competitive, ought not to be competitive any more than con-
tinental defense is, which is another part of the defense of the country and of
the free world. That job was slow in accomplishment. It is accomplished now.
or largely accomplished now.
Mr. SILVERMAN. I have no further questions of Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. GRAY. I wonder if you have any, Mr. Robb?
Mr. ROBB. I have a few; yes, sir.
CBOSS-KXAMINATION
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Doctor, I want to show you a carbon copy of a letter dated September 20,
1944, addressed to Dr. R. C. Tolman, 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington,
D. C., bearing the typewritten signature, "J. R. Oppenheimer," and ask you if
you wrote that
Mr. SILVEBMAN. May I look at it?
Mr. ROBB. I am sorry, it is declassified with certain deletions which have just
been circled here.
The WITNESS. I am sure I wrote it. Would you give me the courtesy of letting
me read It?
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. You mean read it aloud?
A. No.
Q. Sure, that is why I showed it to you.
A. I remember the circumstances.
Q. Have you read it now?
A. Yes.
Q. Including the portions that were circled?
A. Right ; which I think they are relevant to the sense of the whole letter.
Q. Doctor, do you think if we read this into the record that you can para-
phrase those portions in some innocuous way?
A. Let us see how it goes.
Q. It doesn't seem to be very much, and we did that once before.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, might I ask to have this read by Mr. Rolander?
When you get to the portions that are delteted
Mr. SILVBBMAN. I really find this a very disturbing procedure.
Mr. GRAY. All right, you can state your concern.
Mr. SILVERMAN. My concern is that here on what I hope is the last day of the
hearing we are suddenly faced with a letter which I have not seen, which I
know nothing about, and which is going to be read into the record, and I haven't
the vaguest idea of what it is about.
The WITNESS. It is from my file.
Mr. SILVBBMAN. There are lots of things in the file.
954
Mr. BOBB. Mr. Chairman, Dr. Oppenheimer testified, as I understand his testi-
mony, to certain, opinions which were expressed to him, and I think by him in
the period 1944-45, about the thermonuclear.
The WITNESS. No.
Mr. BOBB. I think there were certain discussions he had with Groves and
others.
The WITNESS. In 1945?
Mr. BOBB. In 1945 ; yes.
I think the letter pertains to that general subject. I think the board ought
to have the letters before the board.
Mr. GRAY. There seems to be no question about this is a letter written by Dr.
Oppenheimer. I believe he has identified it.
I repeat, Mr. Silverman, what I have said many times, and what I hope has
been demonstrated by the conduct of this proceeding, that if you are taken by
surprise by anything that happens in this procedure, we will give you an oppor-
tunity to meet a difficulty arising.
Mr. SILVERMAN. At this moment I haven't any idea that whether I am going
to be taken by surprise. I do think it would have been a very easy matter to
give us a paraphrased copy of this letter in advance.
Mr. BOBB. Mr. Chairman, until Dr. Oppenheimer testified about this this
morning, we had no idea that this letter would become relevant at this particular
time. If Mr. Silverman does not want Dr. Oppenheimer to have a chance to
comment on the letter, that is all right with me.
Mr. SILVERMAN. I really think that is not the question at all. The real ques-
tion that I suggest is that it would have been a. very easy thing to let us have
some intimation of what this is about, instead of having it Just flounder here —
I don't know whether we are caught by surprise or not. I don't know what we
are talking about
Mr. BOBB. You know, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that Mr. Silverman is
most anxious to be outraged. I don't know why.
Mr. SELVERMAN. Mr. Chairman, is that remark to remain on the record?
Mr. GRAY. I know we have had frequent exchanges between counsel which
are on the record.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. The suggestion that I am anxious to be outraged suggests
that I am putting on some kind of an act
Mr. BOBB. Mr. Chairman, there is some suggestion that I have done some-
thing improper in anticipating what Dr. Oppenheimer is going to testify.
Mr. SILVERMAN. I frankly am about documents being produced that we have
not seen and being produced at the last minute. This is an inquiry and not a trial,
and it would not happen at a trial. I still don't know what is in this document
For all I know it is a very helpful document.
Mr. GRAY. It may well be. The Chairman of the board makes this statement,
that while this Is an inquiry and not a trial, there are involved in this proceeding
counsel who have not always agreed. I think I can speak for my colleagues on
the board when I say that this board takes cognizance of this fact, and the fact
that observations of counsel appear on the record do not in any way indicate
agreement or disagreement on the part of this board with observations by counsel.
As far as producing the testimony here has been concerned, there has been
the greatest amount of latitude afforded both to Dr. Oppenheimer and his counsel
and to Mr. Bobb throughout. I must say that I don't think frankly that the
observations of counsel on either side are matters which will be of too much
interest and concern to this board. I suggest that you proceed, Mr. Bobb.
Mr. BOBB. Would you go ahead and read it?
Mr. BOLANDER, I will hand Dr. Oppenheimer a copy of this letter.
The WITNESS. Is this an unexpurgated copy?
Mr. BOLANDER. It has the portions that are classified circled. The letter Is
dated September 20, 1944, addressed to Dr. B. C. Tolman, 2101 Constitution Ave.,
Washington, D. C. :
"DEAR KIOHARD. The accompanying letter makes some suggestions about pro-
cedure in the matter of site Y recommendations for postwar work. As you will
recognize, the problem of making sensible recommendations is complicated by
the fact that we do not know how far this project will get during its present
life. It seems a reasonable assumption that we will succeed in making some
rather crude forms of the gadget per se, but that the whole complex of problems
associated with the super will probably not be pushed by us beyond rather ele-
mentary scientific considerations.
"I should like, therefore, to put in writing at an early date the recommendation
that the subject of initiating violent thermonuclear reactions be pursued with
055
vigor and diligence, and promptly. In this connection I should like to point
out that gadgets of reasonable efficiency and suitable design can almost certainly
induct significance thermonuclear reactions in deuterium even under conditions
where these reactions are not self-sustaining"
Then there is a portion that has been deleted.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Can you paraphrase that for us, doctor?
A. Yes. It is a part of the program of site Y to explore this possibility
Mr. ROLANDER. Continuing, "It is not at all clear whether we shall actually
make this development during the present project, but it is of great importance
that such" — and then there is a blank.
The WITNESS. I think that can Just be left out.
Mr. ROLANDER. — "such blank gadgets form an experimentally possible transi-
tion from a simple gadget to the super and thus open the possibility of a not
purely theoretical approach to the latter.
"In this connection also I should like to remind you of Rabi's proposal for
initiating thermonuclear reactions"— and then blanks.
*******
Mr. ROLANDER. "At the present time site Y does not contemplate undertaking
this, but I believe that with a somewhat longer time scale than our present one,
this line of investigation might prove profitable.
"In general, not only for the scientific but for the political evaluation of the
possibilities of our project, the critical, prompt, and effective exploration of the
extent to which energy can be released by thermonuclear reactions is clearly of
profound importance. Several members of this laboratory, notably Teller, Bethe,
von Neumann, Rabi, and Fermi have expressed great interest in the problems
outlined above and I believe that it would be profitable to have a rather detailed
discussion of the present technical status— which I know to be confused— which
should be made available to the committee before it draws up its final recom-
mendations.
"Sincerely yours,
"J. R. OPPENHEIMER."
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, before we go into any discussion, I will show you a carbon copy
of another letter dated October 4, 1944, addressed to Dr. R C. Tolman, 2101
Constitution Avenue, Washington, D. C., bearing the typewritten signature,
"J. R. Oppenheimer," and ask you if you will read that and tell us if you wrote it.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Is this a continuation of the same correspondence, Mr. Robb?
Mr. ROBB. Yes ; I think so. I am trying to get this unclassified so I can hand
you a copy of it, Mr. Silveraan.
Mr. MARKS. When was this document unclassified that you are about to hand
to us?
Mr. SILVERMAN. It is being declassified now.
Mr. MARKS. I think we are entitled to an answer to that question.
Mr. ROBB. How is that again?
Mr. MARKS. The question is when was this document unclassified?
Mr. ROBB. I haven't any idea. Do you know, Mr. Rolander?
Mr. ROLANDER. It may appear on the face of the document
Mr. ROBB. There is a note on there. I don't know when it says.
Mr. ROLANDER. Just a minute.
The WITNESS. I have read the letter.
Mr. ROBB. Does it say on there when it was unclassified?
The WITNESS. April 13, 1954.
Mr. ROBB. Have you a copy of that for Mr. Silverman?
The WITNESS. I will recognize the letter as one that I wrote.
Mr. ROBB. We are handing you a copy of that last letter, Mr. Silverman,
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. You testified that is a letter you wrote, Doctor, or rather a copy of a letter
you wrote.
A. I have no, reason to doubt it whatever.
Mr. ROBB. Did the Chairman wish me to wait until counsel have had a chance
to look at this before it is read or could they follow it as it is read?
Mr. SILVERMAN. I will request that.
Mr. GRAY. All right We will wait until they get a chance to look at it
Mr. SILVEBMAN. We are ready.
Mr. ROBB. Would yon read it, Mr. Rolander?
956
Mr. ROLANDEB. The letter is dated October 4, 1944, addressed to Dr. B. 0.
Tolman, 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, D. 0.
"DEAR DB. TOLMAN : In transmitting to you the recommendations of workers
at project Y on the technical and scientific developments which should he sup-
ported in the postwar period, it would seem unnecessary, in view of the essen-
tial unanimity in detail and in emphasis, to provide a summary of our opinions.
I should like, however, to emphasize a general point of view which I believe is
shared by most of the responsible members of the project"
Dr. EVANS. Of this project.
Mr. ROLANDEB. "Of this project, but which deserves repeated and clear state-
ment.
"It may be difficult for those not directly associated with the efforts of project
Y to appreciate how provisional, rudimentary, and crude they have been. I re-
gard this not primarily as criticism of the project, but as an inevitable conse-
quence of our attempt to meet a directive with the greatest possible speed. This
has for instance made it impossible for us to embark on methods of assembly and
use which require long experience with the active materials. It has furthermore
discouraged us from entering into a program of more than the TniniTgnm com-
plexity. I believe that these limitations have all been appropriate for this
wartime project What is essential is that they should not be forgotten in
evaluating future prospects.
"To make these points somewhat more concrete, it is extremely unlikely that
project Y, even if completely successful in its present program, will produce
weapons whose explosive effect is equivalent to more than about 10,000 tons of
high explosive. It would seem unlikely that we will manage to design weapons
in which the efficiency of the reaction is as much as 10 percent. It is almost
certain that we shall not in a practical way explore the possibilities of releasing
the vastly greater energies available in self-sustaining thermonuclear reactions
which should afford energy release some ten thousand times greater than those
from presently contemplated designs. Finally, the methods of assembly ac-
tually being pursued by this laboratory are complicated, crude and bulky, and
we shall probably not develop methods which by incorporating autocatalytic fea-
tures in assembly may completely alter the nature and difficulty of the problems
of delivery.
"The above are specific indications of directions which we now know to be
worthy of further research. No one can have witnessed the rapid development
of ideas in this project, and the extreme liability of fundamental design, without
appreciating that the work of this project constitutes a beginning in a field of
great complexity and great novelty. Only when investigations can be pur-
sued in a more leisurely and scientifically sound manner than is possible in war,
and only when actual experience with the active materials can be used to supple-
ment theoretical ideas of their behavior, will it be possible to foresee the
boundaries of this new field.
"The above considerations are all intended to focus attention at one point.
Such technical hegemony as this country may now possess in the scientific
and technical aspects of the problem of using nuclear reactors for explosive
weapons is the result of a few years of intensive but inevitably poorly planned
work. This hegemony can presumably be maintained only by continued develop-
ment both on the technical and on the fundamental scientific aspects of the
problem, for which the availability of the active materials and the participation
of qualified scientists and engineers are equally indispensable. No government
can adequately fulfill its responsibilities as custodian if it rests upon the war-
time achievements of this project, however great they may temporarily seem,
to insure future mastery in this field. I believe that this point is one which
will readily be appreciated by the members of your committee, but that it is my
duty as the director of the project directly concerned with these developments,
to insist on it in the clearest possible terms.
''Sincerely yours,
"J. R. OPPENHEIMEB."
Mr, SILVEBMAN. Just one second. Do we now have the complete correspond-
ence between Dr. Oppenheimer or Dr. Tolman on this matter, or are there more
letters?
Mr. KOBB. I haven't the slightest idea whether there were more* letters written
or not These are the ones that are available to me now. I may say I never
read these letters until this morning myself.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Thank you.
957
By Mr. BOBB :
Q. Doctor, who was Dr. Tolman?
A. He was a very close and dear friend of mine. He had been Vice Chair-
man of the National Defense Research Committee. When I assumed the
responsibility for Los Alamos I introduced him or saw that he was intro-
duced to General Groves. General Groves asked him to be one of his two
scientific consultants. He was a member, possibly secretary, of the Committee
of Review, which visited Los Alamos in the spring of 1943, and pointed out
some things that we needed to do if we were to be a successful laboratory.
He was a frequent and helpful visitor to Los Alamos throughout the war. He
was at one time, and I would assume at the time these letters were addressed
to him, a member of a committee, possibly chairman of a committee appointed
by General Groves which was a precursor to the scientific panel to the interim
committee in trying to sketch out for the benefit of the Government what
the postwar problems in atomic energy might be. These included military and
nonmilitary problems.
I think that these letters were addressed to him in that capacity.
Q. And site Y was what?
A. Los Alamos.
Q. Doctor, have you any comment you wish to make on these letters, and
if so, will you please do it?
A. I have a couple of comments. Let us take the first letter, the one of
September 20. In the second paragraph, the second sentence — do you have a
copy of this?
Mr. SH.VEEMAN. No.
The WITNESS. I will read it: "In this connection I should like to point out
that gadgets of reasonable efficiency and suitable design can almost certainly
induce significant deuterium reactions even under conditions where these
reactions are not self-sustaining."
That turned out not to be true, and I think it was known by the end of the
war.
In the third paragraph it says, "in this connection also I should like to remind
you of Rabi's proposal for initiating thermonuclear reactions." * * *
"At the present time site Y does not contemplate undertaking this, but I
believe that with a somewhat longer time scale than our present one this line
of investigation might prove profitable."
This has been under investigation at Los Alamos both immediately after the
war and very recently.
On the general character of the recommendations or views, especially on the
second letter, this is the point I made in the testimony before the Stimson
committee, that we were at the very beginning. The comments on how success-
ful a wartime effort would be were too conservative. We did substantially
better than was here indicated, but the warning that however it looked, it
was not right to rest on it was one that I repeated then. I think that we went
over ail the points that are mentioned in these letters in the report of the
scientific panel to the Secretary of War's interim committee. I would think
that we went over them in the most careful and complete way that we could.
These were some comments.
Mr. SILVERMAN. What was the date of Secretary Stimson's interim committee,
approximately?
The WITNESS. Which dates do you want?
Mr. SILVERMAN. The date they started.
The WITNESS. I don't know when they started, but the date that the panel
appeared with them was the 1st of June, 1945; the date of filing on this long
report to which reference has already been made was perhaps October 1945.
By Mr. ROBB:
Q. Had you completed your comment on these letters?
A. I may need to come back to them, but that is what comes to mind at the
moment.
Q. At the time you wrote these letters, you were in favor of going ahead with
a program for the development of a thermonuclear weapon, weren't you?
A. The letters speak for themselves. I believe they speak exactly what I
meant
Q. Did you mean that?
A. I meant these letters.
Q. Did you mean that you were in favor of going ahead with the thermonuclear?
A. I would like to read the phrases.
958
Q. What I am getting at, Doctor, laying aside the technical language, wasn't
that the ordinary meaning of that you said, that you though you ought to get
busy on the thermonuclear?
A. Among other things.
Q. Yes.
A. With the exploration of the thermonuclear.
Q. Did there come a time when you changed that view in subsequent years?
A. Manifestly by October 29, 1949, 1 was saying very different things.
Q. Yes. Doctor, something was said about the liquid hydrogen plant at Los
Alamos. That was constructed for the purpose of working on a fusion weapon,
wasn't it, or hydrogen weapon?
A. For preliminary research on ingredients that we thought would be essential
in a hydrogen weapon.
Q. Yes. In the matter of reactors, there are various kinds of reactors, aren't
there?
A. Indeed there are.
Q. Those built for commercial purposes, those built for research purposes,
and those built for production of weapons purposes, isn't that right?
A. I have yet to see one built for commercial purposes but I hope I some day
will.
Q. I am asking for information.
A. There are, as I testified, reactors for the development of reactors, reactors
for production, reactors for research, and reactors that serve more than one
pupose.
Q. You were asked about how many reactors were built during your tenure as
chairman of the GAG and I think you said nine, was it?
A. No. I think you asked me during the entire period how many were started,
and I tM"fr I said about a dozen and a half. Mr. Silverman asked me up to
the first of 1950 how many were started, and I said perhaps eight.
Q. Were those eight built for research or production?
A. This is better found in the reports of the Commission. I believe that 3 or
4 were reactor development reactors, namely, to improve the art of reactor
development. A couple, 2 or 3 were for supplementary production, and 2 or 3
were for research.
Q. Was any of them a so-called heavy-water reactor?
A. No. I am not quite sure there was not a research reactor at the Argonne,
but there was no production reactor involving heavy water.
Q. You spoke of the long range detection matter and the three methods which
we speak of rather cryptically. Is it true, Doctor, that it was the opinion of
certain qualified people that the one method which you supported might not
detect a Russian explosion if it occurred under certain circumstances?
A. We argued about that, and I advocated that opinion.
Q. That it might not?
A. That the Russians might hide an explosion, that this was unlikely, but
that they might do it if we relied only on this one method.
Q. la other words, the other methods were necessary to make sure that you
could detect the explosion?
A. That's right May I add that I know of no instance in which the method
I advocated has not detected the explosion and in which the others have.
Q. Do you recall who it was recommended Dr. Libby for appointment to the
GAO?
A. I wrote a note to Mr. Dean recommending him. Are you asking how the
idea came to me?
Q. I am asking if you recall who it was, if anyone, who brought his name to
your attention?
A. Yes, it was Fermi.
Q. Did Dr. Pitzer have anything to do with it?
A. No.
Q. So far as you know.
A. I don't know that he had to do with his being appointed, but he didn't
discuss it with me.
Q. Doctor, you have spoken somewhat of strategic and tactical airpower and
strategic and tactical uses of weapons and all that; you of course don't conceive
yourself to be an expert in war, do you, or military matters?
A. Of course not I pray that there are experts in war.
Q. Have you from time to time, however, expressed rather strong views one
way or the other in the field of military strategy and tactics?
U50
A. I am sure that I have. I don't know what specific views or instances you
are referring to, but I am sure the answer to your question is "Yes."
Q. I ani not referring to any for the moment.
A. I am sure the answer to your question is "Yes."
Q. Doctor, I am a little curious and I wish you would tell us why you felt it
was your function as a scientist to express views on military strategy and
tactics.
A. I felt, perhaps quite strongly, that having played an active part in pro-
moting a revolution in warfare, I needed to be as responsible as I could with
regard to what came of this revolution.
Q. To draw a parallel, Doctor, of course you recall that Ericsson designed
the first ironclad warship.
A. I don't. I am reminded of it.
Q. Beg pardon?
A. I am reminded of it
Q. Do you think that would qualify him to plan naval strategy merely because
he built the Monitor?
Mr. SILVEUMAN. Aren't we really getting Into argument?
The WITNESS. I don't think that I ever planned military
Mr. GRAY. Wait just a minute. Are you objecting?
Mr. SILVERMAN. Yes, I think this is argument.
Mr. GRAY. Argument?
Mr. SILVERMAN. Yes, of course.
Mr. GRAY. It seems to me that this board has listened for weeks to witnesses
who have probed into Dr. Oppenheimer's mind, have said what he would do under
circumstances, have stated with certainty what he would, what his opinions are,
witnesses who disagreed on this, and I think that counsel has not failed to ask
almost any question of any witness that has appeared here. I can't think of
questions that could be remotely related to Dr. Oppenheimer that have not been
asked.
My ruling is that Mr. Robb will proceed with his question.
The WITNESS. Now I have forgotten the question.
Mr. ROBB. Perhaps we better have it read back.
(Question read by the reporter.)
The WITNESS. Merely because he built the Monitor would not qualify him to
plan naval strategy.
By Mr. ROBB :
Q. Doctor, do you think now that perhaps you went beyond the scope of your
proper function as a scientist in undertaking to counsel in matters of military
strategy and tactics?
A. I am quite prepared to believe that I did, but when we are talking about
my counseling on military strategy and tactics, I really think I need to know
whom I was counseling and in what terms. I am sure that there will be in-
stances in which I did go beyond, but I do not wish to give the impression that I
was making war plans or tiring to set up military planning, nor that this prac-
tice was a very general one.
Mr. GRAY. I think the witness is entitled to know whether Mr. Robb has in
mind committees, panels, and other bodies on which Dr. Oppenheimer served or
something else.
Mr. ROBB. I was merely trying to explore in general Dr. Oppenheimer's phi-
losophy in respect of this matter. That is what I had in mind. I was not pin-
pointing on any particular thing, Doctor, and I wanted to get your views on it as
to proper function.
The WITNESS. I served on a great many mjxed bodies. This controversial
Vista project was not a civilian project. There were a great many military
consultants. I learned a great deal from them. The formulation of the views
of Vista depend to a very large extent on discussions, day-to-day discussions with
working soldiers and staff officers. The committees in the Pentagon on which
I sat were usually predominantly committees of military men. I also sat on
some bodies where there were no military men. I would have thought that in an
undertaking like Vista the joint intelligence, in which I played an extremely
small part, of a lot of bright technical and academic people— not all scientists—
and of a lot of excellent staff officers and military officers was precisely what
gave value to the project.
303818— 54 61
960
By Mr. Boss :
Q. Doctor, you stated in response to a question by Mr. Silverman that among
other things the job of the strategic airpower was to destroy enemy aircraft on
the fields. Do you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you confine the job of strategic airpower to that, or would you also
include the destruction of enemy cities and centers of manufacture?
A. The Strategic Air Command has not only very secret but extremely secret
war plans which define its job.
Q. I am asking you for your views on its job.
A. You mean what it should do?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I think that it should be prepared to do a great variety of things, and
that we should maintain at all times full freedom to decide whether in the actual
crisis we are involved in, this or that should be done. It must obviously be
capable of destroying everything on enemy territory.
Q. Do you think that it should do that in the event of an attack on this country
by Russia?
A. I do.
Mr. ROBB. That is all. Thank you.
Mr. GEAT. I think that the only question I have, Dr. Oppenheimer, really re-
lates to a matter that was discussed briefly at an earlier appearance before the
board and not anything that has been asked this morning, but I take it that coun-
sel would not object to my question?
Mr. SILVERMAN. Anything that will enlighten the board we are all for.
Mr. GRAY. I think I know the answer to this, but there was some discussion
about Mr. Volpe, the other day.
The WITNESS. Yes. I have not read the transcript of that.
Mr. GRAY. I don't think this will be involved. Is the board correct in thinking
that this is the same Mr. Volpe that made a speech the other day to the Physical
Society?
The WITNESS. As far as I know, sir. I have not been in communication with
Mr. Volpe, but I read it in the newspapers.
Mr. GRAY. The board has discussed this. I think counsel is entitled to know it
The board has assumed that this was the same man.
The WITNESS. It obviously is.
Mr. SILVERMAN. I should say self -evidently the speech was made without our
knowledge or consent or instigation.
Mr. GRAY. I think I am willing to state for the record that the Chairman
believes that this is the case.
Mr. MARKS. I wanted to add to what Mr. Silverman said, not only without our
knowledge or consent, but to our embarrassment.
Mr. GRAY. I think the board recognizes that and my question, I would like to
have it clearly understood, was not in any suggestion that you as counsel had
anything to do with it. My own belief is that you didn't
Mr. SILVERMAN. It is a fact, sir.
Mr. GRAY. Dr. Evans?
Dr. EVANS. No questions.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Silverman?
Mr. SILVERMAN. I have just 1 or 2 questions really.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. SILVERMAN :
Q: Do you think that a scientist can properly do his job of advising the military
on the potential of newly developed weapons without having some idea of the use
that they are to be put to, and some idea of the tactical and strategic use?
A. It depends. I believe we developed the atomic bomb without any idea at
all of military problems. The people who developed radar needed to know pre-
cisely, or to have a very good idea of what the actual military campaign and
needs were. Certainly you do a much better job if you have a feeling for what
the military are up against In peacetime it is not always clear, even to the
military, what they will be up against
Q. You were shown two letters by Mr. Robb, one dated September 20, 1944, I
think, and the other October 4, 1944. Do those letters in any way modify the
testimony you gave on direct examination as to the scale and intensity of the
thermonuclear effort at Los Alamos?
A. Oh, no.
,961
Mr. SILVEEMAN. That is all.
Mr. GRAY. May I have that read back?
(Question and answer read by the reporter.)
The WITNESS. May I amplify? I testified what I could recollect, and I think
it is complete, of what was going on at Los Alamos daring my period there in
the thermonuclear program. I was asked whether these letters caused me to
have a different view of what was going on there and I said they did not.
Mr. GRAY. I understand, thank yon.
Mr. Bobb, do you have any questions?
Mr. ROBB. I have nothing farther.
The WITNESS. May I make a comment. I don't care whether it is on the record
or off.
Mr. GEAY. Yes.
The WITNESS. I am grateful to, and I hope properly appreciative of the
patience and consideration that the board has shown me daring this part of the
proceedings.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Dr. Oppenheimer.
Do you have anything else?
Mr. SILVERMAN. There are two or three documents 1 would like to have go in.
1 have no further questions of Dr. Oppenheimer.
Mr. GRAY. All right.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. SILVERMAN. Unfortunately I don't have copies of it here.
Mr. KOBE. I don't care.
Mr. SILVERMAN. A letter from Maj. Peer de Silva to Dr. Oppenheimer dated
April 11, 1945. I will read it into the record. Do you want to see it first
[handing].
Mr. BOBB. Sure.
Mr* SILVERMAN (reading).
"ARMY SERVICE FORCES,
"UNITED STATUS ENGINEER OFFICE,
"P. O. Boas 1539, 8<mta Fe, N. Mex.t April llt 1945.
"Dr. J. R. OPPENHEIMER,
"Project Director. ^
"DEAR OPPUB : Upon my transfer from duty at the project, I want you to know
of my sincere appreciation of the support and encouragement which you have
personally given me during my services here. In spite of your many more urgent
problems and duties, your consideration and help on matters I have brought
to you have been gratifying and have, in fact, contributed much to whatever
success my office has had in performing its mission.
"I am sure you know that my interests and thoughts win concern themselves
in large measure with the continued progress and ultimate success of the work
which you are directing. My service at the project and my association with
you and your assistants and fellow workers, are matters which I shall remember
with pride.
"I want to wish you and your staff every possible success in your work, upon
which so much depends.
"Sincerely,
"(S) PEER, PEER DE SILVA,
"Afajor, Corps of Engineers.
"cc— Maj. Gen. L. R. Groves."
During Dr. Oppenheimer's cross-examination, Mr. Bobb questioned Dr. Op-
penheimer about certain public statements that Dr. Oppenheimer had made in
which there was reference to the hydrogen bomb.
Dr. Oppenheimer referred to appearing on a radio panel with Mrs. Roosevelt
and also to a speech which he made before the Science Talent Search, Westing-
house, I think. We have here the precise thing that was said on those two
occasions. I thought I would read them into the record insofar as they relate
to the hydrogen bomb, so that you would know exactly what it is he said.
Mr. ROBB. May I inquire as to the source of the text?
Mr, SXLVERMAN. Yes. I have the text of the radio broadcast in two things.
One is the bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, and one appears to be the script of
the radio thing. The other, the Science Talent Search thing, is a draft of a
talk on the encouragement of science, which comes from Dr. Oppenheimer's files.
I understand this was also published in the bulletin of the Atomic Scientist
Dr. OPPENHEIMER. It was published in Science*
803318—64 62
962
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I will read what Dr. Oppenheimer said. Other people have
said stuff which I don't know is too important. I will read what Dr. Oppen-
heimer said on the radio thing with Mrs. Roosevelt which appears to have been
on February 12, 1950.
"Dr. Oppenheimer : Of course, we personally agree with you about the fostering
of science and basic knowledge of nature and man which is one of the few
creative elements of our times. It is very essential to the idea of progress to
sustain the rest of the world throughout the last centuries. The growth of.
science is a condition, a precondition, to the health of our civilization. It is
manifestly not a job for the AEG alone. It is manifestly not a primary Job
of the ABO or the primary reason for interest in atomic energy. These reasons
lie a lot deeper.
"The decision to seek or not to seek international control of atomic energy, the
decision to try to make or not to make the hydrogen bomb, these are complex
technical things, but they touch the very basis of our morality. It Is a grave
danger for us that these decisions are taken on the basis of facts held secret.
This is not because those who contributed to the decisions or make them are
lacking in wisdom; it is because wisdom itself cannot flourish and even the
truth not be established, without the give and take of debate and criticism. The
facts, the relevant facts, are of little use to an enemy, yet they are fundamental
to an understanding of the issues of policy. If we are guided by fear alone, we
will fail in this time of crisis. The answer to fear can't always lie in the dissipa-
tion of its cause ; sometimes it lies in courage.'1
That is the end of what Dr. Oppenheimer said on that occasion.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, might I interpose here for a moment. I have before
me what I believe to be what is called in the language of the trade "the off-the-
air" transcript of that statement. T think it is what Mr. Silverman read sub-
stantially, but I do find in this "off-the-air transcript" this sentence at the end of
the first paragraph Mr. Silverman read : "It is manifestly not the primary job
for the ABC or the primary reason" and then a series of dots and in parentheses
"voice drops." Apparently there was something unintelligible that the off-the-
air reporter didn't get
Mr. SILVEBMAN. I read that. I didn't say that the voice dropped. "It is mani-
festly not a job for the AEC alone. It is manifestly not a primary job for the
ABC or the primary reason for atomic energy. These reasons lie a lot deeper."
Mr. ROBB. All right.
Mr. SILVERMAN. I will not frighten the board by reading them 6 pages of single-
apace material. The only reference to the hydrogen bomb in this speech which
was given on March 6, 1950, to the Science Talent Search Awards banquet, Wash-
ington, D. O.— that is these high school boys, I think— Is the second paragraph
which I will read into the record.
"I do not propose to talk to you of such topics of the day as the hydrogen bomb
and the statutory provisions of the National Science Foundation. If these mat-
ters are not in a very different state when you shall have to come to assume the
full responsibilities of citizenship, you will have reason to reproach your elders
for your inheritance."
That is all. Perhaps we might have the whole speech go into the record, hut
I won't read it now.
Mr. GRAY. There certainly would be no objection to having the speech appear
as an exhibit
(The document was received as exhibit No. 3.)
Mr. SILVERMAN. I will have some copies made.
Mr. ROBB. I don't think we will need some.
Mr. SILVEBMAN. That is all, sir.
Mr. GRAY. I thought you had three documents you referred to
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Didn't I give you three; deSilva's letter
Mr. GRAY. Oh, I beg your pardon. Does this complete what you have?
Mr. SILVEBMAN. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. We will recess now until 2 o'clock, but I want to alert Mr. Garrison
that I will at that time wish to raise again the question of any necessity for
broadening the Commission's letter not with respect to the points we discussed
in an earlier session, but with respect to other points which have been very clearlv
in this testimony. I don't think there is any surprise, but I want to make sure
that we have no misunderstanding about it. I will wait to raise this question
at 2 o clock.
M\rGAS?s«ow- I wonder if tt woutt not be better if you would raise them
now, Mr. Chairman, so I might reflect on it a little.
Mr. GRAY. I would be very glad to.
963
Mr. GARRISON. I don't mean not to have the recess.
Mr. GRAY. We will recess briefly.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GRAY, The points I would like to discuss are these. The letter of notifica-
tion from General Nichols to Dr. Oppenheimer of December 23, 1953, contain
some detail about the so-called Chevalier incident. The letter, however, does not,
I believe, refer to a matter about which we have had a good deal of testimony,
and that is the fabrication in the Pash and Lansdale interviews. I think Dr.
Oppenheimer's counsel ought to know that the board considers that an important
item, and certainly is one of the innumerable things that will be taken into con-
sideration, I am sure, when we begin our deliberations.
I therefore want to avoid any misunderstanding about the question of whether
the letter should be broadened to contain a point about that aspect of the episode.
That is the first point I have.
Do you care to comment on that?
Mr. GABRISON. I thought perhaps you would proceed, and let me comment at
the end.
Mr. GRAY. All right. The other which you may wish in your summation to
' address yourself to, Mr. Garrison, is the matter, as well as we have been able to
ascertain, of what really happened at the time, the 1947 clearance of Dr. Oppen-
heimer by the Commission.
Mr. GARRISON. This is for summation, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. GRAY. I am saying you may wish to be aware of the fact — you must be
aware of the fact — that the Chairman up to this point has stated that he has been
a little confused about the attendant circumstances.
Mr. GARRISON. Yes.
Mr. GRAY. So you may want to bear that in mind in preparation of your sum-
mation. There is related to the events in 1947 involving Dr. Oppenhei trier's clear-
ance by the Commission the General Groves letter to the Commission at that
time, and his testimony before this board. I must confess I am not clear just
how this might be involved in a broadening of the letter of specifications and yet
at least as of this time we consider these things material without in any way
being able to say now how material, but at least material.
Mr. GARRISON. Sir, the letter contains derogatory items and I don't quite under-
stand what in the 1947 clearance might be regarded as derogatory.
Mr. GRAY. I think that is a very good question and is a different kind of thing
than the matter I referred to in the Chevalier episode. I suppose, Mr. Garrison,
what the board is doing at this time is taking cognizance of statements made to
the press, and perhaps otherwise, which have been to the effect that the full
picture was known (o the Commission in 1947, and it acted on the full picture,
therefore leaving at least the impression that if the Nichols letter is taken in
connection with these statements, then the only tiling considered under those cir-
cumstances would be the so-called derogatory information with respect to the
hydrogen bomb development.
What I am trying to say is that it is not clear to the board yet that the full
flle was before the Commission in 1947, and at least the circumstances of the
clearance at that time are to me still somewhat hazy.
I think in moving more directly to an answer to the question that you put to
me, I suppose this is not a matter of broadening the Commission's letter, and per-
haps therefore I am talking at this time only about the Chevalier incident.
Mr. GARRISON. I think I know what, I would like to say about that, but if it is
completely agreeable to you, Mr. rhairman, I would make my comment when we
reconvene.
Mr. GRAY. That is quite all right.
Mr. GAJRRISON. I have to do a little more work than I anticipated on the 1947
thing, I wonder If it would be agreeable if we could resume at 2 : 30.
Mr. (In AY. Yes.
Mr. GAKIUSON. I hope you won't take me amiss if I just ask this for informa-
tion. If t«he board is going to be here in any event tomorrow — I don't want to
make this as a formal request, because I fully accepted your conclusion that I
should sum up this afternoon — I just would like to ask once more if you arc
going to be here tomorrow, would it be just as convenient to have me "sum up
tomorrow morning ns this afternoon. Please don't misunderstand me. I am not
pressing this, and I am not making an argument of it.
Mr. GRAY. I think my answer without having consulted the board as of this
moment is that the board would prefer to proceed this afternoon.
(The room was cleared while the board conferred.)
964
(The persons previously present, with the exception of Messrs. Rnbh 'ami
Rolander, returned to the room.)
Mr. GEAY. The board has had a discussion of this matter of time and pro-
cedure, and in the interest, Mr. Garrison, of not pressing you and and not thereby
perhaps affecting Dr. Oppenheimer's interest. I think the board is willing to put
over until tomorrow, frankly at some considerable inconvenience to the board,
your summing up. However, in a sense perhaps I am suggesting a bargain with
>ou, and that is, if we put it over until tomorrow morning, do you think we can be
through by 1 o'clock?
Mr. GABRISON. Mr. Chairman, I give you my word on that, and I appreciate
very, very much your consideration.
Mr. GRAY. You wish to wait until tomorrow to discuss these points I raised
with you?
Mr. GARRISON. I think so. It will only take me a minute.
Mr. GRAY. All right. Then we will be in recess until 0:30 tomorrow morning.
Mr. GARRISON. I might say the longer I have in preparation, the shorter ray
argument will be.
(Thereupon at 11 : 45 u. m., a recess was taken until Thursday, April 6, 1954, Ht
2 p. m.)
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
PERSONNEL SECURITY BOARD
IN THE MATTER OF J. EGBERT OPPENHEIMER
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
BUILDING T-3, BOOM 2022,
Washington, D. #., Thursday, May 6, 1954.
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to recess,
before the board, at 9 : 30 a. m.
Personnel Security Board : Mr. Gordon Gray, chairman ; Dr. Ward
T. Evans, member; and Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, member.
Present: Roger Eobb and C. A. Rolander, Jr., counsel for the
board; J. Robert Oppenheimer, Lloyd K Garrison, Samuel J. Silver-
man, and Allan B. Ecker, counsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer ; Herbert
S. Marks, cocounsel for J. Robert Oppenheimer.
PROCEEDINGS
Mr. GRAY. Before Mr. Garrison's summation, there are a couple of things
J would like to take care of which I do not think will take very long. One
concerns the 1947 AEG activities with respect to Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance,
and I believe Mr. Marks has a statement that he would make with respect to
that matter, inasmuch as he was at that time the General Counsel of the Com-
mission, as I understand it
Mr. MAEKS, That is correct
As the chairman will recall, I mentioned to him in the course of these
proceedings some time ago, during one of the recesses, I believe, that in view
of the questions that the board was asking about the 1947 clearance, I thought it
might wish me to state, either on the record or otherwise, what recollection I
had of the events connected with that matter. I mentioned this subject again
this morning informally to the board, and ascertained that they would be inter-
ested in my stating what my memory was, and I am glad to do this because,
while I think that what I have to report will not add much, if anything, to what
the board already has heard, I would prefer for them to judge it, rather than me.
Soon after the Hoover letter to the Commission about the Oppenheimer case,
I learned about that letter. This would have been, as the proceedings here have
brought out, in March of 1947. Whether I was told about the letter by Mr.
Yolpe or by the then chairman of the Commission, or at a Commission meeting,
I do not recall. I believe that at about that time Mr. Volpe told me of the derog-
atory information concerning Dr. Oppenheimer as transmitted to the Commis-
sion with Mr. Hoover's letter.
I believe also that it was I who then first suggested that consideration be given
to establishing a board to review the case. In that proposal, I suggested that
.such a board might include distinguished jurists. I would not have recom-
mended that members of the Supreme Court be included. Whether I made this
suggestion to Mr. Volpe with the expectation that he would communicate it to
the Commission, whether I made it to the general manager or to the chairman
of the Commission or at a Commission meeting, I do not recall. I certainly made
it under circumstances where I expected it to be considered by the Commission.
As general counsel for the Commission, I was naturally concerned with ques-
tions of procedure in personnel security cases. As the same time, I believe I am
correct in my memory that in this matter I had a quite minor role. This was
partly because Mr. Volpe, who was deputy general counsel, and as such my
first assistant, was handling the matter to the extent that the office of general
counsel was concerned, but perhaps more importantly, because Mr. Volpe, as a
result of his experience with the Manhattan District, was in those early days
of the Commission organization looked to by the Commission for assistance in
security matters, and aspects of security matters outside of the sphere of the
office of general counsel
I have no independent recollection, but there certainly must have come a
lime when I was aware that the idea of a board had not been adopted, and there
must have been a time also when I was aware that the Oppenheimer case had in
some way been disposed of by the Commission. I have no independent recollec-
tion of the Commission meeting of August 6, 1947, or of the other documents
concerning this matter that have come into these proceedings, except that I have
a vague memory that T knew that Mr. Lilienthal, and I believe Mr. Volpe, had
visited Mr. Hoover about the matter, and I also have a memory that there was
consultation or correspondence with Dr. Conant, Dr. Bush, Mr. Patterson, and
General Groves about the matter.
I should say also that when I was in Washington during the year I was general
counsel in 1947 either Mr. Volpe or I, or both of us, attended regular Commission
meetings. If the meeting of August 6 was of that character, it is quite possible
that one or both of us attended. Seldom, if ever, did I attend executive sessions
of the Commission. I think it quite possible that on one or more occasions this
case might have been the subject of conversation between the Chairman of the
Commission and me, although I have no memory of it. I rather doubt that there
(967)
were any extensive discussions either between Mr. Lilienthal and me, or the Com-
mission, because I was surprised to find in one of the documents that came into
this proceeding that the idea of a board of review included the notion of having
Supreme Oourt Justices be members. I would certainly have opposed any such
idea, simply because I have long felt that the Supreme Oourt Justices should not
take assignments off the Court.
If the board has any questions, I would be glad to try to answer them.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Marks. I should say that I recall very
clearly that you mentioned this matter to me several days ago, and also, of course,
you came informally to us this morning and we discussed it again. I think it
appropriate that your statement be made.
I would like to ask a couple of questions.
Do you recall whether you were asked to review the file in the case at that
time? Do you have a recollection of whether the material which, I guess, came
to the Commission from Mr. Hoover was submitted to you for study and comment?
Mr. MARKS. As to the material that came to the Commission initially from Mr.
Hoover, I was certainly told the nature of the derogatory information by someone.
I seem to remember that on one occasion Mr. Volpe had that Hoover letter with
attachments when he was talking to me. I think he showed me the Hoover letter,
and that I may have flipped through the pages of the attachment, but I have no
recollection of studying the information in the sense in which I think you in-
quired, and I doubt very much that I did.
Mr. GRAY. I asked the question because, as I recall the testimony here, the
recollection of former Commissioners as to whether they saw the file or what
kind of a file they saw was very hazy. I think it is of interest to this board to
know how extensively this file really was reviewed by members of the Commis-
sion and their principal advisers at the time.
Mr. MARKS. My memory, Mr. Chairman, is that what I saw would have been
mpre or less contemporaneously with the communication from Mr. Hoover, and
whether I am now going on my memory or my memory is refreshed by questions
that have been asked by Mr. Robb, certainly the impression that I have of the
bulk of that particular document is consistent with the questions which Mr. Eobb
has asked. That is to say, that it was certainly not a document, of 100 pages ; it
was a document of a half inch or quarter fo^*, speaking now of the Hoover letter,
mid what was attached to it.
Mr. GRAY. I have asked you this question informally, but I should like to ask
you again, you are sure that you did not prepare this unidentified memorandum
about which we had very considerable discussion earlier In these proceedings?
You know the one to which I have reference which I characterized, as not being
signed or initialed in any way.
Mr. MARKS. I am quite sure that I did not prepare that. I doubt very much
that I ever saw it It is hard for me to say without not now seeing the document
whether I ever saw it, but the description of it here
Mr. GRAY. It would not have been your practice to prepare a memorandum for
the file and put it in the file without in some way indicating that you had seen
it or authored it?
Mr. MARKS. Certainly not. I think I was quite meticulous about such matters.
Mr. GRAY. In this connection, I think that Dr. Oppenhelmer and counsel ought
to know that an effort has been made to learn the authorship of this document
that we discussed, and the people who are concerned now in the Commission
I think just don't know who prepared it It was not prepared by Mr. Jones,
whose name has come into these hearings, or by Mr. Menke, or by Mr. Uanna.
Also, Mr. Belcher did not write it, he says, and nobody can furnish any informa-
tion that is of any real value apparently as to the identity of the person who
wrote the summary or memorandum. The best guess of the people connected
with it is that it was probably written by Mr. Volpe, but that is pure guess and
speculation. I suppose as far as this proceeding is concerned, the author of the
memorandum will remain unidentified. We have done all that Is reasonable to
do to find out
Mr. MARKS. I think I ought to say that I would have expected that if Mr. Volpe
had prepared a memorandum of the kind that was described here that he would
have mentioned it to me. I have no recollection of his ever having done so, or
ever having prepared a memorandum of that kind.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Marks.
Do you want to proceed, Mr. Robb?
Mr. ROBB. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
After the board adjourned yesterday, we received three documents which I
think should be made a part of the record. The first and second of these docu-
ments respectively are photostats of a letter from Haakon Chevalier to Mr.
Jeffries Wyman, dated February 23, 1954, and the response to that letter from
Mr. Wyman to Mr. Chevalier dated March 1, 1954. I will ask to have these read
into the record by Mr. Rolander, if yon please, sir. I am sorry we haven't copies
of these. These jnst came in this morning.
Mr. ROLANDER. The address is "19, me du Mont-Cenis, Paris, 18e."
"FEBBTTARY 23, 1954.
"Mr. JEFFRIES WYMAN,
"7, Cite Martignac, Paris, 7e.
"DEAR MR. WYMAN: My friend— and yours—Robert Oppenheimer, gave me
your name when he was up for dinner here in our apartment early last December,
and urged me to get in touch with you if a personal problem of mine which I
discussed with him became pressing. He gave me to understand that I could
speak to you with the same frankness and fullness as I have with him, and he
with me, during the 15 years of our friendship.
"I should not have presumed to follow-up such a suggestion if it had come
from anyone else. But as you know, Opje never tosses off such a suggestion
lightly.
"If you are in Paris, or will be in the near future, I should, then, like to see
you informally and discuss the problem.
"On rereading what I have written, I have a feeling that I have made the
thing sound more formidable than it really is. It's just a decision that I have
to make, which is fairly important to me, and which Opje in his grandfatherly
way suggested that I shouldn't make before consulting you.
"Very sincerely,
"HAAKON CHEVALIER."
There is a signature and then typed name.
The second letter :
"AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS, March 1, 1954.
"MR. HAAKON CHEVALIER,
"19, rue du Mont-Cents, Paris (18e).
"DEAR MR. CHEVALIER: I have just received your letter of February 28. I shall
be delighted to see you and talk over your problem with you. Would you care
to have lunch with me at my house on Thursday, the 4th of March, at 1 o'clock?
The address is 17, rue Casimir Pfcrier, Paris (7e), third story. (The telephone
is Invalides 00-10.)
"Time being rather short, will you let me know your answer by telephone
either at my house or preferably here at the embassy (Anjou 74-60, extension
249). If the time I suggest is not convenient we will arrange for another.
"You will notice that my address is not that given you by Bob Oppenheimer.
I have moved since he was here.
"Yours sincerely,
"JEFBTKES WYMAN, Science Attacht"
Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, the third document is an affidavit dated May 4, 1954,
signed and sworn to by Ernest O. Lawrence. Would yon read that, please?
Mr. ROLANDER (reading) :
"MAY 4, 1954.
"I remember driving up .to San Francisco from Palo Alto with L. W. Alvarez
and Dr. Vannevar Bush when we discussed Oppenheimer's activities in the
nuclear weapons program. At that time we could not understand or make any
sense out of the arguments Oppenheimer was using in opposition to the thermo-
nuclear program and indeed we felt he was much too lukewarm in pushing the
overall ABC program. I recall Dr. Bush being concerned about the matter and
in the course of the conversation he mentioned that Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg had
insisted that Dr. Bush serve as chairman of a committee to evaluate the evidence
for the first Russian atomic explosion, as General Vandenberg did not trust
Dr. Oppenheimer. I beleive it was on the basis of the findings of this com-
mittee that the President made the announcement that the Soviets had set off
their first atomic bomb."
Signed "Ernest O. Lawrence", typed "Ernest O. Lawrence." His signature
appears twice signed.
In the bottom left hand corner, "Subscribed to and sworn before me this 4th
day of May, 1954," the signature of Elizabeth Odle, the name, and then typed,
"Notary public in and for the County of Alameda, State of California. My com-
mission expires Aug. 26, 1956."
The seal appears thereon.
970
Mr. ROBB. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Garrison, do you want to have a recess for a conference?
Mr. GAEBISON. It may be a minute of two of discussion.
Mr. GRAY. By ail means, take it We will take a short recess.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GAEBISON. I think Dr. Oppenheimer would like to make a very short state-
ment
Mr. GRAY. Before he does, I would like to say something about this affidavit
which was offered by Mr. Robb. It will be recalled that when Dr. Bush came
back before this board as a rebuttal witness, the chairman of the board asked
him the question whether if you substitute the name Vandenberg for Truman
whether his recollection would be the same, and Dr. Bush said emphatically
that his recollection would be the same. I wish it known that there is no way
that Dr. Lawrence could have known of my question to Dr. Bush. I wish it
also known that I had no knowledge of Dr. Lawrence's affidavit, or that there
was to be an affidavit at the time I put the question.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I think it is correct that Dr. Bush testified on
May 4, I believe this affidavit is dated May 4. I assume Mr. Robb, you com-
municated with Dr. Lawrence about it?
Mr. EOBB. I asked Mr. Rolander to communicate with Mr. Lawrence, yes.
Mr. GARRISON. Did you tell him Dr. Bush's testimony?
Mr. ROLANDER. I communicated with Dr. Lawrence through Dr. Alvarez, during
which I asked Dr. Alvarez; to check with Lawrence and ask Lawrence to prepare
a statement as to his recollection of the conversation that took place in this auto-
mobile trip from Palto Alto.
Mr. GARRISON. Did you tell Mr. Alvarez about the nature of the discussion
here before the board?
Mr. ROLANDER. I am quite sure that I told him there was some question as to
what did take place, but I am also quite sure I did not mention the name
"Vandenberg."
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Garrison, are you prepared now to proceed with your sum-
mation?
Mr. GARRISON. I would like to clear up Just one procedural matter, and then
I think Dr. Oppenheimer has a very brief comment to make on the matter of his
dinner with Mr. Chevalier.
Mr. GRAY. He will be given that opportunity.
Mr. GARRISON. At the session yesterday, Mr. Chairman, you said to me that the
General Nichols letter of December 23 contained some detail about the so-called
Chevalier incident. The letter did not, however, refer to a matter about which
the board has had a good deal of testimony, and that is the fabrication of the
Pash and Lansdale interviews. You informed me that we should know that the
board considers this an important item, that it would be one of the innumerable
things that would be taken into consideration when you begin your deliberation*.
You wanted to avoid any misunderstanding about the question whether the letter
should be broadened to contain the point about that aspect of the episode, and you
asked me if I had a comment to make on that
My comment is, Mr. Chairman, that in Dr. Oppenheimer's letter of response to
General Nichols in which he refers to Eltenton's approaching people on the proj-
ect through intermediaries and then recounts his own conversation with Cheva-
lier, it is quite clear that he was indicating that he had fabricated the story
which he had told, and, therefore, Mr. Chairman, we do not suggest or request
that the letter of General Nichols be broadened to contain this point.
Mr. GRAY. I see.
Mr. GARRISON. It is at the bottom of page 22. He has previously in the preced-
ing paragraph described his conversation with Chevalier in which it is dear
that he did not believe that Chevalier was seeking Information.
Mr. GRAY. Yes. I think you have answered the question which I asked you.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Mr. Chairman, while Mr. Garrison has been making his state-
ment, we have been checking the transcript to see what the testimony is on this
business of Chevalier's discussion with Dr. Oppenheimer, and with Mr. Wyman.
Mr. GRAY. Yes.
Mr. SILVERMAN. As Mr. Garrison said, Dr. Oppenheimer was going to take the
stand again for a minute to tell what he knows about it, but we find in looking
at the transcript that he has already said what he has to say. I would simply
call your attention to page 2990 of the transcript. I will wait a moment for you»
Mr. Robb.
Mr, ROBB. I have it,
071
Mr. SILVERMAW. In which, Mr. Chairman, you were questioning Dr. Oppen-
heimer. I am reading only a part of the questioning on this point, but it is the
part I think is material.
"Is it clear to you in your visit in the late fall of 1953 to Paris you did not in
any way get involved in Dr. Chevalier's passport problems as of the present time?
"The WITNESS. I don't believe I became involved in them. I am not even sure
we discussed them.
"Mr. GRAY. You say he did discuss them with you?
'"The WITNESS. I am not even sure he discussed them with me. I am sure he
discussed one point with me at length which was his continued employment at
UNESCO."
Mr. GRAY. If Dr. Oppenheimer wishes to add to that, we should be glad to
hear it
Mr. GARRISON. I think he would Just for a moment. Would you care to
comment on this?
Whereupon, J. Robert Oppenheimer, a witness, having been previously duly
sworn, resumed the stand and testified further as follows :
The WITNESS. I understand that I am under oath.
The problem that most of the evening with Chevalier was spent in quite scat-
tered talk ; there was one thing that was bothering him and his wife. Either a
large part or a substantial part of his present employment is as a translator for
UNESCO. He understood that if he continued this work as an American citizen,
he would be investigated, he would have to be cleared for it, and he was doubtful
as to whether he would be cleared for this. He did not wish to renounce his
American citizenship. He did wish to keep his job, and he was in a conflict
over that. This occupied some of the discussion. This is the only problem that
I knew about at that time. I don't know what the problem is that he did con-
sult Wyman about I believe I should also say that the sense that the Chevalier
letter to Wyman gives, that Wyman should act as a personal confidant assistant
to him and not as an officer of the Government, could not have been anything
that I communicated. It was precisely because Wyman was an officer of the
Government that it would have appeared appropriate to me for Chevalier to
consult Wyman, precisely because anything that was said would be reported to
the Government and would be quite open. That is about all I can remember.
Mr. SILVERMAN, May I add one thing. I note at page 462, when Mr. Robb
was originally questioning Dr. Oppenheimer about this matter, let me read tin*
question and answer that I refer to :
"Q. Dirt you thereafter go to the American Embassy to assist Dr. Chevalier
getting a passport to come back to this country?
"A. No."
That is the context of this matter.
The WITNESS. Thank yon.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you, Dr. Oppenheimer.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. GRAY. Will you proceed, Mr. Garrison.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman and members of the board, I would like to thank
you again for waiting over until this morning to give me a little more time to
prepare what I might say to you. I want to thank each of you also for your
great patience and courtesy and consideration which you have extended us all
through these weeks that we have been together.
I think I should take Judicial notice of the fact that unless Dr. Evans has some
possible question, that I understand that you did not seek the positions which you
are here occupying, and I appreciate the fact that you are rendering a great
public service in a difficult and arduous undertaking.
As we approach the end of this period in which we have been together, my
mind goes back to a time before the hearings began when the Commission told
me that you were going to meet together in Washington for a week before the
hearings began here to study the FBI files with the aid of such staff as might be
provided. I remember a kind of sinking feeling that I had at that point— the
thought of a week's immersion in FBI files which we would never have the privi-
lege of seeing, and of coming to the hearings with that intense background of
study of the derogatory Information.
I suggested two things to the Commission. One, that I might be permitted
to meet with you and participate with you during the week in discussions of the
case without, as I knew would have to be the case, actual access to the FBI
972
documents themselves, but at least informally participating with you in discus-
sions about what the files contained.
This the Commission said was quite impractical because of the confidential
nature of the material, and I then suggested that I meet with you at your very
first session in Washington to give you very informally a little picture of the
case as we saw it, so that you might at least have that picture as you went about
your task, and also that we might have a chance to explore together the proce-
dures which would be followed in the hearings. That request likewise was not
found acceptable.
It was explained to me that the practice in these proceedings was that the
board would conduct the inquiry itself and would determine itself whether or
not to call witnesses and so forth, and it was therefore necessary for the board
to have a thorough mastery of the file ahead of time.
We came together then as strangers at the start of the formal hearings and
we found ourselves rather unexpectedly in a proceeding which seemed to us to
be adversary in nature. I have previously made some comments upon this pro-
cedure. I don't want to repeat them here. I do want to say in all sincerity that
T recognize and appreciate very much the fairness which the members of the
board have displayed in the conduct of these hearings, and the sincere and
intense effort which I know you have been making and will make to come to a
just understanding of the issues.
I would like now to discuss very briefly the legal framework in which it seems
to me you will be operating. You have two basic documents, I suppose, the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and Executive Order 10450. The essential provisions
of these two enactments are contained in summary form in. General Nichols'
letter of December 23 in the second paragraph, in which the question before
the board is put, I think, in this way. General Nichols in the second paragraph
of his letter of December 23 says that, "As a result of the investigation and the
review of your personnel security file in the light of the requirements of the
Atomic Energy Act and the requirements of Executive Order 10450, there has
developed considerable question whether your continued employment on Atomic
Energy Commission work will endanger the common defense and •ecurity"
that is the language of the act— "and whether such continued employment is
clearly consistent with the interests of the national security." That is the
language of the Executive order. So that they are both together in that
sentence.
Now, I think that the basic question— the question which you have to decide—
can be boiled down to a very short form. Dr. Oppenheimer's position is that of
a consultant. He is to give advice when his advice is sought This is up to
the Atomic Energy Commission as to when and where and under what circum-
stances they shall seek his advice. That, of course, is not a question that this
board is concerned with. The basic question is whether in the handling of
restricted data he is to be trusted. That, it seems to me, is what confronts
this board, that bare, blunt question.
In trying to reach your determination, you have some guides, some things that
you are to take into consideration. The statute speaks of character, associations,
and loyalty. Certainly loyalty is the paramount consideration. If a man is
loyal, if in his heart he loves his country and would not knowingly or willingly
do anything to injure its security, then associations and character become rela-
tively unimportant, it would seem to me.
I suppose one can imagine a case of a loyal citizen whose associations were
so intensely concentrated in Communist Party circles— it is hard for me to sup-
pose this of a loyal citizen, but I suppose one might reach a case where the associ-
ations were so intense and so pervasive— that it would create some risk of a
chance word or something doing some harm, a slip, and so forth.
In the case of character, I suppose that a loyal citizen could still endanger
the national security in the handling of restricted data if he were addicted to
drunkenness or to the use of drugs, if he were a pervert. These conditions, we
of course don't have here.
I would like to skim through with you, because it seems to me to illuminate
the nature of the task before you, the Commission's memorandum of decision
regarding Dr. Frank Graham, because this was a case which involved a con-
sideration of loyalty and associations. I have the memorandum of the decision
here, which was one, I think, of only two that the Commission has thought it
desirable to publish. This Is dated December 18, 1948. If the board would like
copies of It, I would be glad to pass them up to you. I don't propose to read it
all, Mr. Chairman, but to point out what seems to me significant in it
,973
I would direct your attention to paragraph 4, which follows the brief recital
of Dr. Graham's character and it cites the sentence from the Atomic Energy Act
with which we are familiar, and refers to the FBI report on character, associa-
tions and loyalty. Then it goes on to describe their examination of the security
tile:
"The five members * * * are fully satisfied that Dr. Graham is a man of
upright character and thoroughgoing loyalty to the United States. His career
as a leading educator and prominent public figure in the South has, it appears,
been marked by controversy, engendered in part by his role in championing
freedom of speech and other basic civil or economic rights.
"0. In the course of his vigorous advocacy of the principles in which he
believes, Dr. Graham has allied himself, by sponsorship or participation, with
large numbers of people and organizations all over the country. In this way he
has been associated at times with individuals or organizations influenced by
motives or views of Communist derivation. These associations, which in sub-
stance are described in various published material, are all referred to in the
security tile.
"7. 'Associations,* of course, have a probative value in determining whether
an individual is a good or bad security risk. But it must be recognized that it
is the man himself the Commission is actually concerned with, that the associa-
tions are only evidentiary, and that commonsense must be exercised in judging
their significance. It does not appear that Dr. Graham ever associated with any
such individuals or organizations for improper purposes'; on the contrary, the
specific purposes for which he had these associations were in keeping with
American traditions and principles. Moreover, from the entire record it is clear
in Dr. Graham's case that such associations have neither impaired his integrity
nor arouse in him the slightest sympathy for Communist or other antidemocratic
or subversive doctrines. His record on controversial issues has made this abun-
dantly clear, and his course of conduct during the past two decades leaves no
doubt as to his opposition to communism and his attachment to the principles
of the Constitution.
"8. All five members of the Commission agree with the conclusion of the Gen-
eral Manager that, in the words of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, it 'will not
endanger the common defense or security* for Dr. Graham to be given security
clearance, and that it is very much to the advantage of the country that Dr.
Graham continue his participation in the atomic-energy program. Our long-
range success in the field of atomic energy depends in large part on our ability
to attract into the program men of character and vision with a wide variety of
talents and viewpoints."
So I say to you, Mr. Chairman and members of the board, that in the Com-
mission's own view of the matter it is the man himself that is to be considered,
commonsense to be exercised in judging the evidence, and that it is appropriate
to consider in the final reckoning the fact that our long-range success in the field
of atomic energy depends in large part on our ability to attract into the program
men of character and vision with a wide variety of talents and viewpoints.
The factors of character, associations, and loyalty are not the only ones that
are set forth in the catalog of things that you are to consider. Section 4J.6 (a/
of the Atomic Energy Commission Rules and Regulations contains two paragraphs
about the recommendations of the board, and the very first sentence says that
the board shall consider all material before it, including the reports of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the testimony of all witnesses, the evidence
presented by the individual, and the standards set forth in "AEG Personnel
Security Clearance Criteria for Determining Eligibility" (14 F. R, 42).
That, it seems to me, means that the standards set forth in this document
entitled "AEC Personnel Security Clearance Criteria for Determining Eligi-
bility" are all to be considered. It is, as Mr. Robb pointed out, true that this
document in many places refers to the General Manager and what the General
Manager shall take into account. I think that it is both sensible and logical
and clearly intended by section 4.16 (a) that you, in making your recommenda-
tions to the General Manager, would take into account the things which he has
to take into account in arriving at the decision.
Mr. GEAT. May I Interrupt?
Mr. GABBISON. Yes.
Mr. GBAT. I am very much interested in this point, Mr. Garrison. You earlier,
I believe, suggested that the usefulness of a man to the program of the Commis-
sion was something that the general manager had to consider. Does this most
recent observation you made mean that this board must take into account that
kind of thing also, because if you say that this board takes into account every-
974
thing the general manager takes Into account, then it seems to me that is
inconsistent with an earlier portion of your argument
Please don't misunderstand me. I am not arguing with you but I want to have
your views clearly on this point because it may be an important one.
Mr. GABRISON. I think, as I said earlier, that in the case of a consultant where
it is up to the Commission to decide what advice to seek from him, and when
that a commonsense reading of this document would leave that question of
the appraisal of his usefulness as an adviser necessarily to the Commission. I
should think that would be true. I would not want to make a rigid argument
that every sentence in this document must be literally applied in arriving at your
opinion. Indeed, what I am going to end up in a moment is, having eliminated
all of the things that appear in here, when you add to those the words that
appear in the statute, you have really in the end no way of arriving at a Judg-
ment except by a commonsense overall judgment, which is what is emphasized
in the personnel security clearance document and in the regulations.
If I might just pursue that for a moment, the personnel security clearance
criteria include references to the past association of the person with the atomic
energy program and the nature of the Job he is expected to perform. It is
there, I think, that the fact that this is a consultant position does come into
the consideration. It goes on to say that the Judgment of responsible persons
as to the Integrity of the individuals should be considered. A little later it talks
about the mature viewpoint and responsible judgment of Commission staff mem-
bers, and then it goes on to list these categories (a) and (&) with numerous
subheadings.
I don't think there should be any mystery about these categories. Category
(a) does not differ from category (ft) except to the extent that items that are
established under category (a) create a presumption of security risk, and a pre-
sumption, of course, is something which is rebuttable by other evidence. If
there is any doubt on that point, I hope the board will let me know.
It would be, I think, a complete misreading of this document to say that if
you should find an item established under category (a), let us say, that disposes
of the case, because everything in the document and in section 4.16 to which I
shall return in the rules and regulations, emphasize that everything in the record
is to be considered.
For example, this document entitled, "The Criteria," says that the decision as to
security clearance is an overall commonsense judgment made after considera-
tion of all the relevant information as to whether or not there is risk that the
granting of security clearance would endanger the common defense or security.
The next paragraph says that cases must be carefully weighed in the light of
all the information and a determination must be reached which gives due recog-
nition to the favorable as well as unfavorable information.
Then 4.16 (a) provides that the members of the board as practical men of
affairs should be guided by the same consideration that would guide them in
making a sound decision in the administration of their objectives. It goes on to
instruct the board to consider the manner in which witnesses have testified,
their credibility, and so forth. Then that if after considering all the factors
that they are of the opinion that it will not endanger the common defense and
security to grant security clearance, they should so recommend.
So I think we come down in the end, Mr. Chairman, to the basic acid ques-
tion before the board, whether in the overall judgment of you three men, after
considering and weighing all the evidence, that Dr. Oppenheimer's continued
right of access to restricted data in connection with his employment as a con-
sultant would endanger the national security and the common defense, or be
clearly inconsistent with the national security.
It would seem to me that in approaching that -acid question the most im-
pelling single fact that has been established here is that for more than a decade
Dr. Oppenheimer has created and has shared secrets of the atomic energy pro-
gram and has held them inviolable. Not a suggestion of any improper use by
him of the restricted data which has been his in the performance of his distin-
guished and very remarkable public service.
Now, at this moment of time, after more than a decade of service of this
character, to question his safety in the possession of restricted data seems to me
a rather appalling matter.
I would like to tell you what this case seems to me to look like in short com-
pass. I wish we could dispose of it out of hand on the basis of the fact that
I have Just mentioned to you, that for more than a decade Dr. Oppenheimer
has been trusted, and that he has not failed that trust. That in my Judgment is
975
the most persuasive evidence that you could possibly have. But I know that
you will have to go into the testimony and the evidence, the matters in the file
before you, and I would like to sum up, if I may, that it looks like to me to be
like.
Here is a man, beginning in 1943— beginning in 1942, actually— taken suddenly
out of the academic world in which up to that time he had lived, and suddenly
in 1343 put in charge by General Groves. of the vast and complex undertaking
of the establishment and operation of the laboratory at Los Alamos, a man
who suddenly finds himself in administrative charge of the scientific direction
of some 4,000 people in a self-contained community in a desert He performs
by common consent an extraordinary service for his country, both administra-
tively and militarily. After the war he hopes to go back to his academic work,
back to physics, but the Government keeps calling upon him almost continuously
for service. Secretary Stimson puts him on his Interim Committee on Atomic
Energy, the Secretary of State puts him on the consultant group in connection
with the program for the control of atomic energy before the U. N., he write a
memorandum to Mr. Lilienthal within a month of his appointment which con-
tains the essence of the plan which the United States is to adopt, a plan which
would have called for the breaking down of the Iron Curtain, and which was
to prove extremely distasteful to the Russians. He serves Mr. Baruch at the
United Nations and after Mr. Baruch retires, he served General Osborne, and
General Osborne has told us here of his firmness and his realism and his grasp
of the problems, of the conflict and the difficulties of dealing with the Russians.
He makes speeches and he writes articles setting forth the American program
and the essence of it, and supporting it. Some of those you have heard before
you.
The President appoints him to the General Advisory Committee in January
of 1947, and then he is elected chairman by his fellow members, and he serves
on that for 6 years. He helps to put Los Alamos back on its feet. He has earlier
supported the May-Johnson bill as a means of insuring that this work at Los
Alamos or the work on atomic weapons wherever it be conducted can go forward.
He backs in his official work every move calculated to expand the facilities
of the Commission, to enlarge raw material sources, to develop the atomic
weapons for long-range detection, so that we may find out what the Russians
are doing, if and when they achieve the atomic bomb.
After Korea when we are in the midst of an actual shooting war with a mili-
tary establishment then found to be very depleted, he Interests himself in the
development of atomic weapons for the battlefield in connection not merely
with our problems of intervention in situations like Korea, but more importantly
for the defense of Europe against totalitarian aggression.
Finally, he interests himself in continental defense as a means of helping
to preserve the home base from which both strategically and tactically any
war must be fought. In these and in other ways through half a dozen other
committees he gives something like half his time to the United States Government
as a private citizen.
Now he is here in this room and the Government is asking the question, is he fit
to be trusted.
How does this case come about? Why is Dr. Oppenheimer subjected to this
kind of a scrutiny by the Government he has served so long and so brilliantly?
Two main things stand out. His opposition to the H-bomb development in 1949
in the report in which he Joined with the other members of the GAO, and his left-
wing associations and related incidents through 1943. I emphasize that period
because it is there that the real searching questions have been put. These are
the two main things, and I am going to concentrate in the remarks that I have
to make chiefly on these two main facts of the case.
I would digress for a moment to make a short comment on Mr. Borden's
letter. I will say this merely. It appears that this letter was before the Atomic
Energy Commission at the time that General Nichols wrote his letter to Dr.
Oppenheimer ; that to the exent that the items in Mr. Borden's letter are covered
in General Nichols* letter, there is adequate testimony before the board in our
judgment to shed light on all of them. To the extent that there are items in
Mr. Borden's letter not covered by the Nichols letter, I just assume that they
were not worthy of credence by the Atomic Energy Commission, and are not
worthy of credence here.
Finally, I would point out that the matters contained in his letter are matters
of opinion and conclusions without evidentiary testimony or facts.
976
Now, returning to the two central elements in this case, of the H-bomb opposi-
tion and the leftwing associations and the related incidents through 1943, I
would say this in the shortest possible compass about the H-bomb opposition in
1949— that on the whole record here it represented simply an honest difference
of opinion. I don't see how it is possible to arrive at any other conclusion than
that ; that there are on this record no acts of opposition to this program once the
President decided to go ahead with it, and that finally there is evidence of
affirmative support for the program, particularly after new inventions had es-
tablished the practical possibility or the near possibility of the creation of the
bomb for the first time.
In respect to the leftwing associations and their related incidents through
1943, 1 would say in all basic essentials they were known to General Groves, and
they were known to Colonel Lansdale, and these two men trusted Dr. Oppenheimer.
I propose to show in a moment that in all basic essentials they were known to
the Atomic Energy Commission in 1947, and that the Commission cleared him,
as I shall argue, and as I believe to be the case from the records.
This perhaps might be enough, and surely should be enough, but in addition, we
have the testimony of a long series of witnesses here who have worked with
Dr. Oppenheimer and have known him for many years and who have arrived
at the kind of judgment of the whole man which is the real task before us.
I would like, if I might, now to develop these very shortly stated observations
about first the H-bomb and then the leftwing associations. I hope the board
will interrupt me at any point at which you would like to put questions. I
hope you will interrupt me at any point when you feel you are getting tired
listening to me, and you would like a recess or a few minutes of relaxation.
Mr. GBA.Y. I would Just put a question to you now, Mr. Garrison. Did I under-
stand you to say that you feel that the clearance in 1947, which you are prepared
to argue, is clearly established, is sufficient?
Mr. GABBISON. No ; I didn't mean to suggest in any way that it forecloses the
judgment of this board, or that you are not under a responsibility to consider
the whole record. If I conveyed any other impression, I didn't intend to. That
is your task. I would have thought as an original proposition that this pro-
ceeding ought never to have -been instituted in the light of this history and in
the light of the clearances and of the whole record. But it has been and it is
before you, and it is your responsibility and it is your task. When I said this
should have been enough, I meant it should have been enough and this proceeding
should never have been brought.
Let me return to the topic of the H-bomb. You have had an enormous quan-
tity of evidence, some of it quite technical and some of it quite complicated,
about the pros and cons of proceeding with an intensified H-bomb program
in 1949, and I am not going to dream of attempting at this time to recapitulate
that evidence. I Just want to pick out a few salient points and enlarge on
them a little bit
I want to stress at the outset what I am sure this board must feel, and that
is that the members of the General Advisory Committee who appeared here and
testified before the board were men deeply convinced of the rightness as of 1949
of the Judgments which they then made. Certainly that those Judgments were
honest judgments, that they were arrived at by each individual, each in his
own way. No two men put the case to you in quite the same fashion as to
what was in their minds. I am sure you must credit each of them with sin-
cerity, with honesty, and with having made a genuine effort in 1949 to say,
and to recommend what each believed to be in the interests of America. Surely
that was true of Dr. Conant, who expressed his own views, while Dr. Oppen-
heimer was still not quite certain of his before the meeting of the GAG and
I think Dr. Alvarez or somebody testified to that effect, who was as strong in
his opposition as a man can be, who drafted the majority annex with Dr
DuBridge, and whose rugged and independent character is well known to the
country and must be apparent to all of us here.
Dr. Fermi, who spoke of the soul searching for all of us which they went
through at that time, and to whom Dr. Conant looked for technical appraisals
who surely must have given this board of the sense of the struggle that they
went through at the time to do what they believed to be the right thing
Dr. Babi, now chairman of the General Advisory Committee; Mr. Oliver
Buckley, who made that very sincerely felt and separately stated statement on
September 3 to make sure that the very most precise sense of what he believed
was on the record. And of Mr. Hartley Bowe, who told you among other things
of his experience with Communists and communism in the Latin American
977
countries, and who certainly felt deeply what he was up to in 1949. And then
Dr. Oppenheimer, who by the account of all of the inenihers, did not attempt
in any way to impose his own views, to dominate the sessions. On the con-
trary, there is evidence quite to the contrary of the extent to which he welcomed
and stimulated discussion of the most protracted character from all concerned,
who unquestionably had the influence which goes with great mastery of the
subject and of a character that carries weight and meaning and significance
in itself.
But the picture that some would paint of a Svengali or a mastermind manipu-
lating men to do his will just faUs apart when one actually hears and sees and
talks with the members who served with him on the General Advisory Com-
mittee. Honest judgments honestly arrived at by Dr. Oppenheimer and all the
others.
I would like to stress now the thoroughgoing nature of the consideration which
they brought to this subject. This was not a snap decision. Before the meeting,
the record now shows that Dr. Oppenheimer had discussions with all kinds of
people, including Dr. Teller, who was of course very much for the program, Dr.
Bethe ; Dr. Serber came to see him ; Dr. Alvarez. Not only that, but all around
in the Government, this thing was being discussed and considered. General
Wilson has described to us the meeting on October 14 of the Joint Chiefs with
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, with General Vandenberg for the Joint
Chiefs urging the development of the H-bomb. This is 2 weeks before the GAC
meeting. General Wilson has described how, on the same day, the chairman of
the Military Liaison Committee informed that committee of his visit with
General McCormack and Dr. Manley to Dr. Oppenheimer at Princeton where
they had discussed the super and other problems to be taken up by the General
Advisory Committee.
I quote that verbatim from General Wilson's testimony at page 2354. The
chairman of the Military Liaison Committee goes with General McCormack, and
with Dr. Manley to see Dr. Oppenheimer at Princeton where they discuss the
super and other problems to be taken up by the General Advisory Committee.
Then on October 17, the Joint Congressional Committee writes a letter to the
Atomic Energy Commission requesting further information on the super. A
copy of this goes to the Military Liaison Committee. Then we have Dr. Alvarez
talking with all the members of the GAC, and with most of the ABO Commis-
sioners a couple of days before the meeting, and also a couple of days before the
meeting, we have a joint meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission and the
Military Liaison Committee, and in General Wilson's testimony, the Atomic
Energy Commission — and I am now quoting verbatim — "announced that it had
asked the General Advisory Committee to consider the superweapon in the light
of recent developments."
Then we have the meeting itself, beginning on October 29, and running for
3 days, beginning with a joint session with the Atomic Energy Commission.
There was, for a little while, some doubt in the record which puzzled the chair-
man particularly, as to how the question of the super arose in the Commission.
It was the recollection of Dr. Oppenheimer and of Mr. Rowe, and Mr. Lilienthal,
Mr. Dean, none of them perhaps very sharp, that at this joint meeting the chair-
man of the Atomic Energy Commission, for the Commission, raised the question.
Mr. Lilienthal testified about Admiral Strauss' memorandum of October 5 or 6,
which asked that this be considered by the General Advisory Committee. But
I tMnfr General Wilson's testimony, it is quite apparent that informally no
doubt this matter was actually at the top of the agenda for the General Advisory
Committee.
Then you have this 3 days of discussion, consultation with the State Depart-
ment, with Intelligence, and the Military Liaison Committee, and after all this
Is over, these gentlemen of the General Advisory Committee sit down and draft
their report, and the annexes expressing their individual points of view. Not a
snap decision; a decision arrived at after the most intense kind of discussion
with people representing the whole gamut of points of view about it
And then, not content .with that, at this December meeting of the General
Advisory Committee, the matter is reviewed once more in the light of all the
discussion and reactions that have taken place since October.
We have to take into account in measuring or appraising whether Dr. Oppen-
heimear, which is the only question you have here, whether his own advice,
unlike that of every other member of the GAC, was motivated by a sinister
purpose to injure the United States of America, and to help our enemy — the
mere utterance of that proposition is somehow shocking to me. But it is the
303313— 54 «8
978
question that has been posed and because it is a shocking question, we have to
deal with it in direct and blunt terms.
Not one scrap of evidence to indicate that he differed in his purposes from
the other honorable Americans who served on the committee and who went into
this matter at such length.
There were other leading men in the country who formed the same kind of
judgments. This was not an isolated piece of advice that the General Advisory
Committee gave. This was a very, very close, difficult and warmly debated
subject, debated by all kinds of men. You heard Dr. Herman, the author of our
containment policy, former Ambassador to Russia, describe his own thinking for
the State Department Policy Planning Committee on the subject. You have
heard Mr. Winne, of the General Electric, giving in retrospect his views, and
Dr. Burke giving in retrospect his, and Hans Bethe and Dr. Lauritsen and Dr.
Bacher, Mr. Pike, of the AEG, Mr, Lilienthal, men of the most varied outlooks,
experiences, and backgrounds themselves troubled by the whole business of
going forward to make this super weapon.
Then you heard also from other men who, while they favored going forward
with the H-bomb program, were not in the slightest critical of those like Dr.
Oppenheimer, who favored the other course. On the contrary, they expressed
themselves of the extraordinarily difficult nature of the problem. Gordon Dean,
who favored going ahead with the H-bomb program, joining with Admiral Strauss
on the Atomic Energy Commission in that, gave us his view of the difficulty
of the decision that confronted everybody. Norris Bradbury, who likewise
favored moving forward with it, giving similar testimony. And Dr. von Neu-
mann, iu the same vein, Professor Ramsey, who was then with the Science
Advisory Committee of the Air Force, describing the closeness of the 55-45 in
his own mind.
Now, let us come down to Dr. Oppenheimer himself and the honesty of his
own judgment, which seems to me impossible to doubt. Even the most active
pro-H-bomb advocates, the strongest critics of the position which Dr. Oppen-
heimer took in 1949, have not questioned his loyalty, although they have, some
of them, in strong terms questioned the wisdom of his Judgment. Dr. Teller,
Dr. Alvarez, Dr. Pitzer, Professor, Latimer, General McCormack, General Wilson.
If you will read the record, you will find that all of those men, critics as they
were and strong critics of the position taken, did not doubt Professor Oppen-
heimer's loyalty in the advice that he gave with his fellows on the GAG.
It seems to me that in the face of all of the long catalog of efforts of Dr.
Oppenheimer since 1945, let alone at Los Alamos, but since 1945, to strengthen
our defenses, to build up Los Alamos, to expand the weapons program, to make
us strong in atomic energy, and strong in weapons and strong in defense, it is
fantastic to suppose that in the face of all those efforts he should be harboring
a motive to destroy his own country in favor of Russia, Just the mere proposi-
tion is unthinkable on its face.
Then, in spite of his strong feelings on the subject, when the President has
made the decision to go ahead, the record shows whatever might be the situa-
tion in his heart about this matter, difficult for a man to change what is in his
mind and his convictions, but no opposition in this record to the carrying forward
of the program. On the contrary, affirmative evidence that all members of the
GAO including Dr. Oppenheimer went along with it, and when it became by
process of unexpected inventions something that could really be talked about
in terms of production, Dr. Oppenheimer chairs the meeting and presides over
the meeting at Princeton which is called together to really put the stuffing in
this program. Dr. Teller himself paid tribute to Dr. Oppenheimer's attitude
and efforts that he made at that meeting to get the program going.
What can be made of this H-bomb argument? The only thing that has been
suggested has been an alleged pattern of opposition which somehow is intended
to imply a sinister and un-American attitude toward the whole safety of the
military program of the country. This alleged pattern of opposition comes
down to the Lincoln summer session, to the Vista project, to the second labora-
tory. Those are the three main things that one witness here at least suggested
constituted a pattern of opposition which troubled him about Dr. Oppenheimer.
Now, we have looked at these. We have looked at the Lincoln summer ses-
sion. We have seen that the suspicions that that was somehow going to do
something that would impair the Strategic Air Force was unfounded. There
was no change in the program at all. It was a matter of suspicion that was
simply shown to be completely groundless. Over and above that, the affirmative
contributions that the thinking and the planning that went on at that session
979
made to the Lincoln project, which is warmly supported by the Air Force as has
been brought out.
Now, in Vista, the business of the atomic weapons for the battlefront Such
minor differences as may have existed between the thinking of the group in
Dr. Oppenheimer took a certain but not a leading part were adjusted, the report
came out to the satisfaction of all concerned, and the testimony of those who
criticized what may have been some suggestions in some portions of the report,
although the record is very unclear about the whole business, the testimony
was that this chapter 5, the whole business of developing these atomic weapons
for the battlefront was a great contribution to the country. Actually the work
that was done in Lincoln and Vista has become the official policy of the Military
Establishment of the country.
Dr. Oppenheimer, if anything could be said about him, could be said that he
was a little ahead of his time.
The second laboratory controversy comes down likewise to a difference of
opinion about the building of a new Los Alamos in the desert Dr. Oppen-
heimer's position in the matter, as Chairman of the GAG, was no different from
that of Dr. Bradbury at Los Alamos, whose respect Dr. Teller testified so
warmly about. Dr. Oppenheimer supported the Livermore Laboratory when
that was found to be the solution to the whole matter, and in the end the bomb
that we have been exploding was produced at Los Alamos.
So this alleged pattern of opposition really falls apart upon examination,
and it is the only shred of a suggestion of evidence that Dr. Oppenheimer was
pursuing an unpatriotic course.
Now, the alleged opposition by Dr. Oppenheimer after President Truman's
go-ahead has also vanished under the miscroscope of the testimony, that he
caused to be distributed the QAO report to top personnel to discourage them
from working on the H-bomb. That I take by common consent has been dropped
out of this because its origin in an unfounded suspicion by Dr. Teller has been
made quite apparent. Dr. Manley and Dr. Bradbury have explained precisely
how those reports came to be distributed by order of the General Manager of
the Atomic Energy Commission.
We have gone over the evidence about recruitment and the suggestion in the
letter that Dr. Oppenheimer was instrumental in persuading people not to work
on the project has no foundation of fact, and on the contrary, the evidence shows
that he took affirmative steps to help in that direction, the difficulties of Dr.
Teller as an administrator being recognized as one of the problems that made
recruitment difficult, until the Livermore Laboratory was set up, and the admin-
istration was handled under Dr. Lawrence's direction.
The Princeton meeting I have already referred to and I shall not mention it
again, but as an evidence of the affirmative -help to the H-bomb program, I might
just mention a little item of Dr. Bradbury's testimony, that tie GAC and Dr.
Oppenheimer were willing to go further in pushing the new invention than the
laboratory itself was at the time. You will find that at page 1582 of the record.
You have also testimony by Gordon Dean and by Dr. Bradbury of the help
to the staff at Los Alamos that Dr. Oppenheimer and his colleagues gave. The
GAC went to Los Alamos in the summer of 1950 when the H-bomb project was at
its lowest point, when there was grave doubt whether the thing could ever be
built at all, and went out there to help Dr. Bacher and see what they could do.
In general you have testimony from numerous people — Hartley Rowe, General
McCormack, and others—that there was no holding back when the President's
decision was made.
Now, just a word about the myth of delay. I trust that Dr. Bradbury's testi-
mony will be studied with particular care by this board, because of all the men
who "testified here he is the one who knows the most about the actual work at
Los Alamos, about the problems of producing the H-bomb at the place where it
actually has been produced, and I think that his testimony completely destroys
the myth of delay. I shall say no more about that because in any event, it has
really nothing to do with the question of Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance. Indeed,
none of this has to do with it at all. This whole H-bomb controversy, all of the
rest of these things, Vista, Lincoln, and all the rest of them, that we have been
talking about, except as an indicating and affirmative attitude, as I believe,
toward the strengthening of the United States, have nothing to do with the
question of Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance unless- you are willing to believe to me
the unthinkable thought, and I am sure to you, that in spite of everything he had
done to help this country from 1945 on, he suddenly somehow becomes a sin-
ister agent of a foreign power. It is unthinkable.
I think, Mr. Chairman, that you would like a recess.
980
Mr. GBAY. I was about to ask if we may recess for a few moments.
(Brief recess.)
Mr. GBAY. You may resume, Mr. Garrison.
Mr. GABMSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn now to the topic of leftwing
associations and related incidents through 1943. Jii iny previous summary of
this topic, I said that the basic facts about Dr. Oppenheirner's background and
his actions in relation to persons themselves of leftwing background had been
known to General Groves and Lansdale, and that they trusted him knowing
these basic facts.
The basic facts I have listed as follows :
1. That Dr. Oppenheimer's wife and brother and sister-in-law had been Com-
munists.
2. That Dr. Oppenheimer had a number of leftwing associations and friends.
8. That Dr. Oppenheimer had brought certain persons with former leftwing
associations to Los Alamos.
4. That Dr. Oppenheimer had assigned Hawkins to write the history, with
General Groves' consent
5. That Dr. Oppenheimer had protested Lomanitz' draft deferment, with a
notation as I go along, that Dr. Oppenheimer's knowledge of Lomanitz' indis-
cretions, which is the word used throughout the Lansdale and the Pash inter-
views by them themselves, whatever, these indiscretions may have been, that his
knowledge of them came from the security officers as is apparent from those
interviews, and that in asking deferment for Lomanitz he took notice of the
existence of the objections. He said he understood the objections, but Lomanitz'
value as a physicist was so-and-so.
Parenthetically I will observe here that Colonel Lansdale brought out quite
forcibly the acute manpower problem in the scientific world that existed in those
days, and he testified how persons whom the security officers regarded as
dangerous were in particular instances deliberately employed because they had
to be. They had this great necessity for manpower, and they were then sur-
rounded with extra special surveillance.
You have also in the record Dr. Ernest Lawrence's great urgencies about man-
power for the Berkeley Laboratory- This is all part of the setting of the times
which we must not lose sight of.
6. That Dr. Oppenheimer had visited Jean Tatlow during the existence of the
period of his work at Los Alamos.
7. That he may have made contributions to or through the Communist Party.
This is in the Lansdale interview and appears from Lansdale's own statement.
8. That he had delayed in reporting Eltenton, but had delayed still longer in
naming Chevalier, and had not told a frank story. I will come back to this in
a moment
At least the foregoing items and no doubt others were known to Groves and
Lansdale. I don't think it would serve any purpose to refine this matter into
any greater detail, but Groves and Lansdale certainly had before them these
basic facts with which we are now concerned here once again after 11 years.
They knew all about them and they trusted Dr. Oppenheimer.
I am going to discuss the Chevalier case in a little detail particularly because
the Chairman had raised the question of the possibility that the board intends
to consider that the story which Dr. Oppenheimer told Pash and Landsdale was
true and that his account to this board of his Chevalier incident was not true.
I want to make the point to begin with that the Chevalier fabrication, if I may
use the word, was the statement that there were three persons whom Chevalier
had contacted, or "X" as the course of the examination went. The question
of the microfilm seems now to have been quite inconsequential
In Dr. Oppenheimer's cross examination before the Pash transcript had been
revealed, he was asked if Chevalier had talked about microfilm with him, and
put in that way, creating an image of Chevalier coming about microfilm. He
answered no, and he answered honestly. It rang no bell in his recollection.
When we get to the actual Pash recording, what do we find, this not even in
the typewritten transcript that Dr. Qppenheimer was confronted with — not until
we get to the recording do we find him saying to Colonel Pash that he under-
stood that this fellow at the Consulate had some means, microfilm "or whatever
the hell" of getting the information to Russia.
That is the most casual kind of remark — microfilm or whatever the hell — and
might simply be regarded as another means of saying that this fellow has means
of getting secret Information to Russia. To blow that up into a lie to this board
I think it utterly unfair and not warranted by the course of the proceedings
here.
981
The reference to the Russian consulate, it seems to me, is likewise an incon-
sequential matter. If Eltenton was a spy, if he was seeking information, it
would be perfectly natural that he should have a contact at the consulate whether
he did or not. I would like to point out that neither this reference to the consu-
late nor the reference to the microfilm or whatever the hell appears in the Lans-
dale interview. It Just is of no account
Dr. Oppenheimer's final testimony to this board, going over this matter again
with you, was that it was the very best of his recollection that Chevalier did
not mention the consulate, but it was conceivable that he know that Mtenton
had some connection with the consulate, although he doesn't remember it. Both
of these things seemed to me to be of no significance. The way in which these
separate items of the story were broken down and converted into separate lies,
and the phrase in cross-examination put into Dr. Oppenheimer's mouth that
he told a tissue of lies, I think is a most false characterization of what happened.
I think his own characterization is the right one, that the story he told was a
fabrication, but it was one story, and it was not a separate series of lies each
of them to be held up and looked at with the way one looks at that sort of thing.
Now, as to the story about the 3 contacts which I think this really all
boils down to, the record indicates that Chevalier did contact only 1 person,
as Dr. Oppenheimer stated to this board. Lansdale testified that in the end
the number of contacts by Chevalier definitely came down to only one. The
only doubt left in the recollections of himself and General Groves is whether
that one was Frank Oppenheimer or Robert Oppenheimer. Lansdale testified
that there was only one. He believes, according to his testimony, that it was
Frank. But this he had from General Groves. And he conceded that General
Groves may have told him not that Robert Oppenheimer had named Frank to
General Groves, but only that General Groves thought that when Robert Oppen-
heimer named himself, he was really protecting his brother Frank who was the
one, a suspicion in Groves' mind. But again it is one person.
General Groves testified that his own recollection of what Dr. Oppenheimer
told him is in a complete state of confusion.
When we leave out Colonel Pash's speculations about which is the truth and
which is the false story, his investigations again bear out or support Dr.
Oppenheimer's testimony that the story he told to this board is the truth and what
he told Colonel Pash was the invention, because when he was asked if they had
ever established that there were any other contacts, Colonel Pash testified,
"No, sir."
I submit to you, Mr. Chairman, that upon this close examination of the
evidence, looking upon it as reasonable men searching for the truth of the
matter, as I know you will, you will reach only the conclusion that Dr. Oppen-
heimer told you here the truth, and that he did in fact in his anxiety to protect
Chevalier invent, embroider a story, fabricate a story, to Colonel Pash and
Laiisdale.
Now, this whole Chevalier incident has, I am convinced, assumed undue
Importance, and must be judged in perspective. It has been so extensively
analyzed here in cross-examination, in the reading of transcripts of Interviews
of 11 years a?o, the hearing of a recording, Colonel Pash's presence here, it is
almost as if this whole Chevalier case brought into this room here at 16th
and Constitution Avenue in 1954 had happened yesterday in the setting of
roday, and that we are judging a man for something that has happened almost
in our presence.
I get that illusion of a foreshortening of time here which to me is a grisly
matter and very, very misleading. This happened in 1943. It happened in a
wholly different atmosphere from that of today. Russia was our so-called gallant
ally. The whole attitude toward Russia, toward persons who were sympathetic
with Russia, everything was different from what obtains today. I think you
must beware above everything of judging by today's standards things that
happened in a different time and era.
The next perspective about this story is that Dr. Oppenheimer has surely
learned from this experience. People who have known him intimately over the
years, who have worked with him as closely as anybody could work with
people, have heard of this account with some pain, they have taken it in their
stride, they have given their own Judgment to you that Dr. Oppenheimer would
riot today do what he did 11 years ago, and that like all good men' and intelli-
gent men, he can learn by the bitter fruits of experience. Surely you must
have felt, as you listened to the cross-examination here, the sense of guilt which
he bore within himself about this incident, something that he does not like to
982
think about back in his past, that God knows he has outlived in his service to this
country, and in the way in which he has deported himself as a servant of the
United States.
Getting back again to the judgment of this thing in its perspective, General
Groves certainly did not regard the matter as a very urgent one. He testified
about the schoolboy attitude of Dr. Oppenheimer. That was the way he char-
acterized this thing, this schoolboy attitude of not telling on one's friends
which warped his whole judgment and led him into this unfortunate spinning of a
story. He didn't seem to be pressed for time, General Groves. He testified that
after the first interview with 'Dr. Oppenheimer— now I am quoting the testi-
mony— about 2 months later, or some time later — actually I think the record
will show that it was 3 months — after much discussion in trying to lead him
into it and having then got the situation more or less adjusted, "I told him
if you don't tell me, I am going to have to order you to do it, then I got what
to me was the final story."
This is at page 542.
The final point of perspective is Groves' and Lansdale's own testimony as to
their conviction of Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty. General Groves was asked the
question, "Based on your total acquaintance with him and your experience
with him and your knowledge of him, would you say that in your opinion he
would ever commit a disloyal act?" Answer, "I would be amazed if he did."
That is at page 533.
Now, I know that this incident of 1943 has posed in the minds of some of you,
perhaps all of you, this question : Did he put loyalty to a friend above loyalty
to his country? He has given the straight answer that he did not in his own
mind, which is what we are here analyzing, put loyalty to his friend above
loyalty to his country. In his own mind, his friend was innocent and the
investigation would be in no way benefited y knowing that it was Haakon
Chevalier.
That his fault consisted in, and what he has freely confessed to this board, was
his arrogance, if I may use my own word, in putting his judgment as to what
the interests of the country required at that point about the judgment of the
security officers, but that he thought he was injuring the United States of
America, that did not occur to him.
Now, it is true that Colonel Pash was put to some labor and wasted efforts.
That was not known to Dr. Oppenheimer. Perhaps he should have known of it.
I am not apologizing for this incident. I am not condoning it. I am not saying
it is something irrelevant and not to be taken into account. Of course it has to
be. I am urging you to make the intellectual effort which, gentlemen, will
require effort, to put this whole thing into the perspective where it ought to be
and not judge it in the light of today's standards and to take into full account
the testimony of General Groves and Lansdale about it.
I think at this point I might just remind you of General Groves' letter to Dr.
Oppenheimer of May 18» 1950, just after the Paul Crouch testimony. I am not
going to read it to you because you have heard it read, but I want to remind you
that this letter was volunteered by General Groves and sent on his own initiative
out of feelings about Dr. Oppenheimer that were in his system when this incident
occurred in California. Why did he do it if he didn't believe Dr. Oppenheimer
to be a loyal American citizen? He authorizes him to make a public statement,
and the public statement he authorizes him to make is that General Groves has
informed me, Dr. Oppenheimer, that shortly after he took over the responsibility
for the development of the atomic bomb he reviewed personally the entire
file and all known information concerning me, and immediately ordered that I
be cleared for all atomic information in order that I might participate in the
development of the atomic bomb. General Groves has also informed me that he
personally went over all information concerning me which came to light during
the operations of the atomic project — and that includes the whole Chevalier
business — and that at no time did he regret his decision.
Colonel Lansdale's conviction about Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty and basic
integrity is to the same effect.
Their judgment about this whole matter should not lightly be disregarded by
this Board. It should indeed be taken to heart, because their judgment was
made in the context of the times and their judgment took into account all that
Dr. Oppenheimer was then doing and then thinking, his life, his surroundings,
everything about him, viewed from a more intimate standpoint than any that
can now be reconstructed. We cannot here reconstruct Robert Oppenheimer's
life and activities in the sense of the time and the pressures under which he was
working and laboring and all the rest of it That is gone forever. No one can
983
reconstruct that, but Groves and Lansdale have that in their minds, and in
their memories, and they lived with it, and they have testified about it, and
they have given you their solemn sworn testimony about the way they viewed
that incident.
Dr. Oppenheimer comes out of the war, he embarks on this continuous career
of service to the Government. Like the jobs which Dr. Evans, you, Mr. Gray,
and Mr. Morgan now fill, he did not seek these positions. The Government called
him into service as it has called you into service, and he goes forward.
He becomes chairman of the GAG and the Atomic Energy Commission has then
occasion to consider his clearance under the Atomic Energy Act, which we are
here bound by. You asked me to pay particular attention to that, and I therefore
am going to discuss it in rather meticulous detail. I am going to begin with
the entry in the minutes.
The first sentence, which was the basis of the stipulation which the Com-
mission entered into with us and which we put on the record at the start of
these proceedings, and which has been found to have been half of the action
that was taken and not all of it. Mr. Bellsley called the Commission's attention
to the fact that the Commission's decision to authorize the clearance of J. R.
Oppenheimer, chairman of the General Advisory Committee, made in February
1947, had not previously been recorded.
I want to say a, word about February 1947. There has been a suggestion and
at first I myself thought it was the correct suggestion, that before we had the
whole story from the documents which were doled piecemeal during the cross-
examination and which were subsequently given to us insofar as they are
available at our own request afterwards. But before all that, I had credited
the suggestion that the Commission took formal action to clear Dr. Oppen-
heimer in March and that they had not then recorded it, and woke up to the
fact in August that they had not and made a minute to that effect, and that
the reference to February was a clerical error.
Now, upon a closer examination of the documents in the case, it seems to
me that the rational explanation of this overwhelming probability is that Febru-
ary 1947 was correct. Mr. Pike made the suggestion, or offered the guess that
in February 1947, the Commission which was then Just getting going, acted
upon Dr. Oppenheimer's name and cleared him as a matter of course. They
knew him, they knew a great deal about him, he had been appointed by the
President, they had no occasion to raise any question, and they cleared him.
Then what happened was that in March, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover raised the
question in his letter to Lilienthal, and sent over material about him and so forth,
and that precipitated an inquiry into Dr. Oppenheimer's associations, back-
ground and so forth, and they in effect opened up the whole question and then
disposed of it at the August 6 meeting which I shall come to a little later, and
said in substance we have examined all this material from the FBI, we have
talked with Dr. Bush and Conant and Groves, and so forth, we have thought
about this, we see no reason to alter our original action of February in clearing
him, which is. I think, an affirmative act of judgment,
Mr. GRAY. You think that the March memorandum of Mr. Wilson, who was
then the general manager, as I recall it, from which it was indicated that the
Commission was concerned with this matter for 2 days, one meeting and then a
subsequent meeting; that the August statement which you refer to as the
second half of the action referred all the way back to the March
Mr. GARRISON. To February.
Mr. GRAY. I am talking about March now.
Mr. GABBISON. No, I say it did not. I originally thought it did. I originally
thought from Mr. LilienthaVs testimony which he had told me about before I
called him as a witness and reconstructed this from his diary as best he could,
I thought from his statement of the affair that there had been clearance in March.
I assumed that this February thing was therefore an error, and that the first
time it came up was in March. But then under cross examination of Mr. Lilien-
than when these documents began to come out, and when we obtained further
documents later on, it now seems to me to have been, as Mr. Sumner Pike
suggested, and not as Mr. Ldlienthal suggested— and I would like to trace through
those documents with you. '
Mr. GRAY. I would like to get back to your statement that the August 5
minutes in effect say in the second sentence that we have examined the FBI
documents
Mr. GARRISON. I was attempting to say what I thought the Commissioners
had done.
984
Mr. GRAY. I am not quarreling with your interpretation. I am asking you for
my own clarification whether you mean by that, that in August they made a
minute referring to action which they had actually taken in March?
Mr. GARRISON. No ; I don't think they took action in March, except to study the
FBI flies and to discuss the matter. They took some action in March.
Mr. GRAY. Not action, but the study took place in March, and they waited
until August to weigh
Mr. GARRISON. No ; I think the study as again will be shown probably stretched
over quite a period of time because the staff went to work, as these documents
show, they got the whole file from Mr. Hoover, and the staff got to work on that.
There is a memorandum here that everything in the file, all the reports were seen
with the exception of two memoranda that I will come to in a moment So
there was study going on. Nobody knows whether it was in June or July or
when it was. But I think it certainly shows that it stretched well beyond March.
Mr. GRAY. Is there anything that reflects any action or activity of the Com-
mission between March and August?
Mr. GARRISON. I would like to come to that, if I may.
Mr. GRAY. All right.
Mr. GARRISON. To answer your question ; yes.
Mr. GRAY. I am trying to get the straight of it.
Mr. GARRISON. I really don't think it is so complicated, although it has to
take a sort of steppingstone approach.
I am proceeding on the assumption that in February 1947 there was what
might be called a sort of an off-the-cuff clearance of Dr. Oppenheimer simply
based on the knowledge of him, the fact that the President had appointed him.
Then comes a letter from Mr. Hoover to Mr. Lilienthal dated March 8, 1947,
which sends over and draws to his attention the attached copies of summaries of
information about Dr. Oppenheimer and his brother Frank. That then comes
before the board.
Dr. EVANS. You mean the Commission.
Mr. GARRISON. Comes before the Commission. Thank you, Dr. Evans.
In Mr. Wilson's memorandum of March 10 it shows that the Commission met.
The actual FBI file says that the file was delivered to Mr. Jones by the FBI
on Saturday morning, March 8. But I don't want to make any point now of
what was in the particular documents, and I will limit myself to the summaries
of information which, for the moment, Mr. Hoover sent over on March 8. The
Wilson memorandum says each of the Commissioners read the rather voluminous
summary after they met You know what happened. They called in Dr. Bush
and they called in Dr. Conant. They had rather a long discussion of the matter.
They tried to reach General Groves. That ultimately was accomplished by
Secretary Patterson. There is set forth here the views of Drs. Bush and Conant,
not based apparently on an examination of the summary— at least they don't
recall it — they were testifying merely from their knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer
as to his loyalty and the serious consequences that failure of clearance would
have and so forth.
Then on March 11, the Commission meets again. They have 2 days of meet-
ings. They arrive at the conclusion on March 11 that Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty
was prima facie clear despite the FBI, and that there was no immediate hazard
or any issue requiring immediate action, but that a full and reliable evaluation
should be made of the case so that it can be disposed of. It is quite clear lhat
at this meeting they are not trying to dispose of it They say evaluation should
be made. Then they decide to seek written views from Drs. Bush and Conant
and General Groves, and they instruct the Chairman to confer with Dr. Bush
and Mr. Clifford concerning the establishment of an evaluation board. They
go to the White House on that mission, and we know all about that.
Mr. GRAY. Do we know the outcome of that?
Mr. GARBISON. No. I am going into that. I mean we know about the proposal
for the board, the discussion with Clifford, and their coming back to the meet-
ing that same afternoon and reporting the results of their discussion with Mr.
Clifford.
Then we have this entry. At that meeting, that is 5 o'clock in the afternoon
of March 11, the general manager reported that a detailed analysis of the FBI
summary was in process of preparation by the Commission's security staff as an
aid to evaluation. So they have put their staff to work on the FBI summary
to make an evaluation of it.
The next thing that happens is Mr. Lilienthal's minute about his telephone
conversation with Clark Clifford about the proposal that they had made. It
appears from this that Clifford reported the matter to Truman, that Truman
985
wanted to think about it, that he was busy with the Mediterranean crisis, that
Clifford said that the Commission had done all that they were under any reason-
able obligation to do, and presented the matter and he would take it up with the
President, but if Mr. Lilienthal did not hear from him, he should call and remind
him about it.
The next document that throws light on this subject is the memorandum from
Mr. Jones, the security officer, to the file, dated March 27. I might say perhaps
at this point that as we know, there Is no more in the record about what hap-
pened to this proposal at the White House. Either the President considered it
and thought it quite unnecessary to have a board to evaluate Dr. Oppenheimer's
qualifications as a loyal citizen of the United tSates, and that this was reported
to the Commission in some way or other, or that in the press of his affairs the
President never got around to doing anything about it, and either Mr. Lilienthal
didn't call up Mr. Clifford in the end to check or find out, or he may have
called him up and Mr. Clifford said, "Well, we are not going to take any action
on it" Nobody can remember what happened, and there is no documentary
evidence to show.
Now, I want to resume the story of what the Commission and its staff were
doing. This next thing is this Jones memorandum of March 27, which talks
about Mr. Lilienthal going to see Mr. J. Edgar Hoover on March 25 with repre-
sentatives of the ABC and the FBI. This meeting was attended both by Mr.
Lilienthal and Mr. Hoover, and there was a discussion of the case.
I now want to read to you what seems to me particularly in the light of
the discussion of the Chevalier incident to be quite a significant passage in this
memorandum which I think has escaped our attention until just now. It says,
and this is the third paragraph of the memorandum, and the page in the transcript
that this appears is 1231, I think: "In the case of J. Robert, those present
all seem keenly alive to the unique contributions he has made and may be ex-
pected to continue to make. Further there seems general agreement on his
subversive record * * * that while he may at one time have bordered upon
the communistic"— this is all language of the security officer — "indications are
that for some time he has decidedly moved away from such a position. Mr.
Hoover himself appeared to agree on this stand with the one reservation, which
he stated with some emphasis, that he could not feel completely satisfied in
view of J. Robert's failure to report promptly and accurately what must have
seemed to him an attempt at espionage in Berkeley.*'
Now, we know from the record that the files of the Manhattan District went
to the FBI. We know from the record that the transcript of the Pash and
Lansdale interviews went to the FBI. So that all of this must be presumed
to have been known to Mr. Hoover when he participated in this conference,
and he says that Dr. Oppenheimer's failure to report promptly and accurately
what took place has given him pause, and that is the only thing apparently in
the record that troubled him.
Mr* GRAY. Where does he say this?
Mr. GABKESON. This is as reported by Mr. Jones, the security officer of the
AEC in his memorandum of March 27, 1949, from which I have been reading,
which is in the record. It is not a verbatim quote from Mr. Hoover. It is
obviously Mr. Jones' recollection of the conversation that took place there. Mr.
Jones was the security officer of the AEC and he says Mr. Hoover was troubled
about Dr. Oppenheimer's failure to report promptly and accurately. This is one
more piece of evidence, Mr. Chairman, that Dr. Oppenheimer's story about the
Chevalier incident contained the elements of fabrication that we have talked
about and that this was known to General Groves and Lansdale as it was known
to J. Edgar Hoover.
The next thing that happens — this is March 27, now — is a memorandum
again from the security officer, Mr. Jones, and this is at page 1409 of the tran-
script, a memorandum from Mr. Jones to Mr. Bellsley dated July 18. We are
now in the middle of July. This memorandum to Mr. Bellsley, the secretary
of the AEC, says, "Herewith a complete investigative file on J. Robert Oppen-
heimer upon which it is believed the Commission may not have formalized their
decision. If the Commission meeting minutes contain Indication of Commis-
sion action, would you kindly so advise. If they do not, I presume yon will
wish to docket this case for early consideration."
Now comes the sentence I want to stress :
''Each Commissioner and the General Manager have seen every report In this
file with the exception of the summary of July 17, and my memorandum for the
file dated July 14, 1947."
986
That memorandum for the file of July 14 is in the record. It is an account
of a discussion with Lansdale in which Lansdale vouches for Robert Oppen-
heimer's loyalty as an American citizen. So whether they saw tbat or not does
not affect the matter, because it was favorable to Dr. Oppenheimer and not
derogatory.
What this summary of July 17 contained, which they may or may not have
seen, Mr. Volpe in his sort of return memorandum here, suggests that it be
circulated among the Commissioners if Mr. Jones thinks it ought to be. We
don't know whether they saw it or not. We don't know what is in it because
when we asked that it be produced here, we were told that it was confidential
and could not be. The record shows here that each Commissioner and the
General Manager had seen every report in this file with the exception of this
summary of July 17, and the Lansdale transcript saying Dr. Oppenheimer was
loyal. This cannot have amounted to anything very important, because Mr.
Volpe, whose job then was security matters as well as Deputy General Counsel,
left it to the security officer whether it was important enough to send to the
members of the board. So presumably it was not much of a document. And
the thing that stands out starkly here is that every report in this file except
for this probably not important document had gone to each Commissioner and
the General Manager, and that they had seen them. They have seen every
report in this file, not Just that they received them.
It is this memorandum which leads me to suppose that that after the two
meetings in the middle of March, the staff which was at work, as we know,
had sent the reports in the investigative file to the members of the Commission.
I think this many account, sir, for the testimony here which had a ring of
veracity to it, by Dr. Bacher, by Mr. Lilienthal, by Mr. Pike, that what they
remembered going through was a thick document — a thick document — it stuck
in their memories that this thing was thick.
I think in giving credit to that testimony, as one should that presumably that
thick stuff that went through was all the reports in this file that the staff had sent
around in the course of time. Again whether this was April, May, June, or when,
that these things were sent around and reviewed, I don't know. The record does
not show. But that there was more than they had before them, the 12-page
summary that Mr. Eobb identified here, at the March 10 and 11 meeting, seems
to me pretty clear on the face of the record.
Dr. Bacher testifies explicitly that what they saw "was first a summary of in-
formation from the FBI and later a quite voluminous file, the file being a fairly
thick document," at page 2126. That seems to me what had happened here.
They testify, these gentlemen, that they treated this matter seriously. Mr. Pike
said they all treated it as a serious thing. I am sure we all did. They would
indeed have been derelict in their duty if they had not.
Here they were, operating under the Atomic Energy Act, a new thing, laying
duties upon them, conscientious men, J. Edgar Hoover's putting them on notice,
his explicit reserve about the Chevalier incident, the staff at work on this, the
reports in the file, voluminous, going to them — how can we conclude anything but
that they took this seriously as they said they did and acted upon it.
Now I come back to the minutes of that August 6 meeting and read the last
sentence of the minutes ; this, you will remember, follows the memorandum of
July 18, in which Mr. Jones, the security officer, asks that a check be made to see
what the Commission has done about this in a formal way, and evidently they
did make this check and they saw that no formal action had been taken with
respect to the matters that had come from Mr. Hoover.
The Commission then on this meeting of August 6, which follows in due course
after this July 18 memorandum, Mr. Bellsley calls their attention to the fact
that the decision made in February, which I think we must take as the right date,
had not previously been recorded. The Commission directed the Secretary to
record the Commission's approval of security clearance in this case, and now here
are the key words that were not in the stipulation from the Commission when we
asked for information about all this, "and to note that further reports"— that
means further FBI reports which we are talking about here — "concerning Dr.
Oppenheimer since that date (since February) had contained no information
which would warrant reconsideration of the Commission's decision."
If that is not action by the Commission, I will eat my hat They are saying
that they got reports after this business in February, they got FBI reports, that
they contained no information which would warrant them to go back and re-do
what they had done in February. That surely means, as nearly as words can, that
this was considered by the Commissioners, as all the documents here indicate,
987
and that they took a serious action upon the matter, saying, "We have gone
all through this stuff, we have looked at it all, we have considered this whole
thing, and we will let the February action stand." It is exactly the same thing as
saying, "We have looked at it all and we hereby reaffirm what we did in February."
There is no difference in it It is Just the form of verbiage.
I don't want to make too much of this action, but I think that this board should
not lightly pass over it I want to tell you why.
It seems to me that you should give great weight to the judgment of these five
men who bore the responsibility of the United States Government under the
Atomic Energy Act in the administration of the program, the judgment that they
formed in 1947. This is not a light matter.
Considering one other factor about tills whole business of security clearance,
when a man is cleared it seems, as we see in this case, and as we have seen in
other cases, that the matter can be brought up again and again and again.
I think that is most unfortunate. If a man is solemnly and seriously and
deliberately cleared by responsible men, that ought to have a kind of sticking
quality — I don't say conclusive for all time at all, I say it can be reexamined
in the light of what happens later on — but where, as in this case, it seems to
me that nothing has happened since 1947 of import, and I want to argue that in
a minute, that the sticking quality of an action of this character should be
taken seriously to heart and respected. I say this because this business
of haling men before security boards is one of the most terrible ordeals that we
can subject fellow citizens to. We all know that. It is not good for the
country. It is not good for the whole operation of the country. Once a man
has been cleared, unless there are serious things that have happened since, it
ought to stick. That I urge upon you to take most seriously.
Needless to say in these proceedings, if a man's clearance is taken away from
him, that action probably is final for all time. As a practical matter, when a man
is branded as disloyal to his country or is not fit to be trusted with classified
data by a board of distinction and character and integrity, like this board, and
like the Commission in this case, if that happens to a man, that is the end of
that fellow for the rest of his life. It is the end of the country's chance to use
him, too. That can't be redone. There are therefore hazards to the country
and to the man in dragging him up again and again for these clearance ordeals.
I urge upon you that consideration as an additional reason for giving the great*
est weight to this action of the Commission in 1947.
Now, what did the Commission have before it? I know that question comes
up, and it is a question I can't answer, because the files are not available to us,
and I can't argue it I do want to say that I think this aspect of the case, like
all others, needs to be judged in the large and not to hang upon some detail.
Supposing that in these reports that went to these Commissioners from this
investigative file supposing there was some document or other that gets into the
file later that may not have been there, or some document at the time that was
not in there, what are we dealing with her basically? We are dealing here with
big facts about Dr. Oppenheimer. These basic facts, his wife had been a Com-
munist, his borther had been a Communist, his sister-in-law had been a Com-
munist, all these things that have happened that we are talking about here, can
anybody suppose that those things were not in the FBI files that went to the
members of the Commission? That is the main thing. These big things were
in there, the Chevalier incident, the whole tiling, and they acted upon it That
seems to me is what we should go by. Just because we haven't a precise and
meticulous enumeration of every document in the file that we can compare with
the Nichols letter, I think that should not be regarded as of any moment. I will
come to that later.
What has happened since 1947 that this board has before it? There is the
whole record of Dr. Oppenheimer's public service since 1947, his service on the
GAC, on these various other boards and committees which we have talked about
at the greatest length. There has been the controversy over the 1949 report on
the H-bomb. I think it was Dr. Conant who testified here, if I am not mistaken,
that if the case in 1947 for clearance was strong, the case since 1947 is all the
stronger in the light of the record of what Dr. Oppenheiraer has done for the
whole Defense Establishment, and the inference that he has made as a loyal
American to help his country.
The Commission did not have Paul Crouch's testimony before it. I cannot
suppose that that would be regarded as a change in the condition of substance
though it has to be looked at, of course. I am not going to discuss that incident
except to say that I am sure that if this board had any substantial doubt on
988
the validity and the accuracy of Dr. Oppenhetmer's sworn reply that Mr. Crouch
would have been produced here. I venture the assertion that if he had, Dr.
Oppenheimer's case would have become even stronger.
Now, what is left? Some associations, but awfully little, I want to bring this
to a close soon, and I am going to say just a little word about Dr. Oppenheimer's
associations. The point is really what are these associations now? There is no
use going back into the days that now have been cut asunder, the whole Berkeley
period, Los Alamos period is over with. What is the situation about these
associations?
There have been so many names brought into this record in the form of ques-
tions, did you know X, no, did you know Y, no, did you know Z, no, questions
put to witness after witness that I have gotten a little bit dizzy listening to all
the catalogs of names whose significance I have absolutely no way of judging.
But so far as Dr. Oppenheimer is concerned, and that is what we are talking
about, his present contacts of a kind that this board should consider are for the
most part nearly all of the merely casual contacts inevitable to a man of Dr.
Oppenheimer's prominence and professional standing — he goes to a meeting of
the physicists once a year, some scientific meeting, and he bumps into a physicist
there who may have had some past record of association with Communist causes.
This is inevitable in the life any scientist who goes to meetings, that he will meet
at these meetings some scientist here or there who at one time had some past
associations with the Communist Party. But to say that because of that a man
like Dr. Oppenheimer is not fit to be trusted with restricted data just seems to
me to reduce the whole business to absurdity.
With respect to only two of the names can it really be said that his present
association with them is more than a casual one? One of these is Dr. Chevalier,
whom Dr. Oppenheimer believes not to be a Communist, and whom he has seen
twice in the last few years. He has described him as a friend. I think he has
honored himself in describing him as a friend, and in not trying to say that it is
just a casual matter. He has his loyalties, Mr. Chairman.
The other one is Dr. and Mrs. Serber. There has been quite a lot of talk about
the Serbers. Dr. Serber, as we know from the record, is a distinguished scien-
tist, professor of physics at Columbia University, consultant to the Atomic Energy
Commission at Brookhaven Laboratory, and cleared by the Atomic Energy Com-
mission as a result of a review by a board under the chairmanship of Admiral
Nimitz, with John Francis Neyland on it I have forgotten the third man. You
know Mr. Neyland as the protagonist of the teachers' oath and the great contro-
versy at the University of California, and counsel for William Randolph Hearst,
and surely not a man soft on lef twingers. He and Admiral Nimitz, and the third
man, General Joyce, went over the Serber case back in the late forties for the
Commission, and they said he is O. K. This man is a loyal citizen, and give him
his Q clearance. They have to take into account Mrs. Serber. If he is fit to
associate with Mrs. Serber, I don't know what her background, but if Admiral
Nimitz and Neyland and Joyce say that Dr. Serber is fit to associate with his
wife and have a Q clearance and work for the Atomic Energy Commission, then
why should there be any question about Dr. Oppenheimer once in a while seeing
Di\ and Mrs. Serber as he does, maybe once or twice a year?
I am going to wind up, sir, in Just a very few minutes. I want to mention
and not make anything conclusive of it, but direct seriously to your attention
the testimony of Dr. Walter Whitman, who in July 1958, as special assistant
to the Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, had to review Dr.
Oppenheimer's file under this Executive order that we are operating under, re-
quiring a review of cases with derogatory information in it. He testified here
that he went through the file, that it had maybe 50 or 60 pages in it He read it
and reread it, he said, until he had the full significance of it He examined very
carefully General Nichols' letter. He said to the best of his recollection every-
thing in it, except this controversy about the H-bomb, was in this file. He reaches
the mature conclusion that Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance should be continued.
He makes this recommendation to a review board consisting of Dr. Carnes, Dr.
Thompson, and General Hines, and to the best of his information, this board
agreed with his recommendation. Certainly the clearance was continued until
this unfortunate episode in which we are engaged. I think that, too, is entitled
to weight
Now, I am going to make the briefest kind of mention of the men who have
appeared here in Dr. Oppenheimer's behalf. We have had a whole lot of fellows
here who have talked about Dr. Oppenheimer for 3% weeks. Dr. Oppenheimer
has sat here day after day and listened to the minute analysis of his character,
mind, his background and his past. How he survived it all I don't know. I am
not going to elaborate about these people. I want to say this, that they differ
from the ordinary character witnesses that we are used to in judicial proceedings,
where a man conies in and is asked, "Do you know the reputation in the com-
munity of the defendant for whatever it may be," and he says "Yes" and they say,
"What is that reputation/' and he says, "It is good," or whatever he says about
it. This has not been that kind of testimony. I can't emphasize that too much.
Every one of these men who has appeared here have been men who have worked
with Dr. Oppenheimer, who have seen him on the job and oil the Job, who have
formed judgments about character which is the way human beings do judge
one another. How do we learn to trust one another except by knowing each other.
How can we define the elements of that trust except to say I know that man, I
have worked with that man? That is what it comes down to. How else can you
express it? These men have known him and have worked with him, and have
lived with him.
I ani just going to mention 1 or 2 or 3 that I want to especially com-
ment on. I would like to mention Gordon Dean for one, because among other
things, he saw him not only in his relationship as an Atomic Energy Commis-
sioner to Dr. Oppenheimer as the GAG chairman, but he also went through this
famous FBI file in 1050 and later. He made it his business to follow that file.
He testified that if anything came along, whatever came along, he looked into it,
and he took it very, very seriously, as to the responsibility that he bore. He came
in here without a shadow of a reservation about Dr. Oppenheimer as a security
risk and as a loyal American citizen. He considered the Ghevalier incident, and
he put it in its place, and looked at it as so many of these men of the highest
probity and honor have looked at it and said, "Yes, that is .there and we don't like
it, but we know Dr. Oppenheimer and we trust him, and we trust him for the
United States of America."
Here is Dr. Babi, present chairman of GAG. He too read this file, 40 pages, he
said it was, in January of this year which Admiral Strauss gave him to read.
He went all through it He testified, as you know, of his complete and unwaver-
ing faith in Dr. Oppenheimer.
Here is Norris Bradbury, surely a man that this board can tie up to and lean
upon, a man of obvious deep probity, good judgment, sound fellow, who has
lived at Los Alamos for about the whole shooting match than any other man
you have seen here, including Dr. Teller, because he has had the whole thing in
his hands, and everything to do with it that Dr. Oppenheimer has had he knows.
If anybody was in a position to say this fellow impeded our progress or inter-
fered with us, or was somehow sinister, it would be Bradbury. Exactly the
reverse is the case.
I could go on and I think I won't. You will read the record, and I know that
you will take these judgments deeply seriously. You had S% weeks now with the
gentleman on the sofa. You have learned a lot about him. There is a lot about
him, too, that you haven't learned, that you don't know. You have not lived any
life with him. You have not worked with him. You have not formed those
intangible judgments that men form of one another through intimate association,
and you can't. It is impossible for you to do so. And I think that you should take
most earnestly to heart the judgment of those who have.
Here he is now with his life in one sense in your hands, and you are asked
to say whether if he continues to have access to restricted data he may injure
the United States of America, and make improper use of that. For over a
decade that he has had this position of sharing in the atomic energy information,
never a suggestion of an improper use of data. His life has been an open book.
General Wilson, one of his critics, on the H-bomb end of things, testified— I have
forgotten the exact words, but we probably have it around here— that if anybody
had demonstrated his loyalty by affirmative action, it is Dr. Oppenheimer, and
this affirmative action runs all through his record.
You have a tough job of applying these rather complicated standards, criteria,
and so forth. I know that. I beg of you, as I wind 'up now my conclusion, to
take 'the straightforward commensense judgment that the Commission took in
the case of Dr. Graham, and look at the whole man, and you consider the case,
"It must be recognized that it is the man himself that the Commission is actually
concerned with. Associations are only evidentiary, and commonsense must be
exercised in Judging their significance." There Is the whole thing in a nutshell.
Now, the concluding sentence, indeed that whole memorandum of decision,
breathes a kind of air of largeness of reality of practicality in dealing with this
problem. The thing that I would most urge you not to do, in addition to not
990
bringing 1943 into 1954, is to get chopped up into little compartments of categories
that will give to this case a perfectly artificial flavor of Judgment, that you will
treat it in the round and the large with the most careful consideration of the
evidence, and then treat it as men would treat a problem of human nature, which
can't be cut up into little pieces.
There is more than Dr. Oppenheimer'on trial in this room. I use the word
"trial" advisedly. The Government of the United States is here on trial also.
Our whole security process is on trial here, and is in your keeping as is his life—
the two things together. There is an anxiety abroad in the country, and I think
I am at liberty to say this to you, because after all, we are all Americans, we
are all citizens, and we are all interested here in doing what is in the public
interest, and what is best for our country. There is an anxiety abroad that
these security procedures will be applied artificially, rigidly, like some monolithic
kind of a machine that will result in the destruction of men of great gifts and of
great usefulness to the country by the application of rigid and mechanical tests.
America must not devour her own children, Mr. Chairman and members of this
board. If we are to be strong, powerful, electric, and vital, we must not devour
the best and the most gifted of our citizens in some mechanical application of
security procedures and mechanisms.
You have in Dr. Oppenheimer an extraordinary individual, a very complicated
man, a man that takes a great deal of knowing, a gifted man beyond what nature
can ordinarily do more than once in a very great while. Like all gifted men,
unique, sole, not conventional, not quite like anybody else that ever was or ever
will be. Does this mean that you should apply different standards to him than
you would to somebody like me or somebody else that is just ordinary? No, I
say not I say that there must not be favoritism in this business. You must
hew to the line and do your duty without favor, without discrimination, if you
want to use those words.
But this is the point that if you are to judge the whole man as the Commission
itself in its regulations and its decisions really lays upon you the task of doing,
you have then a difficult, complicated man, a gifted man to deal with and in
judging him, you have to exercise the greatest effort of comprehension. Some
men are awfully simple and their acts are simple. That doesn't mean that the
standards are any different for them. The standards should be the same. But
this man bears the closest kind of examination of what he really is, and what
he stands for, and what he means to the country. It is that effort of comprehen-
sion of him that I urge upon you.
I am confident, as I said, that when you have done all this, you will answer the
blunt and ugly question whether he is fit to be trusted with restricted data, in the
affirmative. I believe, members of the board, that in doing so you will most
deeply serve the interests of the United States of America, which all of us love
and want to protect and further. That I am sure of, and I am sure that is where
the upshot of this case must be.
Thank you very much.
Mr. GEAT. Thank you, Mr. Garrison.
I would like to make a couple of observations. I think I should say that at
some points in your sum-up, I believe you stated that you were assuming that the
board reached some conclusion, and therefore something didn't happen. I have
in mind particularly your observation about the Crouch episode. I would have
to say to you in the interest of the record that at those points my failure to
interrupt and question you did not indicate acquiescence nor disagreement
On 1 or 2 legal points, it was my recollection that in your reference to the
Executive order— were you reading from notes on that point?
Mr. GARRISON. I have the Executive order here, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SILVERMAN. Mr. Chairman, if you are all thinking about the same thing, I
think it was a slip of the tongue by Mr. Garrison.
Mr. GBAY. I am trying to clear it up. I would like to know. In any event, it
was a distinction between what the department head should do with respect to
clearing an individual or not clearing an individual, and it is my impression you
said— I am sorry. I think I would like to check and get the exact reference.
Mr. GARBISON. I think I have the phrase here, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRAY. All right. Where is that?
Mr. GARRISON (reading) . "The head of the agency has to find that his reinstate-
ment, restoration, or reemployment is clearly consistent with the interests of the
national security." If I misquoted that, I beg your pardon.
991
Mr. GRAY. I believe you stated it in the negative. I just wanted to dear
that up.
Mr. GABRISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GBAY. Finally, on the legal point involved, you made some argument in
that respect. I think that you should know that the board, as to these legal
points involved, has asked the opinions of attorneys for the Commission. This
reflects some difference which emerged in the questioning of the witnesses. With
respect to those persons who have been assisting the board in the course of these
proceedings, and particularly in response to a question which you have asked
about possible proposed findings of fact which might be submitted by Mr. Bobb,
Mr. Robb will not submit proposed findings of fact, and I would advert to impli-
cations which might be in the question.
The regulations under which this board has operated or these proceedings
have been conducted state that no person who has assisted the board shall express
an opinion as to the merits of the case, among certain other things stated in that
regulation. This board is to be governed by the procedures under which it oper-
ates, and we shall have to be the guardians of these duties and obligations put
upon us.
I think I am required to make a statement to Dr. Oppenheimer at this point.
As I think you know, you will have a copy of the transcript of this proceeding
with certain exceptions which relate to classified material in the proceeding, and
to certain deletions, I suppose they might be called, of testimony which have to
do with security problems. Of course this board will make its deliberations on
the entire record of your case, and will submit its recommendations to Mr. K. D.
Nichols, General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission.
In the event of an adverse recommendation, you will be notified of that fact
by letter from Mr. Nichols. In such event, you will have an opportunity to review
the record made during your appearance before this board, and to request a
review of such adverse recommendation by the Atomic Energy Commission Per-
sonnel Security Review Board prior to final decision by the general manager.
Under those circumstances, you must notify Mr. Nichols by letter within 5 days
from the receipt of notice of an adverse recommendation of your desire for a
review of your case by the Atomic Energy Commission Personnel Security Review
Board.
In the absence of such a communication by you to Mr. Nichols under sucli
circumstances, it would be assumed that you do not desire further review.
You are further advised that in the event this board or the General Manager
of the Atomic Energy Commission desires any further information to be pre-
sented to the Board, you will be notified of the time and place of the hearing and
of course will be given an opportunity to be present.
Dr. OPEENHEIMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GBAY. I believe that this completes the proceedings as of now.
Air. GARRISON. I have just a couple of details.
Mr. GRAY. All right
Mr. GARRISON. There are in this transcript quite a number — this is without
criticism of our very able and efficient reporter— inevitable garbles and mis-
takes, some of them quite unimportant, but I assume, Mr. Chairman, that if we
should get up a list of them and take it up with Mr. Robb or Mr. Rolander, if he
wants to arrange it so, and if we should reach an agreement that a memorandum
of errata corrections might be incorporated in the record.
Mr. ROBB, When you are doing it, would you cover the whole record and not
just the questions you asked?
Mr. GASBISON. Yes, I will try to.
Mr. GBAY. I assume there is no objection?
Mr. ROBB. No, I think that is a good idea. If I had time, I would have done
it, too, because that is inevitable in any long proceeding, no matter how good the
reporter is.
Mr. GARRISON. I have been meaning to give to the Board, and through in-
advertence I haven't, a collection of excerpts from the speeches and writings of
Dr. Oppenheimer, but they were handed in at different times. I have just
bound them together, and I would be very glad to leave copies of these with
you. It is a convenient way of getting at them. I have compared them care-
fully. I don't think there is anything that is not in the record except the top
page, which is just my own.
Mr. GBAY. We acknowledge receipt of the document you refer to.
992
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, may I thank you again for having borne so
patiently with me and for the great consideration you have shown to us through-
out the proceedings.
Mr. GBAY. Thank you.
Mr. GARRISON. Mr. Morgan and Dr. Evans, the same.
Dr. EVANS. Thank you.
Mr. MORGAN. Thank you.
Mr, GRAY. We now conclude this phase of the proceedings. I think that I
have already indicated to Dr. Oppenheimer that if we require anything further,
he will be notified.
We are now in recess.
(Thereupon at 1 : 30 p. in., the hearing was concluded.)
LIST OF WITNESSES
Pauce
Luis Walter Alvarez _________ ........... - ....... --- ........ _____ 770-805
Robert Fox Bacher ____________________ ........ ------------------ 608-630
HansBethe ............................................ - ...... -- 323-340
William Liscum Borden ...... ____________________ .......... - ..... 832-844
Norris Bradbury _________ ......... -------------- ................ 477-494
Oliver E. Buckley.. ............................................. 603-608
Vannevar Bush .......... _________ ................ - ..... 560-568, 909-915
James B. Conant _____________________ ......... ______ ............ 384r-394
K T. Compton ________ ......................................... 256-258
Gordon Dean .......... . ........... - ....... - .......... ---------- 300-323
Lee Alvin DuBridge ______ ......... ______________________________ 514-534
Enrico Fermi _________________ .................................. 394-?9S
James B. Fisk_.._ ...... -------------- ...... ----- ........ - ...... 34a~342
T. Keith Glennan ____ ..... ------- ...... ------------------------- 253-256
David Tressel Griggs ....................................... - ..... !^7!2
Leslie R. Groves ______________ .......... ------------ ...... ------- MS"1??
Albert Gordon Hill ----- ..... . ........... - .......... ------------- 935I9ft
Mervin J. Kelly ____ ........... . ................................. -- 57-65
George Frost Kennan ------------ .......... - ....... --- ........ — 352-372
John Lansdale, Jr ______ ..... _____ ..... ___________________ ....... 258-281
Wendell MitcheU Latimer .......................... --------------- 656-672
Charles Christian Lauritsen --------- ...... .... ....... ------ --- — - 577-596
David E. Lilienthal— ....... -------------- ....... - ...... 372-382, 398-425
John J. McCloy _____ ............ '- ....................... -------- ISHlS
James McCormack, Jr ___________________________________________ 633-643
J Robert Oppenheimer ............. 26-57, 65-160, 180-253, 887-906, 949-961
Katherine Oppenheimer.. ........ - ....................... 571-577, 915-921
Frederick Osborn ______ ...... ------ .......... ------- ...... -
Boris T. Pash _________ ....... ------ ......... - .......... — -
Sumner T. Pike.. ............... - ................. -----
Kenneth Sanborn Pitzer ........ ... .................... -
Isadore Isaac Rabi ------ ....... . .............. ----- ....... - ..... ii~i
Norman Foster Ramsey, Jr .....................
Hartley Rowe ...... _____ .................. ---- ..... --
Edward Teller. ..... - ............ — ...... - ........... - .....
John Von Neumann ...................... ----- ........ ---------- 9S"S5S
Walter G. Whitman .................... - -------
Roscoe Charles Wilson ...... -------- ......... - ..... ----
::::^^^^
Certain sections of this transcript pertain to playback of recordings, to stipu-
lations entered by counsel, and to procedural discussions and summation.
These items appear as follows: .
^
Oral transcription plus written corrections plus stipulations on a recorded
interview among Lt. Col. Boris T. Pash, Lt. Lyall Johnson, and Dr. J.
Robert Oppenheimer ................ -. ....... 285-300,844-871
Oral transcription of interview between Lt. Col. John Lansdale, Jr., and Dr.
J. Robert Oppenheimer ......... . ............................... 871 -886
Procedural discussions and summation -
(993)
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